THE  LOST  CAUSE; 


rf      @lar  of 


COMPRISING 


.4  FULL  AND  AUTHENTIC  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  RISE  AND  PROGRESS  OF  THE  ZATE  SOUTHERN 
CONFEDERACY— THE    CAMPAIGNS,  BATTLES,  INCIDENTS,  AND   ADVEN 
TURES  OF  THE  MOST  GIGANTIC  STRUGGLE  OF  THE 
WORLD'S  HISTORY. 


DRAWN  FROM  OFFICIAL  SOURCES,  AND  APPROVED  BY  THE  MOST  DIS 
TINGUISHED  CONFEDERATE  LEADERS. 


BY 

EDWAKD    A.   POLLAKD,    OF    VIRGINIA, 

EDITOH  OP  THE   RICHMOND   "EXAMINEE"   DUKINO  THB  TVAB. 

WITH  NUMEROUS  SPLENDID  STEEL  PORTRAITS. 


SOLD  ONLY  BY  SUBSCRIPTION. 


pfl  |0rk: 

E.    B.    TREAT    &    CO.,    PUBLISHERS. 

BALTIMORE,  MD. :  L.  T.  PALMER  &  CO.    ST.  LOUIS,  Mo. :  I.  S.  BBAINERD.   LOUISVILLE,  KT.:  GEO.  B. 

FESSENDEN  &  CO.    AUGUSTA.  GA..  and  AUBURN,  ALA.  :  GEO.  W.  LOYD.    CHARLESTON,  8.  C. : 

ROBERT  WILSON.    MEMPHIS,  iWn. :  J.  B.  BUTTON.    HOUSTON,  TEXAS  :  J.  F.  FULLER. 

1866. 


ENTERED,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1866,  by 

EDWARD  A.  POLLARD, 
In  the  Clerk's  office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of  Virginia. 


JOHN  P.  TROW  &  CO., 

PHIXTERS,  STEREOTYPERS,  <J-  ELECT BOTYPXX8, 
SO    GREENE    STREET,    M.T. 


GIFT 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE  facts  of  the  War  of  the  Confederates  in  America  have  been  at  the 
mercy  of  many  temporary  agents  ;  they  have  been  either  confounded  with 
sensational  rumours,  or  discoloured  by  violent  prejudices :  in  this  condition 
they  are  not  only  not  History,  but  false  schools  of  present  public  opinion. 
By  composing  a  severely  just  account  of  the  "War  on  the  basis  of  cotein- 
porary  evidence — ascertaining  and  testing  its  facts,  combining  them  in 
compact  narrative,  and  illustrating  them  by  careful  analyses  of  the  spirit 
of  the  press,  not  only  in  this  country,  but  in  Europe,  the  author  aspires  to 
place  the  history  of  the  War  above  political  misrepresentations,  to  draw  it 
from  disguises  and  concealments,  and  to  make  it  complete  in  three  depart 
ments  :  the  record  of  facts ;  the  accounts  of  public  opinion  existing  with 
them  ;  and  the  lessons  their  context  should  convey  or  inspire.  These 
three  are  the  just  elements  of  History.  If  the  author  succeeds  in  what  he 
proposes,  he  will  have  no  reason  to  boast  that  he  has  produced  any  great 
literary  wonder  ;  but  he  will  claim  that  he  has  made  an  important  contri 
bution  to  Truth,  and  done  something  to  satisfy  curiosity  without  "  sensa 
tion,"  and  to  form  public  opinion  without  violence. 

The  author  desires  to  add  an  explanation  of  the  plan  of  composition  he 
has  pursued  in.  the  work.  It  is  impossible  to  write  history  as  an  intelligi 
ble  whole,  and  to  secure  its  ends,  without  preserving  a  certain  dramatic 
unity  in  the  narrative.  It  is  by  such  unity  that  the  lesson  of  history  is 
conveyed,  and  its  impression  properly  effected  ;  and  to  do  this  it  becomes 

302 


IV  INTRODUCTION. 

necessary  to  discard  from  the  narrative  many  small  incidents,  either  epi- 
sodal  in  their  nature,  or  of  no  importance  in  the  logical  chain  of  events. 
With  this  view,  the  author  has  paid  but  little  attention  to  small  occur 
rences  of  the  war  which  in  no  way  affected  its  general  fortunes,  and  has 
measured  his  accounts  of  battles  and  of  other  events  by  the  actual  extent 
of  their  influence  on  the  grand  issues  of  the  contest.  Instead  of  a  con 
fused  chronological  collection  of  events,  he  has  sought  to  prepare  for  the 
reader  a  compact  and  logical  narrative  that  will  keep  his  attention  close 
to  the  main  movement  of  the  story,  and  put  instruction  as  to  causes  hand 
in  hand  with  the  information  of  events. 


O  O  1ST  T  E  1ST  T  S  . 


CHAPTER    I. 

True  value  of  the  Federal  principle. — Historical  examples. — Coleridge's  prophecy.— Early 
Mission  of  the  American  Union. — How  terminated. — The  American  system  of  Gov 
ernment  a  mixed  one. — The  Colonial  period. — First  proposition  of  a  General  Con 
gress. — Declaration  of  Independence. — Articles  of  Confederation. — Their  occasion 
and  origin. — Nature  of  the  compact. — Peace-treaty  of  1783. — Analysis  of  the  nature 
and  value  of  the  Confederation. — How  it  was  terminated. — The  Convention  of 
1787. — Character  of  the  men  who  composed  it. — Political  idolatry  in  America^ — 
Parties  in  the  Convention. — The  question  of  Representation. — The  novelty  of  the 
American  Constitution  the  result  of  an  accident. — State  Rights. — Amendments  to 
the  Constitution. — Nature  of  the  American  Union. — Not  a  Consolidated  nation 
ality. — The  Right  of  Secession. — The  Union  not  the  proclamation  of  a  new  civil 
polity. — Not  a  political  revolution. — A  convenience  of  the  States,  with  no  mission 
apart  from  the  States. — The  two  political  schools  of  America. — Consolidation  and 
State  Rights. — How  the  Slavery  question  was  involved. — A  sharp  antithesis* — 
The  Kentucky  and  Virginia  resolutions. — "Webster  and  Calhoun,  the  anti-types  of 
Northern  and  Southern  statesmanship. — Mr.  Calhoun's  doctrines. — "Nullification  " 
a  Union-saving  measure. — Its  ingenuity  and  conservatism. — Calhoun's  profound 
statesmanship. — Injustice  to  his  memory. — How  the  South  has  been  injured  by 
false  party  names : 33 

CHAPTER    II. 

The  Federal  principle  ultimately  fatal  to  the  Union. — Other  causes  of  disunion. — The 
sectional  animosity. — The  geographical  line  in  the  Union. — How  the  differences 
between  North  and  South  produced  two  distinct  communities  instead  of  rival  parties 
within  one  body  politic. — The  theory  of  a  Political  North  and  a  Political  South, — 
Its  early  recognition  in  the  Convention  of  1787. — Declaration  of  Madison. — Mr. 
Pinckney's  remarks. — How  the  same  theory  was  involved  in  the  Constitution* — 
The  "  Treaty"  clause  between  North  and  South. — The  Union  not  the  bond  of  diverse 
States,  but  the  rough  companionship  of  two  peoples. — Gen.  Sullivan's  complaint  to 
"Washington. — The  Slavery  question,  an  incident  of  the  sectional  animosity* — 
Not  an  independent  controversy,  or  a  moral  dispute. — Political  history  of  Negro 
Slavery  in  the  South. — How  it  become  the  subject  of  dispute. — The  Hartford  Con 
vention. — The  Missouri  Line,  the  preliminary  trace  of  disunion. — Declaration  of 
Thomas  Jefferson. — Why  the  North  defamed  "  the  peculiar  institution"  of  the  South. 
— Great  benefits  of  this  institution,  and  its  contributions  to  the  world. — "  Slavery/' 


VI  CONTENTS. 

not  the  proper  term  for  the  institutions  of  labour  in  the  South. — The  Slavery  ques 
tion  significant  only  of  a  contest  for  political  power. — Differences  between  the 
Northern  and  Southern  populations. — The  anti-revolutionary  period. — Traces  of 
the  modern  "  Yankee." — How  Slavery  established  a  peculiar  civilization  in  the  South. 
— Its  bad  and  good  effects  summed  up. — Coarseness  of  Northern  civilization. — No 
landed  gentry  in  the  North. — Scanty  appearance  of  the  Southern  country. — The 
sentiments  and  manners  of  its  people. — "  American  exaggeration,"  a  peculiarity  of 
the  Northern  mind. — Sobriety  of  the  South. — How  these  qualities  were  displayed  in 
the  Northern  and  Southern  estimations  of  the  Union. — "  State  Eights"  the  founda 
tion  of  the  moral  dignity  of  the  Union. — Calhoun's  picture  of  the  Union. — A  noble 
vision  never  realized 45 

CHAPTER    III. 

Material  decline  of  the  South  in  the  Union. — Shifting  of  the  numbers  and  enterprise  of 
the  country  from  the  Southern  to  the  Northern  States. — Virginia's  rank  among  the 
States  at  the  time  of  the  Eevolution. — Commercial  distress  of  the  States  after  the 
Revolution. — How  New  England  suffered. — The  South  then  reckoned  the  seat  of 
future  empire. — The  people  and  strength  of  America  bearing  Southwardly. — 
Emigration  to  the  South. — Kentucky  and  the  vales  of  Frankland. — Virginia's  pros 
perity. — Her  early  land  system. — The  Chesapeake. — Alexandria. — George  "Wash 
ington's  great  commercial  project. — Two  pictures  of  Virginia:  1789  and  1829. — 
An  example  of  the  decline  of  the. South  in  material  prosperity. — This  decline  not 
to  be  attributed  to  Slavery. — Its  true  causes. — Effect  of  the  Louisiana  purchase  on 
the  tides  of  emigration. — Unequal  Federal  legislation,  as  a  cause  of  the  sectional 
lapse  of  the  South  in  the  Union. — The  key  to  the  political  history  of  America. — A 
great  defect  of  the  American  .  Constitution. — Population  as  an  element  of  pros 
perity  and  power. — How  this  was  thrown  into  the  Northern  scale. — Two  sectional 
measures. — Comparisons  of  Southern  representation  in  Congress  at  the  date  of  the 
Constitution  and  in  the  year  1860. — Sectional  domination  of  the  North. — A  pro 
tective  Tariff.—"  The  Bill  of  abominations."— Senator  Benton  on  the  Tariff  of  1828. 
— His  retrospect  of  the  prosperity  of  the  South. — History  of  the  American  Tariffs. 
— Tariff  of  1833,  a  deceitful  Compromise. — Other  measures  of  Northern  aggrandize 
ment. — Ingenuity  of  Northern  avarice. — Why  the  South  could  not  use  her  Demo 
cratic  alliance  in  the  South  to  protect  her  interests. — This  alliance  one  only  for 
party  purposes. — Its  value. — Analysis  of  the  Democratic  Party  in  the  North. — The 
South  under  the  rule  of  a  numerical  majority. — Array  of  that  majority  on  a  sec 
tional  line  necessarily  fatal  to  the  Uiiion. — When  and  why  the  South  should 
attempt  disunion 54 

CHAPTER    IV. 

The  sectional  equilibrium. — How  disturbed  in  1820. — Contest  on  the  admission  of 
Texas. — Compromise  measures  of  1850. — Declaration  of  a  "  Finality." — President 
Pierce's  administration. — The  Kansas-Nebraska  bill. — Repeal  of  "  The  Missouri 
Compromise." — Origin  of  the  Republican  party  in  the  North. — Composition  and 
character  of  this  Party. — Amazing  progress  of  the  Anti-slavery  sentiment  in  the 
North. — New  interpretation  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  by  Senator  Douglas. — 
Intended  to  court  the  Anti-slavery  sentiment. — Doctrine  of  "  Non-Intervention  " 
in  the  Territories. — The  "Dred  Scott  decision." — "  The  Kansas  controversy." — The 
Lecompton  Convention. — The  Topeka  Constitution. — President  Buchanan's  position 
and  arguments. — Opposition  of  Senator  Douglas. — His  insincerity. — The  Northern 
Democratic  Party  demoralized  on  the  Slavery  question. — Douglas'  doctrine  of 


CONTENTS.  vil 

"  Popular  Sovereignty." — u  A  short  cut  to  all  the  ends  of  Black  Republicanism." 
— Douglas  as  a  demagogue. — The  true  issues  in  the  Kansas  controversy. — Import 
ant  passages  in  the  Congressional  debate. — Settlement  of  the  Kansas  question. — 
Douglas' foundation  of  a  new  party. — His  demagogueical  appeals. — The  true  situa 
tion. — Loss  of  the  sectional  equilibrium. — Serious  temper  of  the  South. — "  The 
John  Brown  raid." — Identity  of  John  Brown's  provisional  constitution  and  or 
dinances  with  the  subsequent  policy  of  the  Republican  Party. — Curious  fore 
shadow  of  Southern  subjugation. — The  descent  on  Harper's  Ferry. — Capture  and 
execution  of  Brown.— His  declaration. — Northern  sympathy  with  him. — Alarming 
tendency  of  the  Republican  Party  to  the  Ultra- Abolition  school. — "The  Helper 
Book." — Sentiments  of  Sixty-eight  Northern  congressmen. — The  conceit  and  in 
solence  of  the  North. — Affectation  of  Republicans  that  the  Union  was  a  concession 
to  the  South. — Hypocrisy  of  this  party. — Indications  of  the  coming  catastrophe  of 
disunion. — The  presidential  canvass  of  1860. — Declarations  of  the  Democratic 
Party. — The  Charleston  Convention. — Secession  of  the  Southern  delegates. — The 
different  presidential  tickets. — Election  of  Abraham  Lincoln. — Analysis  of  the 
vote. — How  his  election  was  a  "  sectional "  triumph. — Ominous  importance  of  it 
in  that  view. — Arguments  for  sustaining  Lincoln's  election. — Seward's  argument 
in  the  Senate. — Lincoln's  election  a  geographical  one. — How  there  was  no  longer 
protection  for  the  South  in  the  Union. — The  Anti-slavery  power  compact  and  in 
vincible. — Another  apology  for  Lincoln's  election. — Fallacy  of  regarding  it  as  a 
transfer  of  the  Administration  in  equal  circumstances  from  the  South  to  the  North. 
— How  the  South  had  used  its  lease  of  political  power. — Senator  Hammond's  tri 
bute. — Power  in  the  hands  of  the  North  equivalent  to  sectional  despotism. — The 
North  "  acting  in  mass." — The  logical  necessity  of  disunion 64 

CHAPTER    V. 

Preparations  of  South  Carolina  to  withdraw  from  the  Union. — Passage  of  her  Ordinance 
of  Secession. — The  Federal  force  in  Charleston  Harbour  evacuates  Fort  Moultrie, 
and  occupies  Sumter. — Description  of  Fort  Sumter. — How  the  Secession  of  South 
Carolina  was  entertained  in  the  North. — The  levity  and  inconsistency  of  the  North 
with  respect  to  this  event. — Doctrine  of  Secession,  and  Northern  precedents, — 
Record  of  Massachusetts. — Mr.  Quincy's  declaration  in  Congress. — A  double  justifi 
cation  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  Southern  States  from  the  Union. — The  right  of  Self- 
government. — Opinion  of  Mr.  Lincoln. — Opinion  of  the  New  York  "  Tribune." — 
Opinion  of  Mr.  Seward. — The  Secession  question  in  the  Cotton  States. — Hesitation 
of  Georgia. — Project  of  Alexander  H.  Stephens. — Secession  of  all  the  Cotton  States. 
— Seizure  of  Federal  forts  and  arsenals. — Fort  Pickens. — Senator  Yulee's  letter. — 
The  scenes  of  Secession  transferred  to  "Washington. — Resignation  of  Southern  Sena 
tors. — Jefferson  Davis'  farewell  speech  to  the  Federal  Senate. — Senator  Clay's  bill 
of  indictment  against  the  Republican  party. — The  Convention  at  Montgomery. — 
Constitution  of  the  Confederate  States. — Jefferson  Davis  chosen  President. — His  per 
sonal  history. — His  character. — Why  the  public  opinion  about  him  was  so  divided 
and  contradictory. — Measures  looking  to  pacification. — Three  avenues  through 
which  it  was  expected. — Early  prospects  of  pacification  in  Congress. — The  Republi 
can  "  ultimatum." — u  The  Crittenden  compromise." — Measures  of  compromise  and 
peace  in  Congress  exclusively  proposed  by  the  South,  and  deliberately  defeated  by 
the  North. — The  Peace  Conference. — Its  failure. — Disposition  of  the  Border  Slave 
States. — How  mistaken  by  the  North. — The  Virginia  Convention. — How  the  Secession 
party  gained  in  it. — The  record  of  Virginia  on  the  subject  of  State  Rights. — Presi 
dent  Buchanan  on  the  Secession  question. — His  weak  character  and  undecided 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

policy. — How  over- censured  by  the  North. — Gen.  Scott's  intermeddling. — His  im 
practicable  advice. — President  Buchanan's  perfidy  in  the  Moultrie-Sumter  affair. — 
His  interview  with  the  South  Carolina  delegation. — A  second  deception. — The  "  Star 
of  the  West "  affair. — The  situation  at  the  close  of  Buchanan's  administration. — 
The  country  waiting  for  the  Signal  of  Combat 82 

CHAPTER    VI. 

Character  of  Abraham  Lincoln  in  history. — Absurd  panegyric. — The  personal  and 
political  life  of  the  new  President. — His  journey  to  "Washington. — His  speech  at 
Philadelphia. — The  flight  from  Harrisburg. — Alarm  in  "Washington. — Military  dis 
play  in  the  capital. — Ceremony  of  inauguration. — Criticism  of  Lincoln's  address. — 
"What  the  Republican  party  thought  of  it. — Serious  pause  at  "Washington. — State 
ment  of  Horace  Greeley. — How  the  Inaugural  Address  was  received  in  the  Seceded 
States. — Visit  of  Confederate  Commissioners  to  Washington. — Seward's  pledge  to 
Judge  Campbell. — The  Commissioners  deceived. — Military  and  Naval  expeditions 
from  New  York. — Consultation  of  the  Cabinet  on  the  Sumter  question. — Capt. 
Fox's  visit  to  Charleston. — His  project. — Objections  of  Gen.  Scott. — Singular  article 
in  a  New  York  journal. — Lincoln's  hesitation. — His  final  device. — Seward's  game 
with  the  Commissioners. — The  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter. — 'Description  of  the  Con 
federate  works  for  the  reduction  of  Sumter.  — Beauregard  demands  the  surrender 
of  the  Fort. — The  bombardment.— The  fort  on  fire. — The  Federal  fleet  takes  no 
part  in  the  fight. — The  surrender. — Great  excitement  in  the  North. — Its  true 
meaning. — The  crusade  against  the  South. — Dr.  Tyng's  exhortation. — Conduct  of 
Northern  Democrats. — Dickinson,  Everett,  and  Cochrane. — President  Lincoln's 
Proclamation. — His  pacific  protests  to  the  Virginia  Commissioners. — Secession  of 
Virginia. — Discontent  in  the  Western  counties. — Second  secessionary  movement  of 
the  Southern  States. — Violent  acts  of  the  Washington  Administration. — Prepara 
tions  of  the  Confederate  Government  for  War. — Rush  of  volunteers  to  arms. — Pre 
sident  Davis'  estimate  of  the  military  necessity. — Removal  of  the  seat  of  govern 
ment  to  Richmond. — Activity  of  Virginia. — Robert  E.  Lee. — His  attachment  to  the 
Union. — Why  he  joined  the  Confederate  cause. — His  speech  in  the  State  House  at 
Richmond. — His  organization  of  the  military  force  of  Virginia. — Military  council 
in  Richmond. — The  early  reputation  of  Lee 100 

CHAPTER     VII. 

[n  what  sense  Virginia  seceded  from  the  Union. — A  new  interpretation  of  the  war  of 
the  Confederates. — Influence  of  Virginia  on  the  other  Border  States. — Replies  of 
these  States  to  Lincoln's  requisition  for  troops. — Secession  of  Tennessee,  Arkansas, 
and  North  Carolina. — Seizure  of  Federal  forts  in  North  Carolina. — Movements  in 
Virginia  to  secure  the  Gosport  navy-yard  and  Harper's  Ferry. — Their  success. — 
Burning  of  Federal  ships. — Attitude  of  Maryland. — The  Baltimore  riot. — Chase  of 
Massachusetts  soldiers. — Excitement  in  Baltimore. — Timid  action  of  the  Maryland 
Legislature. — Military  despotism  in  Maryland. — Arrests  in  Baltimore. — A  Reign  of 
Terrour. — Light  estimation  of  the  war  in  the  North. — Why  the  Federal  Government 
sought  to  belittle  the  contest. — Lincoln's  view  of  the  war  as  a  riot. — Seward's 
Letter  to  the  European  Governments. — Early  action  of  England  and  France  with 
respect  to  the  war. — Mr.  Gregory's  letter  to  the  London  Times. — Northern  conceit 
about  the  war. — Prophecies  of  Northern  journals. — A  "  Three  months'  war." — Ells 
worth  and  Billy  Wilson. — Martial  rage  in  the  North. — Imperfect  appreciation  of  the 
Crisis  in  the  South. — Early  ideas  of  the  war  at  Montgomery. — Secret  history  of  the 
Confederate  Constitution.— Southern  opinion  of  Yankee  soldiers.— What  was 


CONTENTS.  ]'X 

thought  of  "King  Cotton." — Absurd  theories  about  European  recognition. — Lost 
Opportunities  of  the  Confederate  Government. — Blindness  and  littleness  of  mind 
North  and  South. — Reflection  on  public  men  in  America. — Comparison  of  the  re 
sources  of  the  Northern  and  Southern  States. — The  Census  of  1860. — Material  ad 
vantages  of  the  North  in  the  war. — The  question  of  subsistence. — Poverty  of  the 
South  in  the  material  and  means  of  war. — How  the  Confederacy  was  supplied  with 
small  arms. — Peculiar  advantages  of  the  South  in  the  war. — The  military  value 
of  space. — Lessons  of  history. — The  success  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  a  question 
only  of  resolution  and  endurance. — Only  two  possible  causes  of  failure 120 

CHAPTER     VIII. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  remark  about  the  wolf. — His  designs  upon  Virginia. — Federal  occupation 
of  Alexandria. — Tragedy  at  the  Marshall  House. — Jackson,  the  martyr. — The  affair 
of  Great  Bethel. — Easy  victory  of  the  Confederates. — Exaggerations  of  Southern 
newspapers. — Apparent  lull  of  hostilities. — New  demonstrations  of  public  opinion 
in  the  North. — Financial  difficulties  at  Washington. — Popular  clamour  against 
President  Lincoln  and  Gen.  Scott. — Early  indications  of  the  real  objects  of  the  war. 
— The  rights  of  humanity. — Virginia  the  great  theatre  of  the  war. — The  Grand 
Army  of  the  North. — Consultation  of  President  Davis  and  Beauregard  and  Lee* — 
Beauregard's  line  of  defence  in  Northern  Virginia. — Sketch  of  General  Beauregard. 
— His  person  and  manners. — His  opinion  of  the  Yankee. — The  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah. — Gen.  Johnson's  evacuation  of  Harper's  Ferry. — 
"  Stonewall "  Jackson's  first  affair  with  the  enemy. — Johnston  amusing  tha 
enemy. — Affair  of  Rich  Mountain. — McClellan's  march  into  Northwestern  Virginia. 
— Rosecrans'  capture  of  the  Confederate  force  on  Rich  Mountain. — Retreat  of  the 
Confederates  from  Laurel  Hill. — Death  of  Gen.  Garnett. — Extent  of  the  disaster  to 
the  Confederates. — The  "Grand  Army"  advancing  on  Manassas. — Johnston's  move 
ment  to  Beauregard's  line. — The  Battle  of  Manassas. — The  affair  of  18th  July. — 
Longstreet's  gallant  defence. — Theatre  of  the  great  battle. — Beauregard's  change 
of  purpose,  and  his  plan  of  battle. — The  Stone  Bridge. — The  "Big  Forest." — The 
Confederates  flanked. — The  day  apparently  lost  for  them. — The  scene  at  the 
Henry  House. — Timely  arrival  of  Jackson. — Gen.  Beauregard  disconcerted. — Rida 
from,  the  Hill  to  the  Henry  House. — The  battle  restored. — The  bloody  plateau. — 
Three  stages  in  the  battle. — The  last  effort  of  the  enemy. — The  strange  flag. — 
Arrival  of  Kirby  Smith. — The  grand  and  final  Charge. — Rout  and  panic  of  the 
enemy. — The  fearful  race  to  the  Potomac. — Scenes  of  the  retreat. — Failure  of  the 
Confederates  to  pursue,  or  to  advance  upon  Washington. — A  lost  opportunity. .  .134 

CHAPTER    IX. 

The  victory  of  Manassas,  a  misfortune  for  the  Confederates. — Relaxation  in  Rich 
mond. — Plotting  among  Confederate  leaders  for  the  Presidential  succession. — 
Beauregard's  political  letter. — Active  and  elastic  spirit  of  the  North. — Resolution 
of  the  Federal  Congress. — Energy  of  the  Washington  Administration. — Its  immense 
preparations  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war. — The  Missouri  campaign. — The  politics 
of  Missouri. — Sterling  Price  and  his  party. — Imprudence  and  violence  of  the  Federal 
authorities  in  Missouri. — Correspondence  between  Gens.  Price  and  Harney. — Gov. 
Jackson's  proclamation. — Military  condition  of  Missouri. — Her  heroic  choice. — 
Affair  at  Booneville. — Composition  of  the  patriot  army  of  Missouri. — Engagement 
at  Carthage. — Confederate  reinforcements  under  McCulloch. — Disagreement  be 
tween  Price  and  McCulloch.— Noble  conduct  of  Price.— The  Battle  of  Oak  Hill.— 
McCulloch  surprised. — A  fierce  fight. — Death  of  Gen.  Lyon. — The  Federals,  de- 


X  CONTENTS. 

feated. — Withdrawal  of  McCulloch's  forces  into  Arkansas. — Operations  in  Northern 
Missouri. — Fremont  in  command  of  the  Federal  forces  in  Missouri. — His  proclama 
tion  emancipating  the  slaves. — Its  novelty  and  brutality. — Repudiated  at  "Washing 
ton. — The  siege  of  Lexington. — Its  surrender  to  Price. — Gallantry  of  Col.  Mulligan. 
— Critical  position  of  Price. — His  disappointment  of  Confederate  succour. — His 
adroit  retreat. — Missouri's  ordinance  of  secession. — Fremont  superseded. — Three 
military  messengers  in  pursuit  of  him. — Excitement  in  his  camp. — Price  at  Spring 
field. — Close  of  the  first  campaign  in  Missouri. — The  campaign,  a  chapter  of 
wonders. — Missouri  manhood. — The  "Western  Virginia  campaign. — Eesources  and 
wealth  of  the  Western  section  of  Virginia. — Wise's  command. — The  enemy  in  the 
Kanawha  Valley. — Wise's  retreat  to  Lewisburg. — The  Floyd  brigade. — Advance  of 
the  joint  forces  towards  the  Gauley. — The  affair  at  Cross  Lanes. — Movement  of 
Rosecrans. — Affair  of  Carnifax  Ferry. — Floyd  and  Wise  fall  back  towards  Sewell 
Mountain. — An  unfortunate  Quarrel  of  Commanders. — Operations  of  Gen.  Lee  in 
Northwestern  Virginia. — His  failure  at  Cheat  Mountain. — Col.  Rust's  part  in  the 
affair. — Movement  of  Lee  to  the  line  of  Lewisburg. — How  Rosecrans  escaped  from 
him. — Engagement  of  the  Greenbrier  River. — Gen.  H.  R.  Jackson's  success. — 
Failure  of  the  Western  Virginia  campaign. — Gen.  Lee's  new  command 152 

CHAPTER    X. 

The  Congress  in  Washington. — New  development  of  Northern  policy. — Lincoln's  po 
litical  discovery. — His  remarkable  measures  of  War. — An  era  of  despotism. — 
Violent  acts  of  Congress. — The  seed  of  Abolition. — Suspension  of  the  habeas 
corpus. — Curious  apology  for  it. — Military  arrests. — A  "Confidential"  document 
from  McClellan. — Curious  disposition  of  the  Northern  people  to  surrender  their 
liberties. — Conservatism  of  the  Confederate  cause. — Lincoln's  view  of  State 
"  Neutrality  "  in  the  war. — Application  of  it  to  Kentucky. — The  elections  in  Ken 
tucky. — The  Confederates  anticipate  the  Federal  occupation  of  Kentucky. — Zolli- 
coffer's  command. — Polk's  command. — Justification  of  the  Confederate  occupation. 
— Claims  and  designs  of  the  Federals  in  Kentucky. — Polk's  occupation  of  Columbus. 
— His  proffer  of  withdrawal. — Arrests  in  Kentucky. — Despotic  and  brutal  legisla 
tion. — Distinguished  refugees. — Breckinridge's  address.— Early  military  movements 
in  Kentucky. — Zollicoffer's  operations. — Buckner's  occupation  of  Bowling  Green. — 
The  Battle  of  Belmont. — Movement  of  U.  S.  Grant. — Gen.  Pillow's  command  en 
gaged  at  disadvantage. — The  Confederates  driven  back. — Timely  reinforcements. — 
Sudden  conversion  of  a  defeat  into  a  victory. — Retreat  of  Grant. — His  official 
misrepresentation  of  the  day. — Prospect  of  the  war  in  the  West 175 

CHAPTER    XI. 

The  fickle  public  of  the  North.— Gen.  Scott. — The  clamour  for  McClellan. — His  exalta 
tion  in  the  newspapers. — The  theatrical  and  sensational  mind  of  the  North. — 
Advance  of  the  Confederates  towards  the  Potomac. — McClellan's  designs. — The 
Confederates  fall  back  to  Centreville. — The  Battle  of  Leesburg.— McClellan's  move 
ment  on  the  Confederate  left. — Evans'  brigade. — Fortunate  capture  of  a  Federal 
courier. — The  Federals  cross  the  Potomac  and  occupy  Ball's  Bluff. — Splendid 
charge  of  the  Confederates. — Death  of  Col.  Baker. — The  enemy  driven  into  the 
River. — An  appalling  spectacle  of  death. — Misrepresentations  in  Washington. — 
Morale  of  M'Clellan's  army.— The  affair  at  Dranesville.— Defeat  of  Stuart,— 
"  Stonewall  "  Jackson's  new  command. — His  expedition  from  Winchester. — Ter 
rible  sufferings  of  his  command. — His  demonstration  at  Bath. — His  movement  to 
Roniney,  and  return  to  Winchester. — Close  i»f  the  First  Year's  Campaign  in  Vir- 


CONTENTS.  XI 

ginia. — Naval  operations  in  1861. — The  enemy's  immense  advantage  in  his  navy. — 
Statistics  of  the  Federal  navy. — Improvidence  of  the  Confederates  in  coast  and 
river  defences. — Secretary  Mallory. — The  Confederacy  to  lose  all  her  sea-ports. — 
Two  naval  expeditions  down  the  Carolina  coast. — Engagement  at  Hatteras  Inlet. — 
An  unequal  combat. — The  Port  Royal  expedition. — Capture  of  Port  Royal. — Value 
of  this  Federal  success. — The  "  Trent "  affair. — Capture  of  Commissioners  Mason 
and  Slidell. — An  English  commander's  protest. — Great  indignation  in  England. — 
Preparations  there  for  war. — Conceit  and  exultation  of  the  North. — Tributes  and 
attentions  to  Capt.  Wilkes. — Concern  among  the  Confederates. — What  Richmond 
orators  said. — Seward's  correspondence  with  the  British  Government. — His  col 
lapse. — The  last  resort  of  demagogueisni. — Disappointment  of  the  Confederates  in 
the  termination  of  the  "  Trent "  affair. — Earl  Russell's  declaration  in  Parliament. — 
Mr.  Gregory's  reply. — The  Treaty  of  Paris  and  the  Federal  blockade 185 

GH AFTER    XII. 

General  character  of  the  military  events  of  the  year  1&62. — The  Confederate  situation 
in  Kentucky. — Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston's  command  and  position. — Battle  of  Fishing 
Creek. — The  Confederate  right  in  Kentucky. — Gen.  Crittenden's  command  in  ex 
treme  straits. — Difficulty  in  subsisting  it. — The  decision  to  give  battle  to  the 
enemy. — Zollicoffers  brigade. — The  contested  hill. — Death  of  Zollicoffer. — Defeat 
of  the  Confederates. — Crittenden  crosses  the  Cumberland. — His  losses. — Import 
ance  of  the  disaster. — Designs  of  the  enemy  in  Western  Kentucky. — Popular  de 
lusion  as  to  Johnston's  strength. — Hopelessness  of  his  defence. — Official  apathy  in 
Richmond. — Beauregard's  conference  with  Johnston. — The  Tennessee  and  Cumber 
land  rivers. — The  avenue  to  Nashville. — Grant's  ascent  of  the  Tennessee. — Cap 
ture  of  Fort  Henry. — Noble  and  gallant  conduct  of  Gen.  Tilghman. — Battle  of  Fort 
Donelson. — Johnston's  reasons  for  making  a  battle  there. — Commands  of  Buckner, 
Pillow,  and  Floyd. — Site  and  strength  of  the  fort. — Battle  of  the  trenches. — En 
gagement  of  the  gunboats. — Two  days'  success  of  the  Confederates. — Suffering  of 
the  troops  from  cold. — Exposure  of  the  wounded. — Federal  reinforcements. — The 
Confederate  council  of  war. — Plan  of  attack,  to  extricate  the  garrison. — A  fierce 
and  terrible  conflict. — The  Federals  forced  back  towards  the  Wynn's  Ferry  Road. 
— The  opportunity  of  exit  lost. — Gen.  Buckner's  explanation. — A  commentary 
on  military  hesitation. — How  the  day  was  lost. — Nine  hours  of  combat — Scenes 
on  the  battle-field. — Council  of  Confederate  generals. — Gen.  Pillow's  proposition. — 
Literal  report  of  the  conversation  of  Gens.  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner. — A  sur 
render  determined. — Escape  of  Floyd  and  Pillow. — Buckner's  letter  to  Grant. — 
Johnston's  movement  to  Nashville. — Excitement  there. — Retreat  of  Johnston's 
command  to  Murfreesboro'. — Panic  in  Nashville.— Capture  of  Roanoke  Island  by  the 
enemy. — Burnside's  expedition. — Gen.  Wise's  estimate  of  the  importance  of  Roan- 
oko  Island. — His  correspondence  and  interviews  with  Secretary  Benjamin. — De 
fences  of  the  Island. — Naval  engagement.— Commodore  Lynch's  squadron. — Land 
ing  of  the  enemy  on  the  Island. — Defective  reconnoissance  of  the  Confederates. — 
Their  works  flanked. — The  surrender. — Pursuit  of  the  Confederate  gunboats. — 
Extent  of  the  disaster. — Censure  of  the  Richmond  authorities. — Benjamin  accused 
by  the  Confederate  Congress 198 

CHAPTER    XIII. 

True  causes  of  the  Confederate  disasters  in  the  second  year  of  the  war. — The  enemy's 
"  Anaconda  plan." — Rebukes  to  the  vanity  of  the  Confederates. — The  sum  of  their 


Xil  CONTENTS. 

disasters. — Inauguration  of  the  Permanent  Government  of  the  Confederate  States. — 
Gloomy  scene  in  Capitol  Square. — President  Davis'  speech. — Commentary  of  a 
Richmond  journal. — Causes  of  popular  animation  in  the  Confederacy. — Develop 
ment  of  the  enemy's  design  upon  slavery. — History  of  the  Anti-slavery  measures 
of  Lincoln's  administration. — His  early  declaration  of  non-interference  with  sla 
very. — Mr.  Seward  in  1860. — Lincoln's  statement,  March  4th,  1861. — Diplomatic 
declaration,  April,  1861. — Early  affectations  of  Lincoln's  Administration  on  the 
subject  of  slavery. — M'Clellan's  address. — M'Dowell's  order. — Eevocation  of  the 
emancipation  measures  of  Fremont  and  Hunter. — First  act  of  Anti-slavery  legisla 
tion  at- Washington. — Lovejoy's  resolution. — The  Anti-slavery  clause  in  the  Confis 
cation  Act. — Three  notable  measures  of  anti-slavery  legislation. — Commencement 
of  the  Emancipation  policy  in  the  District  of  Columbia. — Explanation  of  the  ascen 
dancy  of  the  Abolition  party  during  the  war. — The  new  Confederate  Congress. — 
Its  vigour. — The  old  Provisional  Congress. — Its  measures. — Its  echoes  to  Federal 
legislation. — The  sequestration  law. — Silly  and  demagogical  military  legislation. — 
The  '*'  Sixty  Days'  furlough  "  law. — Alarm  of  Gen.  Johnston. — Indisposition  of 
Confederate  volunteers  to  re-enlist. — The  Conscription  law  of  the  Confederate 
States. — Its  timely  passage. — Its  provisions  and  effect. — Other  military  acts  of  the 
Confederate  Congress. — He-organization  of  the  army. — Destruction  of  Southern 
cotton  and  tobacco. — Authorization  of  partisan  service. — Alternations  of  Confede 
rate  victory  and  defeat. — The  Trans-Mississippi. — Battle  of  Elk  Horn. — Van  Dorn's 
command. — An  obstinate  fight. — Death  of  M'Culloch. — The  Confederate  success 
indecisive  and  imperfect. — Reasons  for  Van  Dorn's  retreat. — Confederate  designs 
upon  Missouri  abandoned  for  the  present. — Transfer  of  Van  Dorn's  and  Price's 
forces. — Naval  fight  in  Hampton  Roads. — The  Virginia  and  the  Monitor — Lack  of 
naval  enterprise  in  the  Confederacy. — The  privateer  service. — Construction  of  the 
Virginia. — Confederate  squadron  in  the  James  River. — Federal  fleet  off  Fortress 
Monroe. — Fearful  enterprise  of  the  Virginia. — Sinking  of  the  Cumberland. —  Gal 
lantry  of  her  crew. — A  thrilling  ccene  of  heroic  devotion. — Surrender  of  the  Con 
gress. — Frightful  scenes  of  carnage. — Perfidious  conduct  of  the  enemy. — The 
Virginia  engages  the  Minnesota.— "Wonderful  results  of  the  first  day's  fight — 
Second  day's  fight. — Apparition  of  the  Monitor. — A  singular  scene  of  naval  com 
bat. — A  drawn  battle. — Excitement  about  iron  vessels. — Discussion  in  the  news 
papers. — Addition  of  Ironclads  to  the  Federal  navy. — What  M'Clellan  thought  of 
the  Virginia. — Capture  of  Newbern,  &c. — Objects  of  Burnside's  expedition. — 
Branch's  command  at  Newbern. — The  Confederate  works  on  the  Neuse  River. — 
Retreat  of  Branch. — Federal  occupation  of  Newbern. — Capture  of  Fort  Macon. — 
The  entire  coast  of  North  Carolina  in  possession  of  the  enemy. — The  sea-coast 
an  unimportant  part  of  the  Confederate  defences 214 

CHAPTER     XIV. 

The  new  line  of  Confederate  defence  south  of  Nashville. — Its  objects. — Co-operation 
of  Johnston  and  Beauregard. — Capture  of  Island  No.  10  by  the  enemy. — Gen. 
Polk's  evacuation  of  Columbus. — M'Cown's  occupation  of  Island  No.  10  and 
New  Madrid. — Condition  of  the  defences  at  these  places. — Pope  moving  on 
New  Madrid. — Smallness  of  M'Cown's  force. — Pope's  strength  in  artillery. — 
His  occupation  of  Point  Pleasant. — A  terrific  bombardment. — Evacuation  of  New 
Madrid. — Effect  of  this  movement. — Bombardment  of  Island  No.  10. — Gallant 
defence  of  Rucker's  battery. — Transfer  of  a  portion  of  M'Cown's  forces  to  Fort 
Pillow. — His  preparations  for  retreat. — Gen.  Mackall  assigned  to  the  defence  of 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

the  Island. — Canal  cut  by  the  enemy  across  the  Peninsula. — Two  gunboats  pass 
the  Island. — Mackall's  surrender. — Wretched  management  of  the  evacuation  of 
the  Island. — Great  loss  of  Confederate  artillery. — The  Battle  of  Shiloh. — Concen 
tration  of  Confederate  forces  at  Corinth. — Grant's  lines  at  Pittsburg. — Buell 
advancing  from  Nashville. — Design  of  the  Confederates  to  attack  before  the 
junction  of  these  forces. — Unfortunate  loss  of  a  day  in  the  march. — The  Confed 
erate  plan  of  battle. — The  enemy  driven  from  his  encampments. — Splendid  and 
irresistible  charge  of  the  Confederates. — Tragical  death  of  Gen.  Johnston. — The 
Confederates  press  on  in  their  career  of  victory. — Grant  in  the  last  extremity  of 
defeat. — He  retreats  to  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee. — Beauregard's  order  for  a 
cessation  of  the  conflict. — A  fatal  halt. — Explanation  of  it. — Beauregard's  great 
mistake. — Demoralization  of  his  troops  by  plunder. — Buell's  forces  across  the 
Tennessee. — The  second  day's  action. — The  Confederates  fall  back. — Overwhelm 
ing  force  of  the  enemy. — Odds  of  the  second  day's  battle. — The  enemy  does  not 
attempt  a  pursuit. — A  frightful  sum  of  carnage. — Beauregard's  claim  of  success. 
— Federal  interpretation  of  the  battle. — Exultation  at  Washington. — Death  of 
Johnston,  a  serious  loss  to  the  Confederacy. — Sketch  of  his  military  life. — 
President  Davis'  tribute  to  the  fallen  hero. — His  obsequies  in  New  Orleans 232 

CHAPTER     XY. 

The  military  situation  of  the  lower  Mississippi. — The  fall  of  New  Orleans.— A  long 
train  of  secret  history  of  the  Confederate  Administration. — Sense  of  security  in 
New  Orleans. — Strange  errour  of  the  Richmond  authorities. — Gen.  Lovell's  corres 
pondence  with  the  War  Department. — Startling  disclosures. — Naval  structures  for 
the  defence  of  New  Orleans. — Secretary  Mallory's  statement  to  the  Confederate 
Congress. — Testimony  of  Gov.  Moore,  of  Louisiana. — His  interposition  with  the  ship 
builders. — The  ironclads  Mississippi  and  Louisiana. — Condition  of  the  defences  of 
New  Orleans  in  April,  1862. — The  river  obstructed  by  a  raft. — Farragut's  fleet  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.— Festivity  in  New  Orleans. — Bombardment  of  Forts 
Jackson  and  St.  Philip. — Passage  of  the  forts  by  the  enemy's  vessels. — The  Con 
federate  gunboats  all  destroyed.— Confusion  and  panic  in  New  Orleans.— Great 
conflagration  in  the  city. — A  scene  of  terrible  grandeur. — Lovell's  evacuation  of 
New  Orleans. — Disorder  in  New  Orleans. — Farragut's  correspondence  with  Mayor 
Monroe. — Why  the  Mayor  protracted  the  correspondence. — A  new  hope  of  de 
fence. — Surrender  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip. — Gen.  Duncan's  speech  on 
the  Levee. — Farragut's  ultimatum. — Hoisting  of  the  Stars  and  Stripes  over  New 
Orleans. — What  the  fall  of  New  Orleans  involved. — Note: — Gen.  Lovell's  reasons 
for  evacuating  New  Orleans.— Rule  of  Butler  in  the  conquered  city. — Character 
and  person  of  "  The  Tyrant  of  New  Orleans." — "  The  woman-order."— Arrest  of 
Mayor  Monroe  and  of  various  citizens. — Butler  on  female  secessionists. — His 
opinion  of  "she-adders." — Confiscation,  fines,  and  plunder.— Butler's  decoy  for 
assassins. — The  hanging  of  Mumford. — His  speech  on  the  gallows. — General  ex 
perience  in  the  Confederacy  of  the  enemy's  atrocity. — New  codes  and  methods 
of  war. — Progress  of  Federal  cruelty 245 

CHAPTER    XYI. 

More  than  one-third  of  the  Federal  forces  operating  against  Richmond. — M'Clellan's 
opinion  of  his  army. — Its  numerical  strength. — Official  statement  of  Confederate 
forces  in  North  Virginia.— Lincoln's  order  of  the  22d  February.— M'Clellan's  dis 
sent. — When  Johnston  determined  to  change  his  line  on  the  Potomac. — His  prepa- 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

rations  for  retreat. — How  it  was  accomplished. — M'Clellan's  advance. — Discovery 
of  Johnston's  evacuation  of  Manassas  and  Centreville. — He  crosses  the  Rappahan- 
nock  and  waits  for  the  enemy. — He  penetrates  M'Clellans's  designs. — Federal 
council  of  war  at  Fairfax  Court-house. — Shifting  of  the  scenes  of  war  in  Virginia. 
— The  Battle  of  Kernstown. — How  "Stonewall  "  Jackson  came  to  fight  this  battle. 
— Great  numerical  superiourity  of  the  enemy. — The  contest  at  the  Stone  Fence. — 
Jackson  falls  back  to  Cedar  Creek. — Magruder's  line  on  the  Peninsula. — A  fearful 
crisis. — M'Clellan  held  in  check  by  eleven  thousand  Confederates. — Outwitted  again 
by  Johnston. — Retreat  of  the  Confederates  up  the  Peninsula. — Strategic  merit  of  the 
movement. — Battle  of  "Williamsbarg. — Longstreet's  division  engaged. — Success  of 
the  Confederates. — M'Clellan's  whole  army  in  peril. — His  flank  movement  on 
Johnston's  retreat. — Engagement  at  Barhamsville. — The  line  of  the  Chickahominy. 
Johnston's  brilliant  strategy. — Evacuation  of  Norfolk. — Destruction  of  the  Virginia, 
— Her  last  challenge  to  the  enemy. — A  galling  spectacle. — Commodore  Tatnall 
orders  her  destruction. — A  court  of  inquiry. — Naval  engagement  at  Drewry's 
Bluff.— A  feeble  barrier  to  Richmond.— Kepulse  of  the  Federal  fleet.— "What  it 
proved. — M'Clellan's  investment  of  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy. — Defences  of 
Richmond. — Scenes  around  the  Federal  capital. — Alarm  and  excitement  of  its 
people. — The  exodus  from  Richmond. — Public  meeting  in  the  City  Hall. — Noble 
resolution  of  the  Legislature  of  Virginia.— Re-animation  of  the  people  and  the 
authorities. — President  Davis'  early  opinion  of  the  effect  of  the  fall  of  Richmond. 
— Appeals  of  the  Richmond  press. — Jackson's  campaign  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia, — 
Jackson  determines  on  the  aggressive. — Disposition  of  the  Federal  forces  west  of 
the  Blue  Ridge. — Affair  at  M'Dowell. — Jackson  deceives  Banks — Surprises  his 
rear-guard  at  Front  Royal. — Banks'  race  to  "Winchester. — Scenes  of  retreat  through 
Winchester. — Banks'  quick  time  to  the  Potomac. — Extent  of  Jackson's  success. — 
Fruits  of  two  days'  operations  of  the  Confederates. — Jackson  passes  between  the 
columns  of  Fremont  and  Shields. — Death  of  Turner  Ashby. — Jackson's  tribute  to 
him. — Battles  of  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Republic.— E well  defeats  Fremont. — The 
field  of  Port  Republic. — Ewell's  arrival  saves  the  day. — Critical  and  splendid 
action  of  two  Virginia  regiments. — Close  of  the  Valley  campaign. — Jackson's 
almost  marvellous  success. — His  halt  at  Weyer's  Cave 261 

CHAPTER    XVII. 

The  tardiness  of  McClellan. — How  the  Confederates  availed  themselves  of  it. — Their 
concentration  of  forces  at  Richmond. — Strength  of  these  forces. — Position  of  the 
two  armies. — The  Chickahominy  and  the  roads  crossing  it. — Battle  of  "  Seven 
Pines." — Failure  of  Gen.  Huger  to  attack. — Gallant  charge  of  the  troops  of  Long- 
street  and  Hill. — Gen.  Johnston  wounded. — The  affair  of  the  next  day. — Important 
change  of  military  command. — Secret  history  of  the  attempt  to  limit  the  military 
power  of  President  Davis. — A  plan  of  Confederate  politicians. — Plot  against  the 
President's  power. — The  new  affice  ot  Commanding-general  of  the  Confederates. — 
How  made  nominal  by  President  Davis. — Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee  appointed  to  this 
office. — His  appearance  and  manners. — The  Seven  Days'  Battles  around  Richmond. — 
Lee's  plan  of  operations. — Jackson's  withdrawal  from  the  Valley  masked. — Battles 
of  Mechanicsville  and  Beaver  Dam. — Repulse  of  the  Confederates  at  Beaver  Dam 
Creek. — Jackson  flanks  the  enemy's  position. — McClellan's  retreat  to  Games' 
Mills. — Its  strategic  design. — Extraordinary  strength  of  the  new  position. — Gen. 
Lee  waiting  for  the  great  battle. — Battle  of  Games'  Mills. — Heroic  fight  of  Hill's 
division. — The  enemy  gains  ground. — An  urgent  message  to  Longstreet. — Jackson 


CONTENTS.  XV 

appears. — Final  charge  of  the  day. — Its  fierce  grandeur. — Victory  of  the  Confed 
erates. — McClellan  retreats  towards  the  James  River. — Failure  of  Magruder  and 
Huger  to  intercept  him. — The  great  errour  which  they  committed. — Battle  of 
Savage  Station. — McClellan  crosses  White  Oak  Swamp. — Failure  of  Huger's  attack. 
— Another  opportunity  lost. — Battle  of  Frazier's  Farm. — Hill  and  Longstreet'a 
troops  only  engaged. — Battle  of  Malvern  Hill. — McClellan's  position  on  the  Hill. — 
His  numerous  artillery. — The  attack  of  the  Confederate  left  not  supported. — 
Magruder's  impetuous  and  desperate  charge. — The  sublime  scenery  of  the  contest 
— Failure  of  the  attack. — McClellan  continues  his  retreat  to  Harrison's  Landing. — 
Fruits  of  the  Confederate  success. — Gen.  Lee's  explanation  of  McClellan's  escape. — 
Estimate  of  the  victory  by  Lee  and  Stonewall  Jackson. — Richmond  erect  and 
exultant 278 

CHAPTER    XVIII. 

Effect  of  McClellan's  defeat  in  the  North. — Organization  of  another  Federal  army 
under  Gen.  Pope. — Political  significance  of  Pope's  appointment. — ISTew  measures  of 
violence  in  the  war. — McClellan's  ideas  of  the  conduct  of  the  war. — His  "Harri 
son-Bar  Letter." — Divisions  of  sentiment  in  the  North  as  to  the  character  and 
measures  of  the  war. — Position  of  the  Democratic  party. — The  Radicals  in  Congress. 
— Their  Anti-slavery  design. — Their  theory  of  revenge  upon  the  South. — Cardinal 
errour  of  this  political  school. — Declaration  of  Wendell  Phillips. — System  of 
spoliation  and  disfranchisement  in  the  South. — Gen.  Pope's  address  to  his  army  in 
Virginia. — His  war  upon  non-combatants. — Legalization  of  plunder. — Irruption  of 
the  Northern  spoilsmen  into  Virginia. — Pope's  military  lines. — Gen.  Lee  between 
two  forces — He  sends  Jackson  against  Pope. — He  threatens  McClellan's  communi 
cations. — Battle  of  Cedar  Run. — Banks  again  deceived  by  Jackson. — A  rapid  and 
severe  engagement. — Gen.  Lee  moves  out  to  the  lines  of  the  Rappahannock. — Ad 
venturous  movement  of  Jackson  to  reach  Pope's  rear. — His  perilous  position. — 
He  is  apparently  in  the  jaws  of  destruction. — The  affair  of  Manassas  and  Bristoe 
Station. — The  second  battle  of  Manassas. — Longstreet's  march  to  reinforce  Jackson. 
— His  passage  of  Thoroughfare  Gap. — His  timely  and  critical  arrival  on  the  field 
of  battle. — A  close  contest. — Fighting  at  ten  baces. — The  battle  of  the  first  day 
not  decisive. — Disposition  of  the  two  armies  for  the  great  contest  of  the  second 
.  day.— Jackson  at  close  quarters. — He  drives  the  enemy. — The  whole  Confederate 
line  of  battle  advancing. — A  sublime  spectacle. — Scenes  on  the  banks  of  Bull  Run. 
— Pope  retreats  to  Centre ville  and  thence  towards  Washington. — Jackson  strikes 
him  again. — Engagement  at  Ox  Hill. — Pope's  immense  losses. — His  absurd  claim 
of  victory. — Ludicrous  correspondence  between  Pope  and  Halleck. — Rapid  and 
brilliant  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy. — The  war  transferred  from  the 
interiour  to  the  frontier. — Alarm  in  the  North. — Popularity  in  the  Confederacy  of 
an  offensive  war. — A  true  statement  of  Gen.  Lee's  designs  in  crossing  the  Upper 
Potomac  and  invading  Maryland. — Why  he  did  not  move  upon  Washington  and 
Alexandria. — His  proclamation  at  Frederick. — Weak  response  of  the  Marylanders. 
— Explanation  of  this. — Capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,  &c. — How  Jackson  invested  it. 
— M'Clellan  at  the  head  of  the  Federal  army. — His  inactivity. — He  becomes 
acquainted  with  Lee's  plans  by  a  curious  accident. — He  presses  forward  to  relievo 
Harper's  Ferry. — Fight  in  Boonesboro'  Gap. — Gen.  Lee  retires  to  Sharpsburg, — 
Meanwhile  Jackson  completes  the  reduction  of  Harper's  Ferry. — Battle  of  Sharps- 
burg. — Comparative  strength  of  the  two  armies. — Fluctuation  of  the  tide  of 
battle  on  the  Confederate  left. — Repulse  of  the  enemy. — The  Confederate  centre  is 


XV  CONTENTS. 

broken  and  recovers. — The  enemy  gets  possession  of  the  bridge  over  the  Antietam. 
— The  day  closes  with  the  enemy  repulsed  at  all  points,  and  a  victory  for  the  Con 
federates. — Why  Gen.  Lee  did  not  renew  the  battle  the  next  day. — Why  he 
retreated. — M'Clellan's  claim  of  victory. — How  it  was  an  afterthought. — Lee's 
army  recruiting  in  Virginia 2S5 

CHAPTER    XIX. 

The  Western  theatre  of  the  war. — Yalley  of  the  Mississippi. — Evacuation  of  Corinth. — 
Important  objects  of  the  movement. — Its  success. — The  Halleck-Pope  dispatch. — 
An  enormous  falsehood. — Gen.  Beauregard's  comments  on  it. — Capture  of  Memphis*. 
— An  unequal  fight  on  the  river. — Bombardment  of  Yicksburg. — Great  importance 
of  this  point. — Preparations  for  its  defence  by  Van  Dorn. — The  ironclad  Arkansas, 
— She  runs  the  gauntlet  of  the  enemy's  fleet. — Thrilling  scene  of  the  adventure. 
— Failure  of  the  first  attempt  of  the  enemy  upon  Yicksburg. — Engagement  at 
Baton  Kouge. — Success  of  Breckinridge's  attack. — He  waits  for  the  iron-clad 
Arkansas. — She  becomes  unmanageable  and  is  fired  by  her  crew. — Withdrawal  of 
Breckinridge  from  Baton  Rouge. — Confederate  occupation  of  Port  Hudson. — The 
Kentucky  campaign. — Gen.  Bragg  in  command  of  the  Confederate  army  in  the 
"West. — How  Gen.  Beauregard  was  retired. — Bragg's  plan  of  operations  against 
Kentucky. — Morgan's  raid. — Disposition  of  the  Federal  forces  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghany  Mountains. — Oo- operation  of  Kirby  Smith  with  Bragg's  column. — Battle  of 
Richmond. — Kirby  Smith  in  a  position  to  threaten  both  Cincinnati  and  Louisville. — 
Bragg's  movement  to  intercept  Buell. — The  latter  concentrating  at  Bowling  Green. 
— Great  success  of  Bragg's  movements  so  far. — His  boastful  dispatch  to  Richmond. 
— His  political  object  in  invading  Kentucky. — His  proclamation  at  Glasgow. — Sur 
render  of  the  Federal  garrison  at  Mumfordsville. — Bragg's  whole  army  between 
Nashville  and  Louisville. — His  splendid  opportunity. — He  does  not  use  it. — He 
permits  Buell  to  pass  to  Louisville  without  a  battle. — His  weak  excuse  for  a  fatal 
errour — The  Federals  now  able  to  resume  the  offensive  in  Kentucky. — Bragg's 
uncertain  movements. — His  disarranged  plan  of  battle. — Gen.  Polk's  disobedience 
of  orders. — Battle  of  Perryville. — Bragg's  unfortunate  distribution  of  forces. — 
Misapprehension  of  Kirby  Smith. — Withers'  division  not  in  the  fight. — The  enemy 
driven. — Arrival  of  another  of  his  corps  upon  the  field. — Bragg  retires  upon 
Bryantsville. — He  determines  to  evacuate  Kentucky. — Retreat  through  Cumberland 
Gap. — Disappointment  at  Richmond. — Errours  of  the  Kentucky  campaign. — How 
far  it  was  a  Confederate  success. — Its  large  captures. — North  Alabama  and  Middle 
Tennessee  redeemed. — Bragg  in  front  of  Nashville. — Operations  in  the  Southwest. 
— Battle  of  Corinth.— Movements  of  Van  Dorn  and  Price. — The  affair  of  luka.— 
Yan  Dorn's  reasons  for  attacking  Corinth. — Gallant  and  impetuous  charge  of  Price's 
troops. — The  second  day's  fight. — Mismanagement  of  the  attack  on  the  enemy's 
works. — Terrible  slaughter  at  College  Hill. — The  Confederates  repulsed. — Affair 
on  the  Hatchie  River. — Van  Dorn's  retreat. — Review  of  the  summer  and  autumn 
campaigns  of  1862. — Glory  of  the  Confederate  arms. — Reflection  of  the  London 
Times  on  the  "  New  Nationality." 319 

CHAPTER    XX. 

The  two  main  theatres  of  the  war. — Operations  in  Yirginia. — Battle  of  Fredericksburg. 
— Preliminary  movements  of  the  *  two  armies. — Expedition  of  Stuart's  cavalry  into 
Pennsylvania. — Removal  of  M'Clellan. — The  true  reasons  for  it. — Gen.  Burnside's 
"On  to  Richmond." — His  movement  towards  Fredericksburg. — The  surrender  of 


CONTENTS. 

the  town  demanded. — It  is  abandoned  by  the  citizen-population. — Sorrowful  scenes. 
— Burnsido  forces  the  passage  of  the  Eappahannock. — The  Confederate  position,— 
Burnside's  hope  to  surprise  Gen.  Lee. — How  disappointed. — The  Confederate  line 
of  battle. — The  attack  on  the  Confederate  right. — Young  Pelham's  gallantry. — 
The  Confederate  right  broken. — The  battle  restored. — Interest  of  the  field  on  the 
left.— The  attack  on  Marye's  and  Willis'  Hills.— Gallantry  of  the  Federals.— They 
make  six  attacks. — A  terrible  scene  of  carnage. — Burnside's  army  driven  into 
Fredericksburg. — His  appalling  extremity. — Expectations  in  Kichmond  of  the  des 
truction  of  his  army. — He  escapes  across  the  Eappahannock. — Gen.  Lee's  own 
explanation  of  his  failure  to  follow  up  his  victory. — Comparative  losses  in  the 
battle. — Death  of  Gens.  Gregg  and  Cobb. — Gen.  Lee's  sentiment  with  respect  to 
the  objects  of  the  war. — Operations  in  Tennessee. — Battle  of  Murfreesboro'.— The 
situation  in  the  West. — The  lines  in  Tennessee  and  Mississippi. — Eosecrans'  advance 
from  Nashville. — Conflicting  statements  of  his  force. — Position  of  Gen.  Bragg'a 
army  around  Murfreesboro'. — Bragg  anticipates  the  Federal  attack. — Hardee  com 
mences  the  battle. — He  drives  the  entire  right  wing  of  the  Federals. — Desperate 
situation  of  Eosecrans. — His  sang-froid. — He  developes  a  new  line  of  battle. — 
The  Confederates  renew  the  attack. — How  Bragg  lost  an  opportunity. — Splendid 
charge  of  the  Confederates. — The  day  undecided,  but  the  advantage  with  the  Con 
federates. — Bragg's  "Happy  New- Year." — Breckinridge  attempts  to  dislodge  the 
enemy. — "  The  bloody  crossing  of  Stone  Eiver." — Repulse  of  Breckinridge. — Why 
Bragg  determined  to  retreat. — The  results  of  the  Battle  of  Murfreesboro'  in  favour 
of  the  Confederates. — A  peculiarity  of  Gen.  Bragg. — His  eloquent  tribute  to  the 
private  soldier  of  the  Confederacy. — Operations  in  the  Trans-Mississippi. — The  cam 
paign  West  of  the  Mississippi  feeble  and  irregular. — Gen.  Hindman's  command, — 
His  extravagant  Address  to  his  Soldiers. — Battle  of  Prairie  Grove. — Hindman's  first 
success  and  unfortunate  delay. — His  blunders  and  extraordinary  retreat. — Con 
dition  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  country. — IJindman's  "  Government  ad  Interim." — 
His  despotic  orders. — An  extraordinary  list  of  outrages. — Virtue  and  fidelity  of 
the  Confederate  States  West  of  the  Mississippi  Elver 338 

CHAPTER    XXI. 

Review  of  political  questions  in  the  war. — The  thread  of  Anti-slavery  legislation.— 
President  Lincoln's  hesitation. — The  opposition  to  his  administration. — Scheme  of 
compensated  emancipation. — How  visionary. — Mr.  Lincoln's  motives  in  suggesting 
it. — The  President  and  the  Chicago  Deputation. — His  characteristic  discourse  on 
slavery. — His  reference  to  the  Pope's  Bull  against  the  Comet. — Political  importance 
of  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg. — The  mask  dropped. — The  Proclamation  of  Emancipa 
tion. — Misrepresentations  of  it. — An  act  of  malice  towards  the  master,  not  one  of 
mercy  to  the  slave. — Pretence  of  "  military  necessity." — Dishonour  of  the  plea.— 
Proof  of  its  falsehood. — Effect  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  on  the  Confeder 
ates. — President  Davis'  commentary. — Spirit  of  the  press  and  people  of  the  Con 
federacy.— Effect  of  the  proclamation  in  the  North. — Analysis  of  the  Northern 
elections  of  1862. — The  Democratic  protest  against  President  Lincoln's  administra 
tion. — Speech  of  Mr.  Cox  in  the  Federal  Congress. — Supposed  design  of  "  recon 
struction  "  of  the  Union. — How  the  idea  was  treated  in  Eichmoud. — Savage  de 
nunciations  of  it. —  Vice-President  Stephens'  Declaration  of  Independence  or  death. 
— Military  operations  in  the  early  months  of  1863. — General  character  of  the  war 
in  the  winter  season. — The  recapture  of  Galveston  by  the  Confederates. — Fight 
between  the  Cottonboats  and  the  Federal  Fleet.— The  Harriet  Lane  captured.— The 
2 


XV111  CONTENTS. 

other  Federal  vessels  surrender,  but  escape  under  white  flags. — Renewed  attempts 
against  Vicksburg. — Shameful  failure  of  Sherman's  expedition. — Third  attempt 
upon  Vicksburg  made  by  Gen.  Grant. — Its  failure. — Attempt  of  Farragut's  fleet  to 
run  past  Fort  Hudson. — Destruction  of  the  Mississippi. — Capture  of  Arkansas  Post 
by  the  Federals. — Its  importance. — Attack  of  an  iron-clad  fleet  upon  Charleston. — 
Trial  between  iron-clads  and  artillery. — Combat  of  the  Keokuk  and  Fort  Sumter. — 
Complete  triumph  of  the  Confederates. — The  prestige  of  "  Monitors  "  destroyed.  .356 

CHAPTER    XXII. 

Military  situation  in  the  early  months  of  1863. — Early  resumption  of  the  campaign  in 
Virginia. — The  new  Federal  favourite,  "Fighting  Joe  Hooker." — The  Battle  of 
Chancellorsville. — Hooker's  plan  of  operations. — His  flaming  address  to  his  troops. 
— Critical  situation  of  Gen.  Lee. — Surrounded  by  an  enemy  more  than  threefold 
his  numbers. — Calmness  and  self-possession  of  Lee. — His  deliberate  dispositions  for 
attack. — The  flank-march  of  Stonewall  Jackson. — How  he  emerged  from  "the 
Wilderness." — Fall  of  Stonewall  Jackson. — The  impetus  of  the  Confederate  attack 
ceases. — How  Gen.  Lee  received  the  news  of  Jackson's  fall. — The  battle  in  front  of 
Chancellorsville. — Hooker's  army  crippled  and  driven. — Sedgwick's  advance  from 
Fredericksburg. — It  arrests  Lee's  pursuit  of  Hooker.— The  fight  near  Salem  Church. 
— Sedgwick's  force  routed. — Hooker  retreats  across  the  river. — His  terrible  los 
ses. — Chancellorsville,  the  masterpiece  of  Lee's  military  life. — Reflections  on  the 
victory. — Startling  official  developments  as  to  the  numbers  of  Confederate  armies. 
— Particulars  of  the  death  of  Jackson. — Exact  report  of  his  last  words. — Character 
of  Stonewall  Jackson. — His  great  ambition. — Early  misconceptions  of  the  man. — 
How  he  was  ridiculed. — His  difference  with  President  Davis. — His  resignation  sent 
in,  but  recalled. — Jackson's  military  career. — His  genius. — His  piety. — His  epicene 
nature. — Personal  appearance  of  the  hero. — What  Virginia  owes  to  his  memory.  .370 

CHAPTER     XXIII. 

Vicksburg,  the  second  prize  of  the  war. — Gen.  Grant. — What  his  persistency  was 
worth. — His  new  scheme  of  attack. — Two  parts  of  the  enterprise. — Porter's  gun 
boats  run  the  batteries. — Grant's  march  from  Milliken's  Bend. — Blindness  of  Gen. 
Pemberton  at  Vicksburg. — Antecedents  and  character  of  this  commander. — His 
extreme  incornpetency. — President  Davis  blamed. — His  caprice  and  obstinacy. — 
Grant  crosses  the  Mississippi  and  moves  towards  Port  Gibson. — Gen.  Johnston's 
telegram  to  Pemberton. — Critical  opportunity  of  the  campaign. — Pemberton 
refuses  to  use  it,  and  disregards  Johnston's  despatch. — Battle  of  Port  Gibson. — 
Extraordinary  valour  of  Bowen's  command. — Grant  turns  Grand  Gulf  and  moves 
upon  Jackson. — Gen.  Johnston's  arrival  at  Jackson. — Situation  and  strength  of  the 
Confederate  forces. — Evacuation  of  Jackson. — Johnston  offers  a  second  op 
portunity  of  attack  to  Pemberton. — The  latter  disobeys  the  order  and  commits  a 
fatal  error. — Sherman's  incendiary  record  in  Jackson. — His  use  of  the  fire-brand. 
— Grant  forces  battle  upon  Pemberton. — Battle  of  Baker's  Creek. — Tremendous 
exertions  of  Stevenson's  division. — Gen.  Loring  fails  to  support  him,  remains  in 
active,  and  is  cut  off  in  the  retreat. — Pemberton's  new  position  upon  the  Big  Black. 
— Its  strength. — It  is  shamefully  abandoned. — Disgraceful  retreat  of  Pemberton's 
army. — The  fate  of  Vicksburg  virtually  decided  at  the  Big  Black. — Gen.  John 
ston  orders  the  evacuation  of  Vicksburg. — Pemberton  entrapped  there. — Siege  and 
surrender  of  Vicksburg. — Confidence  of  the  garrison  restored. — Prospect  of  relief 
from  Johnston. — How  it  Vas  visionary. — Two  assaults  of  the  enemy  repulsed. — 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

Painful  operations  of  siege. — Sufferings  of  the  garrison. — Johnston  has  some  hope 
of  extricating  the  garrison. — Taylor's  attack  and  repulse  at  Millikcn's  Bench — 
Pemberton's  despatch  to  Johnston. — The  reply :  "  Something  may  yet  be  done  to 
save  Vicksburg." — Johnston  prepares  to  attack  on  7th  July. — Pemberton  surrenders 
on  Fourth  of  July. — His  conference  with  Grant. — A  terrible  day's  work. — Extent 
of  the  disaster  to  the  Confederate  cause.— Surrender  of  Port  Hudson.— Other  events 
in  the  region  of  the  Mississippi  connected  with  the  Fall  of  Vicksburg. — Operations 
in  the  Trans-Mississippi. — Battle  of  Helena. — Object  of  Gen.  Holmes'  movement  on 
Helena. — An  extraordinary  march. — An  extraordinary  council  of  war. — Gen. 
Price  protests  against  an  attack. — He  is  ordered  to  take  u  Graveyard  "  fort. — He 
succeeds. — The  other  attacks  fail. — Disastrous  retreat  of  Gen.  Holmes. — The  cam 
paign  in  Lower  Louisiana. — Gen.  Taylor's  capture  of  Brashear  City  and  its  forts* — 
His  operations  in  the  Lafourche  country. — His  successes  neutralized  by  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson. — Banks  returns  to  New  Orleans  and  the  enemy  holds 
the  entire  line  of  the  Mississippi 385 

CHAPTEK    XXIV. 

Favourable  aspects  of  Confederate  affairs  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville. — Alter 
native  of  campaigns  in  Richmond. — Virginia  and  Tennessee. — What  decided  the 
campaign  into  Pennsylvania. — Eeorganization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia**— 
Its  grand  preparations  on  the  Plains  of  Culpepper. — E well's  movement  upon  Win 
chester. — His  captures. — Order  of  Lee's  march  to  the  Potomac. — Hooker  out- 
generalled  and  blinded. — Lee's  march  to  Gettysburg,  a  master- piece  of  strategy*— 
Conduct  of  his  troops  in  the  enemy's  territory. — Gen.  Lee  abstains  from  "  retalia 
tion." — Comment  of  the  Richmond  "Examiner." — Gen.  Hooker  relieved,  and  Meade 
put  in  command  of  the  Federal  army. — Alarm  in  the  North. — Meade  marches 
towards  Gettysburg. — The  battle  of  Gettysburg. — A  Confederate  victory  the  first 
day. — How  it  was  not  improved. — A  great  errour. — The  critical  heights  of  Gettys 
burg  taken  by  the  enemy. — Cemetery  Ridge. — "  Round  Top." — The  Confederate 
line  of  battle. — Why  Gen.  Lee  determined  to  attack. — Action  of  the  second  day*— 
Longstreet's  desperate  engagement. — Temporary  possession  of  u  Round  Top.y — 
Successes  on  the  Confederate  left. — Action  of  the  third  day. — An  ominous  silence. 
— Sudden  and  terrible  cannonade. — Heroic  charge  of  Pickett's  division. — Sublime 
devotion  of  the  Virginians. — They  take  the  key  of  the  enemy's  position. — The 
shout  of  victory. — Pettigrew's  support  fails. — The  day  lost. — Gen.  Lee  rallying 
his  troops. — His  subsequent  retreat  to  the  Potomac. — Success  of  the  retreat. — He 
retires  to  the  line  of  the  Rapidan. — Gettysburg  the  climacteric  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy. — History  of  the  peace  mission  of  Vice-President  Stephens  as  connected 
therewith. — An  ostensible  letter  of  President  Davis. — How  the  mission  was  re 
pulsed. — The  honourable  position  of  the  Confederate  President 401 

CHAPTER     XXV. 

Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg  twin  disasters  for  the  Confederates. — Their  effect  on  the 
Confederate  currency. — The  financial  system  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. — The 
modern  system  of  public  credits  an  encouragement  to  war. — Review  of  financial 
experiments  in  the  modern  wars  of  Europe. — The  three  conspicuous  examples  of 
Great  Britain.  France  and  Russia. —  The  great  financial  errour  in  the  American 
war. — How  a  bank  of  exchequer  would  have  operated  in  the  war. — The  rule  of 
reflux  in  currency. — Brief  statement  of  financial  condition  of  North  and  South  at 
close  of  the  war. — Suspension  of  the  Southern  banks  in  the  first  year  of  the  war. 


XX  CONTENTS. 

— Amount  of  specie  in  the  South  at  the  commencement  of  the  war. — Principal 
measures  of  Confederate  finance. — How  the  Southern  banks  became  involved. — 
Practical  results  of  their  loan  to  the  Government. — "  Making  money  by  machinery." 
— Sales  of  Confederate  bonds. — Special  occasions  for  this  investment. — Unequal  to 
relieve  the  currency. — Rates  of  depreciation  of  the  Confederate  money. — Rich 
mond,  the  centre  of  finance  and  trade. — Gold  not  a  measure  of  value  in  the 
Confederacy. — Reasons  for  its  extraordinary  appreciation  there. — Comparison  of 
Confederate  money  with  the  Continental  currency  in  the  Revolution  of  17Y6.— 
Two  capital  causes  of  the  depreciation  of  the  Confederate  money. — The  influence 
of  speculation. — How  the  engrossers  managed  in  Richmond. — Summary  of  the 
mismanagement  of  the  Confederate  finances 415 

CHAPTER     XXVI. 

The  new  attempt  upon  Fort  Surnter  and  Charleston. — Gen.  Gillmore's  command. — His 
plan  of  operations. — What  was  proposed  by  the  reduction  of  the  works  on  Morris 
Island. — A  base  of  operations  on  Folly  Island. — How  Gen.  Beauregard  was  blinded 
and  deceived. — Forty-seven  guns  of  the  enemy  unmasked. — The  assault  on  Fort 
Wagner. — Gallantry  of  a  Connecticut  regiment.' — The  assault  repulsed. — Gen. 
Beauregard's  plans. — His  object  in  holding  Morris  Island. — Second  assault  on  Fort 
"Wagner  in  conjunction  with  Dahlgren's  fleet. — The  bombardment  of  Fort  Wagner. 
— Profound  and  significant  silence  of  the  garrison. — Advance  of  the  storming 
column. — Its  repulse. — Terrible  scenes  of  carnage. — Siege  operations. — Appeals  to 
the  South  Carolina  planters,  and  their  indifference. — Gillmore  prepares  to  bombard 
and  destroy  Charleston. — "The  Greek  Fire." — "The  Swamp  Angel."— Gillmore's 
notice  of  bombardment. — Sharp  and  memorable  reply  of  Gen.  Beauregard.— 
Cowardly  rejoicings  in  the  North. — The  bombardment  a  failure. — Attempted 
demolition  of  Fort  Sumter. — How  far  the  fort  was  injured  by  the  bombardment. — 
Gillmore  announces  its  reduction. — The  announcement  false  and  absurd. — Pro 
gress  of  the  siege  operations  against  Fort  Wagner. — A  .terrific  fire  opened  upon 
it. — Surpassing  grandeur  of  the  scene. — Gillmore  plans  another  assault  upon  the 
fort. — The  Confederates  evacuate  it  and  Morris  Island. — What  Gen.  Beauregard 
accomplished  by  the  retention  of  Morris  Island  for  two  months. — The  Island  not 
the  key  to  Charleston. — Admiral  Dahlgren  refuses  to  ascend  the  harbour  with  his 
iron-clads. — He  summons  Fort  Sumter  to  surrender. — Beauregard's  reply. — A 
boat-attack  on  the  Fort. — Its  disastrous  repulse. — The  enemy's  operations  against 
Charleston  degenerate  into  a  chronic  and  fruitless  bombardment. — Disappoint 
ment  in  the  North 429 

CHAPTER      XXVII. 

General  Joseph  E.  Johnston's  prophecy  of  the  fate  of  Tennessee. — Character  and  ex 
traordinary  foresight  of  this  commander. — How  Tennessee  was  sacrificed  to  the 
attempted  defence  of  Vicksburg. — Bragg's  army  flanked  at  Hoover's  Gap. — It 
commences  a  retreat  to  Chattanooga. — Expedition  of  John  Morgan. — How  it 
affected  the  Western  campaign  and  embarrassed  Burnside. — Morgan's  circuit 
through  Kentucky,  Indiana,  and  Ohio. — What  he  accomplished. — His  anxiety  for 
retreat. — Cut  off  on  the  Ohio  River. — Terrible  scenes  in  the  attempt  to  swim  the 
river. — Capture  of  Morgan  and  the  bulk  of  his  command. — Cruel  and  infamous 
treatment  of  the  distinguished  captive  and  his  officers. — Surrender  of  Cumberland 
Gap. — President  Davis'  commentary  on  this  event.-Recoil  of  serious  charges  upon 
the  Richmond  administration. — Burnside's  invasion  of  East  Tennessee. — Gen. 


CONTENTS.  XXI 

Frazier  in  command  at  Cumberland  Gap.— His  correspondence  with  Gen.  Buckner. 
— The  defences  of  the  Gap  imperfect. — Insufficiency  of  the  garrison. — Why  Gen. 
Frazier  surrendered  it. — Two  lines  of  operations  now  opened  against  Chattanooga. 
— The  Battle  of  Chickamauga. — Topography  of  the  country  around  Chattanooga. — 
Movements  of  Rosecrans. — He  threatens  a  flank  movement  towards  Rome. — The 
Confederates  evacuate  Chattanooga. — Bragg'snew  line  from  Lee's  and  Gordon's  Mills 
to  Lafayette. — Longstreet's  corps  on  the  way  from  Virginia  to  reinforce  him. — 
Rosecrans  pursues  the  Confederates,  and  exposes  himself  in  detail. — The  lost 
opportunity  in  M'Lenore's  Cove. — Lines  of  Rosecrans'  advance. — Bragg  resolves 
to  advance  and  attack  him. — Arrival  of  Longstreet  with  five  brigades.— The 
enemy  anticipates  a  flank  movement  by  Bragg. — A  severe  encounter. — Cleburne's 
gallant  charge. — The  Confederate  plan  of  battle  for  the  next  day. — Gen.  Polk  to 
open  the  action. — A  strange  delay. — A  singular  breakfast  scene. — Gen.  Bragg 
furious. — The  Confederate  right  wing  beaten  back. — Critical  condition  of  the 
field. — Longstreet's  attack. — He  saves  the  day. — The  enemy  utterly  routed. — 
Chickamauga  a  brilliant  but  unproductive  victory 439 

CHAPTER    XXVIII. 

Conference  of  Gens.  Bragg  and  Longstreet  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga. 
— Longstreet's  plan  of  campaign  north  of  the  Tennessee  River. — Why  Gen.  Bragg 
declined  it. — His  investment  of  Chattanooga. — He  cuts  off  the  enemy's  supplies. 
— He  hopes  to  starve  the  garrison  into  surrender. — Reorganization  of  the  Federal 
armies  in  the  west. — Gen.  Grant's  new  and  large  command. — His  first  task  to 
relieve  Thomas  in  Chattanooga. — His  successful  lodgment  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Tennessee  River. — Surprise  of  Longstreet. — The  Confederates  retreat  to  Lookout 
Mountain. — Longstreet  makes  a  night  attack  on  the  enemy's  new  position,  but  is 
repulsed. — The  enemy  accomplishes  the  relief  of  Chattanooga. — Detachment  of 
Longstreet  from  Bragg's  front  to  operate  against  Knoxville.— This  unfortunate 
movement  the  work  of  President  Davis. — Military  pragmatism  and  vanity  of  the 
Confederate  president. — Grant  determines  to  take  the  offensive. — The  Battle  of 
Missionary  Ridge. — Extraordinary  strength  of  the  Confederate  position. — Two  at 
tacks  repulsed. — General  advance  of  the  Federal  lines  to  the  crest  of  Missionary 
Ridge. — Audacity  of  the  movement. — Bad  conduct  of  the  Confederate  troops. — A 
shameful  panic. — Causes  of  the  extraordinary  misconduct  of  Bragg's  army. — It 
falls  back  to  Dalton. — Longstreet's  expedition  against  Knoxville. — His  pursuit  of 
Burnside. — His  unsuccessful  assault  on  Fort  Sanders  at  Knoxville. — He  retreats  to 
Rogersville,  is  cut  off  from  Virginia,  and  spends  the  winter  in  North-eastern  Ten 
nessee. — Operations  in  Virginia  in  the  Fall  of  1863. — Lee  attempts  to  flank  Meade 
and  get  between  him  and  Washington. — An  extraordinary  adventure  of  Stuart's 
cavalry. — Meade  retreats  to  and  beyond  Bull  Run. — Failure  of  Lee's  flank  move 
ment. — Incidents  of  success  for  the  Confederates. — Lee  retires  to  the  Rappah  fin- 
nock. — Affair  of  Rappahannock  Bridge. — Affair  of  Germauia  Ford.— Desultory 
operations  between  Lee's  lines  and  East  Tennessee. — Averill's  raid. — Close  of  the 
campaign  of  1863  in  Virginia 453 

CHAPTER    XXIX. 

Effect  of  the  Federal  successes  of  1863  on  the  Northern  elections. — Estimate  in  the 
Richmond  newspapers  of  the  Democratic  alliance  in  the  North. — Losses  of  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  elections  of  1863. — President  Lincoln's  triumph. — His 
administration  strengthened. — It  ventures  to  new  lengths. — Arrest  of  Mr.  Val- 


XXli  CONTENTS. 

landigham. — Protests  of  the  Democratic  Party. — Their  worthless  and  ridiculous 
character. — New  and  vigorous  measures  of  war  at  Washington. — Scarcity  of  men 
and  of  food,  the  two  concerns  at  Kichmond. — Meagre  results  of  the  Conscription 
law. — An  alarming  statement  from  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War. — Diminution 
of  subsistence  in  the  Confederacy. — Suffering  among  the  people  and  army. — His 
tory  of  the  Confederate  commissariat. — Report  of  the  meat  supplies  in  the  Con 
federacy  in  January,  1862. — Effect  of  the  campaigns  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  on 
the  question  of  subsistence. — Proposition  to  get  meat  through  the  enemy's  lines. 
— Obstinate  objections  of  President  Davis. — His  mania  about  cotton. — The  Con 
federate  States  drained  of  meat  in  the  second  year  of  the  war. — Statement  of 
Commissary  $Torthrop. — Attempt  to  get  supplies  through  the  blockade. — How 
mismanaged. — The  Crenshaw  contract. — Small  yield  of  impressments. — The  whole 
Confederate  policy  of  subsistence  a  failure. — An  extraordinary  device  of  Secretary 
Seddon. — How  it  played  into  the  hands  of  speculators. — Reflection  upon  the  want 
of  the  commercial  or  business  faculty  in  the  Southern  mind. — A  stock  of  childish 
expedients 464 

CHAPTER    XXX. 

A  train  of  Confederate  successes  in  the  beginning  of  1864. — The  Battle  of  Ocean  Pond. — 
Gen.  Seymour's  expedition  into  Florida — Its  defeat  and  complete  disaster. — 
Sherman's  expedition  in  the  Southwest. — His  first  experiment  of  "the  moveable 
column." — His  designs  upon  Mobile  and  the  Confederate  lines  in  North  Georgia. — 
The  co-operating  column  of  cavalry. — Gen.  Polk  evacuates  Meridian,  and  falls 
back  to  Demopolis.— Forrest  defeats  the  Federal  cavalry. — Disastrous  and  dis 
graceful  conclusion  of  Sherman's  adventure. — The  Red  River  expedition. — Gen. 
Banks'  designs  upon  Texas.  — The  Confederate  commands  in  the  Trans-Mississippi. 
— The  federal  advance  up  Red  River.— The  Confederates  fall  back  towards 
Shreveport. — Battle  of  Mansfield. — How  the  action  was  brought  on. — Rout  of  the 
enemy. — Singular  scenes  on  the  pursuit. — Battle  of  Pleasant  Hill. — An  unfortunate 
mistake  of  orders.— Churchill's  corps  panic-stricken. — Gen.  Walker  holds  the 
field. — The  enemy  continues  his  retreat  to  Alexandria. — His  inarch  a  career  of 
unparalleled  cowardice  and  crime. — Large  spoils  of  the  Confederates. — The  ex 
tent  of  Banks'  disaster. — Termination  of  his  vision  of  empire  west  of  the  Missis 
sippi. — Forrest's  expedition  up  the  Mississippi. — Capture  of  Fort  Pillow.— Hoke's 
operations  on  the  North  Carolina  coast. — Comparative  unimportance  of  these  Con 
federate  successes. — The  raid  of  Ulric  Dahlgren. — The  parts  of  Custer  and  Kil- 
patrick. — Failure  and  ludicrous  cowardice  of  the  several  expeditions. — Dahlgren's 
atrocious  designs. — He  retreats,  and  is  chased  by  Pollard. — Manner  of  his  death. 
—Discovery  of  "the  Dahlgren  papers." — Sensation  in  Richmond. — President  Davis' 
melodrama. — Statement  of  Edward  W.  Halbach  in  relation  to  the  "  Dahlgren  pa 
pers." — The  papers  first  found  by  the  schoolboy  Littlepage. — How  transmitted  to 
Richmond. — 'The  theory  of  forgery. — Its  utter  absurdity 490 

CHAPTER    XXXI. 

Opening  of  the  great  spring  campaign  of  1864. — Explanation  of  renewed  confidence  in  Rich 
mond. — Prospect  for  the  Confederates  in  the  Presidential  contest  of  1864. — A  new 
theory  of  peace. — Value  of  endurance. — The  mission  of  Messrs.  Holcombe,  Clay,  and 
Thompson. — They  leave  Wilmington  when  the  campaign  on  the  Rapidan  opens. — 
U.  S.  Grant  appointed  Lieutenant-General  of  the  Federal  .armies. — Character  of 
Grant.— Compared  with  Buell. — Gen.  Grant's  low  and  gross  conception  of  war.— 


CONTENTS.  XX111 

The  Federal  Government  prepares  an  army  organization  of  one  million  of  men. — 
Distribution  of  the  Federal  forces  in  Virginia. — Strength  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac. — Position  and  numbers  of  Gen.  Lee. — His  great  anxiety. — Appeal  of  Con 
federate  women. — The  battles  of  the  Wilderness.— Grant  crosses  the  Rapidan. — 
Lee  springs  upon  his  flank. — Attack  of  Ewell  and  Hill. — The  Confederate  lino 
broken. — Gordon's  splendid  charge. — Gallant  conduct  of  Pegram's  and  Hays1  di 
visions. — Night  attack  of  the  enemy. — The  second  day's  battle. — Hill's  corps 
broken. — Longstreet  comes  up  and  turns  the  fortunes  of  the  day. — He  is  shot 
down  by  his  own  men. — Gen.  Lee  offers  to  lead  a  charge. — Touching  remons 
trances  of  the  men. — The  Confederate  attack  withdrawn. — Results  of  the  day.— 
Gordon's  night  attack. — Grant's  whole  army  on  the  verge  of  rout.-— His  immense 
losses. — Movements  of  the  two  armies  to  Spottsylvania  Court-house. — Masterly 
performance  of  Lee. — A  melancholy  episode  to  the  campaign. — Sheridan's  expedi 
tion. — Death  of  Gen.  Stuart. — Battles  of  Spottsylvania  Court-house. — Combat  of 
Anderson's  corps. — The  fighting  on  the  10th  May. — The  battle  on  the  12th. — A 
salient  of  the  Confederate  line  taken. — Great  slaughter  of  the  enemy. — Grant 
confesses  a  failure,  and  waits  six  days  for  reinforcements. — Operations  on  the 
south  side  of  Richmond. — Grant's  instructions  to  Butler. — Sigel's  column  in  West 
ern  Virginia,  another  part  of  the  combination. — Butler's  boastful  despatch. — He 
dares  "  The  whole  of  Lee's  army." — He  is  defeated  by  Beauregard,  and  his  army 
"  bottled  up." — Operations  in  the  Kanawha  and  Shenandoah  Valleys. — Signal  de 
feat  of  Sigel. — Grant's  combination  broken  down. — He  moves  to  the  North  Anna 
River. — Is  foiled  again  by  Lee. — He  crosses  the  Pamunkey  River. — "The  Pen 
insula"  made  the  battle-ground  again. — The  sum  of  glory  achieved  by  Lee's 
army. — Statement  as  to  Lee's  reinforcements. — The  Federal  host  held  at  bay  by 
an  army  of  fifty  thousand  men. — Gaseous  nonsense  in  New  York  about  Grant's 
generalship. — His  operations  in  May  absurd  and  contemptible  failures 607 

CHAPTER     XXXII. 

Position  of  the  armies  around  Richmond,  June  1,  1864. — Manoeuvres  for  position,— 
Battle  of  Cold  Harbour. — Easy  repulse  of  the  enemy. — Grant  decides  to  cross  the 
river,  and  attempt  the  south  sifle  of  Richmond. — WThy  Gen.  Lee  did  not  attempt 
to  attack  him  in  the  movement. — Battles  of  Petersburg. — Two  attacks  of  the 
enemy  repulsed. — Butler  advances  his  position,  and  is  driven  back. — Grant  turns 
his  attention  from  the  fortifications  to  the  railroads. — Demonstrations  on  the 
Weldon  and  Danville  Roads. — Defeat  of  Sheridan's  expedition  on  the  railroads 
north  of  Richmond. — Operations  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge. — Hunter's  movement — 
He  captures  Staunton. — He  advances  upon  Lynchburg. — He  is  defeated,  and  driven 
into  Western  Virginia. — Gen.  John  Morgan's  expedition  into  Kentucky. — Its  disas 
trous  conclusion. — Particulars  of  the  murder  of  Gen.  Morgan  in  East  Tennessee. — 
Early's  invasion  of  Maryland. — Daring  of  Gen.  Lee. — What  he  proposed  by  send 
ing  Early's  column  into  the  North. — Grant's  preparations  against  this  movement. — 
Battle  of  Monocacy  Bridge. — Defeat  of  "Lew"  Wallace's  command. — Early  ad 
vances  upon  Washington. — Skirmish  in  front  of  Fort  Stevens. — Early  declines  to 
attack  the  Federal  capital  and  retreats. — Questions  as  to  the  strength  of  Washing 
ton. — Results  of  Early's  expedition. — Its  effect  on  the  armies  operating  arouiud 
Richmond. — The  mine  fiasco  at  Petersburg. — Three  elements  in  the  plan  of  attack. 
— Description  of  the  mine. — The  explosion  and  a  "feu  tfEnfer" — The  assaulting 
column  pausea  in  the  crater. — Terrible  scenes  of  carnage. — The  miserable  failure. 
—Commentary  of  the  New  York  "  Times." 526 


XXIV  CONTENTS. 


OHAPTEE    XXXIII. 

Sherman's  campaign  in  Georgia  the  important  correspondent  of  Grant's  in  Virginia. — 
The  "  On  to  Eichmond,"  and  the  "  On  to  Atlanta,"  the  two  important  movements 
of  1864. — Sherman's  demand  of  numbers. — Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston's  command. — 
He  proposes  an  offensive  movement. — Is  balked  by  Bragg  at  Richmond.— -Statement 
of  Johnston's  forces  on  1st  May. — Johnston's  policy  of  retreat. — He  proposes  to 
fight  at  Cassville ;  but  is  overruled  by  Hood  and  Hardee. — He  crosses  the  Etowah. 
— Engagement  at  New  Hope  Church. — Battle  of  Kenesaw  Mountain. — Sherman's 
ghastly  experiment. — He  resorts  to  manoeuvring. — Johnston  retires  to  Atlanta. — 
The  situation  around  Atlanta. — Defeat  of  Sturgis'  column  in  North  Mississippi. — 
Johnston  master  of  the  situation. — Wonderful  success  of  his  retreat. — He  holds 
Sherman  suspended  for  destruction. — Naval  fight  in  Mobile  Bay. — A  match  of  212 
guns  against  22. — How  the  gunboats  Selma  and  Morgan  fought  the  enemy. — 
Gallant  fight  of  the  iron-clad  Tennessee. — Surrender  of  the  forts  in  the  harbour. 
— Little  value  of  Farragut's  conquest. — Excessive  laudation  of  him  in  the  North. 
—Sinking  of  the  Confederate  privateer  Alabama. — Review  of  the  result  of  the 
privateering  service  of  the  Confederates. — A  glance  at  British  "  neutrality." — How 
Earl  Russell  was  bullied  by  the  Washington  Government. — The  story  of  the  Lairds' 
rams. — Cruise  of  the  Alabama. — Why  she  fought  the  Kearsarge  oif  the  French 
coast. — Capt.  Semmes'  motives  for  a  naval  duel. — The  Alabama  sinking. — The 
Federal  vessel  sends  no  relief. — Mr.  Seward's  little  remark  about  "pirates." — 
Discovery  of  concealed  armour  on  the  Kearsarge. — How  the  Richmond  editors 
would  have  treated  Capt.  Winslow. — A  curious  annecdote  of  Admiral  Farra- 
gut. — Capture  of  the  privateer  Florida, — The  exploit  of  Napoleon  Collins  in  a 
neutral  port. — He  attempts  to  sink  and  then  steals  the  Confederate  vessel. — The 
New  York  Herald  and  "  The  pages  of  History.1' — Invasion  of  Missouri  by  Gen. 
Price. — How  and  why  it  failed. — The  Trans-Mississippi  sunk  out  of  sight  in  the 
War 539 

CHAPTER    XXXIV. 

The  Presidential  canvass  of  1864  in  the  North. — Its  relations  to  the  military  campaign. 
— Review  of  parties  in  the  North. — A  general  distinction  founded  on  two 
questions. — Composition  of  the  party  opposing  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration. — The 
doctrines  of  the  Black  Republican  party  impossible  to  be  defined. — How  the  Party 
changed  and  shifted  through  the  war. — Opinions  of  Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Clay. — 
Modern  verification  of  Mr.  Clay's  charge  of  "  amalgamation." — Policy  of  the  Black 
Republican  party  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. — Mr.  Lincoln's  instincts  of  un wor 
thiness. — How  the  Peace  party  in  the  North  made  the  first  false  step. — Growth 
of  the  power  of  Lincoln's  administration. — Its  measures  of  terrour. — Moderation 
of  the  Confederacy  towards  "Union  men"  and  dissentients. — Some  account  of 
arrests  in  the  North. — Lincoln's  detective  system. — Comparative  impossibility  of 
maintaining  an  Opposition  party  in  the  North. — Infamous  conduct  of  "War 
Democrats." — The  Conservative  phalanx  in  the  Congress  at  Washington. — A 
record  of  its  votes. — Reassurance  of  the  Conservative  party  in.  1864. — The  party 
issues  of  1864,  with  reference  to  "reconstruction." — Convention  of  the  Govern 
ment  party  at  Baltimore. — Its  "platform." — Pretermission  of  the  condition  of 
State  abolition  of  slavery. — How  this  condition  was  afterwards  inserted. — Mr. 
Lincoln's  rescript,  "  To  whom  it  may  concern." — History  of  the  Niagara  Falls  com 
mission. — How  Mr.  Lincoln's  passport  was  made  a  political  card. — Democratic 


CONTENTS.  XXY 

Convention  at  Chicago. — Its  declaration  of  principles. — M'Clellan's  letter  of 
acceptance. — Slavery  no  longer  an  issue  in  the  war.- — The  constitutional  point  at 
issue  between  M'Clellan  and  Lincoln. — The  Radical  wing  of  the  Republican  party. 
— The  Cleveland  convention. — The  issues  of  the  canvass  as  between  the  Democratic 
party,  the  Government  party,  and  the  Radical  party. — How  the  two  last 
instead  of  the  two  first  coalesced. — "Reconstruction"  ante-dated. — A  faint 
hint  of  negro  suffrage. — The  written  issues  of  the  canvass  but  little  considered. 
— The  contest  mainly  on  the  fourth  resolution  of  the  Chicago  "platform." — 
Eloquence  of  the  M'Clellan  campaign  papers. — The  election  of  M'Clellan  impossible 
in  view  of  the  Federal  victories  of  1864. — Triumph  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  party.— 
Analysis  of  the  popular  vote  in  his  election. — A  large  element  of  encouragement 
in  it. — The  victory  of  the  Constitution  postponed 556 

CHAPTER    XXXV. 

AJO.  intrigue  in  Richmond  against  Gen.  Johnston. — Evidence  of  it. — Gen.  Bragg's  visit  to 
Atlanta. — Removal  of  Gen.  Johnston  from  command. — The  battles  of  Atlanta.— 
Engagements  of  the  20th,  22d,  and  28th  July. — Sherman's  designs  on  the  Macon 
Road. — Unsuccessful  raids  of  Stoneman  and  M'Cook. — Hood's  great  mistake. — He 
sends  off  his  cavalry  towards  Chattanooga. — Sherman  moves  on  the  Macon  Road. 
— Defeat  of  Hardee  at  Jonesboro'. — Hood  evacuates  Atlanta,  and  retreats  to  Love- 
joy's  Station. — Sherman's  occupation  of  Atlanta. — His  order  for  its  depopulation. — 
Atrocious  character  of  this  measure. — The  fall  of  Atlanta  a  serious  disaster  for 
the  Confederates. — Visit  of  President  Davis  to  the  military  lines  in  Georgia. — His 
speech  at  Macon. — He  betrays  to  the  enemy  the  new  military  design. — Hood's  new 
movement  to  Tennessee. — Sherman  follows  to  Gaylesville. — He  turns  back  and 
determines  to  traverse  the  State  of  Georgia  to  the  sea. — His  correspondence  with 
Grant. — How  the  enterprise  was  a  plain  one. — No  peril  or  genius  in  it. — Errors  of 
the  Hood-Davis  strategy. — Hood's  Tennessee  campaign. — He  loses  the  great' 
opportunity  of  the  campaign  at  Spring  Hill. — Schofield  effects  a  retreat  to 
Franklin. — Battle  of  Franklin. — Heroic  conduct  of  the  Confederate  troops. — 
Remarkable  loss  among  their  general  officers. — Battle  of  Nashville. — Gen. 
Grant's  fears  that  Hood  would  invade  Kentucky. — Probable  effect  of  such  a 
movement. — The  enemy's  plan  of  battle. — The  second  day's  fight. — Hood's 
assurance  of  victory. — A  Confederate  brigade  gives  way  before  a  skirmish  line 
of  the  enemy. — A  disgraceful  panic  and  rout.— Hood  escapes  across  the  Tennes 
see  River. — His  losses. — The  whole  scheme  of  Confederate  defence  terminated 
West  of  the  Alleghanies 576 

CHAPTER    XXXVI. 

Campaign  of  1864  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia. — Its  general  design  as  a  strategic  auxiliary 
to  Richmond. — The  new  command  of  the  enemy  in  the  Valley. — Gen.  Sheridan  and 
his  forces.— Views  of  Gen.  Lee  about  the  relief  of  Richmond. — He  detaches  a 
force  under  Gen.  Anderson  to  co-operate  with  Early,  and  "  stir  up"  the  enemy 
across  the  Potomac. — Anderson  and  Fitzhugh  Lee  find  Early  falling  back  and  asking 
for  reinforcements. — The  enemy  declines  a  battle  and  retreats  to  Harper's  Ferry.— 
Strength  and  disposition  of  the  Confederate  forces  about  Winchester. — Nearly  a 
month  consumed  in  marching  and  counter-marching. — Gen.  Lee  orders  the  return  of 
Gen.  Anderson  with  Kershaw's  division. — Battle  of  Winchester. — Gen.  Grant  advises 
Sheridan  to  "go  in."— Early's  small  force.— How  it  came  to  be  scattered  over 
twenty-two  miles.— Ramseur's  division  sustains  the  attack  until  the  other  Confed- 


XXVI  CONTENTS. 

erate  forces  come  up. — Gordon  drives  the  enemy. — Happy  stroke  of  a  Confederate 
battery. — The  enemy's  infantry  routed. — His  cavalry  get  on  the  Confederate  left 
and  rear  and  change  the  day. — Retreat  of  the  Confederates. — Battle  of  Fisher's  Hill. 
— How  Gen.  Early's  position  was  defective  here. — He  is  flanked  on  the  left,  and 
retreats  up  the  Valley. — The  enemy  pursues  to  Staunton. — Sheridan's  barbarous 
order  to  devastate  the  Valley. — He  burns  "two  thousand  barns." — Keflections 
upon  this  outrage. — Battle  of  Cedar  Creek. — Early,  reinforced,  resumes  the  cam 
paign,  and  determines  to  make  a  surprise. — A  flanking  column  of  Confederates 
crosses  the  North  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah. — Two  corps  of  the  enemy  broken  and 
put  to  rout. — The  enemy  pursued  through  Middletown. — How  the  vigour  of  pursuit 
was  lost. — The  foolish  newspaper  story  about  Gen.  Sheridan's  sudden  appearance  on 
the  field. — The  Confederates  demoralized  b£  pillage. — The  enemy  makes  a  counter 
charge,  and  sweeps  everything  before  him. — Gen.  Early's  attempt  to  put  the 
censure  of  the  disaster  upon  his  men. — How  far  he  was  responsible  for  it. — True 
explanation  of  the  pause  in  his  victory. — Removal  of  Gen.  Early  from  command. — 
Gen.  Lee's  generous  letter  to  him. — How  the  newspapers  berated  him. — The  charge 
of  habitual  intoxication. — Review  of  the  Valley  campaign. — Its  effects  decisive  upon 
Richmond. — Remark  of  a  Confederate  general. — Some  views  of  the  management  and 
disposition  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  forces  in  Virginia 689 

CHAPTER     XXXVII. 

Gen.  Grant's  opinion  of  manoeuvring. — Lee  his  master  in  every  branch  of  generalship. — 
The  Federals  get  possession  of  the  Weldon  railroad. — Action  at  Ream's  Station. — 
Operations  North  of  James  River. — Surprise  and  capture  of  Fort  Harrison. — At 
tempt  of  the  Confederates  to  retake  it  disconcerted  and  defeated. — Grant  plans 
a  general  advance  in  October. — Three  corps  of  the  enemy  in  motion. — Attempt 
to  turn  the  Confederate  position  on  Hatcher's  Run,  and  seize  the  Southside  Rail 
road. — Defeat  of  the  enemy  and  frustration  of  his  plans. — Public  attention  drawn 
to  Georgia. — Sherman's  march  to  the  sea. — He  returns  from  Gaylesville  to  Atlanta. 
— The  work  of  destruction  commenced  at  Rome. — Burning  cf  Atlanta. — More  than 
four  thousand  houses  consumed. — Outline  of  Sherman's  march  from  Atlanta. — The 
country  it  traverses  full  of  supplies. — Pillage  of  Madison. — Concentration  of  the 
enemy's  forces  at  Milledgeville. — An  affair  of  militia  at  Griswoldsville. — Kil- 
patrick's  demonstration  on  Augusta. — Statement  of  Confederate  forces  there. — 
Sherman's  march  to  Millen. — He  meets  with  no  resistance. — His  devastation  of  the 
country. — Prowess  of  his  troops  in  pillage  and  villainy. — Nothing  but  militia  and 
hasty  levies  to  oppose  him. — Sherman's  approach  to  Savannah. — Fort  M'Allister 
taken  by  assault. — Gallantry  of  the  Confederate  garrison. — Gen.  Hardee  evacuates 
Savannah. — Extent  of  Sherman's  captures. — How  much  of  his  achievements  was 
"  simple  waste  and  destruction." — Review  of  "  the  great  march." — Absurd  his 
torical  comparisons  in  the  North. — Character  of  Gen.  Sherman.— His  charlatanism. 
— His  proper  place  in  history 606 

CHAPTER    XXXVIII. 

The  exchange  of  prisoners,  and  their  treatment  in  captivity. — Exceeding  interest  of 
the  subject. — Slight  account  of  prisoners  in  the  early  periods  of  the  war. — Mr. 
Boyce's  proposition. — The  "Wool-Cobb  negotiation. — The  Fort  Donelson  captures. 
— -Bad  faith  of  the  Federal  Government. — The  cartel  of  1862. — Character  of  Com 
missioner  Ould. — His  humane  and  zealous  services. — Shameful  violation  of 
the  cartel  by  the  Federal  authorities. — Solemn  protest  of  Commissioner  Ould. — 


CONTENTS.  XXVli 

Counter-charge  of  the  Federals. — It  is  disproved  by  Commissioner  Ould. — Case  of' 
Straight. — The  Federal  Government  declares  paroles  void. — Commissioner  Ould 
denounces  the  cheat. — His  retaliation  with  respect  to  the  Vicksburg  prisoners.— 
He  waives  the  cartel,  and  makes  a  new  proposition. — He  sends  to  Washington 
lists  of  mortality  in  the  Anderson ville  prison. — The  Federal  Government  does  not 
reply. — Its  persistent  and  inhuman  silence. — Explanation  of  it. — The  Washington 
Government  resolved  to  make  a  case  of  "  rebel  barbarity." — The  site,  arrange 
ments  and  discipline  of  the  Andersonville  prison. — Explanation  of  the  suffering  and 
mortality  there. — Extraordinary  proposition  of  the  Confederate  Government  to 
release  without  equivalents  and  without  formality  all  sick  and  wounded  Federal 
prisoners. — Secretary  Stanton  deaf  to  the  cry  of  the  sufferers. — His  great  guilt. — 
Exchanges  resumed  under  Gen.  Grant's  authority. — Report  of  the  joint  select 
committee  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  appointed  to  investigate  the  condition  and 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war. — Northern  publications  on  this  subject. — Refuta 
tion  of  "  raw  -  head  -  and  -  bloody  -  bones  "  stories. — Humanity  of  the  Confederate 
authorities. — A  terrible  record  of  Federal  cruelties. — Barbarous  punishments  in 
Northern  prisons. — Last  humane  proposition  of  Commissioner  Ould. — His  letter  to 
Gen.  Grant.— A  complete  record  of  justice  and  humanity  on  the  part  of  the  Con 
federates...  616 


CHAPTER     XXXIX. 

How  Sherman's  march  through  Georgia  developed  a  crisis  in  the  Confederacy. — Geo 
graphical  impossibility  of  the  conquest  of  the  South. — Address  of  the  Confederate 
Congress. — A  vulgar  and  false  estimate  of  the  enemy's  success. — Maps  of  conquest 
and  cobweb  lines  of  occupation. — General  decay  of  public  spirit  in  the  Con 
federacy. — Popular  impatience  of  the  war. — Want  of  confidence  in  President  Davis' 
administration. — Bewildered  attempts  at  counter-revolution. — Executive  misman 
agement  in  Richmond. — How  the  Conscription  law  was  cheated. — Deserters  in 
the  Confederate  armies. — Peculiar  causes  for  it. — Its  frightful  extent. — How  it 
was  not  a  sign  of  infidelity  to  the  Confederate  cause. — Condition  of  the  commis 
sariat. — Bread  taken  from  Gen.  Lee's  army  to  feed  prisoners. — Alarming  reduc 
tion  of  supplies. — Major  French's  letter. — Lee's  troops  bordering  on  starvation, — 
Eight  points  presented  to  Congress. — What  it  did. — The  condition  of  the  currency. 
— Congress  curtails  the  currency  one-third. — Act  of  17th  February,  1864. — Secre 
tary  Seddon  gives  the  coup-de-grace  to  the  currency. — His  new  standard  of  value 
in  wheat  at  forty  dollars  a  bushel. — Disorders  of  the  currency  and  commissariat 
as  contributing  to  desertions. — Impracticability  of  all  remedies  for  desertions. — No 
disaffection  in  the  Confederacy,  except  with  reference  to  faults  of  .the  Richmond 
administration.— President  Davis  and  the  Confederate  Congress,  &c. — Three  princi 
pal  measures  in  Congress  directed  against  the  President. — Remonstrance  of  the  Vir 
ginia  delegation  with  reference  to  the  Cabinet. — Resignation  of  Mr.  Seddon. — Per 
sonal  relations  between  President  Davis  and  Gen.  Lee. — Why  the  latter  declined 
to  take  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy. — Want  of  self-assertion  in 
Gen.  Lee's  character. — Why  his  influence  in  the  general  affairs  of  the  Confederacy 
was  negative. — Recrimination  between  President  Davis  and  Congress. — A  singular 
item  in  the  Conscription  Bureau. — Remark  of  Mrs.  Davis  to  a  Confederate  Senator. 
—The  opposition  led  by  Senator  Wigfall. — His  terrible  and  eloquent  invectives. — 
A  chapter  of  great  oratory  lost  to  the  world. — An  apparent  contradiction  in  the 
President's  character. — The  influence  of  "  small  favourites." — John  M.  Daniel's 


XXV111  CONTENTS. 

opinion  of  President  Davis'  tears. — Influence  of  the  President  almost  entirely  gone 
in  the  last  periods  of  the  war. — The  visible  wrecks  of  his  administration. — 
History  of  "  peace  propositions  "  in  Congress. — They  were  generalities. — Analysis 
of  the  "  Union  Party  "  in  the  South. — How  Gov.  Brown,  of  Georgia,  was  used  by 
it. — Its  persistent  design  upon  the  Virginia  Legislature. — How  it  was  rebuffed. — 
Heroic  choice  of  Virginia. — President  Davis'  tribute  to  this  State. — Want  of  reso 
lution  in  other  parts  of  the  Confederacy. — Summary  explanation  of  the  decline  and 
fall  of  the  Confederacy. — Proposition  to  arm  the  slaves  of  the  South  indicative  of 
a  desperate  condition. — How  it  was  impracticable  and  absurd. — Not  five  thousand 
spare  muskets  in  the  Confederacy. — Paltry  legislation  of  Congress. — Grasping  at 
shadows 644 


CHAPTER    XL. 

Gen.  Sherman's  new  base  at  Savannah. — He  prepares  to  march  through  the  Carolinas. — 
Gen.  Grant's  first  idea  to  bring  Sherman's  army  to  Virgina  by  water. — Opening 
of  the  Carolina  campaign. — Howard's  movement  towards  Charleston. — The  line  of 
the  Salkahatchie  taken. — Slocum  threatens  Augusta. — Junction  of  the  two  columns 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Augusta  and  Charleston  Railroad. — Scenes  of  license  and 
plunder  on  Sherman's  march. — Savage  atrocities. — The  track  of  fire. — Sherman's 
"bummers." — What  was  thought  of  them  in  Washington. — Sherman  turns  his 
columns  on  Columbia. — Disposition  of  the  Confederate  forces  between  Augusta 
and  Charleston. — Why  Columbia  was  not  defended. — Gallantry  of  Gen.  "Wade  Hamp 
ton. — Sack  and  destruction  of  Columbia. — Sherman's  solemn  promise  to  the  Mayor. 
— Robbery  and  outrage  in  the  streets. — The  Catholic  Convent. — Some  of  the  Fede 
ral  soldiers  tell  of  the  proposed  destruction  of  the  town. — It  is  fired  in  twenty 
places. — Horrors  of  the  conflagration. — Scenes  of  misery  and  ruin. — Proofs  that 
Sherman  was  responsible  for  the  fire. — Array  of  evidence  on  this  subject. — Fall 
of  Charleston. — The  city  evacuated  by  Hardee. — Occasion  of  delay  by  President 
Davis. — An  explosion  and  conflagration. — Appearance  of  the  city  after  four  years 
of  conflict. — Capture  of  Fort  Fisher. — Fall  of  Wilmington. — The  enemy's  views  of 
the  importance  of  Wilmington. — How  it  was  to  be  used  as  another  base  of  opera 
tions  towards  Richmond. — Its  capture  auxiliary  to  Sherman's  movement. — The 
first  expedition  against  it. — Butler's  powder-ship. — Failure  of  the  expedition. — 
The  Butler-Grant  controversy. — Second  expedition  against  Wilmington. — Gen. 
Bragg  again  on  the  military  stage. — How  the  enemy  effected  a  landing  above 
Fort  Fisher. — Want  of  vigilance  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates. — Gen.  Hoke 
flanked  and  retreats. — The  Fort  taken  by  assault. — Co-operation  of  the  enemy's 
fleet. — Its  terrible  fire. — Gen.  Bragg  evacuates  Wilmington. — Grant's  instructions 
to  Schofield  to  co-operate  with  Sherman. — The  campaign  in  North  Carolina. — 
Sherman  moves  apparently  towards  Charlotte,  and  deflects  to  Fayetteville. — 
Movement  of  the  co-operating  columns  from  Wilmington  and  Newborn. — Gen. 
Bragg  engages  the  enemy  near  Kinston. — Success  of  the  Confederates. — Arrival 
of  Schofield  and  Terry  at  Goldsboro'. — Sherman  pushes  on  there. — Gen.  Johnston's 
command,  and  distribution  of  the  Confederate  forces. — Hardee  loses  two-thirds 
of  his  army  by  desertions.— He  engages  the  enemy  near  Averysboro',  and  is  com 
pelled  to  fall  back. — The  engagement  at  Bentonville. — Johnston  fights  two  corps 
of  the  enemy  and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  with  fourteen  thousand  men. — Success  on 
the  Confederate  right. — Johnston  holds  his  ground  against  the  whole  of  Sher 
man's  army,  and  retreats  deliberately  to  Smithfield. — Sherman's  arrival  at  Golds 
boro'. — Conference  at  City  Point  of  Sherman,  Grant  and  President  Lincoln GQ1 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER    XL  I. 

Gen.  Lee's  lines  around  Richmond  and  Petersburg. — Comparison  of  his  force  with  that  of 
the  enemy. — Gen.  Lee's  sentiment  about  surrender. — Dull  condition  of  the  popu 
lace  in  Richmond. — Extravagant  rumours, — Story  of  the  French  messenger. — The 
Fortress  Monroe  conference. — Mr.  Blair's  visit  to  Richmond. — Notes  of  Presidents 
Davis  and  Lincoln. — Conversation  of  the  former  with  Alexander  II.  Stephens. — 
Official  narrative  of  the  conference  in  Hampton  Roads. — A  rhetorical  appeal  to 
the  people  of  the  Confederacy. — A  day  of  speeches  in  Richmond. — President  Davis' 
speech  at  the  African  Church. —  Its  extravagant  and  swollen  tone. — A  remark  on 
the  temper  and  vanity  of  the  President. — Battle  of  Hare's  Hill. — Design  of  the 
action  on  the  part  of  Gen.  Lee. — The  general  disposition  of  his  forces. — Capture  of 
Fort  Steadman. — The  Confederates  falter. — What  the  day  proved. — The  last 
battles  around  Petersburg.7— Why  Grant  hurried  the  final  operations. — The  prelim 
inary  expedition  of  Sheridan's  cavalry. — "What  it  accomplished. — The  attempt 
upon  Lee's  right. — Desperate  resource  of  the  Confederate  commander. — Battle  of 
Five  Forks. — Misbehaviour  of  the  Confederates. — Gen.  Lee's  reproach. — Bombard 
ment  of  the  Petersburg  lines. — The  assault. — The  Confederates'  lines  broken. — 
Defence  of  Fort  Gregg. — A  thrilling  scene  of  self-devotion. — The  Confederates 
forced  back  upon  Petersburg. — Death  of  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill. — Evacuation  of  Richmond. 
—The  city  unprepared  for  the  news. — Fright  and  disorder  in  the  streets. — A 
curious  scene  in  the  Capitol. — Gen.  Swell's  withdrawal  from  the  city. — He  fires 
a  number  of  warehouses. — A  frightful  conflagration. — Scenes  of  sublime  horrour. 
— Grand  entree  of  the  Federals.— Ravages  of  the  gre. — Exultation  in  Northern 
cities. — Stuff  of  Yankee  newspapers. — Due  estimate  of  Grant's  achievement  in  the 
fall  of  Richmond. — Definition  of  generalship. — The  qualities  of  mind  exhibited  by 
the  North  in  the  war 679 

CHAPTER    XLII. 

Public  feeling  in  Richmond  after  evacuation  day. — President  Davis'  proclamation  at 
Danville. — New  and  sanguine  theory  of  Confederate  defence. — Moral  effect  of  the 
fall  of  Richmond. — Retreat  and  final  surrender  of  Lee's  army. — Crossing  of  the 
Appomattox. — Explosion  of  magazines. — The  wagon-train  from  Richmond.— 
Order  of  Grant's  pursuit. — General  Lee's  new  hopes. — They  are  dashed  at  Amelia 
Court-house. — The  confederates  in  a  starving  condition. — Lee  abandons  the  route 
to  Danville  and  makes  for  Lynchburg,  by  way  of  Farmville. — Sufferings  on  the 
march. — Demoralization  of  the  troops. — Some  spirited  episodes. — The  action  of 
Sailors'  Creek. — The  Confederates  in  the  vicinity  of  Farmville. — Affairs  with  the 
enemy. — The  Confederates  retreat  to  Appomattox  Court-house,  without  molesta 
tion. — Sense  of  relief  among  the  troops. — Ominous  sounds  of  cannon. — The  exit 
to  Lynchburg  closed  by  Sheridan. — Desperate  adventure  of  Gordon's  corps. — The 
recoil. — A  flag  of  truce  on  the  scene. — Correspondence  between  Gens.  Grant  and 
Lee,  leading  to  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. — The  conference 
at  M'Lean's  house. — Gen.  Lee  announcing  the  terms  of  surrender. — A  touching 
scene  at  his  headquarters. — Gen.  Lee's  farewell  address  to  his  army. — Magnani 
mous  and  delicate  behaviour  of  Grant.4— Gen.  Lee's  return  to  his  home. — Great 
exultation  at  Washington. — Secretary  Stanton's  congratulations. — Scene  at  the  Pres 
ident's  house. — Characteristic  speech  and  last  joke  of  Abraham  Lincoln 700 

CHAPTER     XLII  I. 

Gen.  Lee's  surrender  the  decisive  event  of  the  war. — Strength  and  situation  of  the 


XXX  CONTENTS. 

Confederate  forces  South  of  Virginia. — Surrender  of  Johnston's  army. — Gen, 
Johnston's  line  of  retreat  from  Raleigh. — Sherman's  pursuit. — The  conference  a* 
Durham  Station. — Sherman's  "  memorandum  or  basis  of  agreement." — He  attempts 
an  extraordinary  game  of  hypocrisy. — His  astounding  confessions  at  Washington. 
— Curious  speech  at  a  soldiers'  festival. — Sherman's  convention  with  Johnston 
repudiated  at  Washington. — Johnston  compelled  to  surrender  on  the  terms  given 
Lee. — Review  of  the  sections  of  Confederate  defence. — Operations  in  the  Southwest. 
—Capture  of  Mobile. — Wilson's  expedition. — The  expedition  of  Gen.  Canby  against 
Mobile  and  Central  Alabama. — Statements  of  his  force. — The  works  and-  garrison 
of  Mobile. — Siege  of  Spanish  Fort. — Gen.  Maury  orders  its  evacuation. — Capture  of 
Fort  Blakely. — Evacuation  of  Mobile. — How  Wilson's  cavalry  was  to  co-operate 
with  Canby. — Disposition  of  the  forces  of  Gens.  Forrest  and  Roddy. — Capture  of 
Selma,  Montgomery  and  Columbus. — The  Heroic  episode  of  West  Point. — Wilson 
advances  upon  Macon. — News  of  Sherman's  truce. — Surrender  of  all  the  confed 
erate  forces  in  Alabama,  Mississippi  and  East  Louisiana. — The  Trans-Mississippi. — 
Surrender  of  Gen.  Smith. — Hope  of  prolonging  the  war  west  of  the  Mississippi 
River. — The  last  calculation  of  "  European  recognition." — Surrender  of  the  Trans- 
Mississippi  army  to  Gen.  Canby. — The  downfall  of  the  Confederacy  complete. — Some 
reflections  on  the  termination  of  the  war. — Its  flat  conclusion. — No  grand  catas 
trophe. — Explanation  of  this. — Theories,  to  account  for  the  failure  of  the  Confederacy. 
— The  vulgar  argument  of  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  North. — How  this 
argument  is  defective. — The  true  basis  of  comparison  between  the  military  force* 
of  North  and  South. — The  numerical  inequality  not  sufficient  to  determine  the  war 
against  the  South. — Inconsistency  of  this  argument  on  the  part  of  Southern  leaders. 
— The  relation  of  numbers  to  other  elements  of  armed  contest. — What  advantage* 
the  South  had  in  the  extent  and  features  of  her  territory. — General  conclusion  and 
an  important  reflection  consequent  upon  it 714 

CHAPTER    XLIV. 

Proper  limit  of  the  narrative  of  the  war. — A  glance  at  its  political  consequences. — 
General  condition  of  the  South  after  the  war. — Alternative  of  policies  at  Washing 
ton. — Hideous  programme  of  the  radicals. — The  policy  of  reconciliation. — En 
lightened  lesson  of  history. — The  problem  of  "  reconstruction." — Coincidence  of 
moderate  Republicans  with  the  Conservative  plan. — Position  of  President  Johnson. 
— Estimate  of  the  views  and  character  of  the  new  President. — His  school  of 
politics,  midway  between  those  of  Calhoun  and  Hamilton. — A  happy  position. — 
The  great  historical  issue.— Series  of  Radical  measures  in  Congress. — The  blindness 
of  despotism. — Plain  consequences  of  the  Radical  policy. — The  residuum  of  State 
Rights  claimed  by  the  South. — President  Johnson's  declaration  of  another  war. — 
Have  the  Americans  a  government  ? — Differences  of  opinion  in  the  South,  corres 
pondent  to  the  division  of  parties  in  the  North. — A  small  and  detestable  faction 
of  time-servers. — Noble  declaration  of  Ex-President  Davis. — Eloquent  appeal  of 
Henry  A.  Wise. — Basis  for  a  new  Southern  party. — The  South  to  surrender  only 
what  the  war  conquered. — What  the  war  determined,  and  what  it  did  not  deter 
mine. — The  new  arena  of  contest  and"'  the  War  of  Ideas." — Coarse  and  superficial 
advice  to  the  South  about  material  prosperity. — An  aspiration  of  Gov.  Orr  of 
South  Carolina. — The  South  should  not  lose  its  moral  and  intellectual  distinct- 
iveness  as  a  people. — Questions  outside  the  pale  of  the  war. — Rights,  duties  and 
hopes  of  the  South. — What  would  be  the  extremity  of  her  humiliation 748 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


PAGE 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS FRONTISPIECE. 

A.  H.  STEPHENS 176 

J.  P.  BENJAMIN « 

HENRY  A.  WISE « 

J.  C.  BRECKENRIDGE « 

WM.  L.  YANCEY « 

J.  M.  MASON « 

JOHN  SLIDELL « 

ROBERT  E.    LEE 338 

"  STONEWALL"  JACKSON 490 

P.  T.  BEAUREGARD « 

R.  S.  EWELL « 

A.  P.  HILL « 

J.  LONGSTREET « 

A.  S.  JOHNSON « 

J.  E.  B.  STUART « 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON 661 

BRAXTON  BRAGG 714 

KIRBY   SMITH « 

W.  B.  FORREST « 

LEONID  AS  POLK , « 

J.  B.  HOOD « 

W.  J.  HARDEE « 

JOHN  MORGAN..  « 


34:  THE  -LOST   CAUSE. 

permanent ;  and  all  attempts  to  make  it  so,  though  marked  for  certain 
periods  by  fictitious  prosperity  and  sudden  evidences  of  material  activity 
and  progress,  have  ultimately  resulted  in  intestine  commotions  and  the 
extinction  of  the  form  of  government.  What,  indeed,  can  be  more  natural 
than  that  the  members  of  a  confederation,  after  they  have  advanced  in 
political  life  and  become  mature  and  powerful,  should  desire  for  them 
selves  independence  and  free  action,  and  be  impatient  of  a  system  founded 
en  their  early  and  past  necessities  ! 

Coleridge,  the  acute  English  scholar  and  philosopher,  once  said  that  he 
looked  upon  the  American  States  as  "  splendid  masses  to  be  used  by  and 
by  in  the  composition  of  two  or  three  great  governments."  For  more 
tli an  a  generation  past  it  was  considered  by  a  party  in  America,  as  well  as 
by  intelligent  men  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  that  the  American  Union, 
as  a  confederation  of  States,  had  performed  its  mission,  and  that  the  coun 
try  was  called  to  the  fulfilment  of  another  political  destiny. 

And  here  it  is  especially  to  be  remarked  that  those  statesmen  of  the 
South,  who  for  more  than  thirty  years  before  the  war  of  1861  despaired 
ef  the  continuation  of  the  Union,  were  yet  prompt  to  acknowledge  its 
benefits  in  the  past.  There  could  be  no  dispute  about  the  success  of  its 
early  mission  ;  and  no  intelligent  man  in  America  dared  to  refer  to  the 
Union  without  acknowledging  the  country's  indebtedness  to  it  in  the  past. 
It  had  peopled  and  fertilized  a  continent ;  it  had  enriched  the  world's  com 
merce  with  a  new  trade  ;  it  had  developed  population,  and  it  was  steadily 
training  to  manhood  the  States  which  composed  it,  and  fitting  them  for 
the  responsibility  of  a  new  political  life.  The  party  that  insisted  at  a  cer 
tain  period  that"  the  interests  of  the  Southern  States  demanded  a  separate 
and  independent  government,  simply  held  the  doctrine  that  the  country 
had  outlived  the  necessities  of  the  Union,  and  had  become  involved  in 
the  abuses  of  a  system,  admirable  enough  in  its  early  conception,  but 
diverted  from  its  original  objects  and  now  existing  only  as  the  parent  of 
intolerable  rivalries,  and  the  source  of  constant  intestine  commotions. 

With  reference  to  these  abuses,  it  must  be  remarked  here  that  although 
the  Federal  principle  was  the  governing  one  of  the  American  Union,  yet 
such  Union  was  not  purely  a  confederation  of  States ;  it  was  mixed  with 
parts  of  another  system  of  government ;  and  that  the  subordination  of  the 
Federal  principle  to  these  produced  many  additional  causes  of  disruption, 
which  plainly  hurried  the  catastrophe  of  separation  and  war. 

But  before  coming  to  the  subject  of  these  abuses,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  determine  the  true  nature  and  value  of  the  Union.  We  must  go  back 
to  an  early  period  of  American  history ;  we  must  explore  the  sources  of 
the  great  political  parties  in  the  country  ;  and  we  must  enumerate  among 
the  causes  of  disunion  not  only  the  inherent  weakness  of  the  Federal  prin 
ciple,  but  those  many  controversies  which  aided  and  expedited  the  result, 


THE   LOST   CAUSE.  35 

and  in  which  the  true  idea  of  the  Union  was  violated,  the  government  dis 
torted  to  the  ends  of  party,  and  faction  put  in  the  place  of  a  statesmanship 
that  sought  long  but  in  vain  to  check  its  vile  ambition  and  avert  the  final 
result. 

"When  the  thirteen  colonies  in  North  America  resolved  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  Great  Britain,  committees  of  correspondence  were  established  in 
each  colony.  In  May,  1771,  after  Lord  Dunmore  dissolved  a  patriotic 
Virginia  House  of  Burgesses,  eighty-nine  of  its  members  met  at  the 
Ealeigh  Tavern,  in  Williamsburg,  and,  among  other  acts,  recommended 
that  all  the  colonies  should  send  deputies  to  a  General  Congress,  to  watch 
over  the  united  interests  of  all,  and  deliberate  upon  and  ascertain  the 
measures  best  adapted  to  promote  them. 

On  the  4th  of  July,  1776,  the  Congress  published  a  Declaration  of 
Independence.  It  declared  that  the  colonies  were  "  free  and  independent 
States,"  thus  asserting  their  separate  State  sovereignty,  and  expressly 
negativing  the  idea  of  consolidation,  held  by  New  Hampshire,  who  on  the 
15th  of  June,  1776,  voted  that  the  Thirteen  United  Colonies  ought  to  be 
declared  "  a  free  and  independent  State." 

At  this  time  the  only  common  agent  of  the  States  was  a  Congress 
which  really  had  no  legislative  power.  Its  action  was  generally  wise,  and 
therefore  cheerfully  acquiesced  in  and  made  efficient  by  the  principals. 
But  as  the  war  continued,  its  pressure  became  heavier ;  men,  money,  and 
supplies  were  needed ;  and  often  the  resolutions  of  Congress  were  either 
wholly  neglected  or  positively  repudiated  by  the  States.  It  became  ap 
parent  that  the  common  agent  must  be  clothed  with  actual  power,  and 
this  could  only  be  done  by  an  express  agreement  between  the  States, 
whereby  each  should  bind  itself  to  observe  certain  rules,  and  obey  certain 
regulations  adopted  to  secure  the  common  safety. 

It  was  thus  that  the  first  Confederation  of  the  American  States — the 
articles  of  which  were  adopted  by  the  several  States  in  1777 — originated 
in  the  necessities  of  the  war  waged  by  them  against  Great  Britain  for  their 
independence.  A  common  danger  impelled  them  to  a  close  alliance,  and 
to  the  formation  of  a  confederation,  by  the  terms  of  which  the  colonies, 
styling  themselves  States,  entered  "  severally  into  a  firm  league  of  friend 
ship  with  each  other  for  their  common  defence,  the  security  of  their  liberties, 
and  their  mutual  and  general  welfare,  binding  themselves  to  assist  each 
other  against  all  force  offered  to  or  attacks  made  upon  them  or  any  of  them, 
on  account  of  religion,  sovereignty,  trade  or  any  other  pretence  whatever." 

In  order  to  guard  against  any  misconstruction  of  their  compact,  the 
several  States  made  explicit  declaration,  in  a  distinct  article,  that  "  ecbch 
State  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom  and  independence,  and  every  power, 
jurisdiction,  and  right  which  is  not  by  this  confederation  expressly  dele 
gated  to  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled." 


OO  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  objects  and  character  of  this  confederation  or  union  were  thus  dis 
tinctly  defined.  Under  its  terms  the  war  of  the  Revolution  was  success 
fully  waged,  and  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain  in 
1783,  by  the  terms  of  which  the  several  States  were,  each  l>y  name,  recog 
nized  to  be  independent. 

As  the  Confederation  originated  in  the  necessities  of  the  war  against 
Great  Britain,  it  was  these  necessities  which  determined  its  character  and 
measured  its  powers.  It  was  something  more  than  a  military  alliance ; 
for  it  was  intended  to  unite  the  resources  of  the  States,  to  make  a  common 
financial  fund,  and  to  "  secure  the  public  credit  at  home  and  abroad." 
Partial  and  imperfect  as  was  the  union  it  established,  it  accomplished  a 
great  historical  work,  and  dated  an  important  era ;  it  supplied  what 
scarcely  anything  else  could  have  supplied — a  political  bond  between  colo 
nies  suddenly  erected  into  sovereign  States  ;  it  was  the  stepping  stone  to 
a  firmer  association  of  the  States,  and  a  more  perfect  union.  In  this  sense 
are  to  be  found  its  true  offices  and  value.  Lines  of  exasperated  division 
had  been  drawn  between  the  colonies  ;  the  sharp  points  of  religious  antag 
onism  had  kept  them  at  a  distance ;  the  natural  difficulties  of  intercourse 
and  the  legislative  obstructions  of  trade  had  separated  them ;  differences 
of  government,  contrast  of  manners,  diversity  of  habits  had  contributed  to 
the  estrangement ;  and  in  these  circumstances  a  bond  of  union,  however 
slightly  it  held  them,  wras  important  as  the  initial  of  their  political  asso 
ciation,  and  was  educating  them  for  the  new  and  enlarged  destiny  dated 
with  their  independence. 

We  have  implied  that  the  Confederation  was  a  bond  of  very  partial 
and  imperfect  effect.  It  practically  existed  not  more  than  two  years ; 
although  its  nominal  term  in  history  is  eight  years.  It  was  debated  for 
nearly  five  years.  It  was  not  consummated  until  1Y81.  It  was  full  of 
glaring  defects ;  it  had  no  power  to  enforce  the  common  will  of  the 
States  ;  it  had  no  jurisdiction  of  individuals  ;  it  had  but  a  mixed  and  con 
fused  power  over  foreign  relations,  and  the  treaties  it  might  make  were 
dependent  on  commercial  regulations  of  the  different  States.  Having  out 
lived  the  prime  necessity  that  originated  it  during  the  war,  its  cohesive 
powers  gradually  gave  way  ;  it  yielded  to  the  impressions  of  new  events  ; 
and  it  is  remarkable  that  the  association  formed  under  it  and  entitled  a 
"  Perpetual  Union  "  was  practically  terminated  by  the  uninterrupted  free 
will  of  the  States  which  composed  it. 

A  convention  of  delegates  assembled  from  the  different  States  at  Phila 
delphia  in  May,  1Y8T.  It  had  been  called  by  Congress  "  for  the  sole  and 
express  purpose  of  revising  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  and  reporting 
to  Congress  and  the  several  legislatures  such  alterations  and  provisions 
therein,  as  shall,  when  agreed  to  in  Congress,  and  confirmed  by  the  States, 
render  the  Federal  Constitution  adequate  to  the  exigencies  and  the  preser- 


THE   LOST   CAUSE.  37 

nation  of  the  Union."  This  was  the  Convention  that  erected  the  two 
famous  political  idols  in  America  :  the  Constitution  of  1789  and  the  Union 
formed  under  it,  and  entitled  itself  to  the  extravagant  adulation  of  three 
generations  as  the  wisest  and  best  of  men. 

This  adulation  is  simply  absurd.  The  language  in  the  call  of  the  Con 
vention  was  singularly  confused.  The  men  who  composed  it  were  com 
mon  flesh  and  blood,  very  ignorant,  very  much  embarrassed,  many  of 
them  unlettered,  and  many  educated  just  to  that  point  where  men  are 
silly,  visionary,  dogmatic  and  impracticable. 

Hildreth,  the  American  historian,  has  made  a  very  just  remark,  which 
describes  the  cause  of  the  unpopularity  of  his  own  compositions.  He  says  : 
"  In  dealing  with  our  revolutionary  annals,  a  great  difficulty  had  to  be  en 
countered  in  the  mythic,  heroic  character  above,  beyond,  often  wholly  apart 
from  tiie  truth  of  history,  with  which,  in  the  popular  idea,  the  fathers  and 
founders  of  our  American  Republic  have  been  invested.  American  litera 
ture  having  been  mainly  of  the  rhetorical  cast,  and  the  Revolution  and 
the  old  times  of  the  forefathers  forming  standing  subjects  for  periodical 
eulogies,  in  which  every  new  orator  strives  to  outvie  his  predecessors,  the 
true  history  of  those  times,  in  spite  of  ample  records,  illustrated  by  the 
labors  of  many  diligent  and  conscientious  inquirers,  has  yet  been  almost 
obliterated  by  declamations  which  confound  all  discrimination  and  just 
appreciation  in  one  confused  glare  of  patriotic  eulogium."  * 

*  We  find  in  1866,  even  after  the  experience  of  the  war,  President  Johnson  declaring  that  the 
authours  of  the  Constitution  were  divinely  inspired ;  that  "  they  needed  and  obtained  a  wisdom 
superiour  to  experience."  This  is  silly  extravagance,  if  not  worse.  We  shall  see  that  there  was 
one  element  of  originality  and  of  great  virtue  in  the  Constitution ;  but  apart  from  this,  the  sober 
student  of  history,  looking  over  three  generations  of  fierce  political  conflict  in  America,  must  be 
struck  by  the  enormous  defects  and  omissions  of  an  instrument  that  has  shared  so  much  the  undue 
admiration  of  mankind. 

In  another  work  the  authour  has  enumerated  in  the  paragraphs  quoted  below  the  defective  texts 
of  the  Constitution : 

"  It  is  impossible  to  resist  the  thought,  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  were  so  much  occu 
pied  with  the  controversy  of  jealousy  between  the  large  and  the  small  States  that  they  overlooked 
many  great  and  obvious  questions  of  government,  which  have  since  been  fearfully  developed  in  the 
political  history  of  America.  Beyond  the  results  and  compromises  of  that  jealousy,  the  debates  and 
the  work  of  the  Convention  show  one  of  the  most  wonderful  blanks  that  has,  perhaps,  ever  occurred 
in  the  political  inventions  of  civilized  mankind.  They  left  behind  them  a  list  of  imperfections  in 
political  prescience,  a  want  of  provision  for  the  exigencies  of  their  country,  such  as  has  seldom  been 
known  in  the  history  of  mankind." 

"  A  system  of  negro  servitude  existed  in  some  of  the  States.  It  was  an  object  of  no  solicitude 
in  the  Convention.  The  only  references  in  the  Constitution  to  it  are  to  be  found  in  a  provision  in 
relation  to  the  rendition  of  fugitives  '  held  to  service  or  labour,'  and  in  a  mixed  and  empirical  rule  of 
popular  representation.  However  these  provisions  may  imply  the  true  status  of  slavery,  how  much 
is  it  to  be  regretted  that  the  Convention  did  not  make  (what  might  have  been  made  so  easily)  an  ex 
plicit  declaration  on  the  subject,  that  would  have  put  it  beyond  the  possibility  of  dispute,  and  re 
moved  it  from  even  the  plausibility  of  party  controversy  !  " 


38  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  Constitution  formed  by  this  Convention,  although  singularly  defi 
cient — and  so  far  from  being  esteemed  by  American  demagogueism  as 
"  almost  of  Divine  authority,"  actually  one  of  the  loosest  political  instru 
ments  in  the  world — contained  one  admirable  and  novel  principle,  which 
grew  out  of  the  combination  of  circumstances  in  the  debate.  One  party 
in  the  Convention  plausibly  contended  that  its  power  was  limited  to  a 
mere  revision  and  amendment  of  the  existing  Articles  of  Confederation, 
and  that  it. was  authorized  to  add  nothing  to  the  Federal  principle. 
Another  party  favoured  the  annihilation  of  the  State  governments.  A 
third  party  stood  between  these  extremes,  and  recommended  a  "  national" 
government  in  the  sense  of  a  supreme  power  witli  respect  to  certain  objects 
common  between  the  States  and  committed  to  it.  But  when  on  this  third 
plan  the  question  of  representation  arose,  it  was  found  that  the  large  States 
insisted  upon  a  preponderating  influence  in  both  houses  of  the  National 
Legislature,  while  the  small  States  insisted  on  an  equality  of  representa 
tion  in  each  house  ;  and  out  of  this  conflict  came  the  mixed  representation 

"  For  many  years  the  very  obvious  question  of  the  power  of  the  General  Government  to  make 
'  internal  improvements '  has  agitated  the  councils  of  America :  and  yet  there  is  no  text  hi  the  Con 
stitution  to  regulate  a  matter  which  should  have  stared  its  authours  in  the  face,  but  what  may  be 
derived,  by  the  most  forced  and  distant  construction,  from  the  powers  of  Congress  '  to  regulate  com 
merce,'  and  to  '  declare  war,'  and  '  raise  and  support  armies.'  " 

"  For  a  longer  period,  and  with  a  fierceness  once  almost  fatal  to  the  Union,  has  figured  in  the  poli 
tics  of  America  '  the  tariff  question,'  a  contest  between  a  party  for  revenue  and  a  party  for  protective 
prohibitions.  Both  parties  have  fought  over  that  vague  platitude  of  the  Constitution,  the  power  of 
Congress  '  to  regulate  commerce  ; '  and  in  the  want  of  a  more  distinct  language  on  a  subject  of  such 
vast  concern,  there  has  been  engendered  a  controversy  which  has  progressed  from  the  threshold  of 
the  history  of  the  Union  up  to  the  period  of  its  dissolution." 

"  With  the  territorial  possessions  of  America,  even  at  the  date  of  the  Convention,  and  with  all 
that  the  future  promised  in  the  expansion  of  a  system  that  yet  scarcely  occupied  more  than  the 
water-slopes  of  a  continent,  it  might  be  supposed  that  the  men  who  formed  the  Constitution  would 
have  prepared  a  full  and  explicit  article  for  the  government  of  the  territories.  That  vast  and  intri 
cate  subject — the  power  of  the  General  Government  over  the  territories,  the  true  nature  of  these 
establishments,  the  status  and  political  privileges  of  their  inhabitants — is  absolutely  dismissed  with 
this  bald  provision  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  : 

"  '  New  States  may  be  admitted  by  Congress  into  this  Union.' — AF.T.  iv.,  SEC.  3." 

In  addition  to  these  flagrant  omissions  of  the  Constitution  may  be  observed  a  fault,  which  it  was 
sought  to  correct  in  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  which  has  latterly  grown  much 
upon  public  attention.  It  is  that  defective  construction  of  the  Cabinet,  which  excludes  all  the  min 
isters  of  the  government  from  any  participation  in  the  legislative  councils.  The  practical  conse 
quences  of  this  defective  organization  of  the  government  is,  that  the  relations  between  the  Execu 
tive  and  Congress  have  gradually  descended  to  a  back-door  communication,  in  which  the  Execu 
tive  has  lost  its  dignity,  and  American  politics  been  severely  scandalized.  The  relations  of 
the  British  ministry  to  Parliament  are  such  that  a  vote  of  censure,  any  night,  may  change  the 
administration  of  public  affairs.  There  is  no  such  faculty  of  adaptation  in  the  American  sys 
tem.  If  there  is  a  variance  between  the  Executive  and  Congress,  the  former  communicates 
with  its  partisans  in  that  body  through  the  back-door  and  lobby,  and  the  practical  consequences 
are  bribery,  corruption,  and  all  sorts  of  devious  and  unworthy  appliances  to  the  legislation  of  the 
country. 


THE   CONSTITUTION   A   COMPROMISE.  39 

of  the  people  and  the  States,  each  in  a  different  house  of  Congress  ;  and  on 
this  basis  of  agreement  was  reared  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
of  America. 

The  great  novelty  of  this  Constitution — the  association  of  the  principle 
of  State  sovereignty  with  a  common  government  of  delegated  powers  act 
ing  on  individuals  under  specifications  of  authority,  and  thus,  therefore, 
not  merely  a  Federal  league — is  scarcely  to  be  esteemed  as  an  a  priori  dis 
covery,  and  to  be  ascribed,  as  American  vanity  would  have  it,  to  the  wis 
dom  of  our  forefathers.  The  mixed  representation  of  the  people  and  the 
States  originated,  as  we  have  seen,  in  a  jealousy  sprung  in  the  Convention, 
and  is  better  described  as  the  fruit  of  an  accident  than  the  elaborate  pro 
duction  of  human  wisdom.  It  was  a  compromise.  It  simply  extricated 
the  Convention  from  a  dead-lock  of  votes  between  the  large  and  the  small 
States  as  to  the  rule  of  representation.  But  it  wTas  of  immense  import 
ance  as  the  initial  and  necessary  measure  of  the  combination  of  State 
sovereignty  with  the  simple  republic.  There  is  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution  did  not  fully  comprehend  the  importance  of 
the  great  political  principle  on  which  they  had  stumbled,  with  its  long 
train  of  consequences,  and  that,  as  often  happens  to  simple  men,  they  had 
fallen  upon  a  discovery,  of  the  value  of  which  they  had  but  a  dim  appre 
hension. 

The  principle  involved  in  the  measure  of  the  Convention  referred  to 
was  more  fully  and  perfectly  developed  in  the  Amendments,  which  were  the 
fruit  of  the  legislative  wisdom  of  the  States,  not  of  that  of  the  Convention, 
and  were  designed  to  give  a  full  development  and  a  proper  accuracy  to 
what  was'  certainly  ill-performed  work  in  it.  The  following  Amendments 
were  embodied  in  the  official  declarations  of  at  least  six  of  the  States, 
coupled  with  their  ratification  of  the  Constitution,  and  made  by  them  the 
conditions  precedent  to  such  ratification. 

"  The  enumeration  in  the  Constitution,  of  certain  rights,  shall  not  be  construed  to 
deny  or  disparage  others  retained  by  the  people. 

t£  The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited 
by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserved  to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the  people. 

The  Union,  thus  constituted,  was  not  a  consolidated  nationality.  It 
was  not  a  simple  republic,  with  an  appendage  of  provinces.  It  was  not, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  mere  league  of  .States  with  no  power  to  reach  indi 
viduals.  It  was  an  association  of  sovereign  States  with  a  common  author 
ity  qualified  to  reach  individuals  within  the  scope  of  the  powers  delegated 
to  it  by  the  States,  and  employed  witli  subjects  sufficient  to  give  it  for  cer 
tain  purposes  the  effect  of  an  American  and  national  identity. 

At  the  separation  from  the  British  Empire,  the  people  of  America  pre 
ferred  the  establishment  of  themselves  into  thirteen  separate  sovereignties. 


40  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

instead  of  incorporating  themselves  into  one.  To  these  they  looked  up  for 
the  security  of  their  lives,  liberties,  and  properties.  The  Federal  govern 
ment  they  formed  to  defend  the  whole  against  foreign  nations  in  time  of 
war,  and  to  defend  the  lesser  States  against  the  ambition  of  the  larger. 
They  were  afraid  of  granting  power  unnecessarily,  lest  they  should  defeat 
the  original  end  of  the  Union  ;  lest  the  powers  should  prove  dangerous  to 
the  sovereignties  of  the  particular  States  which  the  Union  was  meant  to 
support,  and  expose  the  lesser  to  being  swallowed  up  by  the  larger. 

The  articles  of  the  first  Confederation  had  provided  that  "  the  Union 
shall  be  perpetual."  Notwithstanding  this,  as  we  have  seen,  another  con 
vention  subsequently  assembled  which  adopted  the  present  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  Article  YII.  provided  that  "  the  ratifications  of  nine 
States  shall  be  sufficient  for  the  establishment  of  this  Constitution,  between 
the  States  ratifying  the  same."  In  effect,  this  Constitution  was  ratified  at 
first  by  only  a  portion  of  the  States  composing  the  previous  Union,  each 
at  different  dates  and  in  its  sovereign  capacity  as  a  State,  so  that  the 
second  Union  was  created  by  States  which  "  seceded "  from  the  first 
Union,  three  of  which,  in  their  acts  of  ratification,  expressly  reserved  the 
right  to  secede  again.  Yirginia,  in  giving  her  assent  to  the  Constitution, 
said  :  "  We,  the  delegates  of  the  people  of  Virginia,  duly  elected,  etc.,  etc., 
do,  in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  the  people  of  Virginia,  declare  and  make 
known  that  the  powers  granted  under  the  Constitution,  being  derived  from 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  may  be  resumed  by  them  whenever  the 
same  shall  be  perverted  to  their  injury  or  oppression."  The  State  of  New 
York  said  that  u  the  powers  of  Government  may  be  re-assumed  by  the 
people  whenever  it  shall  become  necessary  to  their  happiness."  And  the 
State  of  Rhode  Island  adopted  the  same  language. 

The  reader  of  American  history  must  guard  his  mind  against  the  errour 
that  the  Union  was,  in  any  sense,  a  constitutional  revolution,  or  a  procla 
mation  of  a  new  civil  polity.  The  civil  institutions  of  the  States  were 
already  perfect  and  satisfactory.  The  Union  was  nothing  more  than  a 
convenience  of  the  States,  and  had  no  mission  apart  from  them.  It  had 
no  value  as  an  additional  guaranty  of  personal  liberty,  nor  yet  for  its  pro 
hibitions  of  invasion  of  individual  rights.  These  had  been  declared  with 
equal  clearness  and  vigour  five  centuries  before  in  the  Great  Charter  at 
Eunnymede,  had  been  engrafted  upon  the  Colonial  Governments,  and  were 
the  recognized  muniments  of  American  liberty. 

The  novelty  and  value  of  the  Federal  Constitution  was  the  nice  adjust 
ment  of  the  relations  of  the  State  and  Federal  Governments,  by  which  they 
both  became  co-ordinate  and  essential  parts  of  one  harmonious  system ; 
the  nice  arrangement  of  the  powers  of  the  State  and  Federal  Governments, 
by  which  was  left  to  the  States  the  exclusive  guardianship  of  their  domestic 
affairs,  and  of  the  interests  of  their  citizens,  and  was  granted  to  the  Federal 


THE   DOCTRINE   OF    STATE   EIGHTS.  41 

Government  the  exclusive  control  of  their  international  and  inter-State  rela 
tions  ;the  economy  of  the  powers  of  the  States  with  which  the  Federal 
Government  was  endowed ;  the  paucity  of  subjects  and  of  powers,  with 
drawn  from  the  States,  and  committed  to  the  Federal  Government.  It 
was  the  recognition  of  the  idea  of  Confederation — the  appreciation  of  the 
value  of  local  self-government.  It  was  the  recognition  that  the  States 
were  the  creators  and  their  powers  were  inherent,  and  that  the  Federal 
Government  was  the  creature  and  its  powers  were  delegated. 

The  two  great  political  schools  of  America — that  of  Consolidation  and 
that  of  State  Rights — were  founded  on  different  estimates  of  the  relations 
of  the  General  Government  to  the  States.  All  other  controversies  in  the 
political  history  of  the  country  were  subordinate  and  incidental  to  this 
great  division  of  parties.  We  see,  at  once,  how  it  involved  the  question 
of  negro-slavery  in  the  South.  The  agitation  of  this  question  was  a  neces 
sity  of  the  Consolidation  doctrine,  which  was  mainly  the  Northern  theory 
of  the  government ;  for  duty  being  the  correlative  of  power,  the  central 
government  at  Washington  was  responsible  for  the  continuance  or  exist 
ence  of  slavery  in  proportion  to  its  power  over  it.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
State  Eights  party  assented  to  the  logical  integrity  of  the  proposition  that 
if  the  government  had  been  consolidated  into  one,  slavery  might  have  been 
abolished,  or  made  universal  throughout  the  whole ;  but  they  claimed 
that  the  States  had  retained  their  sovereignty,  for  the  reason,  among 
others,  that  they  desired  to  avoid  giving  any  pretext  to  the  General  Gov 
eminent  for  attempting  to  control  their  internal  affairs  ;  and  they,  there 
fore,  contended  that  the  Northern  party  could  with  no  more  reason  assail 
the  domestic  institutions  of  the  South  than  they  could  attack  the  similar 
institutions  of  Cuba  and  Brazil. 

The  difference  between  the  State  Rights  and  Consolidation  schools 
may  be  briefly  and  sharply  stated.  The  one  regarded  the  Union  as  a 
compact  between  the  States:  the  other  regarded  the  Union  as  a  national 
government  set  up  above  and  over  the  States.  The  first  adopted  its 
doctrine  from  the  very  words  of  the  Constitution  ;  the  seventh  article  for 
the  ratification  of  the  Constitution  reading  as  follows  : 


"  The  ratification  of  the  Conventions  of  nine  States  shall  be  sufficient  for  the  estab 
lishment  of  this  constitution  BETWEEN  the  States  so  ratifying  the  same." 

The  great  text  of  the  State  Rights  school  is  to  be  found  in  the  famous 
Kentucky  and  Virginia  Resolutions  of  1798.  These  resolutions  are 
properly  to  be  taken  as  corollaries  drawn  from  those  carefully-worded 
clauses  of  the  Constitution,  which  were  designed  to  exclude  the  idea  that 
the  separate  and  independent  sovereignty  of  each  State  was  merged  into 


THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

one  common  government  and  nation.  The  Virginia  resolutions  were 
drawn  up  by  Mr.  Madison,  and  the  Kentucky  resolutions  by  Mr.  Jefferson. 
The  first  Kentucky  resolution  was  as  follows  : 

':  1st.  Resolved,  That  the  several  States  comprising  the  United  States  of  America,  are 
not  united  on  the  principle  of  unlimited  submission  to  their  general  government,  but 
that  by  compact  under  the  style  and  title  of  a  Constitution  for  the  United  States,  and  of 
amendments  thereto,  they  constituted  a  general  government,  for  special  purposes,  dele 
gated  to  that  government  certain  definite  powers,  reserving  each  State  to  itself,  the  resid 
uary  mass  of  right  to  their  own  self-government ;  and  that  whensoever  the  general  gov 
ernment  assumes  undelegated  powers,  its  acts  are  unauthoritative,  void,  and  of  no  force  ; 
that  to  this  compact  each  State  acceded,  as  a  State,  and  is  an  integral  party ;  that  this 
government  created  by  this  compact,  was  not  made  the  exclusive  or  final  judge  of  the 
extent  of  the  powers  delegated  to  itself,  since  that  would  have  made  its  discretion  and 
not  the  Constitution  the  measure  of  its  powers;  but  that  as  in  all  other  cases  of  compact 
among  parties  having  no  common  judge,  each  party  has  an  equal  right  to  judge  for  itself, 
as  well  of  infractions  as  of  the  mode  and  measure  of  redress." 


The  most  formidable  conflict  between  these  two  schools  of  politics  took 
place  during  the  memorable  tariff  controversy  of  1831-'2,  in  which  Daniel 
Webster  of  Massachusetts  and  John  C.  Calhoun  of  South  Carolina,  the 
most  remarkable  antitypes  of  Northern  and  Southern  statesmanship, 
joined  in  debate,  explored  the  entire  field  of  controversy,  searched  every 
feature  and  principle  of  the  government,  and  left  on  record  a  complete 
and  exhausting  commentary  on  the  whole  political  system  of  America. 

Mr.  Calhoun  was  logician  enough  to  see  that  the  Kentucky  and 
Virginia  Resolutions  involved  the  right  of  Secession.  But  he  was  not 
disposed  to  insist  upon  such  a  remedy.  He  lived  in  a  time  when,  outside 
of  his  own  State,  there  was  a  strong  sentimental  attachment  to  the  Union ; 
and  he  would  have  been  a  reckless  politician,  who  would  then  have  openly 
braved  popular  passion  on  this  subject.  Indeed  Mr.  Calhoun  professed, 
and  perhaps  not  insincerely,  an  ardent  love  for  the  Union.  In  a  speech 
to  his  constituents  in  South  Carolina,  he  declared  that  he  had  "never 
breathed  an  opposite  sentiment,"  and  that  he  had  reason  to  love  the 
Union,  when  he  reflected  that  nearly  half  his  life  had  been  passed  in  its 
service,  and  that  whatever  public  reputation  he  had  acquired  was  indis- 
solubly  connected  with  it. 

It  was  the  task  of  the  great  South  Carolina  politician  to  find  some 
remedy  for  existing  evils  short  of  Disunion.  He  was  unwilling,  either  to 
violate  his  own  affections  or  the  popular  idolatry  for  the  Union ;  and  at 
the  same  time  he  was  deeply  sensible  of  the  oppression  it  devolved  upon 
the  South.  The  question  was,  what  expedient  could  be  found  to  accom 
modate  the  overruling  anxiety  to  perpetuate  the  Union,  and  the  necessity 
of  checking  the  steady  advance  of  ^Northern  aggression  and  sectional 


43 

domination  in  it.  Mr.  Calhonn  did  succeed  in  accommodating  these  two 
considerations.  He  hit  upon  one  of  the  most  beautiful  and  ingenious 
theories  in  American  politics  to  preserve  and  perfect  the  Union,  and  to 
introduce  into  it  that  principle  of  adaptability  to  circumstances,  which  is 
the  first  virtue  of  wise  governments.  He  proposed  that  in  cases  of  serious 
dispute  between  any  State  and  the  General  Government,  the  matter 
should  be  referred  to  a  convention  of  all  the  States  for  its  final  and  con 
clusive  determination.  He  thus  proposed,  instead  of  destroying  the  Union, 
to  erect  over  it  an  august  guardianship,  and  instead  of  bringing  it  to  the 
tribunal  of  popular  passion,  to  arraign  it  only  before  the  assembled  sov 
ereign  States  which  had  created  it. 

Mr.  Calhoun  abundantly  explained  his  doctrine.  "  Should,"  said  he, 
"  the  General  Government  and  a  State  come  into  conflict,  we  have  a 
higher  remedy :  the  power  which  called  the  General  Government  into 
existence,  which  gave  it  all  of  its  authority,  and  can  enlarge,  contract,  or 
abolish  its  powers  at  its  pleasure,  may  be  invoked.  The  States  them 
selves  may  be  appealed  to,  three-fourths  of  which,  in  fact,  form  a  power, 
whose  decrees  are  the  Constitution  itself,  and  whose  voice  can  silence  all 
discontent.  The  utmost  extent  then  of  the  power  is,  that  a  State  acting 
in  its  sovereign  capacity,  as  one  of  the  parties  to  the  constitutional  com 
pact,  may  compel  the  government,  created  by  that  compact,  to  submit  a 
question  touching  its  infraction  to  the  parties  who  created  it."  He  in 
sisted  with  plain  reason  that  his  doctrine,  so  far  from  being  anarchical  or 
revolutionary,  was  "  the  only  solid  foundation  of  our  system  and  of  the 
Union  itself."  His  explanation  of  the  true  nature  of  the  Union  was  a  model 
of  perspicuity,  and  an  exposition  of  the  profoundest  statesmanship.  In 
opposition  to  a  certain  vulgar  and  superficial  opinion,  that  the  State  insti 
tutions  of  America  were  schools  of  provincialism,  he  held  the  doctrine  that 
they  were  in  no  sense  hostile  to  the  Union,  or  malignant  in  their  char 
acter  ;  that  they  interpreted  the  true  glory  of  America  ;  and  that  he  was 
the  wisest  statesman  who  would  constantly  observe  "  the  sacred  distribu 
tion  "  of  power  between  the  General  Government  and  the  States,  and 
bind  up  the  rights  of  the  States  with  the  common  welfare. 

It  is  a  curious  instance  of  Northern  misrepresentation  in  politics  and 
of  their  cunning  in  fastening  a  false  political  nomenclature  upon  the  South, 
that  the  ingenious  doctrine  of  Mr.  Calhoun,  which  was  eminently  con 
servative,  and  directly  addressed  to  saving  the  Union,  should  have  been 
entitled  "  Nullification,"  and  its  author  branded  as  a  Disunionist.  Unfor 
tunately,  the  world  has  got  most  of  its  opinions  of  Southern  parties  and 
men  from  the  shallow  pages  of  Northern  books  ;  and  it  will  take  it  long 
to  learn  the  lessons  that  the  system  of  negro  servitude  in  the  South  was 
not  "Slavery;"  that  John  C.  Calhoun  was  not  a  "  Disvnionist ;  "  and 
that  the  war  of  1861,  brought  on  by  Northern  insurgents  against  the 


THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

authority  of  the  Constitution,  was  not  a  "  Southern  rebellion"  Names  are 
apparently  slight  things ;  but  they  create  the  first  impression  ;  they  solicit 
the  sympathies  of  the  vulgar ;  and  they  often  create  a  cloud  of  prejudice 
which  the  greatest  exertions  of  intelligence  find  it  impossible  wholly  to 
dispel.  But  it  is  not  the  place  here  to  analyze  at  length  the  party  terms 
of  America  ;  and  the  proper  definition  of  the  words  we  have  referred  to  as 
falsely  applied  to  the  South  will  appear,  and  will  be  easily  apprehended 
in  the  general  argument  and  context  of  our  narrative. 


CHAPTEK    II. 

THE   FEDERAL  PRINCIPLE   ULTIMATELY   FATAL   TO   THE   UNION. — OTIIEB  CAUSES   OF   DISUNION. 

— THE  "  SECTIONAL   ANIMOSITY." — THE   GEOGEAPHIOAL   LINE   IN  THE  UNION. HOW   THE 

DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  NORTH  AND  SOUTH  PRODUCED  TWO  DISTINCT  COMMUNITIES 
INSTEAD  OF  RIVAL  PARTIES  WITHIN  ONE  BODY  POLITIC. — THE  THEORY  OF  A  POLITICAL 
NORTH  AND  A  POLITICAL  SOUTH. — ITS  EARLY  RECOGNITION  IN  THE  CONVENTION  OF  1Y87. 
— DECLARATION  OF  MADISON. — MR.  PINCKNEY?S  REMARK. — HOW  THE  SAME  THEORY 
WAS  INVOLVED  IN  THE  CONSTITUTION. — THE  "  TREATY-CLAUSE  "  BETWEEN  NORTH  AND 
SOUTH. — THE  UNION  NOT  THE  BOND  OF  DIVERSE  STATES,  BUT  THE  ROUGH  COMPAN 
IONSHIP  OF  TWO  PEOPLES. — GEN.  SULLIVAN?S  COMPLAINT  TO  WASHINGTON. — THE 
SLAVERY  QUESTION,  AN  INCIDENT  OF  THE  SECTIONAL  ANIMOSITY. — NOT  AN  INDE 
PENDENT  CONTROVERSY,  OR  A  MORAL  DISPUTE. — POLITICAL  HISTORY  OF  NEGRO  SLAVERY 
IN  THE  SOUTH. — HOW  IT  BECAME  THE  SUBJECT  OF  DISPUTE. — THE  HARTFORD  CONVEN 
TION. — THE  MISSOURI  LINE,  THE  PRELIMINARY  TRACE  OF  DISUNION. — DECLARATION  OF 
THOMAS  JEFFERSON. — WHY  THE  NORTH  DEFAMED  "THE  PECULIAR  INSTITUTION"  OF 
THE  SOUTH. — GREAT  BENEFITS  OF  THIS  INSTITUTION  AND  ITS  CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  THE 

WORLD. — "SLA VERT"  NOT  THE  PROPER  TERM  FOR  THE  INSTITUTION  OF  LABOUR  IN 
THE  SOUTH. THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION  SIGNIFICANT  ONLY  OF  A  CONTEST  FOR  POLITICAL 

POWER. — DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  THE  NORTHERN  AND  SOUTHERN  POPULATIONS. — THE 
ANTE-REVOLUTIONARY  PERIOD. — TRACES  OF  THE  MODERN  "YANKEE." — HOW  SLAVERY 
ESTABLISHED  A  PECULIAR  CIVILIZATION  IN  THE  SOUTH.— ITS  BAD  AND  GOOD  EFFECTS 

SUMMED  UP. COARSENESS    OF    NORTHERN    CIVILIZATION. — NO    LANDED   GENTRY    IN   THE 

NORTH. — SCANTY  APPEARANCE  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  COUNTRY. — THE  SENTIMENTS  AND 
MANNERS  OF  ITS  PEOPLE. — "  AMERICAN  EXAGGERATION1'  A  PECULIARITY  OF  THE  NORTH 
ERN  MIND. — SOBRIETY  OF  THE  SOUTH. — HOW  THESE  QUALITIES  WERE  DISPLAYED  IN  THE 
NORTHERN  AND  SOUTHERN  ESTIMATIONS  OF  THE  UNION.  — "  STATE  RIGHTS"  THE 
FOUNDATION  OF  THE  MORAL  DIGNITY  OF  THE  UNION. — CALHOUN'S  PICTURE  OF  THE 
UNION. — A  NOBLE  VISION  NEVER  REALIZED. 

ALTHOUGH  the  American  Union,  as  involving  the  Federal  principle, 
contained  in  itself  an  element  ultimately  fatal  to  its  form  of  government, 
it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  by  careful  and  attentive  statesmanship  a 
rupture  might  have  been  long  postponed.  We  have  already  briefly  seen 
that,  at  a  most  remarkable  period  in  American  history,  it  was  proposed 
by  the  great  political  scholar  of  his  times — John  C.  Calhoun — to  modify 
the  Federal  principle  of  the  Union  and  to  introduce  an  ingenious  check 


4:6  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

upon  its  tendencies  to  controversy — a  measure  that  might  long  have 
extended  the  term  of  the  Union,  and  certainly  would  have  realized  a  very 
beautiful  idea  of  political  association. 

But  we  must  notice  here  another  cause  of  disunion  that  supervened 
upon  that  of  Federal  incoherence,  and  rapidly  divided  the  country. 
It  was  that  Sectional  Animosity,  far  more  imposing  than  any  mere  dis 
cord  of  States,  inasmuch  as  it  put  in  opposition,  as  it  were,  two  distinct 
nations  on  a  geographical  line,  that  by  a  single  stroke  divided  the  country, 
and  thus  summarily  effected  what  smaller  differences  would  have  taken 
long  to  accomplish. 

We  have  elsewhere  briefly  referred  to  the  divisions  of  population 
between  the  Northern  and  Southern  States,  marked  as  they  were  by 
strong  contrasts  between  the  characters  of  the  people  of  each.  Had  these 
divisions  existed  only  in  a  contracted  space  of  country,  they  might  have 
resulted  in  nothing  more  than  the  production  of  parties  or  the  formation 
of  classes.  But  extending  as  they  did  over  the  space  of  a  continent,  these 
divisions  ceased  to  be  political  parties  or  classes  of  one  community,  and 
really  existed  in  the  condition  of  distinct  communities  or  nations.  A 
recent  English  writer  has  properly  and  acutely  observed  :  u  In  order  to 
master  the  difficulties  of  American  politics,  it  will  be  very  important  to 
realize  the  fact  that  we  have  to  consider,  not  the  action  of  rival  parties  or 
opposing  interests  within  the  limits  of  one  body  politic,  but  practically 
that  of  two  distinct  communities  or  peoples,  speaking  indeed  a  common 
language,  and  united  by  a  federal  bond,  but  opposed  in  principles  and 
interests,  alienated  in  feeling,  and  jealous  rivals  in  the  pursuit  of  political 
power." 

No  one  can  read  aright  the  history  of  America,  unless  in  the  light  of 
a  North  and  a  South  :  two  political  aliens  existing  in  a  Union  imperfectly 
defined  as  a  confederation  of  States.  If  insensible  or  forgetful  of  this 
theory,  he  is  at  once  involved  in  an  otherwise  inexplicable  mass  of  facts, 
and  will  in  vain  attempt  an  analysis  of  controversies,  apparently  the  most 
various  and  confused. 

The  Sectional  Animosity,  which  forms  the  most  striking  and  persistent 
feature  in  the  history  of  the  American  States,  may  be  dated  certainly  as 
far  back  as  1787.  In  the  Convention  which  formed  the  Constitution, 
Mr.  Madison  discovered  beneath  the  controversy  between  the  large  and 
small  States  another  clashing  of  interests.  He  declared  that  the  States 
were  divided  into  different  interests  by  other  circumstances  as  well  as  by 
their  difference  of  size  ;  the  most  material  of  which  resulted  partly  from 
climate,  but  principally  from  the  effects  of  their  having  or  not  having 
slaves.  "  These  two  causes,"  he  said,  "  concurred  in  forming  the  great 
division  of  interests  in  the  United  States  ; "  and  u  if  any  defensive  power 
were  necessary  it  ought  to  be  mutually  given  to  these  two  sections."  In 


CONFLICT   BETWEEN   NORTHERN    AND    SOUTHERN    INTERESTS.  47 

the  South  Carolina  Convention  which  ratified  the  Constitution,  Gen. 
Pinckney  spoke  of  the  difference  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  Northern 
and  Southern  States.  He  explained :  "  When  I  say  Southern,  I  mean 
Maryland  and  the  States  southward  of  her.  There,  we  may  truly  observe 
that  nature  has  drawn  as  strong  marks  of  distinction  in  the  habits  and 
manners  of  the  people,  as  she  has  in  her  climates  and  productions." 

There  was  thus  early  recognized  in  American  history  a  political  North 
and  a  political  South ;  the  division  being  coincident  with  the  line  that 
separated  the  slave-holding  from  the  non-slave-holding  States.  Indeed, 
the  existence  of  these  two  parties  and  the  line  on  which  it  was  founded 
was  recognized  in  the  very  frame-work  of  the  Constitution.  That  pro 
vision  of  this  instrument  which  admitted  slaves  into  the  rule  of  representa 
tion  (in  the  proportion  of  three-fifths),  is  significant  of  a  conflict  between 
North  and  South  ;  and  as  a  compact  between  the  slave-holding  and  non- 
slave-holding  interests,  it  may  be  taken  as  a  compromise  between  sections, 
or  even,  in  a  broader  and  more  philosophical  view,  as  a  treaty  between 
two  nations  of  opposite  civilizations.  For  we  shall  see  that  the  distinction 
of  North  and  South,  apparently  founded  on  slavery  and  traced  by  lines 
of  climate,  really  went  deeper  to  the  very  elements  of  the  civilization  of 
each  ;  and  that  the  Union,  instead  of  being  the  bond  of  diverse  States,  is 
rather  to  be  described,  at  a  certain  period  of  its  history,  as  the  forced 
alliance  and  rough  companionship  of  two  very  different  peoples. 

When  Gen.  Sullivan  complained  to  Washington  that  there  was  a  party 
in  New  England  opposed  to  his  nomination  as  minister  of  war,  because 
they  considered  he  had  "  apostatized  from  the  true  New  England  faith,  by 
sometimes  voting  with  the  Southern  States,"  he  declared  thus  early  the 
true  designs  of  the  North  to  get  sectional  control  of  the  government. 

The  slavery  question  is  not  to  be  taken  as  an  independent  controversy 
in  American  politics.  It  was  not  a  moral  dispute.  It  was  the  mere  inci 
dent  of  a  sectional  animosity,  the  causes  of  which  lay  far  beyond  the 
domain  of  morals.  Slavery  furnished  a  convenient  line  of  battle  between 
the  disputants  ;  it  was  the  most  prominent  ground  of  distinction  between 
the  two  sections ;  it  was,  therefore,  naturally  seized  upon  as  a  subject  of 
controversy,  became  the  dominant  theatre  of  hostilities,  and  was  at  last  so 
conspicuous  and  violent,  that  occasion  was  mistaken  for  cause,  and  what 
was  merely  an  incident  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  main  subject  of  con 
troversy. 

The  institution  of  slavery,  as  the  most  prominent  cause  of  distinction 
between  the  civilizations  or  social  autonomies  of  North  and  South,  was 
naturally  bound  up  in  the  Sectional  Animosity.  As  that  animosity  pro 
gressed,  the  slavery  question  developed.  This  explains,  indeed,  what  is 
most  curious  in  the  political  history  of  slavery — namely  that  the  early 
part  of  that  history  is  scarcely  more  than  an  enumeration  of  dates  and 


48  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

measures,  which  were  taken  as  matters  of  course,  and  passed  without  dis 
pute.  The  Fugitive  Slave  Law  of  1793  was  passed  without  a  division  in 
the  Senate,  and  by  a  vote  of  forty-eight  to  seven  in  the  House.  Louisiana 
and  Florida,  slave-holding  territories,  were  organized  without  agitation. 
Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Mississippi  and  Alabama  were  admitted  into  the 
Union  without  any  question  as  to  their  domestic  institutions.  The  action 
of  Congress,  with  respect  to  the  north-west  territory,  was  based  upon  a 
pre-existing  anti-slavery  ordinance,  and  had  no  significance.  There  was 
nothing  or  but  little  in  the  early  days  of  the  Union,  to  betoken  the  wild 
and  violent  controversy  on  slavery,  that  was  to  sweep  the  country  like  a 
storm  and  strew  it  with  scenes  of  horrour. 

"With  the  jealousy  of  Southern  domination  came  the  slavery  agitation ; 
proving  clearly  enough  its  subordination  to  the  main  question,  and  that 
what  was  asserted  as  a  matter  of  conscience,  and  attempted  to  be  raised  to 
the  position  of  an  independent  controversy,  was  but  part  of  or  an  attach 
ment  to  an  animosity  that  went  far  below  the  surface  of  local  institutions. 
The  Hartford  Convention,  in  1814,  which  originated  in  jealousy  of  the 
political  power  of  the  South,  proposed  to  strike  down  the  slave  represen 
tation  in  Congress,  and  to  have  the  representation  conformed  to  the  num 
ber  of  free  persons  in  the  Union.  A  few  years  later,  the  country  was  more 
distinctly  arrayed  into  two  sectional  parties,  struggling  for  supremacy  with 
regard  to  the  slavery  question.  The  legislation  on  the  admission  of  Mis 
souri  in  1820,  by  which  the  institution  of  slavery  was  bounded  by  a  line 
of  latitude,  indicated  the  true  nature  of  the  slavery  controversy,  and  sim 
ply  revealed  what  had  all  along  existed  :  a  political  North  and  a  political 
South.  It  was  here  that  we  find  the  initial  point  of  that  war  of  sections 
which  raged  in  America  for  forty  years,  and  at  last  culminated  in  an 
appeal  to  arms.  The  Missouri  legislation  was  the  preliminary  trace  of  dis 
union.  "  A  geographical  line,"  wrote  Mr.  Jefferson,  "  coinciding  with  a 
marked  principle,  moral  and  political,  once  conceived  and  held  up  to  the 
angry  passions  of  men  will  not  be  obliterated ;  and  every  new  irritation 
will  make  it  deeper  and  deeper." 

The  ISTorth  naturally  found  or  imagined  in  slavery  the  leading  cause  of 
the  distinctive  civilization  of  the  South,  its  higher  sentimentalism,  and  its 
superior  refinements  of  scholarship  and  manners.  It  revenged  itself  on 
the  cause,  diverted  its  envy  in  an  attack  upon  slavery,  and  defamed  the 
institution  as  the  relic  of  barbarism  and  the  sum  of  all  villainies.  But, 
whatever  may.  have  been  the  defamation  of  the  institution  of-  slavery,  no 
man  can  write  its  history  without  recognizing  contributions  and  naming 
prominent  results  beyond  the  domain  of  controversy.  It  bestowed  on  the 
world's  commerce  in  a  half-century  a  single  product  whose  annual  value 
was  two  hundred  millions  of  dollars.  It  founded  a  system  of  industry  by 
which  labour  and  capital  were  identified  in  interest,  and  capital  therefore 


NO   CONGENIALITY   BETWEEN   CAVALIERS   AND   PURITANS.  4:9 

protected  labour.  It  exhibited  the  picture  of  a  land  crowned  with  abun 
dance,  where  starvation  was  unknown,  where  order  was  preserved  by  an 
unpaid  police  ;  and  where  many  fertile  regions  accessible  only  to  the  labour 
of  the  African  were  brought  into  usefulness,  and  blessed  the  world  with 
their  productions. 

We  shall  not  enter  upon  the  discussion  of  the  moral  question  of  slav 
ery.  But  we  may  suggest  a  doubt  here  whether  that  odious  term  "  slav 
ery,"  which  has  been  so  long  imposed,  by  the  exaggeration  of  Northern 
writers,  upon  the  judgment  and  sympathies  of  the  world,  is  properly  ap 
plied  to  that  system  of  servitude  in  the  South  which  was  really  the  mildest 
in  the  world  ;  which  did  not  rest  on  acts  of  debasement  and  disenfranchise- 
ment,  but  elevated  the  African,  and  was  in  the  interest  of  human  improve 
ment  ;  and  which,  by  the  law  of  the  land,  protected  -the  negro  in  life  and 
limb,  and  in  many  personal  rights,  and,  by  the  practice  of  the  system, 
bestowed  upon  him  a  sum  of  individual  indulgences,  which  made  him  alto 
gether  the  most  striking  type  in  the  world  of  cheerfulness  and  content 
ment.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  prolong  this  consideration.*  For,  we 
repeat,  the  slavery  question  was  not  a  moral  one  in  the  North,  unless,  per 
haps,  with  a  few  thousand  persons  of  disordered  conscience.  It  was  signifi 
cant  only  of  a  contest  for  political  power,  and  afforded  nothing  more  than 
a  convenient  ground  of  dispute  between  two  parties,  who  represented  not 
two  moral  theories,  but  hostile  sections  and  opposite  civilizations. 

In  the  ante-revolutionary  period,  the  differences  between  the  popula 
tions  of  the  Northern  and  Southern  colonies  had  already  been  strongly 
developed.  The  early  colonists  did  not  bear  with  them  from  the  mother- 
country  to  the  shores  of  the  New  World  any  greater  degree  of  congeniality 
than  existed  among  them  at  home.  They  had  come  not  only  from  dif 
ferent  stocks  of  population,  but  from  different  feuds  in  religion  and  poli 
tics.  There  could  be  no  congeniality  between  the  Puritan  exiles  who 
established  themselves  upon  the  cold  and  rugged  and  cheerless  soil  of  New 
England,  and  the  Cavaliers  who  sought  the  brighter  climate  of  the  South, 
and  drank  in  their  baronial  halls  in  Virginia  confusion  to  roundheads  and 
regicides. 

In  the  early  history  of  the  Northern  colonists  we  find  no  slight  traces 


*  It  may  not  be  improper  to  note  here  a  very  sententious  defence  of  the  moral  side  of  slavery 
occurring  in  a  speech  delivered,  in  1856,  by  Senator  Toombs  of  Georgia,  in  the  Tremont  Temple  at 
Boston.  It  is  briefly  this  :  "  The  white  is  the  superior  race,  and  the  black  the  inferior  ;  and  sub 
ordination,  with  or  without  law,  will  be  the  status  of  the  African  in  this  mixed  society ;  and,  there 
fore,  it  is  the  interest  of  both,  and  especially  of  the  black  race,  and  of  the  whole  society,  that  this 
status  should  be  fixed,  controlled,  and  protected  by  law." 

The  whole  ground  is  covered  by  these  two  propositions :    that  subordination  is  the  necessary 
condition  of  the  black  man ;   and  that  the  so-called  "  slavery "  in  the  South  was  but  the  precise 
adjustment  of  this  subordination  by  law. 
4 


50  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

of  the  modern  Yankee  ;  although  it  remained  for  those  subsequent  influ 
ences  which  educate  nations  as  well  as  individuals  to  complete  that  char 
acter,  to  add  new  vices  to  it,  and  to  give  it  its  full  development.  But  the 
intolerance  of  the  Puritan,  the  painful  thrift  of  the  Northern  colonists,  their 
external  forms  of  piety,  their  jaundiced  legislation,  their  convenient  mor 
als,  their  lack  of  the  sentimental  ism  which  makes  up  the  half  of  modern 
civilization,  and  their  unremitting  hunt  after  selfish  aggrandizement 
are  traits  of  character  which  are  yet  visible  in  their  descendants.*  On  the 
other  hand,  the  colonists  of  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas  were  from  the  first 
distinguished  for  their  polite  manners,  their  fine  sentiments,  their  attach 
ment  to  a  sort  of  feudal  li,fe,  their  landed  gentry,  their  love  of  field-sports 
and  dangerous  adventure,  and  the  prodigal  and  improvident  aristocracy 
that  dispensed  its  stores  in  constant  rounds  of  hospitality  and  gaiety. 

Slavery  established  in  the  South  a  peculiar  and  noble  type  of  civiliza 
tion.  It  was  not  without  attendant  vices  ;  but  the  virtues  which  followed 
in  its  train  were  numerous  and  peculiar,  and  asserted  the  general  good 
effect  of  the  institution  on  the  ideas  and  manners  of  the  South.  If  habits 
of  command  sometimes  degenerated  into  cruelty  and  insolence  ;  yet,  in  the 
greater  number  of  instances,  they  inculcated  notions  of  chivalry,  polished 
the  manners  and  produced  many  noble  and  generous  virtues.  If  the  relief 
of  a  large  class  of  whites  from  the  demands  of  physical  labour  gave  occa 
sion  in  some  instances  for  idle  and  dissolute  lives,  yet  at  the  same  time  it 
afforded  opportunity  for  extraordinary  culture,  elevated  the  standards  of 

*  It  appears  that  in  the  revolutionary  war  Gen.  Washington  acquired  a  singular  insight  into  the 
New  England  character.  From  his  camp  at  Cambridge,  in  1775,  he  wrote,  in  a  private  letter  to 
Richard  Henry  Lee,  an  account  of  the  New  England  part  of  his  army,  that  reminds  one  of  incidents 
of  1861-'5.  We  append  an  extract  from  this  letter,  which  remained  for  many  years  in  the  Lee 
family,  and  was  only  brought  to  light  during  the  recent  war  : 

u  *  *  *  j  submit  it,  therefore,  to  your  consideration,  whether  there  is,  or  is  not,  a  propriety 
in  that  resolution  of  the  Congress  which  leaves  the  ultimate  appointment  of  all  officers  below  the  rank 
of  general  to  the  governments  where  the  regiments  originated,  now  the  army  is  become  Continental  ? 
To  me,  it  appears  improper  in  two  points  of  view — first,  it  is  giving  that  power  and  weight  to  an 
individual  Colony  which  ought  of  right  to  belong  to  the  whole.  Then  it  damps  the  spirit  and  ardour 
of  volunteers  from  all  but  the  four  New  England  Governments,  as  none  but  their  people  have  the 
least  chance  of  getting  into  office.  Would  it  not  be  better,  therefore,  to  have  the  warrants,  which 
the  Commander-in-Chief  is  authorized  to  give  pro  tempore,  approved  or  disapproved  by  the  Conti 
nental  Congress,  or  a  committee  of  their  body,  which  I  should  suppose  in  any  long  recess  must 
always  sit  ?  In  this  case,  every  gentleman  will  stand  an  equal  chance  of  being  promoted,  according 
to  his  merit :  in  the  other,  all  offices  will  be  confined  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  four  New  England 
Governments,  which,  in  my  opinion,  is  impolitic  to  a  degree.  I  have  made  a  pretty  good  slam 
among  such  kind  of  officers  as  the  Massachusetts  Government  abounds  in  since  I  came  to  this  camp, 
having  broken  one  colonel  and  two  captains  for  cowardly  behaviour  in  the  action  on  Bunker's  Hill, 
two  captains  for  drawing  more  provisions  and  pay  than  they  had  men  in  their  company,  and  one  foi 
being  absent  from  his  post  when  the  enemy  appeared  there  and  burnt  a  house  just  by  it.  Besides 
these,  I  have  at  this  time  one  colonel,  one  major,  one  captain,  and  two  subalterns  under  arrest  foi 
trial.  In  short,  I  spare  none,  and  yet  fear  it  will  not  all  do,  as  these  people  seem  to  be  too  inatten 
tive  to  everything  but  their  interest" 


THE  NORTH  JEALOUS  OF  SOUTHERN  SUPERIORITY.  51 

scholarship  in  the  South,  enlarged  and  emancipated  social  intercourse,  and 
established  schools  of  individual  refinement.  The  South  had  an  element 
in  its  society — a  landed  gentry — which  the  North  envied,  and  for  which 
its  substitute  was  a  coarse  ostentatious  aristocracy  that  smelt  of  the  trade, 
and  that,  however  it  cleansed  itself  and  aped  the  elegance  of  the  South, 
and  packed  its  houses  with  fine  furniture,  could  never  entirely  subdue  a 
sneaking  sense  of  its  inferiority.  There  is  a  singularly  bitter  hate  which 
is  inseparable  from  a  sense  of  inferiority ;  and  every  close  observer  of 
Northern  society  has  discovered  how  there  lurked  in  every  form  of  hos 
tility  to  the  South  the  conviction  that  the  Northern  man,  however  dis 
guised  with  ostentation,  was  coarse  and  inferiour  in  comparison  with  the 
aristocracy  and  chivalry  of  the  South. 

The  civilization  of  the  North  was  coarse  and  materialistic.  That  of  the 
South  was  scant  of  shows,  but  highly  refined  and  sentimental.  The  South 
was  a  vast  agricultural  country ;  waste  lands,  forest  and  swamps  often 
gave  to  the  eye  a  dreary  picture  ;  there  were  no  thick  and  intricate  nets 
of  internal  improvements  to  astonish  and  bewilder  the  traveller,  no  coun 
try  picturesque  with  towns  and  villages  to  please  his  vision.  Northern 
men  ridiculed  this  apparent  scantiness  of  the  South,  and  took  it  as  an  evi 
dence  of  inferiority.  But  this  was  the  coarse  judgment  of  the  surface 
of  things.  The  agricultural  pursuits  of  the  South  fixed  its  features;  and 
however  it  might  decline  in  the  scale  of  gross  prosperity,  its  people  were 
trained  in  the  highest  civilization,  were  models  of  manners  for  the  whole 
country,  rivalled  the  sentimentalism  of  the  oldest  countries  of  Europe, 
established  the  only  schools  of  honour  in  America,  and  presented  a  strik 
ing  contrast  in  their  well-balanced  character  to  the  conceit  and  giddiness  of 
the  Northern  people. 

Foreigners  have  made  a  curious  and  unpleasant  observation  of  a  cer 
tain  exaggeration  of  the  American  mind,  an  absurd  conceit  that  was  never 
done  asserting  the  unapproachable  excellence  of  its  country  in  all  things. 
TJie  Washington  affair  was  the  paragon  of  governments  ;  the  demagogical 
institutions  of  America  were  the  best  under  the  sun  ;  the  slip-shod  litera 
ture  of  the  country,  the  smattered  education  of  the  people  were  the  foci 
of  the  world's  enlightenment ;  and,  in  short,  Americans  were  the  lords 
of  creation.  De  Tocqueville  observed :  "  the  Americans  are  not  very 
remote  from  believing  themselves  to  belong  to  a  distinct  race  of  man 
kind." 

But  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  this  boastful  disposition  of  mind,  this 
exaggerated  conceit  was  peculiarly  Yankee.  It  belonged  to  the  garish 
civilization  of  the  North.  It  was  Daniel  Webster  who  wrote,  in  a  diplo 
matic  paper,  that  America  was  "  the  only  great  republican  power."  It 
was  Yankee  orators  who  established  the  Fourth-of- July  school  of  rhetoric, 
exalted  the  American  eagle,  and  spoke  of  the  Union  as  the  last,  best  gift 


52  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

to  man.  This  afflatus  had  but  little  place  among  the  people  of  the  South. 
Their  civilization  was  a  quiet  one  ;  and  their  characteristic  as  a  people  has 
always  been  that  sober  estimate  of  the  value  of  men  and  things,  which,  as 
in  England,  appears  to  be  the  best  evidence  of  a  substantial  civilization 
and  a  real  enlightenment.  Sensations,  excitements  on  slight  causes,  fits 
of  fickle  admiration,  manias  in  society  and  fashion,  a  regard  for  magnitude, 
display  and  exaggeration,  all  these  indications  of  a  superficial  and  restless 
civilization  abounded  in  the  North  and  were  peculiar  to  its  people.  The 
sobriety  of  the  South  was  in  striking  contrast  to  these  exhibitions,  and  was 
interpreted  by  the  vanity  of  the  North  as  insensibility  and  ignorance,  when 
it  was,  in  fact,  the  mark  of  the  superiour  civilization. 

This  contrast  between  the  Northern  and  Southern  minds  is  vividly 
illustrated  in  the  different  ideas  and  styles  of  their  worship  of  that  great 
American  idol — the  Union.  In  the  North  there  never  was  any  lack  of 
rhetorical  fervour  for  the  Union ;  its  praises  were  sounded  in  every  note 
of  tumid  literature,  and  it  was  familiarly  entitled  "  the  glorious."  But 
the  North  worshipped  the  Union  in  a  very  low,  commercial  sense ;  it 
was  a  source  of  boundless  profit ;  it  was  productive  of  tariffs  and  boun 
ties  ;  and  it  had  been  used  for  years  as  the  means  of  sectional  aggran 
dizement. 

The  South  regarded  the  Union  in  a  very  different  light.  It  estimated 
it  at  its  real  value,  and  although  quiet  and  precise  in  its  appreciation,  and 
not  given  to  transports,  there  is  this  remarkable  assertion  to  be  made : 
Jfchat  the  moral  veneration  of  the  Union  was  peculiarly  a  sentiment  of  the 
^South  and  entirely  foreign  to  the  Northern  mind.  It  could  not  be  other 
wise,  looking  to  the  different  political  schools  of  the  two  sections.  In  the 
North,  the  doctrine  of  State  Rights  was  generally  rejected  for  the  preva 
lent  notion  that  America  was  a  single  democracy.  To  the  people  of  the 
North  the  Union  was  therefore  a  mere  geographical  name,  a  political 
designation  which  had  no  peculiar  claims  upon  their  affection.  In  the 
South  the  Union  was  differently  regarded.  State  Rights  was  the  most 
marked  peculiarity  of  the  politics  of  the  Southern  people  ;  and  it  was  this 
doctrine  that  gave  the  Union  its  moral  dignity,  and  was  the  only  really 
possible  source  of  sentimental  attachment  to  it.  The  South  bowed  before 
neither  an  idol  of  gain,  nor  the  shadow  of  a  name.  She  worshipped  that 
picture  of  the  Union  drawn  by  John  C.  Calhoun :  a  peculiar  association 
in  which  sovereign  States  were  held  by  high  considerations  of  good  faith  ; 
by  the  exchanges  of  equity  and  comity  ;  by  the  noble  attractions  of  social 
order  ;  by  the  enthused  sympathies  of  a  common  destiny  of  power,  honour 
and  renown.  But,  alas  !  this  picture  existed  only  in  the  imagination  ;  the 
idea  of  Mr.  »Galhoun  was  never  realized ;  and  the  South,  torn  from  its 
moral  and  sentimental  attachment  to  the  Union,  found  that  it  had  no  other 
claims  upon  its  affection. 


THE   UNION   OPPEESSIVE  TO   THE   SOUTH.  53 

To  understand  how  the  Union  became  a  benefit  to  the  North  and 
resulted  in  the  oppression  of  the  South,  it  is  only  necessary  to  compare  the 
two  sections  in  the  elements  of  prosperity,  and  to  explore  the  sources  of 
those  elements  as  far  as  they  can  be  traced  within  the  domain  of  the 
Union. 


CHAPTEK   III. 

MATEEIAL  DECLINE  OF  THE  SOUTH  IN  THE  UNION. — SHIFTING  OF  THE  NUMBERS  AND  ENTER- 
PEISE  OF  THE  t.UNTEY  FEOM  THE  SOUTHEEN  TO  THE  NOETHEEN  STATES. — VIEGINIA's 
BANK  AMONG  THE  STATES  AT  THE  TIME  OF  THE  EEVOLUTION. — COMMEECIAL  DISTEESS 

OF    THE    STATES  AFTER    THE   EEYOLUTION. — HOW  NEW  ENGLAND    8IIFFEEED. THE    SOUTH 

THEN  BECKONED  THE  SEAT  OF  FUTUEE  EMPIEE. THE  PEOPLE  AND  STEENGTH  OF  AMEEICA 

BEAEING  SOUTHWAEDLY. — EMIGEATION  TO  THE  SOUTH. — KENTUCKY  AND  THE  VALES 
OF  FEANKLAND. VIEGINIA's  PEOSPEEITY. HEE  EAELY  LAND  SYSTEM. THE  CHESA 
PEAKE. ALEXANDRIA. GEOEGE  WASHINGTON'S  GEEAT  COMMEECIAL  PROJECT. TWO 

PICTUEES  OF  VIEGINIA:    1789  AND  1829.— AN  EXAMPLE  OF  THE  DECLINE  OF  THE  SOUTH 

IN  MATEEIAL  PEOSPEEITY. THIS  DECLINE  NOT  TO  BE  ATTEIBUTED  TO  SLAVEEY. — ITS 

TEUE  CAUSES. — EFFECT  OF  THE  LOUISIANA  PURCHASE  ON  THE  TIDES  OF  EMIGRATION. — 
UNEQUAL  FEDERAL  LEGISLATION  AS  A  CAUSE  OF  THE  SECTIONAL  LAPSE  OF  THE  SOUTH 
IN  THE  UNION. — THE  KEY  TO  THE  POLITICAL  HISTORY  OF  AMERICA. — A  GREAT  DEFECT 

OF  THE  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTION. — POPULATION  AS  AN  ELEMENT  OF  PROSPERITY  AND 
POWER. — HOW  THIS  WAS  THROWN  INTO  THE  NORTHERN  SCALE. — TWO  SECTIONAL  MEAS 
URES. — COMPAEISONS  OF  SOUTHEEN  EEPRESENTATION  IN  CONGRESS  AT  THE  DATE  OF  THE 

CONSTITUTION    AND    IN   THE    YEAR    I860.— SECTIONAL    DOMINATION    OF    THE    NORTH. A 

PROTECTIVE  TARIFF. — "  THE  BILL  OF  ABOMINATIONS." — SENATOR  BENTON  ON  THE 
TARIFF  OF  1828. — HIS  RETROSPECT  OF  THE  PROSPERITY  OF  THE  SOUTH. — HISTORY  OF 
THE  AMERICAN  TARIFFS. — TARIFF  OF  1833,  A  DECEITFUL  COMPROMISE. — OTHER  MEAS 
URES  OF  NORTHERN  AGGRANDIZEMENT. — INGENUITY  OF  NORTHERN  AVARICE. — WHY  THE 
SOUTH  COULD  NOT  USE  HER  DEMOCRATIC  ALLIANCE  IN  THE  NORTH  TO  PROTECT  HER 

INTERESTS. — THIS    ALLIANCE    ONE   ONLY   FOR  PARTY    PURPOSES. ITS   VALUE. — ANALYSIS 

OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY  IN  THE  NORTH. — THE  SOUTH  UNDER  THE  RULE  OF  A  NU 
MERICAL  MAJORITY.— ARRAY  OF  THAT  MAJORITY  ON  A  SECTIONAL  LINE  NECESSARILY 
FATAL  TO  THE  UNION. — WHEN  AND  WHY  THE  SOUTH  SHOULD  ATTEMPT  DISUNION. 

IT  is  not  unusual  in  countries  of  large  extent  for  the  tides  of  popula 
tion  and  enterprise  to  change  their  directions  and  establish  new  seats  of 
power  and  prosperity.  But  the  change  which  in  little  more  than  a 
.generation  after  the  American  Revolution  shifted  the  numbers  and  enter 
prise  of  the  country  from  the  Southern  to  the  Northern  States  was  so 
•distinctly  from  one  side  of  a  line  to  the  other,  that  we  must  account  such 
the  result  of  certain  special  and  well-defined  causes.  To  discover  these 


EARLY   PROSPERITY   OF   THE    SOUTH.  55 

causes,  and  to  explain  that  most  remarkable  phenomenon — the  sharply- 
defined  transfer  of  population,  enterprise,  and  commercial  empire  from  the 
South  to  the  North — we  shall  pass  rapidly  in  review  a  number  of  years 
in  the  history  of  the  American  States. 

About  the  revolutionary  period  Virginia  held  the  front  rank  of  the 
States.  Patrick  Henry  designated  her  as  "  the  most  mighty  State  in  the 
Union."  "  Does  not  Virginia,"  exclaimed  this  orator,  u  surpass  every 
State  in  the  Union  in  the  number  of  inhabitants,  extent  of  territory, 
felicity  of  position,  in  affluence  and  wealth?  "  Her  arms  had  been  singu 
larly  illustrious  in  the  seven  years'  war  ;  and  no  State  had  contributed  to 
this  great  contest  a  larger  measure  of  brilliant  and  patriotic  service. 
James  Monroe,  himself  a  soldier  of  the  Revolution,  declared  :  "  Virginia 
braved  all  dangers.  From  Quebec  to  Boston,  from  Boston  to  Savannah 
she  shed  the  blood  of  her  sons." 

The  close  of  the  Revolution  was  followed  by  a  distress  of  trade  that 
involved  all  of  the  American  States.  Indeed,  they  found  that  their  inde 
pendence,  commercially,  had  been  very  dearly  purchased :  that  the 
British  Government  was  disposed  to  revenge  itself  for  the  ill-success  of  its 
arms  by  the  most  severe  restrictions  on  the  trade  of  the  States,  and  to 
affect  all  Europe  against  any  commercial  negotiations  with  them.  The 
tobacco  of  Virginia  and  Maryland  was  loaded  down  with  duties  and 
prohibitions  ;  the  rice  and  indigo  of  the  Carolinas  suffered  similarly  ;  but 
in  New  England  the  distress  was  out  of  all  proportion  to  what  was 
experienced  in  the  more  fortunate  regions  of  the  South,  where  the  fertility 
of  the  soil  "was  always  a  ready  and  considerable  compensation  for  the 
oppression  of  taxes  and  commercial  imposts.  Before  the  Revolution, 
Great  Britain  had  furnished  markets  for  more  than  three- fourths  of  the 
exports  of  the  eight  Northern  States.  These  were  now  almost  actually 
closed  to  them.  Massachusetts  complained  of  the  boon  of  independence, 
when  she  could  no  longer  find  a  market  for  her  fish  and  oil  of  fish,  which 
at  this  time  constituted  almost  wholly  the  exports  of  that  region,  which 
has  since  reached  to  such  insolence  of  prosperity,  and  now  abounds  with 
the  seats  of  opulence.  The  most  important  branch  of  New  England 
industry — the  whale  fisheries — had  almost  perished ;  and  driven  out  of 
employment,  and  distressed  by  an  unkind  soil,  there  were  large  masses 
of  the  descendants  of  the  Puritans  ready  to  move  wherever  better  fortune 
invited  them,  and  the  charity  of  equal  laws  would  tolerate  them. 

In  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising  that,  in  the  early  stages  of 
the  Federal  Republic,  the  South  should  have  been  reckoned  the  seat  of 
future  empire.  There  was  a  steady  flow  of  population  from  the  sterile 
regions  of  the  North  to  the  rich  but  uncultivated  plains  of  the  South. 
In  the  Convention  that  formed  the  Constitution  Mr.  Butler,  a  delegate 
from  New  England,  had  declared,  with  pain,  that  "  the  people  and 


56  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

strength  of  America  were  evidently  bearing  southwardly  and  southwest- 
wardly."  As  the  sectional  line  was  then  supposed  to  run,  there  were 
only  five  States  on  the  southern  side  of  it :  eight  on  the  northern.  In  the 
House  of  Representatives  the  North  had  thirty-six  votes ;  the  South  only 
twenty-nine.  But  the  most  persistent  statement  made  in  favour  of  the 
Constitution  in  Virginia  and  other  Southern  States,  was,  that  though  the 
North,  at  the  date  of  this  instrument,  might  have  a  majority  in  the 
representation,  the  increase  of  population  in  the  South  would,  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years,  change  it  in  their  favour.  So  general  and  imposing 
was  the  belief  that  the  Southern  States  were  destined  to  hold  the  larger 
share  of  the  numbers  and  wealth  of  America.  And  not  without  reason 
was  such  a  prospect  indulged  at  this  time.  The  people  of  New  England 
were  then  emigrating  to  Kentucky,  and  even  farther  to  the  South  and 
Southwest.  In  vain  the  public  men  of  the  North  strove  to  drive  back 
the  flow  of  population  upon  the  unoccupied  lands  of  Maine,  then  a 
province  of  Massachusetts.  Land  was  offered  there  for  a  dollar  an  acre. 
But  the  inducement  of  even  such  a  price  was  insufficient  to  draw  the 
emigrant  to  the  inhospitable  regions  of  the  Penobscot.  There  was  the 
prosperous  agriculture  to  tempt  him  that  had  made  Virginia  the  foremost 
of  the  British  colonies.  There  were  the  fertile  and  undulating  prairie 
lands  of  Kentucky  to  invite  and  reward  his  labours.  There  were  the 
fruitful  vales  of  Frankland — a  name  then  given  to  the  western  district 
of  North  Carolina — to  delight  his  vision  writh  the  romances  of  picturesque 
prosperity.  To  these  regions  the  Northern  emigration  flowed  with  steady 
progress,  if  not  with  the  rapidity  and  spirit  of  a  new  adventure. 

Virginia  did  not  need  the  contributions  of  numbers  or  of  capital 
moving  from  the  North  after  the  Revolution,  to  make  her  the  foremost 
State  of  the  Union.  She  was  already  so.  In  1788,  her  population  was 
estimated  at  more  than  half  a  million,  and  her  military  force  at  fifty 
thousand  militiamen.  Her  early  land  system,  in  which  the  soil  was  cul 
tivated  by  tenants,  and  thus  most  effectively  divided  for  labour,  had  put 
her  agricultural  interest  far  above  that  of  the  other  States,  and  during  the 
colonial  period  had  drawn  to  her  borders  the  best  class  of  population  in 
America — that  of  the  yeomanry  of  England.  The  Chesapeake  was  the 
chosen  resort  of  the  trader.  Alexandria,  then  the  principal  commercial 
city  of  Virginia,  was  thought  to  hold  the  keys  to  the  trade  of  a  continent. 
The  election  of  George  Washington  to  the  Presidency  of  the  United 
States  interrupted  him  in  a  project,  by  which  he  hoped  to  unite  the  Bay 
of  Chesapeake,  by  her  two  great  arms,  the  James  and  Potomac  rivers, 
with  the  Ohio,  and  eventually  to  drain  the  commerce  of  the  Lakes  into 
the  same  great  basin,  and,  extending  yet  further  the  vision  of  this  enter 
prise,  to  make  Alexandria  the  eastern  depot  of  the  fur  trade.  Everywhere 
was  blazoned  the  prosperity  of  Virginia  ;  and,  indeed,  in  coming  into  the 


HER   DECLINE   NOT   CAUSED   BY    SLAVERY.  57 

Union,  many  of  her  public  men  had  said  that  she  sacrificed  an  empire  in 
itself  for  a  common  concern. 

Of  the  decline  of  the  South,  after  the  early  periods  of  the  government, 
in  population  and  industry,  Virginia  affords  the  most  striking  example. 
To  show  the  general  fact  and  to  illustrate  especially  the  decline  of  that 
State,  we  may  take  two  pictures  of  Virginia,  placing  an  interval  between 
them  of  scarcely  more  than  one  generation  of  men. 

At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  Virginia  was  in  the 
heyday  of  prosperity.  Her  system  of  tenant  farms  spread  before  the  eye 
a  picture  of  thrifty  and  affluent  agriculture.  In  1800  she  had  a  great 
West  Indian  and  a  flourishing  European  trade.  She  imported  for  herself 
and  for  a  good  part  of  North  Carolina  and,  perhaps,  of  Tennessee.  She 
presented  a  picture  in  which  every  element  of  prosperity  combined  with 
lively  effect. 

In  1829  it  was  estimated  in  her  State  Convention  that  her  lands  were 
worth  only  half  what  they  were  in  1817.  Her  slave  property  had  pro 
portionally  declined,  and  negro  men  could  be  bought  for  one  hundred  and 
fifty  dollars  each.  Her  landed  system  had  become  extinct.  Regions 
adapted  to  the  growth  of  the  grasses  were  converted  into  pasture  lands. 
The  busy  farms  disappeared  ;  they  were  consolidated  to  make  cattle-ranges 
and  sheep-walks.  Where  once  the  eye  was  entertained  with  the  lively 
and  cheerful  scenes  of  an  abiindant  prosperity  it  looked  over  wasted  fields, 
stunted  forests  of  secondary  growth  of  pine  and  cedar,  and  mansions 
standing  partly  in  ruins  or  gloomily  closed  in  tenantless  silence. 

The  contrast  between  such  prosperity  and  such  decay,  witnessed  in 
every  part  of  the  South,  though  not  perhaps  to  the  extent  displayed  in 
Virginia,  and  taking  place  within  a  short  and  well-defined  period  of  time, 
demands  explanations  and  strongly  invites  the  curiosity  of  the  historical 
inquirer.  And  yet  the  explanation  is  easy  when  we  regard  obvious  facts, 
instead  of  betaking  ourselves  to  remote  and  refined  speculations  after  the 
usual  fashion  of  the  curious,  with  respect  to  striking  and  remarkable  phe 
nomena. 

It  has  been  a  persistent  theory  with  Northern  writers  that  the  singular 
decline  of  the  South  in  population  and  industry,  while  their  own  section 
was  constantly  ascending  the  scale  of  prosperity,  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the 
peculiar  institution  of  negro  slavery.  But  this  is  the  most  manifest  non 
sense  that  was  ever  spread  on  the  pages  of  history.  Negro  slavery  had 
no  point  of  coincidence  with  the  decline  referred  to ;  it  had  existed  in 
the  South  from  the  beginning ;  it  had  been  compatible  with  her  early 
prosperity  extending  over  the  period  of  the  Constitution  ;  it  had  existed  in 
Virginia  when  Virginia  was  most  flourishing.  But  the  fallacy  of  the 
anti-slavery  argument  is  not  only  apparent  in  the  light  of  the  early  his 
tory  of  America  :  examples  in  other  parts  of  the  world  emphasize  it,  and 


58  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

add  to  the  illustration.  Cuba  and  Brazil  are  standing  examples  of  the 
contributions  of  negro  slavery  to  agricultural  wealth  and  material  pros 
perity  ;  while  on  the  other  hand  Jamaica  affords  the  example  of  decline  in 
these  respects  from  the  very  abolition  of  this  institution  of  labour. 

The  true  causes  of  that  sectional  lapse,  in  which  the  South  became  by 
far  the  inferiour  part  of  the  American  Union  in  every  respect  of  material 
prosperity,  will  naturally  be  looked  for  in  the  peculiar  history  of  that 
Union.  "We  shall  make  this  discovery  of  adequate  causes  in  not  more 
than  two  prominent  considerations,  having  reference  to  the  geographical 
and  political  history  of  the  American  States. 

1.  The  Louisiana  Purchase,  although  opposed  by  the  North,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  an  acquisition  to  the  territorial  and  political  power 
of  the  South,  was  mainly  instrumental  in  turning  the  scale  of  population 
as  between  the  two  sections.     It  opened  the  Mississippi  River  ;  turned  the 
tide  of  emigration  to  its  upper  branches ;   opened   a  new   empire — the 
Northwest,  soon  to  become  known  as  "  the  Great  West ; "  and  drew  to 
these  distant  fields  much  of  the  numbers  and  wealth  that  had  before 
tended  to  the  South  and  Southwest  for  the  rewards  of  enterprise. 

2.  But  by  far  the   more  important   cause  of    that   decline  we  have 
marked  in  the  South  was  the  unequal  legislation  of  Congress  and  the  con 
stant  discrimination  of  the  benefits  of  the  Union  as  between  the   two 
sections  of  the  country. 

And  here  in  this  consideration  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  we  find 
the  key  to  the  whole  political  history  of  America.  The  great  defect  of  the 
American  Constitution  was  that  it  rested  too  much  power  upon  the 
fluctuating  basis  of  population.  In  the  Convention  that  formed  this 
instrument  there  were  Southern  members  who  made  light  of  the  Northern 
majority  in  representation.  They  thought  the  next  census  would  set  all 
right.  But  the  Northern  party  understood  the  advantage  of  getting  the 
control  of  the  government  in  the  outset ;  they  strained  every  nerve  to  gain 
it ;  and  they  have  never  since  relinquished  it. 

Population,  where  the  soil  is  not  too  densely  peopled,  and  yields  a  good 
average  of  production,  is  the  obvious  source  of  national  wealth,  which, 
in  turn,  increases  population.  This  great  productive  power  was  thrown 
into  the  Northern  scale.  By  the  two  measures,  of  the  exclusion  of  slavery 
from  the  Territories  and  the  interdiction  of  the  slave  trade,  Congress 
turned  the  tides  of  population  in  favour  of  the  North,  and  confirmed  in 
the  Northern  majority  the  means  of  a  sectional  domination.. 

What  effect  this  turn  in  the  population  had  upon  the  political  power 
of  the  South  in  the  Union  is  at  once  seen  in  the  startling  changes  of  her 
representation  in  the  lower  house  of  Congress.  The  population  of  the 
South  had,  of  course,  largely  increased,  since  the  date  of  the  Revolution ; 
but  it  had  not  been  able  to  keep  up  with  the  changes  in  the  ratio  of 


INJURIOUS   SECTIONAL  LEGISLATION.  59 

representation.  This  had  been  at  first  33,000  ;  in  the  census  of  1860,  it 
was  raised  to  127,381.  In  the  first  House  of  Representatives,  Virginia 
had  ten  members  to  six  from  New  York  ;  the  proportion  under  the  last 
census  was,  Virginia  eleven  to  New  York  thirty.  South  Carolina,  which 
originally  had  one-thirteenth  of  the  popular  representation  in  Congress, 
would  only  return,  under  the  census  of  1860,  four  members  in  a  house  of 
two  hundred  and  thirty-three.  The  representative  power  in  the  North 
had  become  enormously  in  excess,  and  whenever  it  chose  to  act  unani 
mously,  was  capable  of  any  amount  of  oppression  upon  the  rival  section. 

Under  this  sectional  domination  grew  up  a  system  of  protections  and 
bounties  to  the  North  without  parallel  in  the  history  of  class  legislation 
and  of  unequal  laws  in  a  common  country.  Virginia  had  accepted  the 
Constitution  in  the  hope  that  the  General  Government,  having  "  power  to 
regulate  commerce,"  would  lift  the  restrictions  from  her  trade.  This 
consideration  was  held  out  as  a  bribe  for  votes  in  the  Convention.  She 
was  bitterly -disappointed.  In  the  Virginia  Convention  of  1822,  Mr.  Wat- 
kins  Leigh  declared :  u  Every  commercial  operation  of  the  Federal 
Government,  since  I  attained  manhood,  has  been  detrimental  to  the 
Southern  Atlantic  slaveholding,  planting  States." 

The  South  had  no  protection  for  her  agriculture.  At  the  time  of  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the  manufacturing  interest  was  a  very 
unimportant  one  in  the  country.  But  manufactures  soon  became  a 
prominent  and  special  branch  of  industry  in  the  North  ;  and  a  course  of 
sectional  legislation  was  commenced  to  exact  from  the  South  a  large 
portion  of  the  proceeds  of  her  industry,  and  bestow  it  upon  the  North  in 
the  shape  of  bounties  to  manufacturers  and  appropriations  in  a  thousand 
forms.  "  Protection  "  was  the  cry  which  came  up  from  every  part  of  the 
North.  Massachusetts,  although  unwilling  to  be  taxed  on  the  importa 
tion  of  molasses,  wanted  protection  for  the  rum  she  made  from  it,  a,nd 
contended  that  it  should  be  fenced  in  by  high  duties  from  a  competition 
with  the  rum  of  Jamaica.  Pennsylvania  sought  protection  for  her  man 
ufactures  of  steel  and  her  paper  mills.  Connecticut  had  manufactures 
of  woollens  and  manufactures  of  cordage,  which  she  declared  would  perish 
without  protection.  New  York  demanded  that  every  article  should  be 
protected  that  her  people  were  able  to  produce.  And  to  such  clamours 
and  demands  the  South  had  for  a  long  time  to  submit,  so  helpless  indeed 
that  she  was  scarcely  treated  as  a  party  to  common  measures  of  legislation. 
The  foundation  of  the  protective  tariff  of  1828 — "  the  bill  of  abominations," 
as  it  was  styled  by  Mr.  Calhoun — was  laid  in  a  Convention  of  Northern 
men  at  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania ;  and  from  this  Convention  were 
excluded  all  sections  of  the  country  intended  to  be  made  tributary  under 
the  act  of  Congress. 

Of  the  tariff  of  1828  Senator  Benton  remarked  :  "  The  South  believed 


60  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

itself  impoverished  to  enrich  the  North  by  this  system  ;  and  certainly  an 
unexpected  result  had  been  seen  in  these  two  sections.  In  the  colonial 
state  the  Southern  were  the  richer  part  of  the  colonies,  and  they  expected 
to  do  well  in  a  state  of  independence.  But  in  the  first  half  century  aftei 
independence  this  expectation  was  reversed.  The  wealth  of  the  Nortl 
was  enormously  aggrandized  ;  that  of  the  South  had  declined.  Northern 
towns  had  become  great  cities,  Southern  cities  had  decayed  or  become 
stationary  ;  and  Charleston,  the  principal  port  of  the  South,  was  less 
considerable  than  before  the  Revolution.  The  North  became  a  money 
lender  to  the  South,  and  Southern  citizens  made  pilgrimages  to  Northern 
cities  to  raise  money  upon  their  patrimonial  estates.  The  Southern 
States  attributed  this  result  to  the  action  of  the  Federal  Government — its 
double  action  of  levying  revenue  upon  the  industry  of  one  section  of 
the  Union  and  expending  it  in  another — and  especially  to  its  protective 
tariffs." 

Again,  contrasting  the  condition  of  the  South  then  with  what  it  had 
been  at  the  Revolutionary  period,  the  same  Senator  remarked  :  "  It  is  s 
tradition  of  the  colonies  that  the  South  had  been  the  seat  of  wealth  anC 
happiness,  of  power  and  opulence ;  that  a  rich  population  covered  the 
land,  dispensing  a  baronial  hospitality,  and  diffusing  the  felicity  which 
themselves  enjoyed  ;  that  all  was  life,  and  joy,  and  affluence  then.  And 
this  tradition  was  not  without  similitude  to  the  reality,  as  this  writer  can 
testify  ;  for  he  was  old  enough  to  have  seen  (after  the  Revolution)  the  still 
surviving  state  of  Southern  colonial  manners,  when  no  traveller  wag 
allowed  to  go  to  a  tavern,  but  was  handed  over  from  family  to  familj 
through  entire  States ;  when  holidays  were  days  of  festivity  and  expecta 
tion  long  prepared  for,  and  celebrated  by  master  and  slave  with  music 
and  feasting,  and  great  concourse  of  friends  and  relations ;  when  gold 
was  kept  in  chests,  after  the  downfall  of  Continental  paper,  and  weighed 
in  scales,  and  lent  to  neighbours  for  short  terms  without  note,  interest 
witness,  or  security ;  and  when  petty  litigation  was  at  so  low  an  ebb  that 
it  required  a  fine  of  forty  pounds  of  tobacco  to  make  a  man  serve  as 
constable.  The  reverse  of  all  this  was  now  seen  and  felt — not  to  the 
whole  extent  which  fancy  or  policy  painted,  but  to  extent  enough  to 
constitute  a  reverse,  and  to  make  a  contrast,  and  to  excite  the  regrets 
which  the  memory  of  past  joys  never  fails  to  awaken." 

The  early  history  of  the  tariff  makes  a  plain  exhibition  of  the  stark 
outrage  perpetrated  by  it  upon  the  Southern  States.  The  measure  of  1816 
had  originated  in  the  necessities  of  a  public  revenue — for  the  war  com 
menced  against  England  four  years  before  had  imposed  a  debt  upon  the 
United  States  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  millions  of  dollars.  It  was 
proposed  to  introduce  into  this  tariff  the  incidental  feature  of  "  protec 
tion  ;  "  and  it  was  argued  that  certain  home  manufactures  had  sprung  up 


HISTORY   OF   THE  AMERICAN   TARIFFS.  61 

during  the  exigencies  of  the  war,  which  were  useful  and  deserving,  and 
that  they  were  likely  to  lapse  under  the  sudden  return  of  peace  and  to 
sink  under  foreign  competition.  A  demand  so  moderate  and  ingenious 
the  South  was  not  disposed  to  resist.  Indeed,  it  was  recommended  by 
John  C.  Calhoun  himself,  who  voted  for  the  bill  of  1816.  But  the  danger 
was  in  the  precedent.  The  principle  of  protection  once  admitted  main 
tained  its  hold  and  enlarged  its  demands ;  it  was  successively  cariied 
farther  in  the  tariffs  of  1820,  '24,  and  '28.  And  in  1831,  when  it  was 
shown  by  figures  in  Congress  that  the  financial  exigencies  that  had  first 
called  the  tariff  into  existence  had  completely  passed  away,  and  that  the 
government  was,  in  fact,  collecting  about  twice  as  much  revenue  as  its 
usual  expenditures  required,  the  North  still  held  to  its  demands  for  pro 
tection,  and  strenuously  resisted  any  repeal  or  reduction  of  the  existing 
tariff. 

The  demand  of  the  South  at  this  time,  so  ably  enforced  by  Calhoun, 
for  the  repeal  of  the  tariff,  was  recommended  by  the  most  obvious  justice 
and  the  plainest  prudence.  It  was  shown  that  the  public  debt  had  been 
so  far  diminished  as  to  render  it  certain,  that,  at  the  existing  rate  of 
revenue,  in  three  years  the  last  dollar  would  be  paid,  and  after  three  years 
there  would  be  an  annual  surplus  in  the  treasury  of  twelve  or  thirteen 
millions.  But  the  North  was  insensible  to  these  arguments,  and  brazen 
in  its  demands.  The  result  of  this  celebrated  controversy,  which  shook 
the  Union  to  its  foundations,  was  a  compromise  or  a  modification  of  the 
tariff,  in  which  however  enough  was  saved  of  the  protective  principle  to 
satisfy  for  a  time  the  rapacity  of  the  North,  and  that  through  the  dema 
gogical  exertions  of  Henry  Clay  of  Kentucky,  who  courted  Northern 
popularity,  and  enjoyed  in  Northern  cities  indecent  feasts  and  triumphs 
for  his  infidelity  to  his  section. 

But  the  tariff  of  1833  was  a  deceitful  compromise,  and  its  terms  were 
never  intended  by  the  North  to  be  a  final  settlement  of  the  question. 
In  1842  the  settlement  was  repudiated,  and  the^  duties  on  manufactures 
again  advanced.  From  that  time  until  the  period  of  Disunion  the  fiscal 
system  of  the  United  States  was  persistently  protective ;  the  South  con 
tinued  to  decline  ;  she  had  no  large  manufactures,  no  great  cities,  no  ship 
ping  interests ;  and  although  the  agricultural  productions  of  the  South 
were  the  basis  of  the  foreign  commerce  of  the  United  States,  yet  Southern 
cities  did  not  carry  it  on. 

Nor  was  the  tariff  the  only  measure  of  Northern  aggrandizement  in 
the  Union.  Besides  manufactures,  the  North  had  another  great  interest 
in  navigation.  A  system  of  high  differential  duties  gave  protection  to  it ; 
and  this,  of  course,  bore  with  peculiar  hardship  on  the  Southern  States, 
whose  commodities  were  thus  burdened  by  a  new  weight  put  upon  them 
by  the  hand  of  the  General  Government.  In  tariffs,  in  pensions,  in  fishing 


62  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

bounties,  in  tonnage  duties,  in  every  measure  that  the  ingenuity  of  avarice 
could  devise,  the  North  exacted  from  the  South  a  tribute,  which  it  could 
only  pay  at  the  expense  and  in  the  character  of  an  inferiour  in  the  Union. 

But  in  opposition  to  this  view  of  the  helplessness  of  the  South  and  her 
inability  to  resist  the  exactions  of  the  North,  it  may  be  said  that  the  South 
had  an  important  political  alliance  in  the  North,  that  she  was  aided  there 
by  the  Democratic  party,  and  that  she  thus  held  the  reins  of  government 
during  the  greater  portion  of  the  time  the  tariffs  alleged  to  be  so  injurious 
to  her  interests  existed.  And  here  we  touch  a  remarkable  fact  in  Ameri 
can  politics.  It  is  true  that  a  large  portion  of  the  Democratic  party 
resided  in  the  North,  and  that  many  of  the  active  politicians  there 
pretended  to  give  in  their  adhesion  to  the  States  Rights  school  of  politics. 
But  this  Democratic  alliance  with  the  South  was  one  only  for  party  pur 
poses.  It  was  extravagant  of  professions,  but  it  carefully  avoided  trials 
of  its  fidelity  ;  it  was  selfish,  cunning,  and  educated  in  perfidy.  It  was  a 
deceitful  combination  for  party  purposes,  and  never  withstood  the  test  of 
a  practical  question.  The  Northern  Democrat  was  always  ready  to  con 
tend  against  the  Whig,  but  never  against  his  own  pocket,  and  the  peculiar 
interests  of  his  section.  The  moment  economical  questions  arose  in  Con 
gress,  the  Northern  Democrat  was  on  the  side  of  Northern  interests,  and 
the  Southern  ranks,  very  imposing  on  party  questions,  broke  into  a  scene 
of  mutiny  and  desertion.  It  was  indeed  the  weak  confidence  which  the 
South  reposed  in  the  Democratic  party  of  the  North  that  more  than  once 
betrayed  it  on  the  very  brink  of  the  greatest  issues  in  the  country,  and  did 
more  perhaps  to  put  it  at  disadvantage  in  the  Union  than  the  party  of 
open  opposition. 

It  was  through  such  a  train  of  legislation  as  we  have  briefly  described 
that  the  South  rapidly  declined  in  the  Union.  By  the  force  of  a  numeri 
cal  majority — a  thing  opposed  to  the  American  system,  properly  under 
stood — a  Union,  intended  to  be  one  of  mutual  benefits,  was  made  a 
conduit  of  wealth  and  power  to  the  North,  while  it  drained  the  South  of 
nearly  every  element  of  material  prosperity. 

It  is  true  that  the  numerical  majority  of  the  North  the  South  held 
long  in  check  by  superior  and  consummate  political  skill.  Party  compli 
cations  were  thrown  around  the  Sectional  Animosity.  But  it  was  easy  to 
see  that  some  time  or  other  that  animosity  would  break  the  web  of  party  ; 
and  that  whenever  on  sectional  questions  the  North  chose  to  act  in  a  mass, 
its  power  would  be  irresistible,  and  that  no  resource  would  be  left  for  the 
South  than  to  remain  helpless  and  at  mercy  in  the  Union  or  to  essay  a 
new  political  destiny.  We  shall  see  that  in  the  year  1860  the  North  did 
choose  to  act  in  a  mass,  and  that  the  South  was  thus  and  then  irresistibly 
impelled  to  the  experiment  of  Disunion. 


CHAPTEE    IY. 


THE   SECTIONAL     EQUILIBBIUM.— HOW   DISTURBED     IN     1820. — CONTEST     ON     THE     ADMISSION 

OF     TEXAS. — COMPROMISE     MEASURES     OF     1850. DECLARATION    OF     A    "FINALITY." 

PRESIDENT  PIERCE'S  ADMINISTRATION.— THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  BILL.— REPEAL  OF  "  THE 
MISSOURI  COMPROMISE."— ORIGIN  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  IN  THE  NORTH.— COM 
POSITION  AND  CHARACTER  OF  THIS  PARTY.— AMAZING  PROGRESS  OF  THE  ANTI-SLAVERY 
SENTIMENT  IN  THE  NORTH. NEW  INTERPRETATION  OF  THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  BILL  BT 

SENATOR  DOUGLAS. INTENDED  TO  COURT  TOE  ANTI-SLAVERY  SENTIMENT. DOCTRINE 

OF  "  NON-INTERVENTION  "  IN  THE  TERRITORIES.— THE  "  DRED  SCOTT  DECISION." THE 

KANSAS  CONTROVERSY. THE   LECOMPTON  CONVENTION.— THE   TOPEKA  CONSTITUTION. 

—PRESIDENT    BUCHANAN'S     POSITION     AND     ARGUMENTS.— OPPOSITION    OF    SENATOR 

DOUGLAS.— HIS     INSINCERITY. THE     NORTHERN      DEMOCRATIC    PARTY    DEMORALIZED      ON 

THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION. DOUGLAS1  DOCTRINE  OF  "  POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY." "  A  SHORT 

CUT  TO  ALL  THE  ENDS  OF  BLACK  REPUBLICANISM."— DOUGLAS  AS  A  DEMAGOGUE.  —THE 
TRUE  ISSUES  IN  THE  KANSAS  CONTROVERSY. IMPORTANT  PASSAGES  IN  THE  CONGRES 
SIONAL  DEBATE. SETTLEMENT  OF  THE  KANSAS  QUESTION.— DOUGLAS1  FOUNDATION  OF 

A     NEW    PARTY.— HIS     DEMAGOGICAL    APPEALS.— THE    TRUE     SITUATION.— LOSS     OF     THE 

SECTIONAL       EQUILIBRIUM. SERIOUS       TEMPER      OF      THE      SOUTH. — THE      JOHN      BROWN 

RAID.— IDENTITY  OF  JOHN  BROWN'S  "PROVISIONAL  CONSTITUTION  AND  ORDINANCES" 
WITH  THE  SUBSEQUENT  POLICY  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY.— CURIOUS  FORESHADOW 

OF    SOUTHERN    SUBJUGATION. THE    DESCENT    ON    HARPER'S   FERRY.— CAPTURE   AND    EXE- 

-CUTION  OF  BROWN.— HIS  DECLARATION.— NORTHERN  SYMPATHY  WITH  HIM.— ALARMING 
TENDENCY  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  TO  THE  ULTRA  ABOLITION  SCHOOL. — "  THE 
HELPER  BOOK."— SENTIMENTS  OF  SIXTY-EIGHT  NORTHERN  CONGRESSMEN.— THE  CONCEIT 

AND   INSOLENCE   OF   THE   NORTH. AFFECTATION   OF   REPUBLICANS  THAT  THE  UNION 

WAS  A  CONCESSION  TO  THE  SOUTH. HYPOCRISY  OF  THIS  PARTY. INDICATIONS  OF  THE 

COMING  CATASTROPHE  OF  DISUNION. THE  PRESIDENTIAL  CANVASS  OF  I860.— DECLARA 
TIONS  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY. THE  CHARLESTON  CONVENTION. — SECESSION  OF  THE 

SOUTHERN  DELEGATES. THE  DIFFERENT  PRESIDENTIAL  TICKETS. ELECTION  OF  ABRAHAM 

LINCOLN. ANALYSIS  OF  THE  VOTE. — HOW  HIS  ELECTION  WAS  A  "  SECTIONAL  "  TRIUMPH. 

OMINOUS  IMPORTANCE  OF  IT  IN  THAT  VIEW. — ARGUMENTS  FOR  SUSTAINING  LINCOLN'S 

ELECTION.— SEWARD'S  ARGUMENT  IN  THE  SENATE. — LINCOLN'S  ELECTION  A  GEOGRAPHI 
CAL  ONE. HOW  THERE  WAS  NO  LONGER  PROTECTION  FOR  THE  SOUTH  IN  THE  UNION. 

THE   ANTI-SLAVERY   POWER   COMPACT    AND   INVINCIBLE. — ANOTHER   APOLOGY   FOR 

LINCOLN'S  ELECTION. — FALLACY  OF  REGARDING  IT  AS  A  TRANSFER  OF  THE  ADMINIS 
TRATION  IN  EQUAL  CIRCUMSTANCES  FROM  THE  SOUTH  TO  THE  NORTH. — HOW  THE  SOUTH 


64:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

HAD  USED  ITS  LEASE  OF  POLITICAL  TO  WEE. — SENATOR  HAMMOND'S  TRIBUTE. — POWER  IN 
THE  HANDS  OF  THE  NORTH  EQUIVALENT  TO  SECTIONAL  DESPOTISM. THE  NORTH  "  ACT 
ING  IN  MASS." THE  LOGICAL  NECESSITY  OF  DISUNION. 

THE  wisest  statesmen  of  America  were  convinced  that  the  true  and 
intelligent  means  of  continuing  the  Union  was  to  preserve  the  sectional 
equilibrium,  and  to  keep  a  balance  of  power  between  North  and  South. 
That  equilibrium  had  been  violently  disturbed,  in  1820,  at  the  time  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise.  The  relative  representations  of  the  North  and 
South  in  the  United  States  Senate  were  then  so  evenly  balanced  that  it 
came  to  be  decisive  of  a  continuance  of  political  power  in  the  South 
whether  Missouri  should  be  an  addition  to  her  ranks  or  to  those  of  her 
adversary.  The  contest  ended,  immediately,  in  favour  of  the  South  ;  but 
not  without  involving  a  measure  of  proscription  against  slavery. 

Another  struggle  for  political  power  between  the  two  sections  occurred 
on  the  admission  of  Texas.  The  South  gained  another  State.  But  the 
acquisition  of  Texas  brought  on  the  war  with  Mexico  ;  and  an  enormous 
addition  to  Northern  territory  became  rapidly  peopled  with  a  population 
allured  from  every  quarter  of  the  globe. 

On  the  admission  of  California  into  the  Union,  the  South  was  per 
suaded  to  let  her  come  in  with  an  anti-slavery  Constitution  for  the 
wretched  compensation  of  a  reenactment  of  the  fugitive  slave  law,  and 
some  other  paltry  measures.  The  cry  was  raised  that  the  Union  was  in 
danger.  The  appeals  urged  under  this  cry  had  the  usual  effect  of  recon 
ciling  the  South  to  the  sacrifice  required  of  her,  and  embarrassed  anything 
like  resistance  on  the  part  of  her  representatives  in  Congress  to  the  com 
promise  measures  of  1850.  South  Carolina  threatened  secession  ;  but 
the  other  Southern  States  were  not  prepared  to  respond  to  the  bold  and 
adventurous  initiative  of  Southern  independence.  But  it  should  be  stated 
that  the  other  States  of  the  South,  in  agreeing  to  what  was  called,  in  severe 
irony,  the  Compromise  of  1850,  declared  that  it  was  the  last  concession 
they  would  make  to  the  North  ;  that  they  took  it  as  a  "  finality,"  and 
that  the  slavery  question  was  thereafter  to  be  excluded  from  the  pale  of 
Federal  discussion. 

In  1852  Franklin  Pierce  was  elected  President  of  the  United  States. 
He  was  a  favourite  of  the  State  Rights  Democracy  of  the  South  ;  and  it 
was  hoped  that  under  his  administration  the  compromise  measures  of  1850 
would  indeed  be  realized  as  a  "  finality,"  and  the  country  be  put  upon 
a  career  of  constitutional  and  peaceful  rule.  But  a  new  and  violent  agita 
tion  was  to  spring  up  in  the  first  session  of  the  first  Congress  under  his 
administration. 

The  Territory  of  Nebraska  had  applied  for  admission  into  the  Union. 
Mr.  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Senator  from  Illinois,  reported  from  the  Com- 


THE    KANSAS-NEBRASKA    BILL.  65 

inittee  on  Territories  a  bill  which  made  two  Territories — Nebraska  and 
Kansas — instead  of  one,  and  which  declared  that  the  Missouri  Compromise 
Act  was  superseded  by  the  compromise  measures  of  1850,  and  had  thus 
become  inoperative.  It  held  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  act,  "  being 
inconsistent  with  the  principles  of  non-intervention  Iry  Congress  viith 
slavery  in  the  States  and  Territories  as  recognized  by  the  legislation  of 
1850,  commonly  called  the  Compromise  Measures,  is  hereby  declared 
inoperative  and  void ;  it  being  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  this  act 
not  to  legislate  slavery  into  any  Territory  or  State,  nor  to  exclude  it  there 
from,  but  to  leave  the  people  thereof  perfectly  free  to  form  and  regulate 
their  domestic  institutions,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States."  The  bill  passed  both  houses  of  Congress  in  1854. 

The  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  involving  as  it  did  the  repeal  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  was  taken  by  the  South  as  a  sort  of  triumph.  The 
latter  measure,  being  viewed  as  an  act  of  proscription  against  the  South, 
was  justly  offensive  to  her  ;  although  indeed  the  repeal  was  scarcely  more 
than  a  matter  of  principle  or  sentiment,  as  the  sagacious  statesmen  of  the 
South  were  well  aware  that  the  States  in  the  Northwest  were  likely,  from 
the  force  of  circumstances,  to  be  settled  by  Northern  people,  and  to  be 
thus  dedicated  to  their  institutions.*  But  it  was  then  supposed  that  the 
phraseology  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  was  not  liable  to  misconstruc 
tion  ;  and  that  when  it  was  declared  that  the  people  of  the  Territories 
were  to  determine  the  question  of  slavery,  it  meant,  of  course,  that  they 
were  to  do  so  in  the  act  of  forming  a  State  Constitution  and  deciding 
upon  other  institutions  of  the  State  as  well  as  that  of  slavery. 

In  the  North,  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  the  occasion 
of  a  furious  excitement.  Mr.  Douglas  was  hung  in  effigy  in  some  of  their 
towns,  execrated  by  Northern  mobs,  and  even  threatened  with  violence  to> 
his  person.  The  anti-slavery  sentiment  of  the  North  was  rapidly  devel 
oped  in  the  excitement ;  a  new  party  was  organized  with  reference  to  the 
question  of  slavery  in  the  Territories ;  and  thus  originated  the  famous 
Republican  party — popularly  called  the  Black  Republican  party — which 
was  indeed  identical  with  the  Abolition  party  in  its  sentiment  of  hostility 
to  slavery,  and  differed  from  it  only  as  to  the  degree  of  indirection  by 
which  its  purpose  might  best  be  accomplished.  This  party  comprised  the 
great  mass  of  the  intellect  and  wealth  of  the  North.  It  was  also  the 


*  As  a  general  rule  the  South  could  not  compete  with  the  North  in  the  race  of  emigration  to 
new  countries.  Nor  was  it  her  interest,  being  a  sparsely  settled  and  agricultural  country,  to  do  so. 
A  recent  English  commentator  on  the  American  Union  (Mr.  Spence)  well  observes :  *  It  is  an 
unfortunate  result  of  the  complex  politics  of  the  Union  that  the  political  instinct  of  the  South  is 
driven  to  oppose  its  material  interest.  It  must  expand  while  the  North  expands,  or  siccumb.. 
It  cannot  seek  expansion  from  choice  or  interest,  but  is  driven  to  it  by  the  impulse  of  political  self- 
preservation." 

5 


66  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Protectionist  party.     Its  leaning  was  in  favour  of  strong  government,  and 
whatever  there  might  be  of  aristocracy  in  the  North  belonged  to  it. 

The  new  party  sprung  at  once  into  an  amazing  power.  In  the  Presi 
dential  canvass  of  1852,  which  had  resulted  in  the  election  of  Mr.  Pierce^ 
John  P.  Hale,  who  ran  upon  what  was  called  the  "  straight-out "  Abolition 
ticket,  did  not  receive  the  vote  of  a  single  State,  and  but  175,296  of  the 
popular  vote  of  the  Union.  But  upon  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Com 
promise,  Abolitionism,  in  the  guise  of  "  Republicanism,"  swept  almost 
everything  before  it  in  the  North  and  Northwest  in  the  elections  of  1854 
and  1855  ;  and  in  the  Thirty-first  Congress,  Nathaniel  Banks,  an  objec 
tionable  Abolitionist  of  the  Massachusetts  school,  was  elected  to  the 
speakership  of  the  House. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  language  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  was  the 
subject  of  no  dispute.  No  one  supposed  that  from  this  language  there 
was  to  originate  an  afterthought  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Douglas,  and  that,  by 
an  ingenious  torture  of  words,  this  measure  was  to  be  converted  into  one 
to  conciliate  the  anti-slavery  sentiment  of  the  North,  and  to  betray  the 
interests  of  the  South.  This  afterthought  was  doubtless  the  consequence 
of  the  rapid  growth  of  the  Black  Republican  party,  and  the  conviction 
that  the  Democratic  party  in  the  North  could  only  recover  its  power  by 
some  marked  concession  to  the  sectional  sentiment  now  rapidly  developing 
on  the  subject  of  slavery. 

It  should  be  noticed  here  that  the  doctrine  of  "  non-intervention," 
which  prohibited  Congress  from  interfering  with  the  question  of  slavery 
an  the  Territories,  had  been  affirmed  by  a  judicial  decision  in  the  Supreme 
^Court  of  the  United  States.  In  the  famous  "  Dred  Scott  case,"  a  negro 
•demanded  his  freedom  on  the  ground  of  legal  residence  beyond  the  lati 
tude  of  36°  30'  N. — the  line  of  the  Missouri  Compromise.  The  Supreme 
Court  pronounced  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  make  that  law  ;  that  it 
was  therefore  null  and  void  ;  and  declared  "  that  the  Constitution  recog 
nizes  the  right  of  property  in  a  slave,  and  makes  no  distinction  between 
that  description  of  property  and  other  property  owned  by  a  citizen  ;  "  and 
further,  that  every  citizen  had  the  clear  right  to  go  into  any  Territory, 
and  take  with  him  that  which  the  Constitution  recognized  as  his  property. 

So  far  the  rights  of  the  South  in  the  Territories  were  thought  to  be 
plain  ;  the  design  of  the  Black  Republican  party  to  exclude  slavery  there 
from  by  the  Federal  authority  had  been  pronounced  unconstitutional  by 
the  highest  judicial  authority  in  the  country ;  and  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill  was  thought  to  be  a  plain  letter,  which  taught  that  slavery  was  the 
subject  of  exclusive  legislation  by  States,  or  by  Territories  in  the  act  of 
assuming  the  character  of  States.  But  the  South  only  stood  on  the 
threshold  of  a  new  controversy — another  exhibition  of  the  ingenuity  of  the 
anti-slavery  sentiment  to  assert  itself  in  new  methods  and  on  new  issues. 


THE  KANSAS  CONTROVERSY.  67 


THE  KANSAS  CONTROVERSY. 

What  is  known  as  the  Kansas  Controversy  was  a  marked  era  in  the 
political  history  of  the  Union.  It  illustrated  most  powerfully  the  fact  that 
the  slavery  question  really  involved  but  little  of  moral  sentiment,  and 
indicated  a  contest  for  political  power  between  two  rival  sections. 

When  Mr.  Buchanan  came  into  the  Presidential  office,  in  1857,  he  at 
once  perceived  that  the  great  point  of  his  administration  would  be  to 
effect  the  admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union,  and  thus  terminate  a 
dispute  which  was  agitating  and  distracting  the  country.  In  September, 
1857,  the  people  of  the  Territory  had  called  a  Convention  at  Lecompton 
to  form  a  Constitution.  The  entire  Constitution  was  not  submitted  to  the 
popular  vote  ;  but  the  Convention  took  care  to  submit  to  the  vote  of  the 
people,  for  ratification  or  rejection,  the  clause  respecting  slavery.  The 
official  vote  resulted :  For  the  Constitution,  with  slavery,  6,226  ;  for  the 
Constitution,  without  slavery,  509.  Under  this  Constitution,  Mr.  Buchanan 
recommended  the  admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union  ;  and  indeed  he  had 
reason  to  hope  for  it  in  view  of  the  principles  which  had  governed  in  his 
election. 

The  argument  on  the  other  side  was  that  the  entire  Constitution  had 
not  been  submitted  to  the  people,  and  that  the  principle  of  "  popular 
sovereignty  "  had  been  invaded  by  the  Convention,  in  not  representing 
all  the  voters  of  the  Territory,  and  in  not  submitting  the  entire  result  of 
their  labours  to  a  vote  of  the  people.  The  Anti-Slavery  or  Free  State 
party  had  also  their  Constitution  to  advocate,  an  instrument  framed  in 
1855,  at  Topeka,  which  had  been  submitted  to  the  people,  and  ratified  by 
a  large  majority  of  those  who  voted.  But  the  facts  were  that  scarcely 
any  but  Abolitionists  went  to  the  polls ;  and  it  was  notorious  that  the 
Topeka  Constitution  was  the  fruit  of  a  bastard  population  that  had  been 
thrown  into  the  Territory  by  the  "  Emigrant  Aid  Societies  "  of  New 
England. 

In  his  first  message  to  Congress,  Mr.  Buchanan  surveyed  the  whole 
ground  of  the  controversy.  He  explained  that  when  he  instructed 
Gov.  Walker  of  Kansas,  in  general  terms,  in  favour  of  submitting  the 
Constitution  to  the  people,  he  had  no  other  object  in  view  beyond  the 
all-absorbing  topic  of  slavery  ;  he  considered  that  under  the  organic  act 
—known  as  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill — the  Convention  was  bound  to 
submit  the  all-important  question  of  slavery  to  the  people  ;  he  added,  that 
it  was  never  his  opinion,  however,  that,  independently  of  this  act,  the 
Convention  would  be  bound  to  submit  any  portion  of  the  Constitution  to 
a  popular  vote,  in  order  to  give  it  validity  ;  arid  he  argued  the  fallacy  and 


68  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

unreasonableness  of  such  an  opinion,  by  insisting  that  it  was  in  opposition  to 
the  principle  which  pervaded  our  institutions,  and  which  was  every  day 
carried  into  practice,  to  the  effect  that  the  people  had  the  right  to  delegate 
to  representatives,  chosen  by  themselves,  sovereign  power  to  frame  Con 
stitutions,  enact  laws,  and  perform  many  other  important  acts,  without  the 
necessity  of  testing  the  validity  of  their  work  by  popular  approbation. 

These  views  appeared  reasonable  enough.  But  Mr.  Buchanan  found 
that  they  were  opposed  by  many  members  of  Congress  who  had  actively 
supported  him  in  his  canvass,  and  chief  and  leader  among  them  the  dis 
tinguished  author  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  Mr.  Douglas.  This  man 
had  assembled  an  opposition  under  the  captivating  term  of  "  popular 
sovereignty  ;  "  but  these  words  had  a  certain  narrow  and  technical  party 
meaning,  and  covered  a  remarkable  and  ingenious  design  upon  the  power 
and  interests  of  the  South. 

It  had  long  been  evident  to  intelligent  observers  that  the  Northern 
Democratic  party,  of  which  Mr.  Douglas  some  time  ago  had  been  the 
acknowledged  leader,  was  becoming  demoralized  on  the  slavery  question. 
This  party  had  formerly  acted  with  the  South  for  political  power.  In  the 
depression  of  that  power  and  the  rapid  growth  of  the  anti-slavery  party  in 
the  North,  it  had  no  hesitation  in  courting  and  conciliating  the  ruling 
element.  This  disposition  was  accommodated  by  the  controversy  which 
had  taken  place  between  Mr.  Douglas  and  the  administration  of 
Mr.  Buchanan.  The  anti-slavery  sentiment  in  the  North  was  conciliated 
by  the  partisans  of  the  former  in  adopting  a  new  principle  for  the  govern 
ment  of  the  Territories,  which  was  to  allow  the  people  to  determine  the 
question  of  slavery  in  their  Territorial  capacity,  without  awaiting  their 
organization  as  a  State,  and  thus  to  risk  the  decision  of  the  rights  of  the 
South  on  the  verdict  of  a  few  settlers  on  the  public  domain.  This  doc 
trine  was  violently  entitled  by  Mr.  Douglas  u  popular  sovereignty  ;  "  but 
it  was  more  justly  described  by  Gov.  Wise  of  Virginia,  as  "  a  short  cut  to 
all  the  ends  of  Black  Republicanism." 

It  is  thus  seen  that  Mr.  Douglas  had  tortured  the  language  of  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill  into  the  sense  that  the  unorganized  population  of  a 
Territory  might  decide  the  question  of  slavery  as  against  the  State 
interests  of  the  South  ;  thus  indicating  to  the  North  that  this  measure 
might  quite  as  easily  and  readily  exclude  slavery  as  the  intervention  of 
Congress,  the  right  of  which  the  Black  Republican  party  claimed. 

Mr.  Douglas  was  an  able  and  eloquent  demagogue.  He  imposed  his 
doctrine  upon  the  minds  of  not  a  few  of  the  Southern  people  by  the  artful 
ness  of  its  appeals  to  the  name  of  a  principle,  which  had  none  of  the 
substance  of  justice  or  equality.  He  raised  in  Congress  what  was  called 
the  Anti-Lecompton  party,  pledged  to  the  exclusion  of  Kansas  under  the 
Lecompton  Constitution,  and  insisting  on  the  right  of  Territorial  legisla- 


SETTLEMENT   OF   THE   KANSAS    QUESTION.       ,  69 

tiou  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  For  six  months  the  Kansas  question  occu 
pied  Congress,  and  held  the  country  in  anxiety  and  suspense.  It  was  a 
contest  for  political  power  between  North  and  South.  The  mere  indus 
trial  interests  or  morals  of  slavery  had  nothing  to  do  with  it. 

^  The  sum  of  the  controversy  was   that  the  South  struggled   for  the 
principle  of  equality  in  the  Territories,  without  reference  to  the  selfish 
interests  of  slavery,  and  even  with  the  admission  of  the  hopelessness  of 
those  interests  in  Kansas ;  while  the  North  contended  for  the  narrow 
selfish,  practical  consequence  of  making  Kansas  a  part  of  her  Free-soil 
possessions.     This  was  evident  in  the  debates  in  Congress.     At  one  stage 
of  the  discussion,  Mr.  English,  of  Indiana,  asked  the  question  :    « Is  there 
a  Southern  man  here  who  will  vote  against  the  admission  of  Kansas  as 
a  Free  State,  if  it  be  the  undoubted  will  of  the  people  of  that  Territory 
that  it  shall  be  a  Free  State— if  she  brings  here  a  Constitution  to  that 
effect  ? :  —and  there  was  a  general  response  "  Not  one  "  from  the  Southern 
side  of  the  House.     At  another  period  of  the  debate,  Mr.  JBarksdale  of 
Mississippi  put  the  question  to  Black  Eepublican  members  whether  they 
would  vote  for  the  admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union  with  a  Consti 
tution  tolerating  slavery  "  if  a  hundred  thousand  people  there  wished  it." 
Mr.  Giddings  of  Ohio  replied  that  he  "  would  never  vote  to  compel  his 
State  to  associate  with  another  Slave  State."     Mr.  Stanton,  his  colleague, 
added  :  « I  will  say  that  the  Republican  members  of  this  House,  so  far  as 
.  know,  will  never  vote  for  the  admission  of  any  Slave  State  north   of 
36°  30V 

The  result  of  the  dispute  was  the  report  of  a  bill  for  the  admission  of 
Kansas,  which  became  a  law  in  June,  1858,  and  substantially  secured 
nearly  all  that  the  North  had  claimed  in  the  matter.  The  people  were 
authorized  to  form  a  new  Constitution.  Kansas  did  not  come  into  the 
Union  until  nearly  three  years  afterwards,  just  as  it  was  going  to  pieces  ; 
and  then  it  came  in  with  an  anti-slavery  Constitution,  and  President 
Buchanan,  consistently,  signed  the  bill  of  admission. 

But  the  trouble  did  not  end  with  the  solution  of  the  Kansas  difficulty. 
The  true  character  of  that  event,  and  the  debates  which  Imd  attended  it  in 
Congress,  convinced  the  South  that  it  could  hardly  expect,  under  any  cir 
cumstances,  the  addition  of  another  Slave  State  to  the  Union.     The  per 
nicious  doctrines  of  Mr.  Douglas  were  used  to  erect  a  party  which,  while 
t  really  pandered  to  the  anti-slavery  sentiment  of  the  North,  imposed 
upon  the  South  by  cheap  expressions  of  conservatism,  and  glozed  state- 
tents  of  its  designs.     Mr.  Douglas  proclaimed  his  views  to  be  in  favour  of 
non-intervention  by  Congress  on  the  subject  of  slavery ;  he  avowed  his 
continued  and  unalterable  opposition  to  Black-Republicanism  ;  his  princi 
ples  were  professed  to  be  "held  subject  to  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
-the  distinction  between  judicial  questions  and  political  questions 


70  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

being  purposely  clouded ;  and  his  friends,  with  an  ingenious  sophistry 
that  had  imposed  upon  the  South  for  thirty  years  with  success,  insisted 
that  the  support  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas  was  a  support  of  the  party  in  the 
North  which  had  stood  by  the  South  amid  persecution  and  defamation. 

But  it  was  evident  to  reflecting  minds  that,  either  by  the  policy  of  the 
Black  Eepublican  party,  or  the  shorter  device  of  the  Douglas  Democracy 
for  the  government  of  the  Territories,  the  sectional  equilibrium  of  the 
Union  was  lost.  A  disposition  was  shown  to  calculate  the  real  value  of  a 
Union  which,  by  its  mere  name  and  the  paraphrases  of  demagogues,  had 
long  governed  the  affections  of  the  people,  but  in  which,  it  was  now  seen, 
the  South  must  constantly  descend  in  political  power  ;  in  which  she  paid  a 
tribute  to  the  North  in  unequal  taxations  and  in  the  courses  of  trade,  esti 
mated  by  a  Northern  writer  at  two  hundred  millions  of  dollars  a  year ; 
and  in  which  she  was  constantly  enduring  insult,  occupied  the  position  of 
an  inferiour,  and  was  designated  as  the  spotted  and  degraded  part  of 
America. 


THE    JOHN    BROWN    KAID. 

Other  events  were  to  repeat  and  enlarge  the  shock  given  to  the  Union 
by  the  Kansas  controversy.  In  October,  1859,  occurred  the  famous  John 
Brown  raid  into  Virginia,  in  which  an  old  man,  who  had  obtained  in  Kan 
sas  the  notoriety  of  a  horse-thief  and  an  assassin,  invaded  the  State  of  Yir- 
ginia  at  Harper's  Ferry  with  a  band  of  outlaws,  declared  his  purpose 
to  free  the  slaves,  and  commenced  with  a  work  of  blood  the  first  acts  of 
sectional  rebellion  against  the  authority  of  the  United  States.  It  seems 
that  this  man,  who  had  the  singular  combination  of  narrow  sagacity,  or 
cunning  with  visionary  recklessness  that  is  often  observed  in  fanatics,  had, 
in  1858,  summoned  a  convention  in  West  Canada,  in  which  he  proposed 
to  substitute  a  plan  of  action  entitled  u  Provisional  Constitution  and  Ordi 
nances  "  for  all  other  governments  then  in  existence  in  the  United 
States. 

This  fanatical  instrument  has  a  very  curious  interest  from  its  general 
similitude  to  that  "  plan  of  action  "  which  was  afterwards  adopted  by  the 
Government  at  Washington  in  its  great  war  upon  the  South,  and  its  sub 
sequent  programme  of  subjugation. 

The  main  point  of  the  preamble  of  John  Brown's  Constitution  was  to 
announce  the  fact  that  the  new  government  especially  contemplated  the 
accession  of  "  the  proscribed,  oppressed,  and  enslaved "  people  of  the 
United  States.  And  this,  and  the  qualification  for  membership  in  a  fol 
lowing  article,  intimated  that  not  sex,  colour,  age,  political  or  social  condi 
tion  would  be  at  all  considered  against  any  one. 


THE   JOHN    BROWN    RAID.  71 

The  powers  of  the  central  Congress  were  defined  in  this  instrument  after 
the  strictest  school  of  Consolidation ;  and  the  existence  of  the  States  was 
nowhere  practically  acknowledged. 

In  article  17  we  find  the  following  provision  : 

"  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  President  and  Secretary  of  State  to  find  out,  as  soon  as 
possible,  the  real  friends,  as  well  as  enemies  of  this  organization  in  every  part  of  the 
country ;  to  secure  among  them  inn-keepers,  private  postmasters,  private  mail  contrac 
tors,  messengers  and  agents,  through  whom  may  be  obtained  correct  and  regular  infor 
mation  constantly." 

The  remaining  articles  of  the  Constitution  develop  a  plan  to  build  up 
on  the  ruins  of  existing  laws  and  institutions  a  despotism,  in  which  the 
"  enemies  of  the  government  "  are  to  be  deprived  of  their  capacity  to  do 
further  evil  by  the  loss  of  their  liberty  and  property,  while  the  loyal  citizens 
are  to  form  a  sort  of  aristocratic  fraternity,  whose  patriotic  duty  it  will  be 
to  punish  disloyalty  at  all  hours  and  upon  all  occasions  "promptly  and 
effectually,"  and  "  without  the  formality  of  a  complaint."  The  confisca 
tion  of  the  property  of  all  slaveholders  and  u  other  disloyal  persons  "  is 
directed  ;  and  here,  too,  we  find  prescribed  oaths  of  neutrality  and  alle 
giance,  registering,  &c. 

This  curious  foreshadow  of  the  policy  of  the  North,  which  was  to  sup 
plant  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  originated  in  a  convention  of 
thirty-five  fanatics,  of  whom  ten  where  white  men  and  the  remaining 
twenty-five  negroes  of  various  shades  of  colour.  John  Brown,  having 
thus  prefaced  his  expedition  into  Virginia,  collected  a  small  company  of 
insurgents,  black  and  white,  on  a  farm  he  had  rented  near  Harper's  Ferry, 
hoping  that,  as  he  invaded  Virginia,  the  blacks  would  flock  to  his  stand 
ard,  and  be  armed  there  with  the  pikes  and  rifles  he  had  provided  for  his 
recruits. 

At  half  past  ten  o'clock,  Sunday  night,  17th  October,  1859,  the  Poto 
mac  was  crossed,  and,  proceeding  with  military  method,  the  party  seized 
first  the  watchman  guarding  the  railroad  bridge  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and,, 
posting  pickets  at  certain  points,  occupied  the  arsenal  and  armory  building. 
A  white  confederate,  named  Cook,  went  out  in  command  of  a  party  for 
the  purpose  of  getting  black  recruits  from  the  adjoining  estates  of  slave 
holders.  He  arrested  Col.  Lewis  Washington  in  his  house,  and  brought  in 
some  other  hostages  in  the  persons  of  prominent  citizens.  In  the  mean 
while,  Brown's  pickets  from  time  to  time  arrested  and  brought  into  his 
presence  all  who,  from  motives  of  curiosity  or  otherwise,  had  ventured 
within  his  military  lines.  These  were  retained  as  prisoners  in  one  of  the 
armory  buildings.  The  pickets  having  captured  one  of  the  watchmen  on- 
the  bridge,  when  the  one  who  was  to  relieve  him  made  his  appearance,, 
they  challenged  him.  He,  alarmed,  at  once  retreated  without  obeying 


72  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

their  command  to  stand.  Finding  words  of  no  avail,  the  outlaws  fired 
upon  the  fugitive,  and  brought  him  to  the  ground.  Upon  examining  their 
victim,  they  discovered  that  he  was  a  mulatto  and  mortally  wounded. 

About  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  Baltimore  train  arrived.  This 
was  halted  for  two  or  three  hours,  and  finally,  after  much  expostulation, 
allowed  to  pass.  The  news  soon  reached  Washington ;  and  Col.  Robert 
E.  Lee,  then  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  was  despatched  to 
command  the  regular  troops  concentrating  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Accom 
panied  by  his  aid,  Lieut.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart — afterward  the  world-renowned 
cavalry  chief  of  Lee's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — he  set  out  on  a  special 
train,  and  sent  a  telegraphic  despatch  to  the  U.  S.  Marines,  in  advance  of 
him,  directing  them  what  to  do.  Other  troops — the  militia  from  Virginia 
and  Maryland — had  promptly  reached  the  scene,  and  when  Col.  Lee 
arrived  during  the  night,  were  awaiting  his  orders  to  act.  He  imme 
diately  placed  his  command  within  the  armory  grounds,  so  as  to  com 
pletely  surround  the  fire-engine  house  where  the  insurgents  had  taken 
refuge.  In  it,  Brown  and  his  party  had  confined  Col.  Washington, 
Mr.  Dangerfield,  and  some  other  citizens  whom  they  had  surprised  and 
captured  the  night  before ;  and  therefore  to  use  the  cannon  upon  it  now 
would  be  to  endanger  the  lives  of  friends  as  well  as  foes. 

Accordingly,  at  daylight,  Col.  Lee  took  measures  to  attempt  the 
capture  of  the  insurgents,  if  possible,  without  bloodshed.  At  seven  in  the 
morning  he  sent  his  aid,  Lieut.  Stuart,  to  summon  them  quietly  to  sur 
render,  promising  only  protection  from  violence  and  a  trial  according  to 
law.  Brown  refused  all  terms  but  those  which  he  had  more  than  once 
already  asked  for,  namely :  "  That  he  should  be  permitted  to  pass  out 
unmolested  with  his  men  and  arms  and  prisoners,  that  they  should  proceed 
unpursued  to  the  second  toll-gate,  when  they  would  free  their  prisoners, 
and  take  the  chances  of  escape."  These  concessions  were,  of  course, 
refused. 

At  last,  perceiving  all  his  humane  efforts  to  be  of  no  avail,  Col.  Lee 
gave  orders  for  an  attack.  A  strong  party  of  marines  advanced  by  two 
lines  quickly  on  each  side  of  the  door.  When  near  enough,  two  powerful 
men  sprung  between  the  lines,  and,  with  heavy  sledge-hammers,  attempted 
to  batter  down  the  doors,  but  failed.  They  then  took  hold  of  a  ladder 
-.some  forty  feet  long,  and,  advancing  on  a  run,  brought  it  with  tremendous 
•effect  upon  the  door.  At  the  second  blow  it  gave  way,  and  immediately 
the  marines  rushed  to  the  breach  as  a  volley  from  within  came  right  upon 
.them.  One  man,  in  the  front,  fell  mortally  wounded,  and  sharp  and  rapid 
was  the  firing  from  within  from  the  insurgents,  now  driven  to  desperation. 
The  next  moment  the  gap  was  widened,  and  the  marines  poured  in. 
As  Lieut.  Stuart  entered  the  door,  a  voice  cried  out,  "  I  siirrender." 
Brown  said,  "  One  man  surrenders,  give  him  quarter !  "  and  at  the  same 


CAPTTJEE  AND   EXECUTION   OF   BROWN.  73 

time  fired  his  piece.  The  next  moment  Stuart's  sword  had  entered  his 
skull,  and  the  desperate  outlaw  was  stretched  bleeding.  The  other  insur 
gents  were  quickly  secured  ;  and  the  liberated  citizens,  who  had  held  up 
their  hands  to  designate  themselves  to  the  marines,  and  thus  escape  their 
fire,  were  hailed  with  shouts  of  congratulation  as  they  passed  out  of  the 
building. 

While  suffering  from  a  wound  supposed  to  be  mortal,  Brown  made  the 
following  admissions  to  Governor  Wise  of  Virginia  :  "  I  never  had  more 
than  twenty-two  men  about  the  place  at  one  time ;  but  had  it  so 
arranged,  that  I  could  arm,  at  any  time,  fifteen  hundred  men  with  the 
following  arms :  two  thousand  Sharp's  rifles,  two  hundred  Maynard's 
revolvers,  one  thousand  spears.  I  would  have  armed  the  whites  with  the 
rifles  and  revolvers,  and  the  blacks  with  the  spears ;  they  not  being 
sufficiently  familiar  with  other  arms.  I  had  plenty  of  ammunition  and 
provisions,  and  had  a  good  right  to  expect  the  aid  of  from  two  to  five 
thousand  men,  at  any  time  I  wanted  them.  Help  was  promised  me  from 
Maryland,  Kentucky,  North  and  South  Carolina,  Virginia,  and  Canada. 
The  blow  was  struck  a  little  too  soon.  The  passing  of  the  train  on  Sunday 
night  did  the  work  for  us  ;  that  killed  us.  I  only  regret  that  I  have  iailed 
in  my  designs  ;  but  I  have  no  apology  to  make  or  concession  to  ask  now. 
Had  we  succeeded,  when  our  arms  and  funds  were  exhausted  by  an 
increasing  army,  contributions  would  have  been  levied  on  the  slaveholders, 
and  their  property  appropriated  to  defray  expenses  and  carry  on  the  war 
of  freedom." 

On  the  2d  of  December,  1859,  having  been  tried  at  Charleston,  Vir 
ginia,  and  condemned,  Brown  was  conducted  to  the  gallows,  and  there,  in 
sight  of  the  beautiful  country,  a  portion  of  which  he  had  hoped  one  day 
to  possess,  he  suffered  the  extreme  penalty  of  the  law.  He  died  with  the 
unnatural  firmness  of  a  fanatic — but  as  many  in  the  North  interpreted  it, 
with  the  exalted  courage  of  a  martyr. 

It  had  been  said  in  some  Northern  newspapers  that  the  John  Brown 
raid  and  its  expiation  would  have  a  good  effect  in  opening  the  eyes  of  the 
people  to  the  crime  and  madness  of  Abolition  doctrines.  But  subsequent 
events  were  quite  to  the  contrary.  The  Northern  elections  of  the  next 
month  showed  no  diminution  in  the  Black  Republican  vote.  The  mani 
festations  of  sympathy  for  John  Brown  could  not  be  contained,  and  took 
place  openly  in  many  of  the  Northern  cities  and  towns.  Upon  the  day 
appointed  for  his  execution,  a  motion  for  adjournment,  out  of  respect  to 
the  sacredness  of  the  day,  was  lost  in  the  State  Senate  of  Massachusetts  by 
only  three  votes ;  while  in  many  of  the  towns  the  bells  of  the  churches 
were  tolled,  and  congregations  assembled  to  consecrate  the  memory  of 
their  hero.  The  body  was  carried  to  North  Elba  in  New  York,  and  after 
it  was  consigned  to  the  grave,  many  of  the  New  England  clergy  allotted 


74:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

John  Brown  an  apotheosis,  and  consigned  his  example  to  emulation  as  one 
not  only  of  public  virtue,  but  of  particular  service  to  God. 

But  a  much  graver  series  of  events  was  to  show  the  real  sympathy  of 
the  North  with  John  Brown's  "  plan  of  action,"  and  to  attest  the  rapid 
tendency  of  the  Black  .Republican  party  to  the  worst  schools  of  Abolition. 
At  the  meeting  of  Congress  in  December,  1859,  the  Black  Republicans 
nominated  to  the  speakership  of  the  House  Mr.  Sherman  of  Ohio,  who  had 
made  himself  especially  odious  to  the  South,  by  publicly  recommending, 
in  connection  with  sixty-eight  other  Republican  Congressmen,  a  fanatical 
document  popularly  known  as  "  Helper's  Book"  This  publication,  thus 
endorsed  by  Black  Republicans,  and  circulated  by  them  in  the  Northern 
elections,  openly  defended  and  sought  to  excite  servile  insurrections  in  the 
South ;  and  it  was  with  reason  that  the  entire  Southern  delegation  gave 
warning  that  they  would  regard  the  election  of  Mr.  Sherman,  or  of  any 
man  with  his  record,  as  an  open  declaration  of  war  upon  the  institutions 
of  the  South  ;  as  much  so,  some  of  the  members  declared,  as  if  the  John 
Brown  raid  were  openly  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives. 

This  book,  which  even  Mr.  Seward,  the  leader  of  the  Black  Republican 
party,  had  recommended,  along  with  others,  urged  the  North  to  extermi 
nate  slavery,  and  at  once,  without  the  slightest  compensation,  in  language  of 
which  the  following  is  a  specimen,  addressed  to  the  South erners  :  "  Frown, 
sirs  ;  fret,  foam,  prepare  your  weapons,  threaten,  strike,  shoot,  stab,  bring 
on  civil  war,  dissolve  the  Union  ;  nay,  annihilate  the  solar  system,  if  you 
will — do  all  this,  more,  less,  better,  worse — anything  ;  do  what  you  will, 
sirs — you  can  neither  foil  nor  intimidate  us  ;  our  purpose  is  as  fixed  as  the 
eternal  pillars  of  heaven ;  we  have  determined  to  abolish  slavery,  and — 
so  help  us  God — abolish  it  we  will !  " 

Some  other  extracts  from  this  infamous  book  we  may  place  here  to 
indicate  its  character,  and  the  importance  of  the  act  of  the  Black  Repub 
lican  party  in  endorsing  it  as  a  campaign  document :  "  Slavery  is  a  great 
moral,  social,  civil,  and  political  evil,  to  be  got  rid  of  at  the  earliest  prac 
ticable  period Three-quarters  of  a  century  hence,  if  the  South 

retains  slavery,  which  God  forbid  !  she  will  be  to  the  North  what  Poland 

is  to  Russia,  Cuba  to  Spain,  and  Ireland  to  England Our 

own  banner  is  inscribed — No  cooperation  with  slaveholders  in  politics  ;  no 
fellowship  with  them  in  religion ;  no  affiliation  with  them  in  society  ;  no 
recognition  of  pro-slavery  men,  except  as  ruffians,  outlaws,  and  criminals. 
.  .  .  .  We  believe  it  is,  as  it  ought  to  be,  the  desire,  the  determina 
tion,  and  the  destiny  of  the  Republican  party  to  give  the  death-blow  to 

slavery In  any  event,  come  what  will,  transpire  what  may, 

the  institution  of  slavery  must  be  abolished We  are  deter 
mined  to  abolish  slavery  at  all  hazards — in  defiance  of  all  the  opposition, 


INDOLENCE   AND    HYPOCRISY   OF   THE   REPUBLICANS.  75 

of  whatever  nature,  it  is  possible  for  the  slaveocrats  to  bring  against  us. 
Of  this  they  may  take  due  notice,  and  govern  themselves  accordingly. 
.  .  .  .  It  is  our  honest  conviction  that  all  the  pro-slavery  slaveholders 
deserve  to  be  at  once  reduced  to  a  parallel  with  the  basest  criminals  that 
lie  fettered  within  the  cells  of  our  public  prisons Compensa 
tion  to  slave-owners  for  negroes !  Preposterous  idea — the  suggestion  is 
criminal,  the  demand  unjust,  wicked,  monstrous,  damnable.  Shall  we  pat 
the  blood-hounds  for  the  sake  of  doing  them  a  favour  ?  Shall  we  feed  the 
curs  of  slavery  to  make  them  rich  at  our  expense  ?  Pay  these  whelps  for 
the  privilege  of  converting  them  into  decent,  honest,  upright  men  ?  " 

Such  was  the  language,  endorsed  by  sixty-eight  Northern  Congressmen, 
applied  to  the  South :  to  that  part  of  the  Union  indeed  which  was  the 
superiour  of  the  North  in  every  true  and  refined  element  of  civilization  ; 
which  had  contributed  more  than  its  share  to  all  that  had  given  lustre  to 
the  military  history  of  America,  or  the  councils  of  its  senate ;  which,  in 
fact,  had  produced  that  list  of  illustrious  American  names  best  known  in 
Europe :  Washington,  Jefferson,  Madison,  Monroe,  Jackson,  Marshall, 
Clay,  Calhoun,  Scott,  and  Maury. 

The  fact  was  that  insult  to  the  South  had  come  to  be  habitual  through 
every  expression  of  Northern  opinion  ;  not  only  in  political  tirades,  but 
through  its  lessons  of  popular  education,  the  ministrations  of  its  church, 
its  literature,  and  every  form  of  daily  conversation.  The  rising  generation 
of  the  North  were  taught  to  regard  the  Southerner  as  one  of  a  lower  order 
of  civilization  ;  a  culprit  to  reform,  or  a  sinner  to  punish.  A  large  party 
in  the  North  affected  the  insolent  impertinence  of  regarding  the  Union  as 
a  concession  on  the  part  of  the  North,  and  of  taunting  the  South  with  the 
disgrace  which  her  association  in  the  Union  inflicted  upon  the  superiour 
and  more  virtuous  people  of  the  Northern  States.  There  were  no  bounds 
to  this  conceit.  It  was  said  that  the  South  was  an  inferiour  part  of  the 
country ;  that  she  was  a  "  plague-spot ;  "  that  the  national  fame  abroad 
was  compromised  by  the  association  of  the  South  in  the  Union  ;  and  that 
a  New  England  traveller  in  Europe  blushed  to  confess  himself  an  American, 
because  nearly  half  of  the  nation  of  that  name  were  slaveholders.  Not  a 
few  of  the  Abolitionists  made  a  pretence  of  praying  that  the  Union  might 
be  dissolved,  that  they  might  be  cleared,  by  the  separation  of  North  and 
South,  of  any  implication  in  the  crime  of  slavery.  Even  that  portion  of 
the  party  calling  themselves  Republicans,  affected  that  the  Union  stood  in 
the  way  of  the  North.  Mr.  Banks,  speaker  of  the  House  in  the  Thirty-first 
Congress,  was  the  author  of  the  coarse  jeer — "  Let  the  Union  slide  /  "  and 
the  New  York  Tribune  had  complained  that  the  South  "  could  not  be 
kicked  out  of  the  Union." — We  shall  see  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events 
how  this  Northern  affectation  for  disunion  was  a  lie,  a  snare  to  the  South, 
and  a  hypocrisy  unparalleled  in  all  the  records  of  partisan  animosity. 


76  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

It  would  have  been  more  or  less  than  human  nature  if  the  South  had 
not  been  incensed  at  expressions  in  which  her  people  were  compared  with 
"  rnad-dogs  " — with  "  small-pox,  as  nuisances  to  be  abated,"  or  classed  with 
gangs  of  "  licensed  robbers,"  "  thieves,"  and  "  murderers."  But  it  was 
not  only  the  wretched  ribaldry  of  the  u  Helper  Book  "  that  was  the  cause 
of  excitement ;  the  designs  there  declared  of  war  upon  the  South,  and 
recommended  by  an  array  of  Black  Republican  names,  were  the  occasion 
of  the  most  serious  alarm.  It  is  true  that  Mr.  Sherman,  the  "  Helper 
Book  "  candidate  for  the  speakership  of  the  House,  was  finally  withdrawn, 
and  one  of  his  party,  not  a  subscriber  to  the  book,  elected.  But  the  fact 
remained  that  more  than  three-fourths  of  the  entire  Northern  delegation 
had  adhered  to  Mr.  Sherman  for  nearly  two  months  in  a  factious  and 
fanatical  spirit.  Such  an  exhibition  of  obstinate  rancour  could  not  fail  to 
produce  a  deep  impression  on  the  South  ;  and  the  early  dissolution  of  the 
Union  had  now  come  to  be  a  subject  freely  canvassed  in  Congress  and  in 
the  country. 

"We  have  thus,  in  a  rapid  summary  of  political  events  from  1857  to 
1860 — the  Kansas  controversy,  the  John  Brown  raid,  and  the  "  Helper 
Book  "  imbroglio — enabled  the  reader  to  discover  and  combine  some  of  the 
most  remarkable  indications  of  the  coming  catastrophe  of  Disunion.  In 
the  historical  succession  of  events  we  shall  see  that  occurrence  rapidly  and 
steadily  advancing,  until  at  last  the  sharp  and  distinct  issue  of  a  sectional 
despotism  was  forced  upon  the  South,  and  war  precipitated  upon  the 
country. 

The  Democratic  party  of  the  South  had  cooperated  with  the  Demo 
cratic  party  of  the  North  in  the  Presidential  canvass  of  1856,  upon  the 
principles  of  the  platform  adopted  by  the  National  Democratic  Convention 
assembled  in  Cincinnati,  in  June  of  that  year.  They  expressed  a  willing 
ness  to  continue  this  cooperation  in  the  election  of  1860,  upon  the  prin 
ciples  of  the  Cincinnati  platform  ;  but  demanded,  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  this,  that  the  question  of  the  construction  of  this  platform  should  be 
satisfactorily  settled.  To  this  end,  the  Democratic  party,  in  several  of  the 
Southern  States,  denned  the  conditions  upon  which  their  delegates  should 
hold  seats  in  the  National  Convention,  appointed  to  meet  at  Charleston, 
on  the  23d  of  April,  1860.  The  Democracy  in  Alabama  moved  first  and 
adopted  a  series  of  resolutions,  the  purport  of  which  was  afterwards 
embodied  in  the  instructions  administered  by  some  of  the  other  Cotton 
States  to  their  delegations  to  the  National  Convention. 

The  most  important  of  these  resolutions  were  as  follows  : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  a  compact  between  sovereign 
and  co-equal  States,  united  ujfcn  the  basis  of  perfect  equality  of  rights  and  privileges. 
"  Resolved,  further,  That  the  Territories  of  the  United  States  are  common  property,  in 


THE    CHARLESTON    CONVENTION.  77 

which  the  States  have  equal  rights,  and  to  which  the  citizens  of  any  State  may  right 
fully  emigrate,  with  their  slaves  or  other  property,  recognized  as  such  in  any  of  the  States 
of  the  Union,  or  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

44  Resolved,  further,  That  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  has  no  power  to  abolish 
slavery  in  the  Territories,  or  to  prohibit  its  introduction  into  any  of  them. 

"  Resolved,  further,  That  the  Territorial  Legislatures,  created  by  the  legislation  of 
Congress,  have  no  power  to  abolish  slavery,  or  to  prohibit  the  introduction  of  the  same, 
or  to  impair  by  unfriendly  legislation  the  security  and  full  enjoyment  of  the  same  within 
the  Territories;  and  such  constitutional  power  certainly  does  not  belong  to  the  people  of 
the  Territories  in  any  capacity,  before,  in  the  exercise  of  a  lawful  authority,  they  form  a 
Constitution,  preparatory  to  admission  as  a  State  into  the  Union  ;  and  their  action  in  the 
exercise  of  such  lawful  authority  certainly  cannot  operate  or  take  effect  before  their 
actual  admission  as  a  State  into  the  Union." 

When  the  Convention  met  at  Charleston  two  sets  of  resolutions  were 
represented : 


u  Resolved,  That  the  platform  at  Cincinnati  be  reaffirmed  with  the  following  reso 
lutions  : 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Democracy  of  the  United  States  hold  these  cardinal  principles  on 
the  subject  of  slavery  in  the  Territories :  First,  that  Congress  has  no  power  to  abolish 
slavery  in  the  Territories.  Second,,  that  the  Territorial  Legislature  has  no  power  to 
abolish  slavery  in  any  Territory,  nor  to  prohibit  the  introduction  of  slaves  therein,  nor 
any  power  to  exclude  slavery  therefrom,  nor  any  power  to  destroy  and  impair  the  right 
of  property  in  slaves  by  any  legislation  whatever. 


II. 

"Resolved,  That  the  platform  adopted  by  the  Democratic  party  at  Cincinnati  be 
affirmed,  with  the  following  explanatory  resolutions : 

"  First.  That  the  government  of  a  Territory,  organized  by  an  act  of  Congress,  is 
provisional  and  temporary ;  and,  during  its  existence,  all  citizens  of  the  United  States 
have  an  equal  right  to  settle  with  their  property  in  the  Territory,  without  their  rights, 
either  of  person  or  property,  being  destroyed  or  impaired  by  Congressional  or  Territorial 
legislation. 

"  Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Federal  Government,  in  all  its  departments,  to 
protect.,  when  necessary,  the  rights  of  persons  and  property  in  the  Territories  and 
wherever  else  its  constitutional  authority  extends. 

"  Third.  That  when  the  settlers  in  a  Territory,  having  an  adequate  population,  form 
a  State  Constitution,  the  right  of  sovereignty  commences,  and  being  consummated  by 
admission  into  the  Union,  they  stand  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  people  of  other  States ; 
and  the  State  thus  organized,  ought  to  be  admitted  into  the  Federal  Union,  whether  its 
Constitution  prohibits  or  recognizes  the  institution  of  slavery." 

The  Convention  refused  to  accept  either  of  the  foregoing  resolutions, 
and  adopted,  by  a  vote  of  165  to  138,  the  following  as  its  platform  on  the 
slavery  question : 


78  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

"  1.  Resolved,  That  we,  the  Democracy  of  the  Union,  in  Convention  assembled,  hereby 
declare  our  affirmance  of  the  resolutions  unanimously  adopted  and  declared  as  a  platform 
of  principles  by  the  Democratic  Convention  at  Cincinnati,  in  the  year  1856,  believing 
that  Democratic  principles  are  unchangeable  in  their  nature,  when  applied  to  the  same 
subject-matters ;  and  we  recommend  as  the  only  further  resolutions  the  following : 

"  Inasmuch  as  differences  of  opinion  exist  in  the  Democratic  party  as  to  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  powers  of  a  Territorial  Legislature,  and  as  to  the  powers  and  duties  of 
Congress  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  over  the  institution  of  slavery 
within  the  Territories : 

"  2.  Resolved,  That  the  Democratic  party  will  abide  by  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  on  the  questions  of  constitutional  law." 

This  platform  being  unsatisfactory  to  the  Southern  delegates,  a  body 
of  them  seceded,  and  called  a  new  Convention  at  Baltimore,  on  the  18th 
of  June.  The  Cotton  States  all  withdrew  from  the  Charleston  Convention ; 
but  the  Border  States  remained  in  it,  with  the  hope  of  effecting  some  ulti 
mate  settlement  of  the  difficulty.  But  the  reassembling  of  the  Convention 
at  Baltimore  resulted  in  a  final  and  embittered  separation  of  the  opposing 
delegations.  The  majority  at  Charleston  exhibited  a  more  uncompromising 
spirit  than  ever ;  and  Virginia,  and  all  the  Border  Slave  States,  with  the 
exception  of  Missouri,  withdrew  from  the  Convention,  and  united  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Cotton  States,  then  assembled  in  Baltimore,  in  the 
nomination  of  candidates  representing  the  views  of  the  South.  Their  nomi 
nees  were  John  C.  Breckinridge  of  Kentucky  for  President,  and  Joseph 
Lane  of  Oregon  for  Vice-President. 

The  old  Convention,  or  what  remained  of  it,  nominated  Stephen  A. 
Douglas  of  Illinois  for  President,  and  Benjamin  Fitzpatrick  of  Alabama 
for  Vice-President.  The  latter  declining,  Herschel  V.  Johnson  of  Georgia 
was  substituted  on  the  ticket. 

A  Convention  of  what  was  called  the  "  Constitutional  Union  "  party 
met  in  Baltimore  on  the  9th  of  May,  1860,  and  nominated  for  President 
and  Vice-President  John  Bell  of  Tennessee  and  Edward  Everett  of  Massa 
chusetts.  Their  platform  consisted  of  a  vague  and  undefined  enumeration 
of  their  political  principles,  as,  "  The  Constitution  of  the  Country,  the 
Union  of  the  States,  and  Enforcement  of  the  Laws." 

The  National  Convention  of  the  Black  Republican  party  was  held  at 
Chicago  in  the  month  of  June.  It  adopted  a  platform  declaring  freedom 
to  be  the  "  normal  condition  "  of  the  Territories  ;  and  protesting  especial 
attachment  to  the  Union  of  the  States.  The  Presidential  ticket  nomi 
nated  by  the  Convention  was,  Abraham  Lincoln  of  Illinois  for  President, 
and  Hannibal  Hamlin  of  Maine  for  Vice-President. 

The  great  majority  of  the  Southern  Democracy  supported  the  Breckin 
ridge  ticket ;  it  was  the  leading  ticket  in  all  the  Slave  States  except 
Missouri ;  but  in  the  North  only  a  small  and  feeble  minority  of  the  Demo- 


ABRAHAM   LINCOLN   ELECTED   PRESIDENT.  79 

cratic  party  gave  it  their  support.  In  several  States,  the  friends  of 
Douglas,  of  Breckinridge,  and  of  Bell  coalesced,  to  a  certain  extent,  with 
a  view  to  the  defeat  of  Lincoln,  but  without  success,  except  in  New  Jersey, 
where  they  partially  succeeded. 

The  result  of  the  contest  was,  that  Abraham  Lincoln  received  the  entire 
electoral  vote  of  every  free  State,  except  New  Jersey,  and  was,  of  course, 
elected  President  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the  forms  of  the  Con 
stitution. 

The  entire  popular  vote  for  Lincoln  was  1,858,200 ;  that  for  Douglas, 
giving  him  his  share  of  the  fusion  vote,  1,276,780  ;  that  for  Breckinridge, 
giving  him  his  share  of  the  fusion  vote,  812,500  ;  and  that  for  Bell,  includ 
ing  his  proportion  of  the  fusion  vote,  735,504.  The  whole  vote  against 
Lincoln  was  thus  2,824,874,  showing  a  clear  aggregate  majority  against 
him  of  nearly  a  million  of  votes. 

The  analysis  of  the  vote  which  elected  Mr.  Lincoln  showed  plainly 
enough  that  it  was  a  sectional  triumph  ;  and  it  was  in  view  of  that 
ominous  fact,  rather  than  in  any  less  important  resentment,  or  with  any 
especial  reference  to  the  declaration  of  principles  in  the  Chicago  platform, 
that  the  South  proposed  to  repudiate  for  herself  the  result  of  the  election, 
and  to  go  out  of  a  Union  now  plainly  converted  into  a  means  of  deliberate 
sectional  oppression. 

There  has  been  much  loose  and  plausible  protest  against  this  course  of 
the  South,  in  which  it  has  been  said  that  it  was  essentially  revolutionary 
and  refractory  ;  that  Mr.  Lincoln  had  been  elected  according  to  the  forms 
of  the  Constitution  by  a  majority  of  the  electoral  college,  and  that  the 
South  was  bound  by  honour  and  in  precedent  to  submit  to  the  result  of  an 
election  legitimately  and  constitutionally  accomplished.  This  view  was 
pronounced  by  Mr.  Seward,  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  "  Was 
the  election  illegal  ? "  he  asked.  "  No  ;  it  is  unimpeachable.  Is  the  can 
didate  personally  offensive  ?  No  ;  he  is  a  man  of  unblemished  virtue  and 
amiable  manners.  Is  an  election  of  President  an  unfrequent  or  extraordi 
nary  transaction  3  No ;  we  never  had  a  Chief  Magistrate  otherwise 
designated  than  by  such  election,  and  that  form  of  choice  is  renewed 
every  four  years.  Does  any  one  even  propose  to  change  the  mode  of 
appointing  the  Chief  Magistrate  ?  No  ;  election  by  universal  suffrage,  as 
modified  by  the  Constitution,  is  the  one  crowning  franchise  of  the  Ameri 
can  people.  To  save  it  they  would  defy  the  world." 

But  it  was  surprising  to  find  a  man  of  Mr.  Seward's  pretension  to 
statesmanship  using  such  a  loose  and  superficial  argument  to  sustain  an 
election,  the  sectional  significance  of  which,  kept  out  of  view,  was  really 
the  important  point,  and,  of  itself,  terminated  the  constitutional  existence 
of  the  Union. 

True,  Mr.  Lincoln  was  the   choice  of  the  majority  of  the   electoral 


80  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

college.  But  his  election  was  almost  purely  geographical.  The  South  had 
sustained  a  defeat,  not  at  the  hands  of  a  party,  but  at  those  of  the  Northern 
power.  Every  Northern  State  but  New  Jersey  had  voted  for  Mr.  Lincoln  ; 
every  Southern  State  had  voted  against  him.  He  was  not  known  as  a 
statesman,  whose  name  might  therefore  be  one  of  national  significance  ;  he 
was  known  only  as  a  partisan,  and  the  election  of  such  a  man  in  such  a 
character  was  plainly  to  declare  war  against  the  other  side. 

In  the  face  of  this  sectional  triumph  there  was  plainly  no  protection  for 
the  South  in  the  future.  There  was  none  in  power ;  for  the  superiour 
political  strength  of  the  North  was  now  beyond  dispute.  There  was  none 
in  public  opinion ;  for  that,  all  the  political  history  of  America  showed, 
was  the  slave  of  the  majority.  There  was  none  in  the  courts ;  for  the 
Dred  Scott  decision  had  been  denounced  in  the  Chicago  platform  as  a 
dangerous  heresy,  and  the  doctrine  upon  which  Mr.  Lincoln  had  been 
elected  had  been  actually  declared  illegal  by  the  supreme  judicial  authority 
of  the  country. 

In  Congress  the  Northern  States  had  183  votes ;  the  South,  if  unani 
mous,  120.  If  then  the  North  was  prepared  to  act  in  a  mass  its  power 
was  irresistible ;  and  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  plainly  showed  that  it 
was  prepared  so  to  act  and  to  carry  out  a  sectional  design.  The  anti- 
slavery  power  in  the  North  was  now  compact  and  invincible.  A  party 
opposed  to  slavery  had  organized  in  1840,  with  about  seven  thousand 
voters  ;  in  1860,  it  had  polled  nearly  two  million  votes,  and  had  succeeded 
in  electing  the  President  of  the  United  States.  The  conservative  party  in 
the  North  had  been  thoroughly  corrupted.  They  were  beaten  in  every 
Northern  State  in  1860,  with  a  single  exception,  by  the  avowed  enemies 
of  the  South,  who,  but  a  few  years  ago,  had  been  powerless  in  their  midst. 
The  leaders  of  the  Northern  Democratic  party  had,  in  1856  and  in  1860, 
openly  taken  the  position  that  freedom  would  be  more  certainly  secured 
in  the  Territories  by  the  rule  of  non-intervention  than  by  any  other  policy 
or  expedient.  This  interpretation  of  their  policy  alone  saved  the  Demo 
cratic  party  from  entire  annihilation.  The  overwhelming  pressure  of  the 
anti-slavery  sentiment  had  prevented  their  acceding  to  the  Southern  plat 
form  in  the  Presidential  canvass.  Nothing  in  the  present  or  in  the  future 
could  be  looked  for  from  the  so-called  conservatives  of  the  North  ;  and  the 
South  prepared  to  go  out  of  a  Union  which  no  longer  afforded  any 
guaranty  for  her  rights  or  any  permanent  sense  of  security,  and  which 
had  brought  her  under  the  domination  of  a  section,  the  designs  of  which, 
carried  into  legislation,  would  destroy  her  institutions,  and  even  involve 
the  lives  of  her  people. 

Such  was  the  true  and  overwhelming  significance  of  Mr.  Lincoln's 
election  to  the  people  of  the  South.  They  saw  in  it  the  era  of  a  sectional 
domination,  which  they  proposed  to  encounter,  not  by  revolution,  properly 


THE   LOGICAL   NECESSITY   OF    DISUNION.  81 

so  called,  not  by  an  attempt  to  recover  by  arms  their  constitutional  rights 
in  the  Union,  but  simply  to  escape  by  withdrawal  from  the  confederation, 
and  the  resumption  of  their  original  character  of  independent  States. 

But  again  it  was  urged  by  the  apologists  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election 
that  such  escape  of  the  South  from  its  results  was  unfair,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  during  most  of  the  preceding  period  of  the  Union,  the  South  had 
held  in  its  hands  the  administration  at  Washington,  and  had  but  little 
reason  now  to  complain  that  it  had  passed  to  those  of  the  rival  section. 

This  view  was  not  without  plausibility,  and  yet  as  fallacious  as  that 
which  appealed  to  the  prescriptive  rule  of  majorities  in  America.  The 
South  had  held  political  power  at  Washington  for  a  long  time ;  but  that 
power  threatened  nothing  in  the  North,  sought  nothing  from  it,  desired 
to  disturb  nothing  in  it.  It  had  no  aggressive  intent :  it  stood  constantly 
on  the  defensive.  It  had  no  sectional  history :  it  was  associated  with  a 
general  prosperity  of  the  country.  "  Do  not  forget,"  said  Senator  Ham 
mond  of  South  Carolina,  when  Mr.  Seward  boasted  in  the  United  States 
Senate  that  the  North  was  about  to  take  control  at  Washington, — "  it  can 
never  be  forgotten — it  is  written  on  the  brightest  page  of  human  history — 
that  we,  the  slaveholders  of  the  South,  took  our  country  in  her  infancy, 
and,  after  ruling  her  for  sixty  out  of  seventy  years  of  her  existence,  we 
shall  surrender  her  to  you  without  a  stain  upon  her  honour,  boundless  in 
prosperity,  incalculable  in  her  strength,  the  wonder  and  the  admiration  of 
the  world.  Time  will  show  what  you  will  make  of  her  ;  but  no  time  can 
ever  diminish  our  glory  or  your  responsibility." 

When  the  South  held  power,  it  was  only  to  the  North  a  certain 
absence  from  office,  a  certain  exclusion  from  patronage.  But  when  the 
North  was  to  obtain  it,  acting  not  as  a  party,  but  a  people  united  on  a 
geographical  idea,  it  was  something  more  than  a  negative  evil  or  disap 
pointment  to  the  South ;  it  was  the  enthronement  at  Washington  of  a 
sectional  despotism  that  threatened  the  institutions,  the  property,  and  the 
lives  of  the  people  of  the  Southern  States.  Power  in  the  hands  of  the 
South  affected  the  patronage  of  a  political  party  in  the  North.  Power  in 
the  hands  of  the  North  affected  the  safety  and  happiness  of  every  indi 
vidual  in  the  South. — It  was  simply  determined  by  the  South  to  withdraw 
from  a  game  where  the  stakes  were  so  unequal,  and  where  her  loss  would 
have  been  ruin. 


OHAPTEE   Y. 

PREPARATIONS    OF    SOUTH    CAROLINA    TO    WITHDRAW   FROM    THE   UNION. — PASSAGE   OF   HEB 

ORDINANCE   OF   SECESSION. THE   FEDERAL   FORCE  IN  CHARLESTON  HARBOUR   EVACUATES 

FORT    MOULTRIE,    AND   OCCUPIES    SUMTER. DESCRIPTION    OF    FORT    SUMTER. — HOW    THE 

SECESSION   OF   SOUTH  CAROLINA  WAS    ENTERTAINED   IN   THE    NORTH. THE    LEVITY    AND 

INCONSISTENCY  OF  THE  NORTH  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THIS  EVENT. — DOCTRINE  OF  SECESSION, 
AND  NORTHERN  PRECEDENTS. — RECORD  OF  MASSACHUSSETTS. — MR.  QUINCY's  DECLARA 
TION  IN  CONGRESS. — A  DOUBLE  JUSTIFICATION  OF  THE  WITHDRAWAL  OF  THE  SOUTHERN 

STATES  FROM  THE  UNION. — THE  RIGHT  OF  SELF-GOVERNMENT. OPINION  OF  MR.  LINCOLN. 

— OPINION   OF    THE   NEW  YORK    "  TRIBUNE." — OPINION  OF  MR.  SEWARD. — THE    SECESSION 

QUESTION  IN  THE   COTTON   STATES. HESITATION   OF    GEORGIA. — PROJECT  OF  ALEXANDER 

H.  STEPHENS. SECESSION  OF  ALL  THE  COTTON  STATES. SEIZURE  OF   FEDERAL  FORTS  AND 

ARSENALS. — FORT     PICKKNS.— SENATOR     YULEE's    LETTER. THE    SCENES     OF     SECESSION 

TRANSFERRED  TO  WASHINGTON. — RESIGNATION  OF  SOUTHERN  SENATORS. — JEFFERSON 
DAVIS'  FAREWELL  SPEECH  TO  THE  FEDERAL  SENATE. SENATOR  CLAY'S  BILL  OF  INDICT 
MENT  AGAINST  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY. — THE  CONVENTION  AT  MONTGOMERY. CONSTI 
TUTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES. — JEFFERSON  DAVIS  CHOSEN  PRESIDENT. — HIS 
PERSONAL  HISTORY. — HIS  CHARACTER. — WHY  THE  PUBLIC  OPINION  ABOUT  HIM  WAS  SO 
DIVIDED  AND  CONTRADICTORY. — MEASURES  LOOKING  TO  PACIFICATION. — THREE  AVENUES 
THROUGH  WHICH  IT  WAS  EXPECTED. — EARLY  PROSPECTS  OF  PACIFICATION  IN  CONGRESS. 
— THE  REPUBLICAN  "  ULTIMATUM." — "  THE  CRITTENDEN  COMPROMISE."' — MEASURES  OF 
COMPROMISE  AND  PEACE  IN  CONGRESS  EXCLUSIVELY  PROPOSED  BY  THE  SOUTH,  AND  DE 
LIBERATELY  DEFEATED  BY  THE  NORTH. — THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE. — ITS  FAILURE. — DIS 
POSITION  OF  THE  BORDER  SLAVE  STATES. — HOW  MISTAKEN  BY  THE  NORTH. — THE  VIRGINIA 
*  CONVENTION. — HOW  THE  SECESSION  PARTY  GAINED  IN  IT. — THE  RECORD  OF  VIRGINIA  ON 
THE  SUBJECT  OF  STATE  RIGHTS. — PRESIDENT  BUCHANAN  ON  THE  SECESSION  QUESTION. — 
HIS  WEAK  CHARACTER  AND  UNDECIDED  POLICY. — HOW  OVER-CENSURED  BY  THE  NORTH. — 
GEN.  SCOTT'S  INTERMEDDLING. — HIS  IMPRACTICABLE  ADVICE. — PRESIDENT  BUCHANAN'S 
PERFIDY  IN  THE  MOULTRIE-SUMTER  AFFAIR. — HIS  INTERVIEW  WITH  THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA 
DELEGATION. — A  SECOND  DECEPTION. — THE  "  STAR  OF  THE  WEST  "  AFFAIR. — THE  SITU 
ATION  AT  THE  CLOSE  OF  BUCHANAN'S  ADMINISTRATION. THE  COUNTRY  WAITING  FOR  THE 

SIGNAL   OF   COMBAT. 

THE  telegraph  had  no  sooner  announced  the  election  of  Abraham  Lin 
coln  President  of  the  United  States  than  the  State  of  South  Carolina  pre 
pared  for  a  deliberate  withdrawal  from  the  Union.  Considering  the  argn- 


SECESSION   OF   SOUTH   CAROLINA.  83 

ment  as  fully  exhausted,  slie  determined  to  resume  the  exercise  of  her 
rights  as  a  sovereign  State ;  and  for  this  purpose  her  Legislature  called  a 
Convention.  It  assembled  in  Columbia  on  the  17th  of  December,  1860. 
Its  sessions  were  held  in  a  church,  over  which  floated  a  flag  bearing  the 
device  of  a  palmetto  tree,  with  an  open  Bible  at  its  trunk,  with  the  inscrip 
tion  :  "  God  is  our  refuge  and  strength,  a  very  present  help  in  time  of  trou 
ble,  therefore  will  we  not  fear,  though  the  earth  be  removed  and  though 
the  mountains  be  carried  into  the  sea ;  the  Lord  of  Hosts  is  with  us — the 
God  of  Jacob  is  our  refuge." 

On  the  18th  the  Convention  adjourned  to  Charleston,  and  on  the  20th 
of  December  passed  the  memorable  ordinance  of  Secession,  concluding 
that  "  the  Union  now  subsisting  between  South  Carolina  and  other  States, 
under  the  name  of  '  The  United  States  of  America  '  is  hereby  dissolved." 
The  ordinance  was  passed  by  a  unanimous  vote.  A  ceremony  was  ap 
pointed  for  the  signing  in  public  of  the  roll  of  parchment  on  which  the 
ordinance  was  engrossed.  The  public  procession  entered  St.  Andrew's 
Hall  in  order  :  the  President  and  members  of  the  Convention  coming  first, 
followed  by  the  President  and  members  of  the  Senate,  and  the  Speaker 
and  House  of  Representatives.  Their  entry  was  greeted  by  loud  and  pro 
longed  cheers  from  the  spectators  ;  the  proceedings  were  commenced  with 
prayer ;  the  Attorney-General  of  the  State  then  announced  that  the  ordi 
nance  had  been  engrossed  by  order  of  the  Convention,  and  the  parchment 
roll  was  signed  by  the  members  who  were  called  successively  to  the  table. 
When  all  had  signed,  the  parchment  was  raised  in  the  sight  of  the  assem 
blage,  and  when  the  President  announced  the  State  of  South  Carolina  an 
Independent  Commonwealth,  the  whole  audience  rose  to  their  feet,  and 
with  enthusiastic  cheers  testified  their  sense  of  the  thrilling  proclamation. 

A  few  days  after  this  event  a  memorable  event  occurred  in  Charleston 
harbour.  On  the  26th  of  December  Major  Anderson,  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Federal  forces  there,  evacuated  Fort  Moultrie,  spiking  the 
guns  and  burning  the  gun  carriages,  and  occupied  Fort  Sumter  with  a 
view  of  strengthening  his  position.  This  movement  was  effected  as  a  sur 
prise  under  cover  of  night.  The  place  in  which  Major  Anderson  had  now 
taken  refuge  was  pronounced  by  military  critics  to  be  well-nigh  impreg 
nable.  Fort  Sumter  was  a  small  work ;  but  as  strong  as  could  well  be 
conceived.  It  was  a  modern  truncated  pentagonal  fort,  rising  abruptly 
out  of  the  water  at  the  mouth  of  Charleston  harbour,  three  and  a  half 
miles  from  the  city.  The  foundation  was  an  artificial  one,  made  of  chips 
of  granite  firmly  imbedded  in  the  mud  and  sand,  and  so  well  constructed 
that  it  had  cost  half  a  million  of  dollars,  and  consumed  ten  years  of  labour. 
"When  Major  Anderson  occupied  the  fortification,  it  was  so  nearly  com 
pleted  as  to  admit  the  introduction  of  its  armament.  The  walls  were  of 
solid  brick  and  concrete  masonry,  sixty  feet  high,  and  from  eight  to  twelve 


84:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

feet  in  thickness,  and  pierced  for  three  tiers  of  guns  on  the  northern,  east 
ern,  and  western  sides.  These  guns  commanded  the  harbour,  thus  giving 
the  Federal  garrison  the  power  to  arrest  the  shipping  bound  to  and  from 
the  port,  and  to  assume  an  attitude  of  hostility  inconsistent  with  the  safety 
of  that  part  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina. 

In  the  mean  time  the  event  of  South  Carolina's  formal  withdrawal  from 
the  Union  was  treated  by  the  North  generally  with  derision.  Northern 
newspapers  scoffed  at  her ;  Northern  pictorials  abounded  with  caricatures 
of  Palmetto  chivalry  ;  secession  cockades,  it  was  said,  would  soon  pass  out 
of  fashion,  and,  on  the  appearance  of  the  first  United  States  regiment  in 
Charleston  harbour,  would  be  found  as  scarce  as  cherries  in  the  snow. 
But  what  was  most  remarkable  in  the  treatment  of  the  event  by  the 
Northern  newspapers  and  politicians  was,  that  they  all  united  in  affecting 
the  most  entire  and  ready  willingness  that  South  Carolina,  and  as  many 
Slave  States  as  chose  to  accompany  her  should  go  out  of  the  Union  when 
ever  they  pleased.  This  affectation,  which  was  half  insolence  and  half 
hypocrisy,  was  heard  everywhere  in  the  North.  As  long,  indeed,  as  the 
North  apprehended  no  serious  consequences,  and  from  its  very  vanity 
refused  to  entertain  the  idea  that  the  South  had  any  means  or  resources 
for  making  a  serious  resistance  to  the  Federal  authority,  it  easily  afforded 
to  ridicule  the  movement  of  South  Carolina  ;  to  compare  her  to  a  "  spoilt 
child,"  wandering  from  the  fold  of  a  "  paternal  government ; "  and  to 
declare  that  there  was  really  no  design  to  coerce  her  or  her  sister  States, 
but  rather  pleasure  at  the  separation.  "  Let  the  prodigal  go,"  exclaimed 
one  of  the  political  preachers  of  the  North.  A  God-speed  was  added  by 
Mr.  Greeley,  of  the  New  York  Tribune.  And  yet  a  few  months  later, 
and  these  men  and  their  followers  were  in  agonies  of  anxiety  and  parox 
ysms  of  fury  to  reclaim  what  they  then  called  the  "  rebel  "  States,  declar 
ing  that  their  cities  should  be  laid  in  ashes,  and  their  soil  sown  with  blood ; 
while  the  benevolent  Tribune  drew  from  its  imagination  and  hopes  a  pic 
ture,  not  of  the  returned  prodigal,  but  of  punished  "  rebels  "  returning 
home  to  find  their  wives  and  children  cowering  in  rags,  and  Famine  sit 
ting  at  the  fireside.* 

*  (From  the  New  York  Tribune  of  Nov.  26,  and  Dec.  17,  1860.) 

"  We  hold  with  Jefferson  to  the  inalienable  right  of  communities  to  alter  or  abolish  forms  of 
government  that  have  become  oppressive  or  injurious,  and  if  the  Cotton  States  shall  become  satis 
fied  that  they  can  do  better  out  of  the  Union  than  hi  it,  we  insist  on  letting  them  go  in  peace.  The 
right  to  secede  may  be  a  revolutionary  one,  but  it  exists  nevertheless,  and  we  do  not  see  how  one 
party  can  have  a  right  to  do  what  another  party  has  a  right  to  prevent.  Whenever  a  considerable 
section  of  our  Union  shall  deliberately  resolve  to  go  out,  we  shall  resist  all  coercive  measures  de 
signed  to  keep  it  in.  We  hope  never  to  live  in  a  Republic  whereof  one  section  is  pinned  to  the 

residue  by  bayonets If  ever  seven  or  eight  States  send  agents  to  Washington  to  say, 

'  We  want  to  go  out  of  the  Union,'  we  shall  feel  constrained  by  our  devotion  to  human  liberty,  to 
say,  '  Let  them  go ! '  And  we  do  not  see  how  we  could  take  the  other  side,  without  coming  in 


DOCTRINE  OF   SECESSION,   AND  NORTHERN   PRECEDENTS.  85 

But  had  the  Northern  people  really  been  candid  and  just  in  their  pro 
fessed  willingness  to  let  the  South  go,  they  might  have  found,  alike  in  the 
political  precedents  of  the  country  and  in  the  sound  reason  of  its  states 
men,  ample  grounds  for  such  a  disposition.  The  doctrine  of  State  seces 
sion  was  no  new  thing  in  the  North.  The  right  of  it  had  been  reserved 
by  the  State  of  New  York,  on  her  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution. 
The  exercise  of  such  right  had  been  threatened  on  four  separate  occasions 
by  the  State  of  Massachusetts.  She  had  threatened  to  secede  from  the 
Union,  with  reference  to  the  adjustment  of  the  State  debts ;  again,  on 
account  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase ;  thirdly,  because  of  the  war  of 
1812-'14r,  when,  as  Mr.  Jefferson  said,  "  four  of  the  Eastern  States  were 
only  attached  to  the  Union  like  so  many  inanimate  bodies  to  living  men  ;  " 
and  fourthly,  on  the  annexation  of  Texas,  when  her  Legislature  actually 
resolved  in  advance  that  this  event  would  be  good  cause  for  the  dissolution 
of  the  Union.  With  reference  to  the  Louisiana  Purchase,  and  the  bill  to 
admit  into  the  Union  the  Territory  of  Orleans,  under  the  name  of  Louis 
iana,  Mr.  Quincy,  of  Massachusetts,  had  placed  on  record  in  Congress  a 
definition  of  the  remedy  of  secession ;  for,  at  the  instance  of  members,  he 
had  put  in  writing,  and  placed  on  the  desk  of  the  House  of  Kepresenta- 
tives,  the  following  proposition :  "  If  this  bill  passes,  it  is  my  deliberate 
opinion  that  it  is  virtually  a  dissolution  of  this  Union  ;  that  it  will  free  the 
States  from  their  moral  obligations,  and,  as  it  will  be  the  right  of  all,  so 
it  will  be  the  duty  of  some,  definitely  to  prepare  for  a  separation — amica 
bly,  if  they  can  ;  violently,  if  they  must." 

But  it  is  not  necessary  to  make  here  any  discussion  or  recrimination  on 
the  subject  of  State  secession.  For  the  South  claimed  a  double  justification 
of  her  withdrawal  from  the  Union  ;  and  in  putting  it  on  the  alternative  of 
that  right  of  self-government  proclaimed  in  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence,  and  existing  in  all  republican  systems,  she  could  claim  its 
recognition  from  the  highest  sources,  both  of  official  and  popular  authority 
in  the  North. 

Indeed,  the  President-elect,  Mr.  Lincoln,  had,  at  another  period  of  his 
public  life,  made  this  remarkable  declaration  :  "  Any  people,  anywhere, 
being  inclined  and  having  the  power,  have  the  right  to  rise  up  and  shake 

direct  conflict  with  those  rights  of  man  which  we  hold  paramount  to  all  political  arrangements,  how 
ever  convenient  and  advantageous." 

(From  the  same,  of  May  1,  1861.) 

"  But,  nevertheless,  we  mean  to  conquer  them  [the  Confederate  States],  not  merely  to  defeat, 
but  to  conquer,  to  subjugate  them.  But  when  the  rebellious  traitors  are  overwhelmed  in  the  field^ 
and  scattered  like  leaves  before  an  angry  wind,  it  must  not  be  to  return  to  peaceful  and  contented 
homes  !  They  must  find  poverty  at  their  firesides,  and  see  privation  in  the  anxious  eyes  of  mothers, 
and  the  rags  of  children.  The  whole  coast  of  the  South,  from  the  Delaware  to  the  Rio  Grande,  must 
be  a  solitude. 


86  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

off  the  existing  Government,  and  form  a  new  one  that  suits  them  better. 
Nor  is  this  right  confined  to  cases  where  the  people  of  an  existing  Govern* 
ment  may  choose  to  exercise  it.  Any  portion  of  such  people  that  can, 
may  revolutionize,  putting  down  a  minority  intermingled  with  or  near 
about  them,  who  may  oppose  them." 

On  the  eve  of  hostilities  the  New  York  Tribune  declared :  "  Whenever 
a  portion  of  this  Union,  large  enough  to  form  an  independent,  self-sustain 
ing  nation,  shall  see  fit  to  say  authentically  to  the  residue,  '  We  want  to 
get  away  from  you,'  we  shall  say — and  we  trust  self-respect,  if  not  regard 
for  the  principle  of  self-government,  will  constrain  the  residue  of  the  Amer 
ican  people  to  say — Go  !  " 

At  a  later  period,  Mr.  Seward,  then  President  Lincoln's  Secretary  of 
State,  used  the  following  language  to  Mr.  Adams,  the  United  States  Min 
ister  at  London :  "  For  these  reasons  he  [Mr.  Lincoln]  would  not  be  dis 
posed  to  reject  a  cardinal  dogma  of  theirs  [the  Secessionists],  namely,  that 
the  Federal  Government  could  not  reduce  the  seceding  States  to  obedience 
by  conquest,  even  although  he  were  disposed  to  question  that  proposition. 
But  in  fact  the  President  willingly  accepts  it  as  true.  Only  an  imperial 
or  despotic  government  could  subjugate  thoroughly  disaffected  and  insur 
rectionary  members  of  the  State.  This  Federal  Republican  system  of  ours 
is,  of  all  forms  of  government,  the  very  one  most  unfitted  for  such  a 
labour." 

It  was  in  the  face  of  this  plain  and  abundant  record  that  the  North,  as 
we  shall  hereafter  see,  prepared  to  make  upon  the  seceded  Southern  States 
a  war  the  most  terrible  in  modern  annals,  and  the  most  monstrous  of 
Christian  times.  But  we  must  return  here  to  the  course  of  events  imme 
diately  following  the  secession  of  South  Carolina. 

There  could  be  no  doubt  of  the  disposition  of  all  the  Cotton  States  to 
accompany  South  Carolina  in  her  withdrawal  from  the  Union,  and  to 
make  common  cause  with  her.  But  there  was  some  hesitation  as  to  the 
time  and  mode  of  action ;  and  in  Georgia  especially  there  was  a  strong 
party  in  favour  of  holding  a  conference  of  all  the  Southern  States  before 
taking  the  decisive  and  irrevocable  step.  The  influence  of  Alexander  H. 
Stephens  was  not  only  given  to  this  party  in  Georgia,  but  betrayed  a 
design  to  keep  the  State  in  the  Union.  He  had  made  a  speech  of  great 
ingenuity,  to  show  that  the  cause  of  the  Union  was  not  yet  hopeless,  that 
all  honourable  means  should  be  used  to  save  it — that,  notwithstanding  the 
election  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  the  Northern  States  might  yield  to  a  determined 
admonition  from  the  South.  But  to  this  art  of  the  demagogue  there  were 
plain  and  forcible  replies.  Mr.  Howell  Cobb  urged  that  delay  was  dan 
gerous,  and  that  the  Legislature  ought  to  pass  an  act  of  secession  to  be 
ratified  by  the  people  ;  Mr.  Toombs  insisted  that  all  hope  of  justice  from 
the  North  was  gone,  and  that  nothing  remained  but  separation,  and,  if 


SECESSION   OF   ALL   THE   COTTON   STATES.  87 

necessary,  war  to  maintain  the  rights  of  the  South  ;  and  while  the  discus 
sion  was  going  on,  the  Mayor  of  Savannah  had  already  pledged  fifty  thou 
sand  Georgians  to  rally  to  the  aid  of  South  Carolina,  if  needed. 

It  was  impossible  for  any  checks  of  authority  or  arts  of  the  demagogue 
to  restrain  the  popular  sentiment  in  the  Cotton  States  that  clamoured  to 
follow  the  example  of  South  Carolina.  On  the  7th  day  of  January,  1861, 
the  State  of  Florida  seceded  from  the  Union.  Mississippi  followed  on  the 
9th  day  of  the  same  month  ;  Alabama  on  the  llth  ;  Georgia  on  the  20th  ; 
Louisiana  on  the  26th  ;  and  Texas  on  the  1st  of  February.  Thus,  in  less 
than  three  months  after  the  announcement  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  all 
the  Cotton  States  had  seceded  from  the  Union. 

They  had  done  more  than  this.  They  had  secured  all  the  forts,  arse 
nals,  and  government  places  lying  within  their  territory,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  Fort  Sumter  in  Charleston  harbour,  and  Fort  Pickens  near  Pensa- 
cola.  At  this  latter  place  was  to  occur  a  history  somewhat  similar  to  that 
of  Sumter. 

Here  was  a  fine  bay  ;  a  splendid  navy  yard  ;  and  the  principal  depot 
of  the  Gulf  fleet.  In  the  beginning  of  1861,  a  small  military  force  was 
stationed  there  in  charge  of  the  forts.  These  forts  were,  Fort  McKae,  on 
the  main  land,  with  a  lagoon  behind  it,  and  guarding  one  side  of  the  har 
bour  ;  Fort  Barancas,  directly  facing  the  entrance  of  the  harbour,  and 
Fort  Pickens  on  the  other,  or  east  side  of  the  harbour  entrance.  This  lat 
ter  was  on  the  extremity  of  the  long,  low,  sandy  Santa  Rosa  Island,  which 
stretched  away  to  the  eastward,  and  formed  an  excellent  breakwater  to  the 
bay.  The  navy  yard  was  about  a  mile  inside  the  bay,  beyond  Fort  Baran 
cas,  and  was  thus  in  an  admirably  safe  position. 

The  seizure  of  these  places  was  earnestly  and  instantly  advised  by  Sen 
ator  Yulee,  of  Florida,  in  private  letters  written  from  his  seat  in  the  United 
States  Senate.  Fort  Barancas  and  McKae,  with  the  navy  yard,  were  at 
once  surrendered  by  the  naval  commandant ;  but  Lieut.  Slemmers,  not 
approving  such  a  course,  secretly  crossed  over  to  Fort  Pickens,  as  Major 
Anderson  did  from  Moultrie  to  Sumter,  and  there  stationed  himself,  while 
the  ingenuity  and  enterprise  of  the  government  at  Washington  were  to  be 
taxed  for  his  reinforcement. 

The  scene  of  secession  was  now  to  be  transferred  to  "Washington. 
On  the  21st  of  January,  1861,  an  impressive  and  memorable  event 
occurred  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  On  that  day,  resignations 
of  certain  distinguished  Senators  were  announced,  in  consequence  of  the 
secession  of  their  States.  Even  the  Republican  Senators  treated  the 
occasion  with  respect ;  the  chamber  was  pervaded  by  an  air  of  solemnity ; 
and  the  galleries  were  crowded  by  a  vast  concourse  of  spectators,  the  intel 
ligent  of  whom  recognized  in  the  scene  transpiring  before  their  eyes  the 
ceremony  of  the  first  serious  disintegration  of  the  authority  at  Washington. 


88  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  Senators  who  withdrew  on  this  day  were  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis, 
of  Mississippi,  Messrs.  Fitzpatrick  and  Clay,  of  Alabama,  and  Messrs. 
Yulee  and  Mallory,  of  Florida.  Most  of  them  made  temperate  and 
courteous  speeches  in  announcing  the  fact  and  occasion  of  their  resig 
nation.  Mr.  Davis,  although  at  the  time  much  prostrated  by  ill  health, 
made  a  speech  of  remarkable  force  and  dignity  ;  and  turning  to  different 
members,  declared  that  he  was  the  type  of  the  general  feelings  of  his 
constituents  toward  theirs ;  that  he  felt  no  hostility  to  them ;  that  he 
went  thence  unencumbered  by  the  remembrance  of  any  injury  received  ; 
but  he  said,  if  the  North  had  resolved  on  hostile  relations  towards  the 
seceded  States,  then  "  we  will  invoke  the  God  of  our  fathers,  who  deliv 
ered  them  from  the  power  of  the  lion,  to  protect  us  from  the  ravages  of 
the  bear  ;  and  thus,  putting  our  trust  in  God  and  in  our  own  firm  hearts 
and  strong  arms,  we  will  vindicate  the  right  as  best  we  may." 

Mr.  C.  C.  Clay  of  Alabama  was  more  violent.  In  severing  his  con 
nection  with  the  Senate,  he  took  occasion  to  make  out  a  very  full  bill  of 
indictment  against  the  Kepublican  party,  and  to  recount  the  grievances 
that  impelled  the  South  to  separate  herself  from  the  Union.  A  portion 
of  his  speech  is  interesting  here  as  the  historical  statement  on  the  side  of 
the  South  of  the  causes  and  necessity  of  Disunion,  made  by  one  of  her 
leading  statesmen,  and  reflecting  much  both  of  the  intelligence  and 
passion  of  his  countrymen.  He  said  : 


"  It  is  now  nearly  forty-two  years  since  Alabama  was  admitted  into  the  Union.  She 
entered  it,  as  she  goes  out  of  it,  while  the  Confederacy  was  in  convulsions,  caused  by  the 
hostility  of  the  North  to  the  domestic  slavery  of  the  South.  Not  a  decade,  nor  scarce  a 
lustrum,  has  elapsed,  since  her  birth,  that  has  not  been  strongly  marked  by  proofs  of  the 
growth  and  power  of  that  anti-slavery  spirit  of  the  Northern  people  which  seeks  the 
overthrow  of.  that  domestic  institution  of  the  South  which  is  not  only  the  chief  source 
of  her  prosperity,  but  the  very  basis  of  her  social  order  and  state  polity.  It  is  to-day  the 
master-spirit  of  the  Northern  States,  and  had,  before  the  secession  of  Alabama,  of  Missis 
sippi,  of  Florida,  or  of  South  Carolina,  severed  most  of  the  bonds  of  the  Union.  It 
denied  us  Christian  communion,  because  it  could  not  endure  what  it  styles  the  moral 
leprosy  of  slaveholding  ;  it  refused  us  permission  to  sojourn,  or  even  to  pass  through  the 
North,  with  our  property ;  it  claimed  freedom  for  the  slave  if  brought  by  his  master  into 
a  Northern  State ;  it  violated  the  Constitution  and  treaties  and  laws  of  Congress,  because 
designed  to  protect  that  property  ;  it  refused  us  any  share  of  lands  acquired  mainly  by 
our  diplomacy  and  blood  and  treasure  ;  it  refused  our  property  any  shelter  or  security 
beneath  the  flag  of  a  common  government ;  it  robbed  us  of  our  property,  and  refused  to 
restore  it ;  it  refused  to  deliver  criminals  against  our  laws,  who  fled  to  the  North  with 
our  property  or  our  blood  upon  their  hands ;  it  threatened  us,  by  solemn  legislative  acts, 
with  ignominious  punishment  if  we  pursued  our  property  into  a  Northern  State  ;  it  mur 
dered  Southern  men  when  seeking  the  recovery  of  their  property  on  Northern  soil ;  it 
invaded  the  borders  of  Southern  States,  poisoned  their  wells,  burnt  their  dwellings,  and 
murdered  their  people ;  it  denounced  us  by  deliberate  resolves  of  popular  meetings,  of 
party  conventions,  and  of  religious  and  even  legislative  assemblies,  as  habitual  violators 


SPEECH   OF   C.    C.    CLAY.  89 

cf  the  laws  of  God  and  the  rights  of  humanity ;  it  exerted  all  the  moral  and  physical 
agencies  that  human  ingenuity  can  devise  or  diabolical  malice  can  employ  to  heap  odium 
and  infamy  upon  us,  and  to  make  us  a  by- word  of  hissing  and  of  scorn  throughout  the 
civilized  world.  Yet  we  bore  all  this  for  many  years,  and  might  have  borne  it  for  many 
more,  under  the  oft-repeated  assurance  of  our  Northern  friends,  and  the  too  fondly 
cherished  hope  that  these  wrongs  and  injuries  were  committed  by  a  minority  party,  and 
had  not  the  sanction  of  the  majority  of  the  people,  who  would,  in  time,  rebuke  our 
enemies,  and  redress  our  grievances. 

"  But  the  fallacy  of  these  promises  and  folly  of  our  hopes  have  been  too  clearly  and 
conclusively  proved  in  late  elections,  especially  the  last  two  Presidential  elections,  to 
permit  us  to  indulge  longer  in  such  pleasing  delusions.  The  platform  of  the  Republican 
party  of  1856  and  1860  we  regard  as  a  libel  upon  the  character  and  a  declaration  of  war 
against  the  lives  and  property  of  the  Southern  people.  No  bitterer  or  more  offensive 
calumny  could  be  uttered  against  them  than  is  expressed  in  denouncing  their  system  of 
slavery  and  polygamy  as  "twin  relics  of  barbarism."  It  not  only  reproaches  us  as  un 
christian  and  heathenish,  but  imputes  a  sin  and  a  crime  deserving  universal  scorn  and 
Universal  enmity.  No  sentiment  is  more  insulting  or  more  hostile  to  our  domestic  tran 
quillity,  to  our  social  order,  and  our  social  existence,  than  is  contained  in  the  declaration 
that  our  negroes  are  entitled  to  liberty  and  equality  with  the  white  man.  It  is  in  spirit, 
if  not  effect,  as  strong  an  incitement  and  invocation  to  servile  insurrection,  to  murder, 
arson,  and  other  crimes,  as  any  to  be  found  in  abolition  literature. 

"  And  to  aggravate  the  insult  which  is  offered  us  in  demanding  equality  with  us  for 
our  slaves,  the  same  platform  denies  us  equality  with  Northern  white  men  or  free 
negroes,  and  brands  us  as  an  inferiour  race,  by  pledging  the  Republican  party  to  resist 
our  entrance  into  the  Territories  with  our  slaves,  or  the  extension  of  slavery,  which — as 
its  founders  and  leaders  truly  assert — must  and  will  effect  its  extermination.  To  crown 
the  climax  of  insult  to  our  feelings  and  menace  of  our  rights,  this  party  nominated  to  the 
Presidency  a  man  who  not  only  endorses  the  platform,  but  promises,  in  his  zealous  sup 
port  of  its  principles,  to  disregard  the  judgments  of  your  courts,  the  obligations  of  your 
Constitution,  and  the  requirements  of  his  official  oath,  by  approving  any  bill  prohibiting 
slavery  in  the  Territories  of  the  United  States. 

"  A  large  majority  of  the  Northern  people  have  declared  at  the  ballot-box  their  ap 
proval  of  the  platform  and  the  candidates  of  that  party  in  the  late  Presidential  election. 
Thus,  by  the  solemn  verdict  of  the  people  of  the  North,  the  slaveholding  communities 
of  the  South  are  '  outlawed,  branded  with  ignominy,  consigned  to  execration,  and  ulti 
mate  destruction.'  " 

"  Sir,  are  we  looked  upon  as  more  or  less  than  men  ?  Is  it  expected  that  we  will  or  can  ex 
ercise  that  god-like  virtue  which  '  beareth  all  things,  belie veth  all  things,  hopeth  all  things ; 
endureth  all  things  ; '  which  teaches  us  to  love  our  enemies,  and  Hess  them  that  curse  us  f 
Are  we  devoid  of  the  sensibilities,  the  sentiments,  the  passions,  the  reason,  and  the  instincts 
of  mankind  ?  Have  we  no  pride  of  honour,  no  sense  of  shame,  no  reverence  of  our  ances 
tors,  no  care  of  our  posterity,  no  love  of  home,  or  family,  or  friends  ?  Must  we  confess 
our  baseness,  discredit  the  fame  of  our  sires,  dishonour  ourselves,  degrade  our  posterity, 
abandon  our  homes,  and  flee  from  our  country,  all  for  the  sake  of  the  Union  ?  Must  we 
agree  to  live  under  the  ban  of  our  own  Government?  Must  we  acquiesce  in  the  inaugu 
ration  of  a  President,  chosen  by  confederate,  but  unfriendly,  States,  whose  political  faith 
constrains  him,  for  his  conscience  and  country's  sake,  to  deny  us  our  constitutional  rights, 
because  elected  according  to  the  forms  of  the.  Constitution?  Must  we  consent  to  live 
under  a  Government  wkich  we  believe  will  henceforth  be  controlled  and  administered 
by  those  who  not  only  deny  us  justice  and  equality,  and  brand  us  as  inferiours,  but 


90  THE   LOST   CAUSE, 

whose  avowed  principles  and  policy  must  destroy  our  domestic  tranquillity,  imperil  the 
lives  of  our  wives  and  children,  degrade  and  dwarf,  and  ultimately  destroy,  our  State  ? 
Must  we  live,  by  choice  or  compulsion,  under  the  rule  of  those  who  present  us  the  dire 
alternative  of  an '  irrepressible  conflict '  with  the  Northern  people,  in  defence  of  our  altars, 
and  our  fireside,  or  the  manumission  of  our  slaves,  and  the  admission  of  them  to  social 
and  political  equality  ?  No,  sir,  no !  The  freemen  of  Alabama  have  proclaimed  to  the 
world  that  they  will  not ;  and  have  proved  their  sincerity  by  seceding  from  the  Union, 
and  hazarding  all  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  a  separate  and  independent  station  among 
the  nations  of  the  earth." 

Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  had  resigned  from  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
to  encounter  a  responsibility  and  accept  a  trust  the  greatest  of  modern 
times.  Public  opinion  in  all  the  seceded  States  had  long  designated  him 
as  the  leader  of  their  new  destinies.  A  convention  of  delegates  from  the 
then  six  seceded  States  assembled  in  Congress  at  Montgomery,  Alabama, 
on  the  4th  of  February,  1861,  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  a  provisional 
government.  This  body  adopted  a  Constitution  for  the  Confederate  States 
on  the  8th  of  February.  On  the  9th  of  February,  Congress  proceeded  to 
the  election  of  a  President  and  Yice-President,  and  unanimously  agreed 
upon  Jefferson  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  for  President,  and  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  of  Georgia,  for  Yice-President. 

The  framers  of  the  new  government  at  Montgomery  studiously  ad 
hered,  in  the  main  features  of  their  plan,  to  the  Washington  model ;  but 
the  Constitution  adopted  by  them  differed  in  some  particulars  from 
that  of  the  United  States.  And  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  at  every  point 
of  difference  it  made  an  undoubted  improvement,  or  corrected  some  ac 
knowledged  evil  of  former  times.  The  Confederate  Constitution  absolutely 
prohibited  the  over-sea  slave-trade ;  that  of  the  United  States  did  not. 
It  permitted  cabinet  ministers  to  take  part  in  the  discussions  of  Congress. 
It  prohibited  bounties  or  duties  to  foster  any  branch  of  industry.  After 
a  specified  time  the  post-office  was  required  to  cover  its  own  expenses. 
No  extra  compensation  was  to  be  paid  to  any  contractor.  The  President 
was  to  hold  office  for  six  years,  and  was  not  to  be  reeligible.  The  subor 
dinate  government  officers  were  not  to  be  removed  by  the  President 
without  a  report  to  the  Senate  giving  his  reasons.  The  right  of  property 
in  slaves  and  that  of  taking  them  into  any  Territory  were  expressly 
stated  ;  but  in  this,  it  was  claimed  that  no  new  principle  was  adopted  or 
laid  down,  which  did  not  already  exist  in  the  Constitution  of  the  old 
Union. 

The  choice  of  President  was  thought  at  the  time  to  be  quite  as  fit  and 
admirable  as  the  other  work  of  the  Convention.  But  of  this,  the  most 
serious  doubts  were  hereafter  to  arise.  Jefferson  Davis,  the  President  of 
the  Confederate  States,  was  a  name  that  was  associated  with  much  that 
was  brilliant  and  honourable  in  the  history  of  the  old  government.  He 


CHARACTER  OF  JEFFERSON   DAVIS.  91 

had  served  that  government  in  the  field  and  in  council.  He  had  received 
a  military  education  at  West  Point ;  had  served  in  the  Mexican  War,  at 
the  head  of  a  regiment  of  volunteer  riflemen,  winning  distinction  at 
Monterey  and  Buena  Vista ;  and  had  been  called  to  the  cabinet  of 
President  Pierce,  as  Secretary  of  "War ;  in  the  administration  of  which 
office  he  increased  the  strength  of  the  United  States  army,  proposed  to 
abolish  the  permanent  staff-organization  for  one  of  details  on  staff-duty, 
and  sent  to  the  Crimea  a  commission  to  report  upon  the  state  of  the 
science  of  war,  and  the  condition  of  European  armies.  He  re-entered 
political  life  as  a  Senator  in  Congress.  In  that  highest  school  of  debate 
in  America,  he  was  distinguished  for  a  style  of  polished  and  graceful 
oratory ;  and  speaking  in  moderate  rhetorical  figures,  and  in  subdued 
tones,  he  was  never  the  flaming  fanatic  or  popular  exhorter,  but  just  the 
speaker  to  address  with  agreeable  effect  a  small  assembly  of  intelligent 
and  cultivated  persons. 

Mr.  Davis  was  a  man  whose  dignity,  whose  political  scholarship, 
whose  classical  and  lofty  expressions,  whose  literary  style — unexcelled, 
perhaps,  in  the  power  of  statement  by  any  cotemporary  model, — whose 
pure  morals,  well-poised  manners  and  distinguished  air,  were  likely  to 
adorn  the  high  station  to  which  he  had  been  raised,  and  calculated  to 
qualify  him,  in  many  striking  respects,  as  the  representative  of  the  proud 
and  chivalrous  people  of  the  South.  But  these  accomplishments  con 
cealed  from  the  hasty  and  superficial  view  defects  of  character  which  were 
most  serious,  indeed  almost  vital  in  their  consequences,  and  which  were 
rapidly  to  be  developed  in  the  course  of  his  administration  of  the  new 
government.  His  dignity  was  the  mask  of  a  peculiar  obstinacy,  which, 
stimulated  by  an  intellectual  conceit,  spurned  the  counsels  of  equal  minds, 
and  rejected  the  advice  of  the  intelligent,  while  it  was  curiously  not  incon 
sistent  with  a  complete  subserviency  to  the  smallest  and  most  unworthy 
of  favourites.  His  scholarship  smelt  of  the  closet.  He  had  no  practical 
judgment ;  his  intercourse  with  men  was  too  distant  and  constrained  for 
studies  of  human  nature  ;  and  his  estimate  of  the  value  of  particular  men 
was  grotesque  and  absurd.  The  especial  qualifications  of  a  great  leader 
in  the  circumstances  in  which  Mr.  Davis  was  placed  would  have  been 
strong  and  active  common-sense,  quick  apprehension,  knowledge  of  men, 
and  a  disposition  to  consult  the  aggregate  wisdom  of  the  people,  and  to 
gather  the  store  of  judgment  from  every  possible  source  of  practical 
advice  within  its  reach.  Mr.  Davis  had  none  of  these  plain  qualities. 
He  had,  instead  of  these,  certain  elegant  and  brilliant  accomplishments, 
which  dazzled  the  multitude,  confused  the  world  in  its  judgment  of  his 
merits,  r.nd  gave  him  a  singular  reputation,  in  which  admirers  and  censors 
were  strangely  mingled  :  one  party,  looking  at  a  distance,  extravagant  in 
its  praise,  the  other,  having  a  nearer  view,  unlimited  in  its  condemnation. 


92  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

But  we  must  reserve  a  fuller  estimate  of  President  Davis'  character  for 
other  periods  in  our  narrative.  While  the  formidable  events  we  have 
just  been  relating — that  of  the  secession  of  seven  Southern  States,  and 
their  erection  of  a  new  government — were  taking  place,  there  were  on 
foot  measures  of  pacification,  to  which  attention  must  be  given  as  well  as 
to  measures  of  hostility.  These  measures  looking  towards  peace  involve 
the  action  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States ;  the  action  of  States 
outside  of  Congress ;  and  certain  strange  proceedings  on  the  part  of  the 
Federal  Executive,  which  were  undoubtedly  influential  in  determining 
the  question  of  peace  or  war. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  session  of  the  United  States  Congress,  a  hope 
of  pacification  had  been  generally  indulged  by  the  country,  and  was 
largely  shared  by  some  of  the  Southern  members.  Even  after  the  seces 
sion  of  South  Carolina,  Southern  members,  who  made  violent  Disunion 
speeches  on  the  floor  of  Congress,  yet  entertained  in  their  private  conver 
sation  a  prospect  of  adjustment,  and  confidentially  advised  their  constitu 
ents  not  to  sell  their  city  lots  in  Washington,  or  dispose  of  their  property 
interests  in  the  Northern  States.  But  as  the  session  progressed  it  became 
evident  that  no  concessions  were  to  be  expected  from  Congress  ;  that  the 
temper  of  the  Republican  party  was  unyielding  and  insolent ;  that  it  was 
not  impressed  with  any  serious  danger,  and  even  in  the  event  of  a  crisis, 
was  confident  of  subduing  the  South  with  such  expedition  and  decision 
as  to  make  an  issue  of  arms  rather  to  be  desired  than  otherwise.  Indeed, 
the  ultimatum  of  the  Republican  party  was  distinctly  enough  announced 
in  resolutions  offered  by  Mr.  Clarke  of  New  Hampshire,  which  passed 
both  houses  of  Congress.  These  resolutions  declared  that  the  provisions  of 
the  Constitution  were  already  ample  enough  for  any  emergencies  ;  that  it 
was  to  be  obeyed  rather  than  amended ;  and  that  an  extrication  from 
present  dangers  was  to  be  looked  for  in  strenuous  efforts  to  preserve  the 
peace,  protect  the  public  property,  and  enforce  the  laws,  rather  than  in 
new  guaranties  for  peculiar  interests,  compromises  for  particular  difficulties, 
or  concessions  to  unreasonable  demands.  Under  this  surface  of  smooth 
words,  the  proposition  was. plain  that  the  demands  of  the  South  were 
unreasonable,  and  not  to  be  allowed,  and  were  to  be  resisted  to  the 
extremities  of  coercion  and  war. 

Committees  in  both  houses  had  been  appointed  to  consider  the  state 
of  the  Union.  Neither  committee  was  able  to  agree  upon  any  mode  of 
settlement  of  the  pending  issue  between  the  North  and  the  South.  The 
Republican  members  in  both  committees  rejected  propositions  acknowl 
edging  the  right  of  property  in  slaves,  or  recommending  the  division  of 
the  Territories  between  the  slaveholding  and  non-slaveholding  States  by 
a  geographical  line. 

On  the   18th  of  December,  I860,  Mr.  Crittenden  of  Kentucky  had 


THE   CBITTENDEN   COMPROMISE.  93 

introduced  in  the  Senate  a  series  of  resolutions  which  contained  a  plan 
of  compromise,  which  it  was  long  hoped  would  be  effected,  and  which  for 
months  continued  a  topic  of  discussion  in  Congress.  The  features  of  this 
plan  may  be  briefly  indicated.  It  sought  to  incorporate  into  the  Consti 
tution  the  following  propositions  : 

1.  That  south  of  a  certain  geographical  parallel  of  latitude,  Congress, 
or  a  Territorial  Legislature,  shall  have  no  power  to  abolish,  modify,  or  in 
any  way  interfere  with  slavery  in  the  Territories. 

2.  That   Congress   shall   have  no   power   to    abolish   slavery   in   the 
District  of  Columbia ; 

3.  Or  in  the  forts,  arsenals,  dock-yards,  or  wherever  else  the  Federal 
Government  has  exclusive  jurisdiction. 

4.  That  in  case  of  the  failure  to  arrest  any  alleged   "  fugitive  from 
service,"  from  violence  to  the  officer  of  the  law,  or  intimidation  of  his 
authority,  the  community  where  such  failure  took  place  shall  be  compelled 
to  pay  the  value  of  such  alleged  fugitive  to  the  owner  thereof,  and  may 
be  prosecuted  for  that  purpose  and  to  that  effect. 

The  fate  of  this  measure  was  significant  enough  of  the  views  and  tem 
per  of  the  Republican  party,  if  any  additional  evidence  of  these  had  been 
needed.  In  the  Senate  it  was  voted  against  by  every  Republican  senator ; 
and  again,  every  Republican  in  that  body  voted  to  substitute  for  Mr.  Crit- 
tenden's  propositions  the  resolutions  of  Mr.  Clarke,  to  which  reference  has 
already  been  made. 

In  the  House,  certain  propositions  moved  by  Mr.  Etheridge,  which 
were  even  less  favourable  to  the  South  than  Mr.  Crittenden's,  were  not 
even  entertained,  on  a  vote  of  yeas  and  nays ;  and  a  resolution  giving  a 
pledge  to  sustain  the  President  in  the  use  of  force  against  seceding  States 
was  adopted  by  a  large  majority. 

It  is  remarkable  that  of  all  the  compromises  proposed  in  this  Congress 
for  preserving  the  peace  of  the  country,  none  came  from  Northern  men  ; 
they  came  from  the  South,  and  were  defeated  by  the  North  !  The  "  Crit- 
tenden  Compromise  "  (for  a  geographical  limit  within  which  to  tolerate,  not 
establish  slavery  in  the  Territories)  was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  principal  fea 
ture  of  these  pacific  negotiations  ;  it  was  considered  fully  capable  to  recon 
struct  the  Union  ;  it  had  even  the  adhesion  or  countenance  of  such  influ 
ential  leaders  of  Secession  as  Toombs,  of  Georgia,  and  Jefferson  Davis,  the 
future  President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  ;  it  constituted  under  the 
circumstances  the  only  possible  existing  hope  of  saving  the  Union.  But, 
unfortunately  for  the  peace  of  the  country,  the  North  deliberately  de 
feated  it. 

While  the  door  of  Congress  was  thus  closed  to  peace,  there  was  outside 
of  it  a  remarkable  effort  at  conciliation,  which  testified  to  the  popular 
anxiety  on  the  subject.  The  action  of  the  States  was  invoked.  Commis- 


94:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

sioners  from  twenty  States,  composing  a  "  Peace  Conference,"  held  at  the 
request  of  the  Legislature  of  Virginia,  met  in  "Washington  on  the  4th  of 
February,  and  adjourned  February  27th.  All  the  Border  Slave  States 
were  represented.  Most  of  the  delegates  from  these  States  were  willing  to 
accept  the  few  and  feeble  guaranties  of  the  Crittenden  proposition.  The 
ultimate  result  was  the  recommendation  of  a  project  to  Congress  which,  in 
detail,  was  less  favourable  to  the  South  than  that  contained  in  Mr.  Critten- 
den's  resolutions,  but  generally  identical  with  it  in  respect  of  running  a 
geographical  line  between  the  slaveholding  and  non-slaveholding  territo 
ries,  and  enforcing  the  provisions  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  One  curious 
additional  feature  was  that  no  territory  should  in  the  future  be  acquired 
by  the  United  States,  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Senators  from  the 
Southern  States  and  those  from  the  Northern  States.  But  it  is  useless  to 
go  into  the  details  of  the  report  of  the  Peace  Commissioners  ;  for  it  never 
received  any  steady  or  respectful  consideration  in  either  house  of  Con 
gress.  In  the  Senate  it  was  summarily  voted  down  by  a  vote  of  twenty- 
eight  to  seven  ;  and  the  House,  on  a  call  of  yeas  and  nays,  actually  refused 
to  receive  it. 

There  was  an  evident  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  so-called  Border 
Slave  States  to  avoid  a  decisive  step.  To  this  hesitation  the  North  gave 
a  significance  which  it  did  not  really  possess.  It  is  true  that  Tennessee 
and  North  Carolina  decided  against  calling  a  State  Convention ;  but  this 
action  implied  simply  that  they  were  awaiting  the  results  of  the  peace 
propositions  to  which  they  had  committed  themselves.  The  State  of  Vir 
ginia,  which  had  distinguished  herself  by  a  conspicuous  effort  to  save  the 
Union — for  it  was  on  the  unanimous  invitation  of  her  Legislature  that  the 
Peace  Conference  had  been  assembled — had  called  a  State  Convention  in 
the  month  of  January.  It  was  elected  on  the  4th  of  February  ;  and  the 
Northern  party  found  singular  gratification  in  the  circumstance  that  a 
majority  of  Union  men  was  returned  to  an  assembly  so  critical. 

There  is  no  doubt  the  Convention  of  Virginia  was  sincerely  anxious  by 
every  means  in  its  power  to  restore  the  Union.  But  the  party  in  favour 
of  secession  was  steadily  strengthening  in  view  of  the  obstinate  front 
presented  by  the  Black  Eepublican  party  in  Congress.  Delegates 
who  had  been  returned  as  Union  men,  were  afterwards  instructed  to 
vote  otherwise.  Petersburg,  Culpepper,  Cumberland,  Prince  Edward, 
Botetourt,  Wythe,  and  many  other  towns  and  counties,  held  meetings  and 
urged  prompt  secession.  The  action  of  the  Federal  authorities  was  daily 
becoming  more  irritating  and  alarming.  A  garrison  was  thrown  into  Fort 
"Washington  on  the  Potomac ;  and  it  was  observed  that  guns  were  being 
mounted  on  the  parapet  of  Fortress  Monroe,  and  turned  inland  upon  the 
very  bosom  of  Virginia. 

However  Virginia  might  have  lingered,  in  the  hope  that  the  breach 


VIRGINIA  AN  ADVOCATE   OF   STATE  EIGHTS.  95 

that  had  taken  place  in  the  Union  might  be  repaired  by  new  constitu 
tional  guaranties,  there  could  be  no  doubt,  in  view  of  her  record  in  the 
past,  that  whenever  the  issue  of  war  was  made,  whenever  the  coercion  of 
the  seceded  States  should  be  attempted,  she  would  then  be  on  the  side  of 
Southern  Independence,,  prompt  to  risk  all  consequences.  The  Federal 
'  government  could  not  have  been  blind  to  this  ;  for  the  precedents  of  the 
State  were  well  known.  The  Eesolutions  of  '98  and  '99,  originated  by 
Mr.  Jefferson,  constituted  the  text-book  of  State-Eights,  and  vindicated 
and  maintained  the  right  and  duty  of  States  suffering  grievances  from  un 
just  and  unconstitutional  Federal  legislation,  to  judge  of  the  wrong  as 
well  as  of  "  the  mode  and  measure  of  redress."  At  every  period  of  con 
troversy  between  Federal  and  State  authority,  the  voice  of  Virginia  was 
the  first  to  be  heard  in  behalf  of  State  Eights.  In  1832-'33,  the  Governor 
of  Virginia,  John  Floyd,  the  elder,  had  declared  that  Federal  troops  should 
not  pass  the  banks  of  the  Potomac  to  coerce  South  Carolina  into  obedience 
to  the  tariff  laws,  unless  over  his  dead  body ;  and  a  majority  of  the  Legisla 
ture  of  Virginia  had  then  indicated  their  recognition  of  the  right  of  a  State 
to  secede  from  the  Union.  At  every  stage  of  the  agitation  of  the  slavery 
question  in  Congress  and  in  the  Northern  States,  Virginia  declared  her 
sentiments,  and  entered  upon  her  legislative  records  declarations  that  she 
would  resist  the  aggressive  spirit  of  the  Northern  majority,  even  to  the 
disruption  of  the  ties  that  bound  her  to  the  Union.  In  1848,  she  had 
resolved,  in  legislative  council,  that  she  would  not  submit  to  the  passage 
of  the  Wilmot  proviso,  or  any  kindred  measure.  From  the  date  of  the 
organization  of  the  Anti-Slavery  party,  her  people,  of  all  parties,  had 
declared  that  the  election  of  an  abolitionist  to  the  Presidency  would  be  a 
virtual  declaration  of  war  against  the  South.  The  Legislature  that  assem 
bled  a  few  weeks  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  declared,  in  effect,  with  only 
four  dissenting  voices,  that  the  interests  of  Virginia  were  thoroughly  iden 
tified  with  those  of  the  other  Southern  States,  and  that  any  intimation 
from  any  source,  that  her  people  were  looking  to  any  combination  in  the 
last  resort  other  than  union  with  them,  was  unpatriotic  and  treasonable. — 
In  view  of  a  record  so  plain  and  explicit,  it  was  madness  to  suppose  that 
the  Convention  of  1861  entertained  any  desire  to  cling  to  the  Union  other 
than  by  constitutional  guaranties,  or  that  Virginia  would  hesitate  for  a 
moment  to  separate  from  that  Union  whenever  it  should  actually  under 
take  to  subjugate  her  sister  States  of  the  South. 

"VVe  have  seen  that  there  was  but  little  prospect  of  peace  in  the  pro 
ceedings  of  Congress,  or  in  the  action  of  the  people,  outside  of  Congress, 
through  the  forms  of  State  authority.  The  conduct  of  the  Federal  Execu 
tive  afforded  no  better  prospect ;  indeed,  instead  of  being  negative  in  its 
results,  it  did  much  to  vex  the  country  and  to  provoke  hostility. 

The  policy  of  Mr.  Buchanan  was  unfortunately  weak  and  hesitating — 


96  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

an  attempt  at  ambidexterity,  in  which  he  equally  failed  to  conciliate  the 
Secessionists  and  pacify  their  designs,  or  to  make  any  resolute  effort  to 
save  the  Union.  He  had,  in  his  message  to  Congress,  denounced  secession 
as  revolutionary  ;  and  although  lie  was  clear  in  the  constitutional  proposi 
tion  that  there  was  no  right  of  "  coercion  "  on  the  part  of  the  Federal 
Government,  yet  he  did  but  little,  and  that  irresolutely,  to  put  that  Gov 
ernment  in  a  state  of  defence,  in  the  event  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the 
seceded  States.  This  timid  old  man — a  cautious,  secretive  politician,  who 
never  felt  the  warmth  of  an  emotion,  and  had  been  bred  in  the  harsh 
school  of  political  selfishness — attempted  to  stand  between  two  parties ; 
and  the  result  was  embarrassment,  double-dealing,  weak  and  despicable 
querulousness,  and,  finally,  the  condemnation  and  contempt  of  each  of  the 
parties  between  whom  he  attempted  to  distribute  his  favours. 

It  is  true  that  Mr.  Buchanan  was  over-censured  by  the  North  for  his 
failure  to  reinforce  the  garrisons  of  the  Southern  forts.  When  Gen.  Scott, 
on  the  15th  of  December,  1860,  recommended  that  nine  Federal  fortifica 
tions  in  the  Southern  States  should  be  effectively  garrisoned,  there  were 
only  five  companies  of  Federal  troops  within  his  reach ;  and  he  could 
only  have  intended  in  proposing  such  an  impracticable  measure  to  make 
a  certain  reputation  rather  as  a  politician  than  as  a  general.  Again,  when, 
six  weeks  later,  Gen.  Scott  renewed  this  recommendation,  the  fact  was 
that  the  whole  force  at  his  command  consisted  of  six  hundred  recruits, 
obtained  since  the  date  of  his  first  recommendation,  in  addition  to  the 
five  regular  companies.  The  army  of  the  United  States  was  still  out  of 
reach  on  the  remote  frontiers  ;  and  Gen.  Scott  must  have  known  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  withdraw  it  during  mid-winter  in  time  for  this 
military  operation. 

But  while  Mr.  Buchanan's  course  in  refusing  to  distribute  a  thousand 
men  among  the  numerous  forts  in  the  Cotton  States,  as  well  as  Fortress 
Monroe,  is,  in  a  measure,  defensible  against  Northern  criticism,  for  such 
a  proceeding  would  have  been  an  exhibition  of  weakness  instead  of 
strength,  and,  at  the  time,  a  dangerous  provocation  to  the  seceded  States, 
yet,  in  this  same  matter,  he  was  about  to  commit  an  act  of  perfidy,  for 
which  there  can  be  neither  excuse  nor  disguise.  He  had  refused  to  re 
inforce  Fort  Moultrie  in  Charleston  Harbour,  for  the  reason  that  it  might 
provoke  and  alarm  the  Secession  party,  and  disturb  the  movements  in 
Congress  and  in  the  country  then  looking  towards  peace.  But,  for  the 
same  reason,  he  gave  the  distinct  and  solemn  pledge  that  he  would  permit 
the  military  status  quo  in  Charleston  Harbour  to  remain  unless  South 
Carolina  herself  should  attempt  to  disturb  it.  No  language  could  be  more 
explicit  than  that  in  which  this  pledge  was  conveyed. 

The  official  instructions  made  on  the  llth  of  December  to  Major 
Anderson,  then  in  command  of  Fort  Moultrie,  ran  as  follows  : 


97 

"  You  are  aware  of  the  great  anxiety  of  the  Secretary  of  "War  that  a 
collision  of  the  troops  with  the  people  of  the  State  shall  be  avoided,  and 
of  his  studied  determination  to  pursue  a  course  with  reference  to  the  mili 
tary  force  and  forts  in  this  harbour,  which  shall  guard  against  such  a 
collision.  He  has,  therefore,  carefully  abstained  from  increasing  the  force 
at  this  point,  or  taking  any  measures  which  might  add  to  the  present 
excited  state  of  the  public  mind,  or  which  would  throw  any  doubt  on  the 
confidence  he  feels  that  South  Carolina  will  not  attempt  by  violence  to 
obtain  possession  of  the  public  works  or  interfere  with  their  occupancy. 
The  smallness  of  your  force  will  not  permit  you,  perhaps,  to  occupy  more 
than  one  of  the  three  forts,  but  an  attack  on  or  attempt  to  take  possession 
of  either  one  of  them  will  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  hostility,  and  you  may 
then  put  your  command  into  either  of  them  which  you  may  deem  most 
proper  to  increase  its  power  of  resistance." 

On  the  day  previous  to  the  date  of  these  instructions,  the  South  Caro 
lina  delegation  had  called  on  the  President ;  the  distinct  object  of  their 
visit  being  to  consult  with  him  as  to  the  best  means  of  avoiding  a  hostile 
collision  between  their  State  and  the  Federal  Government.  At  the  in 
stance  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  their  communication  was  put  in  writing,  and 
they  presented  him  the  following  note  : 

"  In  compliance  with  our  statement  to  you  yesterday,  we  now  express  to  you  our 
strong  conviction  that  neither  the  constituted  authorities,  nor  any  body  of  the  people  of 
the  State  of  South  Carolina,  will  either  attack  or  molest  the  United  States  forts  in  the 
harbour  of  Charleston,  previously  to  the  action  of  the  convention ;  and  we  hope  and 
believe  not  until  an  offer  has  been  made  through  an  accredited  representative  to  negoti 
ate  for  an  amicable  arrangement  of  all  matters  between  the  State  and  Federal  Govern 
ment,  provided  that  no  reinforcements  be  sent  into  these  forts,  and  their  relative  military 
status  shall  remain  as  at  present." 

Yet  we  have  seen  how  this  military  status  was  disturbed  by  Major 
Anderson's  removal  to  Fort  Sumter,  an  act  which  greatly  strengthened 
his  position,  which  put  him  from  an  untenable  post  into  what  was  then 
supposed  to  be  an  impregnable  defence,  which  changed  the  status,  quite  as 
much  so  as  an  accession  of  numerical  force,  and  which,  to  the  State  of 
South  Carolina,  could  have  none  other  than  a  hostile  significance.  Mr. 
Buchanan  was  reminded  of  his  pledge,  and  asked  to  order  Major  Anderson 
back  to  Fort  Moultrie.  He  refused  to  do  so.  Mr.  Floyd,  of  Yirginia,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  in  view  of  the  President's  violation  of  faith,  and  the 
aternpt  to  make  him  a  party  to  it,  withdrew  from  the  cabinet  in  a  high 
state  of  indignation  ;  and  thus  was  accomplished  the  first  act  of  Mr.  Bu 
chanan's  perfidy  on  the  eve  of  war. 

The  second  was  soon  to  follow.  After  determining  not  to  order  Ander 
son  "back  to  Fort  Moultrie,  President  Buchanan  determined  to  take 


THE    LOST    CAUSE. 


another  step — actually  to  send  troops  to  Sumter.  Under  his  direction  the 
War  Department  chartered  a  steamer  called  the  "  Star  of  the  West," 
which  sailed  from  New  York  on  the  5th  of  January,  1861,  having  on 
board  two  hundred  and  fifty  soldiers,  besides  stores  and  munitions  of  war. 
A  specious  plea  was  originated  for  this  expedition,  and  it  was  declared 
that  its  purpose  was  to  provision  a  "  starving  garrison."  When  the  vessel 
appeared  off  Charleston  Harbour,  on  the  9th  of  January,  heading  in  from 
the  sea,  and  taking  the  channel  for  Sumter,  a  battery  at  Point  Cummings 
on  Morris  Island  opened  upon  her  at  long  range.  Not  daring  to  penetrate 
the  fire,  the  Star  of  the  West  ran  out  to  sea  with  all  speed ;  and  the 
soldiers  on  board  of  her  were  subsequently  disembarked  at  their  former 
quarters  on  Governour's  Island. 

When  the  result  of  this  expedition  was  known,  Mr.  Buchanan  affected 
surprise  and  indignation  at  the  reception  given  the  Federal  reinforce 
ments,  and  declared  that  the  expedition  had  been  ordered  with  the  con 
currence  of  his  Cabinet.  Mr.  Jacob  Thompson  of  Mississippi,  who  yet 
remained  in  the  Cabinet,  repelled  the  slander,  denounced  the  movement 
as  underhanded,  and  as  a  breach  not  only  of  good  faith  towards  South 
Carolina,  but  as  one  of  personal  confidence  between  the  President  and 
himself,  and  left  the  Cabinet  with  expressions  of  indignation  and  con 
tempt. 

Mr.  Buchanan's  administration  terminated  with  results  alike  fearful  to 
the  country  and  dishonourable  to  himself.  He  retired  from  office,  after 
having  widened  the  breach  between  North  and  South,  and  given  new 
cause  of  exasperation  in  the  contest ;  obtaining  the  execrations  of  both 
parties  ;  and  going  down  to  history  with  the  brand  of  perfidy.  When  he 
ceased  to  be  President  on  the  4th  of  March,  1861,  seven  Southern  States 
were  out  of  the  Union ;  they  had  erected  a  new  government ;  they  had 
secured  every  Federal  fort  within  their  limits  with  two  exceptions — 
Sumter  and  Pickens ;  they  had  gathered  not  only  munitions  of  war,  but 
had  obtained  great  additions  in  moral  power ;  and  although  they  still 
deplored  a  war  between  the  two  sections  as  "  a  policy  detrimental  to  the 
civilized  world,"  they  had  openly  and  rapidly  prepared  for  it.  Fort 
Moultrie  and  Castle  Pinckney  had  been  occupied  by  the  South  Carolina 
troops ;  Fort  Pulaski,  the  defence  of  the  Savannah,  had  been  taken  ;  the 
Arsenal  at  Mount  Yernon,  Alabama,  with  twenty  thousand  stand  of  arms, 
had  been  seized  by  the  Alabama  troops ;  Fort  Morgan,  in  Mobile  Bay, 
had  been  taken ;  Forts  Jackson,  St.  Philip,  and  Pike,  near  New  Orleans, 
had  been  captured  by  the  Louisiana  troops ;  the  Pensacola  Navy- Yard 
and  Forts  Barrancas  and  McRae  had  been  taken,  and  the  siege  of  Fort 
Pickens  commenced ;  the  Baton  Rouge  Arsenal  had  been  surrendered  to 
the  Louisiana  troops ;  the  New  Orleans  Mint  and  Custom-House  had  been 
taken  ;  the  Little  Rock  Arsenal  had  been  seized  by  the  Arkansas  troops  ; 


THE   COUNTRY   AWAITING   THE   CONFLICT.  99 

and  on  the  18th  of  February,  Gen.  Twiggs  had  transferred  the  military 
posts  and  public  property  in  Texas  to  the  State  authorities. 

It  is  remarkable  that  all  these  captures  and  events  had  been  accom 
plished  without  the  sacrifice  of  a  single  life,  or  the  effusion  of  one  drop  of 
blood.  It  was,  perhaps,  in  view  of  this  circumstance,  that  people  lingered 
in  the  fancy  that  there  would  be  no  war.  Yet  the  whole  country  was 
agitated  with  passion ;  the  frown  of  war  was  already  visible ;  and  it 
needed  but  some  Cadmus  to  throw  the  stone  that  would  be  the  signal  of 
combat  between  the  armed  men  sprung  from  the  dragon's  teeth. 


CHAPTEE    VI. 


CHARACTER  OF  ABEAHAM  LINCOLN  IN  HISTOET. — ABSURD  PANEGYRIC. — THE  PERSONAL  AND 
POLITICAL  LIFE  OF  THE  NEW  PRESIDENT.— HIS  JOTJENEY  TO  WASHINGTON. — HIS  SPEECH 
AT  PHILADELPHIA. — THE  FLIGHT  FEOM  HAERISBURG. — ALARM  IN  WASHINGTON. — MILI 
TARY  DISPLAY  IN  THE  CAPITAL. — CEREMONY  OF  INAUGURATION. — CEITICISM  OF  LINCOLN'S 
ADDRESS. WHAT  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  THOUGHT  OF  IT. — SERIOUS  PAUSE  AT  WASH 
INGTON. — STATEMENT  OF  HORACE  GREELEY. — HOW  THE  INAUGURAL  ADDRESS  WAS  RE 
CEIVED  IN  THE  SECEDED  STATES. — VISIT  OF  CONFEDERATE  COMMISSIONERS  TO  WASHING 
TON. — SEWARD'S  PLEDGE  TO  JUDGE  CAMPBELL. — THE  COMMISSIONERS  DECEIVED. — MILI 
TARY  AND  NAVAL  EXPEDITIONS  FROM  NEW  YORK. — CONSULTATION  OF  THE  CABINET  ON 
THE  SUMTER  QUESTION. — CAPT.  FOX'S  VISIT  TO  CHARLESTON. — HIS  PROJECT. — OBJECTIONS 
OF  GEN.  SCOTT. — SINGULAR  ARTICLE  IN  A  NEW  YORK  JOURNAL. — LINCOLN'S  HESITATION. 
— HIS  FINAL  DEVICE. — SEWARD's  GAME  WITH  THE  COMMISSIONERS. — THE  REDUCTION 
OF  FORT  SUMTER. — DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  WORKS  FOR  THE  REDUCTION 
OF  SUMTER. — BEAUREGAED  DEMANDS  THE  SURRENDER  OF  THE  FORT. — THE  BOMBARD 
MENT. — THE  FORT  ON  FIRE. — THE  FEDERAL  FLEET  TAKES  NO  PART  IN  THE  FIGHT. — THE 
SURRENDER. — GREAT  EXCITEMENT  IN  THE  NORTH. — ITS  TRUE  MEANING. — THE  CRUSADE 
AGAINST  THE  SOUTH. — DR.  TYNG'S  EXHORTATION. — CONDUCT  OF  NORTHERN  DEMOCRATS. 

DICKINSON,    EVERETT,    AND    COCHRANE. PRESIDENT    LINCOLN'S    PROCLAMATION. — HIS 

PACIFIC  PROTESTS  TO  THE  VIRGINIA  COMMISSIONERS. — SECESSION  OF  VIRGINIA. — DIS 
CONTENT  IN  THE  WESTERN  COUNTIES. — SECOND  SECESSIONARY  MOVEMENT  OF  THE  SOUTH 
ERN  STATES. — VIOLENT  ACTS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  ADMINISTRATION. — PREPARATIONS  OF 

THE  CONFEDERATE  GOVERNMENT  FOR  WAR. RUSH  OF  VOLUNTEERS  TO  ARMS. — PRESIDENT 

DAVIS'  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  MILITARY  NECESSITY. — REMOVAL  OF  THE  SEAT  OF  GOVERNMENT 
TO  RICHMOND. — ACTIVITY  OF  VIRGINIA. — ROBERT  E.  LEE. — HIS  ATTACHMENT  TO  THE 
UNION. — WHY  HE  JOINED  THE  CONFEDERATE  CAUSE. — HIS  SPEECH  IN  THE  STATE  HOUSE  AT 
RICHMOND. — HIS  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  MILITARY  FORCE  OF  VIRGINIA. — MILITARY  COUN 
CIL  IN  RICHMOND. — THE  EARLY  REPUTATION  OF  LEE. 

A  LAEGE  portion  of  the  Northern  people  have  a  custom  of  apotheosis  ; 
at  least  so  far  as  to  designate  certain  of  their  public  men,  to  question 
whose  reputation  is  considered  bold  assumption,  if  not  sacrilegious  daring. 
But  the  maxim  of  de  mortwis  nil  nisi  ~bonum  does  not  apply  to  history. 
The  character  of  Abraham  Lincoln  belongs  to  history  as  fully  as  that  of 
the  meanest  agent  in  human  affairs  ;  and  his  own  declaration,  on  one  occa- 


ME.  LINCOLN'S  ANTECEDENTS.  101 

sion,  that  he  did  not  expect  to  "  escape  "  it  is  sure  to  be  verified,  now  or 
hereafter. 

We  have  already  stated  that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  not  elected  President  of 
the  United  States  for  any  commanding  fame,  or  for  any  known  merit  as  a 
statesman.  His  panegyrists,  although  they  could  not  assert  for  him  a 
guiding  intellect  or  profound  scholarship,  claimed  for  him  some  homely 
and  substantial  virtues.  It  was  said  that  he  was  transparently  honest. 
But  his  honesty  was  rather  that  facile  disposition  that  reaolily  took  impres 
sions  from  whatever  was  urged  on  it.  It  was  said  that  he  was  excessively 
amiable.  But  his  amiability  was  animal.  It  is  small  merit  to  have  a 
Falstaffian  humour  in  one's  blood.  Abraham  Lincoln  was  neither  kind 
nor  cruel,  in  the  proper  sense  of  these  words,  simply  because  he  was  desti 
tute  of  the  higher  order  of  sensibilities. 

His  appearance  corresponded  to  his  rough  life  and  uncultivated  mind. 
His  figure  was  tall  and  gaunt-looking ;  his  shoulders  were  inclined  for 
ward  ;  his  arms  of  unusual  length ;  and  his  gait  astride,  rapid  and  shuf 
fling.  The  savage  wits  in  the  Southern  newspapers  had  no  other  name  for 
him  than  "  the  Illinois  Ape." 

The  new  President  of  the  United  States  was  the  product  of  that  parti- 
zanship  which  often  discovers  its  most  "  available "  candidates  among 
obscure  men,  with  slight  political  records,  and  of  that  infamous  dema- 
gogueism  in  America  that  is  pleased  with  the  low  and  vulgar  antecedents 
of  its  public  men,  and  enjoys  the  imagination  of  similar  elevation  for  each 
one  of  its  own  class  in  society.  Mr.  Lincoln  had  formerly  served,  without 
distinction,  in  Congress.  But  among  his  titles  to  American  popularity 
were  the  circumstances  that  in  earlier  life  he  had  rowed  a  flat-boat  down 
the  Mississippi ;  afterwards  been  a  miller ;  and  at  another  period  had 
earned  his  living  by  splitting  rails  in  a  county  of  Illinois.  When  he  was 
first  named  for  the  Presidency,  an  enthusiastic  admirer  had  presented  to 
the  State  Convention  of  Illinois  two  old  fence-rails,  gaily  decorated  with 
flags  and  ribbons,  and  bearing  the  following  inscription  :  "  Abraham  Lin 
coln,  the  Rail  Candidate  for  President  in  1860. — Two  rails  from  a  lot  of 
3,000,  made  in  1830,  by  Thos.  Hanks  and  Abe  Lincoln."  The  incident  is 
not  mentioned  for  amusement :  it  is  a  suggestive  illustration  of  the  vulgar 
and  silly  devices  in  an  American  election. 

Since  the  announcement  of  his  election,  Mr.  Lincoln  had  remained  very 
retired  and  studiously  silent  in  his  home  at  Springfield,  Illinois.  Expecta 
tions  were  raised  by  the  mystery  of  this  silence  ;  his  panegyrists  declared 
that  it  was  the  indication  of  a  thoughtful  wisdom  pondering  the  grave  con 
cerns  of  the  country,  and  likely  to  announce  at  last  some  novel  and  pro 
found  solution  of  existing  difficulties ;  and  so  credulous  are  all  men  in  a 
time  of  anxiety  and  embarrassment,  and  so  eager  to  catch  at  hopes,  that 
these  fulsome  prophecies  of  the  result  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  meditations  actu- 


102  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ally  impressed  the  country,  which  awaited  with  impatience  the  opening  of 
the  oracle's  lips. 

Never  was  a  disappointment  so  ludicrous.  No  sooner  did  Mr.  Lincoln 
leave  his  home  on  his  official  journey  to  Washington,  than  he  became  pro 
fuse  of  speech,  entertaining  the  crowd,  that  at  different  points  of  the  rail 
road  watched  his  progress  to  the  capital,  with  a  peculiar  style  of  stump 
oratory,  in  which  his  Western  phraseology,  jests,  and  comic  displays 
amused  the  whole  country  in  the  midst  of  a  great  public  anxiety.  He  was 
reported  to  have  been  for  months  nursing  a  masterly  wisdom  at  Spring 
field  ;  he  was  approaching  the  capital  on  an  occasion  and  in  circumstances 
the  most  imposing  in  American  history ;  and  yet  he  had  no  better  coun 
sels  to  offer  to  the  distressed  country  than  to  recommend  his  hearers  to 
"  keep  cool,"  and  to  assure  them  in  his  peculiar  rhetoric  and  grammar 
that  "  nobody  was  hurt,"  and  that  there  was  "  nothing  going  wrong." 
The  new  President  brought  with  him  the  buffoonery  and  habits  of  a  dema 
gogue  of  the  back-woods.  He  amused  a  crowd  by  calling  up  to  the 
speaker's  stand  a  woman,  who  had  recommended  him  to  grow  wrhiskers  on 
his  face,  and  kissing  her  in  public  ;  he  measured  heights  with  the  tall  men 
he  encountered  in  his  public  receptions ;  and,  as  part  of  the  ceremony  of 
the  inauguration  at  Washington,  he  insisted  upon  kissing  the  thirty-four 
young  women  who,  in  striped  colours  and  spangled  dresses,  represented  in 
the  procession  the  thirty-four  States  of  the  Union.  These  incidents  are 
not  improperly  recorded  :  they  are  not  trivial  in  connection  with  a  histor 
ical  name,  and  with  reference  to  an  occasion  the  most  important  in  Amer 
ican  annals. 

At  Philadelphia,  where  Mr.  Lincoln  was  required  to  assist  in  raising  a 
United  States  flag  over  Independence  Hall,  he  was  more  serious  in  his 
speech  than  on  any  former  occasion  in  his  journey.  In  his  address  was 
this  language :  "that  sentiment  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  which 
gave  Liberty,  not  alone  to  the  people  of  this  country,  but,  I  hope,  to  the 
world  for  all  future  time.  It  was  that  which  gave  promise  that,  in  due 
time,  the  weight  would  be  lifted  from  the  shoulders  of  all  men."  These 
words  were  supposed  to  be  aimed  at  the  institution  of  negro  slavery  in  the 
South.  With  reference  to  them  a  Baltimore  newspaper  said  :  "  Mr.  Lin 
coln,  the  President  elect  of  the  United  States,  will  arrive  in  this  city,  with 
his  suite,  this  afternoon  by  special  train  from  Harrisburg,  and  will  proceed, 
we  learn,  directly  to  Washington.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  no  opportunity 
will  be  afforded  him — or  that,  if  it  be  afforded,  he  will  not  embrace  it — to 
repeat  in  our  midst  the  sentiments  which  he  is  reported  to  have  expressed 
yesterday  in  Philadelphia."  This  newspaper  paragraph  and  some  other 
circumstances  equally  trivial  were  made  the  occasion  of  an  alarm  that  the 
new  President  was  to  be  assassinated  in  Baltimore,  or  on  his  way  to  that 
city.  The  alarm  was  communicated  to  Mr.  Lincoln  himself.  He  was  in 


HIS    INAUGURATION    TROUBLES.  103 

bed  at  the  time  in  Harrisburg.  He  at  once  determined  to  leave  by  a  spe 
cial  train  direct  to  Washington.  Not  satisfied  with  thus  avoiding  Balti 
more,  his  alarm  took  the  most  unusual  precautions.  The  telegraph  wires 
were  put  beyond  the  reach  of  any  one  who  might  desire  to  use  them.  His 
departure  was  kept  a  profound  secret.  His  person  was  disguised  in  a  very 
long  military  cloak  ;  a  Scotch  plaid  cap  was  put  on  his  head  ;  and  thus 
curiously  attired,  the  President  of  the  United  States  made  his  advent  to 
Washington.  "  Had  he,"  said  the  Baltimore  Sun,  "  entered  Willard's 
Hotel  withj  a  '  head-spring  '  and  a  i  summersault '  and  the  clown's  merry 
greeting  to  Gen.  Scott,  '  Here  we  are,'  the  country  could  not  have  been 
more  surprised  at  the  exhibition."  * 

Mr.  Lincoln's  nervous  alarm  for  his  personal  safety  did  not  subside 
w^ith  his  arrival  in  Washington.  General  Scott,  who  was  in  military 
command  there,  had  already  collected  in  the  capital  more  than  six  hun 
dred  regular  troops,  and  had  called  out  the  District  militia,  to  resist  an 
attempt  which  would  be  made  by  an  armed  force  to  prevent  the  inaugura 
tion  of  President  Lincoln  and  to  seize  the  public  property.  He  insisted 
upon  this  imagination  ;  he  pretended  violent  alarm  ;  he  had  evidently 
made  up  his  mind  for  a  military  drama,  and  the  display  of  himself  on  the 
occasion  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration.  His  vanity  was  foolish.  A  com 
mittee  of  the  House  of  Representatives  investigated  the  causes  of  alarm, 
heard  the  General  himself,  and  decided  that  his  apprehensions  were  un 
founded.  But  he  would  not  be  quieted.  He  communicated  his  fears  to 
Mr.  Lincoln  to  such  effect,  that  for  some  time  before  and  after  his  inaugu 
ration  soldiers  were  placed  at  his  gate,  and  the  grand  reception-room  of  the 
White  House  was  converted  into  quarters  for  troops  from  Kansas,  who, 
under  the  command  of  the  notorious  Jim  Lane,  had  volunteered  to  guard 
the  chamber  of  the  President. 

Inauguration-day  passed  peacefully  and  quietly,  but  was  attended  by 
an  extraordinary  military  display.  Troops  were  stationed  in  different 
parts  of  the  city ;  sentinels  were  posted  on  the  tops  of  the  highest  houses 
and  other  eminences ;  the  President  moved  to  the  Capitol  in  a  hollow 
square  of  cavalry ;  and  from  the  East  portico  delivered  his  inaugural 
address  with  a  row  of  bayonets  standing  between  him  and  his  audience. 

The  address  was  such  an  attempt  at  ambidexterity  as  might  be  ex 
pected  from  an  embarrassed  and  ill-educated  man.  It  was  a  singular  mix 
ture.  The  new  President  said  he  was  strongly  in  favour  of  the  mainten- 

*  The  silly  or  jocose  story  of  the  intended  assassination  was,  that  a  party  of  Secessionists  had 
plotted  to  throw  the  train  of  cars  on  which  Mr.  Lincoln  was  expected  to  travel  to  Baltimore,  down  a 
steep  embankment,  and  this  project  failing,  to  murder  him  in  the  streets  of  Baltimore.  But  Mr. 
Lincoln  left  his  wife  and  children  to  take  the  threatened  route  to  Baltimore,  and  to  risk  the  reported 
conspiracy  to  throw  the  cars  from  the  track  ;  and  it  turned  out  that  they  arrived  safe  at  their  jour 
ney's  end,  and  without  accident  of  any  sort. 


104  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ance  of  the  Union  and  was  opposed  to  Secession  ;  but  he  was  equally 
against  the  principle  of  coercion,  provided  the  rights  of  the  United  States 
government  were  not  interfered  with.  He  gave  a  quasi  pledge  not  to 
appoint  Federal  officers  for  communities  unanimously  hostile  to  the  author 
ity  of  the  Union ;  he  appeared  to  proceed  on  the  supposition  that  the 
South  had  only  to  be  disabused  of  her  impressions  and  apprehensions  of 
Northern  hostility  ;  in  one  breath  he  exclaimed  :  "  we  are  not  enemies  but 
friends  ;  "  in  another  he  made  the  following  significant  declaration  : 

"  The  power  confided  to  me  will  le  used  to  hold,  occupy,  and  possess  the  property  and 
places  belonging  to  the  Government,  and  collect  the  duties  and  imposts ;  but,  beyond  what 
may  be  necessary  for  these  objects,  there  will  be  no  invasion,  no  using  of  force  against  or 
among  the  people  anywhere." 

The  address  was  variously  received,  according  to  the  political  opinions 
of  the  country,  and  made  decided  friends  in  no  quarter.  Mr.  Lincoln's 
own  party  was  displeased  with  it ;  and  the  Republican  newspapers  de 
clared  that  its  tone  was  deprecatory  and  even  apologetic.  The  Northern 
Democrats  had  no  violent  disapproval  to  express.  The  Border  Slave 
States,  which  yet  remained  in  the  Union,  were  undetermined  as  to  its  mean 
ing,  but  regarded  it  with  suspicion.  In  fact  it  was  with  reference  to  these 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  was  embarrassed,  if  he  was  not  actually  at  this  time 
balancing  between  peace  and  war.  If  coercion  was  attempted  towards  the 
seceded  States,  the  Border  Slave  States  would  go  out  of  the  Union,  and 
the  country  would  be  lost.  If  a  pacific  policy  was  adopted,  the  Chicago 
platform  would  go  to  pieces,  and  the  Black  Republican  party  would  be 
broken  into  fragments. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  for  some  weeks  after  Mr.  Lincoln's 
inauguration  there  was  a  serious  pause  in  his  mind  on  the  question  of 
peace  or  war.  His  new  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward,  at  the  New  Eng 
land  Dinner  in  New  York,  had  confidently  predicted  a  settlement  of  all 
the  troubles  "  within  sixty  days  " — a  phrase,  by  the  way,  that  was  to  be 
frequently  repeated  in  the  course  of  four  long  years.  Mr.  Horace  Greeley 
testifies  that  on  visiting  Washington  s6me  two  weeks  or  more  after  Mr. 
Lincoln's  inauguration,  he  was  "  surprised  to  see  and  hear  on  every  hand 
what  were  to  him  convincing  proofs  that  an  early  collision  with  the  <  Con 
federates  '  was  not  seriously  apprehended  in  the  highest  quarters."  If 
there  was  really  an  interval  of  indecision  in  the  first  days  of  Mr.  Lincoln's 
administration,  it  was  rapidly  overcome  by  partisan  influences,  for  his 
apparent  vacillation  was  producing  disaffection  in  the  Black  Republican 
party,  and  the  clamour  of  their  disappointment  was  plainly  heard  in 
Washington. 

In  the  seceded  States  the  inaugural  address  had  been  interpreted  as  a 
menace  of  war.  This  interpretation  was  confirmed  by  other  circumstances 


THE   CONFEDERATE   COMMISSIONERS.  105 

than  the  text  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  speech.  In  every  department  of  the  public 
service  there  had  been  placed  by  the  new  President  violent  abolitionists 
and  men  whose  hatred  of  the  South  was  notorious  and  unrelenting.  The 
Pennsylvania^  a  newspaper  published  in  Philadelphia,  said  :  "  Mr.  Lin 
coln  stands  to-day  where  he  stood  on  the  6th  of  November  last,  on  the 
Chicago  Platform.  He  has  not  receded  a  single  hair's  breadth.  He  has 
appointed  a  Cabinet  in  which  there  is  no  slaveholder — a  thing  that  has 
never  before  happened  since  the  formation  of  the  Government /  and  in 
which  there  are  but  two  nominally  Southern  men,  and  both  bitter  Black 
Eepublicans  .of  the  radical  dye.  Let  the  Border  States  ignominiously  sub 
mit  to  the  Abolition  rule  of  this  Lincoln  Administration,  if  they  like  ;  but 
dorft  let  the  miserable  submissionists  pretend  to  ~be  deceived.  Make  any 
base  or  cowardly  excuse  but  this." 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  just  apprehensions  of  the  Confederate 
Government  at  Montgomery,  it  exhibited  no  violent  or  tumultuous  spirit, 
and  made  the  most  sedulous  efforts  to  resist  the  consequence  of  war. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  sincerity  and  zeal  of  its  efforts  to  effect  a 
peaceable  secession,  and  to  avoid  a  war  which  it  officially  deplored  as  "  a 
policy  detrimental  to  the  civilized  world." 

As  early  as  February,  prior  even  to  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Lincoln, 
the  Confederate  Congress  had  passed  a  resolution  expressive  of  their 
desire  for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  be  sent  to  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  "  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  friendly  relations 
between  that  government  and  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  and  for 
the  settlement  of  all  questions  of  disagreement  between  the  two  govern 
ments  upon  principles  of  right,  justice,  equity,  and  good  faith." 

In  pursuance  of  this  resolution,  and  in  furtherance  of  his  own  views, 
Mr.  Davis  deputed  an  embassy  of  commissioners  to  Washington,  author 
ized  to  negotiate  for  the  removal  of  the  Federal  garrisons  from  Forts 
Pickens  and  Sumter,  and  to  provide  for  the  settlement  of  all  claims  of 
public  property  arising  out  of  the  separation  of  the  States  from  the  Union. 
Two  of  the  commissioners,  Martin  Crawford  of  Georgia,  and  John  For- 
sythe  of  Alabama,  attended  in  Washington,  arriving  there  on  the  5th  of 
March.  They  gave  only  an  informal  notice  of  their  arrival,  with  a  view  to 
afford  time  to  the  President,  who  had  just  been  inaugurated,  for  the  dis 
charge  of  other  pressing  official  duties  in  the  organization  of  his  adminis 
tration,  before  engaging  his  attention  in  the  object  of  their  mission.  On 
the  12th  of  March,  they  addressed  an  official  communication  to  Mr.  Seward, 
Secretary  of  State,  explaining  the  functions  of  the  embassy  and  its 
purposes. 

Mr.  Seward  declined  to  make  any  official  recognition  of  the  commis 
sioners,  but  very  readily  consented,  for  purposes  which  the  sequel  demon 
strated,  to  hold  verbal  conferences  with  them,  through  the  friendly  inter- 


106 


THE   LOST   CAUSE. 


mediation  of  Judge  Campbell  of  Alabama.  Through  this  gentleman,  the 
commissioners,  who  had  consented  to  waive  all  questions  of  form,  received 
constant  assurances  from  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  peaceful 
intentions,  of  the  determination  to  evacuate  Fort  Sumter  ;  and  further  that 
no  measures,  changing  the  existing  status,  prejudicially  to  the  Confederate 
States,  especially  at  Fort  Pickens,  were  in  contemplation  ;  but  that,  in  the 
event  of  any  change  of  intention  on  the  subject,  notice  would  be  given  to 
the  commissioners. 

It  was  confidentially  explained  to  the  commissioners  that  to  treat  with 
them  at  that  particular  juncture  might  seriously  embarrass  the  administra 
tion  of  Mr.  Lincoln  with  popular  opinion  in  the  North  ;  and  they  were 
recommended  to  patience  and  urged  to  confidence  by  assurances  which 
keener  diplomatists  than  these  ill-chosen  representatives  of  the  Confed 
eracy  might  have  had  reason  to  doubt. 

But,  at  last,  at  the  opportune  time,  this  game  with  the  commissioners 
was  to  be  terminated.  Dull  and  credulous  as  they  were,  their  attention 
was,  at  last,  attracted  to  the  extraordinary  preparations  for  an  extensive 
military  and  naval  expedition  in  New  York,  and  other  Northern  ports. 
These  preparations,  commenced  in  secresy,  for  an  expedition  whose  desti 
nation  was  concealed,  only  became  known  when  nearly  completed,  and 
on  the  5th,  6th,  and  7th  April  transports  and  vessels  of  war,  with  troops, 
munitions,  and  military  supplies,  sailed  from  Northern  ports  bound  south 
wards.  Alarmed  by  so  extraordinary  a  demonstration,  the  commissioners 
requested  the  delivery  of  an  answer  to  their  official  communication  of  the 
1 2th  March,  and  thereupon  received,  on  the  8th  April,  a  reply  dated  on 
the  15th  of  the  previous  month,  from  which  it  appeared  that  during  the 
whole  interval,  whilst  the  commissioners  were  receiving  assurances  calcu 
lated  to  inspire  hope  of  the  success  of  their  mission,  the  Secretary  of  State 
and  the  President  of  the  United  States  had  already  determined  to  hold  no 
intercourse  with  them  whatever  ;  to  refuse  even  to  listen  to  any  proposals 
they  had  to  make,  and  had  profited  by  the  delay  created  by  their  own 
assurances,  in  order  to  prepare  secretly  the  means  for  effective  hostile 
operations. 

Of  this  remarkable  deception,  and  the  disreputable  method  by  which 
it  had  been  obtained,  President  Davis  justly  and  severely  remarked,  in  a 
message  to  the  Confederate  Congress  :  "  The  crooked  paths  of  diplomacy 
can  scarcely  furnish  an  example  so  wanting  in  courtesy,  in  candour,  and 
directness,  as  was  the  course  of  the  United  States  Government  towards  our 
commissioners  in  Washington." 

While  the  Confederate  commissioners  were  thus  being  hoodwinked  and 
betrayed,  the  reinforcement  of  Surnter  was  the  subject  of  constant  Cabinet 
consultation  at  Washington,  held  in  profound  secresy  from  the  public,  and 
surrounded  by  an  air  of  mystery  that  gave  occasion  for  the  most  various 


DECEPTION   AT   WASHINGTON.  107 

rumours.  Gen.  Scott  had  advised  the  President  that,  in  his  military 
judgment,  it  had  become-  impracticable  to  reinforce  Fort  Suinter,  on 
account  of  the  number  of  batteries  erected  by  the  Confederates  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbour ;  that  an  entrance  from  the  sea  was  impossible. 
But  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  especially  one  member  of  his  Cabinet,  Mr.  Blair, 
were  firm  in  their  refusal  to  evacuate  the  fort.  It  now  became  the  concern 
of  the  government  to  avoid  the  difficulty  of  military  reinforcements  by 
some  artifice  that  would  equally  well  answer  its  purposes.  That  artifice 
was  the  subject  of  secret  and  sedulous  consultation,  that  extended  through 
several  weeks. 

About  the  last  of  March,  Capt.  Fox,  of  the  Federal  Navy,  was  sent  to 
Charleston  by  the  government,  and  stated  that  his  object  was  entirely 
pacific.  He  was,  by  a  strange  credulity,  allowed  to  visit  the  fort  and  to 
communicate  with  Major  Anderson.  His  real  object  was  to  carry  con 
cealed  despatches  to  Major  Anderson,  and  to  collect  information  with 
reference  to  a  plan  for  the  reinforcement  of  the  garrison.  On  his  return 
to  Washington  he  was  called  frequently  before  President  Lincoln  and  his 
Cabinet  to  explain  his  plan  for  reinforcing  the  fort,  and  to  answer  the 
objections  presented  by  Gen.  Scott  and  the  military  authorities.  The 
project  involved  passing  batteries  with  steamers  or  boats  at  night  at  right 
angles  to  the  Confederate  line  of  fire,  and  thirteen  hundred  yards  distant 
— a  feat  which  Capt.  Fox  argued  was  entirely  practicable,  and  that  many 
safe  examples  of  it  had  been  furnished  by  the  Crimean  War. 

In  this  conflict  of  counsels  the  Washington  administration  hesitated. 
Mr.  Lincoln,  at  one  time,  although  with  bitter  reluctance,  agreed  that  the 
fort  should  be  evacuated,  if  the  responsibility  of  the  act  could  be  thrown 
on  the  preceding  administration  of  Mr.  Buchanan.  A  leading  article  for 
a  "New  York  paper  had  been  prepared,  the  proof-sheet  of  which  was  sub 
mitted  to  Mr.  Lincoln  and  approved.  In  this,  the  ground  was  taken  that 
the  evacuation  was  an  absolute  military  necessity,  brought  about  by 
treason  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  who,  it  was  insisted,  might  have 
reinforced  and  supplied  the  garrison,  but  not  only  failed  to  do  so,  but 
purposely  left  it  in  such  condition  as  to  force  his  successor  in  office  to 
encounter  the  ignominy  of  yielding  it  up  to  the  Southerners.  This  same 
article  lauded  Mr.  Lincoln's  pacific  policy,  saying  :  u  Had  war — not  peace 
— been  his  object, — had  he  desired  to  raise  throughout  the  mighty  North 
d  feeling  of  indignation  which  in  ninety  days  would  have  emancipated 
every  slave  on  the  continent,  and  driven  their  masters  into  the  sea — if  need 
be,  he  had  only  to  have  said — "  Let  the  garrison  of  Fort  Sumter  do  their 
duty,  and  perish  beneath  its  walls :  and  on  the  heads  of  the  traitours  and 
rebels  and  slavery  propagandists  be  the  consequences." 

And  yet  the  horrible  alternative  depicted  here  and  indicated  as  the 
means  of  rousing  the  North  to  a  war  of  extermination  upon  slavery  and 


108  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

slave-owners,  was  eventually  and  deliberately  adopted  by  Mr.  Lincoln. 
The  point  with  the  government  was  to  devise  some  artifice  for  the  relief 
of  Fort  Sumter,  short  of  open  military  reinforcements,  decided  to  be  im 
practicable,  and  which  would  have  the  effect  of  inaugurating  the  war  by 
a  safe  indirection  and  under  a  plausible  and  convenient  pretence.  The 
device  was  at  last  conceived.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  of  April,  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  sent  for  Capt.  Fox,  and  said  he  had  decided  to  let  the  expe 
dition  go,  but  he  would  send  a  messenger  from  himself  to  the  authorities 
at  Charleston,  declaring  that  the  purpose  of  the  expedition  was  only  to 
provision  the  fort,  peaceably  or  forcibly,  as  they  might  decide  for 
themselves. 

Meanwhile  the  dalliance  with  the  Confederate  commissioners — the 
part  of  the  artifice  allotted  to  Secretary  Seward — was  kept  up  to  the  last 
moment.  At  one  time  Mr.  Seward  had  declared  to  Judge  Campbell,  who 
was  acting  as  an  intermediary  between  the  Secretary  and  the  commis 
sioners,  that  before  a  letter,  the  draft  of  which  Judge  Campbell  held  in  his 
hand,  could  reach  President  Davis  at  Montgomery,  Fort  Sumter  would 
have  been  evacuated.  Five  days  passed,  and  instead  of  evacuating,  Major 
Anderson  was  busy  in  strengthening  Sumter !  A  telegram  from  Gen. 
Beauregard  informed  the  commissioners  of  this.  Again  Judge  Campbell 
saw  Mr.  Seward,  and  again,  in  the  presence  of  a  third  party,  received  from 
him  assurances  that  the  fort  was  to  be  evacuated,  and  was  authorized  by 
him  to  state  to  the  commissioners,  that  "  the  government  will  not  under 
take  to  supply  Fort  Sumter,  without  giving  notice  to  Governor  Pickens." 
This  was  on  the  1st  of  April.  On  the  7th,  Judge  Campbell  again  ad 
dressed  Mr.  Seward  a  letter,  alluding  to  the  anxiety  and  alarm  excited  by 
the  great  naval  and  military  preparations  of  the  government,  and  asking 
whether  the  peaceful  assurances  he  had  given  were  well  or  ill  founded. 
Mr.  Seward's  reply  was  laconic :  "  Faith  as  to  Sumter  fully  kept :  wait 
and  see !  "  On  the  very  day  that  Mr.  Seward  uttered  these  words,  the 
van  of  the  Federal  fleet,  with  a  heavy  force  of  soldiers,  had  sailed  for  the 
Southern  coast ! 


THE  REDUCTION  OF  FOET  SUMTER. 

On  the  3d  of  March  President  Davis  had  commissioned  P.  G.  T.  Beau- 
regard,  then  Colonel  of  Engineers  in  the  Confederate  service,  Brigadier- 
general,  with  official  directions  to  proceed  to  Charleston,  and  assume 
command  of  all  the  troops  in  actual  service  in  and  around  that  place.  On 
arriving  there  he  immediately  examined  the  fortifications,  and  undertook 
the  construction  of  additional  works  for  the  reduction  of  Fort  Surnter,  and 
the  defence  of  the  entrances  to  the  harbour. 


THE   FIRST   GUN.  109 

On  three  sides,  formidable  batteries  of  cannon  and  mortars  bore  upon 
the  Fort.  On  the  south,  at  a  distance  of  about  twelve  hundred  yards,  was 
Cumming's  Point  on  Morris'  Island,  where  three  batteries  had  been  com 
pleted,  mounting  six  guns  and  six  mortars.  Farthest  off  of  these,  was  the 
Trapier  battery,  built  very  strongly  with  heavy  beams  and  sand-bags,  and 
1  containing  three  eight-inch  mortars ;  next  the  "  iron  battery,"  covered 
over  with  railroad  bars,  and  having  thick  iron  plates  to  close  the  em 
brasures  after  the  guns  were  fired.  Nearest  to  Sumter  was  the  "  Point 
battery,"  a  very  large  and  strong  work,  containing  three  ten-inch  mortars, 
two  forty-two  pounders  and  a  rifled  cannon.  From  these  works,  a  long 
line  of  batteries  stretched  down  the  sea  side  of  Morris'  Island,  commanding 
the  ship  channel,  and  threatening  a  terrible  ordeal  to  the  Federal  vessels, 
should  they  attempt  to  enter.  Nearly  west  of  Sumter,  on  James'  Island, 
was  Fort  Johnson,  where  a  strong  battery  of  mortars  and  cannon  was 
erected.  On  the  northeast  was  Fort  Moultrie,  ready  with  Columbiads, 
Dahlgren  guns,  mortars,  and  furnaces  for  red-hot  shot.  In  the  cove  near 
the  western  end  of  Sullivan's  Island,  was  anchored  a  floating  battery, 
constructed  of  the  peculiarly  fibrous  palmetto  timber,  sheathed  with  plate 
iron,  and  mounting  four  guns  of  heavy  calibre. 

On  the  8th  day  of  April  a  message  was  conveyed  to  Gov.  Pickens  of 
South  Carolina,  by  Lieut.  Talbot,  an  authorized  agent  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment.  It  was  as  follows : 

"  I  am  directed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  to  notify  you  to  expect  an 
attempt  will  be  made  to  supply  Fort  Sumter  with  provisions  only,  and  that  if  such  at 
tempt  be  not  resisted,  no  effort  to  throw  in  men,  arms,  or  ammunition  will  be  made, 
without  further  notice,  or  in  case  of  an  attack  upon  the  fort." 

The  long  suspense  was  over ;  the  Federal  fleet  was  approaching  the 
coast.  The  message  was  telegraphed  by  Gen.  Beauregard  to  Montgomery, 
and  the  instructions  of  his  Government  asked.  Mr.  Walker,  the  Confed 
erate  Secretary  of  War,  replied,  that  if  there  was  no  doubt  as  to  the  au 
thorized  character  of  the  messenger,  Beauregard  should  at  once  demand 
the  evacuation  of  Sumter,  and  if  refused,  should  proceed  to  reduce  it. 
The  demand  was  made  at  two  o'clock  of  the  llth  April.  Major  Ander 
son  replied  :  "  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  com 
munication  demanding  the  evacuation  of  this  Fort,  and  to  say  in  reply 
thereto,  that  it  is  a  demand  with  which  I  regret  that  my  sense  of  honour 
and  of  my  obligation  to  my  Government  prevent  my  compliance." 
Nothing  was  left  but  to  accept  the  distinct  challenge  of  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  to  arms.  A  little  past  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  April 
12th,  Gen.  Beauregard  communicated  by  his  aides  with  Major  Anderson, 
notifying  him  that  u  he  would  open  the  fire  of  his  batteries  on  Fort 
Sumter  in  one  hour  from  that 


110  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

At  4.30  A.  M.,  the  signal  shell  was  fired  from  Fort  Johnson.  The  fire 
from  Fort  Johnson  was  quickly  followed  by  that  of  Moultrie,  Cumming's 
Point,  and  the  floating  battery.  The  incessant  flash  of  the  ordnance, 
made  a  circle  of  flame,  and  the  bursting  of  bombs  over  and  in  Fort 
Sumter  became  more  and  more  constant  as  the  proper  range  was  obtained 
by  the  artillerists. 

Fort  Sumter  did  not  reply  until  seven  o'clock.  About  that  hour,  it 
poured  a  well-directed  stream  of  balls  and  shell  against  Moultrie,  the  float 
ing  battery,  and  the  work  on  Cumming's  Point.  The  fire  continued 
throughout  the  day.  Towards  evening  it  became  evident  that  that  of 
the  Confederates  was  very  effective.  The  enemy  was  driven  from  his 
barbette  guns ;  several  of  them  were  disabled ;  the  parapet  walls  had 
crumbled  away  ;  deep  chasms  had  opened  below  ;  the  embrasures  of  the 
casemates  had  been  so  shattered  as  no  longer  to  present  a  regular  outline  ; 
the  chimneys  and  roofs  of  the  houses  were  in  ruins. 

While  this  bombardment  was  going  on,  a  portion  of  the  Federal  fleet 
had  reached  the  rendezvous  off  Charleston.  It  attempted  to  take  no  part 
in  the  fight.  The  only  explanation  of  this  extraordinary  conduct  of  the 
naval  expedition  is  found  in  a  curious  account  from  the  pen  of  Capt.  Fox 
himself.  He  writes  :  "  As  we  neared  the  land,  heavy  guns  wrere  heard, 
and-  the  smoke  and  shells  from  the  batteries  which  had  just  opened  fire  on 
Sumter  were  distinctly  visible.  I  immediately  stood  out  to  inform  Capt. 
Kowan,  of  the  Pawnee,  but  met  him  coming  in.  He  hailed  me  and  asked 
for  a  pilot,  declaring  his  intention  of  standing  into  the  harbour  and  sharing 
the  fate  of  his  brethren  of  the  army.  I  went  on  board,  and  informed  him 
that  I  would  answer  for  it,  that  the  Government  did  not  expect  any  such 
gallant  sacrifice,  having  settled  maturely  upon  the  policy  indicated  in  the 
instructions  to  Capt.  Mercer  and  myself." 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  13th,  all  of  the  Confederate  batteries  re 
opened  upon  Fort  Sumter,  which  responded  vigorously  for  a  time,  direct 
ing  its  fire  specially  against  Fort  Moultrie.  At  eight  o'clock  A.  M.,  smoke 
was  seen  issuing  from  the  quarters  of  Fort  Sumter ;  upon  this,  the  fire  of 
the  Confederate  batteries  was  increased,  as  a  matter  of  course,  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  the  enemy  to  terms  as  speedily  as  possible,  inasmuch 
as  his  flag  was  still  floating  defiantly  above  him.  Fort  Sumter  continued 
to  fire  from  time  to  time,  but  at  long  and  irregular  intervals,  amid  the 
dense  smoke,  flying  shot,  and  bursting  shells.  The  Confederate  troops, 
carried  away  by  their  naturally  generous  impulses,  mounted  the  different 
batteries,  and  at  every  discharge  from  the  fort,  cheered  the  garrison  for  its 
pluck  and  gallantry,  and  hooted  the  fleet  lying  inactive  just  outside 
the  bar. 

A  little  past  one  o'clock  a  shot  from  Moultrie  struck  the  flag-staff  of 
Sumter,  and  brought  down  the  ensign.  At  this  time  the  condition  of 


FALL   OF   FORT   SUMTEB.  Ill 

Sumter  and  its  garrison,  had  become  desperate  ;  the  interiour  was  a  heap 
of  ruins  ;  the  parapet  had  been  so  shattered  that  few  of  its  guns  remained 
mounted ;  tile  smoke  was  packed  in  the  casemates  so  as  to  render  it  im 
possible  for  the  men  to  work  the  guns ;  the  number  of  the  garrison  was 
too  small  to  relieve  each  other ;  incessant  watching  and  labour  had 
exhausted  their  strength.  The  conflagration,  from  the  large  volume  of 
smoke,  being  apparently  on  the  increase,  Gen.  Beauregard  sent  three  of  his 
aides  with  a  message  to  Major  Anderson,  to  the  effect  that  seeing  his  flag 
no  longer  flying,  his  quarters  in  flames,  and  supposing  him  to  be  in  dis 
tress,  he  desired  to  offer  him  any  assistance  he  might  stand  in  need  of. 
Before  his  aides  reached  the  fort,  the  Federal  flag  was  displayed  on  the 
parapets,  but  remained  there  only  a  short  time,  when  it  was  hauled  down, 
and  a  white  flag  substituted  in  its  place. 

The  fort  had  surrendered.  The  event  was  instantly  announced  in  every 
part  of  Charleston  by  the  ringing  of  bells,  the  pealing  of  cannon,  the 
shouts  of  couriers  dashing  through  the  streets,  and  by  every  indication  of 
general  rejoicing.  "  As  an  honourable  testimony  to  the  gallantry  and  forti 
tude  with  which  Major  Anderson  and  his  command  had  defended  their 
posts,"  Gen.  Beauregard  not  only  agreed  that  they  might  take  passage  at 
their  convenience  for  New  York,  but  allowed  him,  on  leaving  the  fort,  to 
salute  his  flag  with  fifty  guns.  In  firing  the  salute,  a  caisson  exploded, 
which  resulted  in  mortal  injuries  to  four  of  the  garrison.  This  was  the 
only  loss  of  life  in  the  whole  affair.  It  appeared  indeed  that  a  Divine 
control  had  made  this  combat  bloodless ;  and  that  so  wonderful  an 
exemption  might  have  invited  both  sections  of  America  to  thoughts  of 
gratitude  and  peace.* 

But  it  was  not  to  be  so.  The  fire  of  the  war  first  drawn  at  Sumter 
produced  an  instant  and  universal  excitement  in  the  North.  It  convinced 
the  people  of  that  section  that  there  was  no  longer  any  prospect  of  recov 
ering  the  Southern  States  by  the  cheap  policy  of  double  and  paltering 
speeches.  From  the  madness  of  their  conviction,  that  they  could  no 
longer  hope  to  accomplish  their  purposes  by  peaceful  deceits  and  amuse 
ments  of  compromise,  there  was  a  sudden  and  quick  current  of  public  senti 
ment  in  the  North  towards  the  policy  of  coercion,  with  the  most  instant 
exertions  to  effect  it. 

The  battle  of  Sumter  had  been  brought  on  by  the  Washington  Govern- 

*  The  North  has  been  famous  for  cheap  heroes  in  this  war.  Major  Anderson  was  one  of  the 
earliest.  When  he  arrived  in  the  North  from  Sumter,  he  was  greatly  lionized,  and  travelled  around 
the  country  feasting  and  speech-making.  He  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  and 
appointed  to  command  the  forces  then  gathering  in  Kentucky  for  the  Western  campaign.  But  he 
unexpectedly  resigned  ;  probably  because  he  was  unwilling  to  put  'in  jeopardy  his  easily  acquired 
reputation,  or  perhaps  because,  as  he  had  once  despatched  from  Sumter  to  Washington,  "  his  heart 
was  not  in  the  war." 


112  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

ment  by  a  trick  too  dishonest  and  shallow  to  account  for  the  immense  dis 
play  of  sentiment  in  the  North  that  ensued.  The  event  afforded  indeed 
to  many  politicians  in  the  North  a  most  flimsy  and  false  excuse  for  loosing 
passions  of  hate  against  the  South  that  had  all  along  been  festering  in  the 
concealment  of  their  hearts.  That  action  suddenly  convinced  them  that 
the  South  was  really  resolved  to  separate  ;  it  disconcerted  their  hopes  and 
plans  of  seducing  her  back  into  the  Union  by  false  and  temporizing 
speeches ;  it  utterly  disappointed  the  Northern  expectation  that  the 
South  was  not  really  in  earnest,  and  that  "  all  would  come  out  right  "  by 
a  little  hypocrisy  and  affectation  on  the  Northern  side ;  it  snapped  as  a 
rotten  net  their  vile  and  cheap  schemes  of  getting  the  South  back  into  the 
Union  by  art  and  deceit ;  and  men,  finding  no  longer  any  purpose  for  con 
cealment,  threw  aside  their  former  professions,  quickly  determined  to 
coerce  what  they  could  not  cozen.  This  was  the  whole  explanation  of  the 
Northern  "  reaction  "  at  the  occurrence  at  Sumter. 

There  now  ensued  in  the  North  a  sort  of  crusade  against  the  South, 
the  passion,  the  fury,  and  blasphemy  of  which  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
describe.  The  holiness  of  this  crusade  was  preached,  alike,  from  the  hust 
ings  and  the  pulpit.  Dr.  Tyng,  a  celebrated  minister  of  New  York, 
assembled  certain  "  roughs  "  and  marauders  of  that  city,  known  as  "  Billy 
Wilson's  men,"  presented  them  Bibles,  and  declared  that  in  carrying  fire 
and  sword  into  the  rebellious  States,  they  were  propitiating  Heaven,  and 
would  go  far  to  assure  the  salvation  of  their  souls.*  In  most  of  the 


*  As  an  evidence  of  the  contrast  of  spirit  between  the  Christian  churches,  North  and  South, 
with  reference  to  the  war,  we  may  place  in  juxtaposition  here  certain  remarkable  cotemporary  ex 
pressions  of  sentiment  emanating  from  two  of  the  most  conspicuous  Episcopal  divines  of  the  coun 
try — Bishop  Meade  of  Virginia,  and  Doctor  Tyng  of  New  York. 

The  report  of  the  first  venerable  Diocesan  to  the  Episcopal  Convention  of  Virginia,  on  the  eve 
of  the  war,  was  replete  with  Christian  sentiment  befitting  the  occasion.  He  wrote  :  "  /  have  clung 
•with  tenacity  to  the  hope  of  preserving  the  Union  to  the  last  moment.  If  I  know  my  own  heart,  could 
the  sacrifice  of  the  poor  remnant  of  my  life  have  contributed  hi  any  degree  to  its  maintenance,  such 
sacrifice  would  have  been  cheerfully  made.  But  the  developments  of  public  feeling  and  the  course 
of  our  rulers  have  brought  me,  slowly,  reluctantly,  sorrowfully,  yet  most  decidedly,  to  the  painful 
conviction  that  notwithstanding  attendant  dangers  and  evils,  we  shall  consult  the  welfare  and  happi 
ness  of  the  whole  land  by  separation.  And  who  can  desire  to  retain  a  Union  which  has  now  become 
so  hateful,  and  by  the  application  of  armed  force,  which,  if  successful,  would  make  it  tenfold  more 
hateful,  and  soon  lead  to  the  repetition  of  the  same  bloody  contests  ? 

"  In  connection  with  this  civil  and  geographical  separation  in  our  country,  and  almost  necessarily 
resulting  from  it,  subjects  of  some  change  of  the  ecclesiastical  relations  of  our  Diocese  must  come 
under  consideration.  There  is  a  general  and  strong  desire,  I  believe,  to  retain  as  much  as  possible 
of  our  past  and  present  happy  intercourse  with  those  from  whom  we  shall  be  in  other  matters  more 
divided.  A  meeting  is  already  proposed  for  this  purpose  in  one  of  the  seceded  States,  whose  plans, 
so  far  as  developed,  I  will  submit  to  the  consideration  of  this  body  at  its  present  session. 

"  I  cannot  conclude  without  expressing  the  earnest  desire  that  the  ministers  and  members  of  our 
Church,  and  all  the  citizens  of  our  State,  who  are  so  deeply  interested  in  the  present  contest,  may  con 
duct  it  in  the  most  elevated  and  Christian  spirit,  rising  above  unworthy  and  uncharitable  imputations 


FANATICISM  OF  THE  NORTH.  113 

Northern  cities  men  were  forced  to  wear  badges  of  "  loyalty,"  and  every 
house  required  to  hang  out  the  Federal  flag  as  a  signal  of  patriotism,  and 
an  evidence  of  their  support  of  the  war.  This  peculiarly  Yankee  exhibi 
tion  in  flags  pervaded  nearly  every  square  mile  of  country,  and  was  car 
ried  even  into  the  sanctuary.  Pulpits  were  dressed  with  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  ;  Sunday-school  children  wore  the  colours  of  the  Federal  ensign  ; 
the  streets  were  rubicund  with  the  bunting  ;  and  even  in  distant  parts  of 
the  country  flags  floated  from  gate-posts  and  tops  of  trees,  as  evidences  of 
"loyal"  sentiments  and  marks  for  protection  against  "  vigilance  "com 
mittees."  This  singular  exhibition  of  "  Union  "  sentiment  was  not  a  mere 
picturesque  affair ;  it  was  attended  with  fearful  riots  and  violence,  and  the 
man  who  refused  to  display  a  piece  of  bunting  was  treated  as  a  criminal 
and  outlaw,  pursued  by  mobs,  and  threatened  with  death. 

Into  this  crusade  against  the  South  all  parties  and  sects  and  races  were 
strangely  mingled.  Old  contentions  and  present  animosities  were  forgot 
ten  ;  Democrats  associated  with  recreants  and  fanatics  in  one  grand  league, 
for  one  grand  purpose ;  foreigners  from  Europe  were  induced  into  the 
belief  that  they  were  called  upon  to  fight  for  the  "  liberty  "  for  which  they 
had  crossed  the  ocean,  or  for  the  "  free  homesteads  "  which  were  to  be  the 
rewards  of  the  war ;  and  all  conceivable  and  reckless  artifices  were  re 
sorted  to  to  swell  the  tide  of  numbers  against  the  South. 

But  what  was  most  remarkable  in  this  display  of  popular  fury  was  its 


on  all  who  are  opposed.  Many  there  are  equally  sincere,  on  both  sides,  as  there  ever  have  been  in 
all  the  wars  and  controversies  that  have  been  waged  upon  earth  ;  though  it  does  not  follow  that  all 
have  the  same  grounds  of  justice  and  truth  on  which  to  base  their  warfare. 

"  Let  me,  in  conclusion,  commend  to  the  special  prayers  all  those  who  have  now  devoted  them 
selves  to  the  defence  of  our  State.  From  personal  knowledge  of  many  of  them,  and  from  the  infor 
mation  of  others,  there  is  already,  I  believe,  a  large  portion  of  religious  principle  and  genuine  piety 
to  be  found  among  them.  I  rejoice  to  learn  that  in  many  companies  not  only  are  the  services  of 
chaplains  and  other  ministers  earnestly  sought  for  and  after,  but  social  prayer -meetings  held  among 
themselves.  Our  own  Church  has  a  very  large  proportion  of  communicants  among  the  officers  of 
our  army,  and  not  a  few  among  the  soldiers.  Let  us  pray  that  grace  may  be  given  them  to  be  faith 
ful  soldiers  of  the  Cross,  as  well  as  valiant  and  successful  defenders  of  the  State." 

About  the  same  tune,  Dr.  Tyng  addressed  a  public  meeting  hi  New  York,  with  reference  to  the 
war.  He  said  he  would  not  descend  to  call  it  civil  warfare.  He  would  not  meet  pirates  upon  the 
deck,  and  call  it  warfare.  He  would  hang  them  as  quick  as  he  icould  shoot  a  mad  dog.  [Cheers.] 

There  was  one  road  to  peace,  and  that  was  absolute  and  entire  subjection.  [Cheers.]  He  did 
not  mean  the  subjection  of  the  South,  but  of  the  riotous  mob  which  there  had  control  of  affairs. 
The  sword  of  justice  was  the  only  pen  that  could  write  the  final  treaty.  Referring  to  the  troops  that 
had  been  raised,  the  speaker  asked  who  ever  saw  such  an  army  as  has  been  gathered  in  our  land  ? 
He  would  not  except  the  rare  birds  of  Billy  Wilson's  Regiment.  He  might  venture  to  say-  of  them 
that  their  salvation  might  be  in  the  very  consecration  they  have  made  of  themselves  to  their  country. 
[Cheers.]  Twenty-three  thousand  Bibles  had  been  given  to  the  troops  who  go  to  fight  for  their 
country ;  did  anybody  believe  there  were  five  hundred  copies  in  the  army  of  renegades  who  are 
meeting  them  in  the  contest  ?  It  would  scald  and  singe  their  polluted  hands.  We  had  every  cause 
to  be  proud  of  our  army.  They  are  worthy  of  the  Bible.  How  their  names  will  glisten  in  glory  I 
8 


114  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

sudden  and  complete  absorption  of  the  entire  Democratic  party  in  the 
North,  which  had  so  long  professed  regard  for  the  rights  of  the  Southern 
States,  and  even  sympathy  with  the  first  movements  of  their  secession. 
This  party  now  actually  rivalled  the  Abolitionists  in  their  expressions  of 
fury  and  revenge.  They  not  only  followed  the  tide  of  public  opinion,  but 
sought  to  ride  on  its  crest.  Daniel  S.  Dickinson  of  New  York,  who  had 
enjoyed  the  reputation  of  a  "  Northern  man  with  Southern  principles," 
became  the  fiercest  advocate  of  the  war,  and  consigned  his  former  friends 
in  the  South  to  fire  and  sword.  Edward  Everett  of  Massachusetts,  who, 
a  few  months  ago,  had  declared  that  the  Southern  States  should  be  per 
mitted  to  go  out  of  the  Union  in  peace,  became  an  apostle  of  the  war,  and 
exhausted  his  famous  rhetoric  in  preaching  the  new  gospel  of  blood.* 
These  men  were  types  of  their  party.  In  the  early  stages  of  Secession,  it 
had  been  said  that  such  was  the  sympathy  of  New  York  with  the  move 
ment,  that  the  Southern  States  would  be  able  to  recruit  several  regiments 
for  their  military  service.  Now  in  that  city  a  newspaper  office  was 
threatened  with  a  mob,  because  it  had  dared  to  criticise  the  defence  of 
Sumter ;  and  Democratic  orators — among  them  a  man  named  John 
Cochrane,  who  had  made  his  reputation  and  modelled  his  manners  by 
playing  toady  to  Southern  members  in  Congress — harangued  the  multi- 

*  In  a  letter  published  in  the  newspapers  of  the  day,  Mr.  Everett  wrote  : 

"  It  was  my  opinion  that,  if  they  [the  Cotton  States]  would  abstain  from  further  aggression,  and 
were  determined  to  separate,  we  had  better  part  in  peace.  But  the  wanton  attack  on  Fort  Sumter 
(which  took  place  not  from  any  military  necessity,  for  what  harm  was  a  single  company  cooped  up 
in  Charleston  harbour,  able  to  do  to  South  Carolina  ?  but  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  '  stirring  the 
blood  of  the  South,  and  thus  bringing  in  the  Border  States),  and  the  subsequent  proceedings  at 
Montgomery  have  wholly  changed  the  state  of  affairs.  The  South  has  levied  an  unprovoked  war 
against  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  the  mildest  and  most  beneficent  hi  the  world,  and  has 
made  it  the  duty  of  every  good  citizen  to  rally  to  its  support." 

The  excuse  of  the  Sumter  attack  served  other  Democrats,  beside  Mr.  Everett,  as  a  convenient 
handle  for  hypocrisy  and  falseness.  To  be  used  as  such,  of  course,  it  had  to  be  put  in  a  convenient 
shape  of  words.  Mr.  Everett  speaks  of  it  as  "  a  wanton  attack."  How  wanton  on  the  part  of  the 
South — how  even  evitable  on  her  part,  when  the  Administration  made  the  direct  challenge,  which 
the  South  had  forewarned  the  Government  at  Washington  that  it  would  be  constrained  to  accept  ? 
This  was  a  simple  question ;  but  it  presented  the  whole  issue  of  the  Sumter  complication,  and 
severely  indicates  where  the  responsibility  for  the  collision  lies. 

There  is  a  wretched  argument  in  Mr.  Everett's  statement  above,  which,  wretched  as  it  is,  may 
be  reversed  against  himself.  He  says  that  there  was  no  "  military  necessity "  for  the  possession  of 
the  fort  by  South  Carolina,  as  it  was  able  to  do  her  no  harm.  Then,  in  what  respect  greater  was 
the  military  necessity  for  the  Government  to  retain  it,  if  it  was  so  powerless  to  control  or  to  affect 
the  seceded  State  ? 

It  was  no  question  of  military  necessity.  The  Government  at  Washington  wanted  the  fort  as  an 
appanage  of  its  sovereignty.  So  did  South  Carolina.  And  its  possession  by  the  latter  was  but  the 
incident  of  the  separation,  which  Mr.  Everett  says  he  had  recommended !  It  was  but  the  logical 
and  legitimate  conclusion  of  his  own  policy  !  Why  should  he  complain  that  South  Carolina  should 
be  in  possession — and  even  bloodless  possession — of  the  fort,  which  very  fact  was  but  the  essential 
and  inevitable  carrying  out  of  his  own  early  recommendation  of  her  separate  sovereignty  ! 


DEFECTION   OF    THE   DEMOCRACY.  115 

tude,  advising  them  to  "  crush  the  rebellion,"  and,  if  need  be,  to  drown 
the  whole  South  in  one  indiscriminate  sea  of  blood. 

This  giving  way  of  the  Democratic  party  to  the  worst  fanaticism  of  the 
North,  proved  beyond  doubt  that  it  was  wholly  unreliable,  entirely  un 
trustworthy  as  the  friend  of  the  South,  and,  as  Senator  Brown  of  Missis 
sippi  had  designated  it  in  the  last  Congress,  hopelessly  "  rotten"  But  it 
proved  something  more  than  this.  It  proved  that  remarkable  want  of 
virtue  in  American  politics,  common  in  a  certain  degree,  to  all  parts  of  the 
country.  It  was  another  illustration  of  the  fact  which  runs  through  the 
whole  of  the  political  history  of  America,  that  in  every  election  where  one 
party  greatly  preponderates,  or  in  every  decisive  exhibition  of  a  majority, 
the  minority  is  absorbed  and  disappears  ;  principle  is  exchanged  for  expe 
diency  ;  public  opinion  becomes  the  slave  of  the  larger  party  ;  and  public 
men  desert  the  standards  of  conviction  to  follow  the  dispensations  of 
patronage,  and  serve  the  changes  of  the  times. 

President  Lincoln  did  not  hesitate  to  take  immediate  advantage  of  the 
"  reaction  "  in  the  North.  Two  clays  after  the  boodless  battle  of  Sumter, 
he  issued  his  proclamation  to  raise  seventy-five  thousand  troops,  usurping 
the  power  and  discretion  of  Congress  to  declare  war  by  a  shallow,  verbal 
pretence  of  calling  them  out  under  the  act  of  1705,  which  only  contem 
plated  the  raising  of  armed  posses  "  in  aid  of  the  civil  authorities."  * 

Even  in  this  conjuncture,  the  President  still  hesitated  to  unmask  his 
real  intentions  of  a  war  of  subjugation,  still  embracing  the  hope  of  keeping 
the  Border  States  "  loyal  "  to  his  Government.  On  the  very  day  of  the 


*  The  following  is  a  full  copy  of  this  important  paper  : 

"  Whereas,  the  laws  of  the  United  States  have  been  for  some  tune  past,  and  now  are,  opposed, 
and  the  execution  thereof  obstructed,  in  the  States  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida, 
Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and  Texas,  by  combinations  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by  the  ordinary 
course  of  judicial  proceedings,  or  by  the  powers  vested  in  the  marshals  by  law :  now,  therefore, 
I,  Abraham  Lincoln,  President  of  the  United  States,  in  virtue  of  the  power  in  me  vested  by  the  Con 
stitution  and  the  laws,  have  thought  fit  to  call  forth  the  Militia  of  the  several  States  of  the  Union  to 
the  aggregate  number  of  75,000,  in  order  to  suppress  said  combinations,  and  to  cause  the  laws  to  be 
duly  executed. 

"  The  details  for  this  object  will  be  immediately  communicated  to  the  State  authorities  through 
the  War  Department.  I  appeal  to  all  loyal  citizens  to  favor,  facilitate,  and  aid,  this  effort  to  main 
tain  the  honour,  the  integrity,  and  existence,  of  our  national  Union,  and  the  perpetuity  of  popular 
government,  and  to  redress  wrongs  already  long  enough  endured.  I  deem  it  proper  to  say  that  the 
first  service  assigned  to  the  forces  hereby  called  forth  will  probably  be  to  repossess  the  forts,  places, 
and  property  which  have  been  seized  from  the  Union  ;  and  in  every  event  the  utmost  care  will  be 
observed,  consistently  with  the  objects  aforesaid,  to  avoid  any  devastation,  any  destruction  of,  or 
interference  with  property,  or  any  disturbance  of  peaceful  citizens  of  any  part  of  the  country  ;  and 
I  hereby  command  the  persons  composing  the  combinations  aforesaid,  to  disperse  and  retire  peace 
ably  to  their  respective  abodes,  within  twenty  days  from  this  date. 

"  Deeming  that  the  present  condition  of  public  affairs  presents  an  extraordinary  occasion,  I  do 
hereby,  in  virtue  of  the  power  in  me  vested  by  the  Constitution,  convene  both  houses  of  Congress. 
The  Senators  and  Representatives  are,  therefore,  summoned  to  assemble  at  their  respective  chambers 


116  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

attack  on  Sumter,  lie  made  the  most  pacific  protests  to  tlie  Virginia 
Commissioners,  who  were  then  visiting  him  ; — the  President  then  threat 
ening  no  other  retaliation  for  the  capture  of  Sumter  than  the  withdrawal 
of  the  mails  from  the  seceded  States.  But  Virginia  was  not  to  be  easily 
deluded.  Two  days  after  the  interview  of  her  Commissioners  with 
President  Lincoln,  her  people  were  reading  his  call  for  a  land  force  of 
seventy-five  thousand  men ;  and  almost  instantly  thereafter,  the  proud 
and  thrilling  news  was  flashed  over  the  South  that  Virginia  had  redeemed 
the  pledges  she  had  given  against  coercion,  and  was  no  longer  a  member 
of  the  Federal  Union,  but  in  a  new,  heart-to-heart,  defiant  union  with  the 
Confederate  States  of  the  South. 

The  ordinance  of  secession  on  the  part  of  Virginia  was  met  by  signs  of 
discontent  in  some  thirty  or  forty  counties  in  the  western  part  of  the 
State.  But  despite  this  distraction,  her  example  was  not  without  its  influ 
ence  and  fruit.  North  Carolina,  Tennessee,  and  Arkansas  followed  the 
leadership  of  Virginia,  in  what  may  be  called  the  second  secessionary  move 
ment  of  the  States — which,  made  as  it  was,  in  the  immediate  presence  of 
war,  and  led  by  Virginia  in  the  face  of  the  most  imposing,  actual,  and 
imminent  dangers  to  herself,  showed  a  courage  and  devotion  of  a  degree 
not  permitted  to  be  exhibited  by  the  first  movement  of  the  Cotton  States. 
History  will  not  allow  the  real  leadership  of  Virginia  in  the  glory  of  the 
movement  for  freedom  to  be  disputed  by  South  Carolina.  Where  all  are 
confessed  brave,  and  where  opportunities  only  have  differed  for  exhibi 
tions  of  devotion,  it  is  only  in  the  historical  spirit,  and  not  in  that  of 
invidiousness,  that  the  fact  is  claimed  for  Virginia  of  a  supreme  manifes 
tation  of  devoted  courage  and  leadership. 

The  people  of  Virginia  had  not  long  to  wait  to  see  verified  the  inter 
pretation  that  that  State  had  given  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  policy,  as  one  of 
coercion  and  subjugation  of  the  South,  and  of  unauthorized  war  upon  its 
citizens.  He  increased  his  levies  by  repeated  proclamations,  until  more 
than  two  hundred  thousand  men  in  the  North  were  put  under  arms.  He 
exchanged  his  former  pretext  for  calling  out  troops  to  repossess  the  South 
ern  forts.  He  induced  his  new  forces  to  believe  that  they  were  only 
intended  for  the  defence  of  his  capital.  He  did  not  hesitate,  however,  to 
occupy  Maryland  with  troops,  to  increase  the  garrison  and  subsidiary 

at  twelve  o'clock,  noon,  on  Thursday,  the  fourth  day  of  July  next,  then  and  there  to  consider  and 
determine  such  measures  as,  in  their  wisdom,  the  public  safety  and  interest  may  seem  to  demand. 

"  In  witness  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to 
be  affixed. 
"  Done  at  the  City  of  Washington,  this  fifteenth  day  of  April,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord,  one 

thousand  eight  hundred  and  sixty-one,  and   of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the 

eighty-fifth. 

"  By  the  President,  "  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

"  WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD,  Secretary  of  State." 


PBEPAEATTON    FOR    WAK.  117 

forces  at  Fortress  Monroe  to  more  than  twelve  thousand  men,  and  to 
establish  systems  of  despotism  in  Maryland  and  Missouri,  by  the  disarm 
ing  of  citizens,  military  arrests,  the  suspension  of  the  hcibeas  corpus,  and 
the  striking  down  of  the  liberties  of  the  people  by  a  licentious  soldiery. 

Before  the  fall  of  Sumter,  the  Confederate  Government  at  Montgomery 
had  perfected  its  organization,  and  was  quietly  awaiting  events.  There 
could  be  no  doubt  of  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  its  mission.  It  had 
called  for  a  slight  loan — only  five  millions  of  dollars ;  but  the  proposals 
amounted  to  eight  millions,  and  not  one  of  them  was  below  par.  It  had 
appointed  three  commissioners  to  England,  France,  Russia,  and  Belgium, 
instructed  to  ask  the  recognition  of  the  Confederate  States  as  a  member 
of  the  family  of  nations. 

The  guns  of  Sumter  gave  a  new  animation  to  the  Government  and 
produced  an  excitement  in  the  South  that  in  volume  and  effect  well 
responded  to  the  fury  of  the  North.  President  Davis,  at  once,  Congress 
being  out  of  session,  called  upon  the  States  for  volunteers  for  the  public 
defence.  He  also  published  a  proclamation  inviting  applications  for  priva 
teering  service,  in  which  private  armed  vessels  might  aid  the  public  de 
fence  on  the  high  seas  under  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  granted  by 
Congress.  The  popular  reply  to  these  measures  was  enthusiastic.  In 
every  portion  of  the  country,  there  was  exhibited  the  most  patriotic  devo 
tion  to  the  common  cause.  Transportation  companies  freely  tendered  the 
use  of  their  lines  for  troops  and  supplies.  The  presidents  of  the  railroads 
of  the  Confederacy  assembled  in  convention,  and  not  only  reduced  largely 
the  rates  heretofore  demanded  for  mail  service,  and  conveyance  of  troops 
and  munitions,  but  voluntarily  proffered  to  receive  their  compensation  at 
these  reduced  rates  in  the  bonds  of  the  Confederacy,  for  the  purpose  of 
leaving  all  the  resources  of  the  Government  at  its  disposal  for  the  common 
defence.  Requisitions  for  troops  were  met  with  such  alacrity  that  the 
numbers  tendering  their  services,  in  every  instance,  greatly  exceeded  the 
demand.  On  the  29th  of  April,  President  Davis  wrote  to  the  Confederate 
Congress  then  convoked  by  him  :  "  There  are  now  in  the  field  at  Charles 
ton,  Pensacola,  Forts  Morgan,  Jackson,  St.  Philip  and  Pulaski,  nineteen 
thousand  men,  and  sixteen  thousand  are  now  en  route  for  Yirginia. — It  is 
proposed  to  organize  and  hold  in  readiness  for  instant  action,  in  view  of 
the  present  exigencies  of  the  country,  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand 
men." 

On  the  20th  day  of  May  the  seat  of  the  Confederate  Government  was 
removed  from  Montgomery,  Alabama,  to  Richmond,  Virginia.  It  was 
clear  enough  that  this  latter  State  was  to  be  the  grand  theatre  of  the  war 
on  land. 

The  first  concern  of  Virginia  after  secession  was  not  to  raise  troops : 
these  were  abundant ;  but  to  select  a  commander  whose  skill  and  name 


118  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

might  obtain  universal  confidence  in  the  commonwealth,  and  befit  the 
heroic  and  momentous  occasion.  Lieut.-Col.  Robert  E.  Lee,  a  son  of  the 
famous  Harry  Lee,  of  the  Revolution,  and  descended  from  a  family  con 
spicuous  for  two  hundred  years  in  Virginia,  had  resigned  his  commission 
in  the  United  States  Army,  immediately  On  learning  of  the  secession  of 
his  State.  He  had  done  so,  protesting  an  attachment  to  the  Union,  but 
putting  above  that  a  sense  of  duty,  that  would  never  allow  him  to  take 
part  against  his -State,  and -"raise  his  hand  against  his  relatives,  his  chil 
dren,  his  home."  This  sentiment  of  duty  was  expressed  in  very  noble 
terms  in  the  letter  which  tendered  his  resignation.  The  man  who,  some 
years  ago,  had  written  in  a  private  letter  to  his  son  at  college,  "  Duty  is 
the  sublimest  word  in  our  language,"  was  now  in  his  own  life  to  attest  the 
sentiment,  and  give  its  example ;  and  when  we  find  him  in  his  farewell 
letter  to  Gen.  Scott,  referring  to  "  the  struggle  it  had  cost  him  "  to  sep 
arate  himself  from  the  Federal  service,  we  are  prepared  for  the  touching 
and  noble  declaration  of  his  wife  :  "  My  husband  has  wept  tears  of  blood 
over  this  terrible  war ;  but  he  must,  as  a  man  of  honour  and  a  Virginian, 
share  the  destiny  of  his  State,  which  has  solemnly  pronounced  for  inde 
pendence." 

Governor  Letcher  was  not  slow  in  nominating  Lee  Major-General  in 
command  of  all  the  military  forces  in  Virginia.  The  nomination  was 
unanimously  confirmed  by  the  Convention.  Gen.  Lee  was  conducted  to  the 
State  House ;  there  was  an  imposing  ceremony  of  reception ;  the  trust 
reposed  in  him  was  announced  in  a  glowing  speech  from  the  Chair.  In 
the  excitement  and  elation  of  the  occasion,  his  reply  was  singularly  solemn 
and  beautiful.  He  said  : 

"  Mr.  President  and  gentlemen  of  the  Convention  :  Profoundly  im 
pressed  with  the  solemnity  of  the  occasion,  for  which  I  must  say  I  was  not 
prepared,  I  accept'  the  position  assigned  me  by  your  partiality.  I  would 
have  much  preferred,  had  your  choice  fallen  upon  an  abler  man.  Trusting 
in  Almighty  God,  an  approving  conscience,  and  the  aid  of  my  fellow- 
citizens,  I  devote  myself  to  the  service  of  my  native  State,  in  whose  behalf 
alone,  will  I  ever  again  draw  my  sword." 

But  a  few  days  after  the  secession  of  Virginia,  she  was  a  great  camp. 
It  was  popularly  estimated  that  in  the  early  summer  there  were  within 
r  her  borders  forty-eight  thousand  men  under  arms.  The  valleys  and  hills 
swarmed  with  soldiers  ;  the  rush  to  arms  could  scarcely  be  contained  ;  the 
alternative  was  not  who  should  go  to  the  war,  but  who  should  stay  at 
home.  Two  merchants  had  fought  in  Richmond,  because  one  had  re 
proached  the  other  for  being  in  his  store,  when  nearly  everybody  in  the 
city  was  following  the  drum,  and  companies  were  actually  begging  to  be 
accepted  into  service.  It  is  no  wonder  that  Gen.  Lee  made  a  very  unpopu 
lar  and  just  remark  :  that  the  volunteer  spirit  of  the  country  should  be  in 


GENERAL   LEE   COMMAND EB-IN-CHIEF.  119 

a  measure  checked  and  moderated,  and  that  he  threw  cold  water  on  a 
rabble  who  hurrahed  him  at  a  railroad  station,  by  telling  them  they  had 
better  go  home. 

Gen.  Lee's  first  task  was  to  organize  and  equip  the  military  forces  that 
were  from  every  direction  flowing  in  upon  his  charge.  The  military  coun 
cil  at  the  State  House,  Richmond,  consisting  of  Governor  Letcher,  Lieut.- 
Gov.  Montague,  Lieut.  M.  F.  Maury,  of  the  Navy,  Gen.  Lee  and  others, 
was  in  almost  constant  session.  The  raw  material  promptly  brought  for 
ward  was  to  be  effected  for  speedy  service.  The  quartermaster  and  com 
missary  departments  were  to  be  organized,  to  enable  the  immediate  con 
centration  of  troops  upon  the  borders  of  the  State,  wherever  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  might  demand  the  presence  of  troops.  In  fact,  Gen. 
Lee  had  now  all  the  duties  of  a  minister  of  war  to  discharge,  in  addition  to 
those  more  immediate  of  general-in-chief.  And  yet  all  these  duties  were 
executed  with  a  rapidity  and  effect,  and  an  easy  precision  of  manner  that 
may  be  said,  at  the  outset  of  the  war  to  have  secured  Lee's  reputation  as 
an  unrivalled  organizer  of  military  forces,  and  thus  early  to  have  indicated 
one  conspicuous  branch  of  his  great  mind. 

On  the  6th  of  May,  Yirginia  was  admitted  into  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy  ;  and  her  forces  then  forming  part  of  the  entire  Confederate  Army, 
Lee's  rank  was  reduced  to  that  of  Brigadier-General.  In  that  position  he 
was  to  remain  for  some  time  in  comparative  obscurity,  while  the  more 
conspicuous  names  of  Beauregard  and  others  were  to  ride  the  wave  of 
popular  favour. 


CHAPTEK   VII. 

IN  WHAT  SENSE  VIEGINIA  SECEDED  FEOM  THE  UNION. — A  NEW  INTEEPEETATION  OF  THE 
WAE  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES. — INFLUENCE  OF  YIEGINIA  ON  THE  OTHEE  BOEDEE 
STATES. — EEPLIES  OF  THESE  STATES  TO  LINCOLN'S  EEQUISITION  FOE  TEOOPS. — SECES 
SION  OF  TENNESSEE,  AEKANSAS,  AND  NOETH  CAEOLINA. — SEIZUEE  OF  FEDEEAL  FOETS 

IN  NOETH  CAEOLINA. — MOVEMENTS  IN  VIEGINIA  TO  SECUEE  THE  GOSPOET  NAVY  TAED 
'AND  HAEPEE'S  FEEET. — THEIE  SUCCESS. — BUENING  OF  FEDEEAL  SHIPS. — ATTITUDE  OF 
MAETLAND. — THE  BALTIMOEE  EIOT. — CHASE  OF  MASSACHUSETTS  SOLDIEES. — EXCITE 
MENT  IN  BALTIMOEE. — TIMID  ACTION  OF  THE  MAETLAND  LEGISLATUEE. — MILITAEY 
DESPOTISM  IN  MAEYLAND. — AEEESTS  IN  BALTIMOEE. — A  EEIGN  OF  TEEEOUE. — LIGHT 
ESTIMATION  OF  THE  WAB  IN  THE  NOETH. — WHY  THE  FEDEEAL  GOVEENMENT  SOUGHT 
TO  BELITTLE  THE.  CONTEST. — LINCOLN'S  VIEW  OF  THE  WAE  AS  A  EIOT. — SEWAED's 

LETTEE  TO  THE  EUEOPEAN  GOVEENMENTS. — EAELY  ACTION  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FEANCE 
WITH  EESPECT  TO  THE  WAE. — ME.  GEEGOEY's  LETTEE  TO  THE  LONDON  TIMES. — NOETH- 
EEN  CONCEIT  ABOUT  THE  WAE. — PEOPHECIES  OF  NOETHEEN  JOUENALS. — A  "  THEEE 

MONTHS'  WAE." — ELLSWOETH  AND  BILLY  WILSON. — MAETIAL  EAGE  IN  THE  NOETH. — 

IMPEEFECT  APPEEOIATtON  OF  THE  CEISIS  IN  THE  SOUTH. — EAELY  IDEAS  OF  THE  WAE 
AT  MONTGOMEEY. — SECEET  HISTOEY  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATE  CONSTITUTION. — SOUTHEEN 
OPINION  OF  YANKEE  SOLDIEES. — WHAT  WAS  THOUGHT  OF  "KING  COTTON." — ABSUED 
THEOEIES  ABOUT  EUEOPEAN  EECOGNITION. — LOST  OPPOETUNITIES  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATE 
GOVEENMENT. — BLINDNESS  AND  LITTLENESS  OF  MIND  NOETH  AND  SOUTH. — EEFLECTION 
ON  PUBLIC  MEN  IN  AMEEICA. — COMPAEISON  OF  THE  EESOUECES  OF  THE  NOETHEEN  AND 
SOUTHEEN  STATES. — THE  CENSUS  OF  I860.— MATEEIAL  ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  NOETH  IN 
THE  WAE. — THE  QUESTION  OF  SUBSISTENCE. — POVEETY  OF  THE  SOUTH  IN  THE  MATE- 
EIEL  AND  MEANS  OF  WAE. — HOW  THE  CONFEDEEACY  WAS  SUPPLIED  WITH  SMALL 
AEMS. — PECULIAE  ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  SOUTH  IN  THE  WAE. — THE  MILITAEY  VALUE 
OF  SPACE. — LESSONS  OF  HISTOEY. — THE  SUCCESS  OF  THE  SOUTHEEN  CONFEDEEACY,  A 
QUESTION  ONLY  OF  EESOLUTION  AND  ENDUEANCE. — ONLY  TWO  POSSIBLE  CAUSES  OF 
FAILUEE. 

IT  is  to  be  remarked  that  Virginia  did  not  secede  in  either  the  circum 
stances  or  sense  in  which  the  Cotton  States  had  separated  themselves  from 
the  Union.  She  had  no  delusive  prospects  of  peace  to  comfort  or  sustain 
her  in  the  decisive  step  she  took.  She  did  not  secede  in  the  sense  in  which 
separation  from  the  Union  was  was  the  primary  object  of  secession.  On 
the  contrary,  her  attachment  to  the  Union  had  been  proved  by  the  most 


ATTITUDE   OF   VIRGINIA.  121 

untiring  and  noble  efforts  to  save  it ;  her  Legislature  originated  the  Peace 
Conference,  which  assembled  at  Washington  in  February,  1861 ;  her 
representatives  in  Congress  sought  in  that  body  every  mode  of  honour 
able  pacification ;  her  Convention  sent  delegates  to  Washington  to  per 
suade  Mr.  Lincoln  to  a  pacific  policy ;  and  in  every  form  of  public  assem 
bly,  every  expedient  of  negotiation  was  essayed  by  Virginia  to  save  the 
Union.  When  these  efforts  at  pacification  failed,  and  the  Government  at 
Washington  drew  the  sword  against  the  sovereignty  of  States  and  insisted 
on  the  right  of  coercion,  it  was  then  that  Virginia  appreciated  the  change 
of  issue,  and,  to  contest  it,  found  it  necessary  to  withdraw  from  the  Union. 
Her  act  of  secession  was  subordinate ;  it  was  a  painful  formality  which 
could  not  be  dispensed  with  to  contest  a  principle  higher  than  the  Union, 
and  far  above  the  promptings  of  passion  and  the  considerations  of  mere 
expediency. 

It  takes  time  for  popular  commotions  to  acquire  their  meaning  and 
proper  significance.  A  just  and  philosophical  observation  of  events  must 
find  that  in  the  second  secessionary  movement  of  the  Southern  States,  the 
war  was  put  on  a  basis  infinitely  higher  and  firmer  in  all  its  moral  and 
consitutional  aspects ;  that  at  this  period  it  developed  itself,  acquired  its 
proper  significance,  and  was  broadly  translated  into  a  contest  for  liberty. 

It  was  in  this  changed  view  of  the  contest  and  on  an  issue  in  which 
force  was  directly  put  against  the  sentiment  of  liberty,  that  the  Border 
States  followed  the  lead  of  Virginia  out  of  the  Union.  The  particular 
occasion  of  the  movement  was  not  so  much  the  fire  at  Sumter  as  the 
proclamation  of  Mr.  Lincoln  to  raise  forces,  the  only  purpose  of  which 
could  be  the  subjugation  of  the  South.  In  this  proclamation  the  issue  was 
distinctly  put  before  the  Border  States  ;  for  Mr.  Lincoln  called  upon  each 
of  them  to  furnish  their  quotas  of  troops  for  a  war  upon  their  sister  States. 
The  unnatural  demand  was  refused  in  terms  of  scorn  and  defiance.  Gov. 
Magofiin  of  Kentucky  replied  that  that  State  "  would  furnish  no  troops 
for  the  wicked  purpose  of  subduing  her  sister  Southern  States."  Gov. 
Harris  of  Tennessee  notified  Mr.  Lincoln  that  that  State  "  would  not  fur 
nish  a  single  man  for  coercion,  but  fifty  thousand  if  necessary  for  the 
defence  of  her  rights."  GJOV.  Ellis  of  North  Carolina  telegraphed  to 
Washington  :  "  I  can  be  no  party  to  this  wicked  violation  of  the  laws  of 
the  country,  and  to  this  war  upon  the  liberties  of  a  free  people."  Gov. 
Rector  of  Arkansas  replied  in  terms  of  equal  defiance,  and  declared  "  the 
demand  is  only  adding  insult  to  injury ; "  and  Gov.  Jackson  showed  an 
indignation  surpassing  all  the  others,  for  he  wrote  directly  to  Mr.  Lincoln : 
"  Your  requisition  in  my  judgment  is  illegal,  unconstitutional,  and  revolu 
tionary,  and,  in  its  objects,  inhuman  and  diabolical"  The  only  Southern 
State  that  did  not  publicly  share  in  this  resentment,  and  that  made  it  an 
occasion  of  official  ambiloquy,  was  Maryland.  Her  Governor,  Thomas 


122  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Holladay  Hicks,  had  advised  that  the  State  should  occupy  for  the  present 
a  position  of  "  neutrality  ;  "  and  while  he  amused  the  country  with  this 
absurd  piece  of  demagogueism,  and  very  plainly  suggested  that  in  the  ap 
proaching  election  of  congressmen,  the  people  of  Maryland  might  deter 
mine  their  position,  it  is  equally  certain  that  he  gave  verbal  assurances  to 
Mr.  Lincoln  that  the  State  would  supply  her  quota  of  troops,  and  give 
him  military  support. 

The  indications  of  sentiment  in  the  Border  States  soon  ripened  into 
open  avowals.  Tennessee  seceded  from  the  Union  on  the  6th  of  May ;  on 
the  18th  day  of  May  the  State  of  Arkansas  was  formally  admitted  into  the 
Southern  Confederacy  ;  and  on  the  21st  of  the  same  month,  the  sovereign 
Convention  of  North  Carolina,  by  a  unanimous  vote,  passed  an  ordinance 
of  secession.  This  latter  State,  although  slow  to  secede  and  accomplish 
formally  her  separation  from  the  Union,  had  acted  with  singular  spirit  in 
giving  early  and  valuable  evidence  of  sympathy  with  the  Southern  cause. 
Under  the  orders  of  her  Governor,  Fort  Macon,  near  Beaufort,  was  seized 
on  the  15th  of  April,  and  promptly  garrisoned  by  volunteers  from  Greens- 
borough  and  other  places.  Fort  Caswell  was  also  taken,  and  on  the  19th 
the  Arsenal  of  Fayetteville  was  captured  without  bloodshed,  thus  securing 
to  the  State  and  the  South  sixty-five  thousand  stand  of  arms,  of  which 
twenty-eight  thousand  were  of  the  most  approved  modern  construction. 

Virginia  had  taken  the  decisive  step,  and  passed  her  ordinance  of 
secession  on  the  17th  day  of  April.  It  became  an  immediate  concern  to 
secure  for  the  State  all  the  arms,  munitions,  ships,  war  stores,  and  military 
posts  within  her  borders,  which  there  was  power  to  seize.  Two  points 
were  of  special  importance  :  one  was  the  Navy  Yard,  at  Gosport,  with  its 
magnificent  dry-dock — its  huge  ship-houses,  shops,  forges,  ware-rooms, 
rope-walks,  seasoned  timber  for  ships,  masts,  cordage,  boats,  ammunition, 
small  arms,  and  cannon.  Besides  all  these  treasures,  it  had  lying  in  its 
waters  several  vessels  of  war.  The  other  point  was  Harper's  Ferry  on  the 
Potomac  River,  with  its  armory  and  arsenal,  containing  about  ten  thou 
sand  muskets  and  five  thousand  rifles,  with  machinery  for  the  purpose 
of  manufacturing  arms,  capable  with  a  sufficient  force  of  workmen,  of 
turning  out  twenty-five  thousand  muskets  a  year. 

Movements  to  secure  these  places  and  their  advantages  were  only  par 
tially  successful.  In  two  days  a  large  force  of  volunteers  had  collected  at 
Harper's  Ferry.  The  small  Federal  force  there  requested  a  parley  ;  this 
was  granted ;  but  in  a  short  time  flames  were  seen  to  burst  from  the 
armory  and  arsenal ;  the  garrison  had  set  fire  to  the  arms  and  buildings, 
and  escaped  across  the  railroad  bridge  into  Maryland.  The  Virginia 
troops  instantly  rushed  into  the  buildings.  A  large  number  of  the  arms 
were  consumed,  but  about  five  thousand  improved  muskets  in  complete 
order,  and  three  thousand  unfinished  small  arms,  were  saved.  The  retreat- 


FIRST   BLOOD   IN   BALTIMORE.  123 

ing  garrison  had  laid  trains  to  blow  up  the  workshops,  but  the  courage 
and  rapid  movement  of  the  Virginians,  extinguished  them,  and  thus  saved 
to  their  State  the  invaluable  machinery  for  making  muskets  and  rifles. 

On  the  succeeding  day  preparations  were  made  by  the  Federals  for 
the  destruction  of  the  Navy  Yard  at  Gosport,  while  reinforcements  were 
thrown  into  Fortress  Monroe.  The  work  of  destruction  was  not  as  fully 
completed  as  the  enemy  had  designed  ;  the  dry-dock,  which  alone  cost 
several  millions  of  dollars,  was  but  little  damaged ;  but  the  destruction 
of  property  was  immense.  All  the  ships  in  the  harbour,  excepting  an  old 
dismantled  frigate,  the  United  States,  were  set  fire  to  and  scuttled.  But 
the  Merrimac,  a  powerful  steam  frigate  of  twenty-six  hundred  tons,  new, 
fully  equipped,  and  nearly  ready  for  sea,  was  only  partially  destroyed,  and 
became,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  a  famous  prize  of  the  Confederacy. 

At  this  time  it  was  expected  that  Maryland  would  emulate  the  heroic 
example  of  Virginia,  and  cast  her  fortunes  with  that  of  the  Confederacy. 
But  two  days  after  the  secession  of  Virginia  occurred  a  memorable  colli 
sion  in  the  streets  of  Baltimore ;  and  the  first  blood  of  Southerners  was 
shed  on  the -soil  of  Maryland.  When  it  became  certain  that  Northern 
troops  were  to  be  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  invading  the  seceded 
States,  the  indignation  of  the  people  of  Maryland,  and  especially  of  Balti 
more,  could  not  be  restrained.  It  being  known  that  a  body  of  volunteers 
from  Massachusetts  were  coming  through  the  city,  on  the  19th  of  April, 
a  fierce  and  determined  purpose  to  resist  their  passage  was  aroused.  As 
several  hundred  of  these  volunteers,  sixty  of  whom  only  were  armed  and 
uniformed,  were  passing  through  the  city  in  horse-cars,  they  found  the 
track  barricaded  near  one  of  the  docks  by  stones,  sand,  and  old  anchors 
thrown  upon  it,  and  were  compelled  to  attempt  the  passage  to  the  depot, 
at  the  other  end  of  the  city,  on  foot.  A  body  of  citizens  got  in  front  of  the 
troops,  checked  their  advance,  shouting,  threatening,  taunting  them  as 
mercenaries,  and  uttering  loud  cheers  for  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
A  Confederate  flag  was  displayed  by  some  of  the  crowd.  Stones  were 
thrown  by  some  of  the  citizens  ;  two  soldiers  were  struck  down,  and  many 
others  severely  hurt.  At  this  time  the  troops  presented  arms  and  fired. 
Several  citizens  fell  dead,  others  were  wounded,  and  falling,  were  borne 
off  by  those  near  them.  Fury  took  possession  of  the  crowd ;  up  to  this 
time  they  had  used  no  weapons  more  deadly  than  stones,  but  now  revolvers 
were  drawn  and  fired  into  the  column  of  troops,  and  men  were  rushing  in 
search  of  fire-arms.  The  firing  on  both  sides  continued  in  quick  succes 
sion  of  shots  from  Frederick  to  South  streets.  Several  of  the  citizens  fell, 
but,  undismayed,  they  pressed  the  soldiers  with  an  incessant  and  heavy 
volley  of  stones.  The  troops  were  unable  to  withstand  the  gathering 
crowd  ;  they  were  bewildered  by  their  mode  of  attack  ;  they  pressed  along 
the  streets  confused  and  staggering,  breaking  into  a  run  whenever  there 


124:  THE    LOST    CAUSE. 

was  an  opportunity  to  do  so,  and  turning  at  intervals  to  fire  upon  the 
citizens  who  pursued  them. 

Harassed  and  almost  exhausted,  the  troops  at  length  reached  Camden 
station.  But  here  the  fight  continued  without  intermission  ;  stones  were 
hurled  into  the  cars  with  such  violence  that  the  windows  and  panelling 
were  shattered  ;  the  soldiers'  faces  and  bodies  were  streaming  with  blood, 
and  they  could  only  protect  themselves  by  lying  down  or  stooping  below 
the  windows.  Taunts  clothed  in  the  most  fearful  language,  were  hurled 
at  them  ;  men  pressed  up  to  the  windows  of  the  car,, presenting  knives  and 
revolvers,  and  cursing  up  in  the  faces  of  the  soldiers  ;  and  for  half  a  mile 
along  the  track  there  was  a  struggling  and  shouting  mass  of  human  beings 
— citizens  piling  the  track  with  obstructions,  and  policemen  removing 
them  as  fast  as  possible.  In  the.  midst  of  the  excitement,  amid  hootings, 
shouts,  and  curses,  the  train  moved  off ;  and  as  it  passed  from  the  depot 
a  dozen  muskets  were  fired  into  the  crowd,  the  volley  killing  a  well-known 
merchant,  who  was  taking  no  part  in  the  fight,  and  was  standing  as  a 
spectator  at  some  distance  from  the  track. 

In  this  irregular  combat  two  soldiers  were  killed  and  several  severely 
wounded  ;  wjrile,  on  the  other  side,  the  casualties  were  more  serious — nine 
citizens  killed  and  three  wounded.  A  terrrible  excitement  ensued  in  Bal 
timore,  and  continued  for  weeks.  The  bridges  on  the  railroad  leading  to 
the  Susquehanna  were  destroyed ;  the  regular  route  of  travel  was  broken 
up  ;  and  large  bodies  of  Northern  troops  were  thus  diverted  from  the 
railroad  lines,  and  placed  in  the  necessity  of  being  carried  in  transports  to 
Annapolis.  Mass  meetings  were  held  in  Baltimore,  and  speeches  of  de 
fiance  made  to  the  Government  at  Washington.  The  city  council  appro 
priated  five  hundred  thousand  dollars  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  putting 
the  city  in  a  state  of  defence,  but  with  the  farther  intent  on  the  part  of 
many,  that  instant  measures  should  be  taken  to  relieve  the  State  from 
Federal  rule. 

But  this  rule  was  steadily  encroaching  upon  Maryland,  and  strengthen 
ing  itself  beyond  the  hope  of  successful  resistance.  Each  day  Southern 
sentiment  became  more  timid  and  equivocal,  as  the  Federal  power  com 
menced  to  display  itself.  The  Legislature  of  Maryland  at  last  put  the 
State  in  an  attitude  of  indefinite  submission.  It  passed  resolutions  protest 
ing  against  the  military  occupation  of  the  State  by  the  Federal  Govern 
ment,  and  indicating  sympathy  with  the  South,  but  concluding  with  the 
declaration :  "  Under  existing  circumstances,  it  is  inexpedient  to  call  a 
sovereign  Convention  of  the  State  at  this  time,  or  take  any  measures  for 
the  immediate  organization  or  arming  of  the  militia." 

Baltimore  was  rapidly  brought  under  the  yoke.  By  a  concerted  move 
ment  of  the  Federal  authorities,  Col.  Kane,  the  marshal  of  police,  was 
arrested ;  the  Police  Board  suspended  ;  a  provost-marshal  appointed,  and 


REIGN   OF    TERROR    IN    MARYLAND.  125 

Baltimore  brought  under  the  law  of  the  drum-head.  The  municipal  police 
were  disbanded,  and  a  reign  of  terror  threatened  to  establish  itself  in  what 
was  already  a  condition  of  anarchy.  The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  sus 
pended  ;  the  houses  of  suspected  persons  were  searched ;  blank  warrants 
were  issued  for  domiciliary  visits ;  and  the  mayor  and  members  of  the 
police  board  were  arrested,  and,  without  a  trial,  imprisoned  in  a  military 
fortress.  In  other  parts  of  the  State,  the  inauguration  of  "  the  strong 
government "  steadily  progressed.  And  so  thoroughly  effective  was  it 
that  in  less  than  a  month  after  the  Baltimore  riot,  Maryland  was  raising 
her  quota  of  troops  under  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclamation,  and  Governor 
Hicks  had  openly  called  for  four  regiments  of  volunteers  to  assist  the 
Northern  Government  in  its  now  fully  declared  policy  of  a  war  of  invasion 
and  fell  destruction  upon  the  South.  But  the  history  of  such  a  change 
has  to  be  read  in  the  light  of  many  circumstances.  Disarmed  ;  not  even 
allowed  to  retain  its  militia  organization  ;  planted  with  troops ;  subjected  to 
an  infamous  and  degraded  sway  ;  cozened  and  betrayed  by  its  Governor  ; 
divided  within  itself ;  its  citizens  separated  by  long-exasperated  lines  of 
prejudice  ;  its  press  exhausting  itself  to  envenom  the  differences  of  men  ; 
"  suspicion  poisoning  his  brother's  cup  ;  "  corruption  chaffering  in  public 
market-places  for  the  souls  of  men ;  and  crime  and  outrage  recognizable 
only  before  the  tribunal  of  Despotism,  it  is  not  wonderful  that  Maryland 
became  the  easy  prey  of  a  Government  that  scrupled  at  no  means  of  suc 
cess  and  spared  no  opportunity  for  the  perversion  of  the  principles 
of  men. 

Whether  the  easy  subjugation  of  Maryland  persuaded  the  people  of 
the  North  that  the  war  was  to  be  a  slight  task,  or  whether  that  opinion  is 
to  be  ascribed  to  their  own  insolent  vanity,  it  is  very  certain  that  they 
entered  upon  the  war  with  a  light  estimation  of  its  consequences  and  with 
an  exhibition  of  passion,  rant  and  bombast,  such,  perhaps,  as  the  world 
has  never  seen  in  similar  circumstances.  The  Government  at  Washington 
shared,  or  encouraged  for  its  own  purposes,  the  vulgar  opinion  that  the 
war  was  soon  to  be  despatched.  It  either  believed,  or  affected  to  believe, 
that  the  Southern  States  would  be  reduced  in  a  few  months.  But  it  is  to 
be  remarked  that  the  Federal  Government  had  a  particular  purpose  in 
reducing,  in  popular  opinion,  the  importance  of  the  contest.  It  desired 
to  attract  volunteers  by  the  prospects  of  short  service  and  cheap  glory  ; 
and  it  was  especially  anxious  to  guard  against  any  probability  of  recogni 
tion  by  England  or  France  of  the  new  Confederacy,  and  to  anticipate 
opinion  in  Europe  by  misrepresenting  the  movements  of  the  Southern 
States  as  nothing  more  than  a  local  and  disorganized  insurrection,  inci 
dental  to  the  history  of  all  governments,  and  unworthy  of  any  serious 
foreign  attention.  It  was  in  this  view  Mr.  Lincoln  had  framed  his  procla 
mation,  calling  for  an  army  of  seventy-five  thousand  men.  He  took 


126  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

especial  pains  to  model  this  paper  after  a  Riot  Act :  to  style  sovereign 
States  "  unlawful  combinations  ;  "  and  to  "  command  the  persons  compos 
ing  the  combinations  aforesaid,  to  disperse  and  retire  peaceably  to  their 
respective  abodes  within  twenty  days." 

But  something  more  remarkable  than  this  grotesque  anticipation  of  a 
four  years'  war,  was  to  emanate  from  the  statesmanship  at  Washington. 
On  the  4th  of  May,  Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  a  letter  of  in 
structions  to  Mr.  Dayton,  the  recently  appointed  minister  to  France, 
designed  as  a  circular  notice  to  the  European  courts,  which,  as  a  tissue  of 
misrepresentation  and  absurdity,  and  an  exhibition  of  littleness  in  a  poli 
tician's  cast  of  the  future,  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  productions  of 
the  political  history  of  the  war.  In  this  document  the  Federal  Secretary 
of  State  urged  that  Mr.  Dayton  could  not  be  "  too  decided  or  too  explicit " 
in  assuring  the  French  Government  that  there  was  no  idea  of  the  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union  ;  and  that  the  existing  commotion  was  only  to  be  ranked 
among  the  dozen  passing  changes  in  the  history  of  that  Union.  He  con 
cluded  :  "  Tell  M.  Thouvenel,  then,  with  the  highest  consideration  and 
good  feeling,  that  the  thought  of  a  dissolution  of  this  Union,  peaceably  or 
by  force,  has  never  entered  into  the  mind  of  any  candid  statesman  here, 
and  it  is  high  time  that  it  be  dismissed  by  statesmen  in  Europe."  Yet  at 
the  time  this  was  penned  eight  millions  of  Mr.  Seward's-  countrymen  had 
decided  on  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  and  the  gathering  armies  of  the 
South  were  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Federal  capital. 

Meanwhile  the  action  of  the  European  Governments  with  reference 
to  the  war  was  thought  to  be  indecisive,  and  was  still  the  subject  of  a 
certain  anxiety.  The  British  Government  and  the  French  Emperor, 
although  they  regarded  and  ranked  the  Confederate  States  as  belligerents, 
proclaimed  a  strict  neutrality  in  the  war,  and  closed  their  ports  to  the 
armed  vessels  and  privateers  of  either  of  the  belligerents.  The  British 
House  of  Commons  had  deemed  it  necessary  to  adjourn  the  discussion  of 
American  affairs  by  the  indefinite  postponement  of  Mr.  Gregory's  notice 
of  a  motion  on  the  subject.  That  gentleman  had  sought  to  defend  his 
motion  for  the  recognition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  in  a  letter  in  the 
London  Times,  of  a  power  and  ingenuity  calculated  to  affect  public 
opinion,  and  putting  the  question  to  the  people  of  England  and  of  France 
in  every  possible  aspect.  He  pointed  out  the  reasons  of  his  advocacy  of 
the  recognition  of  the  new  Confederate  republic  in  several  particulars  :  as 
an  effectual  blow  at  the  slave  trade,  "  mainly  carried  on  by  ships  sailing 
from  Northern  ports  and  floated  by  Northern  capital ;  "  as  an  amelioration 
of  the  condition  of  slavery ;  as  a  means  of  peace  and  unrestricted  com 
merce  ;  as  a  just  retaliation  upon  the  "  Morrill  "  tariff,  the  successful  issue 
of  Northern  policy,  against  which  the  South  had  protested ;  and  as  the 
vindication  of  the  right  of  a  people  to  assert  their  independence.  Mr. 


NORTHERN    BOMBAST   AND   VANITY.  127 

Gregory  concluded  with  the  strong  conviction  that  the  interests  of  France 
and  England  were  identical  in  the  American  question,  and  that  "  the 
recognition  by  these  two  great  Powers  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  would 
cause  the  war  party  in  the  North  to  pause  before  plunging  their  country 
men  deeper  into  the  sad  struggle." 

The  idea  promulgated  at  Washington  of  a  ninety  days'  commotion  was 
readily  taken  up  by  the  Northern  press,  and  was  made  the  occasion  of  a 
volume  of  conceit,  that  was  amusing  enough  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events.  Not  a  paper  of  influence  in  the  North  appeared  to  comprehend 
the  importance  of  the  impending  contest ;  and  the  commentary  of  rant, 
passion,  and  bombast  upon  it  exceeded  all  known  exhibitions  of  the  insane 
vanity  of  the  Northern  people. 

"  The  rebellion  "  was  derided  in  a  style  which  taxed  language  for  ex 
pressions  of  contempt.  The  New  York  Tribune  declared  that  it  was 
nothing  "  more  or  less  than  the  natural  recourse  of  all  mean-spirited  and 
defeated  tyrannies  to  rule  or  ruin,  making,  of  course,  a  wide  distinction 
between  the  will  and  power,  for  the  hanging  of  traitours  is  sure  to  begin 
before  one  month  is  over."  "  The  nations  of  Europe,"  it  continued,  "  may 
rest  assured  that  Jeff.  Davis  &  Co.  will  be  swinging  from  the  battlements 
at  Washington,  at  least,  by  the  4th  of  July.  We  spit  upon  a  later  and 
longer  deferred  justice." 

The  New  York  Times  gave  its  opinion  in  the  following  vigorous  and 
confident  spirit :  "  Let  us  make  quick  work.  The  £  rebellion,'  as  some 
people  designate  it,  is  an  unborn  tadpole.  Let  us  not  fall  into  the  delu 
sion,  noted  by  Hallam,  of  mistaking  a  { local  commotion  '  for  a  revolution. 
A  strong  active  4  pull  together  '  will  do  our  work  effectually  in  thirty  days. 
We  have  only  to  send  a  column  of  twenty-five  thousand  men  across  the 
Potomac  to  Richmond,  and  burn  out  the  rats  there ;  another  column  of 
twenty-five  thousand  to  Cairo,  seizing  the  cotton  ports  of  the  Mississippi ; 
and  retaining  the  remaining  twenty-five  thousand,  included  in  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  call  for  seventy-five  thousand  men,  at  Washington,  not  because  there 
is  need  for  them  there,  but  because  we  do  not  require  their  services 
elsewhere." 

The  Philadelphia  Press  declared  that  "  no  man  of  sense  could,  for  a 
moment,  doubt  that  this  much-aflo-about-nothing  would  end  in  a  month." 
The  Northern  people  were  "  simply  invincible."  "  The  rebels,"  it  prophe 
sied,  "  a  mere  band  of  ragamuffins,  will  fly,  like  chaff  before  the  wind,  on 
our  approach." 

The  West  was  as  violent  as  the  North  or  East,  quite  as  confident,  and 
valorous  to  excess.  The  Chicago  Tribune  insisted  on  its  demand  that  the 
West  be  allowed  to  fight  the  battle  through,  since  she  was  probably  the 
most  interested  in  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion  and  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi.  "  Let  the  East,"  demanded  this  valorous  sheet,  "  get 


128  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

out  of  the  way  ;  this  is  a  war  of  the  West.  We  can  fight  the  battle,  and 
successfully,  within  two  or  three  months  at  the  furthest.  Illinois  can  whip 
the  South  by  herself.  We  insist  on  the  matter  being  turned  over  to  us." 

It  is  no  wonder  that,  with  the  prospect  of  a  short  war  extended  from 
Washington  and  enlivened  by  pictures  of  cheap  glory  in  the  newspapers, 
the  rage  for  volunteering  in  the  North  should  have  been  immense.  Going 
to  the  war  "  for  three  months  "  (the  term  of  the  enlistment  of  volunteers) 
was  looked  upon  as  a  sort  of  holiday  excursion,  and  had  peculiar  attrac 
tions  for  the  firemen,  the  rowdies,  and  "  roughs  "  of  the  Northern  cities, 
from  which  brutal  material  it  was  boasted  that  the  North  would  gather 
the  most  terrible  and  invincible  army  that  ever  enacted  deeds  of  war. 
Many  of  these  men  adopted  the  Zouave  costume  to  add  to  the  terrours  of 
their  appearance ;  and  a  company  of  them  actually  went  through  the 
ceremony  of  being  sworn  in  a  public  hotel  in  New  York  to  "  cut  off  the 
heads  of  every  d — d  Secessionist  in  the  wTar."  Such  exhibitions  of  brutal 
ferocity  were  told  with  glee  and  devoured  with  unnatural  satisfaction  by 
the  Northern  people.  If  the  rowdies  were  in  constant  scenes  of  disorder 
and  violence  before  they  were  marched  away — if  Ellsworth^s  and  Billy 
Wilson's  men  did  knock  down  quiet  citizens  and  plunder  stores  in  New 
York  and  Washington,  the  story  was  merrily  told  even  in  the  communities 
where  these  outrages  were  committed ;  for  these  displays  were  taken  as 
proofs  of  desperate  courage,  and  the  men  so  troublesome  and  belligerent 
towards  quiet  citizens  were  indicated  as  the  terrible  and  ruthless  crusaders 
who  were  to  strike  terrour  to  the  simple  armies  of  the  South,  and  win  the 
brightest  and  bloodiest  laurels  on  the  field  of  battle. 

But  it  was  not  only  the  vagrant  and  unruly  classes  of  the  great  and 
vicious  cities  of  the  North  that  flocked  to  the  standards  of  the  war.  The 
most  quiet  citizens  could  not  resist  the  temptation  of  entering  a  race  for 
cheap  glory.  The  North  was  full  of  martial  rage.  The  war  spirit  pervad 
ed  not  only  the  holiday  volunteer  soldiers  of  the  cities,  but  the  country 
people,  the  shoemakers  and  cobblers  of  New  England  and  the  coal-heavers 
of  Pennsylvania.  Governor  Dennison,  of  Ohio,  telegraphed  to  Washing 
ton,  offering  thirty  thousand  troops.  Governor  Weston,  of  Indiana, 
received  offers  showing  that  the  same  numbers  were  ready  to  come  forward 
in  his  State.  Governor  Curtin,  of  Pennsylvania,  was  equally  liberal  in 
his  assurances  to  Washington.  Massachusetts  and  New  York  were  press 
ing  with  offers  of  men  and  money  for  "  the  three  months'  war." 

But  while  the  North  was  making  such  insolent  and  giddy  exhibitions 
on  the  threshold  of  the  war,  it  must  be  confessed  that,  on  the  part  of  the 
'South,  there  was  also  very  imperfect  appreciation  of  the  impending  crisis, 
and  of  the  extent  and  solemnity  of  the  adventure  in  which  the  Confederate 
States  were  to  embark. 

In  the  first  stages  of  the  dispute  the  Southern  leaders  had  declared  that 


THE   MONTGOMERY   COKSTTnJTIQN.  129 

there  would  be  no  war ;  that  the  mere  act  of  secession  would  exact  from 
the  North  all  that  was  claimed,  and  prove  in  the  end  a  peaceful  experi 
ment.  Heated  orators  in  Charleston  exclaimed  that  there  would  be  no 
conflict  of  arms,  and  that  they  would  be  willing  to  drink  all  the  blood 
shed  in  the  contest. 

Again,  when  the  Confederate  Government  was  •  established  at  Mont 
gomery  the  idea  still  prevailed  that  secession  had  the  countenance  of  a 
large  party  in  the  North,  and  that  the  Black  Republicans  would  find  it 
impossible  to  get  up  a  war  in  front  of  hostile  States  and  in  face  of  a  parti 
san  opposition  at  home.  This  idea  had  especial  hold  of  the  mind  of  Presi 
dent  Davis.  It  has  been  thought  a  little  strange  that  in  the  frame  of  the 
new  government  there  should  be  such  little  originality ;  that  it  should 
have  exhibited  so  few  ideas  of  political  administration  higher  than  the 
"Washington  routine  ;  and  that  the  Montgomery  statesmen  and  legislators 
should  have  fallen  into  an  almost  servile  copy  of  the  old  Federal  Consti 
tution.  This  has  been  accounted  for  by  the  circumstance  that  the  new 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  South  naturally  fell  into  the  hands  of 
old  "Washington  politicians,  who  were  barren  of  political  novelty.  But 
there  is  a  more  direct  and  especial  explanation.  It  was  expected  that  the 
assimilation  of  the  Montgomery  Constitution  to  that  of  the  United  States 
with  some  especial  additions  developing  the  democratic  view  and  construc 
tion  of  that  latter  instrument  would  have  the  effect  of  conciliating,  or,  at 
least,  of  neutralizing  the  Democratic  party  in  the  North.  In  the  address 
on  the  occasion  of  his  inauguration,  President  Davis  took  especial  pains  to 
declare  that  the  seceded  States  meditated  a  change  only  of  the  constituent 
parts,  not  the  system  of  the  government ;  and  he  distinctly  referred  to  the 
expectation  that,  with  a  Constitution  differing  only  from  that  of  their 
fathers,  in  so  far  as  it  was  explanatory  of  their  well-known  intent,  freed 
from  sectional  convicts,  the  States  from  which  they  had  recently  parted 
might  seek  to  unite  their  fortunes  with  those  of  the  new  Confederacy. 
Indeed,  so  far  did  this  conceit  go,  that  it  was  proposed  in  some  of  the 
newspapers  of  the  day — among  them  the  New  York  Herald,  then  the 
affected  friend  of  the  South — that  the  Union  should  be  "  reconstructed  " 
by  the  accession  of  the  Northern  States  to  the  Montgomery  Constitution, 
excluding  perhaps  the  New  England  States,  as  odious  to  both  parties  in 
the  reconstruction. 

But  no  sooner  did  these  silly  prospects  of  amicable  association  with 
Northern  Democrats  end  and  war  blaze  out  at  Sumter,  than  a  new  delu 
sion  took  possession  of  the  Confederate  leaders.  This  was  that  the  war 
would  be  decided  speedily,  and  its  history  be  compassed  in  a  few  battle 
fields.  It  had  been  a  theme  of  silly  declamation  that  "  the  Yankees  " 
would  not  fight ;  and  so-called  statesmen  in  the  South  expounded  the  doc 
trine  that  a  commercial  community,  devoted  to  the  pursuit  of  gain,  could 
9 


130  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

never  aspire  to  martial  prowess,  and  were  unequal  to  great  deeds  of  arms. 
But  if  these  orators  had  considered  the  lessons  of  history  they  would  have 
found  that  commercial  communities  were  among  the  most  pugnacious  and 
ambitious  and  obstinate  of  belligerents,  and  might  have  traced  the  dis 
covery  through  the  annals  of  Carthage,  Yenice,  Genoa,  Holland,  and 
England. 

Another  idea  was  that  the  victory  of  the  South  was  to  be  insured  and 
expedited  by  the  recognition  of  the  new  Government  by  the  European 
Powers.  "  Cotton,"  said  the  Charleston  Mercury,  "  would  bring  England 
to  her  knees."  The  idea  was  ludicrous  enough  that  England  and  France 
would  instinctively  or  readily  fling  themselves  into  a  convulsion,  which 
their  great  politicians  saw  was  the  most  tremendous  one  of  modern  times. 
But  the  puerile  argument,  which  even  President  Davis  did  not  hesitate  to 
adopt,  about  the  power  of  "  King  Cotton,"  amounted  to  this  absurdity : 
that  the  great  and  illustrious  power  of  England  would  submit  to  the  inef 
fable  humiliation  of  acknowledging  its  dependency  on  the  infant  Confed 
eracy  of  the  South,  and  the  subserviency  of  its  empire,  its  political  interests 
and  its  pride,  to  a  single  article  of  trade  that  was  grown  in  America  ! 

These  silly  notions  of  an  early  accomplishment  of  their  independence 
were,  more  than  anything  else,  to  blind  and  embarrass  the  Confederate 
States  in  the  great  work  before  them.  Their  ports  were  to  remain  open 
for  months  before  the  blockade,  declared  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  could  be  made 
effective ;  and  yet  nothing  was  to  be  imported  through  them  but  a  few 
thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  when,  in  that  time,  and  through  those 
avenues,  there  might  have  been  brought  from  Europe  all  the  needed  muni 
tions  of  war.  Immense  contracts  were  to  be  offered  the  Government,  only 
to  be  rejected  and  laughed  at.  Golden  opportunities  were  to  be  thrown 
away,  while  the  Confederate  authorities  still  persuaded  themselves  that  the 
war  was  to  be  despatched  by  mere  make-shifts  of  money,  and  a  sudden 
rush  of  volunteers  to  arms. 

It  is  a  curious  speculation  how  to  explain  that  two  belligerents,  like  the 
North  and  South,  could  have  shown  such  blindness  and  littleness  of  mind 
in  entering  upon  the  mighty  and  tremendous  contest  which  was  to  ensue, 
and  which  had,  in  fact,  become  obvious  and  inevitable.  But  it  is  said 
that  the  Governments  and  leaders  of  each  party  only  shared  the  general 
popular  opinion  on  each  side,  as  to  the  rapid  decision  of  the  war.  This 
excuse  is  imperfect.  Those  who  are  put  in  authority  and  in  the  high  places 
of  government  are  supposed  to  have  peculiar  gifts,  and  an  education  and 
training  suited  to  the  art  of  governing  and  advising  men  ;  they  should  be 
able  to  discern  what  the  populace  does  not  often  see.  Prescience  is  the 
specialty  of  the  statesman ;  and  because  a  populace  is  blind,  that  is  no 
excuse  for  his  defect  of  vision.  For  the  false  view  obtaining  at  "Washing 
ton  and  at  Montgomery  in  the  opening  of  the  war,  there  is  a  very  curt  and 


NORTHERN    AND    SOUTHERN    RESOURCES.  131 

quite  sufficient  explanation.  It  is  that  there  was  really  but  little  states 
manship  in  America,  and  that  much  which  passed  current  under  that 
name  was  nothing  more  than  the  educated  and  ingenious  demagogueism, 
which  reflects  vividly  the  opinions  of  the  masses,  and  acts  out  the  fancies 
of  the  hour.  It  does  seem  indeed  almost  incredible  that  public  men  at 
Washington  and  at  Montgomery  could  have  observed  the  crisis,  without 
considering  the  resources  and  the  temper  of  each  section  ;  for  each  of  these 
elements  in  the  contest  showed  plainly  enough  that  it  was  to  be  one  of 
immense  extent  and  indefinite  duration. 

It  will  be  interesting  here  to  make  a  brief  statement  of  the  resources 
of  the  United  States  about  the  time  of  the  war,  and  to  show  how  they 
were  divided  between  the  two  belligerents. 

The  census  of  the  United  States,  of  1860,  showed  a  population  of  more 
than  thirty-one  millions.  A  web  of  railroads,  the  wonder  of  the  world, 
stretched  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  Missouri  River ;  and  the  most 
important  of  these  had  been  constructed  within  the  last  thirty  years,  for  in 
1830  there  was  but  one  railway  connecting  the  great  Lakes  with  tide-water. 
The  total  extent  of  these  railroads  was  more  than  thirty  thousand  miles. 
Their  tonnage  per  annum  was  estimated  at  thirty-six  million  tons,  valued 
at  about  four  thousand  millions  of  dollars.  Such  was  the  huge  internal 
commerce  of  the  United  States.  Their  manufactures  formed  an  enormous 
fund  of  wealth  ;  they  represented  an  annual  product  of  two  thousand  mil 
lions  of  dollars.  In  the  census  of  1860,  we  have,  as  the  total  assessed  value 
of  real  estate  and  personal  property  in  the  thirty-four  States  and  Territories 
the  monstrous  sum  of  sixteen  thousand  millions  of  dollars. 

But  of  population,  of  internal  improvements,  of  manufactures,  and  of 
all  artificial  wealth  the  North  held  much  the  larger  share.  She  had  a 
population  of  twenty-three  millions  against  eight  millions  in  the  South. 
The  North  had  manufacturing  establishments  for  all  the  requirements  of 
peace  and  war.  She  had  the  advantages  of  an  unrestrained  commerce 
with  foreign  nations.  She  had  all  the  ports  of  the  world  open  to  her 
ships ;  she  had  furnaces,  foundries,  and  workshops ;  her  manufacturing 
resources  compared  with  those  of  the  South  were  as  five  hundred  to  one  ; 
the  great  marts  of  Europe  were  open  to  her  for  supplies  of  arms  and  stores ; 
there  was  nothing  of  material  resource,  nothing  of  the  apparatus  of  con 
quest  that  was  not  within  her  reach  ;  and  she  had  the  whole  world  wherein 
to  find  mercenary  soldiers  and  a  market  for  recruits. 

Yet  one  fact  is  to  be  admitted  here,  which  may  strike  many  readers 
with  surprise,  and  which  furnishes  a  subject  of  curious  reflection,  with 
reference  to  what  we  shall  hereafter  see  of  the  management  of  their  re 
sources  by  the  Confederates.  This  remarkable  fact  is  that  about  the 
beginning  of  the  war  the  South  was  richer  than  the  North  in  all  the 
necessaries  of  life.  It  is  sufficient  to  compile  certain  results  from  the 


132  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

census  of  1860  to  show  this :  Of  live  stock  (milch  cows,  working  oxen, 
other  cattle,  sheep  and  swine)  in  the  Northern  States  there  were  two  to 
each  person ;  in  the  Soiithern  States,  five  to  each  person.  Of  wheat  each 
person  in  the  Northern  States  reckoned  six  bushels  ;  each  white  person  in 
the  Southern  States  about  as  much.  Of  Indian  corn,  each  person  in  the 
Northern  States  reckoned  twenty-eight  bushels ;  while  in  the  Southern 
States  each  white  person  reckoned  fifty-one  bushels,  and  white  and  black 
together  stood  for  thirty-five  bushels  per  head. 

But  the  South  entered  the  war  with  only  a  few  insignificant  manufac 
tories  of  arms  and  materials  of  war  and  textile  fabrics.  She  was  soon  to  be 
cut  off  by  an  encircling  blockade  from  all  those  supplies  upon  which  she 
had  depended  from  the  North  and  from  Europe  in  the  way  of  munitions 
of  war,  clothing,  medicines,  etc.  She  was  without  the  vestige  of  a  navy  ; 
while,  on  the  water,  the  North  was  to  call  into  existence  a  power  equiva- 
1  ent  to  a  land  force  of  many  hundred  thousand  men. 

It  had  been  feared  that  in  the  haste  of  preparation  for  the  mighty  con 
test  that  was  to  ensue,  the  South  would  find  herself  poorly  provided  with 
arms  to  contend  with  an  enemy  rich  in  the  means  and  munitions  of  wai\ 
But  in  respect  of  small  arms,  at  least,  she  found  herself  amply  furnished. 
Mr.  Floyd,  the  Secretary  of  War  under  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration, 
had  taken  occasion  to  transfer  to  the  different  arsenals  at  the  South  more 
than  one  hundred  thousand  muskets.  This  proceeding  was  long  a.  favorite 
theme  of  reproach  and  censure  in  the  North,  and  was  most  unjustly  taken 
us  a  proof  of  incipient  treason  in  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet.  It  was  cer 
tainly  an  important  assistance  to  the  South  (although  this  contribution  of 
arms  was  really  less  than  was  due  her) ;  for  without  it  she  would  have 
been  hurried  into  the  war  with  the  few  and  very  imperfect  arms  purchased 
by  the  States,  or  owned  by  the  citizens.* 

*  For  years  the  accusation  clung  to  Secretary  Floyd  that  he  improperly  and  fraudulently  sup 
plied  the  South  with  these  muskets,  and  "  tlie  story  of  the  stolen  arms  "  was  perpetuated  in  every 
variety  of  Yankee  publication.  It  is  strange  indeed,  as  ex-President  Buchanan  remarks  in  a  recent 
printed  defence  of  his  Administration,  "  to  what  extent  public  prejudice  may  credit  a  falsehood,  not 
only  without  foundation,  but  against  the  clearest  official  evidence."  Let  us  see  how  the  facts  re- 
dncethis  story  of  fraud  and  "treason:"  In  December,  1859,  Secretary  Floyd  had  ordered  the  re 
moval  of  one-fifth  of  the  old  percussion  and  flint-lock  muskets  from  the  Springfield  Armory,  where 
lacy  had  accumulated  in  inconvenient  numbers,  to  five  Southern  arsenals.  The  United  States  had, 
on  hand,  say  500,000  of  these  muskets;  115,000  includes  all  transferred  to  the  Southern  arsenals. 
And  this  order  of  distribution  was  made,  almost  a  year  before  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  and  several 
months  before  his  nomination  at  Chicago.  Again,  hi  1860,  the  aggregate  of  rifles  and  muskets  dis 
tributed  was  10,151,  of  which  the  Southern  and  Southwestern  States  received  only  2,849,  or  between 
one-third  and  one-fourth  of  the  whole  number.  It  thus  apgears  that  the  Southern  and  Southwestern 
States  received  much  less  in  the  aggregate,  instead  of  more  than  the  quota  of  arms  to  which  they  were 
justly  entitled  under  the  law  for  arming  the  militia.  Could  the  force  of  misreprentation  further  go  than 
to  torture  from  these  facts  the  charge  that  Mr.  Buchanan's  Secretary  of  War  had  fraudulently  sent 
public  arms  to  the  South  for  the  use  of  the  insurgents  !  Yet  this  is  bat  one  example  of  that  audacity 
and  hardy  persistence  in  falsehood  displayed  in  all  Northern  publications  concerning  the  war. 


TWO  CAUSES  OF  FAILT7KE.  133 

But  it  may'be  said  here  generally  that  against  the  vast  superiority  of 
the  North  in  material  resources  and  in  the  apparatus  of  war,  the  South 
had  a  set-off  in  certain  advantages,  not  appreciable  perhaps  by  superficial 
observers,  but  which  constitute  a  most  important  element  in  a  true  his 
torical  estimate  of  the  match  between  the  two  belligerents.  The  coarse 
popular  opinion  in  the  North  was  that  the  superiority  of  numbers  would 
give  it  an  overwhelming  preponderance  of  strength.  But  something  more 
than  numbers  makes  armies ;  and  war  is  not  a  duel,  a  single  contest 
despatched  according  to  an  established  j-outine.  The  South  had  a  superiour 
animation  in  the  war.  She  stood  on  the  defensive ;  and  should  thus  have 
been  able  to  put  against  the  invading  force  two  enemies :  the  opposing 
army  and  the  people.  She  had,  also,  on  her  side  one  single  advantage 
which  should  have  been  decisive  of  the  contest — an  advantage  which  no 
numbers  could  really  surmount,  or  skill  effectively  circumvent.  That 
advantage  was  space.  It  had  been  the  victor  in  many  former  wars. 
When  Napoleon  invaded  Eussia,  he  won  battles,  he  obtained  the  very 
object  of  his  march ;  but  space  defeated  him — the  length  of  the  march  from 
"Warsaw  to  Moscow  ruined  him.  "When  Great  Britain  attempted  to  subdue 
only  that  part  of  America  that  borders  the  Atlantic,  space  defeated  her  ; 
her  armies  took  the  principal  cities,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Charleston, 
Savannah,  Eichmond  ;  but  victories  were  barren  of  result,  the  Continental 
troops,  dispersed  in  the  country,  were  easily  re-assembled,  the  lines  of 
military  occupation  existed  only  on  paper,  and  the  process  of  conquest 
became  one  of  hopeless  repetition,  and  was  at  last  abandoned  in  despair. 

In  an  intelligent  view  of  the  precedents  of  history  it  might  safely  be 
predicted  that  the  South,  fighting  on  its  own  soil,  and  for  it,  and  occupy 
ing  a  territory  of  more  than  728,000  square  miles  in  extent,  and  in  which 
the  natural  features  of  the  country,  in  mountain,  river,  and  swamp,  were 
equivalent  to  successive  lines  of  fortification,  would  be  victor  in  the  con 
test,  however  unequally  matched  in  men  and  the  material  of  war,  unless 
the  management  of  her  affairs  should  become  insane,  or  her  people  lose  the 
virtue  of  endurance. 


CHAPTEE    VIII. 

ME.  LINCOLN'S  EEMAEK  ABOUT  THE  WOLF. — HIS  DESIGNS  UPON  VIRGINIA. — FEDEEAL  OCCUPA 
TION  OF  ALEXANDEIA. — TEAGEDT  AT  THE  MAESHALL  HOUSE. — JACKSON,  THE  MAETYE. — 
THE  AFFAIE  OF  GEEAT  BETHEL. — EASY  VICTOEY  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES. — EXAGGEEA- 
TIONS  OF  SOUTHEEN  NEWSPAPEBS. — APPAEENT  LULL  OF  HOSTILITIES. — NEW  DEMONSTBA- 
TIONS  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  THE  NOETH. — FINANCIAL  DIFFICULTIES  AT  WASHINGTON. — 
POPULAE  CLAMOUR  AGAINST  PEESIDENT  LINCOLN  AND  GEN.  SCOTT. — EAELY  INDICATIONS 
OF  THE  EEAL  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAE. — THE  EIGHTS  OF  HUMANITY. — VIEGINIA  THE  GEEAT 
THEATEE  OF  THE  WAE. — THE  GEAND  AEMY  OF  THE  NOETH. — CONSULTATION  OF  PEESIDENT 
DAVIS  AND  BEAUEEGAED  AND  LEE. — BEAUEEGAED'S  LINE  OF  DEFENCE  IN  NOETHEEN  VIE 
GINIA. — SKETCH  OF  GENEEAL  BEAUEEGAED. — HIS  PEESON  AND  MANNEES. — HIS  OPINION 

OF  THE  YANKEE. — THE  AEMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  AND  THE  AEMY  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. — 
GEN.  JOHNSTON'S  EVACUATION  OF  HAEPEE'S  FEEEY. — "STONEWALL"  JACKSON'S  FIEST 
AFFAIE  WITH  THE  ENEMY. — JOHNSTON  AMUSING  THE  ENEMY. — AFFAIE  OF  EICH  MOUN 
TAIN. — MCCLELLAN'S  MAECH  INTO  NOETHWESTEEN  VIEGINIA. — BOSEORANS'  CAPTUEE  OF 

THE  CONFEDEEATE  FOECE  ON  EICH  MOUNTAIN.— EETEEAT  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES  FEOM 
LAUEEL  HILL. — DEATH  OF  GEN.  GAENETT. — EXTENT  OF  THE  DISASTEE  TO  THE  CONFEDEE 
ATES. — THE  "GEAND  AEMY"  ADVANCING  ON  MANASSAS. — JOHNSTON'S  MOVEMENT  TO 
BEAUEEGAED'S  LINE.— THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS. — THE  AFFAIE  OF  18TH  JULY. — LONG- 
STEEET'S  GALLANT  DEFENCE. — THEATEE  OF  THE  GEEAT  BATTLE. — BEAUEEGAED'S  CHANGE 

OF  PUEPOSE,  AND  HIS  PLAN  OF  BATTLE. — THE  STONE  BEIDGE. — THE  "  BIG  FOEEST." — THE 
CONFEDEEATES  FLANKED. — THE  DAY  APPAEENTLY  LOST  FOE  THEM. — THE  SCENE  AT  THE 
HENEY  HOUSE. — TIMELY  AEEIVAL  OF  JACKSON. — GEN.  BEAUEEGAED  DISCONCEETED. — EIDE 
FEOM  THE  HILL  TO  THE  HENEY  HOUSE. — THE  BATTLE  EESTOEED. — THE  BLOODY  PLATEAU. 
— THEEE  STAGES  IN  THE  BATTLE. — THE  LAST  EFFOET  OF  THE  ENEMY. — THE  STEANGE 
FLAG. — AEEIVAL  OF  KIEBY  SMITH.— THE  GEAND  AND  FINAL  CHAEGE. — EOUT  AND  PANIC 
OF  THE  ENEMY. — THE  FEAEFUL  EACE  TO  THE  POTOMAC. — SCENES  OF  THE  EETEEAT. — 
FAILUEE  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES  TO  PUESUE,  OE  TO  ADVANCE  UPON  WASHINGTON. — A  LOST 
OPPOETUNITY. 

SOME  weeks  after  the  secession  of  Virginia,  Mr.  Lincoln  is  said  to  have 
remarked  that  he  "  would  soon  get  the  wolf  by  the  ears."  He  probably 
meant  in  this  figure  of  the  backwoodsman  that  he  would  soon  secure  the 
two  important  passages  into  Virginia  :  that  along  the  Orange  and  Alex 
andria  and  Central  Eailroads  towards  Eichmond,  and  that  along  the  water 
avenue  of  the  James. 


TRAGEDY  AT  THE  MARSHALL  HOUSE.  135 

On  the  24th  of  May  Alexandria  was  occupied  by  the  Federals,  the 
Yirginia  forces  evacuating  the  town,  and  falling  back  towards  Manassas 
Junction.  The  invasion  was  accomplished  under  the  cover  of  night.  It 
was  attended  by  an  incident  which  gave  a  lesson  to  the  enemy  of  the  spirit 
he  was  to  encounter,  and  furnished  the  first  instance  of  individual  martyr 
dom  in  the  war.  On  one  of  the  hotels  of  the  town,  the  Marshall  House, 
there  was  a  Confederate  flag  flying.  The  proprietor  of  the  hotel, 
Mr.  Jackson,  captain  of  an  artillery  company  in  his  town,  had  deliberately 
declared  that  under  any  circumstances  he  would  defend  that  flag  with  his 
life,  and  had  been  deaf  to  the  advice  of  his  neighbours  not  to  make  his 
house,  by  this  display,  a  sign  for  the  enemy's  attack.  The  flag  could  be 
seen  from  a  window  of  the  White  House  in  Washington.  As  a  company 
of  Fire  Zouaves,  at  the  head  of  which  was  Col.  Ellsworth,  a  protege  of 
Mr.  Lincoln,  entered  the  town  in  the  gray  of  the  morning,  their  com 
mander  swore  that  he  would  have  the  flag  as  his  especial  prize.  He  was 
attended  in  his  adventure  by  a  squad  of  his  men.  Having  found  his  way 
into  the  hotel,  he  got  through  a  trap-door  to  its  top,  where  he  secured  the 
obnoxious  ensign  ;  but  descending  the  ladder  he  found  facing  him  a  single 
man  in  his  shirt  sleeves,  with  a  double-barrel  gun  in  hfs  hands.  "  Here 
is  my  trophy,"  exclaimed  Ellsworth,  displaying  the  flag  on  his  arm. 
"  And  you  are  mine,"  replied  Jackson,  as  he  quickly  raised  his  gun,  and 
discharged  its  contents  into  the  breast  of  the  exultant  Federal.  Another 
moment  and  the  brave  Virginian  was  stretched  by  the  side  of  his  antag 
onist  a  lifeless  corpse ;  for  one  of  Ellsworth's  men  had  sped  a  bullet 
through  his  brain,  and  another  had  thrust  a  bayonet  into  his  breast  as  he 
was  in  the  act  of  falling. 

In  the  low  country  of  Yirginia,  in  the  vicinity  of  Fortress  Monroe,  an 
affair  occurred  on  the  10th  of  June,  which,  though  it  is  not  to  be  ranked 
as  a  decisive  engagement,  was  certainly  a  serious  and  well-timed  check  to 
the  enemy  in  this  direction.  A  Federal  coliimn,  exceeding  four  thousand 
men,  moved  out  from  Fortress  Monroe  in  the  direction  of  Great  Bethel, 
a  church  which  stood  about  nine  miles  on  the  road  leading  south  from 
Hampton.  The  position  here  had  been  entrenched  by  Gen.  J.  B.  Ma- 
gruder,  who  had  in  his  command  about  eighteen  hundred  men.  It  was 
designed  by  the  enemy  to  attack  the  Confederates  in  their  front,  while 
another  portion  of  the  column  should  cross  the  creek,  which  ran  here,  some 
distance  below,  and  attempt  to  get  into  the  Confederate  work  through  a 
gorge  which  was  supposed  to  be  open.  The  attack  in  front  was  easily 
repulsed,  as  the  Federals  never  dared  to  advance  from  the  woods  which 
obscured  their  position  ;  and  when  the  1st  North  Carolina  Regiment  was 
ordered  forward,  the  enemy  actually  broke  before  this  small  force  got 
within  sixty  yards  of  their  position.  The  column  that  had  crossed  the 
creek  advanced  witli  cheers,  supposing  that  they  had  turned  the  Confed- 


136  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

erate  position ;  but  a  volley  of  musketry  put  them  to  flight,  and  the  officer 
who  led  them,  Major  Winthrop,  was  killed  by  the  bullet  of  a  North  Caro 
lina  rifleman,  as  he  in  vain  attempted  to  rally  his  men  to  the  charge. 
The  loss  of  the  Confederates  in  this  affair  was  one  man  killed  and  seven 
wounded ;  that  of  the  enemy,  by  their  own  acknowledgment,  was  thirty 
killed  and  more  than  one  hundred  wounded.  In  the  little  experience  of 
war  on  both  sides  the  action  of  Bethel  was  rated  as  a  famous  battle,  and 
was  paraded  through  many  columns  of  the  newspapers.  The  cotemporary 
estimate  of  its  importance  is  ludicrous  enough  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  and  in  comparison  with  those  monuments  of  carnage,  which  were 
hereafter  to  appear  on  the  fields  of  Yirginia. 

The  comparative  pause  of  warlike  excitement  after  the  affair  of  Bethel, 
and  the  apparent  lull  of  hostilities,  while,  in  fact,  both  Governments  were 
making  active  preparations  for  the  contest,  was  marked  by  some  interest 
ing  demonstrations  of  public  opinion  in  the  North.  It  might  have  been 
noticed  in  this  time,  that  public  attention  in  the  North  was  measurably 
turned  from  military  movements  to  the  financial  aspects  of  the  war,  and 
to  the  provisions  which  the  Northern  Congress  was  so  soon  to  be  called 
upon  to  make,  in  order  to  meet  present  exigencies.  A  considerable  por 
tion  of  the  Northern  press  appeared  to  show  the  same  diversion  of  atten 
tion  ;  and  their  tone  might  have  been  noticed  to  have  become  decidedly 
more  healthy  and  prudent  in  leaving  for  a  time  the  grosser  excitements  of 
war  to  ponder  the  vital  concerns  of  the  debts,  taxes,  burdens,  and  losses 
consequent  upon  hostilities. 

Some  time  ago,  an  ominous  growl  from  "Wall  street  had  reached  the 
ear  of  the  Government  at  Washington.  The  discontent  had  since  slowly 
and  steadily  manifested  itself.  Combinations  were  spoken  of  among 
Northern  capitalists  to  terminate  the  war  ;  to  grant  no  more  loans  or  aids 
to  the  Government ;  and  to  overrule  the  programme  of  the  politicians  at 
"Washington  by  the  superiour  power  of  their  money  and  their  commercial 
interest.  The  estimates  of  the  Government  had  indeed  become  frightful. 
The  cost  of  the  war  was  rated  at  ten  million  dollars  a  week.  Besides  this, 
Congress  was  to  be  called  upon  to  make  a  current  annual  appropriation 
for  ordinary  expenditures  and  interest  on  the  debt,  of  at  least  one  hundred 
and  fifty  millions  of  dollars,  which  indispensable  estimate — however  the 
war  might  be  pushed  for  a  time  on  credit — there  could  be  no  possible  way 
of  meeting  unless  by  modes  of  direct  taxation,  in  income  taxes,  excises,  etc. 

The  Northern  Government  had  the  most  serious  reasons  to  distrust 
the  Wall  street  combination,  and  to  put  itself  out  of  the  power  of  capital 
ists,  who  were  plainly  aggrieved  by  the  prospect,  that  was  now  being 
steadily  developed,  of  a  long  and  expensive  war.  A  Cabinet  council  was 
called,  and  Mr.  Secretary  Chase  proposed  a  new  plan  of  national  loan. 
It  was  to  make  a  direct  appeal  to  the  people  to  provide  means  for  the 


OBJECTS    OF  THE  WAR  UmiASKED,  107 

prosecution  of  the  war.  Outside  of  the  Cabinet,  at  whose  board  the  plan 
was  reported  to  have  been  well  received,  it  met  with  the  most  strenuous 
objections. 

In  these  distresses  and  embarrassments  of  the  Government,  the  bellicose 
elements  of  the  North,  resenting  all  prospects  of  peace,  became  more  exact 
ing  than,  ever,  and  even  accusatory  of  the  authorities  at  Washington. 
The  more  violent  New  York  papers  demanded  a  vigorous  military  move 
ment  on  the  part  of  the  Government  before  the  meeting  of  Congress. 
They  accused  the  Administration  of  supineness  of  policy  and  uncertainty 
of  purpose ;  and  they,  even,  did  not  hesitate  to  charge  that  the  President 
and  his  Cabinet  were  conniving  with  "  the  rebels,"  and  had  consented  to 
become  parties  to  a  negotiation  for  peace.  These  heated  and  ungenerous 
expressions  did  not  stop  here.  Personalities  were  freely  indulged  in.  The 
President  was  vilely  abused  for  not  having  recalled  Mr.  Harvey,  the  min 
ister  to  Portugal,  because  he  had  corresponded  with  the  South  Carolina 
authorities  during  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration ;  and  Gen.  Scott,  who 
was  sacrificing  for  the  Northern  objects  of  the  war,  all  that  remained  to 
him  of  the  years  and  honours  of  a  long  life,  was  not  spared  from  an 
atrocious  libel  charging  him  with  having  offered  premiums  to  "  treason  " 
in  procuring  the  restoration  to  the  United  States  service  and  the  promo 
tion  to  a  lieutenant-colonelcy  of  Major  Emory,  a  Marylander,  who  had 
formerly  resigned  his  command  on  the  Indian  frontier. 

These  dissatisfied  utterances,  although  they  may  have  been  but  little 
annoying,  personally,  to  the  Government,  were  significant  of  other  most 
serious  troubles  to  be  apprehended  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  They  gave 
evidence  of  a  sentiment  in  the  North,  at  once  fanatical  and  formidable, 
resolved  to  push  the  war  beyond  the  avowed  objects  of  the  Government, 
and  to  resist  any  termination  of  it  short  of  the  excision  or  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  South.  This  sentiment  had,  in  fact,  already  become  clamor 
ous  and  exacting.  A  war  short  of  the  abolition  of  slavery  was  denounced 
as  a  farce,  and  its  mission  of  defending  the  Union  was  openly  exchanged 
in  the  mouths  of  fanatics  for  that  of  achieving  u  the  rights  of  humanity. ^ 

In  the  mean  time  indications  were  obvious  enough  of  the  common 
intention  of  the  belligerents  to  make  the  first  great  battles  of  the  war  in 
Virginia.  Here  was  to  open  the  first  great  chapter  of  Carnage — on  a 
theatre  at  once  wide  and  brilliant ; — filled  with  the  array  of  armies  of  two 
powerful  peoples,  which  brought  from  their  wealth  and  long  seasons  of 
prosperity  all  that  could  invest  war  with  destructive  power  and  dramatic 
display  ;. — occupying  a  territory  noble  and  inspired  in  historical  memories 
— the  name  of  which,  "  Virginia"  had  ever  been  a  word  of  magic  pride 
throughout  the  breadth  and  length  of  a  continent ; — and  engaging  in  the 
issues  of  its  imposing  drama  the  liberties,  or,  at  least,  the  independence  of 
more  than  eight  millions  of  men. 


138  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

On  the  lines  of  the  Potomac,  Gen.  Scott  had  gathered  one  of  the  largest 
armies  that  had  ever  been  seen  in  America.  Nothing  was  left  undone  to 
complete  its  preparations  ;  in  numbers  it  was  all  that  was  desired  ;  and  it 
was  provided  with  the  best  artillery  in  the  world.  All  the  regulars  east 
of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  to  the  number  of  several  thousand,  collected 
since  February,  in  the  city  of  Washington,  from  Jefferson  Barracks,  from 
St.  Louis,  and  from  Fortress  Monroe,  were  added  to  the  immense  force  of 
volunteers  that  had  been  brought  down  to  the  lines  of  the  Potomac.  The 
following  is  the  estimate  of  the  force  of  this  army  at  this  time,  obtained 
from  official  sources :  Fifty-five  regiments  of  volunteers,  eight  companies 
of  regular  infantry,  four  of  marines,  nine  of  regular  cavalry,  and  twelve 
batteries,  forty-nine  guns.  It  was  placed  at  the  command  of  Gen. 
McDowell,  who  came  to  this  important  post  of  action  with  the  reputation 
of  the  greatest  and  most  scientific  general  in  the  North,  but  who  was  to 
run,  indeed,  a  very  short  career  of  Yankee  popularity. 

On  the  Confederate  side,  preparations  for  the  coming  contest  were  quite 
as  busy,  if  not  so  extensive.  At  the  beginning  of  June,  Gen.  Beauregard 
was  in  consultation  with  President  Davis  and  Gen.  Lee,  at  Richmond, 
while,  by  means  of  couriers,  they  held  frequent  communication  with 
Gen.  Johnston,  then  in  command  near  Harper's  Ferry.  The  result  was, 
that  a  military  campaign  was  decided  upon,  embracing  defensive  opera 
tions  in  North  Yirginia  and  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  and  the  concentration 
of  an  army,  under  Beauregard,  at  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad  junction, 
and  in  the  immediate  locality.  The  position  taken  by  Gen.  Beauregard 
was  one  of  great  strength ;  and  probably  no  better  for  defensive  purpose 
could  be  found  in  the  whole  State  of  Yirginia.  It  was  about  midway 
between  the  eastern  spur  of  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the  Potomac  below  Alex 
andria  ;  the  right  wing  stretched  off  towards  the  waters  of  the  Occoquan 
through  a  wooded  country  ;  the  left  was  a  rolling  table-land  readily  com 
manded  from  the  successive  elevations  until  it  broke  into  a  rough  and 
intricate  country  that  no  army  could  pass  without  the  greatest  difficulty. 
The  intervening  country  was  commanded  by  Beauregard's  army  so  per 
fectly  that  there  was  scarcely  a  possibility  of  its  being  turned.  A  small 
stream,  called  Bull  Run,  ran  in  this  locality,  nearly  from  west  to  east,  to 
its  confluence  with  the  Occoquan  River,  about  twelve  miles  from  the 
Potomac,  and  draining  a  considerable  scope  of  country,  from  its  source  in 
Bull  Run  Mountain,  to  within  a  short  distance  of  the  Potomac  at  Oc 
coquan.  At  Mitchell's  Ford,  the  stream  was  about  equi-distant  between 
Centre ville  and  Manassas,  some  six  miles  apart.  There  were  a  number 
of  other  fords  ;  but  the  banks  of  the  stream  were  rocky  and  steep. 

Gen.  Beauregard  was  fresh  from  the  glories  of  Sumter.  A  brief 
account  of  this  man,  who  was,  indeed,  the  central  figure  in  the  early 
period  of  the  war,  will  be  interesting  here.  He  was  now  forty-five  years 


GENEEAL   BEAUKEQARD.  139 

old.  His  family  was  of  French  extraction,  and  had  settled  in  Louisiana 
in  the  reign  of  Louis  XY.  In  1838,  he  was  graduated  at  "West  Point, 
taking  the  second  honours  in  a  class  of  forty-five.  He  entered  the  Mexi 
can  war  as  a  lieutenant,  obtained  two  brevets  in  it,  the  last  that  of  major ; 
and  was  subsequently  placed  by  the  Government  in  charge  of  the  con 
struction  of  some  public  buildings  at  New  Orleans,  as  well  as  the  fortifica 
tions  on  and  near  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  About  the  beginning  of 
the  year  1861,  he  was  appointed  superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy 
at  "West  Point ;  but  the  appoinment  was  revoked  within  forty-eight  hours 
by  President  Buchanan,  for  the  spiteful  reason,  as  is  alleged,  that  Senator 
Slidell  of  Louisiana,  the  brother-in-law  of  the  nominee,  had  given  offence 
by  a  secession  speech  at  Washington.  Subsequently,  Major  Beauregard 
resigned  his  commission  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  was  ap 
pointed  by  Gov.  Moore  of  Louisiana,  Colonel  of  Engineers  in  the  Provi 
sional  Army  of  the  South  ;  from  which  position,  as  we  have  seen,  he  was 
called  by  President  Davis  to  the  defence  of  Charleston. 

Gen.  Beauregard  was  singularly  impassioned  in  defence  of  the  cause 
which  he  served.  He  hated  and  despised  "  the  Yankee ;  "  and  it  must 
be  confessed  was  the  author  of  some  silly  letters  in  the  early  part  of  the 
war,  deriding  the  power  of  the  enemy.  That  the*6outh  would  easily  whip 
the  North  was  his  constant  assertion,  even  if  the  first  "  had  for  arms  only 
pitch-forks  and  flint-lock  muskets."  Of  the  army  which  Gen.  Scott  was 
marshalling  on  the  borders  of  Virginia,  he  wrote  that  the  enemies  of  the 
South  were  "  little  more  than  an  armed  rabble,  gathered  together  hastily 
on  a  false  pretence,  and  for  an  unholy  purpose,  with  an  octogenarian  at 
its  head !  " 

Beauregard's  personal  appearance  could  scarcely  escape  notice.  He 
was  a  small,  brown,  thin  man,  with  features  wearing  a  dead  expression, 
and  hair  prematurely  whitened.  His  manners  were  distinguished  and 
severe,  but  not  cold ;  they  forbade  intimacy ;  they  had  the  abruptness 
without  the  vivacity  of  the  Frenchman ;  but  they  expressed  no  conceit, 
and  were  not  repulsive.  He  had  ardour,  a  ceaseless  activity,  and  an  in 
domitable  power  of  will.  His  notions  of  chivalry  were  somewhat  stilted, 
and  he  had  fought  his  first  battle  with  an  interchange  of  courtesies  that 
induced  a  Frenchman  to  exclaim  in  Paris :  "  Quelle  idee  chevalresque ! 
On  voit  que  vous  avez  profile,  vous  autres  Americains,  de  Vexemple 
Frangais.  Ce  General  Beauregard  port  un  nom  Frangais  !  " 

It  is  not  to  be  wondered  that  Gen.  Beauregard,  with  the  eclat  of  the 
first  victory  of  the  war,  and  the  attractions  of  a  foreign  name  and  manners, 
should  have  been  the  ladies'  favourite  among  the  early  Southern  generals. 
He  was  constantly  receiving  attentions  from  them,  in  letters,  in  flags,  and 
in  hundreds  of  pretty  missives.  His  camp-table  was  often  adorned  with 
presents  of  rare  flowers,  which  flanked  his  maps  and  plans,  and  a  bouquet 


14:0  THE  LOST  CATJSE. 

frequently  served  him  for  a  paper  weight.  There  was  perhaps  a  little 
tawdriness  about  these  displays  in  a  military  camp  ;  but  Gen.  Beauregard 
had  too  much  force  of  character  to  be  spoiled  by  hero-worship,  or  by  that 
part  of  popular  admiration,  the  most  dangerous  to  men  intent  on  great 
and  grave  purposes — the  flattery  and  pursuit  of  women. 

Beauregard's  army  in  Northern  Virginia  was  then  known  as  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  In  the  latter  part  of  July,  its  effective  force  was  enumer 
ated  as  21,833  men  and  twenty-nine  guns.  But  there  was  within  reach  of 
it  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  numbering  little  less  than  nine  thou 
sand  men. 

This  latter  force  was  commanded  by  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  a  native 
of  Virginia,  who  had  distinguished  himself  in  the  Mexican  war,  and  at  the 
commencement  of  the  present  hostilities  was  at  the  head  of  the  quarter 
master's  department  in  the  United  States  Army  with  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general.  Of  the  operations  of  his  army  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley  it  is 
necessary  to  make  a  brief  sketch,  as  these  operations  were  a  necessary  part 
of  the  early  campaign  of  the  Potomac,  and  an  obvious  prelude  to  the  great 
battle  of  the  21st  July  we  are  proceeding  to  relate. 

In  the  latter  part  of  May,  Gen.  Johnston  assumed  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah*  and,  after  a  complete  reconnoissance  of  Harper's 
Ferry  and  environs,  he  decided  that  the  place  was  untenable,  and,  there 
fore,  determined  to  withdraw  his  troops  to  Winchester.  At  this  time 
Gen.  Patterson  was  advancing,  with  a  strong  force,  from  Pennsylvania 
and  Maryland  into  Virginia,  and  it  was  supposed  that  an  attempt  would 
be  made  by  that  general  to  form  a  junction  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  with 
Gen.  McClellan,  then  advancing  towards  "Winchester  from  the  western 
parts  of  Virginia.  To  prevent  this  junction  Gen.  Johnston  abandoned 
Harper's  Ferry,  on  the  13th  of  June,  after  first  burning  the  railroad  bridge 
and  such  buildings  as  were  likely  to  prove  most  useful  to  the  enemy. 

The  Confederates  retired  to  Winchester,  but  had  scarcely  arrived  there 
when  information  was  obtained  that  the  Federals  were  still  advancing ; 
and  Gen.  Jackson — afterwards  known  as  the  immortal  "  Stonewall " 
Jackson — with  his  brigade,  was  sent  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Martins- 
burg,  to  aid  Stuart's  cavalry  in  destroying  what  they  could  of  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  Hailroad  stock,  and  thus  check  the  enemy's  movements. 
On  the  2d  of  July,  however,  Patterson  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Potomac 
at  Williamsport ;  the  river  being  scarcely  waist-deep  there.  Jackson  fell 
back  to  Falling  Waters,  on  the  main  road  to  Martinsburg,  a  running  fire 
being  kept  up.  A  detachment  of  Federal  troops  was  then  sent  forward  to 
reconnoitre,  and  Jackson  was  encountered  in  a  position  where  he  had 
formed  his  men  in  line  of  battle,  with  four  guns  directly  on  the  turnpike 
along  which  the  enemy  was  advancing.  For  half  an  hour  Jackson  suc 
ceeded  in  maintaining  his  ground ;  but,  at  last,  was  compelled  to  fall  back 


AFFAIK  AT  RICH   MOUNTAIN.  141 

slowly,  and  finally  to  retire,  when  about  to  be  outflanked,  scarcely  losing 
a  man,  and  bringing  off  forty-five  prisoners. 

Jackson  having  rejoined  the  main  army  under  Johnston,  at  Winchester, 
Patterson,  fell  back  towards  the  river.  The  design,  of  this  Federal  com 
mander  appears  to  have  been  little  more  than  a  series  of  feints  to  detain 
Johnston  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  to  prevent  the  union  of  his 
forces  with  those  of  Beauregard,  then  strongly  encamped  on  the  plains  of 
Manassas.  But  the  design  was  transparent  to  Johnston,  and,  indeed,  was 
turned  upon  the  enemy,  for  the  more  skilfully  executed  feint  movement 
of  Johnston  completely  deceived  the  enemy  to  the  last  moment. 

But  while  Johnston  was  thus  keeping  in  check  Patterson's  column  at 
the  head  of  tlie  Shenandoah  Valley,  an  important  event,  and  one  of  no 
little  disaster  to  the  Confederate  cause,  was  to  occur  in  Northwestern  Vir 
ginia—as  was  designated  that  portion  of  the  State  beyond  the  western 
ridges  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains.  It  was  designed  by  the  Federal 
Government  not  only  to  secure  this  region,  but  to  use  it  as  a  base  from 
which  to  project  columns  of  invasion  into  the  Valley  of  Virginia  and  the 
rich  counties  of  the  Southwest. 


THE  AFFAIK   OF   KICH   MOUNTAIN. 

An  army  under  Gen.  George  B.  McClellan  was  to  be  used  for  this  pur 
pose.  Its  advanced  regiments  had  already  penetrated  far  in  upon  the  line 
of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Eailroad;  had  driven  a  small  force  from 
Philippi ;  had  occupied  that  town  and  Grafton,  and  had  pushed  forward, 
by  country  roads,  from  Wheeling  and  the  Ohio  Elver  to  Buckhannon,  in 
Upshur  County.  The  movements  of  McClellan  were  now  directed  towards 
Beverley,  with  the  object  of  getting  to  the  rear  of  Gen.  Garnett,  who  had 
been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  Northwest 
ern  Virginia,  and  was  occupying  a  strong  position  at  Eich  Mountain,  in 
Eandolph  County. 

But  the  unskilful  distribution  of  the  Confederate  forces  and  their  in 
adequate  numbers  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  enemy.  The  strength 
of  Gen.  Garnett's  command  was  less  than  five  thousand  infantry,  with  ten 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  four  companies  of  cavalry.  The  disposition  of  these 
forces  was  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Eich  Mountain.  Col.  Pegrani 
occupied  the  mountain  with  a  force  of  about  sixteen  hundred  men  and 
some  pieces  of  artillery.  On  the  slopes  of  Laurel  Hill,  Gen.  Gamett  was 
intrenched  with  a  force  of  three  thousand  infantry,  six  pieces  of  artiller}> 
and  three  companies  of  cavalry. 

The  plans  of  the  enemy  promised  a  complete  success.  Gen.  Eose- 
crans,  with  a  Federal  column  of  about  three  thousand  men,  was  to  gain, 


THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

by  a  difficult  inarch  through  the  mountain,  Pegram's  left  and  rear,  while 
McClellan  attacked  in  front  with  five  thousand  men,  and  a  number  of 
pieces  of  artillery.  On  the  llth  of  July,  before  daybreak,  Rosecrans5 
column  was  in  motion.  The  path  up  the  mountain  was  rugged  and  per 
plexed  beyond  all  expectation ;  the  weather  was  uncertain ;  often  heavy 
showers  of  rain  poured  down  for  hours,  and  when  the  clouds  broke,  the 
sun  appeared  and  filled  the  air  with  heat.  Through  the  laurel  thickets, 
clambering  up  ravines,  slipping  from  stones  dislodged  and  earth  moistened 
by  the  rain,  the  Federals  toiled  up  the  mountain.  As  they  advanced 
through  the  forest,  the  •  Confederate  artillery  posted  on  the  top  of  the 
mountain,  opened  upon  them,  but  with  little  effect,  as  their  lines  were  con 
cealed  by  the  trees  and  brushwood.  After  some  sharp  skirmishing,  Eose 
crans  threw  out  his  men  on  either  flank,  with  the  view  of  surrounding  the 
small  Confederate  force.  Finding  himself  with  three  thousand  of  the 
enemy  in  his  rear,  and  five  thousand  in  his  front,  Col.  Pegram  endeavored 
to  escape  with  his  command  after  a  small  loss  in  action.  ^Six  companies 
of  infantry  succeeded  in  escaping ;  the  other  part  of  the  command  was 
surrendered  as  prisoners  of  war. 

As  soon  as  Gen.  Garnett  heard  of  the  result  of  the  engagement  at  Rich 
Mountain,  he  determined  to  evacuate  Laurel  Hill,  and  retire  to  Huttons- 
ville  by  the  way  of  Beverley.  But  this  plan  was  disconcerted  by  a  failure 
to  block  the  road  from  Rich  Mountain  to  Beverley ;  and  Gen.  Garnett 
was  compelled  to  retreat  by  a  mountain  road  into  Hardy  County.  The 
retreat  was  a  painful  one,  and  attended  with  great  suffering  ;  the  pursuing 
enemy  fell  upon  the  rear  of  the  distressed  little  army  at  every  opportunity ; 
and  at  one  of  the  fords  on  Little  Cheat  River  four  companies  of  a  Georgia 
regiment  were  cut  off,  and  Gen.  Garnett  himself  was  killed  by  one  of  the 
enemy's  sharpshooters. 

The  results  of  the  engagements  on  the  mountain  and  of  the  pursuit  of 
the  retreating  army  was  not  very  considerable  in  killed  and  wounded — 
probably  not  a  hundred  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates.  But  they  had 
lost  nearly  all  of  their  artillery,  more  than  a  thousand  prisoners,  and  al 
most  the  entire  baggage  of  the  command,  portions  of  which  had  been  used 
in  blocking  the  road  against  the  enemy's  artillery. 

But  this  early  disaster  to  the  Confederate  cause  was  soon  to  be  more 
than  retrieved  on  a  broader  and  more  interesting  theatre,  and  by  one  of  the 
most  decisive  and  dramatic  victories  of  the  war ;  and  to  the  direction  of 
these  important  operations  our  narrative  now  takes  us  in  the  regular  suc 
cession  of  events. 

On  the  18th  of  July,  a  despatch  reached  Gen.  Johnston  at  "Winchester, 
that  the  great  Northern  army  was  advancing  on  Manassas.  He  was  im 
mediately  ordered  to  form  a  junction  of  his  army  with  that  of  Beauregard, 
should  the  movement  in  his  judgment  be  deemed  advisable. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  143 

The  "  Grand  Army,"  as  the  Northern  newspapers  entitled  it,  was  at 
last  ready  to  move,  and  only  after  a  period  of  impatience  on  the  part  of 
the  Northern  people,  that  was  clamorous  and  insolent  with  the  assurance 
of  victory.  "  On  to  Richmond  "  had  been  the  cry  of  Northern  newspapers 
for  weeks  ;  extreme  parties  in  the  Federal  Congress  urged  an  immediate 
advance  ;  and  it  was  thought  to  be  so  easy  an  enterprise  to  press  forward 
and  plant  the  stars  and  stripes  in  the  Capitol  Square  of  Richmond,  that 
men  wondered  why  Gen.  Scott,  who  directed  the  military  movements  from 
Washington,  did  not  at  once  grasp  the  prize  within  his  reach,  complete 
his  reputation,  and  despatch  the  war.  At  last  it  was  given  out  in  Washing 
ton  that  the  Grand  Army  was  ready  to  move  ;  and  that  Richmond  would 
be  occupied  probably  in  ten  days.  It  was  an  occasion  of  peculiar  hilarity, 
and  the  prospect  of  a  triumphal  entry  of  the  Federal  arms  into  Richmond 
was  entertained  with  every  variety  of  public  joy.  Politicians  prepared 
carriage-loads  of  champagne  for  festal  celebration  of  the  victory  that  was 
to  be  won ;  tickets  were  printed  and  distributed  for  a  grand  ball  in  Rich 
mond  ;  a  stream  of  visitors  to  the  battle-field  set  out  from  Washington, 
thronged  with  gay  women  and  strumpets  going  to  attend  "  the  Manassas 
Races ;  "  and  soon  in  the  rear  of  McDowell's  army  was  collected  an  in 
decent  and  bedizened  rabble  to  watch  the  battle  from  afar.  Such  an 
exhibition  of  morbid  curiosity  or  of  exultant  hate  lias  seldom  been  wit 
nessed  in  the  history  of  the  civilized  world. 


THE  BATTLE  OF   MANASSAS. 

The  great  contest  of  arms  was  to  be  preceded  by  an  affair  which, 
however  intended,  proved  of  some  importance.  On  the  18th  of  July,  the 
enemy  made  a  demonstration  with  artillery  in  front  of  Gen.  Bonham's 
brigade,  which  held  the  approaches  to  Mitchell's  Ford.  Meanwhile,  he 
was  advancing  in  strong  columns  of  infantry,  with  artillery  and  cavalry  on 
Blackburn's  Ford,  which  was  covered  by  Gen.  Longstreet's  brigade.  Be 
fore  advancing  his  infantry,  the  enemy  maintained  a  fire  of  rifle  artillery 
for  half  an  hour  ;  then  he  pushed  forward  a  column  of  over  three  thousand 
infantry  to  the  assault.  Twice  the  enemy  was  foiled  and  driven  back  by 
the  Confederate  skirmishers  and  Longstreet's  reserve  companies.  As  he 
returned  to  the  contest,  Longstreet,  who  commanded  only  twelve  hundred 
bayonets,  had  been  reinforced  with  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  two 
pieces  of  artillery.  Unable  to  effect  a  passage  of  the  stream,  the  enemy's 
fire  of  musketry  was  soon  silenced,  and  the  affair  became  one  of  artillery. 
Gradually  his  fire  slackened,  and  his  forces  were  drawn  off  in  evident  con 
fusion.  Sixty  of  his  dead  were  found  on  the  field.  The  Confederate 
casualties  were  unimportant — fifteen  killed  and  fifty-three  wounded. 


144  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

Whatever  the  significance  of  this  affair — whether  or  not  it  was 
intended  as  a  mere  "  reconnoissance  in  force,"  according  to  the  ene 
my's  account — it  was  considered  as  a  prelude  to  an  important  battle, 
and,  in  the  artillery  duel,  which  it  had  brought  on,  had  given  the  Con  • 
federates  great  confidence  in  this  unexpectedly  brilliant  arm  of  their 
service.  Two  days  passed  without  any  military  event.  But  on 
the  night  of  the  20th  of  July  it  was  evident  that  -  the  enemy  was 
in  motion.  As  the  lights  around  Centre ville  seemed  to  die  out  about 
midnight,  low  murmuring  noises  reached  the  Confederate  out-posts,  as 
if  large  bodies  of  men  were  marching  towards  the  Stone  Bridge,  where 
the  extreme  left  of  Beauregard's  army  rested.  The  bumping  of  heavy 
wagons  and  artillery  was  distinctly  audible,  and  words  of  command  could 
be  faintly  heard  in  the  still  night. 

The  sun  of  the  21st  of  July  rose  with  more  than  usual  splendour.  It 
was  a  calm  Sabbath  morning.  The  measured  sounds  of  artillery  told  that 
both  armies  were  on  the  alert.  Smoke  curling  away  from  the  cannon's 
mouth  rose  slowly  into  the  air ;  glistening  masses  of  troops  could  be  seen 
on  the  distant  landscape,  and  far  away  in  the  west  rose  the  dark  outline 
of  the  Blue  Ridge,  which  enclosed,  as  an  amphitheatre,  the  "woods  and 
hollows,  the  streams  and  open  spaces  of  Manassas  Plain. 

The  night  before  the  battle  Gen.  Beauregard  had  decided  to  take  the 
offensive.  Gen.  Johnston  had  arrived  during  the  day,  but  only  with  £ 
portion  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  ;  five  thousand  of  his  men  hav 
ing  been  detained  on  the  railroad  for  want  of  transportation.  It  was 
determined  that  the  two  forces,  less  than  thirty  thousand  effective  men 
of  all  arms,  should  be  united  within  the  lines  of  Bull  Eun,  and  thence 
advance  to  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  before  Patterson's  junction  with 
McDowell,  which  was  daily  expected.  But  a  battle  was  to  ensue,  dif 
ferent  in  place  and  circumstances  from  any  previous  plan  on  the  Con 
federate  side. 

The  Confederate  army  was  divided  into  eight  brigades,  stretching  for 
eight  or  ten  miles  along  the  defensive  line  of  Bull  Run.  The  right  of  the 
line  was  much  stronger  than  the  left,  in  position  and  numbers ;  the 
extreme  left  at  Stone  Bridge  being  held  by  Colonel  Evans  with  only  a  regi 
ment  and  battalion.  It  had  been  arranged  by  McDowell,  the  Federal 
commander,  that  the  first  division  of  his  army,  commanded  by  Gen.  Tyler, 
should  take  position  at  Stone  Bridge,  and  feign  an  attack  upon  that  point, 
while  the  second  and  third  divisions  were,  by  routes  unobserved  by  the 
Confederates,  to  cross  the  run,  and  thus  effect  a  junction  of  three  formi 
dable  divisions  of  the  grand  army,  to  be  thrown  upon  a  force  scattered 
along  the  stream  for  eight  iniles>  and  so  situated  as  to  render  a  concerted 
movement  on  their  part  impracticable. 

A  little  after  sunrise  the  enemy  opened  a  light  cannonade  upon  Col. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  145 

Evans'  position  at  Stone  Bridge.  This  continued  for  an  hour,  while  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy  was  marching  to  cross  Bull  Run,  some  two  miles 
above  the  Confederate  left.  Discovering,  to  his  amazement,  that  the 
enemy  had  crossed  the  stream  above  him,  Col.  Evans  fell  back.  As 
the  masses  of  the  enemy  drew  near,  military  science  pronounced  the  day 
lost  for  the  Confederates.  They  had  been  flanked  by  numbers  appar 
ently  overwhelming.  That  usually  fatal  and  terrible  worcl  in  military 
parlance — "jfanfad  " — may  be  repeated  with  emphasis. 

It  is  true  that  Col.  Evans,  who  had  held  the  position  at  Stone  Bridge, 
where  the  enemy's  feint  was  made,  had  discovered  the  nature  of  that 
demonstration  in  time  to  form  a  new  line  of  battle,  as  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy  emerged  from  the  "  Big  Forest,"  where  it  had  worked  its 
way  along  the  tortuous,  narrow  track  of  a  rarely-used  road.  But  the 
column  that  crossed  Bull  Run  numbered  over  sixteen  thousand  men  of 
all  arms.  Col.  Evans  had  eleven  companies  and  two  field-pieces.  Gen. 
Bee,  with  some  Georgia,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi  troops,  moved  up  to 
his  support.  The  joint  force  was  now  about  five  regiments  and  six  field- 
pieces.  That  thin  line  was  all  that  stood  between  sixteen  thousand  Fed 
erals  and  victory.  It  is  wonderful  that  this  small  force  of  Confederates 
should  have,  for  the  space  of  an  hour,  breasted  the  unremitting  battle- 
storm,  and  maintained  for  that  time  odds  almost  incredible.  But  they 
did  it.  It  was  frequently  said  afterwards  by  military  men  in  Richmond, 
that  the  Confederates  had  been  whipped,  but  that  the  men,  in  the  novelty 
of  their  experience  of  a  battle-field,  "  did  not  know  it." 

But  at  last  the  blended  commands  of  Bee  and  Evans  gave  way  before 
the  surging  masses  of  the  enemy.  The  order  for  retreat  was  given  by 
General  Bee.  The  Confederates  fell  back  sullenly.  Their  ranks  were 
fast  losing  cohesion ;  but  there  was  no  disorder ;  and,  at  every  step  of 
their  retreat,  they  stayed,  by  their  hard  skirmishing,  the  flanking  columns 
of  the  enemy.  There  were  more  than  five-fold  odds  against  them.  The 
enemy  now  caught  the  idea  that  he  had  won  the  day ;  the  news  of  a 
victory  was  carried  to  the  rear ;  the  telegraph  flashed  it  to  all  the  cities 
in  the  North,  and  before  noon  threw  "Washington  into  exultations. 

General  Bee  had  a  soldier's  eye  and  recognition  of  the  situation.  The 
conviction  shot  through  his  heart  that  the  day  was  lost.  As  he  was 
pressed  back  in  rear  of  the  Robinson  House,  he  found  Gen.  Jackson's 
brigade  of  five  regiments  ready  to  support  him.  It  was  the  timely 
arrival  of  a  man  who,  since  that  day,  never  failed  to  be  on  the  front 
of  a  battle's  crisis,  and  to  seize  the  decisive  moments  that  make  vic 
tories.  Gen.  Bee  rushed  to  the  strange  figure  of  the  Virginia  com 
mander,  who  sat  his  horse  like  marble,  only  twisting  his  head  in  a 
high  black  stock,  as  he  gave  his  orders  with  stern  distinctness.  "  Gen 
eral,"  he  pathetically  exclaimed,  "  they  are  beating  us  back."  "  Then, 
10 


146 


THE    LOST    CAUSE. 


sir,"  replied  Jackson,  "  we'll  give  them  the  bayonet."  The  words  were 
as  a  new  inspiration.  Gen.  Bee  turned  to  his  over-tasked  troops,  exclaim 
ing,  "  There  are  Jackson  and  his  "Virginians  standing  like  a  stone-wall. 
Let  us  determine  to  die  here,  and  we  will  conquer." 

In  the  meantime,  where  were  the  Confederate  Generals — Beauregard 
and  Johnston  ?  They  were  four  miles  away.  Gen.  Beauregard  had 
become  involved  in  a  series  of  blunders  and  mishaps,  such  as  had  been 
seldom  crowded  into  a  single  battle-field.  In  ignorance  of  the  enemy's 
plan  of  atttack,  he  had  kept  his  army  posted  along  Bull  Run  for  more 
than  eight  miles,  waiting  for  his  wily  adversary  to  develop  his  purpose 
to  him.  He  had,  at  an  early  hour  of  the  morning,  determined  to  attack 
with  his  right  wing  and  centre  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear  at  Centre- 
ville,  with  precautions  against  the  advance  of  his  reserves  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Washington.  Even  after  his  left  flank  had  been  so  terribly  en 
gaged,  he  supposed  that  this  movement  would  relieve  it ;  and  in  his 
official  report  of  the  action,  he  writes :  "  by  such  a  movement,  I  con 
fidently  expected  to  achieve  a  complete  victory  for  my  country  by  12 
o'clock,  M." 

It  was  half-past  ten  in  the  morning,  when  Gen.  Beauregard  learned 
that  his  orders  for  an  advance  on  Centreville  had  miscarried.  He  and 
Gen.  Johnston  had  taken  position  on  a  commanding  hill,  about  half  a 
mile  in  the  rear  of  Mitchell's  Ford,  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 
"While  they  were  anxiously  listening  there  for  sounds  of  conflict  from  the 
Confederate  front  at  Centreville,  the  battle  was  bursting  and  expending 
its  fury  upon  their  left  flank.  From  the  hill  could  be  witnessed  the  grand 
diorama  of  the  conflict.  The  roar  of  artillery  reached  there  like  pro 
tracted  thunder.  The  whole  valley  was  a  boiling  crater  of  dust  and 
smoke.  The  enemy's  design  could  be  no  longer  in  doubt ;  the  violent 
firing  on  the  left  showed,  at  last,  where  the  crisis  of  the  battle  was  ;  and 
now  immense  clouds  of  dust  plainly  denoted  the  march  of  a  large  body  of 
troops  from  the  Federal  centre. 

"Not  a  moment  was  now  to  be  lost.  It  was  instantly  necessary  to 
make  new  combinations,  and  these  the  most  rapid,  to  meet  the  enemy 
on  the  field  upon  which  he  had  chosen  to  give  battle.  It  was  evident 
that  the  left  flank  of  the  Confederates  was  being  overpowered.  Dashing 
on  at  a  headlong  gallop,  Gens.  Beauregard  and  Johnston  reached  the  field 
of  action,  in  the  rear  of  the  Robinson  House,  just  as  the  commands  of  Bee 
and  Evans  had  taken  shelter  in  a  wooded  ravine,  and  Jackson's  brigade 
had  moved  up  to  their  left,  to  withstand  the  pressure  of  the  enemy's  at 
tack.  It  was  a  thrilling  moment.  Gen.  Johnston  seized  the  colours  of 
the  4th  Alabama  regiment,  and  offered  to  lead  the  attack.  Gen.  Beaure 
gard  leaped  from  his  horse,  and  turning  his  face  to  his  troops,  exclaimed  : 
"  I  have  come  here  to  die  with  you." 


THE  BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  147 

In  the  meantime  the  Confederate  reserves  were  rapidly  moving  up 
to  support  the  left  flank.  The  movement  of  the  right  arid  centre,  begun 
by  Jones  and  Loiigstreet,  was  countermanded.  Holmes'  two  regiments 
and  a  battery  of  artillery  of  six  guns,  Early's  brigade  and  two  regiments 
from  Bonham's  brigade,  with  Kemper's  four  six-pounders  were  ordered  up 
to  support  the  left  flank.  The  battle  was  re-established  ;  but  the  aspect  of 
affairs  was  yet  desperate  in  the  extreme.  Confronting  the  enemy's  attack 
Gen.  Beauregard  had  as  yet  not  more  than  sixty-five  hundred  infantry  and 
artillerists,  with  but  thirteen  pieces  of  artillery,  aud  two  companies  of 
cavalry.  Gens.  Ewell,  Jones  (D.  R.),  Longstreet  and  Bonham  had  been 
directed  to  make  a  demonstration  to  their  several  fronts,  to  retain  and 
engross  the  enemy's  reserves  and  forces  on  their  flank,  and  at  and  around 
Centreville.  Gen.  Johnston  had  left  the  immediate  conduct  of  the  field 
to  Beauregard,  and  had  gone  in  the  direction  of  the  Lewis  House,  to  urge 
reinforcements  forward. 

The  battle  was  now  to  rage  long  and  fiercely  on  the  plateau  designated 
by  the  two  wooden  houses — the  Henry  and  Robinson  House — which 
stood  upon  it.  Gen.  Beauregard  determined  to  repossess  himself  of  the 
position,  and  formed  his  line  for  an  assault ;  his  right  rushed  to  the 
charge,  while  his  centre,  under  Jackson,  pierced  that  of  the  enemy.  The 
plateau  was  won,  together  with  several  guns  ;  but  the  enemy  threw  for 
ward  a  heavy  force  of  infantry,  and  again  dispossessed  the  Confederates. 
It  was  evident  that  the  latter  were  being  slowly  overpowered  by  the 
weight  of  numbers.  A  force,  estimated  at  twenty  thousand  infantry, 
seven  companies  of  cavalry,  and  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery  were  bear 
ing  hotly  and  confidently  down  on  their  position,  while  perilous  and 
heavy  reserves  of  infantry  and  artillery  hung  in  the  distance. 

It  was  now  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Fortunately  the 
reinforcements  pushed  forward,  and  directed  by  Gen.  Johnston  to  the 
required  quarter,  were  at  hand  just  as  Gen.  Beauregard  had  ordered  for 
ward  a  second  effort  for  the  recovery  of  the  disputed  plateau.  The  bri 
gade  of  Holmes  and  another  were  put  in  the  line.  Additional  pieces  of 
artillery  came  dashing  up,  and  a  new  inspiration  seemed  to  be  caught  by 
the  Confederates.  The  line  swept  grandly  forward ;  shouts  ran  along 
it ;  and  steadily  it  penetrated  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  The 
whole  open  ground  was  again  swept  clear  of  the  enemy ;  but  it  was 
strewn  with  the  evidences  of  a  terrible  carnage.  Gen.  Bee  had  fallen 
near  the  Henry  House,  mortally  wounded.  A  little  further  on,  Col. 
Bartow,  of  Alabama,  had  fallen,  shot  through  the  heart — and  one  of 
the  bravest  and  most  promising  spirits  of  the  South  was  there  quenched 
in  blood.  But  the  tide  of  fortune  had  changed ;  the  plateau  was  now 
firmly  in  our  possession  ;  and  the  enemy,  driven  across  the  turnpike 
and  into  the  woods,  was  visibly  disorganized. 


148  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

But  there  were  to  be  three  stages  in  the  battle  of  Manassas.  We  have 
already  described  two  :  the  enemy's  flank  movement  and  momentary  vic 
tory,  and  the  contest  for  the  plateau.  The  third  was  now  to  occur  ;  and 
the  enemy  was  to  make  his  last  attempt  to  retrieve  the  fortune  of  the  day. 

His  broken  line  was  rapidly  rallied.  He  had  re-formed  to  renew  the 
battle,  extending  his  right  with  a  still  wider  sweep  to  turn  the  Confed 
erate  left.  It  was  a  grand  spectacle,  as  this  crescent  outline  of  battle 
developed  itself,  and  threw  forward  on  the  broad,  gentle  slopes  of  the 
ridge  occupied  by  it  clouds  of  skirmishers ;  while  as  far  as  the  eye  could 
reach,  masses  of  infantry  and  carefully-preserved  cavalry  stretched  through 
the  woods  and  fields. 

But  while  the  Federals  rallied  their  broken  line,  under  shelter  of  fresh 
brigades,  and  prepared  for  the  renewal  of  the  struggle,  telegraph  signals 
from  the  hills  warned  Gen.  Beauregard  to  "  look  out  for  the  enemy's 
advance  on  the  left."  At  the  distance  of  more  than  a  mile,  a  column  of 
men  was  approaching.  At  their  head  was  a  flag  which  could  not  be  dis 
tinguished  ;  and,  even  with  the  aid  of  a  strong  glass,  Gen.  Beauregard 
was  unable  to  determine  whether  it  was  the  Federal  flag,  or  the  Confed 
erate  flag — that  of  the  Stripes  or  that  of  the  Bars.  "  At  this  moment," 
said  Gen.  Beauregard,  in  speaking  afterwards  of  the  occurrence,  "  I  must 
confess  my  heart  failed  me.  I  came,  reluctantly,  to  the  conclusion  that, 
after  all  our  efforts,  we  should  at  last  be  compelled  to  leave  to  the  enemy 
the  hard-fought  and  bloody-field.  I  again  took  the  glass  to  examine  the 
flag  of  the  approaching  column ;  but  my  anxious  inquiry  was  unpro 
ductive  of  result — I  could  not  tell  to  which  army  the  waving  banner 
belonged.  At  this  time  all  the  members  of  my  staff  were  absent,  having 
been  despatched  with  orders  to  various  points.  The  only  person  with  me 
was  the  gallant  officer  who  has  recently  distinguished  himself  by  a  bril 
liant  feat  of  arms — General,  then  Colonel,  Evans.  To  him  I  communi 
cated  my  doubts  and  my  fears.  I  told  him  that  I  feared  the  approaching 
force  was  in  reality  Patterson's  division ;  that,  if  such  was  the  case,  I 
would  be  compelled  to  fall  back  upon  our  reserves,  and  postpone,  until 
the  next  day,  a  continuation  of  the  engagement." 

Turning  to  Col.  Evans,  the  anxious  commander  directed  him  to  pro 
ceed  to  Gen.  Johnston,  and  request  him  to  have  his  reserves  collected  in 
readiness  to  support  and  protect  a  retreat.  Col.  Evans  had  proceeded  but 
a  little  way.  Both  officers  fixed  one  final,  intense  gaze  upon  the  advancing 
flag.  A  happy  gust  of  wind  shook  out  its  folds,  and  Gen.  Beauregard 
recognized  the  Stars  and  Bars  of  the  Confederate  banner !  At  this 
moment  an  orderly  came  dashing  forward.  "  Col.  Evans,"  exclaimed 
Beauregard,  his  face  lighting  up,  "  ride  forward,  and  order  General 
Kirby  Smith  to  hurry  up  his  command,  and  strike  them  on  the  flank 
and  rear  ! " 


THE   BATTLE   OF    MANASSAS.  149 

It  was  the  arrival  of  Kirby  Smith  with  a  portion  of  Johnston's  army 
left  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  which  had  been  anxiously  expected  during 
the  day  ;  and  now  cheer  after  cheer  from  regiment  to  regiment  announced 
his  welcome.  As  the  train  approached  Manassas  with  some  two  thousand 
infantry,  mainly  of  Elzey's  brigade,  Gen.  Smith  knew,  by  the  sounds  of 
firing,  that  a  great  struggle  was  in  progress,  and,  having  stopped  the 
engine,  he  had  formed  his  men,  and  was  advancing  rapidly  through  the 
fields.  He  was  directed  to  move  on  the  Federal  left  and  centre.  At 
the  same  time,  Early's  brigade,  which  had  just  come  up,  was  ordered  to 
throw  itself  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy.  The  two  movements  were 
made  almost  simultaneously,  while  Gen.  Beauregard  himself  led  the 
charge  in  front.  The  combined  attack  was  too  much  for  the  enemy. 
The  fact  was  that  his  troops  had  already  been  demoralized  by  the  former 
experiences  of  the  day ;  and  his  last  grand  and  formidable  array  broke 
and  crumbled  into  pieces  under  the  first  pressure  of  the  assault.  A 
momentary  resistance  was  made  on  a  rising  ground  in  the  vicinity  of 
what  was  known  as  the  Chirm  House.  As  the  battle  surged  here,  it 
looked  like  an  island  around  which  flames  were  gathering  in  all  direc 
tions.  The  enemy  wras  appalled.  He  had  no  fresh  troops  to  rely  on  ; 
his  cannon  were  being  taken  at  every  turn  ;  lines  were  no  sooner  formed 
than  the  Confederates  broke  them  again  ;  they  gave  way  from  the  long- 
contested  hill ;  the  day  was  now  plainly  and  irretrievably  lost. 

As  the  enemy  was  forced  over  the  ridge  or  narrow  plateau,  his  former 
array  scattered  into  flight,  spreading  each  moment,  until  the  fields  were 
soon  covered  writh  the  black  swarms  of  flying  soldiers.  But  into  this 
general  and  confused  rout  a  singular  panic  penetrated,  as  by  a  stroke  of 
lightning,  and  rifted  the  flying  army  into  masses  of  mad  and  screaming 
fugitives.  As  the  retreat  approached  Cub  Run  bridge,  a  shot  from 
Kemper's  battery  took  effect  upon  the  horses  of  a  team  that  was  crossing  ; 
the  wagon  was  overturned  in  the  centre  of  the  bridge,  and  the  passage 
obstructed  ;  and  at  once,  at  this  point  of  confusion,  the  Confederates  com 
menced  to  play  their  artillery  upon  the  train  carnages  and  artillery  wagons, 
reducing  them  to  ruins.  Hundreds  of  flying  soldiers  were  involved  in 
the  common  heap  of  destruction ;  they  dashed  down  the  hill  in  heedless 
and  headlong  confusion  ;  the  main  passage  of  retreat  was  choked  ;  and  for 
miles  the  panic  spread,  flying  teams  and  wagons  confusing  and  dismem 
bering  every  corps,  while  hosts  of  troops,  all  detached  from  their  regi 
ments,  wTere  mingled  in  one  disorderly  rout.  Vehicles  tumbled  against 
each  other ;  riderless  horses  gallopped  at  random ;  the  roar  of  the  flight 
was  heard  for  miles  through  clouds  of  dust ;  and  as  the  black  volume  of 
fugitives  became  denser,  new  terrours  would  seize  it,  which  called  for 
agonizing  efforts  at  extrication,  in  which  horses  trampled  on  men,  and 
great  wheels  of  artillery  crushed  out  the  lives  of  those  who  fell  beneath 
them. 


150  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

It  was  not  only  at  Cub  Kim  bridge  that  the  retreat  had  been  choked. 
Fugitive  thousands  rushed  across  Bull  Run  by  the  various  fords,  and 
horse,  foot,  artillery,  wagons,  and  ambulances  were  entangled  in  inextri 
cable  confusion.  Clouds  of  smoke  and  dust  marked  the  roads  of  retreat, 
and  rolled  over  the  dark  green  landscape  in  the  distance.  Where  the 
roads  were  blocked,  some  of  the  troops  took  to  the  fields  and  woods,  throw 
ing  away  their  arms  and  accoutrements  ;  and  from  the  black  mass  of  the 
rout  might  be  seen  now  and  then  a  darting  line  of  figures  in  which  panic- 
stricken  men  and  riderless  horses  separated  from  the  larger  bodies,  and 
fled  wildly  through  the  country.  Even  the  sick  and  wounded  were 
dragged  from  ambulances ;  red-legged  Zouaves  took  their  places ;  men 
in  uniform  mounted  horses  cut  out  of  carts  and  wagons.  Never  was  there 
such  a  heterogeneous  crowd  on  a  race-course.  Soldiers,  in  every  style  of 
costume  ;  ladies,  who  had  come  with  opera-glasses  to  survey  the  battle  ; 
members  of  Congress  and  governors  of  States,  who  had  come  with  cham 
pagne  and  after-dinner  speeches  to  celebrate  a  Federal  victory ;  editors, 
special  correspondents,  telegraph  operators,  surgeons,  paymasters,  parsons 
— all  were  running  for  dear  life — disordered,  dusty,  powder-blackened, 
screaming  or  breathless  in  the  almost  mortal  agonies  of  terrour. 

For  three  miles  stretched  this  terrible  diorama  of  rout  and  confusion, 
actually  without  the  pursuit  or  pressure  of  any  enemy  upon  it !  The  Con 
federates  had  not  attempted  an  active  pursuit.  The  only  demonstration 
of  the  kind  consisted  of  a  dash  by  a  few  of  Stuart's  and  Beckham's  cav 
alry,  in  the  first  stages  of  the  retreat,  and  a  few  discharges  of  artillery  at 
Centreville,  where  the  Confederates  had  taken  a  gun  in  position.  The  cry 
of  "  cavalry  "  was  raised,  when  not  a  Confederate  horseman  was  within 
miles  of  the  panic-stricken  fugitives,  who  did  not  abate  their  mad  strug 
gle  to  escape  from  themselves,  or  cease  their  screams  of  rage  and  fright, 
even  after  they  had  passed  Centreville,  and  were  heading  for  the  waters 
of  the  distant  Potomac. 

Over  this  route  of  retreat,  now  thronged  with  scenes  of  horrour,  there 
had  passed  in  the  morning  of  the  same  day  a  grand  army,  flushed  with  the 
hopes  of  victory,  with  unstained  banners  in  the  wind,  and  with  gay  trap 
pings  and  bright  bayonets  glistening  through  the  green  forests  of  Yir- 
ginia.  A  few  hours  later,  and  it  returns  an  indescribable  rout — a  shape 
less,  morbid  mass  of  bones,  sinews,  wood  and  iron,  throwing  off  here  and 
there  its  nebula  of  fugitives,  or  choking  roads,  bridges,  and  every  avenue 
of  retreat ;  halting,  struggling,  and  thrilling  with  convulsions  at  each  beat 
of  artillery  that  sounded  in  the  far  distance,  and  told  to  the  calm  mind 
that  the  Confederates  had  rested  on  their  victory. 

It  was  not  until  the  sight  of  the  Potomac  greeted  the  fugitives  that 
their  terrours  were  at  all  moderated.  Even  then  they  were  not  fully 
assured  of  safety,  or  entirely  dispossessed  of  panic.  At  Alexandria,  the 


THE   BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  151 

rush  of  troops  upon  the  decks  of  the  river  boats  nearly  sunk  them.  At 
Washington  the  railroad  depot  had  to  be  put  under  strong  guard  to  keep 
off  the  fugitives,  who  struggled  to  get  on  the  Northern  trains.  They  were 
yet  anxious  to  put  a  greater  distance  between  themselves  and  the  terrible 
army,  whose  vanguard,  flushed  with  victory  and  intent  upon  planting  its 
flag  on  the  Northern  capitol,  they  aready  imagined  on  the  banks  of  the 
Potomac,  within  sight  of  their  prize,  and  within  reach  of  their  revenge. 

But  the  Confederates  did  not  advance.  The  victorious  army  did  not 
move  out  of  the  defensive  lines  of  Bull  Run.  It  is  true,  that  within  the 
limits  of  the  battle-field,  they  had  accomplished  a  great  success  and  accu 
mulated  the  visible  fruits  of  a  brilliant  victory.  They  had  not  only  de 
feated  the  Grand  Army  of  the  North,  but  they  had  dispersed  and  demoral 
ized  it  to  such  an  extent,  as  to  put  it,  as  it  were,  out  of  existence.  With 
an  entire  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  1,852  men,  they  had  inflicted  a  loss 
upon  the  enemy  which  Gen.  Beauregard  estimated  at  4,500,  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners ;  they  had  taken  twenty-eight  pieces  of  artillery 
and  five  thousand  small  arms ;  and  they  had  captured  nearly  all  of  the 
enemy's  colours.  But  the  Confederates  showed  no  capacity  to  understand 
the  extent  of  their  fortunes,  or  to  use  the  unparalleled  opportunties  they 
had  so  bravely  won.  At  any  time  within  two  weeks  after  the  battle, 
Washington  might  have  fallen  into  their  hands,  and  been  taken  almost  as 
an  unresisting  prey.  Patterson  had  only  ten  thousand  men  before  the 
battle.  His  army,  like  the  greater  part  of  McDowell's,  was  composed  of 
three  months'  men,  who  refused  to  re-enlist,  and  left  for  their  homes  in 
thousands.  The  formidable  hosts  that  had  been  assembled  at  Washington 
were  fast  melting  away,  some  slain,  many  wounded,  more  by  desertion, 
and  yet  more  by  the  ending  of  their  terms  of  enlistment  and  their  persist 
ent  refusal  to  re-enter  the  service.  On  the  Maryland  side,  Washington 
was  then  very  inadequately  defended  by  fortifications.  The  Potomac  was 
fordable  above  Washington,  and  a  way  open  to  Georgetown  heights, 
along  which  an  army  might  have  advanced  without  a  prospect  of  success 
ful  resistance.  It  needed  but  a  march  of  little  more  than  twenty  miles  to 
crown  the  victory  of  Manassas  with  the  glorious  prize  of  the  enemy's 
capital. 

But  the  South  was  to  have  its  first  and  severest  lesson  of  lost  oppor 
tunity.  For  months  its  victorious  and  largest  army  was  to  remain  inac 
tive,  pluming  itself  on  past  success,  and  giving  to  the  North  not  only  time 
to  repair  its  loss,  but  to  put  nearly  half  a  million  of  new  men  in  the  field, 
to  fit  out  four  extensive  armadas,  to  open  new  theatres  of  the  war,  to  per 
fect  its  "  Anaconda  Plan,"  and  to  surround  the  Confederacy  with  armies 
and  navies  whose  operations  extended  from  the  Atlantic  border  to  the 
western  tributaries  of  the  Mississippi. 


CHAPTER   IX. 


THE  VICTOEY  OF  MANASSAS,  A  MISFOETUNE  FOE  THE  CONFEDEEATES. — RELAXATION  IN  RICH 
MOND. — PLOTTING  AMONG  CONFEDEEATE  LEADEES  FOE  THE  PEESIDENTIAL  SUCCESSION. — 
BEAUEEGAED'S  POLITICAL  LETTEE. — ACTIVE  AND  ELASTIC  SPIEIT  OF  THE  NOETH. — EESO- 
LUTION  OF  THE  FEDEEAL  CONGEESS. — ENEEGY  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  ADMINISTEATION. — 
ITS  IMMENSE  PEEPAEATIONS  FOE  THE  PEOSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR. THE  MISSOURI  CAM 
PAIGN.— THE  POLITICS  OF  MISSOURI. — STEELING-  PRICE  AND  HIS  PAETY. — IMPEUDENCE 
AND  VIOLENCE  OF  THE  FEDEEAL  AUTHOEITIES  IN  MISSOUEI. — COEEESPONDENCE  BETWEEN 
GENS.  PEICE  AND  HAENEY. — GOV.  JACKSON'S  PEOCLAMATION. — MILITAEY  CONDITION  OF 
MISSOUEI. — HEE  HEEOIC  CHOICE. — AFFAIE  AT  BOONEVILLE. — COMPOSITION  OF  THE  PATEIOT 
AEMY  OF  MISSOURI. — ENGAGEMENT  AT  CAETHAGE. — CONFEDEEATE  EEINFOECEMENTS 
UNDEE  MCCULLOCH. — DISAGEEEMENT  BETWEEN  PEICE  AND  MCCULLOCH. — NOBLE  CONDUCT 

OF  PEICE. THE  BATTLE    OF  OAK  HILL. MCCULLOCH  SUEPEISED. A  FIEECE  FIGHT. 

DEATH    OF    GEN.   LYON. THE    FEDEEALS  DEFEATED. — WITHDEAWAL  OF  MCCULLOCH's 

FOECES  INTO  AEKANSAS. OPEEATIONS  IN  NOETHEEN  MISSOUEI. — FEEMONT  IN  COMMAND 

OF  THE  FEDEEAL  FOECES  IN  MISSOUEI. HIS  PEOCLAMATION  EMANCIPATING  THE  SLAVES. 

— ITS  NOVELTY  AND  BEUTALITY. — EEPUDIATED  AT  WASHINGTON. — THE  SIEGE  OF  LEXING 
TON. — ITS  SUEEENDEE  TO  PEICE. — GALLANTEY  OF  COL.  MULLIGAN. — CEITICAL  POSITION 

OF  PEICE. — HIS  DISAPPOINTMENT  OF  CONFEDEEATE  SUCCOUE. HIS  ADEOIT  EETEEAT. — 

MISSOURI'S  OEDINANOE  OF  SECESSION. — FEEMONT  SUPEESEDED. — THEEE  MILITAEY  MES- 
SENGEES  IN  PUESUIT  OF  HIM. — EXCITEMENT  IN  HIS  CAMP. — PEICE  AT  SPEINGFIELD. — CLOSE 
OF  THE  FIEST  CAMPAIGN  IN  MISSOUEI. — THE  CAMPAIGN,  A  CHAPTER  OF  WONDEES. — MIS 
SOUEI  MANHOOD. — THE  WESTERN  VIEGINIA  CAMPAIGN. — EESOUECES  AND  WEALTH  OF  THE 
WESTERN  SECTION  OF  VIEGINIA. — WISE's  COMMAND. — THE  ENEMY  IN  THE  KANAWHA 

VALLEY. — WISE'S  RETREAT  TO  LEWISBUEG. — THE  FLOYD  BEIGADE. ADVANCE  OF  THE 

JOINT  FOEOES  TOWAEDS  THE  GAULEY. — THE  AFFAIR  AT  CROSS  LANES. — MOVEMENT  OF 
ROSEORANS. — AFFAIE  OF  CARNIFAX  FEREY. — FLOYD  AND  WISE  FALL  BACK  TOWAEDS  SEWELL 
MOUNTAIN. — AN  UNFOETUNATE  QUAEEEL  OF  COMMANDEES. — OPEEATIONS  OF  GEN.  LEE  IN 
NORTHWESTERN  VIEGINIA. — HIS  FAILURE  AT  CHEAT  MOUNTAIN. — COL.  RUST'S  PART  IN 
THE  AFFAIR. — MOVEMENT  OF  LEE  TO  THE  LINE  OF  LEWISBURG. — HOW  EOSECEANS  ESCAPED 
FEOM  HIM. — ENGAGEMENT  ON  THE  GEEENBEIEE  RIVER. — GEN.  H.  R.  JACKSON'S  SUCCESS. — 
FAILURE  OF  THE  WESTERN  VIEGINIA  CAMPAIGN. GEN.  LEE'S  NEW  COMMAND. 

THE  victory  of  Manassas  proved  the  greatest  misfortune  that  could 
have  befallen  the  Confederacy.  It  was  taken  by  the  Southern  public  as  the 
-end  of  the  war,  or,  at  least,  as  its  decisive  event.  Nor  was  this  merely  a 


MISCONCEPTIONS  OF  THE  SOUTH.  153 

vulgar  delusion.  President  Davis,  after  the  battle,  assured  his  intimate 
friends  that  the  recognition  of  the  Confederate  States  by  the  European 
Powers  was  now  certain.  The  newspapers  declared  that  the  question  of 
manhood  between  North  and  South  was  settled  forever ;  and  the  phrase 
of  "  one  Southerner  equal  to  five  Yankees  "  was  adopted  in  all  speeches 
about  the  war — although  the  origin  or  rule  of  the  precise  proportion  was 
never  clearly  stated.  An  elaborate  article  in  "  De  Bow's  Review  "  com 
pared  Manassas  with  the  decisive  battles  of  the  world,  and  considered  that 
the  war  would  now  degenerate  into  mere  desultory  affairs,  preliinmary  to 
a  peace.  On  the  whole,  the  unfortunate  victory  of  Manassas  was  followed 
by  a  period  of  fancied  security,  and  of  relaxed  exertions  on  the  part  of  the 
Southern  people  highly  dangerous  and  inauspicious.  The  best  proof  of 
this  inactivity  is  to  be  found  in  the  decrease  of  enlistments  by  volunteers. 

There  are  to  be  found  in  the  politics  and  literature  of  the  Confederacy 
at  this  time,  some  very  singular  indications  of  the  exaggerated  and  foolish 
confidence  which  took  place  upon  the  event  of  Manassas.  So  certain,  after 
this  event,  was  supposed  to  be  the  term  of  Confederate  existence,  that  poli 
ticians  actually  commenced  plotting  for  the  Presidential  succession,  more 
than  six  years  distant.  Mr.  Hunter  of  Yirginia  about  this  time  left  Mr. 
Davis'  Cabinet,  because  it  was  said  that  he  foresaw  the  errours  and  unpop 
ularity  of  this  Administration,  and  was  unwilling  by  any  identification 
with  it  to  damage  his  chances  as  Mr.  Davis'  successor  in  the  Presi 
dential  office.  Gen.  Beauregard  was  already  designated  in  some  quarters 
as  the  next  Confederate  President ;  and  the  popular  nominee  of  an  honour 
six  years  hence,  wrote  a  weak  and  theatrical  letter  to  the  newspapers,  dated 
"  Within  Hearing  of  the  Enemy's  Guns,"  and  declaring :  "  I  am  not 
either  a  candidate,  nor  do  I  desire  to  be  a  candidate,  for  any  civil  office  in 
the  gift  of  the  people  or  Executive."  There  was  actually  a  controversy 
between  different  States  as  to  the  location  of  the  capital  of  a  Government, 
the  existence  of  which  they  could  not  understand  was  yet  imperilled  by  war. 
The  controversy  went  so  far  that  the  city  council  of  Nashville,  Tennessee, 
appropriated  $750,000  for  a  residence  for  the  President  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  as  an  inducement  to  remove  the  capital  there. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  statesmen  of  Richmond  did  not  observe  the 
singular  temper  of  the  authorities  at  Washington,  on  the  news  of  their 
defeat  at  Manassas.  On  the  very  day  that  Washington  was  crowded  with 
fugitives  from  the  routed  army,  the  Federal  Congress  legislated  calmly  and 
patiently  throughout ;  and  the  House  of  Representatives,  passed  unani 
mously  the  following  resolution : 


"  Resolved,  That  the  maintenance  of  the  Constitution,  the  preservation  of  the  Union, 
and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws,  are  sacred  trusts  which  must  be  executed  ;  that  no  dis 
aster  shall  discourage  us  from  the  most  ample  performance  of  this  high  duty ;  and  that 


154:  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

we  pledge  to  the  country  and  the  world  the  employment  of  every  resource,  national  and 
individual,  for  the  suppression,  overthrow,  and  punishment  of  rebels  in  arms." 

While  the  South  reposed  on  the  laurels  of  Manassas,  the  active  and 
elastic  spirit  of  the  North  was  at  work  to  repair  its  fortunes.  It  accom 
plished  wonders.  It  multiplied  its  armies ;  it  built  navies  with  infuriate 
energy ;  it  recovered  itself  from  financial  straits  which  distant  observers 
thought  hopeless  ;  a  few  weeks  after  the  battle  of  Manassas  it  negotiated 
a  loan  <5f  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  dollars,  at  a  fraction  above  the 
legal  interest  of  New  York  ;  in  short,  its  universal  mind  and  energy  were 
consolidated  in  its  war  upon  the  South.  There  is  no  more  remarkable 
phenomenon  in  the  whole  history  of  the  war  than  the  display  of  fully- 
awakened  Northern  energy  in  it,  alike  wonderful  in  the  ingenuity  of  its  ex 
pedients  and  in  the  concentrated  force  of  its  action.  At  every  stage  of  the 
war  the  North  adopted  the  best  means  for  securing  specific  results.  It 
used  the  popularity  of  Fremont  to  bring  an  army  into  the  field.  It  com 
bined  with  the  science  of  McClellan,  Buell,  and  Halleck,  such  elements  of 
popularity  as  could  be  found  in  the  names  of  Banks,  Butler,  and  Baker. 
It  patronized  the  great  ship-brokers  and  ship-owners  of  New  York  to  create 
a  navy.  The  world  was  to  be  astonished  soon  to  find  the  North  more 
united  than  ever  in  the  prosecution  of  the  contest,  and  the  proportions  of 
the  war  so  swollen  as  to  cover  with  its  armies  and  its  navies  the  frontiers 
of  half  a  continent. 

While  these  immense  preparations  were  in  progress  in  the  North,  and 
while  the  South  indulged  its  dreams  of  confidence,  there  was  a  natural 
pause  of  large  and  active  operations  in  the  field.  The  months  of  summer 
and  early  fall  following  the  battle  of  Manassas  are  barren  of  any  great 
events  in  the  history  of  the  war.  But  within  this  period  there  occurred 
two  campaigns,  remarkable  for  other  circumstances  than  decisive  influence, 
taking  place  on  widely  separated  theatres,  and  yet  much  alike  in  their 
features  of  discursive  contest.  These  were  the  campaigns  in  the  distant 
State  of  Missouri  and  in  the  mountainous  regions  of  Western  Virginia. 


THE  MISSOURI  CAMPAIGN. 

The  politics  of  Missouri  had  always  been  strongly  Southern.  As  early 
as  184:8-'9,  when  the  North  was  evidently  intent  upon  excluding  the  South 
from  the  territory  obtained  in  the  Mexican  war — acquired  principally  by 
the  blood  of  Southern  soldiers — the  Legislature  of  Missouri  passed  resolu 
tions  affirming  the  rights  of  the  States,  as  interpreted  by  Calhoun,  and 
pledging  Missouri  to  "  co-operate  with  her  sister  States  in  any  measure 
they  might  adopt "  against  Northern  encroachments.  On  opposition  to 


THE  MISSOURI  CAMPAIGN-  155 

these  resolutions,  Mr.  Benton  was  defeated  for  the  United  States  Senate ; 
and  they  remained  on  the  statute-book  of  Missouri  unrepealed  to  the  date 
of  the  war. 

In  the  last  Presidential  campaign,  Missouri,  under  one  of  those  appa 
rent  contradictions  or  delusions  not  uncommon  in  American  politics,  gave 
her  vote  for  Douglas.  This  result  was  obtained  chiefly  through  the  influ 
ence  of  Sterling  Price,  who  had  formerly  been  Governour  of  the  State, 
had  previously  represented  her  in  Congress,  and  was  a  man  of  commanding 
influence  with  his  party. 

Price  and  his  party  were  strongly  attached  to  the  Union,  and  hoped 
that  it  might  be  perpetuated  with  safety  and  honour  to  the  South.  Of  the 
Convention  called  in  January,  1861,  not  a  single  member  was  yet  ready 
to  avow  the  policy  of  secession  ;  and  Price  himself,  who  had  been  returned 
as  a  Union  man  without  opposition,  was  elected  its  president. 

But  the  Federal  authorities  in  Missouri  did  not  show  that  prudence 
which  the  occasion  called  for ;  they  did  nothing  to  conciliate  the  disposi 
tion  of  the  Convention  ;  and  as  events  marched  onward,  the  designs  of 
the  Washington  Government  were  too  plainly  unmasked,  to  leave  any 
doubt  with  the  people  of  Missouri  of  the  fate  prepared  for  them. 

In  the  city  of  St.  Louis  there  had  been  several  collisions  between  the 
citizens  and  Federal  soldiery  ;  and  those  anxious  to  keep  the  peace  of  the 
State  had  reason  to  fear  that  these  riots  would  be  the  inaugurating  scenes 
of  revolution.  On  the  10th  of  May,  1861,  Capt.  (afterwards  General) 
Lyon  of  the  Federal  army,  had  compelled  the  unconditional  surrender  of 
a  brigade  of  Missouri  militia,  encamped  under  the  State  law.  This  high 
handed  proceeding  was  attended  by  other  outrages.  All  the  arms  and 
ammunition  in  St.  Louis  were  seized ;  houses  were  searched ;  and  a  line 
of  military  posts  extended  around  the  city,  gave  evidence  of  a  reign  of 
terrour. 

About  this  time,  Sterling  Price,  having  been  commissioned  by  Gov. 
Jackson  of  Missouri  as  major-general,  proceeded  to  consult  with  Gen. 
Harney,  of  the  Federal  forces,  as  to  the  best  mode  of  "  restoring  peace  and 
good  order  to  the  people  of  the  State,  in  subordination  to  the  laws  of  the 
General  and  State  Governments."  In  view  of  the  riotous  demonstrations 
at  St.  Louis,  Price,  having  "  full  authority  over  the  militia  of  the  State," 
undertook,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Governour,  to  maintain  order ;  and 
Gen.  Harney  declared  that  he  had  no  intention  of  using  the  military  at 
his  command,  to  cause  disturbance.  Both  recommended  the  citizens  to 
keep  quiet,  and  attend  to  their  ordinary  occupations. 

But  soon  after  this,  Gen.  Harney  was  removed  by  orders  from  "Wash 
ington.  Gen.  Price  continued  to  busy  himself  with  the  duties  of  his  com 
mand,  and  on  the  4th  of  June,  issued  an  address,  in  which  he  declared  that 
the  people  of  Missouri  should  exercise  the  right  to  choose  their  own  posi- 


156  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

tion  in  any  contest  which  might  be  forced  upon  them,  unaided  by  any 
military  force  whatever.  He  referred  to  a  report  of  the  intention  of  the 
Federal  authorities  to  disarm  those  of  the  citizens  of  Missouri  who  did  not 
agree  in  opinion  with  the  Administration  at  "Washington,  and  put  arms  in 
the  hands  of  those  who  in  some  localities  of  the  State  were  supposed  to 
sympathize  with  the  views  of  the  Federal  Government ;  and  he  added  : 
"  The  purpose  of  such  a  movement  could  not  be  misunderstood,  and  it 
would  not  only  be  a  palpable  violation  of  the  agreement  referred  to,  and 
an  equally  plain  violation  of  our  constitutional  rights,  but  a  gross  indignity 
to  the  citizens  of  this  State,  which  would  be  resisted  to  the  last  extremity." 
In  the  conclusion  of  his  address  he  wrote  :  "  The  people  of  Missouri  can 
not  be  forced,  under  the  terrours  of  a  military  invasion,  into  a  position  not 
of  their  own  free  choice.  A  million  of  such  people  as  the  citizens  of  Mis 
souri  were  never  yet  subjugated,  and  if  attempted,  let  no  apprehension  be 
entertained  of  the  result." 

On  the  13th  of  June,  1861,  Gov.  Jackson  issued  his  proclamation  call 
ing  for  fifty  thousand  volunteers.  Price  appointed  nine  brigadier-generals. 
These  preparations  were  large  on  paper  ;  but  the  brigadiers  had  no  actual 
force  at  their  command ;  and  even,  if  men  were  not  lacking,  arms  and 
ammunition  were  ;  and  as  for  military  training  and  discipline,  there  had 
been  for  years  no  military  organization,  and  not  even  a  militia  muster  in 
Missouri.  It  was  thus  poorly  prepared  for  the  contest  that  the  State  of 
Missouri,  separated  from  her  confederates  and  alone,  showed  a  heroism 
almost  unexampled  in  history  in  spurning  the  plea  of  "  helplessness,"  and 
confronting  the  entire  power  of  the  North,  at  a  time  indeed  when  North 
ern  newspapers  were  declaring  that  she  was  but  as  a  mouse  under  the 
lion's  paw. 

The  first  development  of  the  campaign  on  the  part  of  Gen.  Price  was 
to  issue  orders  to  the  several  brigadiers  just  appointed,  to  organize  their 
forces  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  push  them  forward  to  Booneville  and 
Lexington.  His  ulterior  design  was,  having  collected  at  Lexington  volun 
teers  from  the  whole  region  accessible  to  it,  to  march  down  to  the  extreme 
southwest  part  of  the  State  where  subsistence  was  abundant ;  where  op 
portunity  might  be  had  to  organize  his  army  ;  and  where  he  expected  to 
be  joined  by  Confederate  forces  from  Arkansas  under  the  command  gf 
Brig.-Gen.  McCulloch. 

E"o  serious  thought  was  entertained  of  giving  battle  at  Booneville. 
About  eighteen  hundred  Missourians  were  assembled  in  camp  near  there  ; 
and  not  more  than  one-third  of  them  were  armed.  They  had  not  a  piece 
of  artillery ;  and  their  small  arms  were  generally  of  a  very  imperfect 
kind,  including  single-barrelled  shot-guns  and  rifles.  On  the  20th  of  June, 
Gen.  Lyon,  with  a  well-appointed  Federal  force  about  three  thousand 
strong,  debarked  near  Booneville.  The  six  hundred  armed  Missourians, 


AFFAIR  AT  BOONEVILLE.  157 

under  command  of  Col.  Marmaduke,  were  posted  in  loose  order  in  a  wood 
along  a  wheat-field  not  far  from  the  water's  edge.  Seeing  no  reasonable 
hope  of  holding  his  position  against  a  column  of  Federals  advancing  with 
eight  pieces  of  artillery,  Col.  Marmaduke  ordered  his  little  force  to  retreat. 
The  men  refused  to  obey  the  order ;  and  received  the  advancing  enemy 
with  a  close  volley,  under  which  more  than  a  hundred  fell  killed  and 
wounded.  But  the  shock  of  the  encounter,  as  the  enemy  came  on,  was  too 
much  for  the  thin  and  irregular  line  of  these  desperately  brave  men,  and 
they  were  soon  scattered  in  flight.  Their  loss  was  inconsiderable — three 
men  killed,  and  twenty -five  or  thirty  wounded ;  and  they  had  given  to 
the  enemy  his  first  lesson  of  the  courage  and  adventure  of  the  "  rebel 
militia  "  of  Missouri. 

After  the  singular  affair  of  Booneville,  Gov.  Jackson,  who  had  taken 
the  field,  commenced  to  retire  his  small  force  towards  Warsaw  ;  intending 
to  effect  a  junction  with  Price,  and  to  continue  with  him  the  line  of  march 
to  the  southwestern  angle  of  the  State.  This  was  effected  on  the  night  of 
the  3d  of  July  ;  the  column  from  Lexington  forming  a  junction  with  Jack 
son's  forces  in  Cedar  County.  The  plan  of  campaign  was  now  to  get  as 
far  as  possible  from  the  line  of  the  Missouri  River,  which  gave  facilities 
for  attack  to  the  enemy,  who  could  bring  forward  overwhelming  numbers 
before  Gen.  Price  could  possibly  organize  his  forces  in  this  vicinity  and 
throw  them  in  fighting  posture. 

The  very  night  of  the  junction  of  the  two  columns,  an  order  was  issued 
for  the  report  and  organization  of  the  entire  force.  Two  thousand  men 
reported  to  Brig.-Gen.  Rains,  six  hundred  to  Brig.-Gen.  Slack,  and  about 
five  hundred  each  to  Brig.-Gens.  Clark  and  Parsons ;  making  an  entire 
force  of  about  thirty -six  hundred  men.  This,  then,  was  the  Patriot  Army 
of  Missouri.  It  was  a  heterogeneous  mixture  of  all  human  compounds, 
and  represented  every  condition  of  Western  life.  There  were  the  old  and 
the  young,  the  rich  and  poor,  the  high  and  low,  the  grave  and  gay,  the 
planter  and  labourer,  the  farmer  and  clerk,  the  hunter  and  boatman,  the 
merchant  and  woodsman.  At  least  five  hundred  of  these  men  were  entirely 
unarmed.  Many  had  only  the  common  rifle  and  shot-gun.  None  were 
provided  with  cartridge-boxes  or  canteens.  They  had  eight  pieces  of  can 
non,  but  no  shells,  and  very  few  solid  shot  or  rounds  of  grape  and  canis 
ter.  Rude  and  almost  incredible  devices  were  made  to  supply  these 
wants  :  trace-chains,  iron-rods,  hard  pebbles,  and  smooth  stones  were  sub 
stituted  for  shot ;  and  evidence  of  the  effect  of  such  rough  missiles  was  to 
be  given  in  the  next  encounter  with  the  enemy. 

On  the  4th  of  July,  with  his  motley,  ill-provided,  brave  army,  Gen. 
Jackson,  then  in  command,  took  up  his  line  of  march  for  the  Southwest, 
where  he  hoped  to  join  McCulloch.  In  the  mean  time,  however,  Gen. 
Sigel,  with  a  column  of  Federals  three  thousand  in  number,  had  been  sent 


158  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

out  from  St.  Louis  on  the  southwestern  branch  of  the  Pacific  Kailroad  to 
Kolla,  and  had  arrived  at  the  town  of  Carthage,  immediately  in  Jackson's 
front,  thus  threatening  him  with  battle  in  the  course  of  a  few  hours. 
About  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  July,  the  Missouriaiis  ap 
proached  a  creek  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  enemy,  whose  forces  in 
three  detachments  were  admirably  posted  upon  the  brow  of  a  hill. 

The  first  important  encounter  of  arms  in  Missouri  was  now  to  take 
place.  Gen.  Jackson  found  great  difficulty  in  forming  his  line  of  battle 
and  in  deploying  his  cavalry  under  the  constant  fire  of  Sigel's  batteries. 
Gen.  Sigel  had  assured  his  men  that  there  would  be  no  serious  conflict ; 
he  had  remarked  that  the  Missourians  were  coming  into  line  like  a  worm- 
fence,  and  that  a  few  grape  and  canister  thrown  into  their  midst  would  soon 
involve  them  in  confusion  and  put  them  to  flight.  But  he  was  terribly 
undeceived.  When  it  was  found  impossible,  on  account  of  the  rawness  of 
their  horses,  to  get  the  cavalry  in  position  under  fire,  the  order  was  given 
for  the  infantry  to  charge  the  enemy  ;  the  cavalry  to  come  up  at  the 
same  time  in  supporting  distance.  They  advanced  at  the  double-quick 
with  a  shout.  The  Federals  retreated  across  Bear  Creek,  a  wide  arid  deep 
stream,  destroying  the  bridge  over  which  they  had  crossed.  They  still 
continued  their  retreat  along  the  bank  of  the  creek,  for  the  distance  of  a 
mile  or  more,  and  formed  behind  a  skirt  of  timber. 

The  Missourians  had  to  cross  an  open  field ;  they  were  exposed  to  a 
raking  fire  before  they  could  reach  the  enemy's  cover.  A  number  of  the 
cavalry  dismounted,  and  acted  with  the  infantry,  so  as  to  put  in  active  use 
all  the  small  arms  brought  upon  the  field.  They  rushed  towards  the  skirt 
of  timber,  and  opened  vigorously  upon  the  enemy  across  the  stream,  who 
returned  the  fire  with  spirit.  For  the  space  of  an  hour  the  fire  on  each 
side  was  incessant  and  fierce.  At  last,  the  Missourians  threw  a  quantity 
of  dead  timber  into  the  stream,  and  commenced  crossing  in  large  numbers, 
when  the  enemy  again  abandoned  his  position,  and  started  in  the  direction 
of  Carthage,  eight  miles  distant.  A  running  fight  was  kept  up  all  the  way 
to  Carthage.  Here  the  enemy  again  made  a  stand,  forming  ambuscades 
behind  houses,  wood-piles,  and  fences.  After  a  severe  engagement  there 
of  some  forty  minutes,  he  retreated  under  cover  of  night  in  the  direction  of 
Bolla  ;  never  halting  until  the  next  day,  about  forty  miles  from  the  field 
of  battle,  over  twelve  of  which  he  had  been  pursued  by  men,  whom  Gen. 
Sigel  had  expected  to  capture,  almost  without  a  fight. 

The  results  of  the  day  were  greatly  encouraging  and  gratifying  to  the 
Missourians.  These  raw  and  poorly-armed  men  had  driven  a  well-dis 
ciplined  enemy  from  three  different  positions.  Their  own  loss  was  prob 
ably  not  more  than  fifty  killed  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  wounded  ;  that 
of  the  enemy,  who  had  suffered  greatly  in  his  retreat,  about  three  times  as 
large.  No  wonder  that  with  this  experience  of  the  fighting  qualities  of 


ENGAGEMENT  AT  CARTHAGE.  159 

the  people  against  whom  they  had  to  contend,  the  Federal  commanders  in 
Missouri  were  awakened  to  a  sense  of  the  magnitude  of  the  work  before 
them. 

The  day  succeeding  this  engagement,  Gen.  Price,  who  had  hitherto 
been  detained  from  active  command  by  a  severe  sickness,  arrived  at 
Carthage,  accompanied  by  Brig. -Gen.  McCulloch  of  the  Confederate  forces, 
and  Maj.-Gen.  Pearce  of  the  Arkansas  State  troops,  with  a  force  of  nearly 
two  thousand  men.  These  timely  reinforcements  were  hailed  with  great 
joy  ;  and  the  patriot  army  was  alike  animated  by  the  appearance  of  their 
beloved  commander,  and  the  assurance,  which  McCulloch's  presence  gave 
them,  of  the  friendly  feeling  and  intention  of  the  Confederate  Government. 

The  next  day  the  forces  at  Carthage,  under  their  respective  commands, 
took  up  their  line  of  march  for  Cowskin  Prairie,  near  the  boundary  of  the 
Indian  Nation.  Here  they  remained  for  several  days,  organizing  and 
drilling ;  Gen.  Price  still  continued  to  receive  reinforcements ;  and  the 
whole  numerical  strength  of  the  command  was  now  rated  about  ten  thou 
sand.  "With  this  force,  although  yet  imperfectly  armed,  it  was  decided 
to  venture  on  the  offensive  ;  and  it  having  been  ascertained  that  the  Fed 
eral  commanders,  Lee,  Sturgis,  Sweeny,  and  Sigel,  were  about  to  form  a 
junction  at  Springfield,  it  was  determined  by  Price,  McCulloch,  and 
Pearce,  to  march  upon  that  place,  and  attack  the  enemy  where  he  had 
taken  his  position  in  force. 

When  the  army  reached  Crane  Creek,  about  thirty  miles  from  Spring- 
•field,  a  consultation  was  held  as  to  their  future  course.  Gen.  Price  ear 
nestly  advocated  an  advance.  Gen.  McCulloch  doubted  its  prudence.  He 
looked  with  great  concern  on  the  large  proportion  of  undisciplined  men 
in  Price's  command  ;  he  regarded  the  unarmed  men  as  incumbrances ;  and 
he  concluded  that  the  unorganized  and  undisciplined  condition  of  both 
wings  of  the  army  suggested  the  wisdom  of  avoiding  battle  with  the  disci 
plined  enemy  upon  his  own  ground  and  in  greatly  superiour  numbers. 
Gen.  Price  resented  the  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  materials  under  his  com 
mand,  and  assured  McCulloch  that  when  the  time  of  battle  came,  these 
untaught  and  headstrong  men  would  fight  together  and  with  a  resolution 
which  would  spurn  defeat.  He  requested  the  Confederate  commander  to 
loan  a  number  of  arms  from  his  command  for  the  use  of  such  Misssouri 
soldiers  as  were  unarmed,  believing  that,  with  the  force  at  his  command, 
he  could  whip  the  enemy.  This  McCulloch  refused,  and  still  declined  the 
responsibility  of  ordering  an  advance  of  the  whole  command. 

But  in  the  midst  of  this  hesitation  Gen.  McCulloch  received  a  general 
order  from  Gen.  Polk,  commander  of  the  Southwestern  division  of  the  Con 
federate  army,  to  advance  upon  the  enemy  in  Missouri.  Another  council 
was  called.  McCulloch  exhibited  the  order  he  had  received,  and  offered 
to  inarch  at  once  upon  Springfield,  upon  condition  that  he  should  have  the 


160  THE    LOST  CAUSE. 

chief  command  of  the  army.  The  question  of  rank  was  one  of  no  little 
embarrassment.  Price  was  a  Major-General  in  the  State  service.  McCul- 
loch  was  a  Brigadier-General  in  the  Confederate  service.  If  the  State 
troops  were  merely  militia,  and  Price  a  General  of  Militia,  the  question 
was  at  once  settled — McCulloch  would  have  been  entitled  to  precedence. 
But  the  Missourians,  with  much  show  of  reason,  contended  that  their  State 
had  assumed  an  independent  attitude,  and  by  her  laws,  as  a  sovereign, 
had  raised  an  army  which  was  on  a  regular  military  footing,  and  therefore 
their  Major-General  was  entitled  to  command. 

The  question  was  solved  by  Price  in  a  noble  and  patriotic  spirit.  He 
relinquished  his  post  to  McCulloch,  expressing  himself  in  substance  as  fol 
lows  :  "I  seek  not  distinction ;  I  am  not  fighting  for  that ;  but  in  the 
defence  of  the  liberties  of  my  countrymen.  It  matters  little  what  position 
I  hold.  I  am  ready  to  surrender,  not  only  the  command,  but  my  life  as  a 
sacrifice  to  the  cause."  That  his  services  and  his  presence  among  the  men 
should  not  be  lost,  he  took  a  subordinate  position  in  the  forthcoming  con 
test.  McCulloch  assumed  chief  command,  and  Price  was  a  division 
general  under  him  ;  and  thus  the  army  marched  forward  to  meet  the  foe. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   OAK   HILL. 

On  the  7th  of  August,  McCulloch  reached  a  camp  three  miles  from 
Wilson's  Creek,  and  twelve  miles  from  Springfield.  His  command  was 
thus  composed :  the  Missouri  forces  numbered  eight  thousand,  of  whom 
only  about  six  thousand  were  armed ;  the  Confederate  troops  were  three 
thousand  two  hundred,  coming  from  Louisiana,  Texas,  and  Arkansas ; 
and  there  were  eighteen  hundred  Arkansas  State  troops  under  General 
Pearce.  The  total  effective  force  was  thus  about  eleven  thousand,  of 
whom  nearly  six  thousand  were  mounted  ;,  and  it  had  fifteen  pieces  of 
artillery. 

General  Lyon  had  assembled  at  Springfield  an  effective  army  of  nearly 
ten  thousand  men,  consisting  of  his  own  and  Col.  Totten's  forces  from 
Booneville  and  St.  Louis,  and  the  troops  heretofore  acting  under  Gens. 
Sigel  and  Sturgis  and  Col.  Sweeny.  About  two  thousand  were  "  home 
guards,"  of  Missouri,  the  rest  were  United  States  regulars  and  volunteers 
from  the  Northwestern  States.  Their  artillery  consisted  of  sixteen  pieces 
— several  batteries  being  of  the  regular  service. 

On  the  9th  of  August  McCulloch  moved  up  to  Wilson's  Creek,  intend 
ing  to  advance  upon  the  enemy  at  Springfield.  But  I^yon  had  anticipated 
him,  and  was  already  moving  in  three  heavy  columns.  The  next  morning 
before  sunrise,  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  position  he 
desired ;  and  McCulloch,  who  was  quietly  taking  breakfast  at  the  time, 


THE   BATTLE   OF   OAK   HILL.  161 

was  surprised  by  his  couriers  announcing  that  the  enemy  were  in  sight 
and  in  great  force,  and  had  gained  both  sides  of  his  camp. 

On  the  right  Gen.  Sigel  had  already  opened  a  heavy  fire.  By  muffling 
the  wheels  of  his  cannon,  he  had  succeeded,  under  cover  of  the  night,  in 
getting  positions  near  McCulloch's  camp,  and  now  poured  into  it  a  severe 
and  destructive  fire.  Gen.  Lyon  led  the  attack  on  the  left. 

Keinforcements  were  rapidly  hurried  in  the  direction  of  Sigel's  attack. 
Gen.  McCulloch  sent  forward  Col.  Hebert's  Louisiana  Volunteers  and 
Mclntosh's  mounted  Arkansians,  who,  moving  to  the  left,  gained  a  position 
along  a  fence  enclosing  a  cornfield.  Here  Mclntosh  dismounted  his  men, 
and  the  two  regiments  rapidly  advanced  in  the  face  of  a  galling  fire.  A 
terrible  conflict  of  small  arms  ensued.  Undismayed,  breasting  a  deadly 
fire,  the  gallant  men  of  these  regiments  leaped  the  fence,  and  drove  the 
enemy  before  them  back  upon  his  main  body.  But  still  Sigel's  artillery 
continued  to  play  with  damaging  effect.  A  battery,  commanded  by  Capt. 
Eeid,  was  brought  up  to  oppose  it.  Seizing  the  critical  moment,  Gen. 
McCulloch  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  two  companies  of  a  Louisiana 
regiment  near  him,  and  marching  to  the  right,  drew  rapidly  upon  the 
adverse  guns.  At  the  same  time,  Mclntosh  and  Hebert,  with  their  men, 
came  up,  and  with  a  loud  cheer,  they  rushed  upon  the  enemy's  cannoniers, 
driving  them  from  their  guns.  This  gallant  charge  swept  everything 
before  it ;  five  guns  were  taken  ;  and  nothing  could  now  arrest  the  tide  of 
success  on  the  right.  Sigel  fell  back  in  confusion,  and  lost  his  last  gun  in 
a  retreat  which  had  now  become  irretrievable. 

Having  cleared  their  right  and  rear,  it  became  necessary  for  the  Con 
federate  forces  to  direct  all  their  attention  to  the  centre,  where  Gen.  Lyon 
was  pressing  upon  the  Missourians  with  all  his  strength.  To  this  point 
Mclntosh's  regiment,  Churchill's  regiment  on  foot,  Gratiot's  regiment,  and 
McKae's  battalion  were  rapidly  moved.  Along  the  whole  line  of  the  hill, 
upon  which  the  enemy  was  posted,  a  terrible  fire  of  musketry  was  now 
kept  up.  The  roar  of  the  battle  was  tremendous,  bursting  along  two  op 
posing  lines  which  swept  for  miles  over  the  rolling  fields.  Masses  of  infan 
try  fell  back  and  again  marched  forward.  The  summit  of  the  hill  was 
covered  with  the  dead  and  wounded.  Totten's  battery  on  the  enemy's 
side  did  fearful  execution.  With  the  loss  of  many  men  and  horses,  the 
Federal  battery,  after  a  fierce  engagement  with  Woodruff's,  was  with 
diificulty  withdrawn.  Part  of  it  was  again  planted  where  it  swept  the 
front — part  was  masked  to  meet  an  advance.  At  this  moment,  when  the 
fortunes  of  the  day  yet  hung  in  doubt,  two  regiments  of  Gen.  Pearce's 
command  were  ordered  forward  to  support  the  centre.  .Reid's  battery  was 
also  brought  up  and  the  Louisiana  regiment  was  again  called  into  action 
on  the  left  of  it.  The  enemy  was  now  evidently  giving  way. 

Gen.  Lyon  had  marked  the  progress  of  the  battle  with  deep  anxiety. 
11 


162  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

He  saw  that  his  men  were  unable  to  advance  against  the  sheet  of  fire  be 
fore  them,  and  he  marked  with  desperate  concern  the  huge  chasms  in  his 
lines  where  his  torn  regiments  had  given  way.  He  had  already  been 
wounded  in  the  leg,  and  a  bullet  had  cut  the  scalp  of  his  head.  His  horse 
was  shot  under  him.  Bloody  and  haggard,  he  turned  to  one  of  his  officers, 
and  said  :  "  I  fear  the  day  is  lost — I  will  lead  the  charge."  Kemounting 
and  riding  rapidly  to  the  front,  he  said  simply  to  the  nearest  regiments, 
"  Forward,  men  :  I  will  lead  you."  He  had  advanced  but  a  little  way, 
when  two  small  rifle-balls,  or  buckshot,  pierced  his  breast.  He  reeled  in 
his  saddle,  and  fell  dead  from  his  horse.* 

The  Federal  line  pushed  forward,  but  after  a  brief  encounter  was  evi 
dently  staggered.  McCulloch  and  Price  threw  forward  nearly  all  their 
reserves.  Totten's  dreadful  battery  at  last  fell  back.  Missourians,  Arkan- 
siaus,  Louisanians,  and  Texans  pressed  forward.  The  Federal  centre 
gave  way  ;  the  wings  were  forced  to  the  rear ;  and  with  one  wild  yell,  the 
Southerners  broke  upon  their  disordered  ranks,  pushing  them  back,  and 
strewing  the  ground  with  their  dead.  The  order  to  retreat  was  given,  and 
soon  the  enemy's  infantry  columns,  artillery,  and  wagons,  were  seen  in  the 
distance  among  the  hills,  rapidly  making  their  way  towards  Springfield, 
defeated  and  driven  from  the  field. 

The  Federal  loss  could  not  have  been  less  than  two  thousand  in  killed 
and  wounded  ;  three  hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  and  six  pieces  of  artil 
lery.  Gen.  McCulloch  officially  stated  his  loss  as  two  hundred  and  sixty- 
five  killed  and  eight  hundred  wounded.  More  than  half  of  this  loss  was 
among  the  Missourians  commanded  by  Price. 

After  the  brilliant  victory  of  Oak  Hill — which  for  a  time  freed  the 
whole  of  Southwestern  Missouri  from  Federal  rule — it  unfortunately  fell 
out  that  McCulloch  and  Price  could  not  agree  upon  a  plan  of  campaign. 

*  Maj.-Gen.  Nathaniel  Lyon  was  a  native  of  Connecticut,  and  had  served  in  the  regular  army  of 
the  United  States.  He  was  an  exception  to  the  politics  of  that  army  ;  for  he  was  an  undisguised 
and  fanatical  Abolitionist  He  entered  the  United  States  army  as  second  lieutenant  in  1841,  and 
was  subsequently  brevetted  captain.  He  arrived  hi  St  Louis  in  April,  1861,  having  been  sent  from 
a  post  far  in  the  Southwest  to  stand  a  court-martial  on  the  charge  of  peculation.  Here  his  great 
activity  in  suppressing  the  excitement  of  Southern  feeling,  seizing  the  arsenal,  erecting  defences 
around  the  city,  and  disarming  Southern  sympathizers,  recommended  him  to  notice  in  the  North 
and  at  "Washington ;  and  he  rapidly  rose  from  the  rank  of  captain  to  that  of  major-general  in  two 
months.  He  was  undoubtedly  an  able  and  dangerous  man :  one  who  appreciated  the  force  of  au 
dacity  and  the  value  of  quick  decision.  He  was  small  in  stature,  wiry,  active,  of  dark  complexion : 
brave,  to  a  fault ;  and  an  excellent,  though  restless  and  ambitious  officer.  For  several  days  before 
the  battle  in  which  he  lost  his  life,  he  is  said  to  have  been  a  prey  to  uneasiness  and  disappointment, 
which  brought  upon  his  face  a  troubled  look,  observed  by  all  around  him.  To  one  of  his  staff  he 
said  gloomily,  that  he  "  believed  in  presentiments,"  and  could  not  rid  himself  of  the  idea  that  the 
coming  battle  would  result  disastrously.  After  he  was  dead,  it  was  remarked  that  the  same 
troubled  look  he  had  borne  for  days  clung  to  his  countenance  in  death.  The  fall  of  this  man  was 
undoubtedly  a  serious  loss  to  the  Federals  in  Missouri. 


FREMONT  AT   ST.   LOUIS.  163 

The  former  therefore  took  the  responsibility  of  withdrawing  the  Confed 
erate  forces,  and  retired  with  his  army  to  the  frontiers  of  Arkansas.  Late 
in  August,  Gen.  Price,  abandoned  by  the  Confederate  forces,  took  up  his 
line  of  march  for  the  Missouri  River,  with  an  armed  force  of  about  five 
thousand  men,  and  seven  pieces  of  cannon.  He,  however,  continued  to 
receive  reinforcements  from  the  north  side  of  the  Missouri  River.  On  the 
7th  of  September  he  encountered  a  force  of  irregular  Federal  troops  under 
the  notorious  Lane  and  Montgomery,  at  a  place  called  Drywood,  some 
fifteen  miles  east  of  Fort  Scott.  Defeating  and  brushing  this  force  from  his 
path,  Price  threw  a  small  garrison  into  Fort  Scott,  and  pressed  on  towards 
Lexington,  the  main  object  of  his  movement. 

In  the  meantime  the  active  and  adventurous  demonstrations  of  Brig.- 
Gen.  Harris,  in  Northern  Missouri,  had  made  an  important  diversion  of 
the  enemy  in  favour  of  Gen.  Price.  Although  surrounded  by  enemies,  and 
within  their  reach  from  many  points,  Gen.  Harris  had  secretly  organized 
a  force,  and  by  the  rapidity  of  his  movements  produced  the  impression 
that  he  was  stronger  than  he  really  was  ;  the  result  of  which  was  that  he 
had  diverted  several  thousand  men  from  the  support  of  Gen.  Lyon,  and  held 
them  north  of  the  river  until  after  the  battle  of  Oak  Hill,  thus  making  an 
important  contribution  to  the  issue  of  that  contest.  On  the  10th  of  Sep 
tember,  Gen.  Harris  crossed  the  Missouri  at  Artien  Creek.  Recruits  in 
bodies  of  ten,  fifty,  and  a  hundred  constantly  joined  him,  and  when  he 
effected  a  junction  with  Gen.  Price,  he  added  nearly  three  thousand  effec 
tive  men  to  a  force  already  consisting  of  more  than  six  thousand. 

Some  weeks  previous,  Gen.  Fremont  had  arrived  to  take  chief  com 
mand  of  the  Western  Department.  He  had  reached  St.  Louis,  and  mili 
tary  preparations  were  immediately  carried  on  with  renewed  vigour.  He 
assumed  his  command  with  great  ostentation ;  and  his  displays  of  garish 
splendour  in  his  camp  were  such  that  some  of  the  Northern  newspapers 
were  provoked  to  say  that  he  resembled  more  an  Eastern  satrap  than  an 
American  commander.  But  the  most  remarkable  event  with  which  he 
inaugurated  his  authority  was  a  proclamation,  issued  at  St.  Louis,  on  the 
30th  of  August.  In  this  remarkable  fulmination  of  authority  he  declared 
that,  in  his  judgment,  the  public  safety  and  the  success  of  the  Federal  arms 
required  "  unity  of  purpose  without  let  or  hindrance  to  the  prompt  admin 
istration  of  affairs ;  "  therefore  he  proclaimed  martial  law  through  the 
whole  State  of  Missouri,  and  asserted  that  the  lines  of  his  army  of  occupa 
tion  extended  from  Leavenworth,  by  way  of  the  posts  of  Jefferson  City, 
Rolla,  and  Ironton,  to  Cape  Girardeau  on  the  Mississippi ;  all  persons 
within  these  lines,  taken  with  arms  in  their  hands,  were  to  be  tried  by 
court-martial,  and  shot  if  found  guilty  ;  he  furthermore  proclaimed,  that 
the  property,  real  and  personal,  of  persons  who  took  up  arms  against  the 
United  States,  or  who  should  be  proved  to  have  taken  part  with  their 


164:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

enemies  in  the  field,  should  be  confiscated,  and  their  slaves  should  ~be 
freemen. 

This  proclamation  was  vastly  pleasing  to  a  large  and  rapidly-growing 
party  in  the  North,  who  recognized  the  extinction  of  negro  slavery  in  the 
South  as  an  essential  object  of  the  war.  It  was  an  ingenious  idea,  too,  to 
make  of  slavery  a  party-coloured  crime — sinful  in  the  u  rebel,"  but  blameless 
in  the  Union  man.  The  brutality  of  the  proclamation,  too,  was  refreshing  ; 
for  there  were  already  many  in  the  North  who  believed  that  their  fellow- 
countrymen  should  be  shot,  and  this  in  the  name  of  the  Union,  for  the 
simple  crime  that  as  citizens  of  the  State  of  Missouri  they  obeyed  the 
orders  of  the  lawful  authority  of  their  State. 

But  the  Government  at  Washington  was  not  yet  prepared  for  these 
lengths  of  the  war ;  and  it  is  a  curious  commentary  on  the  future  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  policy  with  respect  to  the  extinction  of  slavery,  that  Fre 
mont's  proclamation  was  distinctly  disavowed  and  instantly  overruled 
by  him. 

But  while  Fremont  was  thus  indulging  his  political  fanaticism,  he  was 
strangely  inattentive  to  the  course  of  military  events  in  Missouri.  Lexing 
ton,  upon  which  Gen.  Price  was  now  directing  his  march,  was  feebly  de 
fended.  It  was  only  when  it  was  seriously  threatened  that  Col.  Mulligan 
moved  up  from  Jefferson  City  with  his  Irish  brigade,  and  found  himself 
with  an  insufficient  garrison,  and  but  little  time  to  strengthen  his  works, 
confronted  and  encompassed  by  an  army  of  more  than  ten  thousand  men. 


THE   SIEGE  OF   LEXINGTON. 

On  the  12th  of  September,  Gen.  Price  approached  Lexington.  In  the 
midst  of  the  straggling  town  there  was  a  large  brick  building  known  as 
the  College  Building.  Col.  Mulligan  had  planned  an  earthwork  ten  feet 
high,  with  a  ditch  eight  feet  wide,  enclosing  the  College,  with  a  large  area 
capable  of  holding  a  garrison  of  ten  thousand  men.  As  Price  approached 
the  town  a  sharp  affair  occurred  with  the  enemy's  outposts,  and  at  one 
time  a  general  engagement  was  threatened.  Taking  advantage  of  the 
smoke,  Geri.  Eains  prepared  to  lead  a  column  to  the  assault  of  the  breast 
works  at  an  angle  which  was  apparently  weakly  defended.  But  the 
movement  was  discovered  by  the  enemy,  who  rallied  in  force  to  the  threat 
ened  point.  Kneeling  down  to  shelter  themselves,  with  levelled  muskets 
and  fingers  upon  the  triggers,  the  Federals  were  silent  as  death.  The 
Missourians  advanced  at  a  rapid  run.  When  within  a  hundred  yards  of 
the  breastworks,  the  smoke  lifted,  a  line  of  fire  flashed  along  the 
entrenchments,  and  five  hundred  muskets  launched  their  bullets  against 
the  advancing  ranks.  But  with  a  presence  of  mind  inspired  by  their 


THE   SIEGE   OF   LEXINGTON.  165 

habits,  the  Missourians  dropped  at  the  flash,  and,  instantly  rising,  again 
rushed  forward.  Again  they  met  a  fire  which  was  more  destructive. 
Finding  that  a  surprise  was  hopeless,  and  that  the  Federals  were  as 
sembling  a  large  part  of  their  artillery  at  the  threatened  point,  the 
column  of  attack  was  withdrawn. 

Discovering,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  that  his  ammunition,  the  most 
of  which  had  been  left  behind  in  the  march  from  Springfield,  was  nearly 
exhausted,  and  that  his  men,  most  of  whom  had  not  eaten  anything  in 
thirty-six  hours,  required  rest  and  food,  General  Price  withdrew  from 
the  town  and  encamped.  His  ammunition  wagons  having  been  at  last 
brought  up,  and  large  reinforcements  having  come  in,  he  again  moved 
into  the  town  on  the  18th,  and  commenced  the  final  attack  upon  the 
enemy's  works. 

Col.  Mulligan  bore  himself  with  the  bravery  characteristic  of  an  Irish 
man,  and  worthy  of  a  better  cause.  When  summoned  to  surrender,  he 
replied :  <l  If  you  want  us,  you  must  take  us."  The  garrison  had  not 
sufficient  supplies  of  water  within  their  entrenchments,  and  were  com 
pelled  to  resort  to  the  river,  nearly  half  a  mile  distant,  under  the  constant 
fire  of  skirmishers.  Large  bodies  had  to  fight  their  way  to  the  water, 
and  bloody  conflicts  ensued.  As  a  detachment  of  the  Missouri  troops, 
under  command  of  Col.  Rives,  were  passing  down  the  bank  of  the  river 
to  capture  a  steamboat  lying  under  the  enemy's  guns,  a  fire  was  opened 
upon  him  from  a  building  known  as  Anderson's  House,  standing  on  the 
summit  of  the  bluif,  and  designated  as  a  hospital  by  the  white  flag  over 
it.  There  were  in  the  building  at  the  time  twenty-four  sick ;  but  it 
contained  also  a  large  body  of  armed  soldiers.  Indignant  at  the  perfidy 
which  directed  this  attack,  several  companies  from  'Gen.  Harris'  and  the 
fourth  division  rushed  up  the  bank,  leaped  over  every  barrier,  and  speedily 
overpowered  the  garrison.  The  important  position  thus  secured  was 
within  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  yards  of  the  enemy's  entrenchments. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  19th  September,  the  roar  of  cannon  and 
rattle  of  musketry  again  resounded  through  the  hills  around  the  belea 
guered  camp.  The  garrison  suffered  much  from  thirst.  The  pressure 
of  the  assault  was  incessant  and  bloody.  Cannon  surrounded  them  on 
three  sides,  and,  occupying  positions  of  command,  poured  -out  constant 
torrents  of  shot,  shell,  stones,  fragments  of  iron, — every  missile  that  could 
be  found  and  used  for  battering  and  death. 

On  the  20 tli,  Gen.  Price  caused  a  number  of  bales  of  hemp  to  be 
transported  to  the  river  heights,  where  movable  breastworks  were  speedily 
constructed  out  of  them.  The  demonstrations  of  the  artillery,  and  par 
ticularly  the  continued  advance  of  the  hempen  breastworks,  attracted  the 
attention  and  excited  the  alarm  of  the  enemy.  Several  daring  attempts 
were  made  to  drive  back  the  assailants.  At  one  time,  in  extreme  despera- 


166  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

tion,  a  cavalry  assault  was  made  by  the  Illinois  mounted  men  upon  one  of 
the  Missouri  batteries  ;  but  the  assailants  were  terribly  cut  up  with  grape 
and  buckshot,  and  retreated  in  confusion  to  the  entrenchments. 

Col.  Mulligan  had  received  two  painful  wounds.  After  having  once 
ordered  down  a  white  flag  which  some  of  the  "  home  guards,"  had  dis 
played,  he,  at  last,  convinced  of  the  hopelessness  of  his  situation,  determined 
on  a  surrender.  He  did  so,  only  after  fifty-two  hours  of  continuous  fighting. 
Immediately  Gen.  Price  issued  an  order,  that  the  forces  under  Col.  Mul 
ligan,  having  stacked  their  arms,,  "  were  not  to  be  insulted  by  word  or  act, 
for  they  had  fought  like  brave  men."  Mulligan,  having  given  up  his 
sword,  had  it  immediately  returned  to  him  by  Gen.  Price,  who  said  he 
"  could  not  see  a  man  of  his  valour  without  his  sword."  The  brave  cap 
tive  was  afterwards  treated  with  true  chivalric  courtesy  by  Gen.  Price, 
who  induced  him  and  his  wife  to  become  his  guests,  and  entertained  them 
with  all  the  hospitality  at  his  command. 

The  entire  loss  of  the  Missourians  in  this  series  of  engagements  was 
but  twenty-five  killed  and  seventy-two  wounded.  The  enemy's  loss  was 
considerably  larger,  and,  though  never  officially  reported,  was  estimated 
by  their  own  narratives  as  amounting  to  five  hundred  in  killed  and 
wounded.  The  visible  fruits  of  the  victory  were  considerable.  The 
Missourians  captured  five  colonels,  a  hundred  and  nineteen  other  com 
missioned  officers,  and  thirty-five  hundred  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates,  five  cannon,  two  mortars,  over  three  thousand  muskets,  rifles  and 
carbines,  about  seven  hundred  and  fifty  horses,  a  quantity  of  ammunition, 
and  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  worth  of  commissary  stores. 
There  was  also  recovered  about  $900,000  of  coin  of  which  the  Lexington 
Bank  had  been  robbed,  in  accordance  with  Fremont's  instructions,  which 
Gen.  Price  ordered  to  be  immediately  restored  to  its  owners. 

The  capture  of  Lexington  and  the  bold  and  brilliant  movements  of  the 
Missouri  patriots  in  other  parts  of  the  State — among  them  the  operations 
in  Southeastern  Missouri  of  the  partisan  Jeff.  Thompson  and  his  "  Swamp 
Fox  Brigade  " — excited  rage  and  alarm  in  the  "Washington  administration. 
Gen.  Fremont,  who  was  severely  censured  for  not  having  reinforced  Mul 
ligan,  hoped  to  recover  his  position  by  activity  and  success  ;  he  put  him 
self  at  the  head  of  the  army,  and  advanced  towards  Jefferson  City,  sending 
back  the  promise  that  he  would  overwhelm  Price.  It  was  at  this  period 
that  Gen.  Price  found  his  position  one  of  the  greatest  emergency.  He 
had  received  intelligence  that  the  Confederate  forces,  under  Gens.  Pillow 
and  Hardee,  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  southeastern  portion  of  the 
State.  Gen.  McCulloch  had  retired  to  Arkansas.  Gen.  Price  was  left 
with  the  only  forces  in  Missouri  to  confront  an  enemy  sixty  thousand 
strong ;  he  was  almost  entirely  without  ammunition ;  and  he  was  beset 
with  other  difficulties  and  embarrassments.  A  large  number  of  his  men 


ABILITY    OF    GEN.    PEICE.  167 

had  volunteered  in  haste,  and  hied  to  the  camps  with  hardly  a  change  of 
clothing.  Many  were  naturally  anxious  to  return  to  their  homes.  The 
difficulty  of  maintaining  a  wagon  train  sufficient  to  support  so  large  an 
army  was  seriously  felt  Thus  surrounded  by  circumstances  of  the  most 
painful  and  unlooked-for  misfortune,  Gen.  Price  was  compelled  not  only  to 
make  a  retrograde  movement,  but,  also,  to  disband  a  considerable  portion 
of  his  forces. 

With  his  army  thus  diminished,  Gen.  Price  commenced  his  retreat 
about  the  27th  of  September.  "With  Sturgis  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  Lane  on  the  west,  and  himself  on  the  east,  Fremont  expected  to  cut 
off  and  capture  the  entire  force  of  the  Missourians.  This  Price  adroitly 
prevented  by  sending  out  cavalry  as  if  intending  to  attack  each  of  the 
enemy  separately,  and  so  covering  his  retreat.  This  retreat  was  executed 
in  a  most  admirable  manner,  and  amidst  numerous  obstacles.  The  Osage 
river  was  crossed  in  two  flat-bottomed  boats,  constructed  for  the  occasion 
by  the  Missouri  soldiers  ;  and  then  Price  moved  to  Neosho,  on  the  Indian 
frontier  of  the  State.  Here  the  Legislature  had  assembled,  and  here  Price 
again  formed  a  junction  with  McCulloch,  at  the  head  of  5,000  men.  It 
was  at  this  time  the  State  Legislature  at  length  passed  the  Ordinance  of 
Secession,  and  Gen.  Price  had  the  satisfaction  of  firing  a  hundred  guns  to 
celebrate  the  event. 

From  Neosho  Price  and  McCulloch  fell  back  to  Cassvillo  and  Pineville, 
on  the  southern  borders  of  the  State.  At  Pineville,  Price  made  prepara 
tion  to  receive  Fremont,  determined  not  to  abandon  Missouri  without  a 
battle.  But  just  at  this  juncture  news  came  that  Fremont  had  been 
superseded  as  commander  of  the  Federal  forces.  His  course  had  given 
great  offence  at  Washington ;  and  Attorney-General  Bates  had  declared 
that  it  would  be  "  a  crime  "  to  keep  him  in  command.  It  was  said  that 
his  vanity  had  become  so  insolent  that  he  paid  no  regard  whatever  to  acts 
of  Congress,  the  orders  of  his  superiours,  the  usages  of  the  service,  or  the 
rights  of  individuals ;  and  that  he  was  surrounded  by  a  band  of  contractors, 
and,  in  partnership  with  them,  plundered  the  public  funds  without  mercy. 
On  such  persistent  representations  the  order  at  Washington  was  at  last 
given  for  his  removal  and  the  appointment  of  Gen.  Hunter  in  his  place. 

Fremont  had  obtained  intimation  that  such  an  order  was  on  the  way 
from  Washington.  He  took  singular  pains  to  prevent  it  from  reaching 
him.  He  had  two  body-guards,  one  of  whites  and  one  of  Indians.  He 
gave  strict  orders  that  no  one  should  be  admitted  through  the  inner  lines 
surrounding  his  headquarters,  except  by  his  direct  orders.  Notwithstanding 
his  precautions,  one  of  the  three  military  messengers  sent  from  St.  Louis, 
by  address  and  stratagem  succeeded  in  gaining  admission,  and,  making  his 
way  to  Fremont's  presence  on  the  night  of  the  7th  of  November,  delivered 
to  him  the  fatal  missive  which  concluded  his  career. 


168  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

This  event  had  the  effect  of  demoralizing  the  Federal  forces  to  such  an 
extent  that  an  immediate  retreat  was  thought  advisable  by  the  acting  officers 
in  command.  The  degraded  General  showed  symptoms  of  rebellion.  The 
Dutch  were  greatly  attached  to  him  ;  signs  of  mutiny  were  shown  by  these 
adherents ;  for  a  time  open  revolt  was  threatened ;  but  Fremont's  subor 
dinates,  Sigel  and  Asboth,  positively  refused  to  sustain  him,  and  the  army 
was  ordered  to  retreat  from  Springfield.  The  Federals  accordingly  left 
that  town  in  the  direction  of  Eolla,  and  were  pursued  by  Gen.  Price  to 
Osceola.  From  Osceola,  Gen.  Price  fell  back  to  Springfield,  to  forage  his 
army  and  obtain  supplies.  Both  armies  having  thus  drawn  off,  we  may 
leave  here  for  the  present  the  history  of  the  Missouri  campaign. 

Notwithstanding  the  adverse  termination  of  this  campaign  with  respect 
to  the  occupation  of  Missouri,  it  had  alreay  accomplished  much ;  it  had 
given  an  exhibition  of  spirit  and  resource  without  a  parallel  in  equal  cir 
cumstances  ;  and  it  constitutes  the  most  remarkable  and  brilliant  episode 
of  the  war.  It  was  a  chapter  of  wonders.  Price's  army  of  ragged  heroes, 
had  marched  over  eight  hundred  miles ;  it  had  scarcely  passed  a  week 
without  an  engagement  of  some  sort ;  it  was  tied  down  to  no  particular 
line  of  operations,  but  fought  the  enemy  wherever  he  could  be  found  ;  and 
it  had  provided  itself  with  ordnance  and  equipments  almost  entirely  from 
the  prodigal  stores  of  the  Federals.  The  hero  of  Missouri  started  on  his 
campaign  without  a  dollar,  without  a  wagon  or  team,  without  a  cartridge, 
without  a  bayonet-gun.  When  he  commenced  his  retreat,  he  had  about 
eight  thousand  bayonet-guns,  fifty  pieces  of  cannon,  four  hundred  tents, 
and  many  other  articles  needful  in  an  army,  for  which  his  men  were 
almost  exclusively  indebted  to  their  own  strong  arms  in  battle. 

This  campaign  was  little  less  than  a  puzzle  to  military  critics.  Price 
managed  to  subsist  an  army  without  governmental  resources.  He  seldom 
complained  of  want  of  transportation.  His  men  were  never  demoralized 
by  hunger.  They  would  go  into  the  cornfield,  shuck  the  corn,  shell  it, 
take  it  to  the  mill,  and  bring  it  into  camp,  ground  into  meal.  Or,  if  they 
had  no  flour,  they  took  the  wheat  from  the  stack,  threshed  it  themselves, 
and  asked  the  aid  of  the  nearest  miller  to  reduce  it  to  flour.  Price  proved 
that  such  an  army  could  go  where  they  pleased  in  an  agricultural  coun 
try.  His  men  were  always  cheerful.  They  frequently,  on  the  eve  of  an 
engagement,  danced  around  their  camp-fires  with  bare  feet  and  in  rag 
costumes,  of  which  it  was  declared  "  Billy  Barlow's  dress  at  a  circus 
would  be  decent  in  comparison."  Price  himself  wore  nothing  on  his 
shoulders  but  a  brown-linen  duster  ;  and  this  and  his  white  hair  streaming 
on  the  battle-field  made  him  a  singular  figure.  Despite  the  exposure  and 
hardship  of  this  campaign,  the  most  remarkable  fact  remains  to  be 
recorded :  that  in  its  entire  course  not  more  than  fifty  men  died  from 
disease. 


WESTERN   VIRGINIA  CAMPAIGN.  169 

Such  a  record  of  courage,  of  expedient  and  of  endurance,  has  no 
known  parallel  in  the  war.  It  settled  forever  the  question  of  Missouri 
manhood.  It  did  more  than  this  :  it  proved  that  the  spirit  of  the  native 
and  true  population  of  Missouri  was  strongly  Southern,  and  that  it  needed 
nothing  but  organization  and  opportunity  for  its  triumph. 


THE   WESTERN   VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGN. 

The  campaign  in  Western  Virginia,  which  was  mostly  cotemporary 
with  that  of  Missouri,  and  very  similar  to  it  in  its  discursive  character,  un 
fortunately  did  not  partake  of  its  brilliancy.  "With  but  little  compensa 
tion,  either  in  the  prestige  of  arms,  or  in  the  fruits  of  single  victories,  it 
surrendered  to  the  enemy  a  country  of  more  capacity  and  grandeur  than 
perhaps  any  other  of  equal  limits  on  the  American  continent ;  abounding 
in  immense  forests,  possessed  of  almost  fabulous  mineral  resources,  offering 
to  the  manufacturer  the  vastest  water-power  in  the  world,  and  presenting 
in  its  deposits  of  coal  and  salt,  fields  of  inexhaustible  enterprise  and  wealth. 

In  the  month  of  June,  Brigadier-General  "Wise  of  Virginia  was  sent  in 
to  the  Kanawha  Valley  ;  it  being  supposed  that  by  his  rare  and  character 
istic  enthusiasm  he  would  be  able  to  rally  the  people  of  this  region  to  the 
support  of  the  State.  He  established  his  headquarters  at  Charleston,  and 
succeeded  in  raising  a  brigade  of  twenty-five  hundred  infantry,  seven  hun 
dred  cavalry  and  three  batteries  of  artillery.  "With  subsequent  reinforce 
ments  his  command  amounted  to  four  thousand  men.  It  was  obvious  enough 
that  with  this  small  force,  his  situation  was  extremely  critical.  The  enemy 
had  already  landed  considerable  forces  at  Parkersburg  and  Point  Pleasant 
on  the  Ohio  River,  and  was  rapidly  using  his  superiour  facilities  for  raising 
troops  in  the  populous  States  of  Ohio  and  Indiana,  and  his  ample  means 
of  transportation  by  railroad  through  those  States  and  by  the  navigation 
of  the  Ohio  and  Kanawha  Rivers,  to  concentrate  a  large  force  in  the  lower 
part  of  the  Kanawha  Valley. 

After  some  desultory  movements,  and  a  brilliant  affair  on  Scary  Creek, 
in  Putnam  County,  where  Col.  Patton  with  a  small  force  repulsed  three 
Federal  regiments,  Gen.  "Wise  prepared  to  give  battle  to  the  Federal 
forces,  which,  under  the  command  of  Gen.  Cox,  had  been  largely  increased, 
and  which  were  steadily  advancing  up  the  Valley,  both  by  land  and 
water.  But  the  conflict  was  not  to  occur.  A  more  formidable  danger, 
from  a  different  direction,  menaced  the  Confederates.  The  disaster  at 
Rich  Mountain — the  surrender  of  Pegram's  force,  and  the  retreat  north 
ward  of  Garnett's  army,  had  withdrawn  all  support  from  the  right  flank, 
and,  indeed,  from  the  rear  of  Gen.  Wise.  He  was  in  danger  of  being  cut  off 
in  the  rear  by  several  roads  from  the  northwest,  striking  the  Kanawha  road 


170  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

at  various  points  between  Lewisburg  and  Gauley  Bridge.  The  danger 
seemed  to  him  so  pressing,  that  he  fell  back  immediately  with  his  entire 
force,  first  to  Gauley  Bridge  and  thence  to  Lewisburg,  reaching  the 
latter  place  about  the  1st  of  August,  and  after  a  retreat  which  was  neces 
sarily  m  uch  disordered,  on  account  of  his  meagre  means  of  transportation. 

Within  a  few  weeks  after  Gen.  "Wise  fell  back  to  Lewisburg,  the  Con 
federate  cause  in  "Western  Yirginia  received  the  aid  of  a  very  effective 
body  of  men.  John  B.  Floyd,  who  had  been  at  one  time  Governor  of 
Yirginia,  and  afterwards  Secretary  of  "War  under  President  Buchanan, 
was  commissioned  a  brigadier-general  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  had 
succeeded  in  raising  a  command  of  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  bat 
talion  of  cavalry.  This  force  was  intended  for  service  in  "Western  Yirginia, 
and  Gen.  Floyd  soon  decided,  with  the  approval  of  the  "War  Department, 
that  the  defence  of  the  Kanawha  Yalley  was  the  object  of  first  importance. 
He  accordingly  advanced  to  the  "White  Sulphur  Springs,  nine  miles  east 
of  Lewisburg,  and  held  conferences  with  Gen.  Wise.  An  advance  towards 
the  Gauley  was  promptly  determined  on,  but  the  two  bodies,'  under  their 
commanders,  moved  at  different  times,  and  with  perfectly  distinct  organi 
zations,  though  within  supporting  distance. 

Gen.  Floyd  moved  first,  and  for  some  days  skirmished  vigorously  with 
Cox's  troops,  which  were  in  force  at  Gauley  Bridge  and  in  the  neighbour 
hood  of  the  "  Hawk's  Nest,"  a  picturesque  and  majestic  monument  of 
wooded  rocks,  rising  a  thousand  feet  from  the  river  road,  at  a  point  ten 
miles  below  the  mouth  of  the  Gauley.  Gen.  Wise  having  come  up,  the 
joint  Confederate  forces  now  approached  nearer  the  enemy,  skirmishing 
with  various  success.  But  while  thus  occupied,  it  was  ascertained  that 
another  foe  threatened  their  flank. 

Col.  Tyler,  commanding  the  Seventh  Ohio  Regiment,  of  nearly  thirteen 
hundred  men,  was  approaching  the  Gauley  River  at  Carnifax  Ferry, 
about  five  miles  south  of  Summerville,  in  Nicholas  County,  and  twenty- 
four  miles  above  Gauley  Bridge.  His  movement  was  therefore  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  Confederates,  and  had  he  succeeded  in  crossing  the 
river  and  reaching  their  rear,  he  would  have  cut  their  communication^ 
with  Lewisburg.  Gen.  Floyd  at  once  determined  to  cross  the  river  at 
Carnifax  Ferry  and  encounter  this  movement  of  the  enemy.  He  at  once 
put  his  brigade  in  motion,  taking  with  him  a  part  of  Wise's  cavalry  ;  that 
commander  remaining  with  the  larger  body  of  his  troops  at  Pickett's  Mills 
in  Fayette  County,  so  as  to  hold  the  turnpike,  and  guard  against  any  ag 
gressive  movement  of  Cox,  which  might  have  embarrassed  that  against 
Tyler. 

The  enterprise  of  Gen.  Floyd  was  thoroughly  successful.  Having 
crossed  the  Gauley,  he,  on  the  morning  of  the  26th  of  August,  fell  upon 
Tyler  at  a  place  called  Cross  Lanes  ;  defeated  and  dispersed  his  force  ;  and 


AFFAIR  AT  CKOS8  LANES.  171 

inflicted  upon  him  a  loss  of  about  two  hundred  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners. 

After  the  affair  of  Cross  Lanes,  Gen.  Floyd  proceeded  to  strengthen  his 
position  on  the  Gauley.  Owing  to  an  unfortunate  want  of  concert  be 
tween  Wise  and  himself,  these  two  Confederate  forces  in  Western  Virginia 
were  separated  by  a  deep  and  rapid  river  ;  and  Floyd  himself  was  unable 
to  attempt  a  movement  against  Cox.  He  was  far  from  his  depot  of  provi 
sions  in  Lewisburg,  and  being  unprovided  with  adequate  transportation,  it 
would  have  been  rash  to  have  ventured  forward  on  the  north  of  the  river. 
Knowledge  of  this  situation  of  affairs  was  not  lost  upon  the  enemy. 
Gen.  Eosecrans — a  name  which  was  hereafter  to  become  familiar  on  more 
important  theatres  of  the  war — commanded  the  Federal  forces  between 
JBuckhannon  and  Cheat  Mountain.  He  at  once  conceived  the  idea  of  over 
whelming  the  Confederates  on  both  sides  of  the  Gauley,  and  accordingly 
moved  rapidly  down  the  road  leading  from  Weston  to  Summerville,  with 
at  least  nine  thousand  men  and  several  heavy  batteries  of  artillery. 

Gen.  Floyd  was  in  a  bend  of  Gauley  River,  very  near  Carnifax  Ferry. 
On  the  10th  of  September,  Eosecrans,  by  a  rapid  march  of  sixteen  miles, 
threw  his  entire  force  about  Floyd's  entrenchments,  and  commenced  a  vig 
orous  attack.  The  force  of  Floyd's  command  did  not  exceed  seventeen 
hundred  and  fifty  men.  But  his  flanks  were  well  protected  by  precipices 
or  cliffs  heavily  wooded  ;  and  from  three  o'clock  until  nightfall  his  centre, 
protected  by  an  imperfect  earthwork,  sustained  an  assault  from  an  enemy 
five  times  his  numbers,  made  with  small  arms,  grape,  and  round-shot,  from 
howitzers  and  rifled  cannon.  As  the  sun  was  sinking,  Eosecrans  ordered 
a  final  and  desperate  charge.  His  troops  pressed  rapidly  forward  to  short 
musket  range  ;  the  Southern  lines  were  wrapped  in  fire ;  a  thousand  bul 
lets  darted  into  the  adverse  ranks,  and  for  a  few  moments  the  carnage  was 
appalling.  The  Federals  fell  back,  and  returned  no  more  to  the  assault. 
The  ground  was  covered  with  hundreds  of  their  dead  and  wounded.  The 
Confederates  had  not  lost  a  man  killed  and  not  more  than  twenty  wounded. 

During  the  night,  Gen.  Floyd  crossed  the  river  by  means  of  two  ferry 
boats  and  a  hastily  constructed  bridge  of  logs.  He  had  accomplished  a 
brilliant  success  in  the  check  and  lesson  he  had  already  given  the  enemy ; 
and  knowing  Eosecrans'  superiority  of  numbers,  and  fearing  for  his  own 
communications  in  his  rear,  he  determined  to  withdraw  to  Wise's  camp, 
and  unite  the  two  commands. 

It  appears  that  when  Floyd  had  first  learned  of  Eosecrans'  advance,  he 
had  despatched  orders  to  Gen.  Wise  for  reinforcements,  and  that  he  failed 
to  procure  them.  He  wrote  to  the  War  Department  at  Eichmond  that  he 
could  have  beaten  the  enemy,  if  these  reinforcements  had  come  up  when 
ordered  ;  that  if  he  could  have  commanded  the  services  of  five  thousand 
men,  instead  of  eighteen  hundred,  which  he  had,  he  could  have  opened 


172  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

the  road  directly  into  the  Valley  of  the  Kanawha.  He  indic-ated  the 
urgent  necessity  of  shaping  the  command  in  that  region  of  country  so  as  to 
ensure  unity  of  action, — the  condition  of  success  in  all  military  operations. 

In  a  few  days  Rosecrans  crossed  the  Gauley  with  his  army,  and  as  the 
force  opposing  them  was  superiour  in  numbers,  Floyd  and  Wise  fell  back 
deliberately  towards  Sewell's  Mountain.  New  differences  now  developed 
themselves  between  these  two  leaders,  which  disturbed  that  unity  of  action 
so  much  desired.  After  reaching  Sewell's  Mountain,  Gen.  Floyd  held  a 
council  of  his  officers,  and  determined  to  fall  back  still  further,  to  Meadow 
Bluff,  eighteen  miles  west  of  Lewisburg.  Gov.  "Wise  followed  him  only  as 
far  as  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountain,  where  he  proceeded  to  strengthen 
his  position,  which  he  named  Camp  "  Defiance." 

At  this  pause  in  military  operations  in  the  Kanawha  Valley,  it  will  be 
convenient  to  note  the  events  which  had  occurred  further  north  in  this 
Western  region  of  Virginia,  and  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  Confed 
erate  army  there  under  the  command  of  a  man  whose  star  was  to  be  singu 
larly  obscured  before  it  mounted  the  zenith  of  fame — Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee. 

After  the  retreat  of  Gen.  Garnett  from  Rich  Mountain,  and  the  death 
of  that  officer,  Gen.  Lee  was  appointed  to  succeed  him,  and,  with  as  little 
delay  as  possible,  repaired  to  the  scene  of  operations.  He  took  with  him 
reinforcements,  making  his  whole  force,  in  conjunction  with  the  remnant 
of  Gen.  Garnett's  army,  about  sixteen  thousand  men.  The  roads  in  this 
part  of  the  country  were  deep  in  mud  and  horrible  with  precipices.  By 
patience  and  skill,  Gen.  Lee  advanced  with  his  army  across  the  Alleghany 
range,  and  deliberately  approached  the  enemy  in  Randolph  County. 

Rosecrans  was  then  the  ranking  officer  of  the  Federal  troops  in  North 
western  Virginia ;  but  Gen.  Reynolds  held  the  approaches  to  Beverly 
with  a  force  estimated  at  from  ten  to  twelve  thousand  men.  The  larger 
part  of  these  were  strongly  entrenched  at  a  point  at  the  junction  of 
Tygart's  Valley  River  and  Elk  Run,  which  post  was  called  by  the  Federals 
"  Elk  Water."  The  remainder  held  the  pass  at  the  second  summit  of 
Cheat  Mountain,  on  the  best  road  from  Staunton  to  Parkersburg.  The 
mountain  had  three  well-defined  summits.  The  second  presented  the 
greatest  advantages  for  fortification,  and  here  the  enemy  had  built  a  pow 
erful  fort  or  block-house  in  the  elbow  of  the  road,  flanked  by  entrench 
ments  of  earth  and  logs,  protected  by  dense  abattis  on  every  side,  and 
rendered  inaccessible,  in  two  directions,  by  the  steep  and  rugged  walls  of 
the  mountain. 

Having  approached  the  enemy,  Gen.  Lee  directed  careful  reconnois- 
sances  to  be  made  of  all  his  positions.  Col.  Rust,  of  the  3d  Arkansas  Regi 
ment,  made  what  afterwards  proved  to  be  a  very  imperfect  reconnoissance  of 
the  enemy's  position  on  Cheat  Mountain,  and  reported  that  it  was  perfectly 
practicable  to  turn  it  and  carry  it  by  storm.  Gen.  Lee  at  once  issued  his 


FAILURE  AT   CHEAT  MOUNTAIN.  173 

orders  for  a  united  movement  upon  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  both  at  Elk 
"Water  and  on  Cheat  Mountain.  After  great  labour  and  the  endurance  of 
severe  hardships  on  the  mountain  spurs,  where  the  weather  was  very  cold, 
Gen.  Lee  succeeded  in  getting  below  the  enemy  at  Elk  Water,  placing 
other  portions  of  his  forces  on  the  spurs  of  the  mountain  immediately  east 
and  west  of  the  enemy,  and  marching  another  portion  of  his  troops  down 
the  river  close  to  the  enemy.  The  forces  were  thus  arranged  in  position 
for  making  an  attack  upon  the  enemy  at  Elk  "Water,  and  remained  there 
for  some  hours,  waiting  the  signal  from  Col.  Rust's  attack  on  Cheat 
Mountain. 

That  officer,  with  fifteen  hundred  troops,  chiefly  his  Arkansas  men,  had 
turned  the  Cheat  Summit  Fort,  and  was  now  in  its  rear.  But  he  saw  at 
once  that  his  former  reconnoissance  had  been  deceptive.  The  fortified 
post  was  literally  unapproachable,  by  reason  of  thick  abattis  of  felled  trees, 
with  branches  and  undergrowth  densely  interlaced,  extending  from  the 
block-house  nearly  half  a  mile  down  the  rugged  sides  of  the  mountain. 
Col.  Rust  gave  no  signal  for  the  advance,  awaited  by  the  forces  at  Elk 
"Water;  he  thought  his  enterprise  hopeless,  and  withdrew  his  troops. 
Gen.  Lee,  informed  of  the  miscarriage  of  this  part  of  his  plan,  abandoned 
the  whole  of  it,  and  retired  his  command  without  any  results  whatever. 

The  failure  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  Cheat  Mountain,  and  thus  re  • 
lieve  Northwestern  Virginia,  was  a  disappointment  to  the  Southern  public, 
whose  expectations  had  been  greatly  raised  by  vague  rumours  of  Lee's 
strategy  and  plans.  It  was  thought,  too,  that  this  distinguished  com 
mander  might  have  realized  some  results  of  his  well-matured  plan,  if,  de 
spite  of  the  disconcert  of  Rust,  he  had  risked  an  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
position  at  Elk  Water,  which  a  portion  of  his  forces  had  surrounded.  But 
regrets  were  unavailing  now ;  danger  was  imminent  in  another  quarter. 
Learning  by  couriers  of  the  union  of  Rosecrans  and  Cox,  and  of  their  ad 
vance  upon  Wise  and  Floyd,  Gen.  Lee  decided  at  once  to  reinforce  the 
Southern  armies  on  the  line  of  Lewisburg.  He  reached  Gen.  Floyd's 
camp  at  Meadow  Bluff,  on  the  20th  of  September,  and  after  conferring 
with  him  for  two  days,  joined  Gen.  Wise  at  Sewell  Mountain,  on  the  22d. 
The  experienced  eye  of  Lee  saw  at  once  that  Wise's  position  was  very 
strong,  and  capable  of  arresting  a  very  heavy  hostile  force.  He  accord 
ingly  ordered  forward  his  troops  to  the  spot,  and  extended  the  defensive 
works  already  planned. 

Meanwhile  Gen.  Rosecrans,  with  fifteen  thousand  men,  advanced,  and 
took  possession  of  the  top  of  Big  Sewell  Mountain,  skirmishing  with  the 
forward  troops  of  the  Wise  brigade.  Gen.  Lee  daily  expected  an  attack, 
and  was  prepared  for  it.  His  force  was  now  quite  equal  to  that  of  the 
enemy.  He  was  within  sight  of  him  ;  each  apparently  awaiting  an  attack 
from  the  other.  But  the  opportunity  of  a  decisive  battle  in  Western  Yir- 


174  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ginia  was  again  to  be  lost.  On  the  night  of  the  6th  of  October,  Rosecrans' 
troops  moved  to  the  rear  in  the  dark,  and  the  next  morning,  when  the 
Confederates  looked  out  from  their  camp,  the  whole  of  the  threatening 
host  that  had  confronted  them  for  twelve  days  before,  was  gone.  Gen. 
Lee  made  no  attempt  to  pursue  them.  It  was  said  that  the  mud,  the 
swollen  streams,  and  the  reduced  condition  of  his  artillery  horses  made 
pursuit  impracticable. 

But  one  incident  of  success  was  to  occur  in  a  campaign  of  so  many 
disappointments.  When  Gen.  Lee  withdrew  from  the  Cheat  Mountain 
region,  he  left  Gen.  H.  R.  Jackson  with  twenty-five  hundred  men  to  hold 
his  position  on  the  Greenbrier  River.  On  the  3d  of  October,  the  enemy, 
about  four  thousand  strong,  attacked  Jackson's  position.  A  severe  artil 
lery  engagement  occurred,  in  which  Jackson  could  not  bring  more  than 
five  pieces  in  action  to  return  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  eight.  Masses  of  in 
fantry  were  then  thrown  forward  on  Jackson's  right  and  front,  marching 
up  the  wooded  sides  of  a  hill  that  rose  from  the  river.  The  location  of  the 
hill  was  such  that  they  could  not  fire  effectively  until  they  crossed  the 
river ;  and  as  they  attempted  to  form  and  deploy,  in  order  to  a  charge,  the 
12th  Georgia  Regiment  fired  several  rapid  volleys  of  musketry  into  them, 
which  instantly  checked  their  advance.  At  the  same  time,  Shurnaker's 
guns  were  directed  to  the  point  in  the  woods  in  which  they  were  known 
to  be  crowded,  and  completed  their  discomfiture  by  playing  upon  them 
with  destructive  effect.  The  regiments  on  the  hill-side  retreated  rapidly, 
and  soon  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry 
was  moving  in  a  confused  mass  to  the  rear.  His  loss  in  the  engagement 
in  killed  and  wounded  was  estimated  at  from  two  hundred  and  fifty  to 
three  hundred.  The  loss  of  the  Confederates  was  officially  reported  as  six 
killed  and  thirty-one  wounded. 

The  approaching  rigours  of  winter  terminated  the  campaign  in  "Western 
Virginia ;  or  it  may  be  said  to  have  been  virtually  abandoned  by  the 
Richmond  authorities.  Gen.  Lee,  who  had  shed  such  little  blood  in  the 
campaign,  and  obtained  such  indifferent  reputation  in  mountain  warfare, 
was  appointed  to  take  charge  of  the  coast  defences  of  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia.  Gen.  "Wise  was  ordered  to  report  to  Richmond,  and  was  subse 
quently  assigned  to  important  duty  in  North  Carolina.  Gen.  Floyd 
lingered  in  the  mountains ;  had  some  desultory  affairs  with  the  enemy ; 
subsequently  retired  to  Southwestern  Virginia  ;  and  from  there  was  trans 
ferred  by  the  Government  to  the  now  imposing  theatre  of  war  in  Tennessee 
and  Kentucky. 

Thus  ended  the  effort  of  the  Confederate  authorities  to  reclaim  the 
larger  portion  of  "Western  Virginia.  We  have  put  in  a  brief  space  its  nar 
rative  of  military  events ;  for,  after  all,  it  was  a  mere  series  of  local  adven 
tures,  compared  with  other  operations  of  the  war. 


CHAPTEE   X. 

THE    CONGRESS    IN    WASHINGTON. — NEW    DEVELOPMENT    OF    NORTHERN    POLICY. — LINCOLN'S 
POLITICAL  DISCOVERY. — HIS   REMARKABLE  MEASURES   OP  WAR. — AN  ERA   OF   DESPOTISM. 

— VIOLENT  ACTS  OF  CONGRESS. — THE  SEED  OF  ABOLITION. SUSPENSION   OF   THE   HABEAS 

CORPUS. — CURIOUS  APOLOGY  FOR  IT. — MILITARY  ARRESTS. — A  "CONFIDENTIAL"  DOCU 
MENT  FROM  M'CLELLAN. — CURIOUS  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  NORTHERN  PEOPLE  TO  SUR 
RENDER  THEIR  LIBERTIES.— CONSERVATISM  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  CAUSE. — LINCOLN'S 
VIEW  OF  STATE  "NEUTRALITY"  IN  THE  WAR. — APPLICATION  OF  IT  TO  KENTUCKY. — 
THE  ELECTIONS  IN  KENTUCKY. — THE  CONFEDERATES  ANTICIPATE  THE  FEDERAL  OCCU 
PATION  OF  KENTUCKY. — ZOLLICOFFER's  COMMAND. — FOLK'S  COMMAND.— JUSTIFICATION 
OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  OCCUPATION.— CLAIMS  AND  DESIGNS  OF  THE  FEDERALS  IN  KEN 
TUCKY. — FOLK'S  OCCUPATION  OF  COLUMBUS. — ms  PROFFER  OF  WITHDRAWAL. — ARRESTS 
IN  KENTUCKY. — DESPOTIC  AND  BRUTAL  LEGISLATION. — DISTINGUISHED  REFUGEES. — BRECK- 
INRIDGE'S  ADDRESS. — EARLY  MILITARY  MOVEMENTS  IN  KENTUCKY. — ZOLLICOFFER'S  OPERA 
TIONS. — BUOKNER'S  OCCUPATION  OF  BOWLING  GREEN. — THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. — MOVE 
MENT  OF  U.  8.  GRANT.— GEN.  PILLOW'S  COMMAND  ENGAGED  AT  DISADVANTAGE. — THE 
CONFEDERATES  DRIVEN  BACK. — TIMELY  REINFORCEMENTS. — SUDDEN  CONVERSION  OF  A 
DEFEAT  INTO  A  VICTORY. — RETREAT  OF  GRANT. — HIS  OFFICIAL  MISREPRESENTATION  OF 
THE  DAY. — PROSPECT  OF  THE  WAR  IN  THE  WEST. 

THE  new  Federal  Congress,  pursuant  to  the  summons  of  President 
Lincoln,  met  in  Washington  on  the  4th  of  July.  The  event  was  the  occa 
sion  of  a  new  development  of  the  Northern  policy,  and  a  remarkable 
enlargement  of  the  operations  of  the  war. 

In  his  message,  Mr.  Lincoln  announced  a  great  political  discovery.  It 
was  that  all  former  statesmen  of  America  had  lived,  and  written,  and 
labored  under  a  great  delusion  ;  that  the  States,  instead  of  having  created 
the  Union,  were  its  creatures  /  that  they  obtained  their  sovereignty  and 
independence  from  it,  and  never  possessed  either  until  the  Convention  of 
1787.  This  singular  doctrine  of  consolidation  was  the  natural  preface  to  a 
series  of  measures  to  strengthen  the  Government,  to  enlarge  the  Executive 
power,  and  to  conduct  the  war  with  new  decision,  and  on  a  most  unex 
pected  scale  of  magnitude. 

President  Lincoln  had  already  instituted  certain  remarkable  measures 
of  war.  He  had  published  his  proclamation  declaring  the  ports  of  the 


176  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

Southern  Confederacy  in  a  state  of  blockade,  and  denouncing  any  molesta 
tion  of  Federal  vessels  on  the  high  seas  as  piracy,  having  reference  to  let 
ters  of  marque  issued  by  the  Confederate  authority.  He  had  prohibited 
all  commercial  intercourse  with  the  States  composing  the  new  confedera 
tion.  And  although  he  insisted  on  referring  to  the  belligerent  powers  in 
the  flippant  and  unimportant  words  of  "persons  engaged  in  disorderly 
proceedings,"  he  had  found  it  advisable,  as  early  as  the  3d  of  May,  in 
addition  to  his  first  requisition  for  seventy-five  thousand  men  to  operate 
against  these  disorderly  persons,  to  call  for  forty-odd  thousand  additional 
volunteers  to  enlist  for  the  war,  and  eighteen  thousand  seamen,  besides 
increasing  the  regular  army  by  the  addition  of  ten  regiments.  He  now 
wrote  to  Congress  :  "  It  is  recommended  that  you  give  the  legal  means  for 
making  this  contest  a  short  and  a  decisive  one;  that  you  place  at  the 
control  of  the  Government,  for  the  work,  at  least  four  hundred  thousand 
men,  and  four  hundred  millions  of  dollars."  The  recommendation  was  a 
singular  commentary  on  the  prospect  that  had  been  held  out  of  subduing 
the  Confederate  power  by  three  months'  levies,  before  the  Congress  should 
meet  in  the  month  of  July  to  determine  the  disposition  of  the  conquered 
States  and  the  fate  of  the  leaders.  But  Congress  was  generous ;  and,  in 
excess  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  demand,  voted  him  five  hundred  thousand  men,  to 
serve  for  a  period  not  exceeding  three  years. 

But  the  interest  of  the  first  Congress,  under  Mr.  Lincoln's  administra 
tion,  is  not  confined  to  its  military  legislation.  It  is  a  period  from  which 
we  may  trace  a  spirit  that  essentially  tended  to  revolutionize  the  political 
system  and  ideas  of  the  North  itself,  and  to  erect  on  the  ruins  of  the 
Constitution  a  despotic  authority,  whose  consequences  ran  all  through  the 
war. 

The  first  sessions  of  this  Congress  were  signalized  by  a  resolution 
refusing  to  consider  any  propositions  but  those  looking  to  a  continued  and 
vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  and  confining  all  business  to  the  military 
and  naval  operations  of  the  Government ;  by  a  general  approval  of  the 
acts  done  by  the  President  without  constitutional  authority,  including  his 
suspension  of  the  habeas  corpus;  and  by  the  initiation  of  a  barbarous 
policy  of  confiscation  in  a  bill  declaring  free  whatever  slaves  were  em 
ployed  in  the  service  of  "  the  rebellion, "  thus  evidently  containing  the 
seed  of  that  thick  crop  of  Abolition  legislation  which  was  to  ensue. 

Mr.  Lincoln  had  suspended  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  without  the  consti 
tutional  concurrence  of  Congress,  and  under  a  claim  of  authority  to  arrest 
without  process  of  law  all  persons  "  dangerous  to  the  public  safety."  This 
remarkable  usurpation  was  tolerated  by  the  country.  Indeed,  it  obtained 
many  ingenious  defences  in  Northern  newspapers.  It  was  declared  that 
the  privilege  of  habeas  corpus  was  really  in  the  interest  of  no  one  but 
quasi  criminals ;  and  that  what  had  been  esteemed  for  centuries  as  the 


M'CLELLAN'S  "  CONFIDENTIAL  "  DOCUMENT.  177 

bulwark  of  personal  liberty,  was  really  a  matter  of  no  great  concern  to  the 
general  public.  An  apologist  for  Mr.  Lincoln  wrote  :  "  In  such  times  the 
people  generally  are  willing,  and  are  often  compelled,  to  give  up  for  a 
season  a  portion  of  their  freedom  to  preserve  the  rest ;  and  fortunately, 
again,  it  is  that  portion  of  the  people,  for  the  most  part,  who  like  to  live 
on  the  margin  of  disobedience  to  the  laws,  whose  freedom  is  most  in  dan 
ger.  The  rest  are  rarely  in  want  of  a  habeas  corpus" 

This  astounding  and  atrocious  doctrine  had  already  been  put  in  violent 
practice  in  certain  parts  of  the  North.  We  have  already  referred  to  the 
military  arrest  of  the  municipal  officers  of  Baltimore.  It  was  but  the 
beginning  of  a  reign  of  terrour.  There  is  place  here  for  the  following 
remarkable  document,  under  the  authority  of  which  were  arrested  many 
leading  members  of  the  Legislature  of  Maryland  : 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

"WASHINGTON,  Sept.  12,  1861. 

"  GENERAL  :  After  full  consultation  with  the  President,  Secretaries  of  State,  War,  &c., 
it  has  been  decided  to  effect  the  operation  proposed  for  the  17th.  Arrangements  have 
been  made  to  have  a  Government  steamer  at  Annapolis  to  receive  the  prisoners  and 
carry  them  to  their  destination. 

"  Some  four  or  five  of  the  chief  men  in  the  affair  are  to  be  arrested  to-day.  When 
they  meet  on  the  17th,  you  will  please  have  everything  prepared  to  arrest  the  whole 
party,  and  be  sure  that  none  escape. 

"It  is  understood  that  you  arrange  with  General  Dix  and  Governor  Seward  the 
modus  operandi.  It  has  been  intimated  to  me  that  the  meeting  might  take  place  on  the 
14th ;  please  be  prepared.  I  would  be  glad  to  have  you  advise  me  frequently  of  your 
arrangements  in  regard  to  this  very  important  matter. 

"  If  it  is  successfully  carried  out,  it  will  go  far  toward  breaking  the  backbone  of  the 
rebellion.  It  would  probably  be  well  to  have  a  special  train  quietly  prepared  to  take 
prisoners  to  Annapolis. 

"  I  leave  this  exceedingly  important  affair  to  your  tact  and  discretion — and  have  but 
one  thing  to  impress  upon  you — the  absolute  necessity  of  secrecy  and  success.  With  the 
highest  regard,  I  am,  my  dear  General,  your  sincere  friend, 

"  GEOKGE  B.  MOCLELLAN, 

"  Major-General  U.  S.  A." 

But  the  policy  of  arrests  did  not  end  with  this  singular  violation  of  the 
freedom  of  a  legislative  body.  Other  citizens  were  taken.  Military 
arrests  were  made  in  the  dead  hour  of  night.  The  most  honourable  and 
virtuous  citizens  were  dragged  from  their  beds,  and  confined  in  forts. 
Searches  and  seizures,  the  most  rigorous  and  unwarrantable,  were  made 
without  pretext  of  justification.  Hopeless  imprisonment  was  inflicted 
without  accusation,  without  inquiry  or  investigation,  and  without  the  pros 
pect  of  a  trial.  "When,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  at  Washington, 
Mr.  Yallandigham  of  Ohio  moved  a  series  of  resolutions  condemning  these 
acts  of  despotic  authority  and  intolerable  espionage,  including  the  seizure 
12 


178  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

of  despatches  in  the  telegraph  offices,  they  were  unceremoniously  laid  on 
the  table. 

There  was  an  evident  disposition  of  the  Northern  people  to  surrender 
their  constitutional  liberties  to  any  government  that  would  gratify  their 
political  passions.  A  true  account  of  the  despotism  of  these  times  indi 
cates,  indeed,  what  little  love  of  liberty  there  was  in  the  North,  and  its 
low  stage  of  sentimentalism  on  this  subject ;  for  wherever  it  has  been 
observed  in  history  that  a  nation  has  been  willing  to  surrender  liberty  in 
an  attempt  at  territorial  ascendancy,  it  has  always  been  the  evidence  of  a 
coarse  and  materialistic  character  that  serves  well  the  ambitious  designs  of 
Despotism,  and  prefers  a  false  greatness  to  the  humbler  realities  of  honour 
and  happiness.  In  remarkable  contrast  to  this  tendency  of  the  Northern 
people  to  submit  to  a  subtraction  of  their  liberties,  and  even  to  applaud 
it,  while  they  imagined  that  their  greed  of  resentment  and  lust  of  terri 
tory  were  to  be  satisfied,  were  the  declarations  and  spirit  of  the  new  gov 
ernment  erected  in  the  South.  There  the  body  of  civil  liberties  was 
undiminished  and  untouched.  The  muniments  of  constitutional  law  were 
not  disturbed.  In  the  midst  of  a  war  "  waged  not  to  destroy,  but  to  pre 
serve  existing  institutions,"  the  South  was  recurring  to  the  past  rather  than 
running  into  new  and  rash  experiments,  and  exhibiting  a  spirit  of  Conserv 
atism  that  the  world  had  seldom  observed  in  so  vast  a  commotion. 

In  his  message  of  July,  1861,  Mr.  Lincoln  had  referred  to  an  attempt 
meditated  by  States  at  a  position  of  "  neutrality  "  in  the  war.  On  this 
subject  he  wrote,  with  more  than  usual  acuteness  : 

"  In  the  Border  States,  so  called — in  fact,  the  Middle  States — there  are  those  who 
favor  a  policy  which  they  call  '  armed  neutrality ; '  that  is,  an  arming  of  these  States  to 
prevent  the  Union  forces  passing  one  way,  or  the  Disunion  the  other,  over  their  soil. 
This  would  be  disunion  completed.  Figuratively  speaking,  it  would  be  building  an 
impassable  wall  along  the  line  of  separation — and  yet,  not  quite  an  impassable  one ;  for, 
under  the  guise  of  neutrality,  it  would  tie  the  hands  of  the  Union  men,  and  freely  pass 
supplies  from  among  them  to  the  insurrectionists,  which  it  could  not  do  as  an  open 
enemy.  At  a  stroke,  it  would  take  all  the  trouble  off  the  hands  of  Secession,  except  only 
what  proceeds  from  the  external  blockade.  It  would  do  for  the  Disunionists  that  which, 
of  all  things,  they  most  desire — feed  them  well,  and  give  them  disunion  without  a  strug 
gle  of  their  own.  It  recognizes  no  fidelity  to  the  Constitution,  no  obligation  to  maintain 
the  Union ;  and,  while  very  many  who  favored  it  are,  doubtless,  loyal  citizens,  it  is,  nev 
ertheless,  very  injurious  in  effect." 

This  passage  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  message  naturally  introduces  us  to  the 
remarkable  part  taken  by  the  State  of  Kentucky  at  the  period  of  hostilities 
and  in  the  opening  scenes  of  the  war.  Her  Legislature  had  passed  a  reso 
lution,  to  the  effect  that  the  State  should  remain  neutral  in  the  contest 
pending,  and  would  not  permit  the  troops  of  either  party  to  pass  over  or 
occupy  her  soil  for  belligerent  purposes. 


THE  NEUTRALITY  OF  KENTUCKY.  179 

In  assuming  the  part  of  a  neutral,  the  attitude  of  Kentucky  fell  far 
below  the  hopes  of  the  Confederate  States  ;  but  even  that  plea  was  to  be 
used  to  disguise  designs  which  meditated  nothing  short  of  an  eventual  and 
open  declaration-  of  common  cause  with  the  Northern  States.  An  election 
ensued  for  members  of  her  Legislature  in  the  month  of  August.  In  this 
canvass  the  intriguers  of  the  Federal  Government  were  at  work  ;  the  war 
had  fully  opened  ;  paper  money  in  abundance  was  beginning  to  circulate  ; 
rich  contracts  for  mules,  hemp,  and  lumber,  were  scattered  with  lavish  but 
discriminating  hand,  among  the  Union  men  of  Kentucky ;  and  wiien  the 
election  came,  a  large  majority  of  men  were  returned  who  had  professed 
before  the  people  their  fidelity  to  the  neutral  faith,  but  who,  in  reality, 
were  prepared  to  throw  the  whole  power  of  the  State,  as  far  as  they  could 
wield  it,  in  favor  of  Lincoln  and  his  war  against  the  South. 

After  the  returns  of  this  election  were  made,  it  soon  became  evident  that 
the  Federals  intended  to  occupy  Kentucky,  and  to  use  her  roads  and 
mountains  for  marching  invading  columns  upon  the  Confederate  States. 
It  became  necessary  to  anticipate  them.  Brigadier-General  Zollicoffer,  of 
Tennessee,  on  the  14th  of  September,  occupied  the  mountain  passes  at 
Cumberland,  and  the  three  long  mountains  in  Harlan  and  Knox  Counties, 
Kentucky,  through  which  an  invading  column  of  Federals  had  been 
threatening  for  weeks  to  march  from  Hoskins'  Cross-roads.  And  on  the  3d 
of  September  Gen.  Leonidas  Polk  advanced  with  part  of  his  forces,  and 
took  possession  of  Hickman,  Chalk  Banks,  and  the  town  of  Columbus,  in 
Kentucky. 

The  position  of  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky,  and  Gov.  Magoffin,  that 
Gen.  Folk's  occupation  of  Columbus  was  an  act  of  invasion  of  their  State, 
and  violated  its  neutrality,  was  absurd.  The  enemy  had  chosen  to  make 
his  battle-ground  there,  and  to  erect  there  the  signs  of  armed  contest ;  and 
the  Confederates  had,  of  course,  the  right  to  confront  him  on  any  line  of 
operations  he  indicated.  The  Federal  Government  had  disregarded  the 
neutrality  of  Kentucky,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  had  hooted  at  it ;  her  representa 
tives  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  had  voted  supplies  of  men  and 
money  to  carry  on  the  war  against  the  Confederate  States  ;  Federal  camps 
and  depots  of  armies  had  been  established  in  Kentucky ;  military  com 
panies  had  been  organized  within  her  territory ;  and  at  a  rendezvous  in 
Garrard  County,  known  as  Camp  Dick  Eobinson,  several  thousand  troops, 
among  whom  men  from  Tennessee,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  were  mus 
tered  with  Kentuckians  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  were  pre 
pared  not  only  to  put  down  revolt  at  home,  but  to  carry  out  the  designs  of 
the  Washington  Government  for  the  subjugation  of  the  South. 

E~or  was  this  all.  The  Federal  forces  were  preparing  to  take  possession 
of  Columbus  and  Paducah,  regarding  them  as  important  positions ;  and 
when  Gen.  Folk  anticipated  them  in  occupying  the  former  place,  it  was 


180  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

only  when  the  enemy  had  constructed  a  military  work  on  the  Missouri 
shore,  immediately  opposite,  and  commanding  Columbus,  and  evidently 
intended  to  cover  the  landing  of  troops  for  the  seizure  of  the  town.  Fed 
eral  cannon  had  already  been  turned  upon  Columbus,  and  many  of  the 
inhabitants  had  fled  in  terrour  from  the  indications  of  approaching 
hostilities. 

In  no  sense  did  the  Confederates  intend  to  conquer  or  coerce  Kentucky. 
But  it  was  well  understood  that  the  people  of  that  State  had  been  deceived 
into  a  mistaken  security,  were  unarmed,  and  in  danger  of  being  subjugated 
by  the  Federal  forces,  while  a  majority  of  them,  if  perfectly  free  to  indicate 
their  choice,  would,  it  was  thought,  have  espoused  the  cause  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  Proclamation  was  made,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates,  of  the 
desire  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky,  and  the  intention  to  abide  by 
the  wishes  of  her  people,  as  soon  as  they  were  free  to  express  them. 

But  Gen.  Polk  went  even  further  than  this.  He  offered  to  accede  to 
the  demand  of  Gov.  Magoffin  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Confederate  troops 
from  Kentucky,  on  condition  that  the  State  would  agree  that  the  troops  of 
the  Federal  Government  be  withdrawn  simultaneously,  with  a  guaranty 
(which  he  would  give  reciprocally  for  the  Confederate  Government)  that 
the  Federal  troops  should  not  be  allowed  to  enter  or  occupy  any  part  of 
Kentucky  in  the  future.  This  proposition  wras  derided  by  the  Federal 
partisans  in  Kentucky,  and — as  every  proposition  of  equivalents  in  the  war 
— was  ridiculed  in  the  Northern  newspapers  as  a  piece  of  "  rebel "  im 
pertinence. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  period  of  "  policy  "  was  past  in  Kentucky, 
and  Federal  agents  were  making  daily  arrests  of  all  persons  suspected  of 
entertaining  designs  or  sentiments  hostile  to  the  government  at  Washing 
ton.  Many  members  of  the  State  Legislature,  true  to  the  South,  had 
vacated  their  offices  and  left  their  homes.  What  remained  of  this  body 
enacted  a  law  of  pains  and  penalties,  denouncing  death,  imprisonment, 
forfeitures  and  fines,  against  all  who  should  oppose  the  Federal  Govern 
ment. 

Among  those  Kentuckians  who,  fortunately  for  themselves  and  for  the 
cause  which  they  afterwards  served,  escaped  arrest,  and  came  within  the 
Confederate  lines,  were  John  C.  Breckinridge,  late  Yice-President  of  the 
United  States,  Col.  G.  W.  Johnson,  a  prominent  citizen,  Thomas  B.  Mon 
roe,  Sr.,  for  about  thirty  years  District  Judge  of  the  United  States, 
Humphrey  Marshall,  ex-member  of  Congress,  and  a  distinguished  officer  in 
the  Mexican  war,  and  Capt.  John  Morgan,  afterwards  the  "  Marion  "  of 
Kentucky,  and  one  of  the  most  famous  cavalry  commanders  in  the  West. 
Messrs.  Breckinridge  and  Marshall  proceeded  to  Richmond,  and  were 
appointed  Brigadier-Generals  in  the  Confederate  service. 

On  assuming  his  new  position,  Gen.  Breckinridge  published  an  address 


BRECKINKIDGE'S  ADDRESS.  181 

to  the  people  of  Kentucky,  some  passages  of  which  are  of  historical  inter 
est,  as  a  description  of  the  times,  from  a  pen  which,  for  many  years,  had 
been  able  and  conspicuous  in  every  cause  of  truth.  He  wrote  : 

"  The  Federal  Government — the  creature — has  set  itself  above  the  creator.  The 
atrocious  doctrine  is  announced  by  the  President,  and  acted  upon,  that  the  States  derive 
their  power  from  the  Federal  Government,  and  may  be  suppressed  on  any  pretence  of 
military  necessity.  Everywhere  the  civil  has  given  way  to  the  military  power.  The 
fortresses  of  the  country  are  filled  with  victims  seized  without  warrant  of  law,  and  igno 
rant  of  the  cause  of  their  imprisonment.  The  legislators  of  States  and  other  public  offi 
cers  are  seized  while  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties,  taken  beyond  the  limits  of 
their  respective  States,  and  imprisoned  in  the  forts  of  the  Federal  Government.  A  sub 
servient  Congress  ratifies  the  usurpations  of  the  President,  and  proceeds  to  complete  the 
destruction  of  the  Constitution.  History  will  declare  that  the  annals  of  legislation  do 
not  contain  laws  so  infamous  as  those  enacted  at  the  last  session.  They  sweep  away 
every  vestige  of  public  and  personal  liberty,  while  they  confiscate  the  property  of  a  nation 
containing  ten  millions  of  people.  The  great  mass  of  the  Northern  people  seem  anxious 
to  sunder  every  safeguard  of  freedom ;  they  eagerly  offer  to  the  Government  what  no 
European  monarch  would  dare  to  demand.  The  President  and  his  Generals  are  unable 
to  pick  up  the  liberties  of  the  people  as  rapidly  as  they  are  thrown  at  their  feet.  General 
Anderson,  the  military  dictator  of  Kentucky,  announces,  in  one  of  his  proclamations,  that 
he  will  arrest  no  one  who  does  not  act,  write,  or  speak  in  opposition  to  Mr.  Lincoln's 
Government.  It  would  have  completed  the  idea  if  he  had  added,  or  think  in  opposition 
to  it.  Look  at  the  condition  of  our  State  under  the  rule  of  our  new  protectors.  They 
have  suppressed  the  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press.  They  seize  people  by  military 
force  on  mere  suspicion,  and  impose  on  them  oaths  unknown  to  the  laws.  Other  citizens 
they  imprison  without  warrant,  and  carry  them  out  of  the  State,  so  that  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  cannot  reach  them.  Every  day  foreign  armed  bands  are  making  seizures 
among  the  people.  Hundreds  of  citizens,  old  and  young,  venerable  magistrates,  whose 
lives  have  been  distinguished  by  the  love  of  the  people,  have  been  compelled  to  fly  from 
their  homes  and  families,  to  escape  imprisonment  and  exile  at  the  hands  of  Northern  and 
German  soldiers  under  the  orders  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  military  subordinates." 

The  early  military  movements  in  Kentucky  are  to  be  considered  as 
taking  place  along  a  line  running  through  the  interiour  of  the  State,  extend 
ing  from  Columbus  in  the  West  to  Prestonburg  and  Pikeville  in  the 
mountains  on  the  Virginia  frontier. 

From  his  strong  position  at  Cumberland  Mountain,  Gen.  Zollicofler 
prepared  for  cautious  advances  upon  the  enemy.  On  the  19th  of  Septem 
ber,  a  portion  of  his  command  advanced  to  Barboursville,  and  dispersed  a 
camp  of  fifteen  hundred  Federals.  Gen.  Zollicoffer  continued  to  advance, 
and  early  in  October  reached  the  town  of  London  in  Laurel  County,  break 
ing  up  the  enemy's  camps  in  that  region. 

Meanwhile,  Brigadier-General  Buckner,  with  a  force  of  Kentucky  vol 
unteers,  advanced  from  the  borders,  and  on  the  18th  of  September  entered 
the  town  of  Bowling  Green,  in  "Warren  County,  eleven  miles  south  of 
Green  River,  and  immediately  on  the  line  of  approach  to  Louisville.  He 
issued  a  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Kentucky,  stating  that  their  Legis- 


182  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

lature  had  been  faithless  to  their  will ;  that  instead  of  enforcing  neutrality, 
they  had  sought  to  make  the  State  a  fortress  in  which  the  armed  forces  of 
the  United  States  might  securely  prepare  to  subjugate  alike  the  people  of 
Kentucky  and  of  the  Southern  States.  He  declared  that  the  Confederate 
troops  occupied  Bowling  Green  as  a  defensive  position,  and  that  he  renewed 
the  pledge  previously  given  by  their  commanders,  to  retire  as  soon  as  the 
Federal  forces  would  in  like  manner  withdraw. 

But  the  first  serious  collision  of  arms  in  Kentucky  was  to  occur  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  waters  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Tennessee  ;  and  to  that 
end  of  the  line  of  operations  we  must  now  take  the  attention  of  the  reader. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   BELMONT. 

Gen.  Polk  had  for  some  time  been  strengthening  his  position  at  Colum 
bus,  and  had  also  occupied  Belmont,  a  small  village  on  the  Missouri  shore, 
so  as  to  command  both  banks  of  the  stream. 

With  a  view  of  surprising  the  small  Confederate  force  on  the  west 
bank,  Gen.  U.  S.  Grant  collected  a  fleet  of  large  river  steamboats,  and 
embarking  at  night,  steamed  down  the  river  unobserved.  Within  a  few 
miles  of  Columbus  and  Belmont  the  river  makes  a  sudden  bend,  and 
behind  this  bend  Grant  disembarked  his  forces,  and  began  to  advance 
towards  Belmont,  through  the  woods.  When  the  morning  of  the  7th  of 
November  broke,  the  action  commenced ;  the  first  intimation  of  the  ene 
my's  presence  being  a  succession  of  rapid  volleys.  The  troops  were  soon 
under  arms,  but  the  sudden  surprise  precluded  all  idea  of  a  regular  line  or 
plan  of  battle. 

It  appears  that  when  the  enemy  was  reported  landing  troops  a  few 
miles  above,  the  garrison  in  Belmont  consisted  of  only  two  regiments. 
Gen.  Pillow,  with  four  regiments,  immediately  crossed,  and  assumed  com 
mand.  He  had  scarcely  done  so,  when  Grant's  advance  opened  fire,  and 
the  fight  soon  became  fierce  and  obstinate.  The  enemy  made  a  desperate 
attempt  to  turn  the  left  wing  of  the  Confederates,  but  was  defeated  by  the 
destructive  fire  of  Beltzhoover's  battery.  This  wing  was  severely  taxed, 
as  was  also  the  right.  Finding  that  they  stood  firm  and  unbroken,  and, 
anxious  for  decisive  action  before  reinforcements  could  reach  Pillow,  Grant 
repeatedly  hurled  his  strongest  force  at  the  Confederate  centre,  which  was 
in  the  open  field. 

The  centre  evidently  faltered  under  these  heavy  and  repeated  attacks. 
Pillow  ordered  a  charge,  and  the  first  line  of  the  enemy  was  driven  upon 
their  reserves.  But  ammunition  now  began  to  fail,  and  word  came  that 
the  wings  could  not  maintain  their  position  if  the  centre  gave  in,  as  there 
was  every  reason  to  fear  it  would  do.  Again  a  charge  was  ordered,  which 


THE   BATTLE   OF    BELMONT.  183 

proved  no  less  successful  than  the  first.  It  was  now  found  that  the  only 
battery  of  the  Confederates  had  not  a  cartridge  remaining,  and  most  of  the 
troops  were  similarly  circumstanced  ;  there  was  no  alternative  but  to  fall 
back  until  reinforcements  should  arrive  from  Columbus. 

In  moving  back  to  the  river  bank,  the  Confederate  line  was  more  or 
less  broken  and  disorganized  ;  and  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  master  of  the 
field.  He  was  already  in  full  possession  of  the  Confederate  camps,  and 
was  burning  them.  But  at  the  critical  moment  three  regiments,  which 
had  crossed  the  river  from  Columbus,  were  ordered  to  move  up  the  river 
bank,  through  the  woods,  and  get  in  the  enemy's  rear.  The  enemy  had 
seen  the  boats  crossing  with  reinforcements,  and  played  on  them  with  a 
heavy  battery  ;  but  the  guns  at  Columbus  replied,  and  in  a  few  moments 
the  enemy's  pieces  were  silenced.  Finding  that  Polk  himself  was  crossing, 
and  landing  troops  far  up  the  river  on  his  line  of  retreat,  Grant  immedi 
ately  began  to  fall  back,  but  had  not  proceeded  far  when  he  encountered 
Louisianians,  Mississippians,  Tennesseans,  and  others,  formed  on  his  flanks, 
subjecting  him  to  loss  every  moment,  while  the  guns  at  Columbus  contin 
ued  rapidly  firing  across  the  river,  and  from  the  high  position  of  the 
works,  telling  with  deadly  effect.  Under  these  circumstances  resistance 
was  hopeless,  and  Grant  reluctantly  ordered  a  retreat ;  but  while  conduct 
ing  it,  he  was  subjected  to  a  terrific  cross-fire  from  the  Confederates,  while 
Polk  in  person  was  pushing  the  rear  vigorously,  capturing  prisoners  and 
arms  every  yard  of  the  road.  The  confusion,  noise,  and  excitement  were 
terrible,  the  Federals  rapidly  retreating  to  their  boats,  and  the  advance 
columns  of  their  pursuers  pouring  deadly  volleys  into  them.  A  defeat 
was  suddenly  and  almost  miraculously  converted  into  a  glorious  triumph 
of  Confederate  arms. 

In  this  obstinate  conflict,  in  which  the  Confederates  fought  by  detach 
ments,  and  always  against  superiour  numbers,  it  was  officially  stated  that 
their  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  was  632,  while  that  of  the  ene 
my  was  claimed  to  have  been  treble  in  extent.  He  had  been  driven  under 
a  devouring  fire,  and  even  after  he  had  reached  the  river,  his  crowded 
transports  were  assailed  with  the  fire  of  thousands  of  deadly  rifles.  In 
Northern  newspapers,  Belmont  was  put  down  as  "  another  Union  victory." 
The  style  and  effrontery  of  the  falsehood  was  characteristic.  The  first  part 
of  the  day,  when  Grant  pushed  the  Confederates  to  the  river,  was  glow 
ingly  described  ;  but  the  subsequent  flank  movement  which  converted  his 
early  success  into  a  defeat  and  a  rout,  and  was,  indeed,  the  event  of  the 
day,  was  dismissed  in  the  briefest  and  most  indifferent  terms.  Grant 
wrote :  "  The  rebels  followed  in  the  rear  to  our  place  of  debarkation." 
Such  was  the  method  of  Northern  misrepresentation.  It  is  remarkable 
that,  by  ingenious  suppression,  or  by  the  rouged  falsehood  of  official  re 
ports,  the  North  claimed,  after  Manassas,  every  event  of  the  war  as  a  Fed- 


184:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

eral  victory,  unless  where  some  political  animosity  brought  out  the  details, 
or  some  personal  rivalry  extorted  the  truth. 

"With  the  Confederate  victory  of  Belmont,  we  leave  for  the  present  the 
story  of  military  operations  in  the  "West.  "We  shall  soon  recur  to  that 
theatre,  to  find  there  some  of  the  largest  and  most  important  events  of  the 
war.  We  shall  discover  that  the  enemy,  in  fact,  conceived  a  new  plan  of 
invasion  of  the  South,  through  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  by  means  of 
amphibious  expeditions,  composed  of  gunboats  and  land  forces  ;  and  that  a 
war  which  the  Southern  people  supposed  lingered  on  the  Potomac,  was 
suddenly  transferred  and  opened  with  imposing  scenes  on  the  western 
waters. 


CHAPTER    XI. 


THE  FICKLE  PUBLIC  OF  THE  NORTH. — GEN.  SCOTT.— THE  CLAMOUR  FOR  M  CLELLAN. — HIS 
EXALTATION  IN  THE  NEWSPAPERS. — THE  THEATRICAL  AND  SENSATIONAL  MIND  OF  THE 
NORTH. — ADVANCE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  TOWARDS  THE  POTOMAC. — M7CLELLAN's 
DESIGNS. — THE  CONFEDERATES  FALL  BACK  TO  CENTREVILLE. — THE  BATTLE  OF  LEES- 
BURG. — M'CLELLAN'S  MOVEMENT  ON  THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT. — EVANS'  BRIGADE. — 
FORTUNATE  CAPTURE  OF  A  FEDERAL  COURIER. — THE  FEDERALS  CROSS  THE  POTOMAC 
AND  OCCUPY  BALL'S  BLUFF. — SPLENDID  CHARGE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — DEATH  OF 
COL.  BAKER. — THE  ENEMY  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  RIVER. — AN  APPALLING  SPECTACLE  OF 
DEATH. — MISREPRESENTATIONS  IN  WASHINGTON. — MORALE  OF  M'CLELLAN'S  ARMY. — THE 
AFFAIR  AT  DRANESVILLE. — DEFEAT  OF  STUART. — "  STONEWALL"  JACKSON'S  NEW  COM 
MAND. — HIS  EXPEDITION  FROM  WINCHESTER. — TERRIBLE  SUFFERINGS  OF  HIS  COMMAND. 
— HIS  DEMONSTRATION  AT  BATH. — HIS  MOVEMENT  TO  ROMNEY,  AND  RETURN  TO  WIN 
CHESTER. — CLOSE  OF  THE  FIRST  YEAR'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA. — NAVAL  OPERATIONS 

IN   1801. — THE   ENEMY'S  IMMENSE  ADVANTAGE   IN   HIS   NAVY. — STATISTICS   OF  THE 

FEDERAL  NAVY. — IMPROVIDENCE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  IN  COAST  AND  RIVER  DE 
FENCES. — SECRETARY  MALLORY. — THE  CONFEDERACY  TO  LOSE  ALL  HER  SEAPORTS. — 
TWO  NAVAL  EXPEDITIONS  DOWN  THE  CAROLINA  COAST. — ENGAGEMENT  AT  HATTERAS 

INLET. — AN     UNEQUAL     COMBAT. — THE     PORT     ROYAL     EXPEDITION. CAPTURE    OF    PORT 

ROYAL. — VALUE  OF  THIS  FEDERAL  SUCCESS. — THE  "TRENT1'  AFFAIR. — CAPTURE  OF 
COMMISSIONERS  MASON  AND  SLIDELL. — AN  ENGLISH  COMMANDER'S  PROTEST. — GREAT 
INDIGNATION  IN  ENGLAND. — PREPARATIONS  THERE  FOR  WAR. — CONCEIT  AND  EXULTA 
TIONS  OF  THE  NORTH. — TRIBUTES  AND  ATTENTIONS  TO  CAPT.  WILKES. — CONCERN 
AMONG  THE  CONFEDERATES. — WHAT  RICHMOND  ORATORS  SAID. — SEWARD's  CORRE 
SPONDENCE  WITH  THE  BRITISH  GOVERNMENT. — HIS  COLLAPSE. — THE  LAST  RESORT  OF 
DEMAGOGUEISM. — DISAPPOINTMENT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  IN  THE  TERMINATION  OF 

THE  "TRENT"  AFFAIR. — EARL  RUSSELL'S  DECLARATION  IN  PARLIAMENT. — MR.  GREG 
ORY'S  REPLY. — THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  BLOCKADE. 

IN  the  beginning  of  the  war,  General  Winfield  Scott  had  been  entitled 
in  Northern  newspapers  "  the  Greatest  Captain  of  the  Age."  After  the 
disaster  of  Manassas  the  same  newspapers  derided  him  as  an  imbecile ;  and 
in  the  meanest  humiliation  General  Scott  publicly  announced  himself  an 
"  old  coward "  for  having  yielded  to  popular  clamour  in  fighting  the 
battle,  and  thus  sought  by  the  most  infamoiis  confession  the  mercy  of  men 
prompt  to  insult  his  fallen  fortunes. 

The  fickle  course  of  popular  applause  in  the  North  was  to  exalt  a  new 


186  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

idol,  and  to  designate  a  new  victim.  The  clamour  was  for  young  com 
manders.  Gen.  George  B.  McClellan  had  been  lifted  into  a  sudden 
popularity  by  the  indifferent  affair  of  Rich  Mountain.  He  was  a  graduate 
of  West  Point ;  had  been  one  of  the  Military  Commission  sent  to  the 
Crimea ;  and  just  before  the  war  had  been  employing  his  genius  as  super 
intendent  of  a  railroad.  He  was  now  to  take  command  of  the  Federal 
forces  on  the  line  of  the  Potomac,  and  to  find  himself  suddenly  exalted  in 
the  newspapers  to  comparisons  with  Alexander,  Csesar,  Hannibal  and 
Napoleon  the  Great. 

The  volatile,  superficial  and  theatrically-inclined  mind  of  the  North  is, 
perhaps,  in  nothing  more  strikingly  displayed  than  in  its  demonstrations 
towards  its  public  men.  Yankee  fame  has  come  to  be  one  of  the  curiosi 
ties  of  the  world.  Scott  was  "  the  Greatest  Captain  of  the  Age."  But 
McClellan  was  "  the  Young  Napoleon."  The  name  of  the  new  hero  ap 
peared  on  placards,  on  banners,  and  in  newspaper  headings.  Reporters 
stretched  their  ears  to  catch  the  least  word  he  uttered ;  artists  of  illus 
trated  journals  dogged  his  steps ;  his  eyes,  hair,  mouth,  teeth,  voice,  man 
ner  and  apparel  were  carefully  described  in  newspaper  articles.  Every 
store  of  flattery  and  praise  was  exhausted  upon  a  man  who  found  himself 
famous  by  nothing  more  than  the  caprice  of  the  multitude.* 

For  months  after  the  battle  of  Manassas  an  almost  unbroken  quiet  ex 
tended  along  the  line  of  the  Potomac.  McClellan  had  tolerated  the  ad 
vance  of  the  Confederate  lines  to  Munson's  Hill,  within  a  few  miles  of 
Alexandria ;  and  every  attempt  to  draw  him  out  into  a  general  engage 
ment  proved  unavailing.  Northern  politicians  complained  of  his  inactivity ; 

*  There  has  been  a  curious  Yankee  affectation  in  the  war.  It  is  to  discover  in  the  infancy  or 
early  childhood  of  all  their  heroes  something  indicative  of  their  future  greatness,  or  of  the  designs 
of  Providence  towards  them.  Thus  their  famous  cavalry  commanders  rode  wild  horses  as  soon  as 
they  could  sit  astraddle ;  and  their  greatest  commander  in  the  latter  periods  of  the  war — Ulysses 
S.  Grant—when  an  infant  in  arms  desired  a  pistol  to  be  fired  by  his  ear,  and  exclaimed,  frick 
again  I — thus  giving  a  very  early  indication  of  his  warlike  disposition.  The  following,  told  of 
McClellan  in  a  Washington  newspaper,  during  the  days  of  his  popularity,  is  characteristic  : — 

"  THE  INFANT  NAPOLEON. — An  incident  which  occurred  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia  in  the  winter 
of  1826-7,  is  particularly  worthy  of  record  in  our  present  crisis,  inasmuch  as  it  relates  to  the  early 
history  of  one  who  fills  a  position  commanding  the  attention  and  admiration  of  the  world,  and  par 
ticularly  of  our  own  country.  I  will  premise  by  saying  I  was  in  Philadelphia  in  the  winter 
spoken  of,  attending  medical  lectures  under  a  distinguished  surgeon,  then  a  professor  in  one  of  the 
institutions  of  the  city.  A  son  was  born  to  our  professor,  and  the  event  scarcely  transpired  before 
the  father  announced  it  to  his  delighted  pupils.  Scales  were  instantly  brought  from  a  neighboring 
grocer.  Into  one  dish  he  placed  the  babe,  into  the  other  all  the  weights.  The  beam  was  raised, 
but  the  child  moved  not !  The  father,  emptying  his  pockets,  threw  in  his  watch,  coin,  keys,  knives 
and  lancets,  but  to  no  purpose — the  little  hero  could  not  be  moved.  He  conquered  every  thing  ! 
And  at  last,  while  adding  more  and  more  weight,  the  cord  supporting  the  beam  gave  way,  and  broke 
rather  than  the  giant  infant  would  yield  !  The  father  was  Dr.  McClellan,  and  the  son — General 
McClellan  !  our  young  commander  on  the  Potomac.  The  country  will  see  a  prophetic  charm  in 
this  incident." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LEESBUEG.  187 

the  Confederates  were  immensely  reassured  by  it ;  but  there  is  reason  to 
suppose  that  McClellan's  splendid  army,  that  was  constantly  entertaining 
attention  with  parades  and  reviews,  was  performing  a  well-designed  part, 
and  that  the  gorgeous  pageant  on  the  Potomac  was  intended  as  a  veil  to 
immense  military  preparations  going  on  in  other  directions. 

The  Confederate  advance  having  failed  to  bring  on  a  general  battle, 
although  it  was  almost  daily  invited  by  heavy  skirmishing,  and  it  being 
impossible  without  a  chain  of  strong  fortifications  to  hold  the  advanced 
line  of  Mason's  and  Munson's  hills,  or  even  the  interiour  one  of  Fairfax 
Court-house  and  its  flanks,  it  was  decided  by  Gens.  Johnston  and  Beaure- 
gard,  on  the  15th  of  October,  to  withdraw  the  army  to  Centreville.  At 
the  dead  of  night  it  was  put  in  motion,  and  in  perfect  silence,  without  the 
beat  of  a  drum  or  the  note  of  a  bugle,  the  men  marched  out  of  their  for 
saken  entrenchments,  and  took  the  road  to  Centreville. 


THE    BATTLE   OF    LEESBUEG. 

The  apparent  retreat  of  the  Confederates  to  Centreville  encouraged 
McClellan  to  make  an  advance  on  the  extreme  left  wing  of  their  force. 
This  enterprise  brought  on  a  conflict  among  the  most  sanguinary  of  the 
war,  in  view  of  the  numbers  engaged.  The  design  of  the  Federal  com 
mander  was  to  occupy  the  country  covering  the  northern  belt  of  Fairfax 
and  Loudon  counties  ;  and  while  a  column  moved  towards  Dranesville,  he 
ordered  Gen.  Stone,  comanding  on  the  line  of  the  Potomac,  nearly  oppo 
site  to  Leesburg,  to  throw  across  the  river  a  sufficient  force  to  co-operate 
with  the  lower  movement. 

The  Confederate  force  in  and  around  Leesburg  was  about  two  thousand 
men.  It  was  a  brigade  composed  of  three  Mississippi  regiments  and  the 
8th  Virginia,  comanded  by  Gen.  Evans,  whose  name  had  been  conspicu 
ous  on  the  field  of  Manassas.  Before  day  broke  on  the  20th  of  October, 
the  men  were  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle,  and  Evans  addressed  them  thus  : 
"  Gentlemen,  the  enemy  are  approaching  by  the  Dranesville  road,  sixteen 
thousand  strong,  with  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.  They  want  to  cut  off  our 
retreat.  Reinforcements  can't  arrive  in  time  if  they  were  sent.  We  must 
fight"  The  little  army  was  at  once  put  in  motion  across  Goose  Creek 
and  along  the  Dranesville  road,  anticipating  a  desperate  engagement  with 
the  Federal  column  reported  to  be  moving  in  that  direction  under  the 
command  of  Gen.  McCall.  A  few  hours  after  sunrise  a  Federal  courier 
was  captured  proceeding  on  his  way  with  despatches  from  McCall  to 
Stone.  His  papers  betrayed  sufficient  to  reveal  that  it  was  designed  to 
draw  the  Confederates  from  Leesburg  along  the  Dranesville  road,  while 
Stone  crossed  the  river  and  occupied  the  town. 


188  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Gen.  Stone  commenced  the  passage  of  the  river  on  the  20th  of  October. 
A  force  of  five  companies  of  Massachusetts  troops,  commanded  by  Col. 
Devins,  effected  a  crossing  at  Edwards'  Ferry,  and,  a  few  hours  thereafter, 
Col.  Baker,  who  took  command  of  all  the  Federal  forces  on  the  Virginia 
side,  having  been  ordered  by  Stone  to  push  the  Confederates  from  Lees- 
burg  and  hold  the  place,  crossed  the  river  at  Conrad's  Ferry,  a  little  south 
of  Harrison's  Island,  and  on  the  direct  road  to  Leesburg.  Gen.  Stone 
had  ordered  seven  thousand  five  hundred  men  to  co-operate  in  the  move 
ment.  Baker's  brigade,  including  the  advanced  companies  under  Devins, 
was  two  thousand  three  hundred  strong,  and  he  was  rapidly  reinforced 
until  nearly  the  entire  number  designated  by  Stone  had  been  thrown 
across  the  river. 

Meanwhile  Gen.  Evans,  who  had  taken  a  position  at  Goose  Creek, 
awaited  the  approach  of  the  enemy.  The  Federals  had  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  at  different  points,  at  Edwards'  Ferry  which  was  just  above  the  mouth 
of  Goose  Creek,  and  at  Conrad's  Ferry,  where  a  steep  bank  (Ball's 
Bluff)  hung  over  the  water.  Finding  that  no  advance  from  Edwards' 
Ferry  was  attempted,  Gen.  Evans  ordered  the  17th  and  18th  Mississippi 
regiments  to  move  rapidly  to  the  support  of  the  8th  Virginia  and  some 
Mississippi  companies,  which  held  the  approaches  to  Leesburg,  and  had 
already  become  hotly  engaged  with  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  advanc 
ing  from  Ball's  Bluff. 

"  If  the  enemy  won't  come  to  us  we  must  go  to  them,"  exclaimed 
Evans,  as  he  put  the  two  Mississippi  regiments  in  motion,  which  began  a 
race  of  two  miles  to  turn  the  tide  of  battle.  The  Federals  who  had 
occupied  Ball's  Bluff  had  advanced  towards  the  wooded  plain  between  the 
river  and  Leesburg,  and  held  a  semicircular  line  of  battle,  supported  by 
four  howitzers.  Evans'  order  was,  "  to  make  the  business  short."  As 
the  fire  of  musketry  became  hot  and  general — for  the  Confederates  had  no 
opportunity  to  use  their  artillery — the  Federals  gave  way,  and  fell  back 
towards  the  bluff.  Col.  Baker  urged  his  men  to  rally,  and  brought  his  dis 
ordered  lines  to  a  momentary  stand.  Gen.  Evans,  seizing  the  critical  mo 
ment,  ordered  a  charge.  Virginians  and  Mississippians  together  rushed 
forward,  making  a  resistless  onset  upon  the  Federal  lines.  A  private 
sprang  to  the  front,  and  advancing  within  eight  feet  of  Col.  Baker,  fired 
five  chambers  of  his  revolver  at  him,  piercing  his  head  at  the  first  shot, 
and  striking  him  with  nearly  every  ball.  He  fell  dead.  His  terrified 
command  gave  way  in  utter  rout,  and  fled  towards  the  river.  A  portion, 
numbering  several  hundred  men,  attempted  to  make  good  their  retreat  by 
a  flank  movement  to  Edwards'  Ferry,  and  were  taken  prisoners.  But  the 
bulk  of  the  fugitives  madly  ran  to  the  very  verge  of  Ball's  Bluff ;  and  now 
ensued  a  scene  of  unutterable  horrour,  as  these  men  were  driven  over  the 
bluff  on  to  the  bayonets  of  their  friends,  thirty  feet  below. 


THE   BATTLE   OF    LEESBIJKG.  189 

Such  slaughter,  such  havoc,  such  mangling  of  living  men  was  scarcely 
ever  seen  before.  A  whole  army  was  retreating,  tumbling,  rolling,  leap 
ing  down  the  steep  heights.  Hundreds  plunged  into  the  rapid  current ; 
many  were  shot  in  the  act  of  swimming  ;  and  others  were  drowned  in  the 
water,  choked  with  the  wounded  and  dead.  Large  flats  had  been  used  to 
bring  over  reinforcements.  They  now  attempted  to  return  with  the 
wounded ;  but  such  was  the  consternation  among  the  troops  that  large 
numbers  rushed  on  board,  trampling  upon  the  bleeding  men  until  they  all 
sank  together,  amid  frightful  screams.  There  were  men  in  that  agonized 
mass  of  fugitives  who  had  never  seen  the  field  of  battle.  They  had  been 
sent  over  while  the  contest  was  in  progress  ;  they  had  climbed  the  mud 
of  the  bluff,  expecting  to  find  before  them  a  scene  of  victory.  But  before 
them  glared  a  victorious  and  vengeful  foe ;  and  behind  them  rolled  the 
deep  river.  All  was  consternation  and  dismay.  A  thousand  men  ran  up 
and  down  the  banks.  Two  Massachusetts  companies  had  the  presence  of 
mind  to  display  a  white  flag  and  surrender.  Others  rushed  wildly  into  the 
stream  ;  and  the  shrieks  of  the  wounded  and  drowning  mingled  with  the 
shouts  of  the  victors  and  the  rattle  of  musketry. 

The  results  of  the  terrible  disaster  of  Leesburg  were  studiously  sup 
pressed  by  the  Washington  authorities.  Indeed,  they  had  the  hardihood 
to  claim  an  advantage  ;  representing  that  the  movement  towards  Leesburg 
was  merely  a  "  reconnoissance,"  and  was,  in  the  main,  "  gallant "  and 
"  successful."  But  the  Federal  Congress  happened  to  be  in  session  at  the 
time  ;  and  the  opposition  party  brought  out  the  stark  and  horrible  truth 
of  the  affair.  It  was  ascertained  that  the  Federal  loss  was  not  less  than 
500  killed  and  drowned,  800  wounded,  and  about  the  same  number  of 
prisoners,  making  a  total  exceeding  two  thousand.  The  loss  of  the  Con 
federates  was  only  one  hundred  and  fifty-three  in  killed  and  wounded. 
Evans'  little  command  had  defeated  an  army,  probably  three  times  its 
strength,  and  had  inflicted  upon  it  a  loss  greater  in  number  than  the  whole 
Confederate  force  engaged. 

After  the  lesson  administered  at  Leesburg,  McClellan  for  some  months 
attempted  nothing  but  some  foraging  expeditions  ;  but  he  was  constantly 
busy  with  the  organization  and  morale  of  his  army ;  and  the  material 
which  was  raw  at  Manassas  was  rapidly  improving  in  discipline,  stanch- 
ness  and  soldierly  qualities.  On  the  20th  of  December  occurred  an  affair, 
which  was  more  creditable  to  the  Federals  than  any  that  had  yet  taken 
place  in  the  region  of  the  Potomac,  and  constituted  McClellan's  first  suc 
cess  since  the  engagement  of  Rich  Mountain. 

On  the  day  named  Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  with  a  large  foraging  force, 
consisting  of  about  twenty-five  hundred  men,  fell  in  with  the  enemy  near 
Dranesville.  The  Federals  were  in  superiour  force ;  Gen.  Ord's  brigade, 
which  was  also  marching  to  the  same  neighbourhood  for  forage,  being 


190  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

thirty-five  hundred  strong,  while  two  other  brigades  were  in  supporting 
distance.  A  rocket,  shot  up  by  the  enemy,  gave  to  the  Confederates  the 
first  intimation  of  their  presence.  To  give  his  wagon-train  time  to  retreat 
in  safety,  Gen.  Stuart  prepared  for  battle.  He  was  exposed  to  a  very 
severe  cannonade  from  the  enemy ;  and  finding  his  men  contending  at 
serious  disadvantage  with  an  enemy  greatly  outnumbering  them,  and 
almost  concealed  in  ambush,  he,  after  a  desultory  engagement,  drew  off  his 
forces,  and  fell  back  two  miles.  The  enemy  did  not  pursue.  The  Con 
federate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  about  two  hundred. 

The  affair  of  Dranesville  was  the  last  conflict  of  arms  of  any  note  that 
occurred  near  the  Potomac  in  the  first  winter  of  the  war.  But  within  this 
period,  we  must  remark  an  expedition,  conducted  by  "  Stonewall "  Jack 
son,  which  was  a  most  extraordinary  enterprise,  and  was  attended  by  such 
hardships  and  sufferings  as  made  it  a  story  of  terrible  interest  and  fearful 
romance. 

In  September,  Jackson  had  been  made  a  Major-General,  and  in  the 
early  part  of  October  he  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Confederate 
forces  in  and  around  Winchester.  About  this  time  the  famous  Col.  Turner 
Ashby,  with  his  own  regiment  and  other  cavalry  detachments,  making  a 
total  of  some  twelve  hundred  horse,  was  watching  the  river-front  from 
Harper's  Ferry  to  Romney.  In  December  the  enemy  were  strongly  posted 
at  Eomney  and  Bath  southwards ;  and  Banks,  with  his  whole  army  being 
north  of  the  Potomac,  it  was  evident  that  some  great  movement  was  in 
contemplation,  which  prudence  demanded  should  be  watched  by  a  strong 
force. 

A  large  part  of  Gen.  Loring's  command,  after  a  march  of  two  hundred 
and  sixty  miles,  joined  Gen.  Jackson  at  Winchester.  He  was  now  at  the 
head  of  about  nine  thousand  men  ;  and  on  the  first  day  of  January,  1862, 
with  a  portion  of  his  force  he  marched  from  Winchester. 

It  was  the  object  of  Jackson  to  surprise  the  Federals  stationed  at  Bath, 
otherwise  known  as  Berkeley  Springs.  Amid  the  snow,  sleet,  rain  and  ice 
of  the  most  severe  days  of  the  winter  he  commenced  his  march.  He  had  to 
travel  over  fifty  miles  of  the  roughest  country  in  the  world,  and  he  was 
obliged  to  take  unfrequented  roads  to  keep  his  movement  secret.  Pene 
trating  the  mountains  on  roads  winding  along  their  sides,  and  through 
their  rugged  defiles,  exposed  to  sleet  and  hail  in  mid- winter,  and  endur 
ing  the  bitterest  cold,  the  march  was  one  of  almost  indescribable  suffering 
and  horrour.  The  men  were  without  tents.  The  roads  were  covered  with 
ice  two  inches  thick,  and  glazed  over  by  the  sleet,  so  that  neither  man  nor 
horse  could  keep  his  feet  except  by  great  care.  Horses  had  their  knees 
and  muzzles  terribly  injured  and  streaming  with  blood.  Occasionally, 
horsemen,  infantry  and  wagons  would  slip  over  an  embankment ;  and 
men  crippled,  or  filled  with  bruises  and  pains,  laid  down  by  the  wayside 


STONEWALL"  JACKSON  AT  ROMNEY.  191 

to  die,  or  staggered  on  in  the  terrible  march.  Many  were  bootless,  hatless, 
and  ragged.  They  were  not  allowed  to  kindle  fires,  being  within  a  few 
miles  of  the  enemy's  posts  ;  and  their  most  comfortable  sleep  was  under 
stick  arbours  packed  with  snow. 

Amid  the  sharp  distresses  of  this  march  the  command  struggled  on 
with  patient  courage,  and  almost  superhuman  spirit.  On  arriving  at 
Bath,  they  found  the  Federals  had  retreated  to  the  Potomac,  and  had 
waded  the  river  on  one  of  the  coldest  days  of  winter. 

Having  rested  two  or  three  days  in  Bath,  Jackson  made  daily  demon 
strations  at  the  river  to  induce  the  belief  that  his  command  was  the  ad 
vance  of  a  large  force  about  to  cross  into  Maryland.  The  demonstration 
succeeded  even  beyond  his  expectations.  The  Federal  troops  in  and 
around  Romney  amounted  to  eleven  thousand  men,  under  command  of 
Gen.  Shields.  This  officer  felt  so  certain  that  Jackson  was  bent  on  cross 
ing  the  Potomac,  that,  though  forty  miles  above,  he  transferred  his  whole 
command  to  the  north  bank  to  dispute  the  supposed  passage.  As  soon  as 
Jackson  was  informed  of  this,  he  marched  up  the  south  bank  to  Romney, 
surprised  and  captured  many  of  the  enemy,  and  destroyed  what  he  could 
not  carry  away  of  Shields'  immense  stores,  amounting  to  some  half  a  mil 
lion  of  dollars.  Leaving  a  small  force  in  Romney,  Jackson  returned  with 
his  army  to  Winchester.  The  success  of  his  expedition  was  complete  ; 
but  it  had  been  terribly  purchased,  for  hundreds  of  his  brave  men  had  sunk 
under  the  exposure  of  the  march,  or  were  long  on  the  sick-list  from  its 
effects. 

With  this  movement  closed  the  campaign  of  the  winter  in  Virginia. 
The  armies  of  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  at  Centreville  and  Manassas,  of 
Huger,  at  Norfolk,  of  Magruder  on  the  Peninsula,  of  Jackson  at  Win 
chester,  and  the  bodies  of  troops  from  Evansport  to  Acquia  on  the  Poto 
mac,  in  the  Alleghany  Mountains  and  around  Richmond,  rested  for  a 
season  in  their  winter  quarters  ;  and  fields  of  Virginia  soon  to  run  red  with 
blood,  were  now  covered  with  mantles  of  snow  and  ice. 


NAVAL   OPERATIONS   IN   1861. 

The  Federals  had  one  immense  and  peculiar  advantage  in  the  war<; 
and  they  were  prompt  to  use  it.  The  superiourity  which  a  large  navy 
gave  them  may  be  estimated  when  we  reflect  that  the  sea-coast  of  the 
Confederacy  stretched  in  a  continuous  line  of  eighteen  hundred  miles ;  that 
along  this  were  scattered  sea-ports,  many  of  them  without  the  protection 
of  the  feeblest  battery  ;  and  that  the  Mississippi,  with  its  tributaries,  was 
an  inland  sea,  which  gave  access  to  the  enemy  almost  as  freely  as  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico. 


192  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war,  President  Lincoln  found  under  his  com 
mand  a  navy  of  ninety  ships  of  war,  carrying  eighteen  hundred  and  nine 
guns.  In  little  more  than  a  year  from  that  time  the  Federal  navy  em 
braced  three  hundred  and  eighty-six  ships  and  steamers,  carrying  three 
thousand  and  twenty-seven  guns.  Keels  were  laid  not  only  in  the  Eastern 
ship-yards,  but  on  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio  Rivers  ;  iron  armour  was  pre 
pared  ;  mortar  ketches  were  built ;  the  found eries  and  shops  worked  day 
and  night  upon  engines,  plates,  and  guns. 

While  this  wonderful  energy  was  being  displayed  by  the  North  in 
preparations  to  operate  against  our  sea-coast,  and  by  fleets  of  gunboats  on 
the  Upper  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  to  drive  our  armies  out  of  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee,  the  Confederate  Government  showed  a  singular 
apathy  with  respect  to  any  work  of  defence.  The  Confederate  Congress 
had  made  large  appropriations  for  the  construction  of  gunboats  on  the 
Mississippi  waters ;  there  was  the  best  navy-yard  on  the  continent  oppo 
site  Norfolk  ;  there  were  valuable  armouries  with  their  machinery  at  Rich 
mond  ;  and  although  the  Confederate  Government  was  very  far  from 
competing  with  the  naval  resources  of  the  enemy,  yet  there  is  no  doubt, 
with  the  means  and  appliances  at  hand,  it  might  have  created  a  consider 
able  fleet.  In  no  respect  was  the  improvidence  of  this  Government  more 
forcibly  illustrated  than  in  the  administration  of  its  naval  affairs ;  or  its 
unfortunate  choice  of  ministers  more  signally  displayed  than  in  the  selection 
as  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  Mr.  Mallory  of  Florida,  a  notoriously  weak 
man,  who  was  slow  and  blundering  in  his  office,  and  a  butt  in  Congress 
for  his  ignorance  of  the  river  geography  of  the  country. 

The  consequences  of  the  defenceless  and  exposed  condition  of  the  Con 
federate  sea-coast  were  soon  to  be  realized ;  and  many  intelligent  men 
already  took  it  as  a  foregone  conclusion,  that  in  the  progress  of  the  war  the 
Confederacy  would  lose  not  only  all  her  sea-ports,  but  every  fort  and  bat 
tery  to  which  the  floating  guns  of  the  enemy  could  get  access. 

In  the  year  1861,  two  naval  expeditions  were  sent  down  the  Carolina 
coast ;  and  their  results  gave  serious  indications  of  what  was  to  be  ex 
pected  from  this  arm  of  the  enemy's  service  on  the  slight  fortifications  of 
our  ocean  frontier.  The  first  of  these  expeditions  was  designed  against 
Hatteras  Inlet.  To  reduce  two  extemporized  works  there,  mounting  alto 
gether  fifteen  guns,  the  enemy,  with  his  usual  prodigality  of  preparation 
and  care  to  ensure  victory,  sent  an  enormous  sea  armament,  carrying  one 
hundred  heavy  guns,  and  a  naval  and  military  force  numbering  not  less 
than  three  thousand  men.  The  fleet  was  under  the  command  of  Commo 
dore  Stringham,  while  Maj.-Gen.  Butler,  of  Massachusetts,  commanded  the 
force  intended  to  operate  on  land.  On  the  26th  of  August  the  expedition 
bailed  from  Fortress  Monroe,  arriving  off  Hatteras  on  the  28th.  Three 
hundred  and  fifteen  men,  with  a  twelve-pound  rifled  gun,  and  twelve- 


THE  PORT  KOTAL  EXPEDITION.  193 

pound  howitzer,  were  landed  safely,  but  in  attempting  to  land  more,  two 
gunboats  were  swamped  in  tlie  surf.  In  the  mean  time  the  fleet  opened 
a  tremendous  bombardment  upon  one  of  the  Confederate  works.  Fort 
Clark.  The  ships,  secure  in  their  distance,  and  formidable  by  their  long 
range  guns,  kept  up  a  terrific  fire,  which  rained  nine  and  eleven  inch  shells 
upon  the  fort,  at  the  rate  of  seven  in  a  minute,  shattering  to  pieces  the 
wooden  structures  exposed,  killing  and  wounding  a  few  of  the  men,  and 
cutting  down  the  flag-staff  from  which  floated  the  Confederate  ensign. 
Finding  the  work  untenable,  it  was  decided  by  Commodore  Barron,  the 
Confederate  officer  in  command,  to  retire  to  Fort  Hatteras. 

At  half-past  eight  o'clock  the  next  morning,  the  Federal  fleet  steamed 
in  from  the  ocean,  and  approaching  within  a  mile  and  a  quarter  of  Fort 
Hatteras,  renewed  the  bombardment.  The  unequal  combat  continued  for 
some  hours.  Assaulted  by  nearly  a  hundred  heavy  cannon,  the  fort  was 
unable  to  reach  effectively  with  its  feeble  thirty-two  pounders,  the  ships 
which  lay  at  a  safe  distance,  pouring  from  their  ten-inch  rifle  pivot  guns  a 
storm  of  shells  upon  the  bomb-proofs  and  batteries.  About  noon,  the  fort 
surrendered.  The  loss  of  the  Confederates  was  ten  killed,  thirteen 
wounded,  and  six  hundred  and  sixty-five  prisoners.  The  Federals  had  five 
men  wounded. 

But  the  Federals  were  to  obtain  a  much  more  important  success  at  a 
point  on  the  coast  further  south.  In  the  latter  part  of  October  a  great 
fleet  of  war-ships  and  transports  began  to  arrive  at  Old  Point,  and  in  a 
few  days  they  were  ready  for  their  departure.  So  formidable  an  arma 
ment  had  never  before  assembled  in  the  waters  of  America.  The  naval 
force  was  under  the  command  of  Capt.  Dupont,  flag-officer  of  the  South 
Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron ;  it  consisted  of  fifteen  war-steamers ;  the 
land  force  was  embarked  in  thirty  steam  vessels  and  six  sailing  ships, 
and  was  under  the  command  of  Gen.  T.  W.  Sherman.  The  whole  force 
fell  very  little  below  twenty-five  thousand  men. 

On  the  3d  of  November  the  fleet  was  descried  approaching  the  south 
ern  coast  of  South  Carolina ;  and  then  for  the  first  time  it  became  appa 
rent  that  the  point  they  sought  was  Port  Royal  harbour.  To  defend  the 
harbour  and  approaches  to  Beaufort,  the  Confederates  had  erected  two 
sand  forts — one  at  Hilton  Head,  called  Fort  Walker,  and  the  other  at  Bay 
Point,  called  Fort  Beauregard.  The  first  had  sixteen  guns  mounted,  most 
of  them  thirty-two  pounders.  Fort  Beauregard  mounted  eight  guns,  none 
of  the  heaviest  calibre.  The  garrisons  and  forces  in  the  vicinity,  number 
ing  about  three  thousand  men,  were  under  the  command  of  Gen.  Dray  ton. 

Having  carefully  reconnoitred  the  position  and  strength  of  the  forts,  a 

bombardment  was  opened  on  Fort  Walker  in  the  morning  of  the  7th  of 

November.     The  fleet  steamed  forward,  delivering  its   broadsides  with 

ceaseless  violence,  then  turning  in  a  sharp  elliptic,  it  steamed  back  in  the 

13 


194  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

same  order,  so  as  to  fire  the  other  broadside  at  Fort  Walker,  and  load  in 
time  to  open  on  Fort  Beauregard  on  getting  within  range.  This  manoeuvre 
doubtless  disturbed  the  aim  of  the  artillerists  in  the  forts ;  they  fired 
wildly  and  with  but  little  effect.  The  dense  masses  of  smoke  which  the 
wind  drove  clear  of  the  ships,  arid  packed  against  the  land  batteries,  ob 
structed  their  aim,  and  afforded  only  occasional  views  of  the  enemy  through 
the  lifting  cloud.  After  sustaining  a  bombardment  of  about  four  hours, 
the  forts  surrendered.  The  condition  of  Fort  Walker,  at  this  time,  accord 
ing  to  the  official  report  of  Gen.  Dray  ton,  was  "  all  but  three  of  the  guns 
on  the  water  front  disabled,  and  only  five  hundred  pounds  of  powder  in  the 
magazine."  The  garrisons  and  the  men  outside  the  forts  retreated  across 
the  plain  separating  them  from  the  woods.  The  Federal  loss  in  the  en 
gagement  was  eight  killed  and  twenty-three  wounded.  The  Confederates 
lost  about  one  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded,  all  their  cannon,  a  number 
of  small  arms,  and  all  the  stores  collected  in  and  around  the  forts. 

The  capture  of  Port  Royal  was  an  important  Federal  success.  It  gave 
to  the  enemy  a  point  for  his  squadrons  to  find  shelter,  and  a  convenient 
naval  depot.  It  gave  him  also  a  foothold  in  the  region  of  the  Sea-Islands 
cotton,  and  afforded  him  a  remarkable  theatre  for  his  anti-slavery  experi 
ments.  The  Beaufort  district,  commanded  now  by  the  enemy's  position, 
was  one  of  the  richest  and  most  thickly  settled  of  the  State.  It  contained 
about  fifteen  hundred  square  miles,  and  produced,  annually,  fifty  millions 
of  pounds  of  rice,  and  fourteen  thousand  bales  of  cotton,  and  held  a  popu 
lation  of  nearly  forty  thousand,  of  whom  more  than  thirty  thousand  were 
slaves. 

In  the  month  of  November,  1861,  there  was  to  occur  a  naval  exploit  of 
the  enemy,  of  little  prowess,  but  of  such  importance  that  it  was  to  draw 
off  public  attention  from  the  largest  operations  of  the  war,  and  fix  it  unani 
mously  upon  the  issues  of  a  single  incident. 


THE 

On  the  8th  of  November,  Capt.  Wilkes,  of  the  United  States  steam 
sloop-of-war  San  Jacinto,  overhauled  the  English  mail  steamer  Trent  in  the 
Bahama  Channel,  and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  Confederate  emis 
saries,  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell,  who  were  passengers  on  board  that  ves 
sel,  and  were  proceeding  with  their  secretaries  on  a  mission  representing  the 
interests  of  the  Confederacy  at  the  courts  of  England  and  France.  The  San 
Jacinto  had  fired  a  shot  across  the  bows  of  the  mail  steamer  to  bring  her 
to,  and  as  she  did  not  stop  for  that,  had  fired  a  shell  which  burst  close  by 
her.  The  unarmed  vessel  was  boarded  by  a  party  of  marines  under  com 
mand  of  Lieut.  Fairfax,  who  demanded  the  persons  of  the  commissioners 


THE   TRENT   AFFAIR.  195 

and  their  secretaries ;  and  on  their  claiming  the  protection  of  the  British 
flag,  and  refusing  to  leave  it  unless  by  actual  physical  force,  hands  were  laid 
on  Mr.  Mason,  Lieut.  Fairfax  and  another  officer  taking  him  by  the  collar 
of  the  coat  on  each  side,  and,  the  three  other  gentlemen  following,  the 
whole  party  was  thus  transferred  from  the  decks  of  the  Trent.  As  this 
scene  was  taking  place,  Commander  Williams,  of  the  British  Navy,  who 
was  in  charge  of  the  English  mails  on  board  the  Trent,  said :  "  In  this  ship 
I  am  the  representative  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  and  I  call  upon  the 
officers  of  the  ship  and  passengers  generally,  to  mark  my  words,  when  in 
the  name  of  the  British  Government,  and  in  distinct  language,  I  denounce 
this  as  an  illegal  act,  an  act  in  violation  of  international  law  ;  an  act  indeed 
of  wanton  piracy,  which,  had  we  the  means  of  defence,  you  would  not 
dare  to  attempt." 

The  news  of  this  remarkable  outrage  was  received  in  England  with  a 
storm  of  popular  indignation.  The  very  day  it  reached  Liverpool,  a  public 
meeting  was  held,  earnestly  calling  upon  the  Government  to  assert  the 
dignity  of  the  British  flag,  and  demand  prompt  reparation  for  the  outrage. 
This  appeal  went  up  from  all  classes  and  parties  of  the  people.  The 
British  Government  exhibited  a  determined  sentiment  and  a  serious  concern 
in  the  matter.  The  Earl  of  Derby,  who  had  been  consulted  by  the  Govern 
ment,  approved  the  resentful  demand  which  it  proposed  to  make  upon  the 
United  States,  and  suggested  that  ship-owners  should  instruct  the  captains 
of  outward-bound  vessels  to  signalize  any  English  vessels,  that  war  with 
America  was  probable.  The  Liverpool  underwriters  approved  the  sugges 
tion.  The  British  Government  made  actual  preparations  for  war.  Rein 
forcements  were  sent  to  Canada,  together  with  munitions  of  war  for  the 
few  fortifications  England  possessed  in  that  colony. 

Meanwhile  the  North  was  revelling  in  what  it  supposed  the  cheap  glory 
of  the  Trent  affair,  and  making  an  exhibition  of  vanity  and  insolence  con 
cerning  it,  curious  even  among  the  usual  exaggerations  of  that  people. 
The  act  of  Capt.  Wilkes  was  not  only  approved  by  the  Federal  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  ;  it  was  extravagantly  applauded  by  him.  He  accumulated 
words  of  praise,  and  declared  that  it  had  been  marked  by  u  intelligence, 
ability,  decision,  and  firmness."  The  man  who  had  made  himself  a  hero 
in  a  proceeding  in  which  he  encountered  no  peril,  received  the  public  and 
official  thanks  of  the  Congress  sitting  at  Washington.  The  Northern  press 
and  people  appeared  to  be  almost  insane  over  the  wonderful  exploit.  The 
city  of  New  York  offered  Capt.  Wilkes  the  hospitality  of  the  city.  Boston 
gave  him  a  festival.  Gov.  Andrew  of  Massachusetts  declared  that  the  act 
of  taking  four  unarmed  men  from  an  unarmed  vessel  was  "  one  of  the  most 
illustrious  services  that  had  rendered  the  war  memorable,"  and  exulted  in 
the  idea  that  Capt.  Wilkes  had  u  fired  his  shot  across  the  bows  of  the  ship 
that  bore  the  English  lion  at  its  head,"  forgetting  that  the  ship  bore  no 


196  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

guns  to  reply  to  a  courage  so  adventurous.  The  New  York  Times  wrote 
in  this  strain  :  "  There  is  no  drawback  to  our  jubilation.  The  universal 
Yankee  nation  is  getting  decidedly  awake.  As  for  Capt.  Wilkes  and  his 
command,  let  the  handsome  thing  be  done.  Consecrate  another  Fourth 
of  July  to  him  ;  load  him  down  with  services  of  plate,  and  swords  of  the 
cunningest  and  costliest  art.  Let  us  encourage  the  happy  inspiration  that 
achieved  such  a  victory." 

But  while  the  "  universal  Yankee  nation  "  was  thus  astir,  and  in  a  rage 
of  vanity,  the  South  watched  the  progress  of  the  Trent  question  with  a  keen 
and  eager  anxiety.  It  was  naturally  supposed,  looking  at  the  determina 
tion  of  England  on  the  one  side  and  the  unbounded  enthusiasm  in  the 
Northern  States  in  maintaining  their  side  of  the  question,  that  war  would 
ensue  between  the  parties.  It  was  already  imagined  in  the  South  that 
such  a  war  would  break  the  naval  power  of  the  North,  distract  her  means, 
and  easily  confer  independence  on  the  Southern  Confederacy.  There  were 
orators  in  Richmond  who  already  declared  that  the  key  of  the  blockade  had 
been  lost  in  the  trough  of  the  Atlantic.  If  the  North  stood  to  the  issue,  the 
prospect  was  clear.  Gov.  Letcher  of  Yirginia  addressed  a  public  meeting 
in  Yirginia,  and,  in  characteristic  language,  declared  that  he  prayed 
nightly  that  in  this  matter,  "Lincoln's  backbone  might  not  give  way.' 
The  one  condition  of  war  between  England  and  the  North,  was  that  the 
latter  would  keep  its  position,  and  sustain  the  high  tone  with  which  it  had 
avowed  the  act  of  Capt.  Wilkes. 

But  this  condition  was  to  fail  suddenly,  signally  ;  and  the  whole  world 
was  to  be  amused  by  a  diplomatic  collapse,  such  as  is  scarcely  to  be  found 
in  the  records  of  modern  times.  When  the  arrest  of  Messrs.  Mason  and 
Slidell  was  first  made  known  at  Washington,  Secretary  Seward  had  writ 
ten  to  the  Federal  minister  in  London,  advising  him  to  decline  any  ex 
planations,  and  suggesting  that  the  grounds  taken  by  the  British  Govern 
ment  should  first  be  made  known,  and  the  argument  commence  with  it. 
But  the  British  Government  entered  into  no  discussion  ;  it  disdained  the 
argument  of  any  law  question  in  the  matter ;  and  with  singular  dignity 
made  the  naked  and  imperative  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  commis 
sioners  and  their  secretaries.  Mr.  Seward  wrote  back  a  letter,  which  must 
ever  remain  a  curiosity  in  diplomacy.  He  volunteered  the  argument  for 
the  surrender  of  the  parties ;  he  promised  that  they  should  be  "  cheer 
fully  "  liberated  ;  he  declared  that  he  did  it  in  accordance  with  "  the  most 
cherished  principles  "  of  American  statesmanship  ;  but  in  the  close  of  this 
remarkable  letter  he  could  not  resist  the  last  resort  of  demagogueisin  in 
mentioning  the  captured  commissioners,  who  had  for  weeks  been  paraded 
as  equal  to  the  fruits  of  a  victory  in  the  field,  as  persons  of  no  importance, 
and  saying :  "  If  the  safety  of  this  Union  required  the  detention  of  the 
captured  persons,  it  would  be  the  right  and  duty  of  this  Government  to 


THE   TRENT   AFFAIR.  197 

detain  them.''  If  there  was  anything  wanting  to  complete  the  shame  of 
this  collapse,  it  was  the  shallow  show  of  alacrity  at  concession,  and  the 
attempt  to  substitute  a  sense  of  justice  for  what  all  men  of  common  dis 
cernment  knew  was  the  alarm  of  cowardice. 

The  concession  of  Mr.  Seward  wTas  a  blow  to  the  hopes  of  the  Southern 
people.  The  contemplation  of  the  spectacle  of  their  enemy's  humiliation 
in  it  was  but  little  compensation  for  their  disappointment  of  a  European 
complication  in  the  war.*  Indeed,  the  conclusion  of  the  Trent  affair  gave 
a  sharp  check  to  the  long  cherished  imagination  of  the  interference  of 
England  in  the  war,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  her  disputing  the  blockade, 
which  had  begun  to  tell  on  the  war-power  and  general  condition  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  Trent  correspondence  was  followed  by  declarations,  on 
the  Government  side  in  the  British  Parliament,  too  plain  to  be  mistaken. 
In  the  early  part  of  February,  1862,  Earl  Kussell  had  declared  that  the 
blockade  of  the  American  ports  had  been  effective  from  the  15th  of  Au 
gust,  in  the  face  of  the  facts  that  the  despatches  of  Mr.  Bunch,  the  English 
consul  at  Charleston,  said  that  it  was  not  so  ;  and  that  authentic  accounts 
and  letters  of  merchants  showed  that  any  ships,  leaving  for  the  South, 
could  be  insured  by  a  premium  of  seven  and  a  half  to  fifteen  per  cent. 
But  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Mr.  Gregory  disputed  the  minister's  state 
ment,  mentioned  the  evidence  we  have  referred  to,  and  asserted  that  Eng 
land's  non-observation  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  a  deception  for  the  Con 
federate  States,  and  an  ambuscade  for  the  interests  of  commerce  through 
out  the  world. 

*  The  Richmond  Examiner  had  the  following  to  say  of  the  attitude  of  the  enemy  in  the  matter  : 
"  Never,  since  the  humiliation  of  the  Doge  and  Senate  of  Genoa  before  the  footstool  of  Louis  XIV., 
has  any  nation  consented  to  a  degradation  so  deep.  If  Lincoln  and  Seward  intended  to  give  them 
up  at  a  menace,  why,  their  people  will  ask,  did  they  ever  capture  the  ambassadours  ?  Why  the  ex 
ultant  hurrah  over  the  event,  that  went  up  from  nineteen  millions  of  throats  ?  Why  the  glorification 
of  Wilkes  ?  Why  the  cowardly  insults  to  two  unarmed  gentlemen,  their  close  imprisonment,  and 
the  bloodthirsty  movements  of  Congress  in  their  regard  ?  But,  most  of  all,  why  did  the  Government 
of  Lincoln  indulge  a  full  Cabinet  with  an  unanimous  resolution  that,  under  no  circumstances,  should 
the  United  States  surrender  Messrs.  Slidell  and  Mason  ?  Why  did  they  encourage  the  popular  senti 
ment  to  a  similar  position  ?  The  United  States  Government  and  people  swore  the  great  oath  to 
stand  on  the  ground  they  had  taken  ;  the  American  eagle  was  brought  out ;  he  screeched  his  loudest 
screech  of  defiance — then 

1  Dropt  like  a  craven  cock  his  conquered  wing ' 

at  the  first  growl  of  the  lion.    This  is  the  attitude  of  the  enemy." 


CHAPTEK    XII. 

GENERAL  CHAEACTER  OF  THE  MILITAEY  EVENTS  OF  THE  YEAE  1862. — THE  CONFEDEEATE  SITU 
ATION  IN  KENTUCKY. — GEN.  A.  8.  JOHNSTON'S  COMMAND  AND  POSITION. BATTLE   OF 

FISHING  CEEEK. — THE  CONFEDEEATE  EIGHT  IN  KENTUCKY. GEN.  CEITTENDEN's  COM 
MAND  IN  EXTEEME  STEAITS. DIFFICULTY  IN  SUBSISTING  IT. THE  DECISION  TO  GIVE  BAT 
TLE  TO  THE  ENEMY. ZOLLICOFFEB's  BEIGADE. — THE  CONTESTED  HILL. — DEATH  OF  ZOLLI- 

COFFEE. DEFEAT  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES. CEITTENDEN  CEOSSES  THE  CUMBEELAND. — 

HIS  LOSSES. — IMPOETANCE  OF  THE  DISASTEE. — DESIGNS  OF  THE  ENEMY  IN  WESTERN 
KENTUCKY. — POPULAE  DELUSION  AS  TO  JOHNSTON'S  STEENGTH. — HOPELESSNESS  OF  HIS 
DEFENCE. OFFICIAL  APATHY  IN  EICHMOND. BEAUBEGAED's  CONFEEENCE  WITH  JOHN 
STON. — THE  TENNESSEE  AND  CUMBEELAND  EIVEES. — THE  AVENUE  TO  NASHVILLE. 

GEANT'S  ASCENT  OF  THE  TENNESSEE. — CAPTUEE  OF  FOET  HENEY. — NOBLE  AND  GALLANT 

CONDUCT  OF  GEN.  TILGHMAN. BATTLE  OF  FOHT  DONELSON. JOHNSTON'S  EEASONS  FOE 

MAKING  A  BATTLE  THEEE. — COMMANDS  OF  BUCKNEE,  PILLOW,  AND  FLOYD. SITE  AND 

STEENGTH  OF  THE  FOET. BATTLE  OF  THE  TEENCHES. ENGAGEMENT  OF  THE  GUNBOATS. 

— TWO  DAYS'  SUCCESS  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES. — SUFFEEING  OF  THE  TEOOPS  FEOM  COLD. — 

EXPOSURE  OF  THE  WOUNDED. FEDEEAL  EEINFOECEMENTS. THE  CONFEDEEATE  COUNCIL 

OF  WAE. — PLAN  OF  ATTACK,  TO  EXTEICATE  THE  GAEBISON. A  FIEECE  AND  TEEEIBLE 

CONFLICT. — THE  FEDEEAL8  FOECED  BACK  TOWAEDS  THE  WYNN's  FEEEY  EOAD. — THE  OP- 
POETUNITY  OF  EXIT  LOST. — GEN.  BUCKNEE'S  EXPLANATION. — A  COMMENTAEY  ON  MILI 
TARY  HESITATION. — HOW  THE  DAY  WAS-  LOST.— NINE  HOUES  OF  COMBAT. — SCENES  ON 

THE  BATTLE-FIELD. COUNCIL  OF  CONFEDEEATE  GENEEALS. — GEN.  PILLOW 's  PEOPOSITION. 

— LITEEAL  REPORT  OF  THE  CONVERSATION  OF  GENS.  FLOYD,  PILLOW,  AND  BUCKNEE. — A 

SUEEENDEE  DETEEMINED. ESCAPE  OF  FLOYD  AND   PILLOW. — BUCKNEE's    LETTEE  TO 

GEANT. — JOHNSTON'S  MOVEMENT  TO  NASHVILLE. — EXCITEMENT  THEEE. — EETEEAT  OF 
JOHNSTON'S  COMMAND  TO  MUEFEEESBOEO'. — PANIC  IN  NASHVILLE. — CAPTUEE  OF  EOANOKE 
ISLAND  BY  THE  ENEMY. — BUENSIDE's  EXPEDITION. — GEN.  WISE's  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  IM 
POETANCE  OF  EOANOKE  ISLAND. HIS  COEEESPONDENCE  AND  INTEEVIEWS  WITH  SECRE- 

TABY     BENJAMIN. DEFENCES    OF    THE    ISLAND. — NAVAL    ENGAGEMENT. COMMODORE 

LYNCH'S  SQUADEON. — LANDING  OF  THE  ENEMY  ON  THE  ISLAND. — DEFECTIVE  RECON- 
NOISSANCE  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES. THEIE  WOEKS  FLANKED. THE  SUEEENDEE. — PUR 
SUIT  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATE  GUNBOATS. EXTENT  OF  THE  DISASTEE. — CENSUEE  OF  THE 

RICHMOND, AUTHORITIES. — SEOEETAEY  BENJAMIN  ACCUSED  BY  THE  CONFEDEEATE  CONGRESS. 

THE  year  1862  is  a  remarkable  one  in  the  history  of  the  war.     It 
opened  with  a  fearful  train  of  disasters  to  the  Confederacy  that  brought  it 


THE   BATTLE    OF   FISHING    CREEK.  199 

almost  to  the  brink  of  despair,  and  then  was  suddenly  illuminated  by  suc 
cesses  that  placed  it  on  the  highest  pinnacle  of  hope,  and  put  it  even  in 
instant  expectation  of  its  independence. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1861,  while  the  Confederacy  was  but  little  active, 
the  North  was  sending  into  camp,  from  her  great  population,  regiments 
numbered  by  hundreds ;  was  drilling  her  men,  heaping  up  ammunition 
and,  provisions,  building  gunboats  for  the  western  rivers,  and  war-ships 
for  the  coast,  casting  mortars  and  moulding  cannon.  She  was  preparing, 
with  the  opening  of  the  next  campaign,  to  strike  those  heavy  blows  in 
Tennessee  and  Louisiana  under  which  the  Confederate  States  reeled  and 
staggered  almost  to  fainting,  and  from  which  they  recovered  by  a  series  of 
successes  in  Virginia,  the  most  important  of  the  war,  and  the  most  bril 
liant  in  the  martial  annals  of  any  people. 

We  enter  first  upon  the  story  of  disaster.  Despite  the  victory  of  Bel- 
mont,  the  Confederate  situation  in  Kentucky  was  one  of  extreme  weakness. 
Gen.  Albert  Sydney  Johnston  had  assumed  command  of  the  Confederate 
forces  in  the  Western  department.  He  had  occupied  Bowling  Green  in 
Kentucky,  an  admirably  selected  position,  with  Green  River  along  his 
froat,  and  railway  communication  to  Nashville  and  the  whole  South. 
Had  he  simply  to  contend  with  an  enemy  advancing  from  Louisville,  he 
wrould  have  had  but  little  to  fear ;  but  Grant  had  command  of  the  Cum 
berland  and  Tennessee  rivers,  and  while  he  might  thus  advance  with  his 
gunboats  and  transports  upon  Nashville,  Buell,  the  other  Federal  com 
mander,  was  prepared  to  attack  in  front. 


BATTLE   OF    FISHING   CKEEK. 

Having  failed,  as  we  have  seen,  at  Columbus,  the  next  movement  of  the 
enemy  in  Kentucky  was  to  be  made  against  the  Confederate  right  at 
Mill  Springs,  on  the  upper  waters  of  the  Cumberland.  Brig.-Gen.  Zolli- 
coffer  had  been  reinforced  and  superseded  by  Maj.-Gen.  Crittenden,  and  a 
snoall  but  gallant  army  had  been  collected  for  the  defense  of  the  moun 
tains.  The  position  of  the  Confederates  was  advanced  across  the  Cumber 
land  to  Camp  Beech  Grove  ;  and  the  camp  was  fortified  with  earth-works. 

The  Federal  army  in  Eastern  Kentucky  occupied  Somerset  and  Colum 
bia,  towns  to  the  north  of,  but  in  the  vicinity  of  the  upper  part  of  the- 
Cumberland  River.  Two  strong  columns  of  the  enemy  were  thus  advanc 
ing  upon  Gen.  Crittenden  ;  and  he  formed  the  determination  to  fall  upon 
the  nearest  column,  that  under  Thomas  advancing  from  Columbia,  before 
the  arrival  of  the  troops  under  General  Schoepf  from  Somerset. 

But  there  were  other  reasons  which  determined  Crittenden  with  hi> 
Binall  army  of  about  four  thousand  men  to  risk  a  battle  against  Thomas' 


200  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

column,  which  consisted  of  two  brigades  of  infantry,  and  was  greatly  his 
superiour  in  artillery.  His  troops  had  been  in  an  almost  starving  condi 
tion  for  some  time.  For  several  weeks  bare  existence  in  the  camp  was 
very  precarious,  from  want  of  provisions  and  forage.  Regiments  fre 
quently  subsisted  on  one  third  rations,  and  this  very  frequently  of  bread 
alone.  Wayne  County,  which  was  alone  productive  in  this  region  of  Ken 
tucky,  had  been  exhausted,  and  the  neighbouring  counties  of  Tennessee 
could  furnish  nothing  to  the  support  of  the  army.  The  condition  of  the 
roads  and  the  poverty  of  the  intervening  section  rendered  it  impossible  to 
transport  from  Knoxville,  a  distance  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles. 
The  enemy  from  Columbia  commanded  the  Cumberland  River,  and  only 
one  boat  was  enabled  to  come  up  with  supplies  from  Nashville.  With  the 
channel  of  communication  closed,  the  position  became  untenable  without 
attack.  Only  corn  could  be  obtained  for  the  horses  and  mules,  and  this  in 
such  small  quantities  that  often  cavalry  companies  were  sent  out  on  un 
shod  horses  which  had  eaten  nothing  for  two  days. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  .of  January  a  council  of  war  was  called. 
The  position  of  the  enemy  was  unchanged  ;  Fishing  Creek,  a  tributary  of 
the  Cumberland,  was  swollen  by  recent  rains ;  the  force  of  the  enemy  at 
Somerset  was  cut  off  by  this  stream,  and  could  not  be  expected  to  join 
Thomas'  column  moving  from  Columbia,  until  the  freshet  had  subsided. 
It  was  unanimously  agreed  to  attack  Thomas,  before  the  Somerset  brigade 
could  unite  with  him. 

The  march  began  at  midnight.  The  first  column,  commanded  by  Gen. 
Zolli coffer,  consisted  of  four  regiments  of  infantry  and  four  guns ;  the 
second,  under  Gen.  Carroll,  in  support,  of  three  regiments  and  two  guns, 
the  reserve  of  one  regiment  and  two  battalions  of  cavalry.  The  Confed 
erates  were  poorly  supplied  with  artillery ;  but  happily  the  undulating  and 
wooded  surface  of  the  country  presented  but  little  opportunity  for  the  use 
of  that  arm. 

As  the  morning  of  the  19th  January  broke,  the  firing  of  the  enemy's 
pickets  made  a  brisk  prelude  to  the  contest,  and  by  eight  o'clock  the  battle 
opened  with  great  fury.  Zollicoffer's  brigade  pushed  ahead,  and  drove 
the  Federals  some  distance  through  the  woods,  and  were  endeavouring  to 
force  their  way  to  the  summit  of  a  hill  which  fully  commanded  the  whole 
field.  He  was  ascending  the  hill  when  the  heaviest  firing  told  where  the 
battle  raged.  He  sent  for  reinforcements,  and  the  brigade  of  Gen.  Carroll 
was  ordered  up.  When,  in  another  moment,  it  was  announced  that  he 
was  killed,  a  sudden  gloom  pervaded  the  field  and  depressed  the  army. 
He  had  fallen  on  the  crest  of  the  hill — the  stronghold  of  the  enemy,  which 
he  had  almost  driven  them  from,  and  which  once  gained,  the  day  was 
ours.  The  enemy  in  front  of  him  in  the  woods,  after  a  few  moments'  ces- 
.sation  of  firing  and  some  movements,  was  taken  by  him  to  be  a  regiment 


THE   BATTLE   OF   FISHING   CREEK.  201 

of  his  own  command,  and  he  rode  up  to  give  them  a  command,  when  he 
was  shot  down,  pierced  by  several  balls.* 

The  fall  of  this  gallant  leader,  and  a  movement  of  the  enemy  to  flank 
the  Confederates,  completed  their  disorder.  Gen.  Crittenden  attempted  to 
rally  the  troops  by  the  most  conspicuous  displays  of  personal  daring,  in 
which  he  seemed  to  court  death,  as  he  reined  up  his  horse  again  and  again 
abreast  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  exhorted  his  men  to  stand  their  ground. 
But  the  tide  of  retreat  had  set  in,  and  all  that  could  be  done  was  to  steady 
the  men  as  they  moved  back  to  their  entrenchments  at  Camp  Beech 
Grove.  The  Confederates  left  upon  the  field  about  three  hundred  killed 
and  wounded,  and  lost  about  a  hundred  prisoners.  But  this  was  not  the 
measure  of  the  disaster. 

The  enemy  did  not  attempt  an  energetic  pursuit.  He  followed  the  re 
treating  Confederates  as  far  as  their  entrenchments,  in  front  of  which  he 
halted  for  the  night.  The  Confederates,  unprovided  with  rations  and  the 
necessary  supplies  to  enable  them  to  hold  their  entrenched  position,  and 
fearing  lest  they  should  be  cut  off,  retreated  across  the  Cumberland  River 
during  the  night.  The  crossing  was  effected  by  the  aid  of  a  small  steamer, 
which  had  made  its  way  with  supplies  for  the  army  from  Nashville  some 
days  previous.  Time  permitted,  however,  only  the  transportation  of  the 
men ;  and  Gen.  Crittenden  effected  his  retreat  after  having  lost  all  his 
baggage,  camp  equipage,  wagons,  horses,  and  artillery. 

The  battle  of  Fishing  Creek  was  not  remarkable  for  lists  of  killed  and 
wounded ;  but  it  was  undoubtedly  the  most  serious  disaster  that  had  yet 
befallen  the  Confederate  arms.  It  practically  surrendered  to  the  enemy 
the  whole  of  Eastern  Kentucky.  The  right  of  the  defensive  line  of  the 
Confederates  was  now  broken,  and  the  value  of  their  position  greatly  im 
paired.  On  the  other  part  of  their  line — that  through  Western  Kentucky, 
where  the  rivers  and  railroads  passed  which  afforded  an  entrance  into  Ten 
nessee,  and  so  to  the  heart  of  the  Southern  States — an  inadequate  force 
under  Gen.  Albert  Sydney  Johnston  was  extended  from  Bowling  Green 
on  the  right  to  Columbus  on  the  left,  presenting  to  the  enemy  advantages 
of  attack  which  he  could  not  fail  to  perceive. 

*  The  dead  body  of  Zollicoffer  was  brutally  insulted  by  the  enemy.  The  Cincinnati  Commercial 
contained  the  following  sentiment  expressed  on  behalf  of  what  was  styled  in  the  usual  Yankee 
magniloquence  and  virtuous  phrase  "  a  conquering  army,  battling  for  the  right : " 

"  The  corpse  lay  by  the  side  of  the  road  along  which  we  all  passed,  and  all  had  a  fair  view  of 
what  was  once  Zollicoffer.  I  saw  the  lifeless  body  as  it  lay  in  a  fence-corner  by  the  side  of  the 
road,  but  Zollicoffer  himself  is  now  in  hell.  Hell  is  a  fitting  abode  for  all  such  arch-traitors.  May 
all  the  other  chief  conspirators  in  this  rebellion  soon  share  Zollicoffer's  fate — shot  dead  through  the 
instrumentality  of  an  avenging  God — their  spirits  sent  straightway  to  hell,  and  their  lifeless  bodies 
lie  in  a  fence-corner,  their  faces  spattered  with  mud,  and  their  garments  divided  up,  and  even  the 
hair  of  their  head  cut  off  and  pulled  out  by  an  unsympathizing  soldiery  of  a  conquering  army,  bat 
tling  for  the  right." 


202  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Never  was  there  such  a  popular  delusion  in  the  Confederacy  as  that 
with  respect  to  the  strength  of  Johnston's  army.  The  Eichmond  news 
papers  could  not  "  see  why  Johnston  did  not  muster  his  forces,  advance 
farther  into  Kentucky,  capture  Louisville,  push  across  the  Ohio,  sack  Cin 
cinnati,  and  carry  the  war  into  Africa."  But  at  the  time  these  pleasing 
anticipations  of  an  advance  movement  were  indulged,  Johnston  actually 
did  not  have  more  than  twenty-five  thousand  men.  The  utter  inadequacy 
of  his  force,  and  the  exposure  of  his  flanks  and  rear,  were  well  known  to 
the  proper  Confederate  authorities.  But  the  Richmond  Government  ap 
peared  to  hope  for  results  without  the  legitimate  means  for  acquiring 
them  ;  to  look  for  relief  from  vague  and  undefined  sources  ;  and  to  await, 
with  dull  expectation,  what  was  next  to  happen.  There  is  nothing  more 
remarkable  in  the  history  of  the  war  than  the  false  impressions  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  South  as  to  the  extent  of  our  forces  at  the  principal  strategic 
point  in  Kentucky,  and  the  long  and  apathetic  toleration  by  the  Govern 
ment  in  Richmond  of  a  prospect  that  promised  nothing  but  eventual 
disaster. 

Shorly  after  the  disaster  at  Fishing  Creek,  Gen.  Beauregard  had  been 
sent  from  the  Potomac  to  Gen.  Johnston's  lines  in  Kentucky.  At  a  con 
ference  between  the  two  generals,  Beauregard  expressed  his  surprise  at 
the  smal]ness  of  Gen.  Johnston's  forces,  and  was  impressed  with  the  dan 
ger  of  his  position.  Buell  was  in  front ;  the  right  flank  was  threatened  by 
a  large  Federal  force  under  Thomas  ;  while  the  Cumberland  River  offered 
an  opportunity  to  an  attack  in  the  rear,  and  held  the  key  to  Nashville. 

A  large  force  of  Federals  had  been  collected  at  Paducah,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Tennessee  River,  with  a  view  to  offensive  operations  on  the  water. 
This  river  penetrated  Tennessee  and  Alabama,  and  was  navigable  for 
steamers  for  two  or  three  hundred  miles.  There  was  nothing  to  resist  the 
enemy's  advance  up  the  stream  but  a  weak  and  imperfectly  constructed 
fort.  The  Cumberland  was  a  still  more  important  river,  and  the  avenue 
to  Nashville ;  but  nothing  stood  in  the  way  of  the  enemy  save  Fort  Don- 
elson,  and  from  that  point  the  Federal  gunboats  could  reach  Nashville  in 
six  or  eight  hours,  and  strike  a  vital  blow  at  the  whole  system  of  Confed 
erate  defences  north  of  the  capital  of  Tennessee. 

Gen.  U.  S.  Grant  commenced  his  ascent  of  the  Tennessee  River  early 
in  February,  1862,  with  a  mixed  force  of  gunboats  and  infantry  columns, 
the  latter  making  parallel  movements  along  the  banks.  On  the  4th  of 
February  the  expedition  arrived  at  Fort  Henry,  on  the  east  bank  of  the 
river,  and  near  the  lines  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  The  fort  was  obvi 
ously  untenable,  being  so  absurdly  located,  that  it  was  enfiladed  from  three 
or  four  points  on  the  opposite  shore,  while  other  points  on  the  eastern  bank 
of  the  river  commanded  it  at  easy  cannon  range.  But  there  were  more 
than  twenty-five  hundred  Confederate  troops  in  the  vicinity,  under  the 


BATTLE    OF    FOET   DONELSON.  203 

command  of  Gen.  Tilghman  ;  and  to  cover  the  retreat  of  these,  it  became 
necessary  to  hold  the  fort  to  the  last  moment,  and  to  sacrifice  the  small 
garrison  for  the  larger  number. 

Gen.  Grant  was  moving  up  the  east  bank  of  the  river  from  his  landing 
three  miles  below,  with  a  force  of  twelve  thousand  men ;  whilst  Gen. 
Smith,  with  six  thousand  men,  was  moving  up  the  west  bank  to  take  a 
position  within  four  or  five  hundred  yards,  which  would  enable  him  to 
enfilade  the  entire  works.  The  only  chance  for  Gen.  Tilghman  was  to 
delay  the  enemy  every  moment  possible,  and  retire  his  command,  now 
outside  the  main  work,  to  Fort  Donelson.  To  this  end  it  was  necessary  to 
fight  the  eleven  guns  of  Fort  Henry  against  an  armament  of  fifty-four 
guns,  and  an  enemy  nearly  twenty  thousand  strong,  as  long  as  possible. 

Gen.  Tilghman  nobly  devoted  himself  to  the  fate  of  the  garrison,  in 
stead  of  joining  the  main  body  of  troops  retiring  towards  Fort  Donelson, 
the  safety  of  whom  depended  upon  a  protracted  defence  of  the  fort.  He 
engaged  the  enemy  for  two  hours  and  ten  minutes ;  disabled  one  of  his 
gunboats,  and  inflicted  upon  him  a  loss  of  seventy-three  in  killed  and 
wounded ;  and  surrendered  only  when  the  enemy  was  breaching  the  fort 
directly  in  front  of  his  guns.  The  brave  Confederate  commander  and  the 
small  garrison  of  forty  were  taken  prisoners,  after  having  sustained  a  loss 
of  about  twenty  killed  and  wounded. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Henry  was  an  unimportant  event,  of  itself;  but  it  was 
the  signal  for  the  direction  of  the  most  anxious  attention  to  Fort  Donelson 
on  the  Cumberland. 


BATTLE   OF   FOET   DONELSON. 

Grant  approached  Fort  Donelson,  with  immense  columns  of  infantry, 
and  with  his  powerful  fleet  of  gunboats  under  command  of  Commodore 
Foote.  Gen.  Johnston  had  devoted  the  larger  part  of  his  army  to  the 
defence  of  this  important  post.  He  had  determined  to  fight  for  Nashville 
at  Donelson  ;  and  he  had  given  the  best  part  of  his  army  to  do  it,  retain 
ing  only  to  cover  his  front  about  eleven  thousand  effective  men.  Gen. 
Buckner  had  repaired  to  Fort  Donelson  with  a  command  embracing  most 
of  the  troops  who  had  composed  the  central  army  of  Kentucky.  On  the 
10th  of  February,  Gen.  Pillow  arrived  with  a  body  of  Tennessee  troops. 
On  the  13th,  Gen,  Floyd  arrived  with  his  brigade  of  Yirginians,  and  as 
senior  brigadier  took  command  of  the  whole  Confederate  force  assembled 
at  Donelson. 

The  site  of  the  fortification  commanded  a  stretch  of  the  river  for  more 
than  two  miles.  The  armament  of  the  batteries  consisted  of  eight  32- 
pounders,  three  32-pound  carronades,  one  8-inch  columbiad,  and  one  32- 


204  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

pounder  rifled  gun.  A  line  of  entrenchments  about  two  miles  in  extent 
was  occupied  by  the  troops. 

As  the  sun  rose  on  the  13th  of  February,  the  cannonade  from  one  of 
the  enemy's  gunboats  announced  the  opening  of  the  conflict,  which  was 
destined  to  continue  for  several  days  and  nights.  At  eleven  o'clock  the 
enemy's  infantry  moved  forward  upon  the  entrenchments,  along  the  whole 
line.  They  were  met  by  a  scorching  fire,  and  were  repeatedly  driven 
back.  The  day  closed  with  the  disastrous  repulse  of  the  enemy  from  the 
trenches  a't  every  point  of  assault.  They  withdrew  their  infantry,  but 
kept  up  an  incessant  fire  of  artillery  and  sharpshooters,  by  which  the  Con 
federates  were  harassed,  and  deprived  of  rest  and  refreshment. 

It  was  expected  that  the  next  day  the  enemy  would  renew  his  attack 
upon  the  entrenchments.  The  morning  passed  without  any  indications  of 
such  an  onset.  The  smoke  of  a  large  number  of  gunboats  and  steamboats 
on  the  river  was  observed  a  short  distance  below,  and  information  at  the 
same  time  was  received  within  the  Confederate  lines  of  the  arrival  of  rein 
forcements  to  the  enemy,  who  was  already  reported  to  be  more  than  twen 
ty  thousand  strong. 

At  half-past  two  o'clock  the  Federal  fleet  drew  near  the  fort.  It  con 
sisted  of  six  boats,  carrying  forty-six  guns.  Five  of  these  iron-plated  bat 
teries  approached  in  line  of  battle,  en  echelon.  They  kept  up  a  constant 
fire  for  about  an  hour  and  a  half.  Once  the  boats  got  within  a  few  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  fort.  When  they  reached  the  point  of  the  nearest  ap 
proach,  the  fire  on  both  sides  was  tremendous.  That  of  the  Confederate 
batteries  was  too  destructive  to  be  borne.  Fifty-seven  shots  struck  the 
flag-ship,  and  more  than  a  hundred  in  all,  plunged  upon  the  decks  of  the 
assaulting  fleet.  Every  boat  was  disabled,  except  one,  which  kept  beyond 
the  range  of  fire.  With  great  difficulty,  the  shattered  iron-clads  were 
withdrawn,  from  the  storm  of  shot  hailed  from  the  fort.  Fifty-four  men 
were  killed  and  wounded  on  the  boats,  while  in  the  batteries  not  one  man 
was  killed  or  seriously  hurt,  and  no  injury  was  done  to  the  works. 

The  incidents  of  two  days  had  been  altogether  in  favour  of  the  Confed 
erates.  Their  casualties  were  small ;  but  their  sufferings  had  been  extreme. 
The  conflict  had  commenced  on  one  of  the  coldest  days  of  winter ;  the 
thermometer  was  twenty  degrees  below  the  freezing  point ;  and  while  the 
troops  watched  on  their  arms  in  the  trenches,  it  sleeted  and  snowed. 
Many  of  the  men  had  their  feet  and  hands-  frozen.  Their  clothes  were 
stiff  from  frozen  water.  In  the  engagement  in  the  trenches,  many  of  the 
wounded  who  could  neither  walk  nor  crawl  had  been  left  in  the  narrow 
space  between  the  two  armies  ;  and  as  no  flag  of  truce  was  allowed,  under 
which  they  might  have  been  brought  off,  they  lay  there  in  the  pitiless 
weather,  calling  in  vain  for  help.  Many  thus  died  who  otherwise  might 
have  been  saved,  and  those  of  the  wounded  who  were  recovered  alive,  not 


BATTLE   OF   FORT   DONELSON.  205 

until  the  last  act  of  the  battle's  tragedy  had  been  closed,  were  blue  with 
cold,  and  covered  with  frost  and  snow. 

Reinforcements  were  now  continually  reaching  the  enemy.  Transports 
were  arriving  nearly  every  hour,  from  which  dark  streams  of  men  could 
be  seen  pouring  along  the  roads,  and  completing  the  investment  of  the 
lines  around  the  fort.  Indeed,  it  might  have  been  evident  from  the  first, 
that  the  whole  available  force  of  the  Federals  on  the  western  waters  could 
and  would  be  concentrated  at  Fort  Donelson,  if  it  was  deemed  necessary 
to  reduce  it.  It  was  fair  to  infer  that  while  the  enemy  kept  up  a  constant 
menace  of  attack,  his  object  was  merely  to  gain  time  to  pass  a  column 
above  the  works,  both  on  the  right  and  left  banks,  and  thus  to  cut  the 
Confederate  communications  and  prevent  the  possibility  of  egress. 

On  the  night  of  the  14th,  Gen.  Floyd  called  a  council  of  the  officers  of 
divisions  and  brigades.  It  was  unanimously  determined  that  but  one 
course  was  left  by  which  a  rational  hope  could  be  entertained  of  saving 
the  garrison,  and  that  was  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  his  position  on  our 
left,  and  thus  to  pass  the  troops  into  the  open  country  lying  southward, 
towards  Nashville. 

The  plan  of  attack  was  that  Gen.  Pillow,  aided  by  Brigadier-General 
Bushrod  K.  Johnson,  with  three  brigades,  should  advance  to  the  assault  of 
the  enemy  on  the  right,  while  Gen.  Buckner,  with  his  force,  chiefly  of 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee  troops,  should  advance  upon  the  left  and  centre 
of  the  enemy  along  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  which  led  from  the  river  and 
village  of  Dover,  and  was  the  only  practicable  route  to  Nashville.  When 
Gen.  Pillow  moved  out  of  his  position  next  morning,  he  found  the  enemy 
prepared  to  receive  him  in  advance  of  his  encampment.  For  nearly  two 
hours  the  battle  raged  fiercely  on  this  part  of  the  line,  with  very  little 
change  in  the  position  of  the  adverse  forces. 

As  the  morning  advanced,  a  brigade  of  Mississippians  and  Tennesseans 
was  thrown  forward,  and  advanced  up  a  hollow,  firing  terrible  volleys  into 
the  enemy's  right  flank.  This  heroic  band  of  troops,  less  than  fifteen  hun- 
dred  in  number,  marched  up  the  hill,  loading  and  firing  as  they  moved, 
gaining  inch  by  inch,  on  an  enemy  at  least  four  times  their  number.  For 
one  long  hour  this  point  was  hotly  contested  by  the  enemy.  At  last, 
unable  to  bear  the  hot  assault,  the  Federals  gave  way,  and  fell  back  slowly 
to  the  left,  retiring  towards  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road. 

Gen.  Buckner's  advance  on  the  centre  and  left  of  the  enemy  was  re 
tarded  by  various  causes,  and  it  was  nearly  nine  o'clock  before  this  part  of 
the  Confederate  forces  became  fairly  engaged  with  the  enemy.  A  portion 
of  his  artillery  opened  upon  the  flank  and  left  rear  of  the  enemy's  infantry, 
who  were  being  pressed  back  by  Gen.  Pillow's  division. 

As  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  was  along  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  Gen. 
Buckner  now  organized  an  attack  further  to  his  right,  up  a  deep  valley,  in 


206    .  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

rear  of  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy's  batteries.  The  advance  of  his 
infantry  column  was  covered  by  artillery.  The  movement,  combined  with 
the  brisk  fire  of  three  batteries,  induced  a  rapid  retreat  of  the  enemy,  who 
abandoned  a  section  of  his  artillery.  At  the  same  time  that  Buckner's  in 
fantry  was  thus  penetrating  the  line  of  the  enemy's  retreat,  Forrest,  with  a 
portion  of  his  cavalry,  charged  upon  their  right,  while  Pillow's  division 
was  pressing  their  extreme  right  about  half  a  mile  further  to  the  left. 

It  now  appeared  that  the  crisis  of  the  battle  was  past.  Yictory,  or  such 
success  as  they  had  sought,  seemed  to  be  within  the  grasp  of  the  Confed 
erates.  The  Wynn's  Ferry  road  was  now  not  only  open,  but  cleared  of 
the  enemy  entirely  on  one  side,  and  for  a  mile  and  a  half  on  the  other. 
Of  this  posture  of  affairs,  Gen.  Buckner,  in  his  official  report,  writes  :  "  I 
awaited  the  arrival  of  my  artillery  and  reserves,  either  to  continue  the 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  or  to  defend  the  position  I  now  held,  in  order  that 
the  army  might  pass  out  on  the  road,  which  was  now  completely  covered 
by  the  position  occupied  by  my  division.  But  Gen.  Pillow  had  prevented 
my  artillery  from  leaving  the  entrenchments,  and  also  sent  me  reiterated 
orders  to  return  to  my  entrenchments  on  the  extreme  right.  I  was  in  the 
act  of  returning  to  the  lines,  when  I  met  Gen.  Floyd,  who  seemed  sur 
prised  at  the  order.  At  his  request  to  know  my  opinion  of  the  movement, 
I  replied  that  nothing  bad  occurred  to  change  my  views  of  the  necessity 
of  the  evacuation  of  the  post,  that  the  road  was  open,  that  the  first  part  of 
our  purpose  was  fully  accomplished,  and  I  thought  WQ  should  at  once 
avail  ourselves  of  the  existing  opportunity  to  regain  our  communications. 
These  seemed  to  be  his  own  views  ;  for  he  directed  me  to  halt  my  troops 
and  remain  in  position  until  he  should  have  conversed  with  Gen.  Pillow, 
who  was  now  within  the  entrenchments.  After  that  consultation,  he  sent 
me  an  order  to  retire  within  the  lines,  and  to  repair  as  rapidly  as  possible 
to  my  former  position  on  the  extreme  right,  which  was  in  danger  of 
attack." 

It  was  long  a  source  of  keen  regret  among  those  few  people  in  the 
Confederacy  who  knew  the  real  history  of  the  Fort  Donelson  battle,  that 
their  army  did  not  attempt  a  retreat  at  the  precise  period  of  opportunity. 
But  a  few  moments  of  that  superabundant  caution,  which  hesitates  to  seize 
the  crisis,  and  insists  upon  reconnoitring  an  advantage,  are  often  fatal 
upon  a  field  of  battle.  It  was  thought  by  those  superiour  to  Gen.  Buck 
ner  in  command,  that  it  would  be  hazardous  to  attempt  a  retreat  while  the 
enemy,  though  defeated,  was  near  at  hand  with  fresh  troops. 

The  hesitation  was  fatal.  The  effect  of  the  violent  attack  of  the  Con 
federates  on  the  enemy's  right,  followed  up  by  Gen.  Buckner's  advance  on 
his  centre,  had  been  to  roll  over  his  immense  masses  towards  the  right  of 
the  Confederate  works,  immediately  in  front  of  their  river  batteries.  The 
advantage  was  instantly  appreciated.  The  enemy  drove  back  the  Confed- 


BATTLE   OF    FORT   DONELSON.  207 

erates,  advanced  on  the  trenches  on  the  extreme  right  of  Gen.  Buckner's 
command,  getting  possession,  after  a  stubborn  conflict  of  two  hours,  of  the 
most  important  and  commanding  position  of  the  battle-field,  being  in 
the  rear  of  our  river  batteries,  and,  advancing  with  fresh  forces  towards 
our  left,  drove  back  our  troops  from  the  ground  that  had  been  won  in  the 
severe  and  terrible  conflict  of  the  early  part  of  the  day. 

After  nine  hours  of  combat,  the  enemy  held  the  field ;  he  had  changed 
the  fortune  of  the  day  by  a  quick  and  opportune  movement ;  and  he  now 
held  the  Confederates  in  circumstances  of  desperation.  Of  the  results  of 
the  day,  Gen.  Floyd  reported :  "  We  had  fought  the  battle  to  open  our 
way  for  our  army,  and  to  relieve  us  from  an  investment  which  would 
necessarily  reduce  us  and  the  position  we  occupied  by  famine.  We  had 
accomplished  our  object,  but  it  occupied  the  whole  day,  and  before  we 
could  prepare  to  leave,  after  taking  in  the  wounded  and  the  dead,  the 
enemy  had  thrown  around  us  again,  in  the  night,  an  immense  force  of 
fresh  troops,  and  reoccupied  his  original  position  in  the  line  of  investment, 
thus  again  cutting  off  our  retreat.  We  had  only  about  13,000  troops,  all 
told.  Of  these  we  had  lost  a  large  proportion  in  the  three  battles.  The 
command  had  been  in  the  trenches  night  and  day  for  five  days,  exposed 
to  snow,  sleet,  mud,  and  ice  and  water,  without  shelter,  without  adequate 
covering,  and  without  sleep." 

The  field  of  battle  was  thickly  strewn  with  dead  and  wounded.  The 
loss  of  the  Confederates  was  estimated  at  fifteen  hundred.  That  of  the 
enemy  Gen.  Floyd  conjectures,  in  his  official  report,  to  have  been  at  least 
five  thousand. 

Ghastly  spectacles  were  abundant,  as  the  eye  ranged  over  this  scene  of 
mortal  strife ;  for  the  ground  was  in  many  places  red  with  frozen  blood, 
and  the  snow  which  lay  under  the  pine  thickets  was  marked  with  crimson 
streams.  There  were  two  miles  of  dead  strewn  thickly,  mingled  with  fire 
arms,  artillery,  dead  horses,  and  the  paraphernalia  of  the  battle-field. 
Many  of  the  bodies  were  fearfully  mangled,  and  the  ponderous  artillery 
wheels  had  crushed  limbs  and  skulls.  The  dead  were  promiscuously  min 
gled,  sometimes  grappling  in  the  fierce  death-throe,  sometimes  facing  each 
other  as  they  gave  and  received  the  fatal  shot  and  thrust,  sometimes  hud 
dled  in  grotesque  shapes,  and  again  heaped  in  piles  which  lay  six  or  seven 
feet  deep. 

"  I  could  imagine,"  says  an  eye-witness  of  the  field  of  carnage,  "  noth 
ing  more  terrible  than  the  silent  indications  of  agony  that  marked  the  fea 
tures  of  the  pale  corpses  which  lay  at  every  step.  Though  dead  and  rigid 
in  every  muscle,  they  still  writhed,  and  seemed  to  turn  to  catch  the  pass 
ing  breeze  for  a  cooling  breath.  Staring  eyes,  gaping  mouths,  clenched 
hands,  and  strangely  contracted  limbs,  seemingly  drawn  into  the  smallest 
compass,  as  if  by  a  mighty  effort  to  rend  asunder  some  irresistible  bond 


208  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

which  held  them  down  to  the  torture  of  which  they  died.  One  sat  against 
a  tree,  and,  with  mouth  and  eyes  wide  open,  looked  up  into  the  sky,  as  if 
to  catch  a  glance  at  its  fleeting  spirit.  Another  clutched  the  branch  of  an 
overhanging  tree,  and  hung  half-suspended,  as  if  in  the  death-pang  he  had 
raised  himself  partly  from  the  ground  ;  the  other  had  grasped  his  faithful 
musket,  and  the  compression  of  his  mouth  told  of  the  determination  which 
would  have  been  fatal  to  a  foe,  had  life  ebbed  a  minute  later.  A  third 
clung  with  both  hands  to  a  bayonet  which  was  buried  in  the  ground. 
Great  numbers  lay  in  heaps,  just  as  the  fire  of  the  artillery  mowed  them 
down,  mangling  their  forms  into  an  almost  undistinguishable  mass." 

Late  in  the  night  of  the  15th  of  February,  another  conference  of  gen 
eral  officers  was  called.  It  was,  indeed,  a  memorable  one.  Gen.  Pillow 
appears  to  have  favoured  a  proposition  for  a  desperate  onset  upon  the 
right  of  the  enemy's  forces,  with  the  prospect  of  thus  extricating  a  consid 
erable  proportion  of  the  command.  Gen.  Buckner  remarked,  that  it  would 
cost  the  command  three-fourths  its  present  numbers  to  cut  its  way  out,  and 
it  was  wrong  to  sacrifice  three-fourths  to  save  one-fourth ;  that  no  officer 
had  a  right  to  cause  such  a  sacrifice.  The  alternative  of  the  proposition 
was  a  surrender  of  the  position  and  command.  Gen.  Floyd  declared  that 
he  would  not  surrender  himself  a  prisoner,  and  proposed  to  escape  with 
such  portion  of  his  command  as  was  possible  on  two  small  steamers,  which 
had  arrived  from  Nashville  during  the  night.  Gen.  Pillow  remarked  that 
he  thought  there  were  no  two  persons  in  the  Confederacy  whom  the 
"  Yankees  "  would  prefer  to  capture  than  himself  and  Gen.  Floyd,  and 
asked  the  latter's  opinion  as  to  the  propriety  of  his  accompanying  him. 
To  this  inquiry  Gen.  Floyd  replied  that  it  was  a  question  for  every 
man  to  decide  for  himself.  Gen.  Pillow  then  addressed  the  inquiry  to 
Gen.  Buckner,  to  which  Gen.  Buckner  remarked  that  he  could  only  reply 
as  Gen.  Floyd  had  done  ;  that  it  was  a  question  for  every  officer  to  decide 
for  himself,  and  that  in  his  own  case  he  regarded  it  as  his  duty  to  remain 
with  his  men  and  share  their  fate,  whatever  it  might  be. 

It  was  then  arranged  that  the  command  should  be  passed.  Gen.  Buck 
ner  asked,  "  Am  I  to  consider  the  command  as  turned  over  to  me  ? "  Gen. 
Floyd  replied,  "  Certainly,  I  turn  over  the  command."  Gen.  Pillow  replied 
quickly,  "  I  pass  it.  I  will  not  surrender."  Gen.  Buckner  then  called  for 
pen,  ink,  paper,  and  a  bugler,  and  prepared  to  open  communication  with 
the  Federal  commander. 

A  number  of  men  had  fallen  in  battle  ;  some  of  the  sick  and  wounded 
had  been  removed  ;  and  detachments  of  troops  had  escaped  under  Floyd, 
Pillow,  and  Forrest ;  leaving  the  number  surrendered  by  Gen.  Buckner  to 
the  enemy  less  than  nine  thousand  men.  Gen.  Grant  had  demanded 
"  Unconditional  Surrender  " — words,  which  the  Northern  populace  after 
wards  attached  to  his  name  as  a  peculiar  title  to  glory ;  and  Gen. 


PANIC   IN   NASHVILLE.  209 

Buckner  replied :  "  Tlie  distribution  of  the  forces  under  my  command, 
incident  to  an  unexpected  change  of  commanders,  and  the  overwhelming 
force  under  your  command,  compel  me,  notwithstanding  the  brilliant  suc 
cess  of  the  Confederate  arms  yesterday,  to  accept  the  ungenerous  and  un- 
chivalrous  terms  which  you  propose." 

The  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  was  the  heaviest  blow  that  had  yet  fallen  on 
the  Confederacy.  It  opened  the  whole  of  West  Tennessee  to  Federal 
occupation,  and  it  developed  the  crisis  which  had  long  existed  in  the 
West.  Gen.  A.  S.  Johnston  had  previously  ordered  the  e  vac  nation  of  Bow 
ling  Green ;  and  the  movement  was  executed  while  the  battle  was  being 
fought  at  Donelson.  Gen.  Johnston  awaited  the  result  of  the  battle  oppo 
site  Nashville.  At  dawn  of  the  16th  of  February  he  received  the  news  of 
a  defeat.  Orders  were  at  once  issued  to  push  the  army  forward  across  the 
river  as  soon  as  possible.  The  city  papers  or  extras  of  that  morning  pub 
lished  despatches  announcing  a  "  glorious  victory."  The  city  was  wild  with 
joy.  About  the  time  the  people  were  assembling  at  the  churches,  it  was 
announced  by  later  extras  that  "  Donelson  had  fallen."  The  revulsion  was 
great.  Governor  Harris  had  been  informed  of  the  fact  early  in  the  morn 
ing,  and  had  proceeded  to  Gen.  Johnston's  head-quarters  to  advise  with 
him  as  to  the  best  course  to  adopt  under  the  altered  circumstances.  The 
General  said  that  Nashville  was  utterly  indefensible ;  that  the  army 
would  pass  right  through  the  city  ;  that  any  attempt  to  defend  it  with  the 
means  at  his  command  would  result  in  disaster  to  the  army,  and  the  de 
struction  of  the  city  ;  that  the  first  and  highest  duty  of  the  governor  was 
to  the  public  trusts  in  his  hands,  and  he  thought,  to  discharge  them  prop 
erly,  he  should  at  once  remove  the  archives  and  public  records  to  some 
safer  place,  and  call  the  Legislature  together  elsewhere  than  at  Nashville. 
Gen.  Johnston  retreated  with  his  army  towards  Murfreesboro',  leaving 
behind  him  a  scene  of  panic  and  dismay. 

The  confusion  at  Nashville  did  not  reach  its  height  until  a  humane  at 
tempt  was  made  to  distribute  among  the  poor  a  portion  of  the  public 
stores  which  could  not  be  removed.  The  lowest  passions  seemed  to  have 
been  aroused  in  a  large  mass  of  men  and  women,  and  the  city  appeared  as 
if  it  was  in  the  hands  of  a  mob.  A  detachment  of  Forrest's  cavalry  en 
deavoured  to  enforce  order.  Houses  were  closed,  carriages  and  wagons 
were  concealed,  to  prevent  the  mob  from  taking  possession  of  them. 
Horses  were  being  seized  everywhere.  After  every  other  means  failed, 
Forrest  charged  the  mob,  before  he  could  get  it  so  dispersed  as  to  get 
wagons  to  the  doors  of  the  departments,  to  load  up  the  stores  for  transpor 
tation.  The  loss  of  public  stores  by  depredations  was  not  less  than  a  mil 
lion  of  dollars.  "  In  my  judgment,"  said  Col.  Forrest,  "  if  the  quarter 
master  and  commissary  had  remained  at  their  posts,  and  worked  diligently 
with  the  means  at  their  command,  the  government  stores  might  all  have 
14 


210  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

been  saved  between  the  time  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  aud  the  arrival 
of  the  enemy  in  Nashville." 

We  shall  complete  this  chapter  by  a  brief  account  of  a  defeat  of  Con 
federate  arms  that  preceded  by  several  days  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson, 
and  took  place  on  a  widely  separated  theatre  of  the  war.  The  thread  of 
Confederate  disaster  takes  us  here  from  the  tributaries  of  the  Mississippi 
to  the  low  and  melancholy  sea-line  of  North  Carolina. 


CAPTURE   OF   EOANOKE   ISLAND   BY   THE   ENEMY. 

About  the  middle  of  January,  1862,  Gen.  Burnside  entered  Pamlico 
Sound  at  the  head  of  an  expedition,  consisting  of  more  than  sixty  vessels 
of  all  kinds,  twenty-six  of  them  gunboats,  and  with  at  least  fifteen  thousand 
men.  It  readily  became  apparent  that  Roanoke  Island  was  the  first  ob 
ject  of  his  attack.  This  important  island  lies  in  the  broad  inlet  between 
Pamlico  and  Currituck  Sounds,  and  about  midway  between  the  main  land 
and  the  narrow  strip  of  bank  which  dykes  out  the  ocean.  It  was  of  great 
moment  to  the  South  to  defend  it,  for  its  possession  by  the  enemy  would 
unlock  to  them  Albemarle  and  Currituck  Sounds,  open  to  them  eight  rivers, 
give  them  access  to  the  country  chiefly  supplying  provisions  to  Norfolk, 
and  enable  them  to  menace  that  city,  and  the  four  canals  and  two  rail 
roads  running  through  the  country  by  which  it  was  surrounded. 

Gen.  Henry  A.  Wise,  who  had  been  ordered  to  the  command  of  the 
department  embracing  Roanoke  Island,  declared  that  it  should  be  defend 
ed  at  the  expense  of  twenty  thousand  men,  and  many  millions  of  dollars. 
But  to  his  estimate  of  the  importance  of  the  position  he  found  that  the 
Richmond  authorities  had  a  deaf  ear.  On  the  7th  of  January,  1862,  Gen. 
Wise  assumed  command,  and  made  an  examination  of  the  defences.  He 
found  them  inadequate,  in  his  opinion,  to  resist  even  the  force  then  at 
Hatteras,  and  as  the  Burnside  expedition  began  already  to  point  to  the 
North  Carolina  coast,  he  called  urgently  for  reinforcements.  He  addressed 
a  letter  to  Mr.  Benjamin,  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  and  followed 
it  by  a  personal  interview,  in  which  he  strenuously  insisted  that  more 
troops  should  be  sent  to  the  island.  He  urged  that  a  large  part  of  Gen. 
Huger' s  command,  at  Norfolk,  might  be  safely  detached,  and  used  for  the 
defence  of  Roanoke.  He  argued  that  the  fifteen  thousand  men  under 
Huger  were  idle,  and  were  only  kept  at  Norfolk  in  view  of  a  possible 
attack,  and  that  they  would  much  more  advantageously  defend  the  city,  by 
guarding  the  approaches  through  the  Sound,  than  by  remaining  inactive. 
He  explained  that  Roanoke  Island  guarded  more  than  four-fifths  of  all 
Norfolk's  supplies  of  corn,  pork  and  forage,  and  that  its  capture  by  the 
enemy  would  cut  the  command  of  Gen.  Huger  oif  from  all  its  most 


LOSS   OF   ROANOKE   ISLAND.  211 

efficient  transportation.  Bat  Mr.  Benjamin  would  not  adopt  these  views, 
and  would  not  disturb  Gen.  Huger ;  he  told  Wise  sullenly  that  there 
were  no  men  to  spare  to  reinforce  him  ;  and  at  last  he  brought  the  confer 
ences  and  protestations  of  the  General  to  an  abrupt  termination  by  a 
peremptory  military  order,  dated  the  22d  of  January,  requiring  him  to  pro 
ceed  immediately  to  Roanoke  Island. 

The  defences  of  the  island  consisted  of  seven  small  gunboats  and  six  land 
batteries,  not  casemated,  and  wholly  inefficient.  After  manning  the  forts, 
there  were  scarcely  more  than  eight  hundred  effective  men.  In  the  sick 
ness  of  Gen.  Wise,  who  was  confined  to  his  bed  at  Nag's  Head,  the  imme 
diate  command  devolved  upon  Col.  Shaw,  the  senior  officer  present. 

In  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  February  the  enemy  made  an  attack,  with 
twenty-two  heavy  steamers,  upon  the  little  Confederate  squadron  under 
the  command  of  Commodore  Lynch,  and  upon  Fort  Bartow,  the  most 
southern  of  the  defences  on  the  west  side  of  the  island.  The  action  com 
menced  at  two  miles  distance,  the  Confederate  gunboats  retiring  slowly 
with  the  intention  of  drawing  the  enemy  under  the  guns  of  the  batteries. 
Soon  the  air  was  filled  with  heavy  reports,  and  the  sea  was  disturbed  in 
every  direction  by  fragments  of  shell.  Explosions  of  shell  rang  through 
the  air ;  and  occasionally  a  large  one  hundred  arid  twenty-four  pounder 
thundered  across  the  waves,  and  sent  its  ponderous  shot  in  the  midst  of 
the  flotilla.  At  times,  the  battery  would  be  enveloped  in  the  sand  and 
dust  thrown  up  by  shot  and  shell.  The  scene  of  this  bombardment,  which 
lasted  continuously  from  ten  in  the  morning  until  half-past  five  in  the 
afternoon,  was  a  singular  and  picturesque  one.  The  melancholy  shore 
line  which  bound  it,  was  an  unbroken  one  of  dark  cypresses  and  pines. 
On  the  water  were  the  enemy's  vessels  rapidly  pouring  out  shot  and  shell 
at  the  line  of  Confederate  gunboats  or  at  the  batteries.  Still  further  on, 
just  gleaming  through  the  sunlight,  was  the  forest  of  masts  and  the  white 
sails  of  the  transports,  kept  far  in  the  rear  out  of  the  reach  of  danger. 

Our  casualties  on  the  gunboats  were  only  one  man  killed  and  three 
wounded.  But  the  engagement  had  been  disastrous.  The  Curlew,  our 
largest  steamer,  was  sunk,  and  the  Forrest,  one  of  the  propellers,  disabled. 
Commodore  Lynch  writes,  in  his  official  report,  that  at  the  close  of  the 
action  he  had  "  not  a  pound  of  powder  or  a  loaded  shell  remaining."  This 
singular  deficiency  of  ammunition  and  the  disasters  he  had  already  sus 
tained,  determined  the  policy  of  retreat,  and  tinder  cover  of  the  night,  the 
squadron  was  drawn  off  to  Elizabeth  City. 

Gen.  Burnside  gave  orders  that  a  landing  should  be  made  on  the  island 
the  next  morning.  It  was  accomplished  under  cover  of  the  gunboats, 
about  the  centre  of  the  western  shore.  At  nine  o'clock  the  enemy  ad 
vanced  through  a  country  swampy  and  covered  with  forest.  About  the 
centre  of  the  island  an  entrenchment  had  been  thrown  up,  covered  on  the 


212  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

flanks  by  marshy  ground  ;  and  here  the  Confederates  took  position  to  dis 
pute  the  enemy's  advance.  But  the  marshes  were  found  to  be  practicable. 
The  Federals  advanced  with  flanking  columns  debouching  to  the  right  and 
left.  Their  overwhelming  numbers  literally  crowded  upon  and  crushed 
our  battery  of  three  field-pieces  on  the  left,*  while  at  the  same  time  the 
enemy  passed  through  the  cypress  swamp,  which  Col.  Shaw  thought  im 
practicable,  and  turned  the  right  flank.  The  order  was  given  to  spike  the 
guns  in  the  battery,  and  retreat  to  the  northern  end  of  the  island.  The 
Confederates  were  followed  up  to  the  shore,  slowly  and  cautiously,  by  the 
enemy.  Some  effected  their  escape  in  boats,  which  were  quickly  towed 
away  by  a  steamer ;  but  the  bulk  of  the  command  was  captured,  includ 
ing  two  boats  conveying  the  wounded,  which  were  compelled  to  return  by 
the  enemy's  flre. 

The  capture  of  the  island  was  immediately  followed  by  the  pursuit  of 
the  Confederate  gunboats.  A  squadron,  consisting  of  fourteen  gunboats, 
was  detached  for  that  purpose,  and,  on  the  10th  of  February,  found  the 
remaining  Confederate  vessels  drawn  up  in  line  in  the  narrow  channel 
which  leads  up  to  Elizabeth  City.  After  a  brief  and  desultory  engage 
ment,  the  crews  of  the  Confederate  gunboats,  after  setting  fire  to  the  ves 
sels,  abandoned  them,  and  fled  for  the  shore.  Thus  was  the  disaster  of 
Roanoke  Island  complete.  The  Confederates  had  lost  in  all  the  actions 
but  twenty- three  killed  and  fifty-eight  wounded.  But  the  disaster  in  other 
respects  was  great.  The  enemy  had  taken  six  forts,  forty  guns,  nearly  two 
thousand  prisoners,  and  upwards  of  three  thousand  small  arms ;  secured 
the  water  avenue  of  Roanoke  River,  navigable  for  one  hundred  and  twenty 
miles  ;  got  possession  of  the  granary  and  larder  of  Norfolk,  and  threatened 
the  back-door  of  that  city. 

The  disaster  of  Roanoke  Island  dates  the  period  when  public  censure 
towards  the  Richmond  Government  appeared  to  have  first  awakened. 
Heretofore  the  administration  of  that  Government  had  gone  on  almost 

*  In  this  action  was  killed  Capt.  0.  Jennings  Wise,  of  the  "  Richmond  Blues,"  a  son  of  Gen. 
Wise,  a  young  man  of  brilliant  promise,  prominently  connected  with  the  Richmond  press  before  the 
war,  and  known  throughout  the  State  for  his  talents,  chivalric  bearing,  and  modesty  of  behaviour. 
A  correspondent  furnishes  the  following  particulars  of  the  death  of  this  brilliant  young  officer : 

"  About  ten  o'clock  Capt.  Wise  found  his  battalion  exposed  to  the  galling  fire  of  a  regiment ;  turn 
ing  to  Capt.  Coles,  he  said  :  '  This  fire  is  very  hot ;  tell  Col.  Anderson  we  must  fall  back  or  be  rein 
forced.'  Capt.  Coles  turned  to  pass  the  order,  and  was  shot  through  the  heart,  dying  instantly.  Capt. 
Wise  was  wounded,  first  in  the  arm  and  next  through  the  lungs,  which  latter  wound  brought  him 
to  the  ground.  He  was  borne  to  the  hospital  in  charge  of  Surgeon  Coles,  and  received  two  additional 
wounds  while  being  borne  from  the  field.  That  evening  Surgeon  Coles  put  him  into  a  boat  to  send 
him  to  Nag's  Head,  but  the  enemy  fired  upon  it,  and  he  was  obliged  to  return.  The  enemy  seemed 
to  regret  this,  and  treated  him  very  kindly,  taking  him  out  of  the  boat  on  a  mattress,  and  starting 
back  to  the  hospital.  The  next  day,  about  eleven  o'clock  A.  M.,  he  calmly  and  in  his  perfect  senses, 
without  suffering,  softly  passed  away.  A  Federal  officer,  standing  by  him  and  witnessing  his  death, 
gaid,  '  T/iere  is  a  brave  man  ! '  " 


LOSS    OF   TtOANOKE    ISLAND.  213 

without  inquiry,  the  people  presuming  on  the  wisdom  of  their  rulers,  and 
having  but  little  curiosity  to  penetrate  the  details  of  their  business,  or  to 
violate  that  singular  official  reserve  which  was  thrown  around  the  mili 
tary  condition  of  the  Confederacy  from  the  first  gun  of  the  war  down  to 
the  final  catastrophe.  But  such  a  disaster  as  that  referred  to,  in  which 
improvidence  stared  out,  and  in  which  an  army  had  been  put,  as  it  were, 
in  a  mash-trap — in  a  condition  in  which  it  could  neither  hope  for  success 
nor  extricate  itself  from  a  besetting  peril — provoked  public  inquiry,  and 
demanded  an  investigation.* 

A  committee  was  accordingly  ordered  in  the  Confederate  Congress  to 
report  upon  the  affair  of  Roanoke  Island.  It  declared  that  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Mr.  J.  P.  Benjamin,  was  responsible  for  an  important  defeat  of 
our  arms,  which  might  have  been  safely  avoided  by  him  ;  that  he  had  paid 
no  practical  attention  to  the  appeals  of  Gen.  Wise ;  and  that  he  had,  by 
plain  acts  of  omission,  permitted  that  general  and  an  inconsiderable  force 
to  remain  to  meet  at  least  fifteen  thousand  men,  well  armed  and  equipped. 
No  defence  to  this  charge  was  ever  attempted  by  Secretary  Benjamin  or 
his  friends  ;  and  the  unanimous  conclusion  of  the  committee,  charging  one 
of  President  Davis'  Cabinet  with  a  matter  of  the  gravest  offence  known  to 
the  laws  and  the  interests  of  the  country,  was  allowed  to  remain  on  the 
public  record  without  commentary  or  consequence. 

*  The  Richmond  Enquirer  had  the  following  commentary  on  the  Roanoke  Island  affair.  It 
contains  a  picture  of  Confederate  improvidence,  which  was  to  be  repeated  at  many  stages  of  the  war, 
and  to  put  our  scantiness  and  shiftlessness  in  frightful  contrast  with  the  active  zeal  and  munificent 
preparations  of  the  enemy  : 

"  On  the  island  no  preparations  whatever  had  been  made.  Col.  Shaw's  regiment,  Col.  Jordan's, 
and  three  companies  of  Col.  Marten's  regiment,  had  been  on  the  island  for  months.  These  regiments 
numbered,  all. present,  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  fourteen.  Of  these,  about  one  thousand 
seven  hundred  were  soldiers.  There  were  four  hundred  and  fifty  absent  and  sick,  leaving  one  thou 
sand  two  hundred  and  fifty  for  all  duty.  From  these,  five  batteries  had  to  be  manned,  leaving,  on 
the  morning  of  the  eighth,  only  eight  hundred  and  three  North  Carolina  infantry  reported  for  duty. 
These  had  not  been  paid,  or  clothed,  or  fed,  or  drilled.  The  island  had  no  implements  for  the  la 
bour  on  the  works,  no  teams  but  two  pair  of  broken-down  mules,  and  no  horses  for  field-artillery. 
There  were  but  three  pieces  of  field-artillery — one  twenty-four  pounder,  one  eighteen  pounder,  and 
one  brass  howitzer — the  mules  drew  the  latter,  and  the  men  the  heavier  pieces  through  the  sand. 
There  was  only  twelve-pounder  ammunition  for  any  of  the  large  pieces.  The  forts,  built  on  the 
island  before  Gen.  Wise  was  assigned  to  the  command,  were  all  in  the  wrong  places — at  the  north 
end  of  the  island — leaving  all  the  landings  on  the  south  end  uncovered  by  a  single  battery.  No 
breastworks  had  been  made,  and  there  were  no  tools  to  make  any — the  marshes  at  the  south  end  of 
the  island  had  no  defensive  works  upon  them.  But  one  steam-tug  and  two  barges  were  provided, 
and  there  were  no  means  of  retreat  either  by  tugs  or  ferry.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  there  were  provided 
no  means  of  defence,  and  still  less  of  escape,  though  timely  notice  and  a  providential  warning  of 
twenty-five  days  had  been  given." 


CHAPTER    XIII. 


TRUE  CAUSES  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  DISASTERS  IN  THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. — THE 
ENEMY'S  "ANACONDA  PLAN." — REBUKES  TO  THE  VANITY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — THE 

SUM  OF  THEIR  DISASTERS. INAUGURATION  OF  THE  PERMANENT  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 

CONFEDERATE  STATES. GLOOMY  SCENE  IN  CAPITOL  SQUARE. PRESIDENT  DAVIS5  SPEECH. 

COMMENTARY  OF  A  RICHMOND  JOURNAL. CAUSES  OF  POPULAR  ANIMATION  IN  THE  CON 
FEDERACY. DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  DESIGN  UPON  SLAVERY. HISTORY  OF  THE 

ANTI-SLAVERY  MEASURES  OF  LINCOLN'S  ADMINISTRATION. HIS  EARLY  DECLARATION  OF 

NON-INTERFERENCE  WITH  SLAVERY. MR.   8EWARD  IN  1860. LINCOLN'S  STATEMENT, 

MARCH  4rTH,  1861. DIPLOMATIC  DECLARATION,  APRIL,  1861. EARLY  AFFECTATIONS  OF 

LINCOLN'S  ADMINISTRATION  ON  THE  SUBJECT  OF  SLAVERY. — M'CLELLAN'S  ADDRESS. — 
M'DOWELL'S  ORDER. — REVOCATION  OF  THE  EMANCIPATION  MEASURES  OF  FREMONT  AND 
HUNTER. FIRST  ACT  OF  ANTI-SLAVERY  LEGISLATION  AT  WASHINGTON. LOVEJOY's  RESO 
LUTION. THE  ANTI-SLAVERY  CLAUSE  IN  THE  CONFISCATION  ACT. — THREE  NOTABLE  MEAS 
URES  OF  ANTI-SLAVERY  LEGISLATION. COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  EMANCIPATION  POLICY  IN 

THE  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA. — EXPLANATION  OF  THE  ASCENDANCY  OF  THE  ABOLITION 

PARTY  DURING  THE  WAR. — THE  NEW  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS. ITS  VIGOUR. THE  OLD 

PROVISIONAL  CONGRESS. ITS  MEASURES. — ITS  ECHOES  TO  FEDERAL  LEGISLATION. THE 

SEQUESTRATION  LAW. — SILLY  AND  DEMAGOGICAL  MILITARY  LEGISLATION. THE  "  SIXTY 

DAYS'  FURLOUGH  "  LAW. ALARM  OF  GEN.  JOHNSTON. INDISPOSITION  OF  CONFEDERATE 

VOLUNTEERS  TO  RE-ENLIST. — THE  CONSCRIPTION  LAW  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES. ITS 

TIMELY  PASSAGE. — ITS  PROVISIONS  AND  EFFECT. — OTHER  MILITARY  ACTS  OF  THE  CONFED 
ERATE  CONGRESS. — RE-ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY. — DESTRUCTION  OF  SOUTHERN  COT 
TON  AND  TOBACCO. — AUTHORIZATION  OF  PARTISAN  SERVICE. — ALTERNATIONS  OF  CONFED 
ERATE  VICTORY  AND  DEFEAT. THE  TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. BATTLE  OF  ELK  HORN. VAN 

DORN'S  COMMAND. AN  OBSTINATE  FIGHT. DEATH  OF  M'CULLOCH. THE  CONFEDERATE 

SUCCESS  INDECISIVE  AND  IMPERFECT. — REASONS  FOR  VAN  DORN's  RETREAT.  — CONFED 
ERATE  DESIGNS  UPON  MISSOURI  ABANDONED  FOR  THE  PRESENT. TRANSFER  OF  VAN 

DORN'S  AND  PRICE'S  FORCES.— NAVAL  FIGHT  IN  HAMPTON  ROADS. — THE  VIRGINIA  AND 

THE  MONITOR. LACK  OF  NAVAL  ENTERPRISE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY. THE  PRIVATEER 

SERVICE. CONSTRUCTION  OF  THE  VIRGINIA. CONFEDERATE  SQUADRON  IN  THE  JAMES 

RIVER. — FEDERAL  FLEET  OFF  FORTRESS  MONROE. FEARFUL  ENTERPRISE  OF  THE  VIR 
GINIA. SINKING  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.— GALLANTRY  OF  HER  CREW. A  THRILLING 

SCENE  OF  HEROIC  DEVOTION. SURRENDER  OF  THE  CONGRESS. FRIGHTFUL  SCENES  OF 

CARNAGE. — PERFIDIOUS  CONDUCT  OF  THE  ENEMY. — THE  VIRGINIA  ENGAGES  THE  MINNE 
SOTA. WONDERFUL  RESULTS  OF  THE  FIRST  DAY'S  FIGHT. SECOND  DAY'S  FIGHT. APPA 
RITION  OF  THE  MONITOR. — A  SINGULAR  SCENE  OF  NAVAL  COMBAT. — A  DRAWN  BATTLE. — 


CONFEDERATE  DISASTERS.  215 

EXCITEMENT  ABOUT  IRON  VESSELS. — DISCUSSION  IN  THE  NEWSPAPERS. — ADDITION  OF  IRON- 
CLADS  TO  THE  FEDERAL  NAVY. — WHAT  M'CLELLAN  THOUGHT  OF  THE  VIRGINIA. — CAPTURE 
OF  NEWBERN,  &C. — OBJECTS  OF  BURNSIDE's  EXPEDITION. — BRANCH'S  COMMAND  AT  NEW- 
BERN. — THE  CONFEDERATE  WORKS  ON  THE  NEUSE  RIVER. — RETREAT  OF  BRANCH. — FED 
ERAL  OCCUPATION  OF  NEWBERN. — CAPTURE  OF  FORT  MACON. — THE  ENTIRE  COAST  OF 
NORTH  CAROLINA  IN  THE  POSSESSION  OF  THE  ENEMY. — THE  SEA-COAST  AN  UNIMPORTANT 
PART  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  DEFENCES. 

THE  series  of  disasters  that  befel  the  Confederates  in  the  early  months 
of  1862,  may  be  distinctly  and  sufficiently  traced  to  human  causes.  In 
stead  of  being  ascribed  to  the  mysterious  dispensations  of  Providence,  they 
are  more  properly  named  as  the  results  of  human  mismanagement.  The 
first  important  defeat  of  the  Federal  arms  on  the  plains  of  Manassas  was  the 
initial  point  with  the  North  of  an  enlarged  scheme  of  war,  and  it  was  now 
simply  giving  proof  of  its  "  Anaconda  Plan,"  and  realizing  the  natural 
result  of  those  immense  preparations  it  had  made  by  sea  and  land,  to  con 
found  its  adversary. 

The  rebukes  which  were  now  being  administered  to  the  vaingloriousness 
of  the  South  were  neither  few  nor  light.  The  Confederates  had  been 
worsted  in  almost  every  engagement  that  had  occurred  since  the  fall  of 
1861.  There  had  come  disaster  after  disaster,  culminating  in  the  fall  of 
Donelson,  the  occupation  of  Nashville,  the  breaking  of  our  centre,  the  fall 
ing  back  on  all  sides,  the  realization  of  invasion,  the  imminence  of  perils 
which  no  one  dared  to  name. 

No  one  who  lived  in  Kichmond  during  the  war  can  ever  forget  these 
gloomy,  miserable  days.  In  the  midst  of  them  was  to  occur  the  ceremony 
of  the  inauguration  of  the  Permanent  Government  of  the  Confederate 
States.  It  was  only  a  difference  of  name  between  two  governments,  one 
called  Provisional  and  the  other  Permanent;  for  Mr.  Davis  had  been 
unanimously  elected  President,  and  there  was  no  change  either  of  the 
organic  law  or  of  the  personnel  of  the  Administration.  But  the  ceremony 
of  the  second  inauguration  of  President  Davis  was  one  of  deep  interest  to 
the  public  ;  for  it  was  supposed  that  he  might  use  the  occasion  to  develop 
a  new  policy  and  to  reanimate  the  people.  The  22d  of  February,  the  day 
appointed  for  the  inauguration,  was  memorable  for  its  gloom  in  Kichmond. 
Eain  fell  in  torrents,  and  the  heavens  seemed  to  be  hung  with  sable.  Yet 
a  dense  crowd  collected,  braving  the  rain-storm  in  their  eager  interest  to 
hear  the  President's  speech  from  the  steps  of  the  Capitol.  "  It  was  then," 
said  a  Eichmond  paper,  "  that  all  eyes  were  turned  to  our  Chief;  that  we 
hung  upon  his  lips,  hushing  the  beating  of  our  heavy  hearts  that  we  might 
catch  the  word  of  fire  we  longed  to  hear — that  syllable  of  sympathy  of 
which  a  nation  in  distress  stands  so  in  need.  One  sentence  then  of  defiance 
and  of  cheer — something  bold,  and  warm,  and  human — had  sent  a  thrill 
of  lightning  through  the  land,  and  set  it  ablaze  with  the  fresh  and  quench- 


216  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

less  flame  of  renewed  and  never-ending  fight.  That  sentence  never  came. 
The  people  were  left  to  themselves." 

The  Confederate  President  offered  but  little  of  counsel  or  encourage 
ment  to  his  distressed  countrymen.  He  declared  that  the  magnified  pro 
portions  of  the  war  had  occasioned  serious  disasters,  and  that  the  effort 
was  impossible  to  protect  the  whole  of  the  territory  of  the  Confederate 
States,  sea-board  and  inland.  To  the  popular  complaint  of  inefficiency  in 
the  departments  of  the  Government,  he  replied  that  they  had  done  all 
which  human  power  and  foresight  enabled  them  to  accomplish.  He  lifted 
up,  in  conclusion,  a  piteous,  beautiful,  appropriate  prayer  for  the  favour  of 
Divine  providence. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  people  of  the  Confederacy,  al 
though  so  little  cheered  or  sustained  by  their  rulers,  despaired  of  the  war. 
There  were  causes,  which  were  rekindling  the  fiercest  flames  of  war  apart 
from  official  inspiration  at  Richmond.  The  successes  of  the  enemy  had 
but  made  him  more  hateful,  and  strengthened  th£  South  in  the  determina 
tion  to  have  done  with  him  forever.  They  found  new  causes  of  animosity ; 
the  war  had  been  brought  home  to  their  bosoms  ;  they  had  obtained  prac 
tical  lessons  of  the  enemy's  atrocity  and  his  insolent  design ;  and  they 
came  to  the  aid  of  their  Government  with  new  power  and  a  generosity  that 
was  quite  willing  to  forget  all  its  short-comings  in  the  past. 

One  great  cause  of  animated  resolution  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate 
States  was  the  development  at  Washington  of  the  design  upon  slavery, 
now  advanced  to  a  point  where  there  could  no  longer  be  a  doubt  of  the 
revengeful  and  radical  nature  of  the  war.  The  steps  by  which  the  Federal 
Government  had  reached  this  point  were  in  a  crooked  path,  and  attended 
by  marks  of  perfidy.  It  had  indeed  given  to  the  world  on  this  subject  an 
astounding  record  of  bad  faith,  calculated  to  overwhelm  the  moral  sense 
of  the  reader  as  he  compares  its  different  parts  and  approaches  its  grand 
conclusion  of  self-contradiction  the  most  defiant,  and  deception  the  most 
shameless. 

Never  had  there  been  such  an  emphatic  protest  of  a  political  design  as 
that  given  by  Mr.  Lincoln  on  taking  the  reins  of  government,  declaring 
that  there  was  no  possible  intention,  no  imaginable  occasion,  no  actual  de 
sire  to  interfere  with  the  subject  of  negro  slavery  in  the  States.  Mr. 
Seward,  who  had  been  constituted  Secretary  of  State,  and  who  had  been 
Mr.  Lincoln's  mouth-piece  in  Congress  before  the  inauguration,  had  de 
clared  there  :  "  Experience  in  public  affairs  has  confirmed  my  opinion  that 
domestic  slavery  existing  in  any  State  is  wisely  left  by  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  exclusively  to  the  care,  management,  and  disposition  of 
that  State  ;  and  if  it  were  in  my  power  I  would  not  alter  the  Constitution 
in  that  respect"  "Words  could  scarcely  be  more  distinct  and  emphatic  ; 
but  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  his  inauguration  address,  had  seen  fit  to  add  to  them, 


FALSITY   OF   THE  ABOLITIONISTS,  217 

and,  quoting  from  a  former  speech,  announced  to  the  country  :  "  I  have 
no  purpose,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  interfere  with  the  institution  of 
slavery  in  the  States  where  it  exists.  I  believe  I  have  no  lawful  right  to 
do  so,  and  /  ha/ve  no  inclination  to  do  so" 

This  assurance  was  again  repeated  after  the  commencement  of  hostili 
ties,  as  if  there  was  the  most  anxious  purpose  to  obtain  the  ear  of  the 
Southern  people  on  the  subject,  and  to  impress  the  world  with  the  just  and 
moderate  designs  of  the  war.  In  his  letter  of  April,  1861,  to  the  Federal 
minister  at  Paris,  intended  as  a  diplomatic  circular  for  the  courts  of  Eu 
rope,  and  an  authoritative  exposition  of  the  objects  and  spirit  of  the  war 
on  the  Northern  side,  Mr.  Seward,  by  direction  of  the  President,  wrote : 
"The  condition  of  slavery  in  the  several  States  will  remain  just  the  same, 
whether  it  succeeds  or  fails.  The  rights  of  the  States,  and  the  condition  of 
every  human  being  in  them,  will  remain  subject  to  exactly  the  same  laws 
and  form  of  administration,  whether  the  revolution  shall  succeed  or  whether 
it  shall  fail.  Their  constitutions  and  laws  and  customs,  habits  and  institu 
tions  in  either  case  will  remain  the  same.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  to 
this  incontestable  statement  the  further  fact  that  the  new  President,  as  well 
as  the  citizens  through  whose  suffrages  he  has  come  into  the  administra 
tion,  has  always  repudiated  all  designs  whatever,  and  wherever  imputed 
to  him  and  them,  of  disturbing  the  system  of  slavery  as  it  is  existing  under 
tJie  Constitution  and  laws.  The  case,  however,  would  not  be  fully  pre 
sented  were  I  to  omit  to  say  that  any  such  effort  on  his  part  would  be 
unconstitutional,  and  all  his  acts  in  that  direction  would  be  prevented  by 
the  judicial  authority,  even  though  they  were  assented  to  by  Congress  and 
the  people." 

The  first  acts  of  the  Federal  authority  in  the  active  prosecution  of  the 
war,  touching  the  institution  of  slavery,  were  busily  conformed  to  these 
assurances.  They  even  afforded  an  extravagant  testimony  of  their  sin 
cerity.  Fugitive  slaves  were  not  only  arrested  within  the  Federal  military 
lines  and  returned  to  slavery,  but  were  taken  in  the  streets  of  Washington 
and  returned,  by  judicial  process,  to  their  masters.  On  the  26th  of  May, 
1861,  Gen.  McClellan  issued  an  address  to  the  people  of  Western  Yirginia, 
assuring  them  that  not  only  would  the  Federal  troops  abstain  from  all  in 
terference  with  their  slaves,  but  that  they  would  crush  any  attempt  at 
servile  insurrection.  Gen.  McDowell  issued  an  order  forbidding  fugitive 
slaves  from  coming  into,  or  being  harboured  within  his  lines.  "When  on 
the  31st  of  August,  1861,  Gen.  Fremont,  in  Missouri,  issued  an  order  de 
claring  the  negro  slaves  within  his  military  department  to  be  free  men,  it 
was  instantly  repudiated  and  nullified  at  Washington.  At  a  later  period. 
Gen.  Hunter,  commanding  the  Department  of  the  South,  issued  an  order 
putting  the  States  of  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  and  Florida  under  martial 
law,  and  declaring  that,  as  slavery  and  martial  law  were  incompatible,  the 


218  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

slaves  in  those  States  were  forever  free.  Mr.  Lincoln  set  aside  this  decla 
ration,  and  made  it  an  occasion  of  rebuke  to  the  pragmatical  commander, 
who  had  thus  attempted  to  extend  to  political  objects  the  police  regulations 
of  armies  and  camps. 

It  is  remarkable  how  this  affectation  of  non-interference  with  slavery 
was  laid  aside  by  successive  measures  of  the  Federal  Government,  until  at 
last  it  discovered  its  real  purpose  of  the  entire  excision  of  slavery,  and 
Mr.  Lincoln  fell  into  the  arms  of  the  extreme  Abolition  party,  and  adopted 
the  doctrine  that  the  opportunity  was  to  be  taken  in  the  prosecution  of 
hostilities  to  crush  out  slavery  as  the  main  cause  of  difference,  and  thus 
assure  the  fruit  of  a  permanent  peace.  The  first  official  display  of  anti- 
slavery  sentiment  in  the  war  was  in  the  extra  session  of  Congress  in  July, 
1861.  Mr.  Lovejoy,  of  Illinois,  proposed  a  resolution,  which  was  adopted, 
declaring  that  it  was  no  part  of  the  duty  of  Federal  soldiers  to  capture  and 
return  fugitive  slaves.  This  measure  was  apparently  reasonable  ;  'but  it 
was  significant  of  a  badly-disguised  sentiment,  the  consequences  of  which 
were  soon  to  be  developed.  ]SText  to  Lovejoy's  resolution  was  that  part  of 
the  Confiscation  Act,  which  specially  provided  that  any  owner  of  a  slave, 
or  any  person  having  a  legal  claim  to  his  services,  who  should  require  or 
permit  such  slave  to  take  up  arms  against,  or  be  in  any  way  employed  in 
military  or  naval  service  against  the  United  States,  should  thereby  forfeit 
all  claim  to  him,  any  law  of  a  State  or  of  the  United  States  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding. 

The  advance  of  the  anti-slavery  sentiment  was  now  to  be  rapid  and 
decisive.  In  the  Thirty-seventh  Federal  Congress,  which  met  at  Washing 
ton  in  December,  1861,  it  accomplished  three  measures,  which  put  the  Gov 
ernment  of  Mr.  Lincoln  on  the  verge  of  committal  to  the  entire  doctrine  of 
Abolitionists,  and  plainly  informed  the  Southern  people  of  the  real  animus 
of  the  war. 

Naval  and  military  officers  were  prohibited,  by  an  additional  article 
of  war,  under  penalty  of  dismissal  from  the  service,  from  employing  the 
forces  under  their  command  for  the  purpose  of  returning  fugitive  slaves. 

In  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  the  President,  a  joint  reso 
lution  was  passed,  declaring  that  the  United  States  ought  to  co-operate 
with  any  State  which  may  adopt  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery,  by 
giving  pecuniary  aid  to  such  State. 

The  third  step  was  the  forcible  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of 
Columbia.  By  this  act  all  persons  held  to  service  or  labour  within  the 
District,  by  reason  of  African  descent,  were  freed  from  all  claim  for  such 
service  or  labour ;  and  no  involuntary  servitude,  except  for  crime,  and 
after  due  conviction,  should  hereafter  exist  in  the  District. 

It  is  not  within  the  design  of  this  chapter  or  within  the  period  of  time 
which  it  traverses,  to  follow  further  the  record  of  the  "Washington  Govern- 


NORTHERN   BAD   FAITH.  219 

meiit  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  The  crowning  act  of  deception  was  re 
served  for  another  time.  But  the  record  had  already  progressed  far  enough 
to  assure  the  people  of  the  South  that  the  only  safety  for  their  domestic  in 
stitutions  was  in  a  separate  and  independent  political  existence ;  that 
Northern  faith  was  only  a  thing  of  convenience  ;  that  in  the  war  the  Con 
federates  contended  for  no  mere  abstractions,  but  had  at  stake  all  their 
substantial  rights  and  nearly  every  element  of  individual  happiness. 

There  was  a  good  deal  of  curious  commentary  in  Southern  newspapers 
how,  step  by  step,  the  war  of  the  North  had  changed  its  objects.  But  in 
a  broad  historical  sense  the  explanation  is  obvious.  History  has  shown 
that  in  all  great  civil  commotions  it  is  the  most  violent  party,  the  party 
whose  aim  is  most  clearly  defined,  that  gradually  obtains  the  upper  hand. 
It  was  thus  that  the  Abolition  party  in  the  North  gradually  ascended, 
through  four  years  of  commotion  and  contest,  and  finally  obtained  the 
entire  control  of  the  war,  and  dictated  its  consequences. 

"We  have  referred  to  that  public  sentiment  in  the  Southern  Confed 
eracy  which  about  the  time  of  the  foundation  of  its  Permanent  Govern 
ment  came  forward  with  fresh  support  of  the  war,  and  a  new  resolution  for 
its  prosecution.  Happily,  although  this  sentiment  found  but  little  encour 
agement  on  the  part  of  President  Davis,  and  was  neither  directed  nor 
employed  by  him,  it  secured  a  medium  of  forcible  expression  and  a  channel 
of  effective  action  through  the  new  Confederate  Congress  summoned  at 
Richmond.  The  measures  of  this  Congress  constitute  the  most  critical 
and  interesting  pages  of  the  Confederate  annals.  It  is  perhaps  not  saying 
too  much  to  declare  that  the  vigour  of  this  body  saved  the  Confederacy, 
rallied  the  strength  of  the  country,  and  put  on  a  hopeful  footing  a  war 
which  was  languishing  and  almost  in  the  last  stages  of  neglect. 

The  Congress  which  preceded  it — what  is  known  as  the  Provisional 
Congress — was  perhaps  the  weakest  body  that  had  ever  been  summoned 
in  a  historical  crisis.  It  was  the  creature  of  State  conventions ;  it  was 
elected  at  a  time  when  most  of  the  ambition  and  virtue  of  the  country 
were  seeking  the  honours  of  the  tented  field  ;  it  was  composed  of  third- 
rate  professional  politicians,  who  had  no  resources  beyond  the  emoluments 
of  office,  who  were  in  a  constant  intrigue  for  patronage,  and  who  had  no 
higher  legislative  training  than  that  of  a  back-door  communication  with 
the  Executive.  The  measures  of  this  Congress  must  ever  remain  a  stock 
for  ridicule,  or  the  theme  of  severer  criticism.  All  its  legislative  ingenuity 
appears  to  have  been  to  make  feeble  echoes  to  the  Federal  Congress  at 
Washington.  The  latter  authorized  an  army  of  half  a  million  of  men. 
The  Provisional  Congress  at  Richmond  replied  by  increasing  its  army  on 
paper  to  four  hundred  thousand  men,  but  doing  nothing  whatever  to  collect 
such  a  force,  and  still  relying  on  the  wretched  shift  of  twelve  months'  vol 
unteers  and  raw  militia.  The  Congress  at  Washington  passed  a  sweeping 


220  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

confiscation  law.  That  at  Richmond  replied  by  a  "  sequestration  "  act, 
which,  by  corrupt  amendments  allowing  the  Confederate  "  heirs  "  of  alien 
enemies  to  rescue  and  protect  the  property,  was  converted  into  a  broad 
farce.  It  was  announced  with  flourishes  ;  it  was  said  that  it  would  sweep 
into  the  Confederate  treasury  three  hundred  millions  of  dollars.  Two 
years  after  the  passage  of  this  law  its  actual  results  were  summed  up  by  the 
Treasurer  of  the  Confederate  States  as  less  than  two  millions  of  dollars  ! 

A  short  while  before  the  expiration  of  its  official  life  the  Provisional 
Congress  passed  a  law,  the  effect  of  which  was  almost  to  disband  our 
armies  in  the  field,  and  put  the  Confederacy  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 
Never  was  there  such  a  silly  and  visionary  measure  of  demagogueism  ap 
plied  to  the  stern  exigencies  and  severe  demands  of  a  state  of  war.  The 
purpose  was  to  persuade  the  twelve  months'  volunteers  to  re  enlist ;  and 
to  do  this  Congress  passed  a  law  granting  to  those  who  pledged  themselves 
to  re-enlist  for  the  term  of  the  war  a  sixty  days'  furlough.  This  extraordi 
nary  measure  was  inspired  by  the  military  genius  of  President  Davis,  and 
was  directly  recommended  by  him.  It  depleted  our  armies  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy  ;  it  filled  our  military  commanders  with  consternation  ;  it  car 
ried  alarm,  confusion,  and  demoralization  everywhere.  Our  army  near 
the  line  of  the  Potomac,  under  the  effect  of  this  ill-timed  and  ill-judged 
law,  was  melting  like  snow.  The  streets  of  Richmond  were  almost  daily 
filled  with  long  processions  of  furloughed  soldiers  moving  from  the  railroad 
depots  on  their  way  home.  Gen.  Beauregard  had  taken  the  alarm  before 
he  left  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  had  exhorted  the  men  to  stand  by 
their  colours.  Gen.  Johnston  had  published  a  general  order  on  the  sub 
ject,  and  said  as  much  as  he  could  say  on  this  subject  of  the  exodus  with 
out  discovering  to  the  enemy  the  fearful  decrease  of  his  numbers,  and  in 
viting  an  attack  upon  the  thin  military  line  that  now  formed  the  only  de 
fence  of  Richmond. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  the  Congress  of  1862  took  up 
the  thread  of  Confederate  legislation.  It  at  once  broke  it,  and  commenced 
a  series  of  measures  of  startling  vigour.  Its  most  important  act  was  the 
Conscription  law  of  the  16th  of  April,  1862,  from  which  properly  dates  the 
military  system  of  the  Confederacy.  Previous  to  this  the  Confederacy  had 
had  nothing  that  deserved  the  title  of  a  military  system,  and  had  relied  on 
mere  popular  enthusiasm  to  conduct  the  war.  When  the  suggestion  was 
first  made  in  the  newspapers  of  Richmond  of  the  harsh  and  unpopular 
measure  of  conscription,  other  journals,  notoriously  in  the  interest  of  the 
Administration,  denounced  it  on  the  singular  demagogical  plea  that  it 
conveyed  a  reflection  upon  the  patriotism  of  the  country.  Even  in  his 
inaugural  address  in  February,  President  Davis  had  avoided  the  unpopu 
larity  of  a  conscription  law,  and  had  passed  over  the  difficult  question 
with  the  general  phrase  that  troops  must  be  enlisted  for  long  terms,  instead 


THE    CONSCRIPTION    LAW.  221 

of  short  ones,  for  which  they  had  hitherto  taken  the  field.  But  it  was  no 
time  to  hesitate  for  popularity,  and  to  entertain  the  prejudices  of  the  igno 
rant,  when  the  entire  fortunes  of  the  country  were  at  stake.  The  Conscrip 
tion  law  was  barely  in  time  to  save  the  Confederacy.  At  another  period, 
the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War  stated  that  thirty  days  after  the  passage 
of  this  law,  the  terms  of  one  hundred  and  forty-eight  regiments  would 
have  expired,  and  left  us  at  the  mercy  of  an  enemy  which  had  every 
guaranty  of  success  that  numbers,  discipline,  complete  organization,  and 
perfect  equipment  could  effect. 

The  law  of  the  16th  of  April  withdrew  every  non-exempt  citizen,  be 
tween  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  thirty-five  years,  from  State  control,  and 
placed  him  absolutely  at  the  disposal  of  the  President  during  the  war.  It 
annulled  all  contracts  made  with  volunteers  for  short  terms,  holding  them 
in  service  for  two  years  additional,  should  the  war  continue  so  long.  All 
twelve  months'  recruits  below  eighteen  and  over  thirty-five  years,  who 
would  otherwise  have  been  exempted  by  this  law,  were  to  be  retained  in 
service  for  ninety  days  after  their  term  expired.  In  every  State  one  or 
more  camps  of  instruction,  for  the  reception  and  training  of  conscripts,  was 
established  ;  and  to  each  State  an  officer,  styled  a  commandant  of  con 
scripts,  was  appointed,  charged  with  the  supervision  of  the  enrollment  and 
instruction  of  the  new  levies.  The  conscription  law,  besides  its  great  value 
for  recruiting  service,  gave  solidity  to  the  military  system  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  and  centralized  the  organization  of  the  army.  Its  efficiency  in  these 
respects  was  assisted  by  the  appointment  of  lieutenant-generals,  some  com 
manding  separate  departments,  and  others  heading  army  corps  under  a 
general  in  the  field.  The  policy  of  organizing  the  brigades  with  troops 
and  generals  from  the  several  States  was  pursued,  as  opportunities  offered, 
without  detriment  to  the  public  service. 

Accompanying  this  great  military  reform  in  the  Confederacy,  there 
were  other  measures  which  gave  evidence  of  awakened  attention  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  war.  Laws  were  passed  to  ensure  the  destruction  of  all 
cotton  and  tobacco  likely  to  come  into  possession  of  the  enemy.  The  au 
thorities  were  authorized  to  destroy  these  great  staples  of  Southern  produc 
tion  to  keep  it  from  the  enemy  ;  and  owners  destroying  them  for  the  same 
purpose  were  to  be  indemnified  upon  proof  of  the  value  and  the  circum 
stances  of  destruction.  A  bill  was  passed  for  partisan  service,  intended  as 
a  premium  for  adventure  in  the  war,  authorizing  the  formation  of  bands  of 
rangers,  who  were  to  have  a  designated  share  of  all  captures  from  the 
enemy.* 

These  and  like  measures  indicated  a  new  scale  of  operation  in  the  war, 


*  It  was  an  affectation  of  the  enemy,  in  subsequent  periods  of  the  war,  to  entitle  this  portion  of 
the  Confederate  forces  "  guerillas,"  and  to  apply  this  term  generally  to  whatever  bodies  of  Confeder- 


222  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

and  a  new  spirit  in  the  conduct  of  hostilities.  They  were  to  show  results 
in  a  few  months.  The  campaign  of  1862  covered  the  whole  of  a  huge  ter 
ritory,  and  could  only  be  decided  by  movements  involving  great  expendi 
ture  of  troops  and  time ;  while  the  bitter  exhibitions  of  the  North  had 
envenomed  the  war,  aroused  the  spirit  of  retaliation,  and  swelled  the  san 
guinary  tide  of  conflict. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Permanent  Government  of  the  Confederate 
States  was  inaugurated  at  a  dark  period  of  its  fortunes.  The  military  his 
tory  closely  following  this  event  is  not  a  little  curious.  It  may  be  charac 
terized  as  an  alternation  of  light  and  shade ;  across  the  tract  of  disaster 
there  being  sudden  and  fitful  gleams  of  light,  such  as  the  undaunted  cour 
age  of  our  troops  and  the  variable  accidents  of  war  might  give  in  such 
circumstances  of  misgovernment  as  were  adverse  or  embarrassing  to  a 
grand  scale  of  successes.  Of  these,  and  of  the  reverses  mingled  with  them, 
we  shall  proceed  to  treat  in  the  resumption  of  the  military  part  of  our 
narrative  ;  reaching,  at  last,  through  this  alternation  of  victory  and  defeat, 
the  point  of  that  grand  effulgence  of  our  arms,  that  made  the  year  1862 
the  most  memorable  in  Confederate  annals. 


THE   TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. BATTLE   OF   ELK   HOKN. 

"We  left  Gen.  Price  at  the  close  of  the  Missouri  campaign  proper,  halt 
ing  his  weary  column  at  Springfield.  While  recruiting  and  drilling  his 
men,  Price  watched  for  the  first  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  early  in 
January,  1862,  the  Federals  began  to  advance.  Price  had  taken  up  a  strong 
position  and  fortified  it,  expecting  that  McCulloch  would  move  forward 
to  his  assistance  ;  but  that  commander  did  not  stir,  or  make  the  slightest 
diversion  in  his  favour  ;  so  that,  finding  the  enemy  closing  in  upon  him 
rapidly,  he  withdrew  from  Springfield,  and  was  obliged  to*  cut  his  way 
through  towards  Boston  Mountain,  where  McCulloch  was  reported  to  be. 
This  he  successfully  accomplished,  with  some  desultory  fighting.  Mean 
while  Maj.-Gen.  Earl  Yan  Dorn  had  been  appointed  by  President  Davis 
to  take  command  in  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  and  had  arrived 

ate  cavalry  were  particularly  troublesome.     The  following  resolution,  in  relation  to  partisan  service, 
was  adopted  by  the  Virginia  Legislature,  May  17,  1862  : 

"  Whereas,  this  General  Assembly  places  a  high  estimate  upon  the  value  of  the  ranger  or  partisan 
service  in  prosecuting  the  present  war  to  a  successful  issue,  and  regards  it  as  perfectly  legitimate ; 
and  it  being  understood  that  a  Federal  commander  on  the  northern  border  of  Virginia  has  intimated 
his  purpose,  if  such  service  is  not  discontinued,  to  lay  waste  by  fire  the  portion  of  our  territory  at 
present  under  his  power, 

"  Resolved,  by  the  General  Assembly,  That  in  its  opinion,  the  policy  of  employing  such  rangers 
and  partisans  ought  to  be  carried  out  energetically,  both  by  the  authorities  of  this  State  and  of  the 
Confederate  States,  without  the  slightest  regard  to  such  threats." 


THE   BATTLE   OF   ELK   HOBN. 

at  Pocahontas,  Arkansas.  He  resolved  to  go  in  person  to  take  command 
of  the  combined  forces  of  Price  and  McCulloch,  and  reached  their  head 
quarters  on  the  3d  of  March. 

Yan  Dorn  soon  ascertained  that  the  enemy  were  strongly  posted  on 
rising  ground  at  a  place  called  Sugar  Creek,  about  sixty  miles  distant,  hav 
ing  a  force  of  some  twenty-five  thousand  men,  under  Curtis  and  Sturgis. 
It  was  also  reported  that  they  did  not  intend  to  advance  until  the  arrival 
of  heavy  reinforcements,  which  were  rapidly  moving  up.  Although  not 
twenty  thousand  strong,  Yan  Dorn  resolved  to  attack  them,  and  sending 
word  to  Albert  Pike  to  hurry  forward  with  his  brigade  of  Indians,  moved 
out  of  camp  on  the  4th  of  March,  with  Price  and  McCulloch's  forces,  his 
intention  being  to  surround  the  enemy's  advance,  some  eight  thousand 
strong,  under  Sigel,  at  Bentonville. 

Sigel,  however,  made  a  skilful  retreat,  and  effected  a  junction  with 
Sturgis  and  Curtis.  On  the  7th  of  March,  both  armies  were  in  full  view 
of  each  other.  Early  in  the  morning,  Yan  Dorn  had  made  every  disposi 
tion  for  attack,  and  the  advance  began.  The  enemy  were  strongly  posted 
on  high  ground,  as  usual,  their  front  being  covered  with  a  heavy  body  of 
skirmishers  and  artillery,  but  they  gave  way  as  the  Confederates  advanced 
in  like  order  upon  them,  and  fell  back  upon  the  main  body.  Price's  forces 
constituted  our  left  and  centre,  while  McCulloch  was  on  the  right. 

To  prevent  the  junction  of  reinforcements,  known  to  be  on  the  way, 
Yan  Dorn's  attack  was  made  from  the  north  and  west,  his  columns  almost 
surrounding  the  foe.  The  fight  was  long  and  obstinate.  About  two 
o'clock,  Gen.  Yan  Dorn  sent  a  dispatch  to  Gen.  McCulloch,  who  was 
attacking  the  enemy's  left,  proposing  to  him  to  hold  his  position,  while 
Price's  left  advance  might  be  thrown  forward  over  the  whole  line,  and 
easily  end  the  battle.  Before  the  dispatch  was  penned,  Gen.  McCulloch 
had  fallen ;  and  the  victorious  advance  of  his  division  upon  the  strong  posi 
tion  of  the  enemy's  front  was  checked  by  the  fall  of  himself  and  Gen. 
Mclntosh,  the  second  in  command,  in  the  heat  of  the  battle,  and  in  the  full 
tide  of  success. 

Curtis  and  Sturgis,  perceiving  the  confusion  on  the  Confederate  right, 
rallied  their  commands,  and  presented  a  formidable  front ;  the  skilful 
Sigel  covering  the  retreat  in  a  slow  and  masterly  manner.  At  one  time 
during  the  day  the  enemy  was  thought  to  have  been  thoroughly  beaten  ; 
but  he  now  retired  in  excellent  order  to  other  positions  some  miles  to  the 
rear.  The  Confederates  encamped  for  the  night  nearly  a  mile  beyond  the 
point  where  the  enemy  had  made  his  last  stand,  Gen.  Yan  Dorn  establish 
ing  his  headquarters  at  the  Elk  Horn  tavern. 

The  success  of  the  day  had  not  been  a  decided  one.  The  want  of  disci 
pline  in  the  various  commands  was  painfully  apparent  to  Yan  Dorn.  The 
camps  of  the  enemy  had  been  taken  with  many  prisoners,  stores,  cannon, 


224  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

etc. ;  and  the  men  were  so  excited  with  their  success  that  it  was  impos 
sible  to  form  them  into  line  for  exigencies.  Yan  Dorn,  indeed,  surmised 
that  reinforcements  had  reached  the  enemy  in  great  number,  and  felt  him 
self  too  weak  to  accept  another  engagement  on  the  morrow,  should  the  ene 
my  force  one  upon  him.  He  therefore  ordered  the  sick  far  to  the  rear, 
and,  destroying  so  much  of  the  booty  as  could  not  be  transported,  began 
to  prepare  for  a  retreat.  At  an  early  hour  in  the  morning,  he  had  made 
every  disposition  for  falling  back  to  a  strong  position  some  seven  miles  to 
the  rear,  at  which  point  his  supplies  of  ammunition  had  halted.  Covering 
this  movement  with  a  well-displayed  disposition  of  force,  the  enemy  were 
received  with  valor,  and  their  advance  checked.  Sharp  fighting  ensued, 
but  the  enemy  made  but  feeble  efforts  to  move  forward,  satisfied  to  occu 
py  the  field  after  the  second  day's  fight,  while  the  Confederates  retreated 
many  miles  from  it. 

Gen.  Yan  Dorn  officially  stated  the  Confederate  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  to  be  about  six  hundred,  while  that  of  the  enemy  was  conjec 
tured  to  be  more  than  seven  hundred  killed,  and  at  least  an  equal  num 
ber  wounded.  Gen.  Curtis,  in  his  official  report,  gives  no  statement  of  his 
loss,  and  simply  remarks  that  it  was  heavy.  But  the  battle  of  Elk  Horn 
had  an  importance  beyond  the  measure  of  its  casualties.  It  may  be  said  to 
have  decided  for  the  present  the  question  of  Confederate  rule  in  Missouri. 
Thereafter,  for  a  considerable  time,  the  Trans-Mississippi  was  to  be  a  blank 
in  the  history  of  the  war  ;  and  the  forces  of  Yan  Dorn  and  Price  were  to 
be  summoned  from  what  was  supposed  to  be  their  special  and  immediate 
enterprise  to  a  distant  arena  of  conflict. 

While  this  battle  was  being  fought  on  the  distant  and  obscure  theatre 
of  the  Trans-Mississippi,  a  scene  was  occurring  not  many  miles  from  the 
Confederate  capital,  the  most  remarkable  in  the  war.  On  the  8th  of  March, 
1862,  the  Confederates  obtained  their  first  important  victory  on  the  water 
— an  element  where  they  had  been  supposed  least  able  to  compete  with 
the  enemy. 


NAVAL   FIGHT   IN   HAMPTON   ROADS. THE   VIRGINIA   AND   THE   MONITOR. 

We  have  heretofore  referred  to  the  limited  naval  resources  of  the  Con 
federates,  and  the  feeble  administration  which  employed  and  directed 
them.  Naval  enterprise  in  the  Confederacy  had  been  mainly  occupied 
with  the  privateer  service,  from  which  the  most  extravagant  results  had 
been  expected  ;  although  so  far  it  may  be  said  that  the  only  benefit  which 
we  derived  from  issuing  letters  of  marque  was  the  acknowledgment  by  the 
Federal  government  that  the  Confederates  were  actual  belligerents,  and 


THE   VIRGINIA    AND    THE    MONITOE.  225 

that  prisoners  made  from  them  on  the  sea  as  well  as  on  the  land  were  to 
be  considered  as  prisoners  of  war. 

In  the  early  summer  of  1861  the  Navy  Department  at  Richmond  had 
designed  an  iron-clad  war  vessel,  which  for  the  long  period  of  eight  months 
was  in  course  of  construction  at  the  Gosport  navy  yard.  A  plan  originat 
ed  with  Lieut.  Brooke  to  convert  the  hull  of  the  frigate  Merrimae,  which 
vessel  had  been  scuttled  and  sunk  by  the  Federals  on  their  abandonment 
of  Norfolk  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  into  a  shot-proof  steam  battery,  con 
structed  with  inclined  iron-plated  sides  and  submerged  ends.  The  plates 
to  protect  her  sides  were  prepared  at  the  Tredegar  Iron  Works  at  Rich 
mond  ;  and  their  inclination  and  thickness,  and  form,  were  determined  by 
actual  experiment.  The  eaves  of  the  casemates  as  well  as  the  ends  of 
vessels  were  submerged,  and  a  ram  was  added  as  a  weapon  of  offence. 

This  novel  naval  structure  carried  ten  guns,  eight  broadside,  one  at 
the  bow,  and  one  at  the  stern.  The  other  vessels  of  the  Confederate 
squadron  in  the  James  river,  under  command  of  Captain  Buchanan,  were 
the  Patrick  Henry,  six  guns ;  the  Jamestown,  two  guns ;  the  Raleigh, 
the  Beaufort  and  the  Teazer,  each  of  one  gun.  At  the  time  of  which  we 
write  a  considerable  naval  force  of  the  enemy  had  been  collected  in 
Hampton  Roads,  off  Fortress  Monroe.  The  fleet  consisted  of  the  Cumber 
land,  of  24  guns  ;  the  Congress,  50  guns  ;  the  St,  Lawrence,  50  guns  ;  the 
steam-frigates  Minnesota  and  Roanoke,  40  guns  ;  and  was  under  the  com 
mand  of  Captain  Marston,  of  the  Roanoke.  The  Cumberland  and  the 
Congress  lay  off  Newport  News,  about  thr^ee  hundred  yards  from  the 
shore  ;  the  Congress  about  two  hundred  yards  south  of  the  Cumberland  ; 
whilst  the  remainder  of  the  fleet  were  anchored  off  Fortress  Monroe,  about 
nine  miles  east  of  Newport  News.  With  the  force  of  twenty  guns,  Capt. 
Buchanan  proposed  to  engage  this  formidable  fleet,  besides  the  enemy's 
batteries  at  Newport  News,  and  several  small  steamers,  armed  with  heavy 
rifled  guns.  Everything  had  to  be  trusted  to  the  experiment  of  the 
Virginia.  It  was  an  enterprise  sufficient  to  try  the  nerves  of  any  com 
mander  to  make  the  first  trial  of  the  offensive  and  defensive  powers 
of  a  single  vessel  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  with  such  an  armament, 
when  the  slightest  flaw  would  have  proved  fatal. 

About  eleven  o'clcok  in  the  morning  of  the  8th  of  March  the  Virginia 
cast  loose  from  her  moorings  at  the  Gosport  navy  yard,  and  made  her  way 
down  Hampton  Roads.  On  her  approach  being  signalled,  orders  were 
immediately  issued  by  Capt.  Marston  of  the  Roanoke  for  his  own  vessel, 
the  Minnesota,  and  the  St.  Lawrence  to  get  under  weigh.  The  Cumberland 
and  Congress  had  previously  perceived  "  the  great  Secesh  curiosity,"  and 
had  beat  to  quarters,  and  prepared  for  action.  The  Virginia  came  slowly 
on,  not  making  more'  than  five  knots  per  hour,  and  accompanied  by  the 
Raleigh  and  Beaufort.  The  pivot  guns  of  the  Cumberland  opened  on  her 
15 


226  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

at  about  a  mile's  distance.  There  was  no  reply  ;  the  vessel  moved  tran 
quilly  on ;  hundreds  of  spectators  at  the  wharves  on  both  sides  of  the  river 
watching  her  progress,  and  the  crews  of  the  enemy's  frigates  awaiting  with 
derisive  curiosity  the  singular  iron  roof  bearing  down  upon  them.  As  she 
passed  the  Congress  at  three  hundred  yards  she  received  a  harmless  broad 
side.  "  The  balls  bounced  upon  her  mailed  sides  like  India  rubber."  Re 
turning  the  broadside,  and  in  the  midst  of  a  heavy  fire  from  the  shore 
batteries,  the  Virginia  made  straight  for  the  Cumberland,  which  had  been 
swung  across  the  channel,  to  bring  her  full  broadside  to  bear  upon  the  ap 
proaching  enemy.  It  was  a  crisis  wrapped  in  fire  and  smoke.  Broadside 
after  broadside  of  the  Cumberland  blazed  out  of  her  eleven  nine-inch 
Dahlgrens.  The  Virginia  kept  straight  on,  without  returning  a  shot  or 
showing  a  single  man.  Minutes  seemed  hours.  Then  there  was  a  dull, 
heavy  blow,  and  the  iron-armed  prow  of  the  Virginia  had  struck  the  Cum 
berland  near  the  bow,  and  below  the  water  line.  The  frigate  was  driven 
back  upon  her  anchors  with  great  force  ;  a  ragged  hole  had  been  opened 
into  her  in  which  a  man  might  have  passed ;  the  sound  of  the  rush  of 
water  into  her  told  that  she  was  doomed.  Still  her  crew  manned  her 
guns,  and  were  prepared  to  give  an  example  of  courage  among  the  most 
memorable  and  brilliant  of  naval  warfare.  The  Virginia  had  backed,  and 
was  now  sweeping  the  decks  of  the  Cumberland  with  broadside  after 
broadside  in  merciless  succession.  But  there  was  no  sign  of  surrender  on 
the  part  of  the  gallant  enemy.  As  the  ship  canted  over,  just  ready  to 
sink,  she  still  kept  up  her  useless  fire.  Her  last  gun  was  fired  just  above 
the  water,  and  as  the  brave  gunner  attempted  to  scramble  out  from  the 
open  port- hole,  the  water  rushing  swept  him  back,  and  he  went  down  in 
the  sinking  vessel.  The  Cumberland  went  down  in  fifty-four  foot  water, 
her  pennant  still  flying  from  the  mast-head  above  the  waves  that  had 
engulphed  her.  Some  of  the  crew  succeeded  in  swimming  to  land,  others 
were  saved  by  small  boats  from  the  shore ;.  but  more  than  one  hundred 
men  went  down  into  the  watery  grave  that  closed  over  the  gallant  ship. 

Having  sunk  her  first  antagonist,  the  Virginia  next  turned  her  atten 
tion  to  the  Congress,  which  was  left  to  fight  the  battle  alone,  as  neither 
the  Minnesota,  which  had  grounded  about  one  mile  and  a  half  from  New 
port  News,  the  Roanoke,  nor  the  St.  Lawrence  could  approach  near 
enough,  from  want  of  sufficient  depth  of  water,  to  render  material  assis 
tance.  Having  witnessed  the  fate  of  the  Cumberland,  the  commander  of 
the  Congress  had  hoisted  sail,  and  with  the  help  of  a  tug-boat  had  run 
the  frigate .  ashore  in  water  too  shoal  to  permit  the  Virginia  to  run  her 
down.  But  the  iron-clad,  taking  a  position  about  two  hundred  yards 
from  her,  raked  her  fore  and  aft  with  shell,  while  the  other  small  vessels 
of  the  Confederate  squadron  joined  in  the  fire.  Every  shell  burst  inside 
the  frigate.  The  effect  was  awful.  Blood  and  brains  spurted  in  the  air, 


THE  YIEGINIA   A2O)   THE  MONITOB.  227 

and  human  bodies  were  cut  in  twain,  or  mangled  in  the  most  horrible 
manner.  Arms,  legs  and  heads  were  scattered  in  every  direction,  while 
here  and  there  in  the  agonies  of  death  might  be  found  poor  wretches, 
with  their  breasts  torn  completely  out. 

The  Congress  was  fast  aground,  and  could  only  bring  two  of  her  guns  to 
bear  on  the  Virginia.  In  a  few  moments  her  colours  were  hauled  down, 
and  a  white  flag  hoisted  at  the  gaff  and  half-mast,  and  another  at  the 
main.  The  little  gunboat  Beaufort  was  run  alongside,  with  instructions 
from  Capt.  Buchanan  to  take  possession  of  the  Congress,  secure  the  officers 
as  prisoners,  allow  the  crew  to  land,  and  burn  the  ship.  The  Congress 
was  within  rifle-shot  from  the  shore,  and  as  the  Beaufort  came  alongside 
the  prize,  the  enemy  on  the  shore,  having  brought  a  Parrott  gun  down  to 
the  beach,  opened  upon  the  Confederate  vessel  a  perfidious  fire.  The 
frigate  had  two  white  flags  flying  at  the  time.  Lieut.  Minor  was  severely 
wounded,  and  several  of  the  crew  of  the  Beaufort  But  there  were  other 
additions  to  this  treachery,  for  when  the  Beaufort  had  first  come  along 
side  of  the  Congress,  Lieut.  Parker,  commanding  the  gunboat,  had  received 
the  flag  of  the  ship,  and  her  surrender  from  Lieut.  Prendergast,  with  the 
side-arms  of  the  other  officers.  After  having  delivered  themselves  as 
prisoners  of  war  on  board  the  Beaufort,  the  officers  were  allowed,  at  their 
own  request,  to  return  to  the  Congress  to  assist  in  removing  the  wounded. 
They  never  returned,  though  they  had  pledged  their  honour  to  do  so,  and 
in  witness  of  that  pledge  had  left  their  swords  with  Lieut.  Alexander,  on 
board  the  Beaufort. 

In  the  fire  from  the  shore,  Capt.  Buchanan  had  received  a  severe 
wound  in  the  thigh.  He  ordered  the  Congress  to  be  destroyed  by  hot 
shot  and  incendiary  shell,  her  officers  and  crew  having  treacherously 
escaped  to  the  shore ;  and  finding  himself  disabled  by  his  wound,  trans 
ferred  the  command  of  the  Virginia  to  Lieut.  Catesby  Jones,  with  orders 
to  fight  her  as  long  as  the  men  could  stand  to  their  guns.  But  there  were 
now  only  two  hours  of  daylight  left.  The  Virginia  bore  down  upon  the 
stranded  Minnesota.  The  Roanoke,  after  grounding,  had  gone  down  the 
Roads.  The  St.  Lawrence,  in  tow  of  a  steamer,  had  approached  the  Min 
nesota.  She  too  grounded,  and  after  receiving  a  single  shell,  and  return 
ing  a  harmless  broadside,  was  dragged  off,  and  steered  down  towards 
Fortress  Monroe.  The  shoalness  of  the  channel  prevented  the  near  ap 
proach  of  the  Virginia  to  her  third  antagonist ;  but  she  continued  to  fire 
upon  the  Minnesota,  until  the  pilots  declared  that  it  was  no  longer  safe  to 
remain  in  that  position. 

At  7  P.  M.,  the  Virginia  hauled  off,  and  returned  to  Norfolk,  reserving 
for  another  day  the  completion  of  her  work.  She  had  already  in  a  single 
half-day  achieved  one  of  the  most  remarkable  triumphs  ever  made  on  the 
water.  She  had  destroyed  two  powerful  vessels,  carrying  three  times  her 


228  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

number  of  men,  and  full  six  times  her  weight  of  armament ;  she  had  en 
gaged  two  other  great  vessels ;  and  she  had  only  been  prevented  from 
destroying  them,  because  she  could  not  come  to  close  quarters  with  them. 
The  Cumberland  went  into  action  with  376  men.  When  the  survivors 
were  mustered  there  were  only  255.  She  lost  121  in  killed  and  drowned. 
The  crew  of  the  Congress  were  434  officers  and  men ;  of  these,  298  got 
to  shore,  26  of  them  being  wounded,  10  mortally ;  there  were  in  all  120 
killed  and  missing ;  about  20  of  these  were  made  prisoners,  leaving  a  roll 
of  killed  and  drowned  of  100  men.  Besides  these,  3  were  killed  on  the 
Minnesota,  and  16  wounded  ;  an  absolute  loss  of  fully  250  officers  and 
men.  On  the  Virginia  there  were  but  two  killed  and  eight  wounded. 
On  the  other  Confederate  vessels  four  were  killed  and  a  few  more 
wounded. 

Early  in  the  bright  morning  of  Sunday,  the  9th  of  March,  the  Virginia 
rounded  the  point  of  land  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elizabeth  river.  She  ap 
proached  the  Minnesota.  But  lying  near  the  vessel  which  was  still 
stranded  and  supposed  to  be  doomed,  was  a  curious  object,  which  some  of 
the  crew  of  the  Virginia  straining  their  eyes  compared  to  a  prodigious 
"  cheese-box  on  a  plank."  It  was  another  iron-clad — the  enemy's  experi 
ment  in  naval  architecture,  which  had  come  just  in  time  to  match  the  Con 
federate  curiosity  in  floating  batteries. 

The  new  actor  on  the  scene  which  had  come  in  such  a  dramatic  coin 
cidence  was  a  defensive  structure,  the  invention  of  John  Ericsson.  He 
had  named  the  invention  the  Monitor,  in  order  to  u  admonish  the  South 
of  the  fate  of  the  rebellion,  Great  Britain  of  her  fading  naval  supremacy, 
and  the  English  government  of  the  folly  of  spending  millions  in  fixed  forti 
fications  for  defence."  She  was  different  in  appearance  from  any  vessel 
that  had  previously  been  used  in  war.  Her  deck,  unprotected  by  any  bul 
wark,  rose  about  two  feet  above  the  water,  whilst  from  it  projected  a 
turret  about  nine  feet  high, -and  a  small  box-looking  place  at  the  stern, 
used  as  a  pilot-house.  In  the  turret  she  carried  her  sole  armament — two 
eleven-inch  168-pounder  Dahlgren  guns. 

The  two  strange  combatants  approached  each  other ;  when  within  about 
one  hundred  yards'  distance  the  Monitor  opened  fire.  The  contest  con 
tinued  for  the  space  of  two  hours,  the  distance  between  the  two  vessels 
varying  from  half  a  mile  to  close  quarters,  in  which  they  were  almost  side 
to  side,  belching  out  their  fire,  the  heavy  thugs  on  the  iron  sides  of  each 
being  the  only  effect  of  the  terrific  cannonade.  The  strange-looking  bat 
tery,  with  its  black,  revolving  cupola,  was  more  easily  turned  than  the 
Virginia,  and  had  the  greater  speed.  The  great  length  and  draft  of  the 
Virginia  rendered  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  work  her.  Once  in  changing 
her  position  she  got  aground,  but  succeeded  in  getting  afloat  again,  and 
turning  rapidly  upon  the  Monitor  steamed  directly  at  her,  hoping  with 


THE    VIRGINIA    AND   THE   MONITOR.  229 

her  terrible  arined  prow  to  end  the  contest.      But  the  blow  was  not  fairly 
given,  and  merely  scraped  the  iron  plates  of  her  antagonist. 

About  noon  the  Monitor,  probably  rather  in  consequence  of  an  injury 
that  had  almost  blinded  the  sight  of  her  commander  than  of  any  serious 
damage  to  the  vessel,  ran  into  shoal  water  and  declined  the  further  prose 
cution  of  the  contest.  The  captain  of  the  Minnesota  then  supposed  that 
his  hour  was  come,  and  prepared  to  destroy  rather  than  surrender  his 
vessel.  But  it  had  been  found  impossible  by  the  Virginia  to  get  nearer 
the  Minnesota  than  she  had  the  day  before,  and  supposing  that  her  guns 
had  already  disabled  the  frigate,  she  retired  slowly  from  the  scene  of  con 
test  and  returned  to  Norfolk. 

The  results  of  this  day  were  indecisive,  although  there  can  be  no  doubt 
of  the  retreat  of  the  Monitor  ;  but  each  vessel  had  given  proofs  of  invul 
nerability,  which  left  their  claims  to  advantage  in  the  contest  undecided. 
The  injuries  of  the  Virginia  in  the  two  days'  fight  were  immaterial.  Two 
of  her  guns  had  the  muzzles  shot  off,  the  anchor  and  the  flagstaff's  were 
shot  away,  the  smoke-jack  and  steam-pipes  were  riddled,  the  prow  was 
twisted,  and  the  armour  somewhat  damaged ;  but,  with  the  exception  of 
the  injury  done  to  her  ram,  she  had  suffered  none  other  but  what  might 
be  repaired  in  a  few  hours. 

With  reference  to  this  wonderful  contest  in  Hampton  Roads  the  news 
papers  announced  the  conclusion  that  wooden  ships  were  to  be  of  no  farther 
use  in  naval  warfare,  and  that  the  great  navies  which  France  and  Great 
Britain  had  built  at  such  an  immense  cost  were  practically  annihilated. 
Whatever  haste  there  might  be  in  this  conclusion,  the  Government  at 
Washington  showed  its  early  appreciation  of  the  lesson  in  Hampton 
Eoads.  Almost  immediately  on  the  result  of  the  action  becoming  known, 
a  bill  was  introduced  into  the  Senate  to  authorize  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  to  construct  various  iron  vessels,  both  for  coast  and  harbour  defences, 
and  also  for  offensive  operations  against  the  enemy's  forts.  The  two  com 
batants — the  Virginia  and  the  Monitor — which  had  given  a  sensation  to 
the  whole  world,  and  turned  the  attention  of  every  European  government 
that  had  a  strip  of  sea-coast  to  defend  to  the  experiment  of  iron-clads, 
were  never  again  engaged  in  contest.  The  first  continued  by  her  presence 
at  Norfolk  to  guard  the  entry  into  James  River,  and  was  thought  of  such 
importance  with  respect  to  the  Peninsular  approach  to  Richmond  that 
Gen.  McClellan,  who,  as  we  shall  see  some  months  later,  turned  his  design 
on  Richmond  in  this  direction,  named  as  one  of  the  preliminary  condi 
tions  of  the  new  campaign  that  this  vessel  should  be  "  neutralized."  She 
was  to  be  u  neutralized  "  in  a  way  little  expected  by  the  Confederate  public. 

We  may  find  in  the  close  of  this  chapter  an  apppropriate  place  for  a 
summary  account  of  some  other  naval  events  belonging  to  this  period  of 
time  in  our  narrative. 


230  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 


CAPTUKE   OF   NEWBERN,    &C. 

The  objects  of  Gen.  Burnside's  expedition  were  not  accomplished  with 
the  capture  of  Koanoke  Island.  These  objects,  as  stated  in  a  memorandum 
furnished  by  Gen.  McClellan,  who  directed  the  expedition  as  part  of  a  gen 
eral  campaign  for  1862,  were  an  assault  on  Xewbern,  and,  if  possible,  the 
destruction  of  the  southern  line  of  railroad  through  Goldsboro',  and  the  Wil 
mington  and  Weldon  railroad.  The  town  of  Beaufort,  defended  bj  Fort 
Macon,  was  next  to  be  attacked,  and  the  port  opened,  whilst  operations 
against  Wilmington  were  pointed  to  as  the  eventual  objects  of  the  expedi 
tion.  On  March  12th,  the  expedition  started  from  Hatteras  Inlet  for  its 
new  object  of  attack.  The  troops  were  disembarked  the  next  day  eighteen 
miles  below  Newbern,  and  at  daylight  of  the  14th  advanced  upon  the 
Confederate  works  four  miles  below  the  town.  These  consisted  of  a  line 
of  detached  forts  of  low  relief.  The  entire  Confederate  force,  under  com 
mand  of  Gen.  Branch,  did  not  exceed  five  thousand  men — a  great  part  of 
them  militia — and  had  to  contend  against  an  enemy  outnumbering  them 
at  least  three  to  one. 

Fort  Thompson  was  the  most  formidable  fortification  on  the  river,  and 
mounted  thirteen  heavy  guns.  An  attempt  was  made  to  storm  the  work, 
which  was  repulsed,  and  four  Massachusetts  companies  which  entered  the 
fort  from  the  railway  track  were  driven  out  over  the  parapet.  Another 
attempt  was  made,  with  increased  numbers  ;  and  perceiving  the  enemy's 
gunboats  moving  up  the  river,  and  fearing  that  he  would  be  surrounded, 
Gen.  Branch  ordered  a  retreat.  It  was  commenced  in  good  order,  but 
finally  became  a  rout.  The  guns  of  Fort  Ellis  were  thrown  down  the 
embankment,  Fort  Lane  was  blown  up,  and  the  Confederates  fled  across 
the  railway  bridge  over  the  Neuse.  The  bridge  was  fired  by  a  raft  laden 
with  cotton  and  spirits  of  turpentine  before  the  retreating  column  had 
passed  over,  and  about  five  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  by  the  enemy. 
These,  about  fifty  pieces  of  cannon,  two  small  steamers,  and  large  quanti 
ties  of  arms  and  ammunition,  were  the  immediate  fruits  of  the  enemy's 
victory,  at  a  cost  estimated  in  Burnside's  report  as  91  killed  and  466 
wounded.  The  Confederate  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty. 

Shortly  after  the  enemy's  occupation  of  Newbern,  the  town  of  Wash 
ington,  situated  at  the  mouth  of  Tar  Eiver,  fell  into  their  hands  ;  the  bat 
teries  for  its  defence  having  been  dismantled,  and  the  entrenchments  aban 
doned  by  the  small  Confederate  force  that  had  been  stationed  there. 

On  the  25th  of  April,  Fort  Macon,  which  commanded  the  entrance  of 
Beaufort  harbour,  was  bombarded  by  three  of  the  enemy's  steamers,  and 
three  siege  batteries  on  the  shore.  There  were  not  more  than  five  Con- 


CAPTURE   OP   NEWBEBN.  231 

federate  companies  in  the  fort,  and  after  sustaining  a  fire  of  ten  hours  they 
surrendered. 

The  reduction  of  this  fort  gave  the  Federal  navy  a  port  of  entry,  and  a 
harbour  fitted  for  vessels  of  heavy  draught.  So  far  the  BurnBide  expedi 
tion  had  been  a  train  of  success.  The  Confederate  position  at  Norfolk 
had  been  flanked ;  complete  possession  had  been  gained  of  Albemarle 
and  Pamlico  Sound ;  and  now,  by  the  fall  of  Fort  Macon,  the  enemy  had 
the  entire  coast  of  North  Carolina.  These  blows  on  our  coast  disheart 
ened  the  Confederacy,  but,  after  all,  they  were  of  but  little  real  value,  and 
of  scarcely  any  appreciable  weight  in  the  war.  Burnside  did  not  dare  to 
pursue  his  enterprise  into  the  interiour,  and  to  follow  out  the  programme  of 
moving  on  the  Weldon  railroad.  The  vital  points  of  the  Confederacy 
were  far  in  the  interiour,  and  as  we  had  but  few  war  vessels  our  ports  and 
harbours  were  of  but  little  importance  to  us  for  naval  purposes,  and  were 
really  but  picket  posts  in  our  system  of  defence. 


CHAPTEE   XIV. 


THE  NEW  LINE  OF  CONFEDERATE  DEFENCE  SOUTH  OF  NASHVILLE. — ITS  OBJECTS. — CO-OPERA 
TION  OF  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUEEGARD. — CAPTURE  OF  ISLAND  NO.  10  BY  THE  ENEMY. — 
GEN.  FOLK'S  EVACUATION  OF  COLUMBUS. — M'COWN'S  OCCUPATION  OF  ISLAND  NO.  10  AND 
NEW  MADEID.— CONDITION  OF  THE  DEFENCES  AT  THESE  PLACES. — POPE  MOVING  ON 
NEW  MADEID. — BMALLNESS  OF  M'COWN'S  FORCE. — POPE'S  8TEENGTH  IN  ARTILLERY. — 
HIS  OCCUPATION  OF  POINT  PLEASANT. — A  TEREIFIO  BOMBARDMENT. — EVACUATION  OF 
NEW  MADRID. — EFFECT  OF  THIS  MOVEMENT. — BOMBARDMENT  OF  ISLAND  NO.  10. GAL 
LANT  DEFENCE  OF  EUOKEfi's  BATTERY. TRANSFER  OF  A  PORTION  OF  M'COWN'S  FORCES  TO 

FORT    PILLOW. HIS    PREPARATIONS    FOR    RETREAT. GEN.    MAOKALL    ASSIGNED    TO     THE 

DEFENCE  OF  THE  ISLAND. — A  CANAL  OUT  BY  THE  ENEMY  ACROSS  THE  PENINSULA. — 
TWO  GUNBOATS  PASS  THE  ISLAND. — MAOKAU/S  SURRENDER. — WRETCHED  MANAGEMENT 

OF  THE  EVACUATION    OF    THE    ISLAND. GREAT   LOSS   OF  CONFEDERATE  ARTILLERY. — THE 

BATTLE  OF    SHILOH. CONCENTRATION   OF   CONFEDERATE  FORCES   AT  CORINTH. — GRANT'S 

LINES  AT  PITTSBUEG. — BUELL  ADVANCING  FROM  NASHVILLE. — DESIGN  OF  THE  "CONFED 
ERATES  TO  ATTACK  BEFORE  THE  JUNCTION  OF  THESE  FORCES. — UNFORTUNATE  LOSS  OF 
A  DAY  IN  THE  MARCH. — THE  CONFEDERATE  PLAN  OF  BATTLE. — THE  ENEMY  DRIVEN  FROM 
HIS  ENCAMPMENTS. — SPLENDID  AND  IRRESISTIBLE  CHARGE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — 
TRAGICAL  DEATH  OF  GEN.  JOHNSTON. — THE  CONFEDERATES  PRESS  ON  IN  THEIR  CAREER  OF 
VICTORY. — GRANT  IN  THE  LAST  EXTREMITY  OF  DEFEAT. — HE  RETREATS  TO  THE  BANKS  OF 
THE  TENNESSEE. — BEAUREGARD's  ORDER  FOR  A  CESSATION  OF  THE  CONFLICT. — A  FATAL 

HALT. — EXPLANATION  OF  IT. BEAUREGAED's  GREAT  MISTAKE. — DEMORALIZATION  OF  HIS 

TROOPS    BY    PLUNDER.— BUELL'S   FORCES    ACROSS    THE    TENNESSEE. — THE    SECOND    DAY'S 

ACTION. — THE    CONFEDERATES    FALL   BACK. OVERWHELMING   FORCE    OF    THE    ENEMY. — 

ODDS  OF  THE  SECOND  DAY'S  BATTLE. — THE  ENEMY  DOES  NOT  ATTEMPT  A  PURSUIT. — A 
FRIGHTFUL  SUM  OF  CARNAGE. — BEAUREGARo's  CLAIM  OF  SUCCESS. — FEDERAL  INTERPRE 
TATION  OF  THE  BATTLE. — EXULTATION  AT  WASHINGTON. — DEATH  OF  JOHNSTON,  A 

SERIOUS  LOSS  TO  THE  CONFEDERACY. SKETCH  OF  HIS  MILITARY  LIFE. — PRESIDENT  DAVIS5 

TRIBUTE  TO  THE  FALLEN  HERO. — HIS  OBSEQUIES  IN  NEW  ORLEANS. 

SINCE  falling  back  to  Murfreesboro',  Gen.  Johnston  had  managed,  by 
combining  Crittenden's  division  and  the  fugitives  from  Donelson,  to  collect 
an  army  of  seventeen  thousand  men.  His  object  was  now  to  co-operate 
with  Gen.  Beauregard  for  the  defence  of  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi,  on 
a  line  of  operations  south  of  Nashville.  The  line  extending  from  Colum 
bus,  by  way  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  had  been  lost.  The  disaster 


CAPTURE  OF   ISLAND   NO.  10.  233 

had  involved  the  surrender  of  Kentucky,  and  a  lafge  portion  of  Tennessee 
to  the  enemy  ;  and  it  had  become  necessary  to  re-organize  a  new  line  of 
defence  south  of  Nashville,  the  object  of  which  would  be  to  protect  the 
railroad  system  of  the  Southwest,  and  to  ensure  the  defence  of  Memphis 
and  the  Mississippi. 


CAPTURE   OF   ISLAND  NO.  10   BY   THE   ENEMY. 

Another  concern  was  to  put  the  Mississippi  River  in  a  state  of  com 
plete  defence ;  and  on  abandoning  Columbus,  it  was  decided  to  take  a 
strong  position  about  forty-five  miles  below  it  at  Island  No.  10.  Gen. 
Polk,  with  the  greater  part  of  the  garrison,  retired  towards  Jackson,  Ten 
nessee,  and  Gen.  McCown,  with  the  remainder,  was  ordered  to  occupy  and 
hold  Island  10  and  Madrid  Bend. 

When  Gen.  McCown  arrived  at  the  Island,  he  found  it  nearly  destitute 
of  defences.  He  reached  there  about  the  24th  of  February,  with  Col. 
Kennedy's  21st  Louisiana  Regiment.  At  that  time  there  were  no  batteries 
on  the  Island,  and  only  two,  partially  armed  and  in  bad  working  order,  on 
the  Tennessee  shore.  Col.  Kennedy  was  ordered  to  commence  fortifying 
the  position  immediately.  The  only  fortification  at  New  Madrid,  was  Fort 
Thompson,  a  small  earth-work  under  the  command  of  Col.  E.  "VV.  Gantt. 
Gen.  McCown  immediately  laid  off,  and  ordered  the  construction  of  Fort 
Bankhead,  at  the  mouth  of  Bayou  St.  John,  which  makes  into  the  Missis 
sippi  just  above  New  Madrid.  Between  the  25th  of  February  and  the  1st 
of  March  he  was  followed  by  a  detachment  of  the  forces  from  Columbus. 
The  whole  force  at  the  two  points — Island  10  and  New  Madrid — consisted 
of  about  fourteen  regiments,  some  of  them  greatly  reduced.  This  force 
was  about  equally  divided  between  the  two  points. 

On  the  first  of  March  the  enemy's  cavalry  appeared  before  New 
Madrid,  and  it  was  definitely  ascertained  that  Gen.  Pope  was  moving  on 
that  place,  with  a  large  force.  He  was  not  long  in  making  his  appearance. 
The  Mississippi  River  was  open  to  the  gunboats  of  the  enemy,  down  to 
Island  10,  and  the  Confederate  works  there,  for  want  of  time,  had  not  been 
completed.  To  hold  both  places,  the  Confederates  had  not  more  than  five 
thousand  effective  men,  and  five  or  six  wooden  gunboats,  under  Commo 
dore  Hollins. 

Despite  the  unfavourable  prospect,  Gen.  McCown  commenced  an  ener 
getic  course  of  operations.  At  New  Madrid,  Fort  Bankhead  was  finished 
and  strengthened,  as  was  Fort  Thompson  by  an  abattis  in  front.  Batteries 
and  magazines  were  put  in  course  of  erection,  and  guns  mounted  daily  at 
the  Island.  Such  arrangements  for  securing  stores  and  taking  care  of  the 
sick,  as  the  circumstances  permitted,  were  promptly  made. 


234  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

Heavy  skirmishing  tjommenced  at  New  Madrid  about  the  first  of 
March,  and  continued  daily  up  to  the  13th.  The  enemy  had  brought 
across  with  him  a  large  train  of  artillery,  including  a  number  of  32- 
pounders,  with  which  he  made  frequent  attacks  on  the  forts.  These  at 
tacks  were  handsomely  met ;  our  gunboats  participating  in  the  conflict. 
The  enemy  established  himself  on  the  river  below  New  Madrid,  at  Point 
Pleasant  and  other  places,  for  the  purpose  of  annoying  our  transports,  and 
cutting  off  communication  between  New  Madrid  and  Memphis. 

During  these  thirteen  days  Gen.  McCown  was  most  active  in  his  move 
ments — passing  from  one  point  to  the  other,  as  he  deemed  his  presence 
necessary — superintending  the  erection  of  batteries  at  the  Island,  and 
directing  operations  at  New  Madrid.  Up  to  the  12th  of  March,  the  lines 
of  the  enemy  had  been  gradually  approaching  our  works  at  the  latter 
place.  The  skirmishing  and  artillery  conflicts  had  been  continual  and 
severe. 

At  midnight  on  the  12th,  the  enemy  opened  a  fierce  bombardment 
The  scene  was  terribly  grand.  A  large  number  of  the  enemy's  batteries 
were  in  full  play,  and  were  fiercely  replied  to,  by  all  the  guns  from  our 
forts  and  boats.  The  darkness,  the  hoarse  voice  of  the  wind,  the  rush 
of  the  waters,  the  roar  and  flash  of  the  guns  from  the  shore  and  "from  the 
river,  made  a  scene  exceeding  all  description.  This  bombardment  con 
tinued  but  a  short  time,  and  soon  the  echoes  of  the  last  gun  had  died  upon 
the  waves  ;  and  the  winds,  and  the  sullen  tones  of  the  Mississippi  were  the 
only  sounds  that  disturbed  the  silence  of  the  night. 

About  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  the  enemy  again  opened 
with  their  24-pounders  and  an  8-inch  howitzer.  The  principal  point  of 
attack  was  Fort  Thompson,  under  the  command  of  acting  Brig.-Gen.  E. 
W.  Gantt,  of  Arkansas.  This  officer  conducted  the  defence  with  skill  and 
spirit,  replying  to  the  enemy  so  effectually  as  to  dismount  several  of  his 
guns. 

The  firing  continued  at  intervals  during  the  afternoon,  but  entirely 
ceased  about  sunset.  The  result  of  these  bombardments  determined  Gen. 
McCown  upon  the  evacuation  of  New  Madrid.  Our  wooden  gunboats  had 
suffered  severely  under  the  enemy's  fire  ;  the  garrison  of  New  Madrid  was 
small ;  and  Pope's  batteries  were  in  a  position  which  prevented  reinforce 
ments  from  being  brought  up  the  river. 

On  the  night  of  the  13th  March  there  was  a  heavy  storm  of  rain  and 
thunder,  and  under  cover  of  the  darkness  the  Confederate  garrison  evacu 
ated  New  Madrid,  and  sought  shelter  either  with  that  of  Island  10,  or 
in  the  works  on  the  left  bank.  Thus  Pope  obtained  possession  of  New 
Madrid,  was  able  to  isolate  Island  10  from  the  Lower  Mississippi,  and 
eagerly  expected  the  surrender  of  the  other  defences. 

The  evacuation  was  accomplished  without  any  very  serious  loss.     In 


CAPTUBE   OF    ISLAND  10.  235 

the  midst  of  a  furious  rain,  and  in  the  face  of  a  powerful  army  of  the 
enemy,  it  was  hardly  possible  to  have  everything  brought  off.  Gen.  Gantt 
laboured  assiduously  to  save  whatever  he  could,  at  Fort  Thompson,  and 
was  himself  among  the  last  who  embarked.  Our  greatest  loss  was  in 
heavy  guns.  These-  it  was  found  impossible  to  get  away ;  but  they  were 
spiked,  and  otherwise  disabled.  Some  three  or  four  transports  were  or 
dered  to  each  fort,  to  take  off  the  troops  and  munitions.  Gen.  Walker's 
brigade,  from  Fort  Bankhead,  was  landed  at  the  foot  of  the  highlands 
about  four  miles  below  the  Island  ;  Gen.  Gantt's  from  Fort  Thompson,  at 
Tiptonville. 

But  although  the  Confederates  had  surrendered  New  Madrid  so  easily, 
they  had  no  idea  of  giving  up  Island  10.  We  have  already  stated 
that  when  Gen.  McCown  reached  the  Island  the  position  was  nearly  desti 
tute  of  defences.  Now  there  were  five  fine  batteries  erected  on  the  Island, 
and  well  armed,  and  an  equal  number  on  the  Tennessee  shore — mounting 
in  all  nearly  sixty  guns.  Magazines  had  been  provided,  the  ammunition 
assorted  and  arranged,  and  everything  put  in  readiness  for  action. 

From  the  Island  to  New  Madrid  by  the  river,  it  is  about  twelve  miles 
— from  New  Madrid  to  Tiptonville  about  sixteen,  and  from  Tiptonville 
across  to  the  Island  by  land,  about  four  miles.  There  was  a  river  shore  of 
twenty-seven  miles,  between  the  last  two  places,  though  they  were  in  fact 
but  a  short  distance  apart.  This  shore  had  to  be  closely  watched,  for  the 
enemy  held  possession  of  the  Missouri  side,  from  New  Madrid  to  a  point 
below  Tiptonville.  The  brigades  of  Gantt  and  Walker  were  placed  along 
the  river,  to  guard  it,  with  instructions  to  concentrate  and  drive  the  enemy 
back,  if  he  should  anywhere  attempt  a  crossing. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th  the  enemy's  fleet  commenced  shelling  the 
Island  at  long  range,  to  which  the  Confederates  paid  but  little  attention. 
About  ten  o'clock,  however,  they  came  within  range,  and  opened  on 
Rucker's  battery.  This  battery  was  on  the  Tennessee  shore,  about  a  mile 
above  the  Island.  It  was  located  before  Gen.  McCown  took  command  at 
the  Bend,  on  rather  low  ground,  but  at  an  excellent  point  for  commanding 
the  river.  The  Mississippi  was  very  high,  and  this  battery  was  separated 
from  the  others  by  a  wide  slough.  The  platform  was  covered  with  water, 
and  the  magazine  unsafe  from  dampness.  The  attack  was  made  by  five 
iron-clad  gunboats  (three  of  them  lashed  together  about  the  centre  of  the 
stream,  and  one  lying  near  either  shore)  together  with  the  whole  mortar 
fleet.  The  conflict  was  terrific.  For  nine  long  hours,  shot  and  shell  fell 
in,  over  and  around  the  battery,  in  horrible  profusion — tearing  up  its 
parapet,  and  sending  death  through  the  company  engaged  in  its  defence. 
The  men  worked  their  pieces  standing  half-leg  deep  in  mud  and  water.  The 
company  was  small  and  the  labour  great.  In  the  afternoon,  Capt.  Kucker, 
finding  his  men  exhausted  by  fatigue,  asked  for  reinforcements,  which  were 


236  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

sent  to  him.  For  this  purpose  no  detail  was  made,  as  a  sufficient  number 
of  volunteers  were  found  to  supply  his  wants,  and  marched  into  the  very 
jaws  of  death  to  the  relief  of  their  exhausted  comrades.  In  the  mean  time, 
from  fort  and  river,  the  conflict  was  still  kept  up  with  unabated  fury.  It 
seemed  more  than  could  be  hoped  from  mortal  courage  and  endurance, 
that  the  battery  should  be  worked  against  such  terrible  odds.  But  it  was, 
and  at  last,-  about  night-fall,  the  enemy  was  compelled  to  withdraw,  with 
some  of  his  boats  for  the  time  disabled.  Rucker  had  the  last  shot  at  him,  as 
he  retired  up  the  river.  The  battery  mounted  five  guns.  Only  two  of 
them  were  in  a  condition  to  be  worked,  at  the  close  of  the  fight. 

Gen.  McCown,  under  orders  from  Gen.  Beauregard,  left  the  Bend  for 
Fort  Pillow,  on  the  night  of  the  17th  of  March,  with  six  regiments  of  in 
fantry,  Bankhead's  light  battery,  and  a  part  of  Stuart's,  embarking  at  Tip- 
tonville,  and  reaching  the  former  place  on  the  morning  of  the  18th.  This 
movement  was  accomplished  with  such  secrecy,  that  few,  even  of  the 
officers  remaining  at  the  Bend,  were  aware  of  it  until  it  was  accom 
plished. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  19th,  Gen.  McCown  was  ordered  to  send  from 
Fort  Pillow  three  regiments,  to  report  to  Gen.  Bragg,  leave  the  re 
mainder  at  that  post,  and  return  himself  and  re-assume  command  at  Island 
10,  which  he  immediately  did.  Upon  returning  to  the  Island,  he  found 
the  enemy  engaged  in  cutting  a  canal  across  the  Bend,  on  the  Missouri 
side,  from  a  point  three  miles  above  the  Island  to  Bayou  St.  John,  for  the 
purpose  of  communicating  with  New  Madrid  without  having  to  run  our 
batteries.  From  this  time  up  to  the  30th,  the  enemy  continued  to  shell  at 
long  range,  but  without  effect.  Gen.  McCown,  in  the  mean  time,  made 
a  full  reconnoissance  of  the  Bend.  In  his  despatches  he  expressed  confi 
dence  in  his  ability  to  repel  the  enemy's  boats,  if  they  should  attack  his 
batteries,  but  strongly  intimated  his  doubts  as  to  his  being  able  to  stop 
them  if  they  attempted  to  run  by.  He  was  also  busily  engaged  in  build 
ing  flatboats  and  collecting  canoes  on  Reetford  Lake,  ostensibly  with  the 
view  of  bringing  over  reinforcements,  but  actually  for  the  purpose  of  secur 
ing  his  retreat,  should  the  enemy  force  a  crossing  in  numbers  sufficient  to 
overwhelm  his  command,  now  reduced  to  less  than  two  thousand  effec 
tive  men. 

On  the  1st  of  April,  Gen.  McCown  was  relieved,  and  Gen.  Mackall 
assigned  to  the  defence  of  the  Island.  In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  had 
busily  progressed  in  his  herculean  enterprise  of  digging  a  canal  twelve 
miles  long,  across  the  peninsula  formed  by  the  winding  of  the  river.  This 
work  was  fatal  to  the  defence  of  the  Island,  for  it  enabled  the  enemy  to 
take  it  in  its  rear.  On  the  night  of  the  6th  of  April,  Gen.  Mackall  moved 
the  infantry  and  a  battery  to  the  Tennessee  shore,  to  protect  the  landing 
from  anticipated  attacks.  The  artillerists  remained  on  the  Island.  The 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SHILOH.  237 

enemy's  gunboats  had  succeeded  in  passing  the  Island  in  a  heavy  fog  ;  he 
had  effected  a  landing  above  and  below  the  Island  in  large  force  ;  and  the 
surrender  of  the  position  had  become  a  military  necessity. 

But  never  was  an  evacuation  so  wretchedly  managed.  None  of  the 
means  of  retreat  prepared  by  Gen.  McCown  were  used  ;  everything  was 
abandoned ;  six  hundred  men  were  left  to  their  fate  on  the  Island ;  and 
the  force  transferred  to  the  mainland  was  surrendered,  except  the  few 
stragglers  who  escaped  through  the  cane-brakes. 

The  enemy  captured  Mackall  himself,  two  brigadier-generals,  six 
colonels,  several  thousand  stand  of  arms,  two  thousand  rank  and  file,  sev 
enty  pieces  of  siege  artillery,  thirty  pieces  of  field  artillery,  fifty-six  thou 
sand  solid  shot,  six  steam  transports,  two  gunboats,  and  one  floating  bat 
tery  carrying  sixteen  heavy  guns.  The  Southern  people  had  expected  a 
critical  engagement  at  Island  No.  10,  but  its  capture  was  neatly  accom 
plished  without  it ;  and,  in  the  loss  of  men,  cannon,  ammunition,  and  sup 
plies,  the  event  was  doubly  deplorable  to  them,  and  afforded  to  the  North 
such  visible  fruits  of  victory  as  had  seldom  been  the  result  of  a  single 
enterprise.  The  credit  of  the  success  was  claimed  for  the  naval  force  under 
the  command  of  Commodore  Foote.  The  Federal  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
had  reason  to  declare  that  "  the  triumph  was  not  the  less  appreciated 
because  it  was  protracted,  and  finally  bloodless."  The  Confederates  had 
been  compelled  to  abandon  what  had  been  fondly  entitled  "  the  Little 
Gibraltar  "  of  the  Mississippi,  and  had  experienced  a  loss  in  heavy  artillery 
which  was  nigh  irreparable. 

Meanwhile,  Gen.  Beauregard  was  preparing  to  strike  a  decisive  blow 
on  the  mainland,  and  the  movements  of  the  enemy  on  the  Tennessee  River 
were  preparing  the  situation  for  one  of  the  grandest  battles  that  had  yet 
been  fought  in  any  quarter  of  the  war. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   SHILOH. 

S 

In  the  early  part  of  March,  Gen.  Beauregard,  convinced  of  the  enemy's 
design  to  cut  off  his  communications  in  "West  Tennessee  with  the  eastern 
and  southern  States,  by  operating  from  the  Tennessee  River,  determined 
to  concentrate  all  his  available  forces  at  and  around  Corinth.  By  the  first 
of  April,  Gen.  Johnston's  entire  force,  which  had  taken  up  the  line  of 
march  from  Murfreesboro',  had  effected  a  junction  with  Beauregard,  and 
the  united  forces,  which  had  also  been  increased  by  several  regiments  from 
Louisiana,  two  divisions  of  Gen.  Folk's  command  from  Columbus,  and  a 
fine  corps  of  troops  from  Mobile  and  Fensacola,  were  concentrated  along 
the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad,  from  Bethel  to  Corinth,  and  on  the  Mem- 


238  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

phis  and  Charleston  railroad  from  Corinth  to  luka.  The  effective  total  of 
this  force  was  slightly  over  forty  thousand  men.* 

It  was  determined  with  this  force,  which  justified  the  offensive,  to 
strike  a  sudden  blow  at  the  enemy,  in  position  under  Gen.  Grant,  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  at  Pittsburg,  and  in  the  direction  of  Sa 
vannah,  before  he  was  reinforced  by  the  army  under  Gen.  Buell,  then 
known  to  be  advancing  for  that  purpose,  by  rapid  marches  from  Nashville. 
The  great  object  was  to  anticipate  the  junction  of  the  enemy's  armies,  then 
near  at  hand  ;  and  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  April,  it  was  decided  that  the 
attack  should  be  attempted  at  once,  incomplete  and  imperfect  as  were  the 
preparations  of  the  Confederates  for  such  a  grave  and  momentous  adven 
ture.  The  army  had  been  brought  suddenly  together,  and  there  had  been 
many  difficulties  in  the  way  of  an  effective  organization. 

The  enemy  was  in  position  about  a  mile  in  advance  of  Shiloh  church — 
a  rude,  log  chapel,  from  which  the  battle  that  was  to  ensue  took  its  name 
— with  the  right  resting  on  Owl  Creek  and  his  left  on  Lick  Creek.  The 
army  collected  here  was  composed  of  the  flower  of  the  Federal  troops, 
being  principally  Western  men,  from  the  States  of  Illinois,  Indiana,  Wis 
consin,  and  Iowa. 

It  was  expected  by  Gen.  Beauregard  that  he  would  be  able  to  reach 
the  enemy's  lines  in  time  to  attack  him  on  the  5th  of  April.  The  men, 
however,  for  the  most  part,  were  unused  to  marching,  the  roads  narrow, 
and  traversing  a  densely-wooded  country,  which  became  almost  impassable 
after  a  severe  rain-storm  on  the  4th,  which  drenched  the  troops  in  bivou 
ac  ;  hence  the  Confederate  forces  did  not  reach  the  intersection  of  the  road 
from  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy, 
until  late  in  the  evening  of  the  5th ;  and  it  was  then  decided  that  the 
attack  should  be  made  on  the  next  morning,  at  the  earliest  hour  prac 
ticable. 

The  Confederate  plan  of  battle  was  in  three  lines — the  first  and  second 
extending  from  Owl  Creek  on  the  left  to  Lick  Creek  on  the  right,  a  dis 
tance  of  about  three  miles,  supported  by  the  third  and  the  reserve.  The 
first  line,  under  Major-Gen.  Hardee,  was  constituted  of  his  corps,  aug 
mented  on  his  right  by  Gladden's  brigade,  of  Major-Gen.  Bragg's  corps. 
The  second  line,  composed  of  the  other  troops  of  Bragg's  corps,  followed 

*  It  waa  composed  as  follows : 

First  Army  Corps,  Major-Gen.  L.  Polk, 9,136 

Second  Army  Corps,  Gen.  B.  Bragg, 13,589 

Third  Army  Corps,  Major-Gen.  W.  J.  Hardee, 6,789 

Reserve,  Brig.-Gen.  John  C.  Breckinridge, *. . . .  6,439 

Total  infantry  and  artillery, 35,953 

Cavalry,  Brig.-Gen.  F.  Gardner, 4,382 

Grand  Total, 40,335 


THE    BATTLE    OF    8HILOH.  239 

the  first  at  the  distance  of  five  hundred  yards,  in  the  same  order  as  the 
first.  The  army  corps  under  Gen.  Polk  followed  the  second  line  at  the 
distance  of  about  eight  hundred  yards,  in  lines  of  brigades,  deployed  with 
their  batteries  in  rear  of  each  brigade,  moving  by  the  Pittsburg  road,  the 
left  wing  supported  by  cavalry.  The  reserve,  under  Brig.-Gen.  Breckin- 
ridge,  following  closely  on  the  third  line,  in  the  same  order,  its  right  wing 
supported  by  cavalry. 

In  the  early  dawn  of  Sunday,  the  6th  of  April,  the  magnificent  array 
was  moving  forward  for  deadly  conflict,  passing  easily  through  the  thin 
ranks  of  the  tall  forest  trees,  which  afforded  open  views  on  every  side. 
But  the  enemy  scarcely  gave  time  to  discuss  the  question  of  attack,  for 
soon  after  dawn  he  commenced  a  rapid  musketry  fire  on  the  Confederate 
pickets.  The  order  was  immediately  given  by  the  commanding  General, 
and  the  Confederate  lines  advanced.  Such  was  the  ardour  of  the  second 
line  of  troops,  that  it  was  with  great  difficulty  they  could  be  restrained 
from  closing  up  and  mingling  with  the  first  line.  Within  less  than  a  mile, 
the  enemy  was  encountered  in  force  at  the  encampments  of  his  advanced 
positions,  but  the  first  line  of  Confederates  brushed  him  away,  leaving  the 
rear  nothing  to  do  but  to  press  on  in  pursuit.  In  about  one  mile  more,  he 
was  encountered  in  strong  force  along  almost  the  entire  line.  His  bat 
teries  were  posted  on  eminences,  with  strong  infantry  supports.  Finding 
the  first  line  was  now  unequal  to  the  work  before  it,  being  weakened  by 
extension,  and  necessarily  broken  by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  Gen.  Bragg 
ordered  his  whole  force  to  move  up  steadily  and  promptly  to  its  support. 

From  this  time  the  battle  raged  with  but  little  intermission.  By  half- 
past  ten  o'clock  the  Confederates  had  already  captured  three  large  encamp 
ments,  and  three  batteries  of  artillery.  Their  right  flank,  according  to  the 
order  of  battle,  had  pressed  forward  ardently,  under  the  immediate  direc 
tion  of  Gen.  Johnston,  and  swept  all  before  it.  Batteries,  encampments, 
storehouses,  munitions  in  rich  profusion,  were  captured ;  and  the  enemy 
was  falling  back  rapidly  at  every  point.  His  left,  however,  was  his  strong 
est  ground  and  position,  and  was  disputed  with  obstinacy. 

Mile  after  mile  the  Confederates  rushed  on,  sweeping  the  camps  of  the 
enemy  before  them.  Gen.  Johnston  was  in  advance,  before  the  troops  of 
Breckinridge  and  Bowen.  He  had  addressed  them  in  a  few  brief  words, 
and  given  the  order  to  "  Charge !  "  when,  at  two  o'clock,  a  minie-ball 
pierced  the  calf  of  his  right  leg.  He  supposed  it  to  be  a  flesh  wound, 
and  paid  no  attention  to  it ;  but  the  fact  was  that  the  ball  had  cut  an 
artery,  and  as  J;he  doomed  commander  rode  onward  to  victory,  he  was 
bleeding  to  death.  Becoming  faint  from  loss  of  blood,  he  turned  to  Gov. 
Harris,  one  of  his  volunteer  aides,  and  remarked,  "  I  fear  I  am  mortally 
wounded."  The  next  moment  he  reeled  in  his  saddle  and  fainted.  Gov. 
Hams  received  the  falling  commander  in  his  arms,  and  bore  him  a  short 


240  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

distance  from  the  field,  into  a  ravine.  Stimulants  were  speedily  adminis 
tered,  but  in  vain.  One  of  his  staff,  in  a  passion  of  grief,  threw  his  arms 
around  the  beloved  commander,  and  called  aloud,  to  see  if  he  would 
respond.  But  no  sign  or  reply  came,  and  in  a  moment  or  two  more,  he 
breathed  his  last. 

Information  of  the  fall  of  Gen.  Johnston  was  not  communicated  to  the 
army.  It  was  still  pressing  on  in  its  career  of  victory ;  and  but  little 
doubt  remained  of  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  As  the  descending  sun  warned 
the  Confederates  to  press  their  advantage,  the  command  ran  along  the  line, 
"  Forward !  let  every  order  be  forward  !  "  Fairly  in  motion,  they  now 
swept  all  before  them.  Neither  battery  nor  battalion  could  withstand 
their  onslaught.  Passing  through  camp  after  camp,  rich  in  military  spoils 
of  every  kind,  the  enemy  was  driven  headlong  from  every  position,  and 
thrown  in  confused  masses  upon  the  river  bank,  behind  his  heavy  artillery, 
and  under  cover  of  his  gunboats  at  the  landing.  He  was  crowded  in 
unorganized  masses  on  the  river  bank,  vainly  striving  to  cross. 

And  now  it  might  be  supposed  that  a  victory  was  to  be  accomplished 
such  as  had  not  before  illustrated  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy.  The 
reserve  line  of  the  Federals  was  entirely  gone.  Their  whole  army  was 
crowded  into  a  circuit  of  half  to  two-thirds  of  a  mile  around  the  landing. 
They  had  been  falling  back  all  day.  The  next  repulse  would  have  put 
them  into  the  river,  and  there  were  not  transports  enough  to  cross  a  single 
division  before  the  Confederates  would  be  upon  them. 

It  is  true  that  the  broken  fragments  of  Grant's  army  were  covered  by  a 
battery  of  heavy  guns  well  served,  and  two  gunboats,  which  poured  a 
heavy  fire  upon  the  supposed  position  of  the  Confederates,  for  they  were 
entirely  hid  by  the  forest.  But  this  fire,  though  terrific  in  sound,  and  pro 
ducing  some  consternation  at  first,  did  no  damage,  as  the  shells  all  passed 
over,  and  exploded  far  beyond  the  Confederate  position. 

At  last,  the  order  was  given  to  move  forward  at  all  points,  and  sweep 
the  enemy  from  the  field.  The  sun  was  about  disappearing,  so  that  little 
time  was  left  to  finish  the  glorious  work  of  the  day.  The  movement  com 
menced  with  every  prospect  of  success.  But  just  at  this  time  the  astound 
ing  order  was  received  from  Gen.  Beauregard  to  withdraw  the  forces 
beyond  the  enemy's  fire  !  The  action  ceased.*  The  different  commands, 
mixed  and  scattered,  bivouacked  at  points  most  convenient  to  their  posi- 

*  Of  this  abrupt  termination  to  the  business  of  the  day,  and  the  condition  of  the  enemy  at  the 
time,  a  Confederate  officer  writes  : 

"  From  some  cause  I  could  never  ascertain,  a  halt  was  sounded,  and  when  the  remnants  of  the 
enemy's  divisions  had  stacked  arms  on  the  river's  edge,  preparatory  to  their  surrender,  no  one 
stirred  to  finish  the  business  by  a  coup  de  main.  It  was  evidently  '  drown  or  surrender '  with 
them,  and  they  had  prepared  for  the  latter,  until,  seeing  our  inactivity,  their  gunboats  opened  furi 
ously,  and,  save  a  short  cannonade,  all  subsided  into  quietness  along  our  lines." 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SHILOH.  241 

tions,  and  beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy's  guns.  All  firing,  except  a 
half-hour  shot  from  the  gunboats,  ceased,  and  the  night  was  passed  in 
quiet. 

Of  this  extraordinary  abandonment  of  a  great  victory — for  it  can 
scarcely  be  put  in  milder  phrase — Gen.  Beauregard  gives,  in  his  ofiicial 
report  of  the  action,  only  this  explanation  :  "  Darkness  was  close  at  hand  ; 
officers  and  men  were  exhausted  by  a  combat  of  over  twelve  hours  without 
food,  and  jaded  by  the  march  of  the  preceding  day  through  mud  and 
water."  But  the  true  explanation  is,  that  Gen.  Beauregard  was  persuaded 
that  delays  had  been  encountered  by  Gen.  Buell  in  his  march  from  Colum 
bia,  and  that  his  main  force,  therefore,  could  not  reach  the  field  of  battle 
in  time  to  save  Gen.  Grant's  shattered  fugitive  forces  from  capture  or  de 
struction  on  the  following  day. 

But  in  this  calculation  he  made  the  great  erroui*  of  his  military  life. 
When  pursuit  was  called  off,  BuelPs  advance  was  already  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Tennessee.  A  body  of  cavalry  was  on  its  banks  ;  it  was  the  advance 
of  the  long-expected  Federal  reinforcements  ;  an  army  of  twenty-five 
thousand  men  was  rapidly  advancing  to  the  opposite  banks  of  the  river  to 
restore  Grant's  fortune,  and  to  make  him,  next  day,  master  of  the  situa 
tion.  Alas !  the  story  of  Shiloh  was  to  be  that  not  only  of  another  lost 
opportunity  for  the  South,  but  one  of  a  reversion  of  fortune,  in  which  a 
splendid  victory  changed  into  something  very  like  a  defeat ! 

As  night  fell,  a  new  misfortune  was  to  overtake  Gen.  Beauregard.  His 
forces  exhibited  a  want  of  discipline  and  a  disorder  which  he  seems  to  have 
been  unable  to  control ;  and  with  the  exception  of  a  few  thousand  disci 
plined  troops  held  firmly  in  hand  by  Gen.  Bragg,  the  whole  army  degen 
erated  into  bands  of  roving  plunderers,  intoxicated  with  victory,  and  scat 
tered  in  a  shameful  hunt  for  the  rich  spoils  of  the  battle-field.  All  during 
the  night  thousands  were  out  in  quest  of  plunder ;  hundreds  were  intoxi 
cated  with  wines  and  liquors  found ;  and  while  scenes  of  disorder  and 
shouts  of  revelry  arose  around  the  large  fires  which  had  been  kindled,  and 
mingled  with  the  groans  of  the  wounded,  BuelPs  forces  were  steadily 
crossing  the  river,  and  forming  line  of  battle  for  the  morrow. 

About  an  hour  after  sunrise  the  action  again  commenced,  and  soon  the 
battle  raged  with  fury.  The  shattered  regiments  and  brigades  collected 
by  Grant  gave  ground  before  our  men,  and  for  a  moment  it  was  thought 
that  victory  would  crown  our  efforts  a  second  time.  On  the  left,  however, 
and  nearest  to  the  point  of  arrival  of  his  reinforcements,  the  enemy  drove 
forward  line  after  line  of  his  fresh  troops.  In  some  places  the  Confeder 
ates  repulsed  them  by  unexampled  feats  of  valor ;  but  sheer  exhaustion 
was  hourly  telling  upon  the  men,  and  it  soon  became  evident  that  num 
bers  and  strength  would  ultimately  prevail.  By  noon  Gen.  Beauregard 
had  necessarily  disposed  of  the  last  of  his  reserves,  and  shortly  thereafter 
16 


242  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

he  determined  to  withdraw  from  the  unequal  conflict,  securing  such  of  the 
results  of  the  victory  of  the  day  before  as  was  then  practicable. 

As  evidence  of  the  condition  of  Beauregard's  army,  he  had  not  been 
able  to  bring  into  the  action  of  the  second  day  more  than  twenty  thousand 
men.  In  the  first  day's  battle  the  Confederates  engaged  the  divisions  of 
Gen.  Prentiss,  Sherman,  Hurlburt,  McClernand  and  Smith,  of  9,000  men 
each,  or  at  least  45,000  men.  This  force  was  reinforced  during  the  night 
by  the  divisions  of  Gens.  Nelson,  McCook,  Crittenden,  and  Thomas,  of 
Buell's  army,  some  25,000  strong,  including  all  arms  ;  also  Gen.  L.  "Wal 
lace's  division  of  Gen.  Grant's  army,  making  at  least  33,000  fresh  troops, 
which,  added  to  the  remnant  of  Gen.  Grant's  forces,  amounting  to  20,000, 
made  an  aggregate  force  of  at  least  53,000  men  arrayed  against  the  Con 
federates  on  the  second  day. 

Against  such  an  .overwhelming  force  it  was  vain  to  contend.  At  1 
p.  M.  Gen.  Beauregard  ordered  a  retreat.  Gen.  Breckinridge  was  left  with 
his  command  as  a  rear  guard,  to  hold  the  ground  the  Confederates  had  oc 
cupied  the  night  preceding  the  first  battle,  just  in  front  of  the  intersection 
of  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads,  about  four  miles  from  the  former 
place,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  passed  in  the  rear,  in  excellent  order. 
The  fact  that  the  enemy  attempted  no  pursuit  indicated  his  condition.  He 
had  been  too  sorely  chastised  to  pursue  ;  and  Gen.  Beauregard  was  left  at 
leisure  to  retire  to  Corinth,  in  pursuance  of  his  original  design  to  make 
that  the  strategic  point  of  his  campaign. 

The  battle  of  Shiloh,  properly  extending  through  eighteen  hours,  was 
memorable  for  an  extent  of  carnage  up  to  this  time  unparalleled  in  the 
war.  The  Confederate  loss,  in  the  two  days,  in  the  killed  outright,  was 
1,728,  wounded  8,012,  missing  957 ;  making  an  aggregate  of  casualties 
10,699.  Of  the  loss  of  the  enemy,  Gen.  Beauregard  wrote  :  "  Their  casu 
alties  cannot  have  fallen  many  short  of  twenty  thousand  in  killed,  wound 
ed,  prisoners,  and  missing." 

Gen.  Beauregard  was  unwilling  to  admit  that  the  experience  of  the 
second  day  had  eclipsed  the  brilliant  victory  which  he  so  unfortunately 
left  unfinished  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee.  He  declared  that  he  had 
left  the  field  on  the  second  day  "  only  after  eight  hours'  successive  battle 
with  a  superiour  army  of  fresh  troops,  whom  he  had  repulsed  in  every  at 
tack  upon  his  lines,  so  repulsed  and  crippled,  indeed,  as  to  leave  it  unable 
to  take  the  field  for  the  campaign  for  which  it  was  collected  and  equipped 
at  such  enormous  expense,  and  with  such  profusion  of  all  the  appliances 
of  war."  On  the  other  hand,  the  North  inscribed  Shiloh  as  its  most  bril 
liant  victory.  An  order  of  the  War  Department  at  Washington  required 
that  at  meridian  of  the  Sunday  following  the  battle,  at  the  head  of  every 
regiment  in  the  armies  of  the  United  States  there  should  be  offered 
by  its  chaplain  a  prayer,  giving  "  thanks  to  the  Lord  of  Hosts  for  the 


DEATH   OF   GEN. .  A.    8.   JOHNSTON.  243 

recent  manifestation  of  His  power  in  the  overthrow  of  the  rebels  and 
traitors." 

But  whatever  may  be  the  correct  estimation  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
there  was  one  event  of  it  which  was  a  most  serious  loss  to  the  Confederacy, 
and  an  occasion  of  popular  sorrow  in  every  part  of  it.  This  was  the  death 
of  Gen.  Albert  Sydney  Johnston,  the  man  especially  trusted  with  the  Con 
federate  fortunes  in  the  West,  esteemed  by  his  Government  as  the  military 
genius  of  his  country,  and  so  gifted  by  nature  with  dignity,  and  with 
power  over  men,  that  it  was  said  he  was  born  to  command.  This  illus 
trious  commander  had  already  figured  in  many  historical  scenes,  and  up  to 
the  period  of  his  death  had  led  one  of  the  most  eventful  and  romantic  mili 
tary  lives  on  the  continent.  He  had  served  in  the  Black  Hawk  war.  In 
the  Texan  war  of  independence,  he  entered  her  army  as  a  private  soldier. 
Subsequently  he  was  made  senior  brigadier-general  of  the  Texan  army, 
and  was  appointed  to  succeed  Gen.  Felix  Houston  in  the  chief  command. 
This  led  to  a  duel  between  them,  in  which  Johnston  was  wounded.  In 
1838,  he  was  chosen  Secretary  of  War  of  the  new  Republic  under  Presi 
dent  Lamar ;  and  the  following  year  he  organized  an  expedition  against 
the  Cherokee  Indians.  He  subsequently  settled  on  a  plantation  in  Texas, 
and  for  several  years  remained  there,  leading  the  quiet  life  of  a  planter. 

When  the  Mexican  war  broke  out,  he,  once  more,  in  1846,  and  at  the 
request  of  Gen.  Taylor,  resumed  his  profession  of  arms,  and  sought  the 
battle-field.  He  arrived  in  Mexico  shortly  after  the  battles  of  Kesaca  and 
Palo- Alto,  and.  was  elected  colonel  of  the  first  Texas  regiment.  After  that 
regiment  was  discharged,  he  was  appointed  aide  and  inspector-general  to 
Gen.  Butler ;  and  in  that  capacity  he  was  at  the  famous  battle  of  Mon 
terey,  and,  during  the  fight,  his  horse  was  three  times  shot  under  him. 

After  the  Mexican  war,  he  obtained  the  appointment  of  paymaster  of 
the  regular  army,  with  the  rank  of  major.  When  the  army  was  increased 
by  four  new  regiments,  Jefferson  Davis,  then  Secretary  of  War,  gave  him 
command  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  with  his  headquarters  at  San  Antonio, 
Texas.  In  the  latter  part  of  1857,  he  was  appointed  by  President  Buchan 
an  to  the  command  of  the  Utah  expedition,  sent  to  quell  the  Mormons.  In 
the  spring  of  1858,  he  crossed  the  plains,  and  arrived  at  Salt  Lake  City, 
where,  in  consequence  of  his  services,  he  was  brevetted  brigadier-general, 
and  full  commander  of  the  military  district  of  Utah.  He  was  subsequently 
sent  to  California,  and  assumed  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Paci 
fic.  There  the  commencement  of  the  war  found  him  ;  and  on  learning  of 
the  secession  of  his  adopted  State,  Texas,  he  resigned  his  position  in  the 
United  States  army,  and  at  once  prepared  to  remove  South,  to  espouse  the 
cause  of  the  Confederacy. 

The  Federal  authorities  had  taken  measures  to  arrest  him,  or,  at  least, 
to  intercept  his  passage  by  sea.  But  he  eluded  their  vigilance  by  taking 


244  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  overland  route.  With  three  or  four  companions,  increased  afterwards 
to  one  hundred,  on  mules,  he  proceeded  by  way  of  Arizona,  passed  through 
Texas,  and  arrived  at  New  Orleans  in  safety.  This  was  in  August,  1861, 
and,  immediately  proceeding  to  Richmond,  he  was  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Mississippi.  , 

In  the  early  part  of  the  western  campaign,  Gen.  Johnston  had  fallen 
under  the  censure  of  the  newspapers.  It  has  been  said  that  this  censure 
preyed  upon  his  mind  ;  but  if  it  did,  he  thought  very  nobly  of  it,  for  in  a 
private  letter,  dated  after  the  retreat  from  Bowling  Green,  and  the  fall  of 
Fort  Donelson,  he  wrote  :  "  The  test  of  merit,  in  my  profession,  with  the 
people,  is  success.  It  is  a  hard  rule,  but  I  think  it  right."  But  a  few  days 
before  the  battle  in  which  he  fell,  he  expressed  a  resolution  to  redeem  his 
losses  at  no  distant  day. 

No  more  beautiful  tribute  could  have  been  paid  to  the  memory  of  the 
departed  hero,  than  that  made  by  Jefferson  Davis  himself ;  and  no  more 
choice  and  touching  language  ever  came  from  the  polished  pen  of  the  Con 
federate  President,  than  on  this  occasion.  He  announced  the  death  in  a 
special  message  to  Congress.  He  said  :  "  Without  doing  injustice  to  the 
living,  it  may  safely  be  said  that  our  loss  is  irreparable.  Among  the 
shining  hosts  of  the  great  and  good  who  now  cluster  around  the  banner  of 
our  country,  there  exists  no  purer  spirit,  no  more  heroic  soul,  than  that  of 
the  illustrious  man  whose  death  I  join  you  in  lamenting.  In  his  death  he 
has  illustrated  the  character  for  which,  through  life,  he  was  conspicuous— 
that  of  singleness  of  purpose  and  devotion  to  duty  with  his  whole  energies. 
Bent  on  obtaining  the  victory  which,  he  deemed  essential  to  his  country's 
cause,  he  rode  on  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  object,  forgetful  of  self, 
while  his  very  life-blood  was  fast  ebbing  away.  His  last  breath  cheered 
his  comrades  on  to  victory.  The  last  sound  he  heard  was  their  shout  of 
victory.  His  last  thought  was  his  country,  and  long  and  deeply  will  his 
country  mourn  his  loss." 

The  remains  were  carried  to  New  Orleans.  They  were  laid  in  state  in 
the  mayor's  parlour,  and  the  public  admitted.  The  evidences  of  the  public 
sorrow  were  most  touching.  Flowers,  the  testimonies  of  tender  affection, 
encircled  his  coffin  simply,  but  beautifully.  And,  attended  by  all  the 
marks  of  unaffected  grief,  with  gentle  hands  and  weeping  eyes  moving 
softly  around  him,  the  great  commander,  with  his  sheathed  sword  still  by 
his  side,  was  borne  to  his  final  and  eternal  rest. 


CHAPTEK    XV. 


THE  MILITARY  SITUATION  OF  THE  LOWER  MISSISSIPPI. — THE   FALL   OF   NEW  ORLEANS. A  LONG 

TRAIN  OF  SECRET  HISTORY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ADMINISTRATION. — SENSE  OF  SECURITY 
IN  NEW  ORLEANS. — STRANGE  ERROUR  OF  THE  RICHMOND  AUTHORITIES. — GEN.  LOVELL's 
CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT. — STARTLING  DISCLOSURES. — NAVAL 
STRUCTURES  FOR  THE  DEFENCE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. — SECRETARY  MALLORY's  STATEMENT  TO 
THE  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS. — TESTIMONY  OF  GOV.  MOORE,  OF  LOUISIANA. — HIS  INTERPO 
SITION  WITH  THE  SHIP-BUILDERS. — THE  IRON-CLADS  MISSISSIPPI  AND  LOUISIANA. — CONDI 
TION  OF  THE  DEFENCES  OF  NEW  ORLEANS  IN  APRIL,  1862.— THE  RIVER  OBSTRUCTED  BY  A 
RAFT. — FARRAGUT'S  FLEET  AT  THE  MOUTH  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI. — FESTIVITY  IN  NEW 
ORLEANS. — BOMBARDMENT  OF  FORTS  JACKSON  AND  ST.  PHILIP. — PASSAGE  OF  THE  FORTS 
BY  THE  ENEMY'S  VESSELS. — THE  CONFEDERATE  GUNBOATS  ALL  DESTROYED. — CONFUSION 
AND  PANIC  IN  NEW  ORLEANS. — GREAT  CONFLAGRATION  IN  THE  CITY. — A  SCENE  OF  TERRI 
BLE  GRANDEUR. — LOVELL5S  EVACUATION  OF  NEW  ORLEANS. — DISORDER  IN  NEW  ORLEANS. 
— FARRAGUT'S  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  MAYOR  MONROE. — WHY  THE  MAYOR  PROTRACTED 
THE  CORRESPONDENCE. — A  NEW  HOPE  OF  DEFENCE. — SURRENDER  OF  FORTS  JACKSON  AND 

ST.  PHILIP. — GEN.  DUNCAN'S  SPEECH  ON  THE  LEVEE. — FARRAGUT'S  ULTIMATUM. — HOIST 
ING  OF  THE  STARS  AND  STRIPES  OVER  NEW  ORLEANS. — WHAT  THE  FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 
INVOLVED. — NOTE  :  GEN.  LOVELL's  REASONS  FOR  EVACUATING  NEW  ORLEANS. — RULE  OF 
BUTLER  IN  THE  CONQUERED  CITY. — CHARACTER  AND  PERSON  OF  "THE  TYRANT  OF  NEW 
ORLEANS." — "  THE  WOMAN-ORDER." — ARREST  OF  MAYOR  MONROE  AND  OF  VARIOUS  CITI 
ZENS. — BUTLER  ON  FEMALE  SECESSIONISTS. — HIS  OPINION  OF  "  SHE-ADDERS." — CONFISCA 
TIONS,  FINES,  AND  PLUNDER. — BUTLER'S  DECOY  FOR  ASSASSINS. — THE  HANGING  OF  MUM- 
FORD. — HIS  SPEECH  ON  THE  GALLOWS. — GENERAL  EXPERIENCE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY  OF 

THE  ENEMY'S  ATROCITY. — NEW  CODES  AND  METHODS  OF  WAR. — PROGRESS  OF  FEDERAL 

CRUELTY. 

THE  Confederate  public  had  been  disposed  to  find  some  consolation 
for  the  disaster  at  Island  No.  10  in  the  brilliant,  though  unfruitful  story 
of  Shiloh.  It  was  considered,  too,  that  the  river  below  Fort  Pillow  was 
safe  ;  and  that  while  the  army  at  Corinth  covered  Memphis,  and  held  the 
enemy  in  check  on  land,  the  rich  and  productive  valley  of  the  Lower 
Mississippi  was  yet  secure  to  the  Confederacy. 

But  in  the  midst  of  these  pleasing  calculations  and  comparative  re-assur 
ance,  a  great  disaster  was  to  occur  where  it  was  least  expected,  which  was 


246  THE    LOST    CAUSE. 

to  astound  the  people  of  the  South,  to  involve  the  practical  loss  of  another 
mass  of  rich  territory,  and  to  alarm  the  hopes  of  men  in  all  parts  of  the 
world  for  the  success  of  the  Confederates.  This  unexpected  event  was  the 
fall  of  New  Orleans. 

With  respect  to  this  disaster,  we  have  to  develop  a  long  train  of  the 
secret  history  of  the  Confederate  Administration — a  history  replete  with 
evidences  of  mismanagement  and  shiftlessness  that  will  be  almost  incredible 
to  the  world  accustomed  to  read  of  the  administration  of  governments  in 
time  of  war,  and  to  expect,  at  least,  an  average  of  intelligence  in  the  con 
duct  of  public  affairs. 


THE    FALL    OF   NEW    ORLEANS. 

.New  Orleans  had  been  so  long  threatened  with  attack,  that  popular 
opinion  in  the  Confederacy  was  disposed  to  take  it  as  impregnable.  For 
months  the  Federal  fleet  cruised  about  the  Gulf  with  evident  indecision, 
until  people  in  ISTew  Orleans  began  to  smile,  and  say  :  "  They  would  think 
twice  before  attempting  a  rehearsal  of  the  scenes  of  1812."  It  was 
declared,  on  the  authority  of  newspapers,  that  the  city  was  inpregnable  ; 
the  forts,  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  sixty  or  seventy  miles  below  the  city, 
were  considered  but  as  the  outer  line  of  defences  ;  the  shores  of  the  river 
were  lined  with  batteries  ;  and  in  the  harbour  were  reported  to  be  twelve 
gunboats,  and  certain  iron-clad  naval  structures  which,  it  was  asserted, 
were  superiour  to  the  famous  "  Virginia,"  and  would  deal  with  a  Federal 
fleet  as  hawks  might  with  a  flock  of  pigeons. 

But  penetrating  this  popular  conceit  and  confidence,  and  going  to  offi 
cial  records  for  proofs,  we  shall  discover  that  the  facts  were  that  New 
Orleans  was  in  a  shamefully  defenceless  condition ;  that  the  Richmond 
authorities  had  persisted  in  the  strange  errour  that  the  attack  on  the  city 
was  to  come  from  above  ;  that  they  had  consequently  stripped  it  almost  en 
tirely  of  troops,  and  neglected  the  armament  of  its  interiour  line  of  defence ; 
and  that  the  naval  structures,  which  the  authorities  had  declared  would  be 
fully  able  to  protect  the  city  under  any  circumstances,  were,  by  the  most 
wretched  and  culpable  mismanagement,  neglected,  delayed,  and  finally 
found  in  a  condition  in  which  they  were  not  of  the  slightest  avail. 

Gen.  Mansfield  Lovell  assumed  command  of  the  defences  of  New 
Orleans  late  in  October,  1861.  The  city  at  that  time  had  been  "drained 
of  arms,  ammunition,  medical  stores,  clothing  and  supplies,  which  had  been 
sent  to  other  points,"  and  the  defences  were  in  a  thoroughly  incomplete 
condition.  The  troops  raised  in  Louisiana  had  been  principally  sent  to 
Virginia  and  Pensacola,  and  those  that  remained  were  necessarily  inade 
quate  to  the  end  desired,  and  required  organization. 


THE  FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.  247 

Several  vessels  were  in  course  of  construction  by  the  Navy  Department, 
but  according  to  the  express  orders  of  President  Davis  "  the  fleet  main 
tained  at  the  port  of  New  Orleans  and  vicinity  formed  no  part  of  the  com 
mand  of  Gen.  Lovell."  The  first  step  taken  by  that  officer  was  to  secure 
ammunition,  of  which  there  was  less  than  twenty  pounds  per  gun ;  the 
second  was  to  complete  the  "  raft  between  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  so 
as  to  make  a  complete  obstruction  under  the  fire  of  those  works."  On  the 
8th  November,  Gen.  Lovell  wrote  to  the  Department  that  he  had  increased 
the  armament  of  Forts  Pike  and  Macomb,  and  thought  he  would  be  able 
to  make  a  complete  obstruction  of  the  raft,  so  that  if  the  enemy's  ships 
should  be  stopped,  they  would  be  hammered  to  pieces.  This  obstruction 
wras  calculated  to  delay  a  "  fleet  under  the  close  fire  of  more  than  one 
hundred  heavy  guns."  Measures  were  also  taken  to  obstruct  the  passage 
at  Forts  Pike  and  Macomb,  and  the  river  above  the  city,  the  commanding 
General  "  feeling  satisfied  that  ships  under  steam  can  pass  forts  in  an  open 
channel." 

On  the  5th  December,  1861,  a  statement  was  made  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  of  the  existing  condition  of  affairs,  in  which  it  wras  shown  that  the 
city  was  defended  by  two  lines  of  works,  for  which  Gen.  Lovell  had  8,000 
men,  besides  the  militia  of  the  city.  Two  powder  mills  were  in  running 
order,  and  the  announcement  was  made  that  with  a  "  sufficiency  of  this 
material,  he  should  consider  himself  in  a  position  to  hold  New  Orleans  for 
an  indefinite  length  of  time."  The  city  was  then  strong  enough  to  with 
stand  any  attack  likely  to  be  made,  and  Gen.  Lovell  stated  that  the  enemy, 
who  were  at  that  time  landing  troops  at  Ship  Island  in  large  numbers, 
"  could  not  take  New  Orleans  by  a  land  attack  with  any  force  they  could 
bring  to  bear." 

In  the  beginning  of  January  the  attention  of  the  Department  was 
directed  to  the  necessity  of  giving  to  the  commanding  General  the  control 
of  at  least  so  much  of  the  Navy  Department  as  would  enable  him,  by 
means  of  light-draught  armed  vessels,  to  protect  the  navigable  streams 
along  the  coast ;  Gen.  Lovell  adding,  that  u  the  blame  of  want  of  protec 
tion  will  rest  upon  me  in  any  event,  and  I  should,  therefore,  have  some 
power  to  say  what  should  be  done."  No  answer  to  this  request  was 
made. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  about  this  time,  furnished  Gen.  Lovell  with  the 
plan  and  details  of  the  river  defence  fleet,  under  Montgomery,  for  "  service 
in  the  upper  Mississippi,"  which  was  to  be  prepared  at  New  Orleans,  by 
Capts.  Montgomery  and  Townsend,  and  the  General  was  directed  "  merely 
to  exercise  such  general  supervision  as  to  check  any  profligate  expendi 
ture." 

On  the  13th  January,  Gen.  Lovell  wrote,  that  "considering  JNew 
Orleans  to  be  in  condition  to  resist  an  attack,  I  am  turning  my  attention 


248  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

to  the  coast  of  Mississippi."  The  obstructions  in  the  river  at  this  time 
were  complete,  and  the  forts  well  manned. 

On  the  8th  of  February,  the  Secretary  of  War  wrote  as  follows  :  "  The 
President  desires  that,  as  soon  as  possible,  on  receipt  of  this  letter,  you 
despatch  5,000  men  to  Columbus  to  reinforce  that  point,  sorely  threatened 
by  largely  superiour  forces.  New  Orleans  is  to  be  defended  from  above, 
by  defeating  the  enemy  at  Columbus."  Gen.  Lovell  replied  :  "I  regret 
the  necessity  of  sending  away  my  only  force  at  this  particular  juncture, 
and  feel  sure  that  it  will  create  a  great  panic  here,  but  will  do  my  best  to 
restore  confidence  by  a  show  of  strength." 

On  the  27th  February,  Gen.  Lovell  notified  the  Secretary  of  War  that 
he  had  sent  "  eight  regiments  and  two  batteries  from  his  department,  besides 
five  hundred  shot  guns,"  and  added  :  "  People  are  beginning  to  complain 
that  I  have  stripped  the  department  so  completely  ;  but  I  have  called  upon 
Gov.  Moore  for  10,000  volunteers  and  militia  for  State  service.  Raw 
troops  with  double-barrelled  shot  guns  are  amply  sufficient  to  hold  our 
entrenchments  against  such  troops  as  the  enemy  can  send  to  attack  them." 

In  the  same  letter  he  adverted  to  the  fact  that  he  had  "  furnished 
Gens.  Johnston  and  Polk,  large  supplies."  In  his  letter  of  March  6th  he 
stated : 

"  This  Department  is  being  completely  drained  of  everything.  We 
have  filled  requisitions  for  arms,  men  and  munitions,  until  New  Orleans 
is  about  defenceless.  In  return  we  get  nothing.  Mobile  and  Pensacola, 
even  Galveston,  are  defended  by  ten-inch  columbiads,  while  this  city  has 
nothing  above  an  eight-inch,  and  but  few  of  them.  The  fortified  line 
about  the  city  is  complete,  but  I  have  taken  ten  of  the  guns  for  the  navy, 
and  sixteen  for  the  vessels  that  we  are  fitting  up -for  the  river  expedition. 
My  reliance  to  defend  these  lines  will  be  with  militia  with  double-bar 
relled  guns  and  32-pound  carronades.  If  now  you  take  the  powder  from 
me,  we  shall  be  in  no  condition  to  resist.  The  only  thing  to  provide  is  a 
sufficiency  of  powder,  to  enable  us  to  resist  a  prolonged  attack  of  ships  and 
mortar  boats  upon  two  points,  Forts  Pike  and  Macomb,  and  Forts  Jack 
son  and  St.  Philip.  If  the  first  are  passed,  we  still  have  a  land  defence  to 
make  ;  if  the  last,  a  fleet  can  proceed  at  once  to  the  city." 

On  the  9th,  Gen.  Lovell  again  wrote,  after  enumerating  the  troops 
sent  away  : 

u  You  will  thus  perceive  that  this  Department  has  been  completely 
stripped  of  every  organized  body  of  troops.  Persons  are  found  here  who 
assert  that  I  am  sending  away  all  troops  so  that  the  city  may  fall  an  easy 
prey  to  the  enemy.  All  requisitions  for  ammunition  have  been  filled, 
until  I  have  none  left,  except  what  is  in  the  hands  of  troops.  Neither 
have  I  funds  placed  at  my  disposal  to  create  supplies  in  place  of  those  sent 
off.  If  the  enemy  intends  an  attack  here,  he  will  make  it  soon,  and  I 


THE  FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.  249 

hope  no  further  calls  will  be  made  until  we  are  placed  in  a  defensible 
condition." 

While  this  correspondence  was  going  on  between  Gen.  Lovell  and  the 
"War  Department,  we  shall  see  what  had  become  of  the  naval  structures 
in  the  harbour,  that  were  calculated,  as  the  Richmond  authorities  claimed, 
i  to  allay  all  the  fears  of  Gen.  Lovell,  and  to  assure,  in  any  circumstances, 
the  safety  of  New  Orleans.  Mr.  Benjamin,  the  Secretary  of  "War,  had 
written  to  Gen.  Lovell :  "  From  the  recent  experiment  of  the  Virginia, 
and  what  I  hear  of  the  steamers  of  New  Orleans,  I  feel  confident  that  if 
even  one  of  them  can.be  got  ready  before  you  are  attacked,  she  will  dis 
perse  and  destroy  any  fleet  the  enemy  can  gather  in  the  river,  above  or 
below.  The  naval  officers  say  that  TIFT'S  steamer  is  far  superiour  to  the 
Virginia." 

In  the  report  of  Mr.  Mallory,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  made  to  the  Con 
federate  Congress  on  the  27th  of  February,  1862,  he  had  made  the  follow 
ing  statement :  "  There  are  now  being  constructed  at  New  Orleans  two 
large  and  formidable  iron-plated  steamships,  of  about  fourteen  hundred 
tons  each,  designed  for  the  carrying  of  twenty  of  the  heaviest  guns.  One 
of  these,  the  Louisiana,  has  been  launched,  and  is  nearly  completed,  and 
the  other,  it  is  believed,  will  be  completed  in  six  weeks." 

With  reference  to  the  construction  of  these  vessels  we  may  place  here 
the  testimony  of  Gov.  Moore  of  Louisiana,  taken  before  a  secret  commit 
tee  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  not  only  for  its  interest  to  the  immediate 
subject,  but  for  its  curious  explanation  of  the  way  the  affairs  of  the  Con 
federacy  were  managed.  The  following  are  extracts  from  his  testimony  : 

"  My  first  active  interposition,  of  which  any  record  is  kept,  was  on  the  26th  of  Feb 
ruary,  1862.  Several  weeks  prior  to  that  date  I  had  been  aware  that  the  work  on  the 
ram  Mississippi  was  not  being  prosecuted  with  the  vigour  and  energy'  that  our  danger 
seemed  to  me  to  require.  Many  merchants  and  business  men  of  New  Orleans,  and  par 
ticularly  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  had  spoken  to  me  of  the  slow  progress  of  the 
work,  but  I  had  refrained  from  any  interference,  except  verbal  expressions  of  my  dis 
satisfaction  to  the  Commanding  General,  (Lovell)  who  in  turn  assured  me  he  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  work.  At  length  the  excuse  was  given  for  this  torturing  wan* 
of  vigour,  that  the  work  could  not  proceed  faster  for  want  of  funds.  The  Navy  Depart 
ment  had  not  paid  its  obligations,  and,  in  consequence,  had  lost  credit.  I  therefore 
telegraphed  the  Treasury  Department  as  follows : 

"NEW  ORLEANS,  February  26th,  1862. 
"  C.  G.  MEMMINGER,  Secretary  Treasury,  Richmond : 

"  The  Navy  Department  here  owes  nearly  a  million.  Its  credit  is  stopped.  If  you  wish,  I  will 
place  two  millions  of  dollars  on  account  of  the  war  tax,  to  the  credit  of  the  Government,  so  that 
the  debts  can  be  paid,  and  the  works  continued. 

"  [Signed]  THOMAS  0.  MOORE,  Governor." 

******** 
"  One  of  the  causes  of  the  delay  in  completing  the  Mississippi  was  the  insufficient 


250  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

number  of  hands  employed.  I  had  long  been  sensible  of  this,  but  there  was  no  officer 
of  the  Government  who  seemed  to  feel  authorized  to  interpose.  I  learned  in  April  the 
excuse  given  was,  that  they  could  not  be  obtained,  and  I  instantly  addressed  a  letter  to 
the  ship-builders,  of  which  the  following  is  an  extract.  Its  date  is  April  15th.  'The 
great  importance  of  having  at  once  completed  the  steam-ram  Mississippi,  induces  me 
to  call  on  you  to  render  Mr.  Tift,  the  builder,  all  the  assistance  that  can  be  advantage 
ously  employed  for  that  purpose.  It  may  be  that  the  ship,  completed  and  fitted  in  fif 
teen  days,  as  we  hope  will  be  done,  may  be  worth  to  us  as  much,  and  perhaps  more, 
than  fifty  thousand  soldiers,  as  it  is  believed  that  she  could  clear  the  river  of  the  whole 
United  States  navy.'  A  large  addition  of  workmen  was  instantly  made,  the  ship-builders 
furnishing  as  many  men  as  the  Tifts  were  willing  to  receive. 

"  Another  cause  of  the  delay  was  a  failure  of  the  Tifts  to '  comprehend  the  fact  that 
the  city  was  in  danger.  I  did  not  know,  until  after  the  city  had  fallen,  that  even  if  the 
wood-work  had  been  completed,  the  means  were  not  at  hand  to  put  her  in  fighting  con 
dition.  I  was  subsequently  informed  that  at  the  time  the  city  fell,  the  plates  for  the  rain 
were  being  manufactured  in  Atlanta,  and  her  guns  were  scattered  along  the  railroad 
from  Weldon  lo  Jackson,  which  latter  place  they  did  not  reach  until  weeks  afterward." 

In  the  month  of  April,  1862,  the  condition  of  the  defences  of  New  Or 
leans  was  as  follows :  As  against  a  land  attack  by  any  force  the  enemy 
could  probably  bring,  the  interiour  line  of  fortifications,  as  adopted  and 
completed  by  Major-Gen.  Lovell,  was  a  sufficient  defence  of  the  city,  but 
his  ability  to  hold  that  line  against  such  an  attack  was  greatly  impaired 
by  the  withdrawal  from  him,  by  superiour  authority,  of  nearly  all  his 
effective  troops.  The  exteriour  line  was  well  devised,  and  rendered  as 
strong  as  the  means  of  his  command  allowed.  But  the  iron-clad  gunboats, 
Louisiana  and  Mississippi,  were  not  ready  for  service.  In  this  extremity  it 
was  indispensably  necessary  to  obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi 
River  between  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  ;  and  to  do  this,  a  raft  was 
completed  under  Gen.  Lovell's  direction.  It  consisted  of  a  line  of  eleven 
dismasted  schooners,  extending  from  bank  to  bank,  strongly  moored,  and 
connected  by  six  heavy  chains. 

The  Federal  fleet  which  threatened  New  Orleans,  consisted  of  forty-six 
sail,  carrying  two  hundred  and  eighty-six  guns  and  twenty-one  mortars ; 
the  whole  under  the  command  of  Flag-officer  Farragut.  The  raft  con 
structed  by  Gen.  Lovell  was  placed  about  a  mile  below  Forts  Jackson  and 
St.  Philip.  Unfortunately,  a  chasm  was  rent  in  it  by  a  severe  storm  ;  and 
on  the  16th  of  April,  the  enemy  slowly  steamed  up  the  stream  in  strong 
force,  and  prepared  to  attack  the  forts. 

Still  there  was  no  alarm  in  New  Orleans,  as  it  was  popularly  supposed 
that  the  enemy  only  intended  a  bombardment  of  the  forts,  and  would  ac 
complish  but  little  in  such  an  enterprise.  Festivity  prevailed  in  the  city. 
Balls,  parties,  theatres,  operas,  and  the  like  were  the  incidents  of  every 
twenty-four  hours.  Thousands  flocked  down  the  river,  and  on  the  levees 
viewed  the  bombardment  with  evident  pleasure,  for  it  was  soon  ascertained 


THE  FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.  251 

that  the  enemy's  fire  was  inaccurate,  and  that  few,  if  any,  of  their  eleven- 
inch  shell  ever  touched  the  forts.  At  night,  the  greatest  vigilance  was 
maintained,  to  inform  commanders  of  the  enemy's  movements.  On  the 
23d  of  April,  the  terrific  bombardment  had  continued  a  whole  week ;  the 
enemy  had  thrown  over  twenty-five  thousand  shells ;  and  Gen.  Duncan 
reported  that  two  of  his  guns  in  Fort  Jackson  were  dismounted ;  half  a 
dozen  killed  and  wounded  was  the  total  loss,  and  the  works  were  as  sound 
as  ever. 

The  evening  of  the  23d  of  April  closed  without  unusual  incident.  Our 
defences  were  thought  to  be  impassable,  and  strong  hopes  were  entertained 
that  Farragut  would  soon  give  up  the  conflict  as  fruitless  and  abortive 
Towards  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  the  enemy's  vessels  were 
descried  creeping  up  the  river  in  full  force,  and  as  they  steamed  abreast  of  the 
forts  were  received  with  deafening  roars  from  our  artillery.  The  conflict  be 
came  furious.  Through  a  storm  of  fire  the  ships  passed  on,  Farragut  lead 
ing  in  the  Hartford.  They  had  not  proceeded  far  when  they  encountered  the 
Confederate  fleet,  consisting  of  seventeen  vessels  in  all,  only  about  eight  of 
which  were  armed.  The  Confederate  gunboats  carried,  some  of  them,  two 
guns,  and  others  only  one.  Nevertheless,  they  fought  with  desperation 
against  the  enemy's  overwhelming  force,  until  they  were  all  driven  on 
shore  and  scuttled  or  burned  by  their  commanders.  The  Louisiana  was 
unmanageable,  and  could  only  use  two  of  her  nine  guns  ;  so  when  it  was 
perceived  that  nothing  could  prevent  the  enemy  from  breaking  our  line, 
she  was  run  ashore,  and  blown  up,  although  the  enemy's  broadsides  had 
not  injured  her  in  the  least.  The  Governor  Moore,  another  of  our  boats, 
commanded  by  the  brave  Capt.  Kennon,  acted  nobly  among  the  enemy's 
twelve  heavy  sloops-of-war  and  gunboats,  and  fired  its  last  cartridge  at 
point-blank  range,  but  was  also  run  ashore  and  blown  up,  to  prevent 
capture. 

The  scene  of  confusion  that  ensued  in  New  Orleans,  when  the  people, 
on  the  morning  of  the  24th  of  April,  awoke  to  the  news  that  the  enemy's 
fleet  had  passed  the  forts,  and  were  actually  approaching  the  city,  defies 
all  description.  People  were  amazed,  and  could  scarcely  realize  the  awful 
fact,  and  ran  hither  and  thither  in  speechless  astonishment.  Very  soon  the 
flames  seen  issuing  from  shipyards  in  Algiers  and  other  places,  convinced 
them  that  the  news  was  authentic,  and  that  Government  officers  were  then 
busily  engaged  destroying  everything  that  was  likely  to  be  of  value  to  the 
enemy.  The  unfinished  Mississippi  and  other  vessels  were  scuttled  or 
fired,  ammunition  destroyed,  and  shot  sunk  in  the  river.  The  people,  on 
their  part,  proceeded  to  the  various  cotton-presses,  rolled  out  thousands  of 
bales,  and  applied  the  torch ;  countless  cotton  ships  were  also  sunk  or 
fired,  and  steamboats  by  the  dozen  similarly  destroyed.  The  roar  of  can 
non  sounded  in  the  distance ;  the  heat  of  the  sun,  and  conflagrations  in 


252  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

every  direction,  made  the  atmosphere  oppressively  hot,  while  dense  col 
umns  of  smoke  darkened  the  air.  It  was  a  scene  of  terrible  grandeur.  The 
baleful  glare  of  the  conflagration  struggled  in  rivalry  with  the  sunlight ; 
masses  of  smoke  ascended  grandly  to  the  sky ;  great  ships  and  steamers, 
wrapped  in  fire,  floated  down  the  river,  threatening  the  Federal  vessels 
with  destruction  by  their  fiery  contact.  And  in  this  scene  of  dire  and 
sublime  destruction,  there  were  perpetually  tolled  the  alarm-bells  of  the 
city. 

Having  narrowly  escaped  capture  in  the  naval  engagement,  Gen.  Lovell 
rode  rapidly  by  the  Levee  road,  and  arrived  in  town  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  Crowds  gathered  round  him  while  he  related  the  events 
of  the  engagement  below,  bearing  testimony  to  the  heroism  of  our  little 
navy  of  indifferent  vessels,  and  seeming  bewildered  at  the  unexpected  ca 
lamity  which  had  befallen  him.  He  considered  ,it  advisable  for  his  small 
force  to  retire  without  the  limits  of  the  city  to  avert  a  bombardment,  and 
this  idea  was  fully  endorsed  by  the  City  Council.  Accordingly,  late  in  the 
day,  his  whole  force,  of  not  more  than  twenty-eight  hundred  effective  men, 
departed  by  rail  some  fifteen  miles  above  the  city,  with  orders  to  keep 
within  easy  call  in  case  of  emergency. 

The  evacuation  of  the  city  by  Gen.  Lovell's  troops  was  the  signal  for  a 
new  consternation,  and  another  era  of  disorder  in  the  city.  Uproar  and 
confusion  continued  throughout  the  day  and  all  night,  while  now  and 
then  heavy  guns  could  be  heard  down  the  river,  as  if  the  enemy  was 
cautiously  approaching,  and  firing  at  suspicious  objects.  Crowds  of  the 
poor  were  enjoying  a  rich  harvest  by  the  wholesale  destruction  of  proper 
ty,  and  scores  of  them  could  be  seen  with  baskets,  and  bags,  and  drays, 
carrying  off  whatever  plunder  fell  in  their  way.  A  low,  murmuring 
voice  filled  the  air — it  was  the  conversation  of  assembled  thousands.  Some 
were  for  burning  the  city,  rather  than  permit  it  to  fall  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  ;  but  the  opinion  prevailed  that  such  foolish  excesses  should  be 
at  once  put  in  check,  and  that  the  city,  being  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the 
foe,  nothing  should  be  done  to  provoke  a  bombardment. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  April,  Farragut's  advance  was  observed 
steamiug  up  towards  the  city.  When  abreast  of  the  Chalmette  batteries 
on  both  sides  of  the  city,  he  was  saluted  with  volleys  from  the  earthworks, 
but,  beiDg  uninjured,  ran  past  and  cast  anchor  at  intervals  before  the  city, 
with  ports  open,  and  every  preparation  made  for  a  bombardment.  Farra- 
gut  then  opened  communication  with  the  Mayor,  and  demanded  the  sur 
render  of  the  city,  together  with  Lovell's  forces  ;  but  the  latter  were  away, 
the  city  had  been  left  under  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Mayor  Monroe, 
and  he  avoided  a  formal  surrender,  declaring  that  if  the  enemy  desired  the 
removal  of  objectionable  flags  floating  over  the  public  buildings  of  New 
Orleans,  he  must  do  it  by  his  own  force. 


THE  FALL  OF  NEW  OELEANS.  253 

The  correspondence  touching  the  surrender  of  the  city  was  protracted 
until  the  28th  of  April.  There  was  a  purpose  in  this.  The  confidence  of 
the  people  had,  in  a  measure,  rallied  ;  there  were  yet  glimpses  of  hope.  As 
long  as  Forts  St.  Philip,  Jackson,  and  the  Chalmette  batteries  remained 
intact,  it  was  thought  that  something  might  be  done  to  save  the  city.  The 
enemy's  fleet  had  no  forces  with  which  to  occupy  it ;  his  transports  were 
unable  to  get  up  the  river,  as  long  as  the  forts  held  out.  The  enemy's  land 
forces,  under  Gen.  Butler,  were  at  Ship  Island  and  Mississippi  City.  Had 
he  attempted  to  march  overland  upon  New  Orleans,  the  levees  would  have 
been  cut,  and  his  men  drowned  in  the  swamps. 

But  the  last  hope  was  to  be  extinguished.  While  Farragut  and  Mayor 
Monroe  were  exchanging  angry  letters  of  great  length,  the  overwhelming 
news  reached  New  Orleans,  that  Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson  had  surren 
dered  to  the  enemy.  The  surrender  was  made  in  consequence  of  a  mutiny 
of  the  garrisons.  On  examining  his  guns  in  Fort  Jackson,  Gen.  Duncan 
found  many  spiked,  several  dismounted,  and  not  less  than  three  hundred 
men  clamoring  around  him  for  a  surrender.  Remonstrances,  threats,  and 
entreaties  were  alike  useless.  In  vain  Gen.  Duncan  declared  to  the  men 
that  it  would  be  an  eternal  shame  to  give  up  the  works,  provisioned  as 
they  were,  and  scarcely  touched  by  the  enemy.  In  vain  he  vowed  that 
the  forts  were  impregnable.  In  vain  he  promised  that  he  would  blow  up 
all  Butler's  transports  in  a  trice,  if  his  men  would  only  stand  by  him.  The 
soulless  creatures  who  disgraced  the  Confederate  uniform  had  no  reply  to 
these  arguments  and  appeals.  Nothing  would  satisfy  them  but  surrender. 
Ragged,  dusty,  powder-blackened,  and  exhausted,  Duncan  reached  New 
Orleans,  to  tell  the  story  of  the  great  misfortune  ;  and  as  he  narrated  it  on 
the  levee  he  wept,  and  the  hundreds  who  listened  to  him  were  silent  with 
amazement  and  shame. 

Farragut,  being  informed  of  the  surrender  of  the  forts,  was  now  anxious 
to  expedite  the  full  and  formal  surrender  of  the  city,  before  the  arrival  of 
Butler  with  his  transports.  The  correspondence  with  the  Mayor  had  con 
tinued  through  several  days.  On  the  28th  of  April,  Farragut  addressed 
his  ultimatum  to  that  officer,  complaining  of  the  continued  display  of  the 
State  flag  of  Louisiana  on  the  City  Hall,  and  concluding  with  a  threat  of 
the  bombardment  of  the  city,  by  notifying  him  to  remove  the  women  and 
children  from  its  limits  within  forty-eight  hours.  The  flag  was  not  re 
moved,  and  the  threat  was  not  fulfilled.  On  the  1st  of  May,  Farragut  re 
luctantly  consented  to  send  his  own  forces  to  take  down  the  flag. 

About  noon,  he  sent  on  shore  a  party  of  two  hundred  marines  with  two 
brass  howitzers,  who  marched  through  the  streets  and  formed  before  the 
City  Hall.  The  officer  in  command  ascended  to  the  dome  of  the  building, 
and  took  down  the  objectionable  State  banner — the  sign  of  all  State  rights. 
The  act  was  done  in  profound  silence ;  there  were  no  idle  utterances  of 


254  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

curiosity ;  indignation  was  impotent,  and  men  with  compressed  lips  and 
darkened  brows  witnessed  the  first  ceremony  of  their  humiliation,  and  saw 
erected  above  them  the  emblem  of  tyrannical  oppression.  A  speechless 
crowd  of  many  thousands  thronged  the  streets ;  a  line  of  bayonets  glis 
tened  within  the  square ;  the  marines  stood  statue-like ;  the  very  air  was 
oppressive  with  stillness ;  and  so,  in  dead  silence,  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
were  hoisted  over  New  Orleans,  and  the  city  passed  forever  from  the  rule 
and  power  of  the  Confederates. 

Thus,  after  an  engagement  the  casualties  of  which  might  be  counted  by 
hundreds,  fell  New  Orleans,  with  its  population  of  one  hundred  and  seven 
ty  thousand  souls — the  commercial  capital  of  the  South,  and  the  largest 
exporting  city  in  the  world.  It  was  a  terrible  disaster  to  the  Confederacy. 
The  fall  of  Donelson  broke  our  centre  in  the  West.  The  fall  of  New  Or 
leans  yet  more  sorely  punished  the  vanity  of  the  Confederates ;  annihi 
lated  their  power  in  Louisiana ;  broke  up  their  routes  to  Texas  and  the 
Gulf;  closed  their  access  to  the  richest  grain  and  cattle  country  in  the 
South  ;  gave  to  the  enemy  a  new  base  of  operations  ;  and,  more  than  any 
thing  else,  staggered  the  confidence  of  Europe  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Con 
federacy.*  And  yet  these  disasters  were  very  far  from  deciding  the  war. 

*  The  following  document,  put  in  our  possession,  discusses  the  evacuation  of  New  Orleans  in  a 
military  point  of  view,  in  a  very  intelligible  style  that  will  interest  the  general  reader,  and  completes 
in  all  respects  the  story  of  the  disaster :  ^ 

Major- General  Lovelies  reasons  for  evacuating  New  Orleans. 

"I  determined  to  evacuate  the-city,  when  the  enemy  succeeded  in  passing  the  forts,  for  the  fol 
lowing  reasons :  The  principal  and  almost  entire  concentration  of  strength  in  guns,  men,  and  ships, 
had  been  made  at  that  point.  It  had  been  selected  as  the  spot  where  the  battle  for  the  defence  of 
New  Orleans,  against  a  fleet  coming  up  the  river,  should  be  fought,  and  everything  available  for  the 
defence  below,  both  ashore  and  afloat,  had  been  collected  there,  except  the  twelve  guns  on  the  river 
at  the  lower  interior  line,  which  had  been  put  there  to  flank  that  line.  The  obstructions  had  been 
placed  there,  and,  until  swept  away,  had  been  a  complete  bar  to  the  passage  of  a  hostile  fleet,  and 
the  Naval  and  River  Defence  officers  had  brought  to  bear  at  that  point  all  their  available  strength  ; 
and  although  New  Orleans  was  still  in  condition  to  resist  any  attack  by  land,  yet  when,  after  six 
days  and  nights  of  incessant  conflict,  the  forts  were  passed,  and  all  our  defences  afloat  were  either 
burnt  or  sunk,  I  knew  that  there  was  no  material  obstacle  to  prevent  the  fleet  from  proceeding  at 
once  to  the  city,  and  that  all  the  guns,  forts,  and  men  on  the  other  ten  or  twelve  water  approaches 
would  go  for  nought. 

"  The  twelve  guns  in  the  open  earthworks  at  the  lower  line  had  but  twenty  rounds  of  powder 
each  (the  remainder  having  been  given  to  the  Louisiana),  and  could  offer  no  serious  resistance  to  a 
fleet  which  had  already  passed  more  than  one  hundred  guns  in  masonry  works,  better  manned,  and 
amply  supplied  with  powder. 

"  The  city  was  surrounded  by  swamps,  and  there  was  but  one  outlet  by  land,  viz.,  through  the 
narrow  neck  between  the  river  and  Lake  Pontchartrain.  At  Kenner,  on  the  Mississippi,  ten  miles 
above  the  city,  the  firm  ground  between  the  river  and  swamp  which  borders  the  lake  is  narrowed  to 
about  three  quarters  of  a  mile,  through  which  passes  the  Jackson  Railroad.  The  river  at  this  time 
was  full  to  the  tops  of  the  levees,  and  a  single  one  of  their  large  ships  of  war,  by  anchoring  at  this 
point,  would  have  commanded  with  her  broadsides  (at  point-blank  range)  the  only  land  exit  from 


THE  FALL  OF  NEW  ORLEANS.  255 

A  train  of  Confederate  victories  was  to  follow  them,  and  the  attention  of 
the  world  was  now  to  be  fixed  upon  the  campaign  in  Virginia. 

New  Orleans,  sweeping  with  her  guns  (which  would  have  been  higher  than  the  surface  of  the  coun 
try)  every  foot  of  ground  between  the  river  and  the  lake. 

"  The  obstructions  placed  across  the  Rigolets  at  Fort  Pike  had  been  swept  away  in  a  storm  short 
ly  before  by  some  vessels  which  had  broken  adrift,  and  there  was  an  open  channel  fully  as  wide  as 
the  Mississippi  River  into  Lake  Pontchartrain,  which  could  easily  be  passed  by  the  enemy  at  night. 
Such  a  movement,  in  connection  with  the  placing  of  one  or  more  ships  at  Kenner,  would  have  com 
pletely  surrounded  New  Orleans,  cutting  off  all  communications  by  land  or  water  with  the  iuteriour. 
My  efforts  to  accumulate  provisions  enough  in  the  city  to  feed  the  population  had  proved  abortive, 
and  an  examination  made  a  few  days  previous  to  the  evacuation,  had  satisfied  me  that  there  were  not 
in  the  city  provisions  enough  to  sustain  the  population  for  more  than  eighteen  days.  Taking  it  for 
granted  that  the  enemy  would  occupy  Kenner,  as,  indeed,  he  did  in  a  few  days,  we  should  have  been 
starved  into  a  surrender  in  less  than  three  weeks,  for  when  the  hostile  fleet  anchored  in  front  of  the 
city,  we  were  entirely  cut  off  from  Texas  and  Red  River — our  main  sources  of  supply. 

"  I  had  more  than  three  months'  rations  available  for  my  troops  (less  than  three  thousand  men), 
but  this  would  have  answered  but  a  few  days  for  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  persons. 
Some  of  the  steamers  at  the  levee  had  been  destroyed,  and  a  number  had  fled  up  the  river,  so  that 
the  Jackson  Railroad  was  the  only  means  of  transportation  for  removing  the  women,  children,  and 
non-combatants  from  the  city,  which  removal  it  would  have  required  months  to  accomplish.  In  the 
vicinity  of  New  Orleans,  and  for  many  miles  above,  there  was  nothing  but  swamps  filled  with  water, 
in  which  the  families  could  take  refuge,  and,  moreover,  a  great  portion  of  the  male  protectors  of 
these  families  were  absent  with  our  armies  in  Tennessee  and  Virginia,  and,  of  course,  could  not 
superintend  their  removal.  The  plan,  therefore,  of  removing  the  non-combatants,  and  remaining 
with  the  troops,  was  entirely  impracticable.  Thirteen  of  the  enemy's  ships  were  anchored  abreast 
of  the  city  with  their  guns  looking  down  the  streets,  which  they  could  have  swept  to  the  swamps 
in  rear  of  the  houses,  or  set  on  fire  at  a  number  of  points,  and  had  I  continued  to  occupy  it  with 
troops,  they  would  have  been  justified  by  the  laws  of  war  in  opening  fire  after  due  notice  to  the 
women  and  children  to  withdraw  from  danger.  I  knew  that  they  had  not,  and  could  not  have  for 
several  days,  any  land  forces  to  take  possession,  and  having  determined,  for  the  reasons  above  stated, 
to  evacuate  the  city,  I  thought  it  best  to  remove  the  troops  at  once  and  speedily,  and  thus  convert 
New  Orleans  from  a  military  position  into  that  of  an  ungarrisoned  city.  By  so  doing,  I  should  de 
prive  the  enemy  of  all  pretext  for  a  wanton  and  useless  sacrifice  of  life  and  property,  and  as  they 
were  unable  to  occupy  it,  I  would  have  a  number  of  days  for  the  undisturbed  removal  of  the  vast 
amount  of  public  property  which  was  on  hand  at  that  time.  My  troops,  however,  were  placed  at 
Camp  Moore,  only  four  hours'  run  from  the  city  by  rail,  and  I  could  have  reoccupied  it  at  any  time 
for  several  days  after  the  evacuation,  if  it  had  been  deemed  advisable.  Had  I  regarded  the  outside 
popular  clamor  that  would  ensue,  I  should  have  subjected  the  people  of  New  Orleans  to  a  bombard 
ment  ;  but  I  did  not  think  myself  justified  for  such  a  purpose  in  spilling  the  blood  of  women  and 
children,  when  I  knew  that  in  two  or  three  weeks  at  farthest,  want  of  food  for  the  inhabitants  would 
compel  me  to  evacuate  the  city,  or,  if  that  had  been  then  impossible,  to  surrender. 

"  I  spoke  to  the  Mayor,  several  members  of  the  City  Council,  and  many  prominent  citizens,  on 
the  subject,  and  while  none  seemed  unwilling  to  undergo  any  danger,  if  by  so  doing  they  could  ar 
rive  at  favourable  results,  yet  all,  without  exception,  under  the  circumstances,  approved  of  and 
advised  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops. 

"  In  determining  upon  the  evacuation,  I  necessarily,  as  soon  as  the  enemy's  fleet  had  passed  the 
forts,  regarded  the  position  the  same  as  if  both  their  army  and  navy  were  present  before  the  city, 
making  due  allowance  simply  for  the  time  it  would  take  them  to  transport  their  army  up  ;  mas- 
much  as  their  ships,  having  passed  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  they  could  at  once  place  them 
selves  in  open  and  uninterrupted  communication  with  their  army  at  points  from  six  to  twenty  miles 
above  the  forts,  through  various  small  water  communications  from  the  Gulf,  made  more  available 


256  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

But  before  passing  to  those  memorable  fields,  we  may  glance  at  a  se 
quel  of  the  surrender  of  New  Orleans,  which,  indeed,  is  among  the  most 


by  the  extraordinary  height  of  the  river,  and  which,  while  we  were  in  possession  of  the  latter,  I  had 
easily  and  without  risk  defended  with  launches  and  a  part  of  the  River  Defence  fleet.  I  had  also 
stationed  Skymanski's  Regiment  at  Quarantine  for  the  same  object.  These,  however,  were  all  de 
stroyed  or  captured  by  the  enemy's  fleet,  after  they  got  possession  of  the  river  between  the  forts 
and  the  city. 

"  There  was  a  further  and  very  important  reason  for  the  course  which  I  pursued.  I  knew  that 
if  I  remained  in  New  Orleans,  we  should  in  all  probability  lose  in  a  short  time  troops,  guns,  and 
supplies  of  all  kinds,  and  the  enemy  would  then  be  in  full  possession  of  the  river  as  far  as  Memphis, 
which  eventually  fell  also  into  their  hands.  By  withdrawing  my  command,  however,  I  would  be 
enabled  to  fortify,  arm,  and  garrison  Vicksburg,  a  strong  and  defensible  position.  On  the  17th  of 
April  I  had  written  to  Gen.  Beauregard,  recommending  the  fortification  of  Vicksburg,  and  asking 
him  for  an  engineer  officer ;  and  two  days  after  the  evacuation  I  advised  the  adjutant-general  at 
Richmond,  Gen.  Cooper,  that  I  should  occupy  that  place  and  Jackson.  I  sent  thither  a  number  of 
heavy  guns  and  quantities  of  ammunition,  with  the  artillerists  from  the  various  forts  near  New  Or 
leans,  and  sent  Gen.  Smith,  with  a  brigade  of  infantry,  to  take  command  of  the  whole.  The  officers, 
troops,  and  guns  which  held  Vicksburg  last  summer,  were  almost  entirely  the  same  which  I  with 
drew  from  New  Orleans,  rather  than  remain  and  submit  to  an  inevitable  surrender. 

"  Results  have  fully  proved  the  wisdom  of  the  military  policy  pursued  by  me  in  collecting  all  the 
means  in  Department  No.  One  and  taking  a  new  and  stronger  position  on  the  Mississippi  River. 

"  The  evacuation  of  New  Orleans  and  its  occupation  by  the  enemy,  would  necessarily  be  followed 
sooner  or  later  by  the  abandonment  of  the  several  forts  and  small  works  on  the  exterior  line,  which 
were  erected  principally  to  defend  the  approaches  to  that  city,  and  after  its  evacuation  could  no 
longer  serve  any  useful  purpose,  as  the  position  of  the  enemy  (in  the  river  abreast  the  city)  gave  him 
control  of  the  Opelousas  Railroad,  thus  enabling  him  to  get  in  rear  of  the  works  at  Barrataria  Bay, 
Grand  Caillou,  Bayou  Lafourche,  and  Berwick  Bay,  by  which  he  could  cut  off  and  capture  all  the 
garrison,  with  small  arms,  ammunition,  and  stores,  all  of  which  were  greatly  needed  at  that  time.  I 
directed  them  to  be  abandoned  at  once.  The  officers  in  command  were  ordered  to  report  with  their 
troops  and  all  transportable  supplies  at  Camp  Moore  or  Vicksburg.  Some  of  them  complied  with 
the  order,  but  a  portion  of  the  garrison,  after  marching  part  of  the  way,  refused  to  go  further,  and, 
in  spite  of  their  officer,  disbanded,  and  went  to  New  Orleans. 

"  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  surrendered  in  consequence  of  a  mutiny  among  the  men  on  the 
28th  of  April.  Forts  Pike  and  Macomb  were  abandoned  without  my  orders.  When  I  returned  to 
the  city  from  the  lower  forts  on  the  24th,  I  directed  Col.  Fuller,  who  was  in  command  of  the  works 
on  the  lakes,  which  comprised  Forts  Pike  and  Macomb,  to  have  everything  ready  to  abandon  those 
forts,  in  case  I  should  so  order  it.  Supposing  that  the  enemy  would  occupy  Kenner,  and  thus  de 
prive  me  of  the  use  of  the  Jackson  Railroad,  it  was  my  intention  to  remove  the  troops,  supplies,  etc., 
across  Lake  Pontchartrain  to  Pass  Manchac  and  Madisonville,  holding  the  entrance  to  that  lake  by 
the  fort  as  long  as  possible.  The  enemy,  however,  did  not  interfere  with  the  railroad  at  Kenner, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  men  and  public  property  were  removed  by  rail.  I  went  to  Camp  Moore 
on  the  night  of  the  25th  to  arrange  matters  there,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  I  received  infor 
mation  that  Col.  Fuller  had  arrived  at  Covington,  La.,  with  the  garrison  of  Forts  Pike  and  Macomb. 
This  was  the  first  knowledge  I  had  of  the  abandonment  of  those  works.  I  immediately  directed 
them  to  be  reoccupied,  and  sent  a  letter  to  Capt.  Poindexter  of  the  navy,  in  command  of  the  ships 
on  the  lake,  requesting  his  coSperation  in  this  movement.  Col.  Fuller  replied  on  the  28th  that  the 
forts  had  been  dismantled,  the  guns  spiked,  and  the  carriages  destroyed,  and  that  it  was  impossible 
to  reoccupy  them.  I  was  officially  informed  of  the  surrender  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  on  the 
morning  of  the  29th,  and  deemed  it,  therefore,  useless  to  make  any  further  attempt  to  reoccupy 
Forts  Pike  and  Macomb.  The  cisterns  in  the  two  last-named  works  only  held  water  enough  to 
serve  the  garrison  a  short  time,  and  had  to  be  supplied  by  steamers  from  a  distance.  They  could 


RULE   OF  BUTLER   IN  NEW   ORLEANS.  257 

remarkable  records  of  the  war.  Any  story  of  New  Orleans  is  incomplete 
without  the  hero,  Benjamin  F.  Butler.  This  man,  who  was  to  reap  the 
fruits  of  the  victory  of  the  Federal  fleet,  and  enact  the  part  of  military 
ruler  in  New  Orleans,  was  an  example  of  that  reputation  so  easily  made 
in  the  North  by  brazen  assertions,  sensational  dispatches,  and  coarse  abuse 
of  rebels.  Gen.  Butler  had  been  a  small  lawyer  in  Massachusetts ;  his 
first  experiment  in  politics  was  that  of  a  Northern  man  with  Southern 
principles  ;  he  was  a  delegate  to  the  Charleston  Convention  of  1860,  and 
he  was  accustomed  to  relate  with  singular  satisfaction  the  circumstance 
that  he  had  voted  in  that  body,  more  than  forty  times,  for  Jefferson  Davis 
as  the  nominee  for  President  of  the  United  States  !  When  the  war  broke 
out,  he  was  a  ready  convert  to  the  popular  doctrine  in  his  State,  and  went 
in  advance  of  it  in  his  expressions  of  ferocity  towards  the  people  of  the 
South.  He  had  already  made  himself  infamous  in  Baltimore  by  his  war 
upon  non-combatants  ;  by  browbeating  quiet  citizens  ;  by  examining  courts 
in  which  the  severity  of  the  military  judge  was  curiously  mingled  with  the 
peculiar  skill  and  disreputable  adroitness  of  the  pettifogger ;  and  by  his 
quick  and  apt  invention  of  various  instruments  of  moral  torture.  The  ap 
pearance  of  the  man  was  extraordinary  and  revolting.  He  had  small, 
muddy,  cruel  eyes ;  one  of  them  was  curtained  by  a  drooping  lid ;  and 
there  was  a  smothered  glower  in  them  indicative  of  ill-contained  and  vio 
lent  passion.  The  other  of  his  features  were  almost  covered  up  in  enor 
mous  chops,  with'  little  webs  of  red  veins  in  them  ;  and  the  whole  expres 
sion  of  his  face  was  that  of  a  lecherous  coarseness  and  a  cunning  ferocity. 

Such  was  the  tyrant  of  New  Orleans.  He  inaugurated  his  rule  in  the 
subdued  city  by  the  following  order,  directed  against  the  women  of  New 
Orleans,  which  at  once  made  his  name  infamous  in  all  the  Christian  and 
civilized  countries  of  the  world,  and  obtained  for  him  in  the  South  the 
popular  and  persistent  title  of  the  "  Beast :  " 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  GULF,  NEW  ORLEANS,  May  15. 

"  As  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  United  States  have  been  subject  to  repeated  insults 
from  women  calling  themselves  ladies,  of  New  Orleans,  in  return  for  the  most  scrupulous 
non-interference  and  courtesy  on  our  part,  it  is  ordered  hereafter,  when  any  female  shall 
by  mere  gesture  or  movement  insult,  or  show  contempt  for  any  officers  or  soldiers  of  the 
United  States,  she  shall  be  regarded  and  held  liable  to  be  treated  as  a  woman  about  town 
plying  her  avocation.  By  command  of  Maj.-Gen.  BUTLER. 

"  GEO.  C.  STRONG,  A.  A.  G." 

The  infamous  "  woman-order "  was  the  prelude  to  a  rule  in  New 
Orleans  that  excited  the  horrour  and  disgust  of  the  civilized  world.  The 

not  have  held  out  for  any  great  length  of  time  for  this  reason,  and  I  deemed  it  best  to  save  their 
garrisons  (composed  of  well-drilled  artillerists)  for  the  works  at  Vicksburg,  where  they  have  ever 
since  rendered  such  good  service.     But  it  was  not  intended  to  abandon  them  so  soon,  nor,  indeed, 
till  I  had  transferred  all  the  public  property  from  New  Orleans." 
17 


258  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

newspapers  which  declined  to  publish  an  edict  so  disreputable  were  threat 
ened  with  suppression  ;  *  and  Mayor  Monroe  and  some  of  the  city  author 
ities  who  ventured  to  protest  against  it,  were  arrested,  shipped  down  to 
F.ort  Jackson,  and  for  many  months  kept  in  confinement  there.  Then 
followed  a  series  of  acts  of  cruelty,  despotism  and  indecency.  Citizens 
accused  of  contumacious  disloyalty,  were  confined  at  hard  labour,  with 
balls  and  chains  attached  to  their  limbs.  Men,  whose  only  offence  was 
selling  medicines  to  sick  Confederate  soldiers,  were  arrested  and  impris 
oned.  A  physician  who,  as  a  joke,  exhibited  a  skeleton  in  his  window  as 
that  of  a  Yankee  soldier,  was  sentenced  to  be  confined  at  Ship  Island  for 
two  years,  at  hard  labour.  A  lady,  the  wife  of  a  former  member  of  Con 
gress  of  the  United  States,  who  happened  to  laugh  as  the  funeral  train  of  a 
Yankee  officer  passed  her  door,  received  this  sentence  :  "It  is,  therefore, 
ordered  that  she  be  not  '  regarded  and  treated  as  a  common  woman,'  of 
whom  no  officer  or  soldier  is  bound  to  take  notice,  but  as  an  uncommon, 
bad,  and  dangerous  woman,  stirring  up  strife,  and  inciting  to  riot,  and  that, 
therefore,  she  be  confined  at  Ship  Island,  in  the  State  of  Mississippi,  within 
proper  limits  there,  till  further  orders."  The  distinction  of  sex  seems  only  to 

*  The  following  appeared  in  a  Southern  newspaper  during  the  days  of  Butler's  rule  in  New 
Orleans : 

"  Considering  the  character  of  the  infamous  order  issued,  with  reference  to  the  ladies  of  New 
Orleans,  the  following  will  be  thought  a  well-designed  act  of  retributive  justice.  Preparations  were 
making  for  a  dress-parade,  and  a  number  of  officers  had  congregated  in  front  of  the  St.  Charles, 
Butler's  headquarters.  A  handsome  carriage  was  driven  in  front  of  the  hotel,  accompanied  by  ser 
vants  in  livery,  with  every  sign  of  wealth  and  taste  in  the  owner  of  the  equipage.  The  occupant, 
dressed  in  the  latest  fashion  and  sparkling  with  jewelry,  drew  from  her  pocket  her  gold  card-case, 
and  taking  therefrom  her  card,  sent  it  up  to  Butler's  rooms.  The  next  day  himself  and  lady  called 
at  the  residence  indicated  on  the  card — a  fine  mansion  in  a  fashionable  part  of  the  city — where  a 
couple  of  hours  were  agreeably  spent  in  conversation,  followed  by  the  introduction  of  wine  and  cake, 
when  the  highly-delighted  visitors  took  their  departure.  Butler  did  not  appreciate  the  fact  that  he 
had  been  made  the  victim  of  a  successful  "  sell,"  until  he  learned  shortly  afterwards  that  he  had  been 
paying  his  respects  to  the  proprietress  of  one  of  the  most  celebrated  bagnios  in  the  State,  who  is  at 
this  time  '  considered  a  woman  of  the  town,  plying  her  vocation  as  such.'  " 

As  a  matter  of  justice — or  as  a  specimen  of  ingenious  quibbh'ng,  as  the  reader  may  decide — we 
should  not  omit  Gen.  Butler's  explanation  and  attempted  justification,  of  his  "  woman-order."  The 
author  of  these  pages,  in  the  painful  character  of  a  prisoner  of  war,  had,  once,  occasion  to  meet  Gen. 
Butler,  and  to  have  some  conversation  with  him,  in  the  course  of  which  Gen.  B.  volunteered  a  long 
defence  of  his  rule  in  New  Orleans.  He  declared  that  as  to  the  "  woman-order,"  when  Lord  Palmer- 
ston  denounced  it  in  the  British  Parliament,  he  might,  if  he  had  turned  to  the  Ordinances  of  London, 
have  found  that  it  had  been  borrowed  from  that  ancient  and  respectable  authority.  The  "  Ladies  " 
of  New  Orleans,  he  said,  did  not  interfere  with  his  troops  ;  it  was  the  demi-monde  that  troubled  him. 
One  of  this  class  had  spat  in  an  officer's  face.  Another  had  placed  herself  vis-a-vis  to  an  officer  in 
the  street,  exclaiming,  "  La,  here  is  a  Yankee  ;  don't  he  look  like  a  monkey  !  "  It  became  necessary 
to  adopt  an  order  that  "  would  execute  itself,"  and  have  these  women  treated  as  street-walkers.  "  How 
do  you  treat  a  street-walker  ?  "  said  Gen.  Butler ;  "  you  dc  a't  hug  and  kiss  her  in  the  street !  "  The 
General  explained  that  he  meant  only  that  these  women  we.  e  to  be  treated  with  those  signs  of  con 
tempt  and  contumely  usually  bestowed  upon  street-walkers,  so  as  to  make  them  ashamed  of  them 
selves  ;  and  it  was  thus  the  order  "  executed  itself." 


RULE   OF   BUTLER   IN   NEW   ORLEANS.  259 

have  been  recognized  by  Butler  as  a  cowardly  opportunity  for  advantage. 
In  his  office,  in  the  St.  Charles  Hotel,  the  inscription  was  placed  in  plain 
sight :  u  There  is  no  difference  between  a  he  and  a  she  adder  in  their 
venom."  His  officers  were  allowed  to  indulge  their  rapacity  and  lust  at 
will ;  they  seized  houses  of  respectable  citizens,  and  made  them  the  shops 
of  infamous  female  characters ;  they  appropriated  the  contents  of  wine- 
rooms  ;  they  plundered  the  wardrobes  of  ladies  and  gentlemen  ;  they  sent 
away  from  the  city  the  clothing  of  whole  families ;  they  "  confiscated  " 
pianos,  libraries,  and  whatever  articles  of  luxury  and  ornament  pleased 
their  fancy,  and  sent  them  as  presents  and  souvenirs  to  their  friends  at 
home.  It  was  the  era  of  plunder  and  ill-gotten  gains.  Fines  were  col 
lected  at  pleasure.  Recusants  were  threatened  with  ball  and  chain.  A 
trade  was  opened  in  provisions  for  cotton,  and  Butler's  own  brother  was 
made  banker  and  broker  of  the  corrupt  operations,  buying  confiscated 
property,  trading  provisions  and  even  military  stores  for  cotton,  and  amass 
ing  out  of  the  distress  of  an  almost  starving  people  fortunes  of  princely 
amount  and  villainous  history.  No  wonder  that  the  principal  of  these 
outrages  lived  in  perpetual  alarm  for  the  safety  of  his  life.  It  was  said 
that  he  wore  secret  armour.  He  certainly  was  never  for  a  moment  with 
out  an  armed  guard.  Sentinels  walked  in  five  paces  of  him  ;  and  when  he 
sat  in  his  office,  several  pistols  lay  beside  him,  and  a  chair  allotted  to  the 
visitor  was  chained  to  the  wall  while  a  pistol  capped  but  unloaded  was 
placed,  as  if  carelessly,  within  reach,  as  a  cunning  decoy  to  the  supposed 
assassin.* 

A  shocking  incident  of  Butler's  despotism  in  New  Orleans  was  the 
execution  of  William  B.  Mumford,  a  citizen  of  the  Confederate  States, 
charged  with  the  singular  crime  of  having  taken  the  Federal  flag  from  the 
United  States  Mint,  which  was  done  before  the  city  had  surrendered,  and 
was,  in  any  circumstances,  but  an  act  of  war.  He  was  condemned  to  death 
for  an  insult  to  the  enemy's  ensign.  It  was  scarcely  to  be  believed  that 
on  such  a  charge  a  human  life  would  be  taken,  deliberately  and  in  cold 
blood.  Butler  was  inexorable.  The  wife  and  children  of  the  condemned 
man  piteously  plead  for  his  life.  Butler's  answer  was  cruel  and  taunting. 
A  number  of  citizens  joined  in  a  petition  for  mercy.  Butler  answered  that 

*  We  are  indebted  to  James  Parton,  a  Northern  biographer  of  Butler,  for  mention  of  this 
ingenious  device.  Parton  thus  describes  the  arrangements  of  his  hero's  office,  while  transacting 
business : 

"  The  office  was  a  large  room,  furnished  with  little  more  than  a  long  table  and  a  few  chairs.  ID 
one  corner,  behind  the  table,  sat,  unobserved,  a  short-hand  reporter,  who,  at  a  signal  from  the  Gen 
eral,  would  take  down  the  examination  of  an  applicant  or  an  informer.  The  General  began  business 
by  placing  his  pistol  upon  the  table,  within  easy  reach.  After  the  detection  of  two  or  three  plots  to 
assassinate  him,  one  of  the  aides  caused  a  little  shelf  to  be  made  under  the  table  for  the  pistol,  while 
another  pistol,  unloaded,  lay  upon  the  table,  which  any  gentleman,  disposed  to  attempt  the  game  of 
assassination,  was  at  liberty  to  snatch." 


260  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

some  vicious  men  in  New  Orleans  had  sent  him  defiant  letters  about 
Mumford's  fate  ;  that  an  issue  had  been  raised,  that  it  was  "  to  be  decided 
whether  he  was  to  govern  in  New  Orleans  or  not  " — and  he  decided  it  by 
keeping  the  word  he  had  first  pronounced,  and  sending  Mumford  to  the 
gallows. 

The  condemned  man  was  one  of  humble  station  in  life,  and  was  said  to 
have  been  of  dissipated  habits.  But  he  was  faultlessly  brave.  On  the  gallows 
the  suggestion  was  made  to  him  that  he  might  yet  save  his  life  by  a  humil 
iating  and  piteous  confession.  He  replied  to  the  officer  who  thus  tempted 
him  :  "  Go  away."  He  turned  to  the  crowd,  and  said,  with  a  distinct  and 
steady  voice  :  "  I  consider  that  the  manner  of  my  death  will  be  no  disgrace 
to  my  wife  and  children  ;  my  country  will  honour  them."  More  than  a 
thousand  spectators  stood  around  the  gallows  ;  they  could  not  believe  that 
the  last  act  of  the  tragedy  was  really  to  be  performed  ;  they  looked  on  in 
astonished  and  profound  silence. 

Before  the  era  of  Butler  in  New  Orleans,  the  Confederates  had  had  a 
large  and  instructive  experience  of  the  ferocity  of  their  enemies,  and  their 
disregard  of  all  the  rules  of  war  and  customs  of  civilization.  At  Manassas 
and  Pensacola  the  Federals  had  repeatedly  and  deliberately  fired  upon 
hospitals.  In  the  naval  battle  in  Hampton  Roads,  they  had  hung  out  a 
white  flag,  and  then  opened  a  perfidious  fire  upon  our  seamen.  At  New 
born  they  had  attempted  to  shell  a  town  containing  several  thousand 
women  and  children,  before  either  demanding  a  surrender,  or  giving  the 
citizens  notice  of  their  intentions.  They  had  broken  faith  on  every  occa 
sion  of  expediency  ;  they  had  disregarded  flags  of  truces  ;  they  had  stolen 
private  property  ;  they  had  burned  houses,  and  desecrated  churches  ;  they 
had  stripped  widows  and  orphans  of  death's  legacies  by  a  barbarous  law 
of  confiscation  ;  they  had  overthrown  municipalities  and  State  Govern 
ments ;  they  had  imprisoned  citizens,  without  warrant  and  regardless  of 
age  or  sex ;  and  they  had  set  at  defiance  the  plainest  laws  of  civilized 
warfare. 

Butler's  government  in  New  Orleans,  and  his  "  ingenious  "  war  upon 
the  helplessness  of  men  and  virtue  of  women  was  another  step  in  atrocity. 
The  Louisiana  soldiers  in  Virginia  went  into  battle,  shouting  :  "  Remem 
ber  Butler  !  "  It  was  declared  that  the  display  of  Federal  authority  in  the 
conquered  city  of  New  Orleans  was  sufficient  to  make  the  soldiers  of  the 
South  devote  anew  whatever  they  had  of  life  and  labour  and  blood  to  the 
cause  of  the  safety  and  honour  of  their  country.  And  yet  it  was  but  the 
opening  chapter  of  cruelty  and  horrours,  exaggerated  at  each  step  of  the 
war,  until  Humanity  was  to  stand  aghast  at  the  black  volume  of  misery 
and  ruin. 


CHAPTEE    XYI. 

MORE  THAN  ONE-THIRD  OF  THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  OPERATING  AGAINST  RICHMOND. — M'CLEL- 
LAN'S  OPINION  OF  HIS  ARMY. — ITS  NUMERICAL  STRENGTH. — OFFICIAL  STATEMENT  OF  CON 
FEDERATE  FORCES  IN  NORTH  VIRGINIA. — LINCOLN'S  ORDER  OF  THE  22D  FEBRUARY. — 

M'CLELLAN'S  DISSENT. — WHEN  JOHNSTON  DETERMINED  TO  CHANGE  HIS  LINE  ON  THE  POTO 
MAC. — HIS  PREPARATIONS  FOR  RETREAT. — HOW  IT  WAS  ACCOMPLISHED. — M'CLELLAN7S 
ADVANCE. — DISCOVERY  OF  JOHNSTON'S  EVACUATION  OF  MANASSAS  AND  CENTREVILLE. — 
HE  CROSSES  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK  AND  WAITS  FOR  THE  ENEMY. — HE  PENETRATES  M'CLEL- 
LAN'S  DESIGNS. — FEDERAL  COUNCIL  OF  WAR  AT  FAIRFAX  COURT-HOUSE. — SHIFTING  OF 
THE  SCENES  OF  WAR  IN  VIRGINIA. — THE  BATTLE  OF  KERNSTOWN. — HOW  "  STONEWALL  " 
JACKSON  CAME  TO  FIGHT  THIS  BATTLE. — GREAT  NUMERICAL  SUPERIORITY  OF  THE  ENEMY. 
— THE  CONTEST  AT  THE  STONE  FENCE. — JACKSON  FALLS  BACK  TO  CEDAR  CREEK. — MAGRU- 
DER'S  LINE  ON  THE  PENINSULA. — A  FEARFUL  CRISIS. — M'CLELLAN  HELD  IN  CHECK  BY 
ELEVEN  THOUSAND  CONFEDERATES. — OUTWITTED  AGAIN  BY  JOHNSTON. — RETREAT  OF  THE 
CONFEDERATES  UP  THE  PENINSULA. — STRATEGIC  MERIT  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. — BATTLE  OF 
WILLIAMSBURG. — LONGSTREET'S  DIVISION  ENGAGED. — SUCCESS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — 

M'CLELLAN'S  WHOLE  ARMY  IN  PERIL. — HIS  FLANK  MOVEMENT  ON  JOHNSTON'S  RETREAT. — 
ENGAGEMENT  AT  BARHAMSVILLE. — THE  LINE  OF  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. — JOHNSTON'S  BRIL 
LIANT  STRATEGY. — EVACUATION  OF  NORFOLK. — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  VIRGINIA. — HER 

LAST  CHALLENGE  TO  THE  ENEMY. — A  GALLING  SPECTACLE. — COMMODORE  TATNALL  ORDERS 
HER  DESTRUCTION. — A  COURT  OF  INQUIRY. — NAVAL  ENGAGEMENT  AT  DREWRY's  BLUFF. — 
A  FEEBLE  BARRIER  TO  RICHMOND. — REPULSE  OF  THE  FEDERAL  FLEET. — WHAT  IT  PROVED. 
— M'CLELLAN'S  INVESTMENT  OF  THE  LINE  OF  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. — DEFENCES  OF  RICH 
MOND. — SCENES  AROUND  THE  FEDERAL  CAPITAL. — ALARM  AND  EXCITEMENT  OF  ITS  PEO 
PLE. — THE  EXODUS  FROM  RICHMOND. — PUBLIC  MEETING  IN  THE  CITY  HALL. NOBLE  RESO 
LUTION  OF  THE  LEGISLATURE  OF  VIRGINIA. — REANIMATION  OF  THE  PEOPLE  AND  THE 
AUTHORITIES. — PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  EARLY  OPINION  OF  THE  EFFECT  OF  THE  FALL  OF  RICH 
MOND. — APPEALS  OF  THE  RICHMOND  PRESS. — JACKSON'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  VALLEY  OF 
VIRGINIA. — JACKSON  DETERMINES  ON  THE  AGGRESSIVE. — DISPOSITION  OF  THE  FEDERAL 
FORCES  WEST  OF  THE  BLUE  RIDGE. — AFFAIR  AT  M'DOWELL. — JACKSON  DECEIVES  BANKS 
— SURPRISES  HIS  REAR-GUARD  AT  PORT  ROYAL. — BANKS'  RACE  TO  WINCHESTER. — SCENES 
OF  RETREAT  THROUGH  WINCHESTER. — BANKS1  QUICK  TIME  TO  THE  POTOMAC. — EXTENT  OF 
JACKSON'S  SUCCESS. — FRUITS  OF  TWO  DAYS'  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — JACK 
SON  PASSES  BETWEEN  THE  COLUMNS  OF  FREMONT  AND  SHIELDS. DEATH  OF  TURNER 

ASHBY. — JACKSON'S  TRIBUTE  TO  HIM. — BATTLES  OF  CROSS  KEYS  AND  PORT  REPUBLIC— 
EWELL  DEFEATS  FREMONT. — THE  FIELD  OF  PORT  REPUBLIC. — EWELL's  ARRIVAL  SAVES 

THE    DAY. — CRITICAL  AND    SPLENDID  ACTION    OF    TWO   VIRGINIA    REGIMENTS. — CLOSE    OF 

THE  VALLEY  CAMPAIGN. — JACKSON5S  ALMOST  MARVELLOUS  SUCCESS. — HIS  HALT  AT 
WEYER'S  CAVE. 


262  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

IN  the  first  part  of  the  year  1862,  the  Federal  Government,  with  plans 
fully  matured,  had  under  arms  about  six  hundred  thousand  men ;  more 
than  one-third  of  whom  were  operating  in  the  direction  of  Richmond. 
What  Gen.  McClellan  himself  said  of  the  vast  and  brilliant  army  with 
which  he  designed  to  capture  the  Confederate  capital  was  not  extravagant. 
It  was,  indeed,  "  magnificent  in  material,  admirable  in  dscipline  and  in 
struction,  excellently  equipped  and  armed."  On  March  1,  1862,  the  num 
ber  of  Federal  troops  in  and  about  Washington  had  increased  to  193,142, 
fit  for  duty,  with  a  grand  aggregate  of  221,987. 

Such  was  the  heavy  and  perilous  force  of  the  enemy  that,  in  the  spring 
of  1862,  hung  on  the  northern  frontier  of  Virginia.  Let  us  see  what  was 
in  front  of  it  on  the  Confederate  line  of  defence.  Gen.  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
had  in  the  camps  of  Centreville  and  Manassas  less  than  thirty  thousand 
men.  These  figures  are  from  an  official  source.  "  Stonewall "  Jackson  had 
been  detached  with  eleven  skeleton  regiments  to  amuse  the  enemy  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  passing  rapidly  between  Banks  and  Shields,  and 
giving  them  the  idea  that  he  meditated  a  formidable  movement.  Such 
was  the  force  that  in  North  Virginia  stood  in  McClellan's  path,  and  de 
terred  him  from  a  blow  that  at  that  time  might  have  been  fatal  to  the 
Southern  Confederacy. 

It  had  been  the  idea  of  the  Washington  authorities  to  despatch  the 
Confederacy  by  a  combined  movement  in  the  winter.  The  order  of  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  for  a  general  movement  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  against 
the  Confederate  positions  on  the  22d  of  February  (Washington's  birth 
day),  directed  that  McClellan's  army  should  advance  for  the  immediate 
object  of  seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon  the  railroad  southwest  of 
Manassas  Junction.  But  McClellan  urged  a  different  line  of  operations 
on  the  Lower  Rappahannock,  obtained  delay,  and  did  not  advance. 

In  the  mean  time,  Gen.  Johnston  had  not  been  an  idle  spectator  of  the 
immense  and  overwhelming  preparations  of  the  enemy  in  his  front.  As 
a  commander  he  was  sagacious,  quick  to  apprehend,  and  had  that  peculiar 
military  reticence  in  connection  with  a  sage  manner  and  decisive  action, 
that  obtained  the  confidence  of  his  men  instead  of  exciting  criticism,  or 
alarming  their  suspicions.  In  the  first  winter  months  of  1862,  he  had  de 
termined  to  change  his  line  on  the  Potomac.  All  idea  of  offensive  opera 
tions  on  it  had  long  ago  been  abandoned.  It  had  become  necessary  in 
Gen.  Johnston's  opinion  that  the  main  body  of  the  Confederate  forces  in 
Virginia  should  be  in  supporting  distance  of  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula, 
so  that,  in  the  event  of  either  being  driven  back,  they  might  combine  for 
final  resistance  before  Richmond. 

During  winter,  Johnston  had  been  quietly  transporting  his  immense 
stores  towards  the  Rappahannock,  removing  every  cannon  that  could  be 


263 

spared,  and  filling  the  empty  embrasures  with  hollow  logs  painted  black, 
which  even  at  a  few  yards'  distance  much  resembled  thirty-two  and  sixty- 
four  pounders.  Never  were  preparations  for  a  retreat  so  quietly  and  skil 
fully  made.  So  perfectly  were  all  things  arranged  that  all  stores,  baggage, 
sick,  material,  and  guns  were  removed  far  to  the  rear,  before  Johnston's 
own  men  realized  the  possibility  of  a  retreat.  It  was  only  as  the  different 
brigades  fell  into  line,  and  the  main  army  defiled  southward  through 
Fauquier  County  that  the  men  discovered  the  movement  to  be  a  general 
and  not  a  partial  one. 

On  the  8th  of  March,  the  Government  at  Washington  issued  a  peremp 
tory  order  to  McClellan  to  move  for  the  new  base  of  operations  he  de 
signed  on  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  to  capture  the  Confederate  batteries  on 
the  Potomac.  The  change  in  the  situation  which  Johnston's  skilful  retreat 
fyad  effected  was  not  known  in  Washington.  On  the  9th  of  March 
McClellan's  army  was  in  motion.  All  Washington  was  in  expectation  ; 
it  was  known  that  the  second  "  On-to-Richmond  "  had  commenced,  and 
that  the  second  grand  army  was  about  to  pass  its  grand  climacteric.  At 
night  Fairfax  Court-Bouse  was  reached,  and  the  grand  army  encamped 
within  a  radius  of  two  miles.  At  a  late  hour  came  the  wonderful  tidings 
that  Manassas  and  Centreville  had  been  evacuated  !  There  was  no  enemy 
there.  But  there  was  a  great  conflagration  in  full  flame,  bridges  and 
machine-shops  just  blown  up,  and  other  incendiary  fires  gleaming  in  the 
distance.  Nothing  was  left  in  the  famous  Confederate  position ;  it  was 
desolate,  though  frowning  in  fortified  grandeur.  Thus  had  been  accom 
plished  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  the  most  successful  and  complete  evacu 
ation — the  most  secure  and  perfect  retreat  of  which  the  history  of  the  war 
furnishes  an  example.  Johnston  had  safely  escaped  with  his  entire  right 
and  left  wings  ;  he  had  securely  carried  off  every  gun  and  all  his  provi 
sions  and  munitions ;  and  he  had  blown  up  or  otherwise  destroyed  every 
bridge  and  culvert  on  turnpike  and  railroad  along  his  route.* 

When  Johnston's  army  had  crossed  the  Rappahannock,  it  was  drawn 
up  in  line,  and  waited  a  week  for  the  enemy  ;  but  McClellan  refused  the 
challenge,  and  moved  down  the  stream  near  the  sea-board.  To  contract 

*  In  Gen.  McClellan's  official  report  of  this  period,  he  seeks  to  convey  the  impression  to  the 
reader  that  he  was  well  aware  of  Johnston's  evacuation,  and  only  marched  his  troops  to  Manassas 
that  they  might  gain  "  some  experience  on  the  march  and  bivouac  preparatory  to  the  campaign,  and 
to  get  rid  of  the  superfluous  baggage  and  other  impediments  which  accumulate  round  an  army  en 
camped  for  a  long  time  in  one  locality."  He  continues  :  "  A  march  to  Manassas  and  back  could 
produce  no  delay  in  embarking  for  the  Lower  Chesapeake,  as  the  transports  could  not  be  ready  for 
some  time,  and  it  afforded  a  good  intermediate  step  between  the  quiet  and  comparative  comfort  of 
the  camps  round  Washington  and  the  rigours  of  active  operations." 

If  Gen.  McClellan  had  designed  to  have  written  something  to  be  laughed  at,  he  could  not  have 
better  succeeded  than  hi  the  sentences  quoted  above. 


264  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

his  left,  Johnston  fell  back  across  the  Rapidan,  and  increased  the  strength 
of  the  right  against  all  flanking  manoeuvres.  Large  fleets  of  transports 
were  gathered  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rappahannock,  but  few  knew  their 
object  or  destination.  Johnston  however  divined  it.  He  promptly  took 
the  idea  that  the  Federals,  while  making  a  show  of  force  along  the  Lower 
Rappahannock,  would  not  attack ;  their  object  being  to  transport  their 
force  wTith  great  celerity  to  the  Peninsula,  thinking  to  suprise  Magruder  at 
Yorktown,  and  seize  Richmond  before  any  troops  could  be  marched  to 
oppose  them. 

He  was  right.  On  March  13,  a  council  of  war  was  assembled  at  Fair 
fax  Court-House,  by  McClellan.  It  agreed  on  the  following  resolution : 
"  That  the  enemy,  having  retreated  from  Manassas  to  Gordonsville,  behind 
the  Kappahannock  and  the  Rapidan,  it  is  the  opinion  of  Generals  command 
ing  army  corps  that  the  operations  to  be  carried  on  will  be  best  undertaken 
from  Old  Point  Comfort  between  the  York  and  James  Rivers  :  provided, 
1st,  That  the  enemy's  vessel  Merrimac  can  be  neutralized  ;  2d,  That  the 
means  of  transportation  sufficient  for  an  immediate  transfer  of  the  force  to 
its  new  base  can  be  ready  at  Washington  and  Alexandria  to  move  down 
the  Potomac  ;  and,  3d,  That  a  naval  auxiliary  force  can  be  had  to  silence, 
or  aid  in  silencing,  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  York  River ;  4th,  That 
the  force  to  be  left  to  cover  Washington  shall  be  such  as  to  give  an  entire 
feeling  of  security  for  its  safety  from  menace." 

While  the  scene  of  the  most  important  contest  in  Virginia  wras  thus 
being  shifted,  and  Gen.  Banks  was  transferring  a  heavy  force  from  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  to  take  position  at  Centreville,  in  pursuance  of 
McClellan's  plan  for  the  protection  of  Washington,  a  battle  unimportant 
but  bloody  took  place  near  Winchester. 


BATTLE   OF  KERNSTOWJST. 

Gen.  Shields  had  been  left  at  Winchester  by  Banks  with  a  division  and 
some  cavalry,  and  commanded,  as  he  states  in  his  official  report,  seven 
thousand  men  of  all  arms.  Ascertaining  that  "  Stonewall  "  Jackson  was  at 
!N"ew  Market,  he  made  a  feint,  pretended  to  retreat  on  the  20th  of  March, 
and  at  night  placed  his  force  in  a  secluded  position,  two  miles  from  Win 
chester  on  the  Martinsburg  road.  This  movement,  and  the  masked  posi 
tion  of  the  enemy  made  an  impression  upon  the  inhabitants  of  Winchester 
that  Shields'  army  had  left,  and  that  nothing  remained  but  a  few  regi 
ments  to  garrison  the  place.  On  the  22nd  Ashby's  cavalry  drove  in  the 
enemy's  pickets,  and  discovered  only  a  brigade.  The  next  clay  Jackson 
had  moved  his  line  near  Kernstown,  prepared  to  give  battle  and  expect- 


BATTLE   OF   KERNSTOWN.  265 

ing  to  find  only  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  at  the  point  of  attack.  He 
had  less  than  twenty-five  hundred  men.  It  will  amuse  the  Southern 
reader  to  find  it  stated  in  Gen.  Shields'  official  report  that  Jackson  had  in 
the  engagement  of  Kernstown  eleven  thousand  men,  and  was,  therefore, 
in  superiour  force. 

The  engagement  between  these  unequal  forces  commenced  about  four 
o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  23d  of  March,  and  terminated  when  night 
closed  upon  the  scene  of  conflict.  Jackson's  left  flank,  commanded  by 
Gen.  Garnett,  was  finally  turned,  and  forced  back  upon  the  centre,  but  only 
after  a  most  desperate  and  bloody  encounter.  A  long  stone  fence  ran  across 
an  open  field,  which  the  enemy  were  endeavouring  to  reach.  Federals 
and  Confederates  were  both  in  motion  for  this  natural  breast-work,  when 
the  24th  Virginia,  (Irish),  ran  rapidly  forward,  arrived  at  the  fence  first, 
and  poured  a  volley  into  the  enemy  at  ten  paces  distant.  But  the  over 
whelming  numbers  of  the  enemy  soon  swept  over  the  fence,  and  drove  the 
Confederate  left  into  the  woods,  taking  two  guns  and  a  number  of 
prisoners. 

During  the  night  Gen.  Jackson  decided  to  fall  back  to  Cedar  Creek. 
The  enemy  pursued  as  far  as  Harrisonburg,  but  with  little  effect,  as 
Ashby's  famous  cavalry,  the  terrour  of  the  Federals,  covered  the  retreat. 
In  his  official  report  Gen.  Shields  wrote  that  the  retreat  "  became  flight ;" 
but  in  a  private  letter  to  a  friend  in  "Washington,  he  had  previously  written 
of  the  Confederates :  "  Such  were  their  gallantry,  and  high  state  of  dis 
cipline  that  at  no  time  during  the  battle  or  pursuit  did  they  give  way  to 
panic." 

The  Confederate  loss  in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners  is  carefully  esti 
mated  at  465.  Gen.  Shields  stated  his  loss  as  103  killed,  and  441  wounded. 
It  had  been  a  fierce  and  frightful  engagement ;  for  Jackson  had  lost  nearly 
twenty  per  cent,  of  his  force  in  a  very  few  hours  of  conflict.  But  the 
battle  was  without  any  general  signification.  It  drew,  however,  upon 
Jackson  a  great  deal  of  censure  ;  "  he  was,"  says  one  of  his  officers,  "  cursed 
by  every  one ;  "  and  it  must  be  confessed,  in  this  instance  at  least,  the 
great  commander  had  been  entrapped  by  the  enern^. 

But  public  attention  in  Richmond  was  speedily  taken  from  an  affair  so 
small  by  daily  announcements  of  fleets  of  transports  arriving  in  Hampton 
Roads,  and  the  vast  extension  of  the  long  line  of  tents  at  Newport  News. 
McClellan,  having  the  advantage  of  water-carriage,  had  rapidly  changed 
his  line  of  operations,  and  was  at  the  threshold  of  a  new  approach  to  Rich 
mond,  while  the  great  bulk  of  the  Confederate  force  was  still  in  motion 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan. 

It  was  a  fearful  crisis.  The  fate  of  Richmond  hung  upon  the  line  held 
across  the  Peninsula,  from  Yorktown  on  the  York  River  to  Mulberry  Isl 
and  on  James  River,  by  Gen.  Magruder  with  little  more  than  ten  thousand 


266  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

men.  McClellan  had  three  corps  cParmee  in  the  lines  before  Yorktown, 
and  had  in  the  field  a  force  of  nearly  90,000  infantry,  55  batteries  of 
artillery  (making  a  total  of  330  field  guns),  and  about  10,000  cavalry, 
besides  a  siege  train  of  103  guns.  This  estimate  of  his  force  did  not 
include  the  garrison  of  Fortress  Monroe  of  about  10,000  men,  nor  Frank 
lin's  division  which  arrived  about  the  end  of  April.  The  commander  of 
this  force  hesitated  before  a  line  of  eleven  thousand  men.  His  hesitation 
again  saved  Richmond.  He  was  again  deceived  as  to  the  strength  of  the 
Confederates.  With  admirable  adroitness  Gen.  Magruder  extended  his 
little  force  over  a  distance  of  several  miles,  placing  a  regiment  in  every 
gap  open  to  observation,  to  give  the  appearance  of  numbers  to  the  enemy. 
McClellan  took  to  the  spade,  and  commenced  the  operation  of  a  regular 
siege  against  Yorktown.  While  he  was  constructing  his  parallels,  Gen. 
Johnston  moved  down  to  reinforce  the  Confederate  lines  of  the  Peninsula, 
in  time  to  save  Magruder's  little  force  from  the  pressure  of  enveloping 
armies. 

McClellan  had  been  deceived  twice  as  to  the  force  in  his  front.  He 
was  to  be  outwitted  twice  by  the  strategy  of  retreat.  Gen.  Johnston 
decided  neither  to  stand  a  siege  nor  to  deliver  a  battle  at  Yorktown.  The 
enemy  was  in  largely  superiour  force,  besides  his  additional  strength  in 
gunboats,  and  the  object  was  to  force  him  to  more  equal  terms.  It  was 
readily  seen  by  Johnston  that  in  falling  back  to  defences  already  prepared 
nearer  Richmond,  and  investing  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy,  he  would 
obtain  the  opportunity  of  concentrating  a  large  force  in  front  of  the  capital, 
besides  being  unexposed  to  operations  in  his  rear,  which  threatened  him 
at  Yorktown  from  McDowell's  corps  at  Fredericksburg.  It  was  the  just 
and  sagacious  view  of  the  situation,  and  again  the  great  master  of  Con 
federate  strategy  was  to  teach  the  enemy  a  lesson  in  the  art  of  war. 

Johnston  had  obtained  all  the  delay  he  desired  in  keeping  the  enemy 
before  his  lines  ;  and  on  the  4th  day  of  May,  when  McClellan  had  nearly 
completed  all  his  parallels,  secured  communications  between  the  different 
batteries,  and  was  almost  ready  to  open  fire  on  the  town,  the  news  came 
that  the  Confederate  army  had  retired. 

The  whole  Federal  army  was,  at  once,  put  in  motion  to  pursue.  The 
Confederate  works  were  left  intact,  but  excepting  a  few  unwieldy  colum- 
biads,  all  ordnance  had  been  carried  off.  The  men  made  "  dummies,"  and 
put  them  in  the  embrasures,  besides  stuffing  old  clothes  to  represent  senti 
nels.  The  pursuing  army  toiled  on  through  rain  falling  in  torrents,  over 
roads  deep  in  mud,  the  men  straggling,  falling  out  and  halting  without 
orders,  and  artillery,  cavalry,  infantry  and  baggage  intermingled  in 
apparently  inextricable  confusion.  The  scene  had  much  more  the  appear 
ance  of  the  retreat  of  a  defeated  army  than  the  advance  of  a  successful 
one. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   WILLIAMSBUKG.  267 


BATTLE   OF  WILLIAMSBURG. 

It  may  be  well  imagined  that  McClellan,  sorely  disappointed,  and 
knowing  very  well  that  the  people  of  the  North,  who  were  already  clam 
ouring  for  a  change  of  commanders,  would  not  be  satisfied  with  the  barren 
occupation  of  the  deserted  works  of  Yorktown,  was  anxious  to  snatch  some 
sort  of  victory  from  the  rear-guard  of  the  Confederate  retreat,  which  he 
might  magnify  in  official  dispatches  and  Northern  newspapers. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  May,  Gen.  Hooker's  division  of  Heintzel- 
man's  corps  came  up  near  Williamsburg  with  the  Confederate  rear-guard, 
commanded  by  Gen.  Longstreet.  The  Federals  were  in  a  forest  in  front 
of  "Williamsburg ;  but  as  Hooker  came  into  the  open  ground,  he  was 
vigorously  attacked,  driven  back  with  the  loss  of  five  guns,  and  with 
difficulty  held  the  belt  of  wood  which  sheltered  and  concealed  his  men 
from  the  Confederate  fire.  Other  forces  of  the  enemy  were  moved  up, 
until  Gen.  Longstreet  was  engaging  nine  brigades  of  the  Federal  army. 
During  the  whole  of  the  day,  from  sunrise  to  sunset,  he  held  McClellan's 
army  in  check,  drove  the  enemy  from  two  redoubts  he  had  occupied,  and 
secured  Johnston's  retreat  so  effectually,  that  the  next  morning  when  the 
rear  guard  moved  off,  it  did  so  as  undisturbed  as  if  the  enemy  were  a 
thousand  miles  distant. 

But  Gen.  Longstreet  not  only  accomplished  the  important  object  of 
securing  the  retreat.  He  won  a  brilliant  victory.  Gen.  McClellan  him 
self  confessed  a  loss  of  456  killed,  1,400  wounded,  and  372  missing, 
making  a  total  of  2,228.  And  Longstreet  carried  off  with  him  nine  pieces 
of  captured  artillery.  Yet  so  anxious  was  McClellan  for  the  colour  of 
victory  that  he  dispatched  to  Washington  news  of  a  success,  and  repre 
sented  as  the  process  of  "  driving  rebels  to  the  wall,"  the  leisurely  retreat 
of  Johnston  to  works  around  Richmond,  prepared  ten  months  ago  under 
the  prudent  and  skilful  direction  of  Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee,  and  already  the 
amplest  and  strongest  at  any  point  in  the  Confederacy. 

The  fact  was  that  McClellan's  army  had  received  a  serious  check  at 
Williamsburg,  which,  if  Gen.  Longstreet  had  been  able  to  take  advantage 
of  it,  might  have  been  converted  into  a  disastrous  defeat,  McClellan  had 
also  planned  a  flank  movement  upon  Johnston's  retreat.  This  perform 
ance,  too,  proved  a  miserable  failure,  although  the  idea  did  credit  to  his 
genius. 

The  design  was  that  Franklin  should  move  to  West  Point,  the  head  of 
the  York  River,  and  disembark  a  large  force  there  to  assail  Johnston  on 
the  flank.  On  the  7th  of  May,  Franklin  attempted  a  landing  under  cover 
of  his  gunboats,  at  Barhamsville  near  West  Point.  The  attempt  was 
gallantly  repulsed  by  Whiting's  division  of  Texas  troops.  The  fight  was 


268  THE  LOST  CAUSE 

wild  and  confused.     Franklin  hurriedly  fell  back  before  an  inferiour  force, 
and  did  not  halt  until  under  the  guns  of  his  flotilla. 

The  incidents  of  Williamsburg  and  Barhamsville  had  been  Confederate 
successes ;  and  Johnston's  movement  to  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy 
turned  out  a  most  brilliant  piece  of  strategy.  He  had  secured  the  safe 
retreat  of  his  army,  together  with  his  baggage  and  supply  train,  and, 
although  forced  by  the  configuration  of  the  land,'  and  the  superiourity  of 
the  enemy  on  the  water,  to  abandon  the  peninsula  of  Yorktown,  he  had 
done  so  in  a  manner  which  illustrated  his  genius,  and  insured  the  safety 
and  efficiency  of  his  army. 


EVACUATION   OF   NORFOLK — DESTRUCTION .  OF  THE  "  VIRGINIA." 

The  retreat  from  Yorktown  involved  the  surrender  of  Norfolk  with  all 
the  advantages  of  its  contiguous  navy-yard  and  dock  arid  the  abandonment 
of  the  strong  Confederate  positions  at  Sewell's  Point  and  Craney  Island. 
Here  was  the  old  story  of  disaster  consequent  upon  haste  and  imperfect 
preparations.  The  evacuation  was  badly  managed  by  Gen.  Huger  ;  much 
property  was  abandoned,  and  the  great  dry-dock  only  partially  blown  up.* 

But  the  evacuation  wras  attended  by  an  incident,  which  was  a  painful 
surprise  to  the  Confederate  people,  an  occasion  of  grief  and  rage,  and  a 

*  The  circumstances  of  the  evacuation  of  Norfolk  were  made  the  subject  of  an  investigation  in 
the  Confederate  Congress.  Commodore  Forrest  testified  as  follows  before  the  committee  making  the 
investigation : 

"  I  understood  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Government  to  withdraw  the  troops  under  Gen. 
Huger,  for  the  protection  of  Richmond,  and  that  the  navy-yard  and  public  buildings  were  to  be  de 
stroyed.  Upon  learning  this,  I  had  a  conference  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  I  stated  to  him 
that  I  did  not  see  any  necessity  for  such  a  proceeding,  and  that  if  he  would  allow  me  to  return, 
I  could  assure  him  that  I  would  protect  the  yard  and  Norfolk  from  any  attack  that  the  enemy  might 
make.  He  asked  me  particularly  in  what  manner  I  could  do  it.  I  explained  to  him  that  I  had 
eleven  hundred  employees  at  the  navy-yard,  good  and  true  men,  that  they  had  been  exercised  at 
great  guns  and  small  arms  weekly  for  several  months,  and  that  there  were  guns  mounted  in  what  is 
called  Forrest  entrenchments,  in  lunette — four  in  all,  containing  each  three  or  four  guns  of  forty- 
one  hundred  weight,  32-pounders,  and  that  I  did  not  apprehend  anything  disastrous  from  Burnside's 
force  ;  that  by  placing  the  steamer  Virginia  in  a  proper  position,  I  thought  she  might  very  well  pro 
tect  the  harbour,  and  even  if  Gen.  Huger's  army  was  taken  away,  I  thought  the  citizens  would  all 
turn  out  to  man  the  batteries.  To  this  he  replied,  they  would  starve  us  out.  I  informed  him  that 
they  could  not  very  well  do  that  for  some  time  to  come,  that  we  had  four  hundred  barrels  of  pork, 
and  four  hundred  barrels  of  beef  stowed  in  the  yard  ;  that  the  forage  there  had  been  collected  for 
three  months  for  the  cattle.  To  this  he  replied,  that  it  had  been  determined  upon  as  a  military  ne 
cessity,  and  must  be  carried  out. 

"  MR.  FOOTE.  What  was  the  value  of  the  navy-yard  ?  What  do  you  conjecture  the  amount  of 
the  injury  to  be  which  we  suffered  from  the  destruction  of  the  navy-yard  ? 

"  COMMODORE  FORREST.  There  is  a  printed  schedule  taken  by  a  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
Governour  of  the  State  of  Virginia,  which  could  be  had  from  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  Common 
wealth.  In  that  schedule  it  mentions  the  value  of  the  public  property  to  be  $6,500,000,  or  there 
abouts." 


DESTRUCTION   OF   THE   VIRGINIA.  269 

topic  of  violent  comment  in  the  Richmond  newspapers.  The  famous  iron 
clad  Virginia,  popularly  said  to  be  worth  fifty  thousand  troops  in  the  field, 
was  destroyed  by  the  orders  of  Commodore  Tatnall,  her  commander. 
"  The  iron  diadem  of  the  South,"  exclaimed  the  Richmond  Examitier^ 
"  had  been  shattered  by  a  wanton  blow." 

The  Virginia  had  been  unable  to  bring  on  a  fight  with  the  enemy's 
fleet.  When  McClellan  was  encamped  before  Yorktown,  she  appeared  in 
Hampton  Roads,  when  the  whole  Federal  fleet  declined  the  combat,  and 
with  the  vaunted  Monitor  took  shelter  beneath  the  guns  of  Fortress 
Monroe.  On  this  occasion  the  Virginia,  in  sight  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  car 
ried  off  three  schooners  lying  in  the  Roads  almost  within  range  of  the  guns 
of  the  fleet,  and  yet  there  was  no  movement  to  engage  her  ;  and  this  spec 
tacle,  so  galling  to  the  esprit  du  corps  of  the  Federal  navy,  was  witnessed 
by  the  French  and  English  ships-of-war  lying  off  Norfolk. 

After  the  enemy's  occupation  of  Norfolk,  both  shores  of  the  James 
River  came  into  possession  of  the  Federal  troops,  who  were  therefore 
enabled  to  cut  off  the  Virginia  from  her  necessary  supplies.  Commodore 
Tatnall  resolved  to  take  the  vessel  up  the  river  above  the  lines  occupied 
by  the  enemy.  According  to  his  statement,  he  had  been  assured  by  her 
pilots  that  if  the  ship  was  lightened  they  would  take  her  with  a  draught 
of  eighteen  feet  of  water  within  forty  miles  of  Richmond.  The  ship  was 
being  lightened ;  Commodore  Tatnall  had  retired  to  bed,  when  another 
message  was  brought  him  that  the  ship  had  been  so  far  lightened  that  her 
wooden  hull  below  the  plating  was  exposed,  and  that  the  pilots  (whom 
Commodore  Tatnall  charged  with  cowardice  and  an  unwillingness  to  en 
gage  in  action)  now  declared  that  the  westerly  wind  had  so  lowered  the 
water  in  the  river  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  take  the  vessel  above  the 
Jamestown  Flats,  up  to  which  point  the  shore  on  both  sides  was  occupied 
by  the  enemy.  The  commander,  aroused  from  his  slumbers,  and  acquaint 
ed  with  the  decision  of  the  pilots,  ordered  the  vessel  to  be  destroyed.  Her 
decks  and  roof  were  saturated  with  oil,  her  crew  were  disembarked  in  small 
boats,  trains  of  powder  were  laid  from  each  port-hole  to  different  parts  of 
the  vessel,  and  these  were  lighted  at  a  given  signal.  Simultaneously  the 
ship  was  on  fire  in  many  parts,  and  after  burning  several  hours  the  flames 
reached  the  magazine,  about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  llth  of 
May,  when  the  Virginia  was  blown  up  with  an  explosion  heard  many  miles 
distant.  Not  a  fragment  was  ever  afterwards  found  of  the  only  naval  struc 
ture  that  guarded  the  water  approach  to  Richmond. 

"  The  Virginia,"  reported  Commander  Tatnall,  "  no  longer  exists. 
I  presume  that  a  court  of  inquiry  will  be  ordered  to  examine  into  all  the 
circumstances,  and  I  earnestly  solicit  it.  Public  opinion  will  never  be  put 
right  without  it."  The  court  was  ordered,  and  public  opinion  was  "  put 
right  "  by  its  decision  that  the  destruction  of  the  Virginia  was  unneces- 


270  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

eary  ;  that  she  might  have  been  taken  up  the  James  to  a  point  of  safety, 
where  she  could  still  have  barred  the  ascent  of  the  river ;  and  that  then 
and  there,  if  the  worst  ensued,  was  the  time  to  decide  upon  the  disposition 
to  be  made  of  the  vessel. 


The  destruction  of  the  Virginia  left  the  James  River  open  for  the  ene 
my's  operations.  The  Galena,  the  Aroostook,  the  Monitor,  Port  Royal, 
and  Naugatuck,  steamed  up  the  river  on  the  15th  of  May,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  and  without  opposition  advanced  within 
twelve  miles  of  Richmond.  Here  was  a  half-finished  fort  at  what  was 
called  Drewry's  Bluff,  mounting  four  guns.  The  river  at  this  point  was 
also  obstructed  by  a  double  line  of  piles  and  sunken  vessels,  and  the  banks 
were  lined  with  sharpshooters.  It  was  a  feeble  barrier  to  Richmond  ;  the 
protection  of  the  river  had  been  entrusted  to  the  Virginia ;  and  yet  the 
fort  proved  a  success,  owing  to  the  defect  of  the  enemy's  gunboats. 

The  Galena  and  Monitor  approached  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the 
batteries,  but  the  guns  of  the  latter  proved  useless,  as  they  could  not  be 
elevated  sufficiently  to  reach  the  work  constructed  on  the  bluff.  The 
armour  of  the  Galena  was  badly  injured,  and  this  river  monster  lost  thirty 
of  her  crew  in  killed  and  wounded.  Notwithstanding,  the  engagement 
continued  for  upwards  of  four  hours,  when  the  gunboats  were  repulsed. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  five  killed  and  seven  wounded.  This  action  was 
considered  as  proving  that  earthworks  could  not  be  reduced  by  gunboats, 
and  decided  the  question  for  the  enemy  that  the  capture  of  Drewry's  Bluff, 
and  the  water  approach  to  Richmond  were  impracticable  without  the  aid 
of  a  land  force. 

The  possession  of  the  James  River  below  Drewry's  Bluff  was  of  but 
little  present  advantage  to  McClellan,  as  his  base  of  supplies  was  on  the 
Pamunkey,  from  which  point  there  was  rail  communication  to  Richmond. 
He  had  advanced  within  sight  of  the  spires  of  the  Confederate  capital. 
The  investment  of  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy  brought  the  two  armies 
face  to  face  within  a  few  miles  of  Richmond,  and  opened  one  of  the  grand 
est  scenes  of  the  war,  exhibiting  the  strength  and  splendour  of  the  opposing 
hosts,  and  appealing  to  the  eye  with  every  variety  of  picturesque  effect. 
For  nearly  a  year  an  immense  labour  had  been  expended  upon  the  fortifi 
cations  of  Richmond.  Earthworks  of  magnitude  arose  on  every  side. 
They  were  constructed  in  different  shapes,  to  suit  the  conformation  of  the 
ground  ;  they  swept  all  the  roads,  crowned  every  hillock,  and  mounds  of 
red  earth  could  be  seen  in  striking  contrast  with  the  rich  green  of  the 
landscape.  Redoubts,  rifle-pits,  casemate  batteries,  horn  works,  and  en- 


THE   LINES   AROUND   RICHMOND.  271 

filacling  batteries  were  visible  in  great  number,  in  and  out  of  the  woods,  in 
all  directions.  Beyond,  through  the  open  and  cultivated  country  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Richmond  stretched  the  camp  of  the  enemy.  Wooded 
heights  overlooked  them,  and  the  numerous  tents  of  the  army,  the  vast 
trains  of  wagons,  the  powerful  park  of  artillery,  together  with  the  fleet  of 
steamers  and  transports,  presented  a  striking  contrast  to  the  usually  quiet 
country. 

The  mere  circumstance  of  McClellan's  proximity  to  Richmond  was,  to 
the  vulgar  mind  of  the  North,  an  indication  of  his  success.  The  fact  that 
his  army  had  marched  unopposed  to  within  a  few  miles  of  the  city  excited 
the  hopes  of  the  ignorant  masses.  Rumour  each  day  in  New  York  an 
nounced  the  fall  of  Richmond.  Nor  was  there  any  great  feeling  of  security 
in  the  Confederate  capital.  There  were  alarm  and  excitement  in  the  mixed 
and  restless  population  of  Richmond  ;  and  the  popular  feeling  found  but 
little  assurance  in  the  visible  tremour  of  the  authorities.  The  Confederate 
Congress  had  adjourned  in  such  haste  as  to  show  that  the  members  were 
anxious  to  provide  for  their  own  personal  safety.  President  Davis  sent  his 
family  to  North  Carolina,  and  a  part  of  the  Government  archives  were 
packed  ready  for  transportation.  At  the  railroad  depots  were  piles  of 
baggage  awaiting  transportation,  and  the  trains  were  crowded  with  women 
and  children  going  to  distant  points  in  the  country,  and  escaping  from  the 
alarm  and  distress  in  Richmond. 

But  the  panic;  like  all  excitements  of  this  sort,  was  soon  subdued  on 
reflection,  and  shamed  by  the  counsels  of  the  brave  and  intelligent.  The 
newspapers  rebuked  it  in  severe  terms.  The  shop-windows  were  filled  with 
caricatures  of  the  fugitives.  Much  of  the  alarm  was  turned  into  ridicule. 
A  meeting  of  citizens,  assembled  on  the  15th  of  May,  in  the  City  Hall, 
wrere  addressed  by  Gov.  Letcher  and  Mayor  Mayo,  and  applauded  the  senti 
ment  that  Richmond  should  be  reduced  to  ashes  before  it  should  become 
a  Yankee  conquest. 

The  Legislature  of  Virginia  acted  with  singular  spirit,  and  led  in  the 
work  of  the  restoration  of  public  confidence.  On  the  14th  of  May  it 
adopted  the  following  resolution,  which,  indeed,  deserves  to  be  committed 
to  history  as  an  example  of  heroic  fortitude  and  patriotic  sacrifice : 

"  Resolved,  by  the  General  Assembly  of  Virginia,  That  the  General  Assembly  hereby 
expresses  its  desire  that  the  capital  of  the  State  be  defended  to  the  last  extremity,  if  such 
defence  is  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States,  and 
that  the  President  be  assured  that  whatever  destruction  and  loss  of  property  of  the  State 
or  individuals  shall  thereby  result,  will  be  cheerfully  submitted  to." 

To  this  exhibition  of  the  spirit  of  Virginia,  President  Davis  responded 
in  lively  terms.  He  stated  to  a  committee  of  the  Legislature,  which  called 
upon  him  to  ascertain  his  views,  that  he  had  never  entertained  the  thought 


272  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

of  withdrawing  the  army  from  Virginia  and  abandoning  the  State.  But 
to  some  extent  he  spoiled  the  assurance  by  suggesting,  in  swollen  words, 
that  even  if  Kichmond  should  fall,  "  the  war  could  still  be  successfully 
maintained  on  Virginia  soil  for  twenty  years" 

The  tardy  battle  for  Richmond  yet  lingered.  Public  confidence  and 
public  courage  rose  each  day  of  the  delay.  The  eloquent  press  of  Rich 
mond  was  stirring  the  Southern  heart.  The  Richmond  Despatch  wrote  : 
"  If  there  is  blood  to  be  shed,  let  it  be  shed  here  ;  no  soil  of  the  Confed 
eracy  could  drink  it  up  more  acceptably  and  none  would  hold  it  more 
gratefully.  Wife,  family,  and  friends  are  nothing.  Leave  them  all  for 
one  glorious  hour  to  be  devoted  to  the  Republic.  Life,  death,  and  wounds 
are  nothing,  if  we  only  be  saved  from  the  fate  of  a  captured  capital  and  a 
humiliated  Confederacy.  Let  the  Government  act ;  let  the  people  act. 
There  is  time  yet." 

But  while  thus  fluctuated  the  sentiment  of  Richmond  there  came  an 
especial  occasion  to  reanimate  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy,  to  erect  again 
the  reputation  of  its  arms,  and  to  fill  with  gratitude  and  hope  the  hearts 
which  had  so  long  throbbed  with  anxiety  in  its  besieged  capital.  That 
occasion  was  the  splendid  diversion  of  "  Stonewall "  Jackson  in  the  Valley 
of  Virginia.  Public  attention  turned  to  the  eccentric  career  of  that  com 
mander  to  find  a  new  hero,  and  an  unexpected  train  of  brilliant  victories. 


When  the  principal  scene  of  the  war  in  Virginia  was  shifted  from  the 
lines  of  the  Potomac,  Gen.  Jackson  remained  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
Swell's  division  was  sent  to  operate  with  him  in  that  part  of  the  State. 
The  object  of  the  combined  force  was  to  divert  the  army  of  McDowell  at 
Fredericksburg  from  uniting  with  that  of  McClellan ;  and  beyond  this 
design  the  authorities  at  Richmond  had  no  expectations  from  Jackson's 
small  command. 

It  was  an  idea  originating  with  the  adventurous  commander  himself  to 
act  on  the  aggressive,  and  to  essay  the  extraordinary  task  of  driving  the 
Federal  forces  from  the  Valley,  then  there  under  the  three  commands  of 
Banks,  Fremont,  and  Shields. 

In  order  to  understand  the  disposition  of  all  the  opposing  forces  at  this 
time  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  a  brief  and  rapid 
resume  of  operations  and  movements  in  that  quarter  for  some  weeks  pre 
vious,  so  as  to  put  before  the  reader  a  comprehensive  scene  and  an  intelli 
gent  situation. 

The  disposition  of  the  enemy's  forces  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge  was  de 
signed  to  co-operate  with  McDowell  at  Fredericksburg.  They  included 


273 

the  troops  of  Banks  and  Shields  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  those  of 
Milroy,  Blenker,  and  Fremont  in  "Western  Yirginia.  As  soon  as  Jackson 
had  been  reinforced  by  Ewell's  division,  which  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  at 
McGackeysville,  the  commander  proceeded  in  person  to  the  position  of 
Gen.  Edward  Johnson's  little  force,  which  was  drawn  up  in  a  narrow  val 
ley,  at  a  village  called  McDowell,  with  the  heavy  brigades  of  Milroy  and 
Blenker  in  line  of  battle  before  them.  The  enemy  was  driven  here  after 
a  brief  engagement.  Learning  that  his  success  at  McDowell  had  so  fright 
ened  Milroy  and  Blenker  that  they  had  called  upon  Fremont,  who  was  a 
few  inarches  behind,  Jackson  determined  to  deceive  them  and  fall  back. 
Moving  at  a  fast  rate  down  the  Yalley  Pike,  he  proceeded  to  Newmarket, 
and  was  there  joined  by  Ewell's  force,  which  had  been  awaiting  him  at 
Swift  Run  Gap.  The  whole  force  now  amounted  to  about  fourteen  thou 
sand  men ;  and  after  a  little  rest,  proceeded  across  the  Shenandoah 
Mountains. 

Let  us  see  how  now  stood  the  forces  of  the  enemy.  When  Shields, 
who  had  followed  Jackson  since  the  battle  of  Kernstown,  found  him 
strongly  posted  at  McGackeysville,  he  declined  to  advance  against  him- 
and,  withdrawing  his  forces  from  between  Woodstock  and  Harrisonburg, 
he  regained  the  Yalley,  determined  to  push  on  towards  McDowell  at 
Fredericksburg.  Banks  had  his  force  scattered  up  and  down  the  Yalley, 
the  rear  being  at  Front  Royal.  Blenker  and  Milroy  were  similarly  bound 
through  Western  Yirginia,  but  their  defeat  had  diverted  Fremont  from  his 
proper  route,  who  immediately  went  to  their  assistance.  Thinking,  there 
fore,  that  Jackson  was  busily  engaged  in  that  distant  quarter,  and  not 
likely  to  trouble  them  in  the  Yalley  again,  Banks  and  Shields  were  com 
mencing  a  movement  towards  Fredericksburg,  unconscious  of  danger,  when, 
on  the  morning  of  May  22d,  Jackson  and  Ewell,  with  fourteen  thousand 
men,  were  meditating  an  attack  on  their  rear  at  Front  Royal. 

The  rear-guard,  consisting  of  the  First  Maryland  Regiment,  may  be 
said  to  have  been  almost  annihilated.  Every  man  was  killed,  wounded,  or 
captured,  save  fifteen ;  nine  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  on  the  retreat 
towards  Strasburg ;  and  a  vast  quantity  of  the  enemy's  stores  was  de 
stroyed.  At  the  first  shock  of  the  action,  Banks  had  his  army  in  motion 
from  Strasburg ;  he  feared  that  Jackson,  moving  from  Front  Royal  on  the 
converging  road  to  Winchester,  might  cut  him  off  from  that  supposed  place 
of  safety.  His  fears  were  nearly  realized ;  for  at  Middletown  Jackson 
pierced  his  main  column,  took  a  number  of  prisoners,  demoralized  the 
retreat,  and  having  driven  a  part  of  his  rear  towards  Strasburg,  turned 
on  hot  pursuit  to  Winchester. 

On  the  24rth  of  May,  Banks'  army,  in  frantic  retreat,  entered  the  streets 
of  Winchester.  The  citizens  received  them  with  shouts  of  derision.  Many 
of  the  fugitives  were  on  the  run  ;  some  shots  were  fired  from  the  windows 
18 


274  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

of  houses ;  ordnance  exploded ;  cavalry  rode  down  stragglers ;  bands  of 
plunderers  hastily  entered  houses,  bayonetted  their  occupants,  and  in  one 
wild  scene  of  unrestrained  disorder,  fury,  and  cowardice,  Banks'  army 
passed  out  of  the  ancient  town,  where  the  enemy  had  so  long  ruled  in  the 
insolence  of  power. 

Banks'  army  had  stood  but  a  few  moments  before  Winchester,  and 
had  broken  under  a  distant  fire  of  artillery.  He  had  evidently  no  disposi 
tion  to  test  the  substance  and  strength  of  the  foe  by  actual  collision,  and 
was  only  desirous  to  place  the  Potomac  between  himself  and  the  danger 
of  action.  Never  was  there  such  a  shameful  retreat ;  such  a  deliberate 
abandonment  by  a  commander  of  everything  but  the  desire  for  safety.  In 
forty-eight  hours  after  he  had  got  the  first  news  of  the  attack  on  Front 
Royal,  Banks  was  on  the  shore  of  the  Potomac,  having  performed  thirty- 
five  miles  of  the  distance  on  the  last  day  of  the  retreat. 

The  fruits  of  Jackson's  two  days'  operations  were  immense.  Banks  had 
escaped  with  the  loss  of  all  the  material  and  paraphernalia  that  constitute 
an  army.  He  had  abandoned  at  Winchester  all  his  commissary  and  ord 
nance  stores.  He  had  resigned  that  town  and  Front  Royal  to  the  undis 
puted  possession  of  the  Confederates.  He  had  left  in  their  hands  four 
thousand  prisoners,  and  stores  amounting  to  millions  of  dollars.  It  was  a 
rapid  stroke  and  a  splendid  success  which  Jackson  had  made.  Tidings  of 
his  victory  were  communicated  to  the  Confederate  army  around  Richmond 
in  general  orders.  "  The  Federal  army,"  wrote  Gen.  Johnston,  "  has  been 
dispersed  and  ignominiously  driven  from  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah, 
and  those  who  have  freed  the  loyal  citizens  of  that  district  by  their  patriotic 
valour,  have  again  earned,  as  they  will  receive,  the  thanks  of  a  grateful 
country.  In  making  this  glorious  announcement,  on  the  eve  of  the  mem 
orable  struggle  about  to  ensue,  the  Commanding  General  does  not  deem  it 
necessary  to  invoke  the  troops  of  this  army  to  emulate  the  deeds  of  their 
noble  comrades  in  the  Valley."  * 

In  falling  back  from  Winchester,  Gen.  Jackson  had  to  run  the  danger 
of  being  enveloped  by  the  converging  columns  of  Fremont  and  Shields. 
He  succeeded  ("  through  the  blessing  of  an  ever  kind  Providence  ")  in 
reaching  Strasburg,  before  the  two  Federal  armies  could  effect  their  contem 
plated  junction  in  his  rear.  On  the  5th  of  June  he  reached  Harrisonburg, 
and,  passing  beyond  that  town,  turned  towards  the  east  in  the  direction 
of  Port  Republic. 

On  the  movement  from  Harrisonburg  occurred  the  melancholy  inci- 

*  We  may  imagine  the  historical  value  of  Federal  official  documents  on  reading  Gen.  Banks' 
report  of  the  events  we  have  related.  The  drama  from  Strasburg  to  the  Potomac  is  thus  epitomized : 

"  My  command  had  not  suffered  an  attack  and  rout,  but  accomplished  a  premeditated  march  (!) 
of  near  sixty  miles,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  (!),  defeating  his  plans  and  giving  him  battle  wherever 
he  was  found  (!  !)." 


BATTLES   OF   CROSS-KEYS   AND   PORT   REPUBLIC.  275 

dent  of  the  death  of  the  famous  cavalry  commander  of  the  Valley,  Turner 
Ashby,  whose  name  was  connected  with  much  of  the  romance  of  the  war, 
and  whose  gentle  enthusiastic  courage,  simple  Christian  faith,  and  royal 
passion  for  danger,  constituted  him  one  of  the  noblest  and  most  beautiful 
types  of  modern  chivalry.  On  the  road  from  Harrisonburg  to  Port 
Republic,  the  58th  Virginia  became  engaged  with  the  Pennsylvania 
Bucktails.  Col.  Johnson  came  up  with  the  Maryland  regiment,  and  by  a 
dashing  charge  in  flank  drove  the  enemy  off  with  heavy  loss.  Ashby  was 
on  the  right  of  the  58th  Virginia,  and  had  just  commanded  a  charge  of 
bayonets  upon  the  enemy,  concealed  in  a  piece  of  woods,  when  he  fell  dead 
not  many  yards  from  a  fence  where  a  concealed  marksman  had  sped  the 
fatal  bullet.  Gen.  Jackson's  tribute  to  the  fallen  officer,  whose  active  and 
daring  cavalry  had  so  often  co-operated  with  his  arms,  was  an  extraordi 
nary  one,  considering  the  habitual  measure  of  this  great  man's  words.  He 
wrote  of  Ashby  :  u  As  a  partisan  officer  I  never  knew  his  superiour.  His 
daring  was  proverbial ;  his  powers  of  endurance  almost  incredible  ;  his  tone 
of  character  heroic,  and  his  sagacity  almost  intuitive  in  divining  the  pur 
poses  and  movements  of  the  enemy." 


BATTLES   OF   CROSS-KEYS   AND   PORT   REPUBLIC. 

On  the  7th  of  June  the  main  body  of  Gen.  Jackson's  command  had 
reached  the  vicinity  of  Port  Republic.  The  village  is  situated  in  the  angle 
formed  by  the  junction  of  the  North  and  South  Rivers,  tributaries  of  the 
south  fork  of  the  Shenandoah.  The  larger  portion  of  Jackson's  command 
was  encamped  on  the  high  ground  north  of  the  village,  about  a  mile  from 
the  river.  Gen.  Ewell  was  some  four  miles  distant,  near  the  road  leading 
from  Harrisonburg  to  Port  Republic.  Gen.  Fremont  had  arrived  with  his 
forces  in  the  vicinity  of  Harrisonburg,  and  Gen.  Shields  was  moving  up 
the  east  side  of  the  south  fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  was  then  some 
fifteen  miles  bekny  Port  Republic.  Gen.  Jackson's  position  was  about 
equi-distant  from  both  hostile  armies.  To  prevent  a  junction  of  the  two 
Federal  armies,  he  had  caused  the  bridge  over  the  south  fork  of  the  Shen 
andoah  at  Conrad's  store  to  be  destroyed. 

Fremont  had  seven  brigades  of  infantry  besides  numerous  cavalry. 
Ewell  had  three  small  brigades  during  the  greater  part  of  the  action  that 
was  to  ensue,  and  no  cavalry  at  any  time.  His  force  was  short  of  five 
thousand  men.  About  ten  o'clock  the  enemy  felt  along  his  front,  posted 
his  artillery,  and,  with  two  brigades,  made  an  attack  on  Trimble's  brigade 
on  the  right.  Gen.  Trimble  repulsed  this  force,  and,  advancing,  drove  the 
enemy  more  than  a  mile,  and  remained  on  his  flank  ready  to  make  the 
final  attack.  At  a  late  hour  of  the  afternoon,  Gen.  Ewell  advanced  both 


276  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

his  wings,  drove  in  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  and,  when  night  closed,  was 
in  possession  of  all  the  ground  previously  held  by  the  enemy. 

The  victory — known  as  that  of  Cross-Keys — had  been  purchased  by  a 
small  Confederate  loss  :  42  killed  and  287  wounded.  Gen.  Ewell  officially 
estimated  the  enemy's  loss  at  2,000.  Gen.  Fremont  officially  gives  it  at 
625 — exhibiting  rather  more  than  the  usual  difference  between  Federal 
and  Confederate  figures. 

Meanwhile  Gen.  Jackson  was  preparing  to  give  the  final  blow  to 
Shields  on  the  other  side  of  the  river ;  and  on  the  morning  after  their 
victory,  Swell's  forces  were  recalled  to  join  in  the  attack  at  Port  Republic. 
As  day  broke  they  commenced  their  march  to  the  other  field  of  battle 
seven  miles  distant. 

The  enemy  had  judiciously  selected  his  position  for  defence.  Upon  a 
rising  ground  near  the  Lewis  House,  he  had  planted  six  guns,  which  com 
manded  the  road  from  Port  Republic,  and  swept  the  plateau  for  a  consid 
erable  distance  in  front.  As  Gen.  Winder  moved  forward  his  brigade,  a 
rapid  and  severe  fire  of  shell  was  opened  upon  it.  The  artillery  fire  was 
well  sustained  by  our  batteries,  which,  however,  proved  unequal  to  that  of 
the  enemy.  In  the  meantime,  Winder,  being  now  reinforced  by  a  Louisiana 
regiment,  seeing  no  mode  of  silencing  the  Federal  battery,  or  escaping  its 
destructive  missiles  but  by  a  rapid  charge,  and  the  capture  of  it,  advanced 
with  great  boldness  for  some  distance,  but  encountered  such  a  heavy  fire  of 
artillery  and  small  arms  as  greatly  to  disorganize  his  command,  which  fell 
back  in  disorder.  The  enemy  advanced  across  the  field,  and,  by  a  heavy 
musketry  fire,  forced  back  our  infantry  supports,  in  consequence  of  which 
our  guns  had  to  retire. 

It  was  just  at  this  crisis,  when  the  day  seemed  lost,  that  Ewell's  forces 
appeared  upon  the  scene.  Two  regiments — the  58th  and  44th  Virginia — 
rushed  with  a  shout  upon  the  enemy,  took  him  in  flank  and  drove  him 
back,  for  the  first  time  that  day  in  disorder.  Meanwhile  Gen.  Taylor  was 
employed  on  the  Federal  left  and  rear,  and,  his  attack  diverting  attention 
from  the  front,  led  to  a  concentration  of  the  enemy's  force  upon  him. 
Here  the  battle  raged  furiously.  Although  assailed  by  a  superiour  force 
in  front  and  flank,  with  their  guns  in  position  within  point  blank  range, 
the  charge  ordered  by  Taylor  was  gallantly  made,  and  the  enemy's  bat 
tery,  consisting  of  six  guns,  fell  into  our  hands.  Three  times  was  this  bat 
tery  lost  and  won  in  the  desperate  and  determined  efforts  to  capture  and 
recover  it.  At  last,  attacked  in  front  and  on  flank,  Taylor  fell  back  to  a 
skirt  of  woods.  Winder,  having  rallied  his  command,  moved  to  his  sup 
port,  and  again  opened  upon  the  enemy,  who  were  moving  upon  Taylor's 
left  flank,  apparently  to  surround  him  in  the  wood.  The  final  attack  was 
made.  Taylor,  with  the  reinforcement,  pushed  forward  ;  he  was  assisted 
by  the  well-directed  fire  of  our  artillery  ;  the  enemy  fell  back ;  a  few 


BATTLES   OF   CROSS-KEYS    AND   PORT   REPUBLIC.  277 

moments  more,  and  he  was  in  precipitate  retreat.  Four  hundred  and  fifty 
prisoners  were  taken  in  the  pursuit,  and  what  remained  of  the  enemy's 
artillery. 

While  the  forces  of  Shields  were  in  full  retreat,  Fremont  appeared  on 
the  opposite  bank  of  the  south  fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  with  his  army,  and 
opened  his  artillery  with  but  little  effect.  The  next  day  withdrawing  his 
forces,  he  retreated  down  the  Valley.  The  battle  of  Port  Republic  closed 
the  campaign  of  the  Valley.  It  had  been  fiercely  contested  by  the  enemy, 
and  the  Confederate  loss  was  quite  one  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded. 
But  the  termination  of  the  campaign  found  Jackson  crowned  with  an  al 
most  marvellous  success.  In  little  more  than  two  weeks,  he  had  defeated 
three  Federal  armies ;  swept  the  Valley  of  Virginia  of  hostile  forces ;  thrilled 
Washington  with  alarm ;  and  thwarted  whatever  plan  the  enemy  might 
have  entertained,  in  other  circumstances,  of  environing  Eichmond  by  large 
converging  armies. 

On  the  12th  of  June  Jackson  encamped  near  Weyer's  Cave.  Here  the 
pious  commander  paused,  to  hold  divine  service  in  his  army  in  commemo 
ration  of  his  victories.  He  was  to  be  here  but  a  few  days  before  receiving 
orders  to  move  towards  Eichmond,  and  to  join  in  the  impending  contest 
for  the  capital. 


CHAPTEE    XVII. 

THE  TAEDINES9  OF  M'CLELLAN. — HOW  THE  CONFEDERATES  AVAILED  THEMSELVES  OF  IT. — 
THEIE  CONCENTRATION  OF  FOEOES  AT  EICHMOND. — STRENGTH  OF  THESE  FORCES. — POSI 
TION  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES. — THE  CHICKAHOMINY  AND  THE  EOADS  CROSSING  IT. — BATTLE 

OF    "  SEVEN   PINES." — FAILURE   OF   GEN.  HUGER  TO    ATTACK. GALLANT  CHARGE   OF  THE 

TROOPS    OF    LONGSTREET    AND    HILL. GEN.    JOHNSTON    WOUNDED. — THE   AFFAIR   OF  THE 

NEXT  DAY. — IMPORTANT  CHANGE  OF  MILITARY  COMMAND. — SECRET  HISTORY  OF  THE 
ATTEMPT  TO  LIMIT  THE  MILITARY  POWER  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. — A  PLAN  OF  CONFED 
ERATE  POLITICIANS. — PLOT  AGAINST  THE  PRESIDENT'S  POWER. — THE  NEW  OFFICE  OF 
COMMANDING-GENERAL  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — HOW  MADE  NOMINAL  BY  PRESIDENT 
DAVIS. GEN.  ROBERT  E.  LEE  APPOINTED  TO  THIS  OFFICE. — HIS  APPEARANCE  AND  MAN 
NERS. — THE  SEVEN  DAYS'  BATTLES  AROUND  RICHMOND. — LEE's  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS. — 
JACKSON'S  WITHDRAWAL  FROM  THE  VALLEY  MASKED. — BATTLES  OF  MECHANICSVILLE  AND 
BEAVER  DAM. — REPULSE  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  AT  BEAVER  DAM  CREEK. — JACKSON 

FLANKS  THE  ENEMY'S  POSITION. M'CLELLAN's  RETREAT  TO  GAINES'  MILLS. — ITS  STRAT 
EGIC  DESIGN. — EXTRAORDINARY  STRENGTH  OF  THE  NEW  POSITION. — GEN.  LEE  WAITING 
FOR  THE  GREAT  BATTLE. — BATTLE  OF  GAINES'  MILLS. — HEROIC  FIGHT  OF  HILL'S  DIVISION. 
THE  ENEMY  GAINS  GROUND. — AN  URGENT  MESSAGE  TO  LONGSTREET. — JACKSON  AP 
PEARS. — FINAL  CHARGE  OF  THE  DAY. — ITS  FIERCE  GRANDEUR. — VICTORY  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATES. — M'OLELLAN  RETREATS  TOWARDS  THE  JAMES  RIVER. — FAILURE  OF  MAGRUDER 

AND  HUGER  TO  INTERCEPT  HIM. — THE  GREAT  ERROUR  WHICH  THEY  COMMITTED. — BATTLE 
OF  SAVAGE  STATION. — M'CLELLAN  CROSSES  WHITE  OAK  SWAMP. — FAILURE  OF  HUGER's 
ATTACK. — ANOTHER  OPPORTUNITY  LOST. — BATTLE  OF  FRAZIER's  FARM. — HILL  AND  LONG- 

STREET'S  TROOPS  ONLY  ENGAGED. — BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. — M'CLELLAN'S  POSITION  ON 

THE    HILL. — HIS  NUMEROUS    ARTILLERY. — THE   ATTACK    OF   THE    CONFEDERATE  LEFT  NOT 

SUPPORTED. — MAGRUDER'S  IMPETUOUS  AND  DESPERATE  CHARGE. — THE  SUBLIME  SCENERY 

OF    THE    CONTEST. — FAILURE    OF    THE    ATTACK. — M'CLELLAN   CONTINUES  HIS  RETREAT  TO 

HARRISON'S  LANDING. — FRUITS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  SUCCESS. — GEN.  LEE'S  EXPLANATION 
OF  M'CLELLAN'S  ESCAPE. — ESTIMATE  OF  THE  VICTORY  BY  LEE  AND  STONEWALL  JACKSON. 

— RICHMOND  ERECT  AND  EXULTANT. 

THE  tardiness  of  McClellan  afforded  opportunity  to  the  Confederates 
to  recruit  their  forces,  to  realize  the  results  of  the  conscription  law,  and  to 
assemble  before  Kichmond  the  largest  army  they  were  ever  able  to  put  on 
a  single  field  in  any  time  of  the  war.  The  enemy  had  had  the  start  in  the 
preparation  of  many  months.  He  delayed  the  advance  upon  Eichmond, 
hesitating  which  line  to  adopt,  when  an  advance  upon  either  of*  the  pro 
posed  lines  could  hardly  have  failed  of  success.  A  month  was  lost  before 


THE  RICHMOND  LINES.  279 

the  advance  was  begun.  Another  month  was  occupied  in  the  siege  of 
Yorktown,  where  McClellan  was  held  in  check  by  eleven  thousand  men. 
Three  weeks  more  were  taken  up  in  the  cautious  advance  across  the  Pen 
insula.  Thus  three  full  months  were  lost  by  the  Federal  army  before  it 
was  fairly  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Richmond,  and  every  day  of  these 
months  was  employed  by  the  Confederates  in  enlarging  their  resources  of 
defence. 

Having  reached  the  Chickahominy,  McClellan  threw  a  portion  of  his 
army  across  the  river,  and,  having  thus  established  his  left,  proceeded  to 
pivot  upon  it,  and  to  extend  his  right  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Pamunkey, 
so  as  to  get  to  the  north  of  Richmond.  "While  conducting  this  manoauvre 
and  delaying  an  attack,  the  Confederate  army  was  rapidly  receiving  rein 
forcements,  and  drawing  troops  from  distant  points  to  make  a  decisive 
battle.  Huger's  army,  from  Norfolk,  united  with  Johnston  before  Rich 
mond  ;  forces,  under  Branch,  in  North  Carolina,  were  rapidly  brought  for 
ward  by  rail ;  and  even  as  far  as  Charleston,  troops  were  withdrawn  to 
match  Johnston's  numbers  as  far  as  possible  with  those  of  the  enemy. 
And  in  this  instance  the  match  of  numbers  was  probably  closer  than  ever 
before  or  afterwards  in  the.  great  conflicts  of  the  war.  "With  Jackson's 
command  in  the  Yalley  which  it  was  intended  to  put  on  the  Richmond 
lines  at  the  proper  moment,  the  force  defending  the  Confederate  capital 
may  be  estimated  at  about  ninety  thousand  men  ;  and  McClellan's,  consid 
ering  his  losses  on  the  Peninsula,  could  scarcely  be  more  than  one  hundred 
and  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  men. 

In  the  last  days  of  May  the  position  of  the  two  armies  around  Rich 
mond  is  described  by  the  Chickahominy.  This  stream,  tracing  through 
heavy  forests  and  swamps  east  of  Richmond  from  a  north-westerly  to  a 
south- easterly  direction,  formed  the  respective  fronts  of  the  two  armies — 
the  Confederates  occupying  the  western,  the  Federals  the  eastern  banks. 
The  line  occupied  by  the  enemy  was  nearly  a  right  line  from  north-west  to 
south-east.  His  forces  were  stretched  from  a  short  distance  above  New 
Bridge,  where  his  right  rested,  to  Bottom's  Bridge,  which  constituted  his 
left.  The  line  was  about  ten  miles  long.  Across  it  ran  five  roads  in  the 
following  order,  from  west  to  east :  the  Brook  turnpike ;  the  Mechanics- 
ville  turnpike,  (Mechanicsville  being  a  village  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy) ;  the  Nine  Mile  road  ;  York  River  railroad ;  the  Williams- 
burg  road  ;  the  Charles  City  road  ;  and  the  Darbytown  road. 

Before  the  30th  of  May,  Gen.  Johnston  had  ascertained  that  McClellan 
had  thrown  his  left  forward  to  a  point  within  six  miles  of  Richmond,  a 
mile  in  front  of  a  point  locally  designated  the  "  Seven  Pines,"  where 
Casey's  division  was  posted.  Couch's  division  was  encamped  in  his  rear, 
his  right  resting  in  front  of  Fair  Oaks  station,  about  six  miles  due  east  of 
Richmond.  Gen.  Keyes  commanded  both  divisions.  In  front  there  was 


280  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

a  heavy  forest,  and  a  screen  of  dense  undergrowth.  A  terrific  thunder 
storm  had  taken  place  on  the  night  of  the  29th  of  May,  and  floods  of  rain 
spirting  in  broad  jets,  had  so  swollen  the  Chickahominy  in  Keyes'  rear, 
that  Johnston  indulged  the  prospect  of  having  to  deal  with  no  other  troops 
than  those  of  this  corps.  In  these  circumstances,  on  the  morning  of  the 
30th  May,  he  moved  out  to  annihilate  the  enemy's  left. 


BATTLE   OF    SEVEN   PINES. 

Gen.  Johnston's  plan  of  battle  was  to  embrace  an  attack  at  three  points. 
Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  supported  by  the  division  of  Gen.  Longstreet,  (who  had 
the  direction  of  operations  on  the  right,)  was  to  advance  by  the  Williams- 
burg  road,  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front ;  Gen.  linger,  with  his  division, 
was  to  move  down  the  Charles  City  road,  in  order  to  atack  in  flank  the 
troops  who  might  be  engaged  with  Hill  and  Longstreet ;  Gen.  Smith  was 
to  march  to  the  junction  of  the  New  Bridge  road  and  the  Nine  Mile  road, 
to  be  in  readiness  either  to  fall  on  Keyes's  right  flank,  or  to  cover  Long- 
street's  left. 

The  greater  part  of  the  day  was  lost  in  vain  expectation  of  Huger's 
movement — the  most  important  part  of  the  design,  as  it  was  to  take  the 
enemy's  flank  and  insure  his  destruction.  The  movement  was  disap 
pointed,  as  Huger  could  not  cross  the  swollen  stream  in  his  front.  At  a 
late  hour  in  the  afternoon  Longstreet  determined  to  move  upon  the  enemy 
with  his  own  and  Hill's  division,  and  accomplish  whatever  results  were 
possible  in  the  far-spent  day.  Gen.  Johnston  remained  with  Smith  on  the 
left,  to  observe  the  field. 

Through  the  thick  woods,  on  marshy  ground,  in  water  in  many  places 
two  feet  deep,  Longstreet's  regiments  moved  on,  brushing  off  occasionally 
a  cloud  of  skirmishers  that  disputed  their  passage.  As  they  came  upon 
the  enemy's  works,  a  sheet  of  fire  blazed  in  their  faces.  It  was  sharp, 
rapid  work.  Some  of  the  regiments  crept  through  the  low  brushwood  in 
front  of  the  redoubt,  and,  at  a  given  signal  from  the  flanking  parties,  made 
a  rush  for  the  guns,  cleared  them,  and,  entering  pell-mell  into  the  earth 
work,  bayonetted  all  who  opposed  them.  Line  after  line  of  the  enemy's 
works  was  carried ;  the  victorious  career  of  the  Confederates  swept  through 
his  successive  camps  and  entrenchments ;  and  as  night  fell  he  had  been 
driven  about  two  miles,  and  had  left  a  track  of  retreat  through  swamp 
and  water  red  with  carnage. 

On  the  left,  where  Johnston  commanded  in  person,  the  enemy  held  his 
position  until  dark  ;  Smith's  division,  with  a  portion  of  Whiting's,  failing 
to  dislodge  him.  On  this  part  of  the  field  Gen.  Johnston  was  disabled  by 
a  severe  wound  in  the  shoulder. 


BATTLE   OF    SEVEN  PINES.  281 

The  work  of  carnage  in  a  few  hours  of  daylight  had  been  terrible. 
The  Confederate  loss  was  more  than  four  thousand.  That  of  the  enemy 
was  stated  in  Northern  journals  to  have  exceeded  ten  thousand.  McClellan 
officially  states  it  at  5,Y39.  The  visible  fruits  of  our  victory  were  ten  pie'ces  of 
cannon,  six  thousand  stand  of  arms,  one  garrison  flag,  four  stand  of  regiment 
al  colors,  a  large  number  of  tents,  besides  much  camp  equipage  and  stores. 

On  the  following  day,  June  1,  the  enemy,  having  thrown  across  the 
Chickahominy  two  additional  divisions,  under  command  of  Gen.  Sumner, 
attacked  the  brigade  of  Gen.  Pickett,  which  was  supported  by  that  of  Gen. 
Pryor.  The  attack  was  vigorously  repelled  by  these  two  brigades,  the 
brunt  of  the  light  falling  on  General  Pickett.  This  was  the  last  demon 
stration  made  by  the  enemy.  This  action,  really  of  no  consequence,  was 
magnified  in  McClellan's  dispatches  as  "  the  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks,"  thus 
giving  to  the  Northern  public  a  new  and  most  undue  "  sensation  "  to 
counteract  the  defeat  of  the  previous  important  day. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  Confederate  public  was  but  little  affected 
by  the  victory  of  Seven  Pines.  It  was  a  splendid  feat  of  arms ;  but  it 
accomplished  no  important  results,  and  the  ground  which  it  gained  was 
unimportant,  and  was  speedily  abandoned.  Had  Huger  obeyed  orders, 
Johnston  might  have  demolished  the  enemy ;  as  it  was,  McClellan's  left 
was  routed  and  demoralized,  and  we  had  gained  nothing  more  substantial 
than  a  brilliant  battle,  when  it  had  been  intended  to  have  embraced  an 
attack  at  three  points,  and  probably  all  along  the  line,  if  the  enemy  had 
accepted  it. 

The  disabling  wound,  which  Gen.  Johnston  had  received,  was  the  occa 
sion  of  an  important  change  of  military  commands.  The  Confederate 
Congress  had  some  time  ago  passed  a  bill  creating  the  office  of  command 
ing  general,  who  should  take  charge  of  the  military  movements  of  the  war. 
This  measure  was  one  of  great  significance,  as  the  early  attempt  in  the 
Confederacy  to  abolish  the  bipartite  character  of  the  Executive  office,  and 
to  supply  two  agents  for  the  management  of  the  war. 

The  merits  of  the  proposed  reform  were  long  a  theme  of  discussion  in 
the  Confederacy.  The  President  in  his  Executive  capacity  was  the  ser 
vant  of  Congress,  and,  therefore,  could  have  nothing  of  the  dictator  in  his 
action  ;  but  as  "  Imperator"  or  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy, 
he  might  be  almost  despotic  in  the  exercise  of  his  powers.  The  army  regu 
lations  would  be  his  "  Constitution ; "  but  with  the  power  to  fill  courts- 
martial  with  his  creatures,  his  authority  would  be  limited  very  much  by  his 
own  will,  and  all  appeals  from  their  decisions  would  be  from  him  the 
Imperator  to  him  the  civil  magistrate.  The  theory  of  such  a  power  was 
evidently  on  the  verge  of  despotism.  Abolish  the  habeas  corpus,  and  the 
President,  with  his  full  bipartite  powers,  would  be  an  autocrat,  if  he  had 
the  tact  to  be  so  without  raising  the  anger  of  the  people  until  he  estab- 


282  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

listed  himself  on  firm  grounds.  Experience  in  the  old  Union  had  suf 
ficiently  taught  the  Confederates  what  little  safety  to  public  liberty  was 
to  be  expected  from  the  representatives  of  the  people,  when  Executive 
patronage  was  brought  to  bear ;  and  indicated  the  additional  lesson  that 
even  where  the  Executive  officer  had  not  sufficient  ability  to  be  danger 
ous,  he  might  become  the  tool  of  a  prescriptive  and  tyrannical  party. 

After  the  first  battle  of  Manassas,  a  certain  adviser  of  President  Davis, 
who  had  some  experience  of  the  Congress  at  Montgomery,  and  knew  the 
numerous  efforts  to  shape  the  action  of  the  government  in  favour  of  local 
interests,  drew  his  attention  to  the  bipartite  nature  of  his  office,  and  urged 
him  to  assume  more  of  the  Imperator,  as  the  best  and  speediest  manner 
of  concentrating  our  forces  for  decisive  action.  From  a  conscientious 
regard  to  the  advisory  power  of  Congress,  President  Davis  then  declined 
to  do  this.  How  could  he,  as  the  executive  officer  of  Congress,  do  it  ? 
"Were  not  the  two  offices  in  one  person  clearly  antagonistic  ?  The  conse 
quence  was,  that  before  the  end  of  the  first  year  of  the  war  it  was  manifest 
that  a  clear  head  and  a  vigorous  will  were  wanting  in  the  administration 
of  military  matters.  The  conclusion  came  to  be  almost  unanimous  in  the 
public  mind  that  the  civil  and  military  affairs  of  the  Confederacy  could 
not  be  conducted  by  one  head,  and  should  be  separated  into  two  distinct 
offices.  It  was  argued  that  this  plan  involved  the  least  danger  to  public 
liberty ;  that  the  civil  and  military  powers  being,  each,  in  the  control  of 
one  clear  head  and  strong  hand,  would  probably  be  most  effectually  exer 
cised  in  the  accomplishment  of  our  independence,  and  that  the  two  heads 
would  not  be  as  likely  to  unite  for  any  end  injurious  to  the  public  liberty 
as  a  Cabinet  of  weak,  plastic  characters,  put  in  place  and  held  in  hand  by 
one  man. 

In  consequence  of  these  views,  a  plan  was  matured  by  several  leading 
Confederate  politicians,  having  for  its  object  the  division  of  the  Executive 
powers  between  a  civil  ruler,  who  should  carry  out  the  designs  of  Congress 
and  watch  over  the  liberties  of  the  people  and  the  safety  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  and  a  military  leader,  Imperator,  or  commander-in-chief,  who  should 
be  entrusted  with  the  conduct  of  the  war,  and  look  to  Congress  and  the 
Executive  for  the  means  to  carry  out  his  plan. 

The  scheme  was  this :  Gen.  E.  E.  Lee  was  to  be  commander-in-chief 
and  have  the  army  of  the  Potomac ;  Johnston  to  be  entrusted  with  the 
war  in  the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi  East ;  Price  in  Missouri ;  Kirby 
Smith  in  Louisiana  and  Texas ;  Bragg  in  the  South ;  Beauregard  in  the 
South-east,  while  Jackson,  Longstreet,  Hill,  "Whiting,  and  the  other  pro 
mising  officers  were  to  carry  out  their  views.  The  commanders  of  divi 
sions,  above  named,  were  to  constitute  a  board  of  advisers  to  Congress,  and 
each  to  be  entrusted  with  discretionary  powers  in  his  own  district. 

President  Davis  was  probably  aware  of  the  details  of  this  early  plot 


BATTLES   ABOUND   RICHMOND.  283 

against  his  power.  He  vetoed  the  bill  creating  the  office  of  commanding 
general.  But  being  personally  well  affected  towards  Lee,  he  took  occasion 
of  Johnston's  disability  to  put  the  first  not  only  in  command  of  the  field 
before  Richmond,  but  to  appoint  him  to  the  nominal  office  of  commanding 
general,  the  order  providing  that  he  should  "  act  "under  direction  of  the 
President."  It  was  the  successful  career  of  the  Confederacy  from  this 
date  that  for  a  time  put  out  of  mind  the  design  upon  the  military  auto 
cracy  of  President  Davis  ;  but  we  shall  hereafter  see  how  this  design  was 
renewed,  in  what  portentous  circumstances  it  afterwards  appeared,  and 
how  it  assumed  the  tone  and  air  of  an  almost  revolutionary  demand. 

Gen.  Lee  assumed  his  new  and  important  command  with  characteristic 
simplicity.  He  was  naturally  quiet,  thoughtful  and  polite  ;  and  he  was 
one  of  those  rare  men  whose  modesty  became  more  conspicuous  at  each 
ascending  stage  of  power  and  responsibility.  A  stranger  would  scarcely 
have  recognized  in  the  quiet  gentleman  who  in  a  plain  grey  suit,  without 
any  insignia  of  rank,  rode  each  day  about  the  lines  of  Richmond,  scarcely 
attracting  observation,  the  man  whose  genius  and  resources  commanded 
the  unbounded  confidence  and  hope  of  the  Confederate  people. 


BATTLES    AKOTJND   RICHMOND. 

Gen.  Lee's  plan  of  operations  around  Richmond  was  soon  formed.  It 
was  very  simple  and  comprehensive  ;  and  is  at  once  understood  on  a  gen 
eral  survey  of  the  positions  of  the  opposing  armies.  McClellan's  base  of 
supplies  was  near  the  head  of  York  River.  His  left  was  established  south 
of  the  Chickahominy,  between  "White  Oak  Swamp  and  New  Bridge, 
defended  by  a  line  of  strong  works.  His  right  wing  lay  north  of  the 
Chickahominy,  extending  beyond  Mechanicsville,  the  approaches  from 
the  south  side  being  strongly  defended  by  entrenchments.  Lee's  army 
was  around  Richmond  ;  the  divisions  of  Huger  and  Magruder,  supported 
by  those  of  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill,  in  front  of  the  enemy's  left,  and 
that  of  A.  P.  Hill  extending  fom  Magruder's  left  beyond  Meadow  Bridge. 

The  intention  of  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  to  attack  Richmond  by 
regular  approaches.  The  strength  of  his  left  wing  rendered  a  direct 
assault  injudicious,  if  not  impracticable.  It  was  therefore  determined  by 
Gen.  Lee  to  construct  defensive  lines  so  as  to  enable  a  part  of  his  army  to 
defend  the  city,  and  leave  the  other  part  free  to  cross  the  Chickahominy, 
and  operate  on  the  north  bank.  By  sweeping  down  the  river  on  that  side, 
and  threatening  his  communications  with  York  river,  it  was  thought  that 
the  enemy  would  be  compelled  to  retreat  or  give  battle  out  of  his  en 
trenchments. 

We  have  already  noticed  the  operations  of  Gen.  Jackson's  command, 


284:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

including  E well's  division,  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  and  seen  how  success 
ful  they  were  in  diverting  the  army  of  McDowell  at  Fredericksburg  from 
uniting  with  that  of  McClellan.  It  was  now  important  to  summon  the  force 
to  the  defence  of  Richmond,  and  to  do  so  with  secrecy  and  dispatch.  To 
mask  his  withdrawal  from  the  Yalley  at  the  proper  time,  Jackson,  after 
the  defeat  of  Fremont  and  Shields,  was  reinforced  by  "Whiting's  division, 
composed  of  Hood's  Texas  brigade,  and  his  own,  under  Colonel  Law,  from 
Richmond,  and  that  of  Lawton  from  the  South.  The  deception  succeeded 
even  beyond  expectation  ;  and  there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  McClellan 
remained  in  profound  ignorance  of  Jackson's  movement  until  his  appari 
tion  on  the  lines  of  Richmond. 

According  to  Lee's  general  order  of  battle,  Gen.  Jackson  was  to  march 
from  Ashland  on  the  25th  of  June,  in  the  direction  of  Slash  Church, 
encamping  for  the  night  west  of  the  Central  railroad,  and  to  advance  at 
three,  A.  M.,  on  the  26th,  and  turn  Beaver  Dam.  A.  P.  Hill  was  to  cross 
the  Chickahominy  at  Meadow  Bridge,  when  Jackson's  advance  beyond 
that  point  should  be  known,  and  move  directly  upon  Mechanicsville.  As 
soon  as  the  Mechanicsville  bridge  should  be  uncovered,  Longstreet  and  D. 
H.  Hill  were  to  cross,  the  latter  to  proceed  to  the  support  of  Jackson,  and 
the  former  to  that  of  A.  P.  Hill.  The  four  commands  were  directed  to 
sweep  down  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  towards  the  York  River 
railroad,  Jackson  on  the  left  and  in  advance,  Longstreet  nearest  the  river 
and  in  the  rear.  Huger  and  Magruder  were  ordered  to  hold  their  posi 
tions  against  any  assault  of  the  enemy,  to  observe  his  movements,  and 
follow  him. closely  should  he  retreat. 

Battles  of  Mechanicsville  and  Beaver  Dam. 

A.  P.  Hill  did  not  commence  his  movement  until  three  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  when  he  crossed  the  river  and  advanced  upon  Mechanicsville. 
This  place  had  been  strongly  fortified  by  Fitz-John  Porter,  whose  services 
as  an  engineer  and  artillerist  were  highly  valued  by  McClellan.  As  the 
Confederates  advanced  on  Porter's  works,  artillery  on  both  sides  opened 
with  a  terrific  roar.  A  deafening  cannonade  of  half  an  hour  disturbed 
the  last  hours  of  evening.  The  flash  of  guns,  and  long  lines  of  musketry 
fire  could  be  seen  in  bright  relief  against  the  blue  and  cloudless  sky.  As 
night  drew  on,  a  grander  scene  was  presented  to  the  eye.  Barns,  houses 
and  stacks  of  hay  and  straw  were  in  a  blaze  ;  and  by  their  light  our  men 
were  plainly  visible  rushing  across  the  open  spaces  through  infernal 
showers  of  grape.  A  few  moments  more  and  the  Federal  guns  were 
silent ;  a  loud  noise  of  many  voices  was  heard ;  and  then  a  long,  wild, 
piercing  yell,  and  the  place  was  ours. 

The  enemy  was  now  forced  to  take  refuge  in  Ms  works  on  the  left 
bank  of  Beaver  Dam  creek,  about  a  mile  distant.  The  position  was  one 


BATTLES   OF    MECHANICSVILLE   AND   BEAVER   DAM.  285 

of  extraordinary  strength  ;  the  banks  of  the  creek  in  front  were  high  and 
almost  perpendicular  ;  the  approach  to  it  was  over  open  fields  ;  there  were 
no  bridges,  and  the  difficulty  of  crossing  the  stream  had  been  increased  by 
felling  the  woods  on  its  banks.  It  was  thought  that  the  only  possible 
method  in  which  the  position  could  be  attacked  was  to  cross  the  creek  and 
swamp  higher  up  ;  and  it  was  expected  that  Jackson  would  pass  Beaver 
Dam  above,  and  turn  the  enemy's  right. 

In  the  meantime  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  crossed  the  Mechanicsville 
bridge  as  soon  as  it  was  uncovered,  and  could  be  repaired.  It  was  late 
before  they  reached  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy.  D.  II.  Hill's 
leading  brigade  under  Ripley  advanced  to  the  support  of  the  troops  en 
gaged,  and  at  a  late  hour  united  with  Fender's  brigade  of  A.  P.  Hill's 
division  in  an  effort  to  turn  the  enemy's  left.  In  the  excitement  and  dark 
ness,  Ripley  advanced  his  line  through  the  open  fields,  and  had  reached  the 
road  and  swamp  in  front,  when  suddenly  the  enemy  opened  with  grape, 
at  seventy  yards,  and  mowed  down  whole  files  of  our  men.  The  word  to 
"  charge  ;  "  ran  from  wing  to  wing,  and  our  men  running  down  the  bank 
to  the  road  beneath,  were  stopped  by  the  impassable  swamp  and  abattis ; 
to  the  right,  up  the  rising  road,  cannon  also  blazed  in  their  faces,  and  well- 
posted  infantry  poured  in  showers  of  small  shot.  Retreat  was  the  only 
alternative,  and  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  it  was  effected  with  little 
additional  loss.  The  fire  was  continued  until  about  nine  o'clock  in  the 
night,  when  the  engagement  ceased  ;  and  thus  closed  the  first  day  of  the 
battles  around  Richmond. 

In  the  morning  of  the  27th  June  Jackson's  arrival  on  the  enemy's  left 
was  still  looked  for.  In  expectation  of  it  the  battle  was  renewed  at  dawn. 
The  fight  continued  with  animation  for  about  two  hours.  As  the  sun 
brilliantly  rose  over  the  tree-tops,  illumining  the  field,  the  line  of  fight 
with  its  stream  of  fire  ;  bursting  of  caissons,  shouts,  yells ;  the  centre 
occupied  by  the  strong  redoubt ;  crowds  of  combatants  rushing  in  the 
charge  ;  soldiers  reeling,  bleeding,  shouting,  powder-blackened  and  faint 
ing,  madly  firing  random  shots,  and  sinking  from  fatigue,  formed  a  scene 
that  was  at  once  soul-stirring,  sublime  and  horrible.  But  while  this 
terrible  and  critical  action  was  going  on,  Jackson  was  rapidly  approaching 
to  decide  it.  He  had  at  last  succeeded  in  crossing  Beaver  Dam  creek 
above  the  enemy's  position  ;  and  the  Federals  no  sooner  perceived  it  than 
they  abandoned  their  entrenchments,  and  retired  rapidly  down  the  river. 

No  time  was  now  to  be  lost.  Gen.  Lee  readily  perceived  that  McClel- 
lan  had  endeavoured  to  force  Porter  into  an  energetic  resistance  thus  far, 
to  gain  time  to  protect  his  centre  on  the  north  bank,  situated  in  the  neigh* 
bourhood  of  Games'  Mills,  near  the  river.  As  soon  as  the  bridges  over 
Beaver  Dam  could  be  repaired  the  several  columns  resumed  their  inarch. 
Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  moved  along  the  edge  of  the  Chickahominy  on 


286  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  right ;  while  Jackson,  with  whom  D.  H.  Hill  had  united,  was  still  far 
to  the  left,  threatening  the  enemy's  right  rear  as  he  gradually  converged 
towards  the  river. 

The  position  which  McClellan  had  taken  at  Games'  Mills  was  evidently 
intended  for  a  decisive  field.  Here  was  to  occur  the  heavy  and  obstinate 
battle  for  Kichmond.  The  enemy  occupied  a  range  of  hills,  with  his  left 
on  a  wooded  bluff,  which  rose  abruptly  from  a  deep  ravine.  The  ravine 
was  filled  with  sharpshooters,  to  whom  its  banks  gave  protection.  A 
second  line  of  infantry  was  stationed  on  the  side  of  a  hill,  behind  a  breast 
work  of  trees,  above  the  first.  A  third  occupied  the  crest,  strengthened 
with  rifle  trenches,  and  crowned  with  artillery.  The  approach  to  this  posi 
tion  was  over  an  open  plain,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide,  commanded 
by  this  triple  line  of  fire,  and  swept  by  the  heavy  batteries  south  of  the 
Chickahominy.  In  front  of  his  centre  and  right,  the  ground  was  generally 
open,  bounded  on  the  side  of  our  approach  by  a  wood,  with  dense  and 
tangled  undergrowth,  and  traversed  by  a  sluggish  stream  which  converted 
the  soil  into  a  deep  morass. 

Gen.  Lee,  having  taken  up  his  headquarters  at  a  house  on  Hogan's 
plantation,  awaited  quietly  the  moment  when  his  word  of  command  would 
join  the  most  important  battle  of  the  war.  It  was  past  noon.  The 
columns  of  Hill  and  Longstreet  halted  in  the  open  ground  to  await  the 
arrival  of  Jackson's  right  at  ISTew  Cold  Harbour.  Gen.  Lee,  quiet  and 
serious,  sat  alone  in  the  rear  portico  of  Hogan's  house.  A  crowd  of  military 
dignitaries  were  gathered  in  council  upon  the  front  door-steps  and  on  the 
grassy  sward.  A  low  and  eager  conversation  was  kept  up  among  them, 
while  the  great  commander  sat  alone  in  thoughtful  attitude,  his  fine,  calm, 
open  countenance  serious  in  its  expression,  but  without  any  line  or  shadow 
upon  it  of  weak  anxiety  or  irresolution.  Presently  a  courier  dashes  up, 
and  delivers  a  paper  to  Gen.  Lee.  As  the  commander  mounts  his  horse  it  is 
understood  that  Jackson  is  at  hand,  and  that  the  time  for  action  has  come. 

Battle  of  Gained  Mills. 

Pressing  on  towards  the  York  Eiver  railroad,  A.  P.  Hill,  who  was  in 
advance,  reached  the  vicinity  of  E"ew  Cold  Harbour  about  two  o'clock, 
where  he  encountered  the  enemy.  He  soon  became  hotly  engaged.  The 
arrival  of  Jackson  on  our  left  was  momentarily  expected,  and  it  was  sup 
posed  that  his  approach  would  cause  the  extension  of  the  enemy's  line  in 
that  direction.  Under  this  impression,  Longstreet  was  held  back  until  this 
movement  should  commence.  The  principal  part  of  the  Federal  army 
was  now  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy.  Hill's  single  division 
met  this  large  force  with  impetuous  courage.  They  drove  the  enemy  back 
and  assailed  him  in  his  strong  position  on  the  ridge.  The  battle  raged 
fiercely,  and  with  varying  fortune,  more  than  two  hours.  Three  regiments 


MILLS.  287 

pierced  the  enemy's  line,  and  forced  their  way  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  on  his 
left,  but  were  compelled  to  fall  back  before  overwhelming  numbers.  The 
superior  force  of  the  enemy,  assisted  by  the  fire  of  his  batteries,  south  of 
the  Chickahominy,  which  played  incessantly  on  our  columns  as  they 
pressed  through  the  difficulties  that  obstructed  their  way,  caused  them  to 
recoil.  Though  most  of  the  men  had  never  been  under  fire  until  the  day 
before,  they  were  rallied,  and  in  turn,  repelled  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 
Some  brigades  were  broken,  others  stubbornly  maintained  their  positions,) 
but  it  became  apparent  that  the  enemy  was  gradually  gaining  ground. 

Jackson  had  not  yet  arrived.  It  was  a  critical  time.  An  urgent 
message  was  sent  by  Gen.  Lee  to  Longstreet  to  make  a  diversion  in  favour 
of  the  attacking  columns.  The  three  brigades  under  "Wilcox  were  at  once 
ordered  forward  against  the  enemy's  left  flank  with  this  view.  Pickett's 
brigade  making  a  diversion  on  the  left  of  these  brigades,  developed  the  strong 
position  and  force  of  the  enemy  in  Gen.  Longstreet's  front ;  and  the  latter 
found  that  he  must  drive  him  by  direct  assault,  or  abandon  the  idea  of 
making  the  diversion.  He  at  once  determined  to  change  the  feint  into  an 
attack,  and  orders  for  a  general  advance  were  issued.  Gen.  R.  H.  Ander 
son's  brigade  was  divided — part  supporting  Pickett's  in  the  direct  assault, 
and  the  other  portions  guarding  the  right  flank  of  the  brigades  under 
Wilcox. 

At  this  moment  Jackson  arrived ;  and  the  air  was  now  rent  with  shouts 
as  the  combined  commands  prepared  for  the  final  charge  of  the  day. 
Jackson's  right  division,  that  of  Whiting,  took  position  on  the  left  of  Long- 
street.  The  opportune  arrival  of  this  division  occupied  the  entire  field. 
The  gallant  command  of  Confederates  was  now  moved  forward  in  the  face 
of  three  lines  of  infantry  fire,  supported  by  batteries  from  both  sides  of  the 
Chickahominy. 

"With  fierce  grandeur  the  charge  swept  on.  On  the  right  the  troops 
pressed  steadily  forward,  unchecked  by  the  terrible  fire  from  the  triple  lines 
of  infantry  on  the  hill,  and  the  cannon  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  which 
burst  upon  them  as  they  emerged  on  the  plain.  The  thousand  continuous 
volleys  of  musketry  .seemed  mingled  into  the  grand  roar  of  a  great  cata 
ract,  while  the  louder  and  deeper  discharges  of  artillery  bounded  forth 
over  the  hills  and  down  the  valley,  with  a  volume  that  seemed  to  shake 
the  earth.  The  canopy  of  smoke  was  so  thick  that  the  sun  was  gloomily 
red  in  the  heavens,  while  the  clouds  of  dust  in  the  rear,  caused  by  the 
commotion  of  advancing  and  retreating  squadrons  of  cavalry,  was  stifling 
and  blinding.  The  dead  and  wounded  marked  the  way  of  the  intrepid 
advance ;  Whiting's  brave  Texan s  leading,  closely  followed  by  their  no 
less  daring  comrades.  The  enemy  were  driven  from  the  ravine  to  the  first 
line  of  breastworks,  over  which  our  impetuous  columns  dashed  up  to  the 
entrenchments  on  the  crest.  These  were  quickly  stormed,  fourteen  pieces 


288  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

of  artillery  captured,  and  the  enemy  driven  into  the  field  beyond.  Fresh 
troops  came  to  his  support,  and  he  endeavoured  repeatedly  to  rally,  but  in 
vain.  He  was  forced  back  with  great  slaughter.  The  retreating  columns 
soon  became  mingled  into  one  black  mass  of  troops.  Night  put  an  end  to 
pursuit,  and  fell  upon  the  scene  of  a  great  Confederate  victory.  Long  lines 
of  dead  and  wounded  marked  each  stand  made  by  the  enemy  in  his  stub 
born  resistance,  and  the  field  over  which  he  retreated  was  strewn  with  the 
slain.* 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th,  it  was  ascertained  that  none  of  the  enemy 
remained  in  our  front  north  of  the  Chickahominy.  As  he  might  yet  intend 
to  give  battle  to  preserve  his  communications,  some  cavalry,  supported  by 
Swell's  division,  was  ordered  to  seize  the  York  Elver  Railroad,  and  Gen. 
Stuart,  with  his  main  body,  to  cooperate.  When  the  cavalry  reached 
Dispatch  Station,  the  enemy  retreated  to  the  south  bank  of  the  river,  and 
burned  the  railroad  bridge.  Ewell,  coming  up  shortly  afterwards,  de 
stroyed  a  portion  of  the  track.  During  the  forenoon,  columns  of  dust, 
south  of  the  Chickahominy,  showed  that  the  Federal  army  was  in  motion. 
The  abandonment  of  the  railroad,  and  destruction  of  the  bridge,  proved 
that  no  further  attempt  would  be  made  to  hold  that  line.  But  from  the 
position  it  occupied,  the  roads  which  led  towards  Jarnes  River,  would  also 
enable  it  to  reach  the  lower  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy,  and  retreat 
down  the  Peninsula.  In  the  latter  event,  it  was  necessary  that  our  troops 
should  continue  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  and  until  the  intention  of 
Gen.  McClellan  was  discovered,  it  was  deemed  injudicious  to  change  their 
disposition. 

*  A  Texan  soldier  writes  of  this  charge  :  "  A  splendid  battery  of  thirteen  guns,  manned  by  regu 
lars,  was  just  beyond,  belching  forth  destruction,  and  it  seemed  almost  like  certain  death  to  venture 
upon  the  brow  of  the  hill ;  but  these  were  Texans.  The  most  extraordinary  fact  about  it  was,  that 
this  terrible  battle  was  being  fought  without  any  directions  from  officers  on  our  side.  We  had  lost 
all  our  field  officers  before  we  got  to  the  first  battery — the  lieutenant-colonel  mortally  wounded,  since 
dead ;  the  major  badly  wounded,  since  dead ;  and  many  of  the  line  officers  killed  or  wounded. 
When  I  got  to  the  top  of  that  hill,  I  was  almost  completely  exhausted,  but  as  I  got  a  breath,  there  I 
was,  able  and  ready  to  go  on  when  the  word  was  given.  The  men  had  been  firing  from  the  brow 
of  the  hill,  and  had  shot  down  many  of  the  artillerymen^  and  so  many  of  their  horses  that  they  could 
not  get  their  guns  away.  They  stood  to  their  guns  well,  only  running  when  they  could  do  nothing 
else.  We  pushed  forward,  and  placed  our  colours  upon  the  battery,  but  as  the  enemy  were  still  firing 
upon  us,  we  commenced  firing  in  return.  Pretty  soon  a  strong  force  opened  fire  upon  our  left,  and 
changing  our  front  in  that  direction,  we  poured  in  a  heavy  fire,  which  soon  brought  them  to  taw,  as 
the  greater  part  of  two  regiments  threw  down  their  arms,  and  ran  to  us,  bringing  their  colours.  Hav 
ing  delivered  them  over  to  another  brigade,  we  pressed  on  in  front,  and  drove  the  last  Yankee  from 
the  field.  As  night  was  coming  on,  we  were  halted,  and  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle.  It  was,  indeed, 
a  sad  sight  to  look  at  the  old  regiment,  a  mere  squad  of  noble  men,  gathered  around  their  tattered 
colours.  I  could  not  realize  that  this  little  band  of  fifty  or  sixty  men  was  the  Fourth  Texas.  But  it 
was  even  so.  Out  of  five  hundred  and  thirty  men  who  went  into  the  fight,  there  were  two  hundred 
and  fifty-six  killed,  wounded,  or  missing :  while  many  were  completely  broken  down,  and  nearly 
every  one  was  struck  or  grazed.  We  staid  here  all  night  without  interruption,  being  heavily  rein 
forced  during  the  night." 


BATTLE    OF    SAVAGE    STATION.  289 

During  the  afternoon  and  night  of  the  28th,  the  signs  of  a  general 
movement  were  apparent,  and  no  indications  of  his  approach  to  the  lower 
bridges  of  the  Chiekahominy  having  been  discovered  by  the  pickets  in  ob 
servation  at  those  points,  it  became  manifest  that  Gen.  McClellan  was 
retreating  to  the  James  River. 

It  had  been  the  part  of  Magruder  and  Huger  to  watch  the  enemy,  and 
to  cut  off  or  press  his  retreat.  The  battle  of  Games'  Mills  had  forced 
McClellan  from  his  original  strongholds  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chieka 
hominy,  and,  with  his  communications  cut  off  on  the  Pamunkey  River, 
and  encountered  by  the  force  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chiekahominy,  it 
was  supposed  that  he  would  be  unable  to  extricate  himself  from  his  posi 
tion  without  a  capitulation.  But  the  enemy  had  been  imperfectly  watched 
at  a  conjuncture  the  most  critical  of  the  contest ;  a  great  and  almost  irre 
parable  errour  had  been  committed ;  and  McClellan  had  succeeded  in 
massing  his  entire  force,  and  taking  up  a  line  of  retreat  by  which  he  hoped 
to  reach  the  cover  of  his  gunboats  on  the  James. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  29th,  the  pickets  at  Magruder's  and  Hu- 
ger's  front  were  attacked  in  force,  but  instead  of  giving  ground,  drove  the 
enemy  down  the  roads  and  through  the  woods,  into  and  past  their  breast 
works,  and  found  them  deserted.  Far  from  profiting  by  this  discovery, 
and  commencing  the  pursuit,  these  Generals  allowed  the  foe  to  pass  across 
their  front,  instead  of  piercing  his  line  of  retreat  by  advancing  down  the 
jSTine  Mile  road,  the  railroad,  and  the  Williamsburg  road,  which  would 
have  cut  these  forces  of  the  enemy  into  so  many  fragments. 

The  works  abandoned  by  McClellan  consisted  of  long  lines  of  casemated 
batteries,  and  were  found  to  be  formidable  and  elaborate.  An  immense 
destruction  of  stores  had  been  accomplished  here.  The  neighboring  fields 
and  woods  were  covered  with  every  description  of  clothing  and  camp 
equipage.  There  was  every  indication  that  the  enemy  had  left  his  encamp 
ment  in  haste  and  disorder.  In  one  place  there  were  four  tiers  of  barrels, 
fifty  yards  square,  in  a  blaze,  scores  of  barrels  being  all  strewn  around, 
which  had  contained  ground  coffee,  sugar,  rice,  molasses,  salt,  tea,  crackers, 
flour  meal,  etc.,  the  heads  of  the  barrels  being  broken  and  their  contents 
strewn  on  the  ground. 

Battle  of  Savage  Station. 

Early  on  the  29th,  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  were  ordered  to  recross 
the  Chiekahominy  at  New  Bridge,  and  move  by  the  Darbytown  to  the 
Long  Bridge  road.  As  soon  as  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  was  discovered, 
Gens.  Huger  and  Magruder  were  ordered  in  pursuit,  the  former  by  the 
Charles  City  road,  so  as  to  take  the  Federal  army  in  flank,  and  the  latter 
by  the  Williamsburg  road,  to  attack  its  rear.  Jackson  was  directed  to  cross 
at  Grapevine  Bridge  and  move  down  the  south  side  of  the  Chiekahominy. 
19 


290  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Magruder  reached  the  vicinity  of  Savage  Station  about  noon,  where  he 
came  upon  the  rear  guard  of  the  retreating  army. 

McClellan's  advance  column  had  already  been  swallowed  in  the  maw 
of  the  dreary  forest.  It  swept  onward  fast  and  furious.  Pioneer  bands 
rushed  along  in  front,  clearing  and  repairing  the  single  road ;  reconnois- 
sance  officers  were  seeking  new  routes  for  a  haven  of  rest  and  safety.  The 
Confederates  were  in  the  rear,  pressing  on  with  fearful  power ;  and  there 
was  yet  an  expectation  that  Jackson's  flank  movement  might  cut  off  the 
retreat.  Moments  seemed  hours.  Back  and  forth  dashed  hot  riders. 
Caravans  of  wagons,  artillery,  horsemen,  soldiers,  camp-followers,  pressed 
through  the  narrow  road,  and  at  intervals  swept  onward  like  an  avalanche 
The  trace  of  agony  was  on  the  face  of  the  commander,  and  the  soldiers 
who  carried  muskets  in  their  hands  could  perceive  it.  Presently  the  dull 
boom  of  a  cannon  and  its  echoing  shell  fell  grimly  upon  the  ear,  and  an 
ominous  roar  behind  told  the  enemy  that  his  rear  was  attacked. 

Magruder  had  struck  the  enemy's  rear  ;  but  Jackson  had  been  delayed. 
The  first,  under  the  false  impression  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  upon 
him,  sent  for  reinforcements.  Two  brigades  of  Huger's  division  were  or 
dered  to  his  support,  but  subsequently  withdrawn,  it  being  apparent  that 
the  force  in  Magruder's  front  was  covering  the  retreat  of  the  main  body. 
Jackson's  route  led  to  the  flank  and  rear  of  Savage  Station,  but  he  was  de 
layed  by  the  necessity  of  reconstructing  Grapevine  Bridge.  Late  in  the 
afternoon  Magruder  attacked  the  enemy  with  one  of  his  divisions  and  two 
regiments  of  another.  A  severe  action  ensued,  and  was  terminated  by 
night.  Owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  hour  and  the  small  force  employed, 
the  result  was  not  decisive,  and  the  enemy  continued  his  retreat,  under 
cover  of  darkness,  leaving  several  hundred  prisoners,  with  his  dead  and 
wounded,  in  our  hands.  The  time  gained  in  Magruder's  action  enabled 
the  retreating  column  to  cross  White  Oak  Swamp  without  interruption, 
and  destroy  the  bridge. 

Jackson  reached  Savage  Station  early  on  the  30th.  He  was  directed 
to  pursue  the  enemy  on  the  road  he  had  taken,  and  Magruder  to  follow 
Longstreet  by  the  Darby  town  road.  As  Jackson  advanced,  his  progress 
was  arrested  at  "White  Oak  Swamp.  The  enemy  occupied  the  opposite 
side,  and  obstinately  resisted  the  reconstruction  of  the  bridge.  Longstreet 
and  A.  P.  Hill,  continuing  their  advance  on  the  30th,  soon  came  upon  the 
enemy,  strongly  posted  across  the  Long  Bridge  road,  about  a  mile  from  its 
intersection  with  the  Charles  City  road.  Huger's  route  led  to  the  right  of 
the  position,  Jackson's  to  the  rear,  and  the  arrival  of  their  commands  was 
awaited,  to  begin  the  attack.  On  the  29th,  Gen.  Holmes  had  crossed  from 
the  south  side  of  the  James,  with  part  of  his  division.  On  the  30th,  reinforced 
by  Gen.  Wise  with  a  detachment  of  his  brigade,  he  moved  down  the  river 
road,  and  came  upon  the  line  of  the  retreating  army  near  Malvern  Hill. 


BATTLE   OF    FRAZIERJS    FARM.  291 

Perceiving  indications  of  confusion,  Gen.  Holmes  was  ordered  to  open 
upon  the  column  with  artillery.  He  soon  discovered  that  a  number  of  bat 
teries,  advantageously  posted,  supported  by  an  infantry  force  superiour  to 
his  own,  and  assisted  by  the  fire  of  the  gunboats  in  James  River,  guarded 
this  part  of  the  line.  Magruder,  who  had  reached  the  Darbytown  road, 
was  ordered  to  reinforce  Holmes,  but,  being  at  a  greater  distance  than  had 
been  supposed,  he  did  not  reach  the  position  of  the  latter  in  time  for  an 
attack.  Huger  reported  that  his  progress  was  obstructed ;  but  about  4 
p.  M.,  firing  was  heard  in  the  direction  of  the  Charles  City  road,  which  was 
supposed  to  indicate  his  approach.  Longstreet  immediately  opened  with 
one  of  his  batteries,  to  give  notice  of  his  presence.  This  brought  on  the 
engagement ;  but  Huger  not  coming  up,  and  Jackson  having  been  unable 
to  force  the  passage  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  Longstreet  and  Hill  were  with 
out  the  expected  support. 

Battle  of  Frazier's  Farm. 

The  superiourity  of  numbers  and  advantages  of  position  were  on  the 
side  of  the  enemy.  He  occupied  the  open  high  lands  constituting  "  Fra- 
zier's  Farm,"  five  miles  northeast  of  Darbytown.  The  place  was  good  for 
defence ;  the  woods  right  and  left  of  it  swarmed  with  skirmishers ;  the 
ascending  grade  of  the  road  was  swept  by  cannon,  while  all  attempts  to 
flank  the  enemy's  left  would  meet  with  broadsides  from  the  gunboats  at 
Curl's  Neck,  in  the  James  River,  two  and  a  half  miles  distant. 

The  Confederates  pressed  forward  under  an  incessant  storm  of  lead ; 
sixteen  pieces  of  artillery  belching  forth  shell,  canister,  and  grape  upon 
them,  while  they  had  but  one  battery  on  their  side,  which  could  not  be 
got  into  position.  The  battle  raged  furiously  until  nine  o'clock  in  the  night. 
By  that  time,  the  enemy  had  been  driven  with  great  slaughter  from  every 
position  but  one,  which  he  maintained  until  he  was  able  to  withdraw 
under  cover  of  darkness.  At  the  close  of  the  struggle  nearly  the  entire 
field  remained  in  our  possession,  covered  with  the  enemy's  dead  and 
wounded. 

After  the  engagement,  Magruder  was  recalled,  to  relieve  the  troops  of 
Longstreet  and  Hill.  The  command  of  the  latter  was,  indeed,  prostrated 
by  almost  superhuman  exertions.  It  had  won  the  battle  of  Mechanics- 
ville,  fought  five  hours  at  Games'  Mills,  marched  over  a  terrible  road  and 
circuitous  route  of  forty  miles,  and  had  now  borne  the  chief  part  in  another 
of  the  series  of  engagements  that  had  tracked  the  lines  of  Richmond  with 
fire  and  destruction. 

Battle  of  Malvern  Hill. 

Early  on  the  1st  of  July,  Jackson  reached  the  battle-field  of  the  pre 
vious  day,  having  succeeded  in  crossing  White  Oak  Swamp,  where  he 


292  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

captured  a  part  of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  a  number  of  prisoners.  He 
was  directed  to  continue  the  pursuit  down  the  Willis  Church  road,  and 
soon  found  the  enemy  occupying  a  high  range,  extending  obliquely  across 
the  road,  in  front  of  Malvern  Hill.  On  this  position,  of  great  natural 
strength,  he  had  concentrated  his  powerful  artillery,  supported  by  masses 
of  infantry,  partially  protected  by  earthworks.  Immediately  in  his  front 
the  ground  was  open,  varying  in  width  from  a  quarter  to  half  a  mile,  and 
sloping  gradually  from  the  crest,  was  completely  swept  by  the  fire  of  his 
infantry  and  artillery.  To  reach  this  open  ground,  our  troops  had  to 
advance  through  a  broken  and  thickly-wooded  country,  traversed,  nearly 
throughout  its  whole  extent,  by  a  swamp  passable  at  but  few  places,  and 
difficult  at  those.  The  whole  of  it  was  within  range  of  the  batteries  on  the 
heights,  and  the  gunboats  in  the  river,  under  whose  incessant  fire  our 
movements  had  to  be  executed.  Jackson  formed  his  line  with  Whiting's 
division  on  his  left,  and  D.  H.  Hill's  on  the  right,  one  of  Swell's  brigades 
occupying  the  interval.  The  rest  of  Swell's,  and  Jackson's  own  division 
were  held  in  reserve.  Magruder  was  directed  to  take  position  on  Jack 
son's  right,  but  before  his  arrival  two  of  Huger's  brigades  came  up  and 
were  placed  next  to  Hill.  Magruder  subsequently  formed  on  the  right  of 
these  brigades,  which,  with  a  third  of  Huger's,  were  placed  under  his 
command.  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  were  held  in  reserve,  and  took  no 
part  in  the  engagement. 

The  position  taken  by  McClellan  enabled  him  to  turn  at  bay,  with  his 
rear  protected  by  the  James,  and  flanks  partially  covered  by  gunboats. 
From  the  magnificent  bluff  might  be  seen  the  Federal  gunboats  cruising  in 
the  river.  The  hill  was  crowned  with  numerous  artillery.  Owing  to  the 
obstacles  presented  by  the  woods  and  swamp,  the  Confederates  had  been 
unable  to  bring  up  sufficient  artillery  to  oppose  successfully  the  extraordi 
nary  force  of  that  arm  employed  by  the  enemy. 

The  Confederate  line  of  attack  was  not  formed  until  a  late  hour  in  the 
afternoon.  A  general  advance  was  to  be  made  at  a  given  signal.  On  the 
left,  D.  H.  Hill  pressed  forward  across  the  open  field,  and  engaged  the 
enemy  gallantly,  breaking  and  driving  back  his  first  line ;  but  a  simultane 
ous  advance  of  the  other  troops  not  taking  place,  he  found  himself  unable 
to  maintain  the  ground  he  had  gained  against  the  overwhelming  numbers 
and  numerous  batteries  of  the  enemy.  Jackson  sent  to  his  support  his 
own  division  and  that  part  of  E well's  which  was  in  reserve,  but  owing  to 
the  increasing  darkness  and  intricacy  of  the  forest  and  swamp,  they  did 
not  arrive  in  time  to  render  the  desired  assistance.  Hill  was  therefore 
compelled  to  abandon  part  of  the  ground  he  had  gained,  after  suffering 
severe  loss. 

On  the  right,  a  more  terrible  and  dramatic  action  was  to  occur.  It  was 
past  four  o'clock,  and  if  anything  was  to  be  attempted,  the  work  must  be 


BATTLE    OF    MALVERN    HILL.  293 

quick  and  desperate.  An  order  had  been  dispatched  by  Gen.  Magruder  to 
bring  up  from  all  the  batteries  thirty  rifle  pieces,  if  possible,  with  which  he 
hoped  to  shatter  the  enemy's  infantry.  It  was  soon  evident  that  the  artil 
lery  could  not  get  up  in  time.  Magruder  determined  to  trust  to  the  im 
petuous  valour  of  his  troops,  and  with  fifteen  thousand  infantry  to  storm 
the  hill  at  Crew's  house.  There  was  a  run  of  more  than  six  hundred  yards 
up  a  rising  ground,  an  unbroken  flat  beyond  of  several  hundred  yards,  one 
hundred  pieces  of  cannon  behind  breastworks,  and  heavy  masses  of  infan 
try  in  support !  The  brigades  advanced  bravely  across  the  open  field, 
raked  by  the  fire  of  the  cannon,  and  the  musketry  of  large  bodies  of  infan 
try.  Some  were  broken  and  gave  way ;  others  approached  close  to  the 
guns,  driving  back  the  infantry,  compelling  the  advanced  batteries  to  retire 
to  escape  capture,  and  mingling  their  dead  with  those  of  the  enemy.  To 
add  to  the  horrors  of  the  scene,  and  the  immense  slaughter  in  front  of  the 
batteries,  the  gunboats  increased  the  rapidity  of  their  broadsides,  and  the 
immense  missiles  coursed  through  the  air  with  great  noise,  tearing  oft'  the 
tree-tops,  and  bursting  with  loud  explosions. 

Towards  sunset  the  concussion  of  artillery  was  terrific ;  the  hill  was 
clothed  in  sheets  of  flame  ;  shells  raced  athwart  the  horizon  ;  the  blaze  of 
the  setting  sun  could  scarcely  be  discovered  through  the  canopy  of  smoke 
which  floated  from  the  surface  of  the  plains  and  rivers.  Piles  of  dead  lay 
thick  close  to  the  enemy's  batteries,  and  the  baleful  fires  of  death  yet 
blazed  among  the  trees,  where  our  shattered  columns  had  sought  an  im 
perfect  cover  behind  the  slight  curtain  of  the  forest. 

It  was  now  dark,  and  little  could  be  done.  The  attack  on  Malvern 
Hill  had  failed  for  want  of  concert  among  the  attacking  columns.  The 
assaults  of  the  Confederates  were  too  weak  to  break  the  Federal  line,  and, 
after  struggling  gallantly,  sustaining  and  inflicting  great  loss,  they  were 
compelled  successively  to  retire. 

But  the  action  of  Malvern  Hill  was  to  be  the  last  important  incident 
of  the  drama  of  Richmond,  and  another  day  was  to  complete  and  reveal  to 
the  world  McClellan's  grand  catastrophe.  As  night  fell,  the  enemy  silently 
retreated  from  Malvern  Hill.  In  the  morning  of  the  2d  July  it  was  dis 
covered  that  McClellan  had  again  retired,  and  was  in  full  retreat,  and  Lee 
instantly  recommenced  the  advance,  although  it  rained  in  floods.  But  the 
Federals  seemed  to  have  vanished  once  more  in  the  densely-timbered 
swamp.  The  outposts  saw  no  signs  of  them,  and  most  of  the  day  was  lost 
before  it  was  ascertained  whither  McClellan  had  fled.  Towards  night  it 
was  discovered  he  had  conducted  his  whole  force  by  a  narrow  road  through 
a  thick  swampy  wood,  several  miles  in  extent,  and  was  safe  under  his  gun 
boats  at  Harrison's  Landing.  . 

McClellan  had  managed  his  retreat  with  skill.  He  had  at  last  obtained 
a  position  on  the  river,  our  advance  to  which  could  be  made  but  by  one 


294:  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

road,  and  that  narrow,  and  swept  with  numerous  artillery.  He  immedi 
ately  began  to  fortify  his  position,  which  was  flanked  on  each  side  by  a 
creek,  the  approach  to  his  front  being  commanded  by  the  heavy  guns  of  his 
shipping  in  addition  to  those  mounted  in  his  entrenchments.  He  had 
reached  at  last  a  safe  cover  for  his  shattered  columns ;  but  after  a  series 
of  defeats  that  had  demoralized  his  command,  inflicted  upon  him  a  loss  of 
not  less  than  twenty  thousand  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  was  fatal  to  his 
designs  upon  Richmond.  The  immediate  fruits  of  the  Confederate  success 
were  the  relief  of  Richmond  from  a  state  of  siege ;  the  rout  of  the  great 
army  which  had  so  long  menaced  its  safety  ;  more  than  ten  thousand  pris 
oners,  including  officers  of  high  rank  ;  the  capture  or  destruction  of  stores 
of  the  value  of  millions,  and  the  acquisition  of  thirty-five  thousand  stand 
of  small  arms,  and  fifty-two  pieces  of  superiour  artillery. 

It  is  true  that  this  success,  great  as  it  was,  fell  below  public  expectation 
in  Richmond,  which  had  looked  for  the  capitulation  or  annihilation  of 
McClellan's  entire  forces,  after  they  had  been  driven  from  the  north  side 
of  the  Chickahominy.  Of  this  disappointment,  Gen.  Lee  writes  :  "  Under 
ordinary  circumstances,  the  Federal  army  should  have  been  destroyed.  Its 
escape  was  due  to  causes  already  stated.  Prominent  among  these  was  the 
want  of  correct  and  timely  information.  This  fact,  attributable  chiefly  to 
the  character  of  the  country,  enabled  Gen.  McClellan  skillfully  to  conceal 
his  retreat,  and  to  add  much  to  the  obstructions  with  which  nature  had 
beset  the  way  of  our  pursuing  columns.  But  regret  that  more  was  not 
accomplished,  gives  way  to  gratitude  to  the  Sovereign  Ruler  of  the  Uni 
verse  for  the  results  achieved." 

The  expression  of  pious  thanks  was  fervently  repeated  by  Jackson.  He 
wrote,  in  his  official  report :  "  Undying  gratitude  is  due  to  God  for  this 
great  victory — by  which  despondency  increased  in  the  North,  hope  bright 
ened  in  the  South,  and  the  capital  of  Virginia  and  of  the  Confederacy  was 
saved." 

It  was  indeed  a  glorious  success.  A  week  before,  and  an  invading 
army,  superiour  to  the  Confederates  in  numbers,  and  in  the  material  of 
war,  closely  beleaguered  their  capital,  and  vauntingly  proclaimed  its  speedy 
conquest.  "Now  the  remains  of  that  confident  and  threatening  host  lay  on 
the  banks  of  James  River,  anxious  only  to  recruit  from  the  effects  of  disas 
trous  defeats  ;  and  Richmond,  erect  and  exultant,  was  secure  in  the  protec 
tion  of  an  army  whose  fresh  victory  had  been  obtained  over  a  force  that 
had  had  every  resource  that  could  be  summoned  to  its  assistance,  every 
possible  addition  of  numbers  within  the  reach  of  the  Federal  Government, 
and  every  material  condition  of  success  to  insure  for  it  the  great  prize  of 
the  capital  of  the  Confederacy. 


CHAPTER   XVIII. 

EFFECT  OF  M'CLELLAN's  DEFEAT  IN  THE  NORTH. — ORGANIZATION  OF  ANOTHER  FEDERAL  ARMY 
UNDER  GEN.  POPE. — POLITICAL  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  POPE'S  APPOINTMENT. — NEW  MEASURES 
OF  VIOLENCE  IN  THE  WAR. — M'CLELLAN's  IDEAS  OF  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. — HIS 
"  HARRISON-BAR  LETTER." — DIVISIONS  OF  SENTIMENT  IN  THE  NORTH  AS  TO  THE  CHAR 
ACTER  AND  MEASURES  OF  THE  WAR. — POSITION  OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY. — THE  RADI 
CALS  IN  CONGRESS. — THEIR  ANTI-SLAVERY  DESIGN. — THEIR  THEORY  OP  REVENGE  UPON 

THE  SOUTH. CARDINAL  ERROUR  OF  THIS  POLITICAL  SCHOOL. — DECLARATION  OF  WENDELL 

PHILLIPS. SYSTEM  OF  SPOLIATION  AND  DISFRANOHISEMENT  IN  THE  SOUTH. GEN.  POPE'S 

ADDRESS  TO  HIS  ARMY  IN  VIRGINIA. HIS  WAR  UPON  NON-COMBATANTS. LEGALIZATION 

OF  PLUNDER. — IRRUPTION  OF  THE  NORTHERN  SPOILSMEN  INTO  VIRGINIA. — POPE'S  MILI 
TARY  LINES. — GEN.  LEE  BETWEEN  TWO  FORCES. — HE  SENDS  JACKSON  AGAINST  POPE. — HE 
THREATENS  M'CLELLAN's  COMMUNICATIONS. BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  RUN. BANKS  AGAIN  DE 
CEIVED  BY  JACKSON. — A  RAPID  AND  SEVERE  ENGAGEMENT. GEN.  LEE  MOVES  OUT  TO  THE 

LINES  OF  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. ADVENTUROUS  MOVEMENT  OF  JACKSON  TO  REACH  POPE' 3 

REAR.— HIS  PERILOUS  POSITION. HE  IS  APPARENTLY  IN  THE  JAWS  OF  DESTRUCTION. 

THE  AFFAIR  OF  MANASSAS  AND  BRISTOE  STATION. THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS. 

LONGSTREET'S  MARCH  TO  REINFORCE  JACKSON. — HIS  PASSAGE  OF  THOROUGHFARE  GAP. — 

HIS  TIMELY  AND  CRITICAL  ARRIVAL  ON  THE  FIELD  OF  BATTLE. A  CLOSE  CONTEST. 

FIGHTING  AT  TEN  PACES. THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  FIRST  DAY  NOT  DECISIVE. DISPOSITION 

OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES  FOR  THE  GREAT  CONTEST  OF  THE  SECOND  DAY. — JACKSON  AT  CLOSE 
QUARTERS. HE  DRIVES  THE  ENEMY. THE  WHOLE  CONFEDERATE  LINE  OF  BATTLE  AD 
VANCING. A  SUBLIME  SPECTACLE. — SCENES  ON  THE  BANKS  OF  BULL  RUN. POPE  EE- 

TREATS  TO  CENTREVILLE  AND  THENCE  TOWARDS  WASHINGTON. — JACKSON  STRIKES  HIM 

AGAIN. — ENGAGEMENT  AT  OX  HILL. POPE'S  IMMENSE  LOSSES. — HIS  ABSURD  CLAIM  OF 

VICTORY. — LUDICROUS  CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  POPE  AND  HALLECK.— RAPID  AND 
BRILLIANT  CHANGE  IN  THE  FORTUNES  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY. — THE  WAR  TRANSFERRED 
FROM  THE  INTERIOUR  TO  THE  FRONTIER. — ALARM  IN  THE  NORTH. — POPULARITY  IN  THE 
CONFEDERACY  OF  AN  OFFENSIVE  WAR. — A  TRUE  STATEMENT  OF  GEN.  LEE^S  DESIGNS  IN 
CROSSING  THE  UPPER  POTOMAC  AND  INVADING  MARYLAND.  — WHY  HE  DID  NOT  MOVE 
UPON  WASHINGTON  AND  ALEXANDRIA. HIS  PROCLAMATION  AT  FREDERICK. — WEAK  RE 
SPONSE  OF  THE  MARYLANDERS. — EXPLANATION  OF  THIS. CAPTURE  OF  HARPER'S  FERRY,  &0. 

HOW  JACKSON  INVESTED  IT. M'CLELLAN  AT  THE  HEAD  OF  THE  FEDERAL  ARMY. — HIS 

INACTIVITY. — HE  BECOMES  ACQUAINTED  WITH  LEE7S  PLANS  BY  A  CURIOUS  ACCIDENT. — HE 

PRESSES  FORWARD  TO  RELIEVE  HARPER'S  FERRY. FIGHT  IN  BOONESBORO'  GAP. — GEN.  LEE. 

RETIRES  TO  SHARPSBURG. MEANWHILE  JACKSON  COMPLETES  THE  REDUCTION  OF  HARPER'S 

FERRY. — BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG. — COMPARATIVE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES. — FLUC- 


296  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

TUATION  OF  THE  TIDE  OF  BATTLE  ON  THE  CONFEDERATE   LEFT. — REPULSE  OF  THE   ENEMY. 

— THE  CONFEDERATE  CENTRE  is  BROKEN  AND  RECOVERS. — THE  ENEMY  GETS  POSSESSION 

OF   THE   BRIDGE  OVER  THE  ANTIETAM. — THE  DAY  CLOSES  WITH   THE   ENEMY   REPULSED  AT 
ALL  POINTS,  AND  A  VICTORY   FOR   THE    CONFEDERATES. — WHY  GEN.  LEE   DID    NOT    RENEW 

THE  BATTLE  THE  NEXT  DAY. — WHY    HE    RETREATED. M'CLELLAN's  CLAIM  OF  VICTORY. 

HOW  IT  WAS  AN  AFTERTHOUGHT. LEE'S  ARMY  RECRUITING  IN  VIRGINIA. 

THE  news  of  the  retreat  of  the  great  Federal  army  under  the  command 
of  McClellan  from  before  Richmond  to  the  James  River,  caused  great 
excitement  throughout  the  North.  The  details  of  the  repulse  fell  upon  the 
community  with  disheartening  effect,  and  produced  such  a  shock  as  had 
not  been  felt  since  the  commencement  of  tlie  war.  A  fierce  clamour  was 
raised  against  the  unfortunate  commander  ;  and  the  occasion  of  the  organi 
zation  and  direction  of  another  Federal  army  against  Richmond  under 
Maj.-Gen.  Pope,  who  had  actually  crossed  the  Rappahannock,  as  if  to  seize 
Gordon  sville,  and  move  thence  upon  the  Confederate  capital,  was  busily 
used  to  throw  McClellan  into  the  shade,  to  disparage  his  career,  and  to 
break  down  whatever  public  confidence  might  yet  be  disposed  to  linger  in 
his  name.  Divisions  and  recriminations  between  these  two  grand  wings  of 
the  Federal  forces  in  Virginia  were  early  developed.  Several  of  McClel- 
lan's  generals  of  division  asked  relief  from  duty  under  him,  regarding  him 
as  inefficient  and  incompetent,  and  had  been  assigned  to  Pope's  army. 
The  friends  of  McClellan  were  not  slow  to  retaliate  that  Pope  was  an  up 
start  and  braggart,  who  by  trickery  and  partisan  politics,  had  become  chief 
favourite  of  the  Washington  Cabinet,  and  a  military  impostor,  convenient 
only  as  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  Radical  party,  who  mistook  brutality  in 
the  war  for  vigour,  and  were  for  increasing  the  horrours  of  hostilities  by 
emancipating  and  arming  the  slaves,  legalizing  plunder,  and  making  the 
invaded  country  of  the  South  the  prey  of  white  brigands  and  u  loyal " 
negroes. 

The  appointment  of  this  man  to  the  command  of  the  Federal  forces 
gathered  on  the  Rappahannock  was  significant  of  the  design  of  the  Wash 
ington  Administration  to  introduce  new  measures  of  violence  in  the  con 
test,  and  to  re-enter  upon  the  campaign  in  Virginia  with  a  new  trial  of 
warfare.  The  desperate  fortunes  of  the  war  were  now  to  be  prosecuted 
with  a  remarkable  exasperation.  Pope  was  a  violent  Abolitionist,  a  furious 
politician  ;  his  campaigns  in  the  West  had  been  remarkable  only  for  the 
bluster  of  official  despatches,  big  falsehoods  in  big  print,  and  a  memorable 
career  of  cruelty  in  Southeastern  Missouri.  He  had  suddenly  risen  into 
favour  at  Washington.  McDowell,  a  moderate  Democrat,  having  no  sym 
pathy  with  the  Anti-Slavery  school  of  politics — who  some  months  before 
had  been  stationed  at  Fredericksburg,  and  was  promised  chief  command 
of  the  movement  thence  upon  Richmond  when  joined  by  Banks,  Shields, 
and  Fremont,  but  whose  hopes  had  been  destroyed  by  the  rapid  inarches 


THE    "  HARRISON-BAR   LETTER."  297 

and  victories  of  "  Stonewall "  Jackson— was  humiliated  to  find  his  plans 
and  chief  command  entrusted  to  an  incompetent  man,  and  himself  put  in 
an  obscure  and  subordinate  position  under  Pope. 

Whatever  question  there  may  have  been  of  the  military  capacity  of 
McClellan,  it  is  certain  that  there  were  political  reasons  at  Washington  for 
putting  him  out  of  the  way.  He  was  a  Democrat ;  his  constant  interpre 
tation  of  the  war  had  been  that  it  was  a  contest  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Union,  not  a  war  of  vengeance,  and  should  not  be  diverted  or  degraded 
from  what  he  esteemed  a  noble  and  laudable  object,  by  revengeful  designs 
upon  the  population  of  the  South  and  a  recourse  to  savage  outrage.  He 
had  already  obtained  certain  respect  from  the  people  of  the  South  by  a 
studious  regard  for  the  rights  of  private  property  within  the  lines  of  his 
military  command,  and  his  honourable  disposition  to  direct  war  and  deal 
its  penalties  against  bodies  of  armed  men  rather  than  against  the  general 
population  of  the  country  without  regard  to  age,  sex,  and  other  conditions, 
appealing  to  humanity  and  protected  under  the  civilized  code  of  war.  The 
distressed  commander,  under  the  weight  of  a  great  defeat,  yet  had  power 
of  mind  to  write,  a  few  days  after  his  retreat  to  James  River,  a  letter  to 
President  Lincoln,  at  Washington,  which,  apart  from  his  military  career, 
must  ever  remain  a  monument  of  honour  to  his  name.  The  text  of  this 
letter  deserves  to  be  carefully  studied  as  the  exposition  of  the  doctrines  of 
a  party  in  the  North,  that  was  for  limiting  the  objects  of  the  war  to  its 
original  declarations,  and  conducting  it  on  humane  and  honourable 
principles  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
"CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON'S  LANDING,  VA.,  July  7,  1862. 

"  ME.  PRESIDENT  :  You  have  been  fully  informed  that  the  rebel  army  is  in  the  front, 
with  the  purpose  of  overwhelming  us  by  attacking  our  positions  or  reducing  us  by  block 
ing  our  river  communications.  I  cannot  but  regard  our  condition  as  critical,  and  I  ear 
nestly  desire,  in  view  of  possible  contingencies,  to  lay  before  your  excellency,  for  your 
private  consideration,  my  general  views  concerning  the  existing  state  of  the  rebellion, 
although  they  do  not  strictly  relate  to  the  situation  of  this  army,  or  strictly  come  within 
the  scope  of  my  official  duties.  These  views  amount  to  convictions,  and  are  deeply  im 
pressed  upon  my  mind  and  heart.  Our  cause  must  never  be  abandoned ;  it  is  the  cause 
of  free  institutions  and  self-government.  The  Constitution  and  the  Union  must  be  pre 
served,  whatever  may  be  the  cost  in  time,  treasure,  and  blood.  If  secession  is  successful, 
other  dissolutions  are  clearly  to  be  seen  in  the  future.  Let  neither  military  disaster,  polit 
ical  faction,  nor  foreign  war,  shake  your  settled  purpose  to  enforce  the  equal  operation 
of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  upon  the  people  of  every  State. 

"  The  time  has  come  when  the  Government  must  determine  upon  a  civil  and  military 
policy,  covering  the  whole  ground  of  our  national  trouble. 

"The  responsibility  of  determining,  declaring,  and  supporting  such  civil  and  military 
policy,  and  of  directing  the  whole  course  of  national  affairs  in  regard  to  the  rebellion, 
must  now  be  assumed  and  exercised  by  you,  or  our  cause  will  be  lost.  The  Constitution 
gives  you  power,  even  for  the  present  terrible  exigency. 


298  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

"  This  rebellion  has  assumed  the  character  of  a  war  ;  as  such  it  should  he  regarded, 
and  it  should  he  conducted  upon  the  highest  principles  known  to  Christian  civilization. 
It  should  not  be  a  war  looking  to  the  subjugation  of  the  people  of  any  State,  in  any  event. 
It  should  not  be  at  all  a  war  upon  population,  but  against  armed  forces  and  political  or 
ganizations.  Neither  confiscation  of  property,  political  executions  of  persons,  territorial 
organizations  of  States,  or  forcible  abolition  of  slavery,  should  be  contemplated  for  a 
moment. 

"  In  prosecuting  the  war,  all  private  property  and  unarmed  persons  should  be  strictly 
protected,  subject  only  to  the  necessity  of  military  operations  ;  all  private  property  taken 
for  military  use  should  be  paid  or  receipted  for ;  pillage  and  waste  should  be  treated  as 
high  crimes ;  all  unnecessary  trespass  sternly  prohibited,  and  offensive  demeanour  by  the 
military  towards  citizens  promptly  rebuked.  Military  arrests  should  not  be  tolerated, 
except  in  places  where  active  hostilities  exist ;  and  oaths,  not  required  by  enactments, 
constitutionally  made,  should  be  neither  demanded  nor  received. 

"  Military  government  should  be  confined  to  the  preservation  of  public  order  and  the 
protection  of  political  right.  Military  power  should  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the 
relations  of  servitude,  either  by  supporting  or  impairing  the  authority  of  the  master,  ex 
cept  for  repressing  disorders,  as  in  other  cases.  Slaves,  contraband  under  the  act  of  Con 
gress,  seeking  military  protection,  should  receive  it.  The  right  of  the  Government  to 
appropriate  permanently  to  its  own  service  slave  labour  should  be  asserted,  and  the 
right  of  the  owner  to  compensation  therefor  should  be  recognized.  This  principle  might 
be  extended,  upon  grounds  of  military  necessity  and  security,  to  all  the  slaves  of  a  partic 
ular  State,  thus  working  manumission  in  such  State ;  and  in  Missouri,  perhaps  in  Western 
Virginia  also,  and  possibly  even  in  Maryland,  the  expediency  of  such  a  measure  is  only  a 
question  of  time.  A  system  of  policy  thus  constitutional,  and  pervaded  by  the  influences 
of  Christianity  and  freedom,  would  receive  the  support  of  almost  all  truly  loyal  men, 
would  deeply  impress  the  rebel  masses  and  all  foreign  nations,  and  it  might  be  humbly 
hoped  that  it  would  commend  itself  to  the  favour  of  the  Almighty. 

"Unless  the  principles  governing  the  future  conduct  of  our  struggle  shall  be  made 
known  and  approved,  the  effort  to  obtain  requisite  forces  will  be  almost  hopeless.  A 
declaration  of  radical  views,  especially  upon  slavery,  will  rapidly  disintegrate  our  present 
armies.  The  policy  of  the  Government  must  be  supported  by  concentration  of  military 
power.  The  national  forces  should  not  be  dispersed  in  expeditions,  posts  of  occupation, 
and  numerous  armies,  but  should  be  mainly  collected  into  masses,  and  brought  to  bear 
upon  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States.  Those  armies  thoroughly  defeated,  the  polit 
ical  structure  which  they  support  would  soon  cease  to  exist. 

"  In  carrying  out  any  system  of  policy  which  you  may  form,  you  will  require  a  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  army,  one  who  possesses  your  confidence,  understands  your  views, 
and  who  is  competent  to  execute  your  orders,  by  directing  the  military  forces  of  the  na 
tion  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  objects  by  you  proposed.  I  do  not  ask  that  place  for 
myself.  I  am  willing  to  serve  you  in  such  position  as  you  may  assign  me,  and  I  will  do 
so  as  faithfully  as  ever  subordinate  served  superiour. 

"  I  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity  ;  and  as  I  hope  forgiveness  from  my  Maker,  I  have, 
written  this  letter  with  sincerity  towards  you  and  from  love  for  my  country. 
"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  GEORGE  B.  McCLELLAtf, 

"  Major-  General  Commanding. 
"  His  Excellency  A.  LINCOLN,  President" 

The  letter  of  McClellan  was  significant  of  a  remarkable  division  of  sen- 


THE  RADICAL  PARTY  IN  THE  NORTH.  299 

timent  in  the  North  on  the  conduct  of  the  war.  That  division  was  appa 
rent  in  the  Federal  Congress,  and  marked  by  sharp  lines  of  party  conflict. 
The  best  portion  of  the  Democratic  party  recognized  the  true  proportions 
and  character  of  the  war ;  were  for  according  all  belligerent  rights  to  the 
Confederates ;  and  strenuously  insisted  that  its  objects  should  be  limited 
to  the  restoration  of  the  Union.  They  claimed  that  the  war  for  the  Union 
had  been  cheated  of  its  due  effect  by  the  intrusion  of  sectional  rancour  and 
the  injudicious  or  unfaithful  acts  of  agents  of  the  Government.  They  re 
sisted  the  inauguration,  now  attempted  at  Washington,  of  a  system  of 
spoliation  and  disfranchisement  in  the  invaded  country  of  the  South  ;  they 
declared  that  such  a  system  would  rob  the  cause  of  its  sanctity,  and  render 
success  more  difficult  of  attainment. 

The  Radical  party,  on  the  other  hand,  which  controlled  a  majority  of 
votes  in  Congress,  were  for  extending  the  contest  to  the  extinction  of 
slavery,  and  punishing  the  "  rebels  "  with  every  conceivable  means  that 
the  quick  imagination  of  hate  and  revenge  could  suggest.  They  could  not 
realize  the  fact  that  the  contest  had  risen  to  the  dignity  of  war.  Their 
great  mistake  was  that  they  habitually  underrated  the  extent  and  strength 
of  "  the  rebellion,"  just  as  they  had  formerly  underrated  and  contemned 
the  grievances  of  the  South  and  their  hold  on  the  Southern  mind.  They 
refused  to  apply  even  Yattel's  test  of  a  civil  war,  viz. :  "  that  a  consider 
able  body  of  insurgents  had  risen  against  the  sovereign  ;  "  they  repudiated 
all  its  appurtenances  of  a  humane  code  of  warfare,  the  exchange  of  prison 
ers,  etc. ;  and  the  consequences  of  such  a  theory  were  constantly  recurring 
difficulties  about  belligerent  rights  on  sea  and  land,  and  inhumanities 
which  would  sicken  the  heart  of  a  savage.  In  fact,  this  party  cared  noth 
ing  for  the  success  of  the  war  unless  it  could  be  used  for  purposes  of  re 
venge  upon  the  Southern  people,  and  embrace  a  design  upon  their  institu 
tion  of  slavery.  Wendell  Phillips,  a  famous  Radical  orator  in  the  North, 
had  not  hesitated  to  declare  that  he  would  deplore  a  victory  of  McClellan, 
because  "  the  sore  would  be  salved  over/5  and  it  would  only  be  the  victory 
of  a  slave  Union ;  and  that  he  thanked  Beauregard  for  marshalling  his 
army  before  Washington,  because  it  had  conferred  upon  Congress  the 
constitutional  power  to  abolish  slavery. 

The  appointment  of  John  Pope  to  what  was  now  the  most  important 
command  in  Virginia  was  a  triumph  of  the  Radical  party  at  Washington, 
and  dated  that  system  of  spoliation  and  disfranchisement  in  the  Southern 
States,  now  to  be  distinctly  announced  in  forms  of  authority  and  in  the 
text  of  official  orders.  Pope  assumed  his  new  command  in  the  following 
address,  which  long  amused  the  world  as  a  curiosity  in  military  literature 
and  the  braggart  nourish  of  a  man,  whom  the  Richmond  Examiner  de 
scribed  as  "  a  compound  of  Bobadil  and  Munchausen  :  " 


300  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

"  To  the  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  : 

"  By  special  assignment  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  I  have  assumed  com 
mand  of  this  army.  I  have  spent  two  weeks  in  learning  your  whereabouts,  your  condi 
tion,  and  your  wants;  in  preparing  you  for  active  operations,  and  in  placing  you  in  posi 
tions  from  which  you  can  act  promptly  and  to  the  purpose.  I  have  come  to  you  from 
the  West,  where  we  have  always  seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies — from  an  army  whose 
business  it  has  been  to  seek  the  adversary,  and  to  beat  him  when  found,  whose  policy 
has  been  attack  and  not  defence.  In  but  one  instance  has  the  enemy  been  able  to  place 
our  Western  armies  in  a  defensive  attitude.  I  presume  that  I  have  been  called  here  to 
pursue  the  same  system,  and  to  lead  you  against  the  enemy.  It  is  my  purpose  to  do  so, 
and  that  speedily.  I  am  sure  you  long  for  an  opportunity  to  win  the  distinction  you  are 
capable  of  achieving — that  opportunity  I  shall  endeavour  to  give  you.  Meantime  I  desire 
you  to  dismiss  from  your  minds  certain  phrases  which  I  am  sorry  to  find  much  in  vogue 
amongst  you.  I  hear  constantly  of  taking  strong  positions  and  holding  them — of  lines 
of  retreat,  and  of  bases  of  supplies.  Let  us  discard  such  ideas.  The  strongest  position 
a  soldier  should  desire  to  occupy  is  one  from  which  he  can  most  easily  advance  against 
the  enemy.  Let  us  study  the  probable  lines  of  retreat  of  our  opponents,  and  leave  our 
own  to  take  care  of  themselves.  Let  us  look  before  us  and  not  behind.  Success  and 
glory  are  in  the  advance.  Disaster  and  shame  lurk  in  the  rear.  Let  us  act  on  this  un 
derstanding,  and  it  is  safe  to  predict  that  your  banners  shall  be  inscribed  with  many  a 
glorious  deed,  and  that  your  names  will  be  dear  to  your  countrymen  forever. 

"JOHN  POPE." 

He  followed  this  characteristic  production  with  a  series  of  general  or 
ders,  making  war  upon  the  non-combatant  population  within  his  lines. 
He  ordered  the  arrest  of  citizens,  and  on  their  refusing  to  take  an  "  oath 
of  allegiance,"  they  were  to  be  driven  from  their  homes,  and  if  they  re 
turned  anywhere  within  his  lines  they  should  be  "  considered  spies,  and 
subjected  to  the  extreme  rigour  of  military  law !  " 

By  a  general  order  of  the  Federal  Government,  the  military  command 
ers  of  that  Government,  within  the  States  of  Virginia,  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Texas,  and  Arkansas, 
were  directed  to  seize  and  use  any  property,  real  or  personal,  belonging 
to  the  inhabitants  of  this  Confederacy  which  might  be  necessary  or  con 
venient  for  their  several  commands,  and  no  provision  was  made  for  any 
compensation  to  the  owners  of  private  property  thus  seized  and  appropri 
ated  by  the  military  commanders  of  the  enemy. 

Pope  went  further  than  this  authority,  for  he  threw  open  all  the  coun 
try  he  occupied  or  controlled  to  unlimited  spoliation  by  his  soldiers.  They 
were  given  to  understand  that  they  were  free  to  enter  upon  a  campaign  of 
robbery  and  murder  against  unarmed  citizens  and  peaceful  tillers  of  the 
soil.  The  country  was  ravaged  as  by  a  horde  of  barbarians.  Houses  were 
robbed ;  cattle  were  shot  dead  in  the  fields ;  clothing  and  jewelry  were 
stolen ;  and  nothing  was  spared  in  this  new  irruption  of  the  Northern 
spoilsmen.  A  Northern  journal,  more  candid  and  honourable  than  its  co- 
temporaries,  referring  to  the  depravity  of  Pope's  troops  in  Virginia,  said  : 


MILITARY   MOVEMENTS   IN   VIRGINIA.  301 

"  The  new  usage  which  has  been  instituted  in  regard  to  protection  of  rebel 
property,  and  the  purpose  of  the  Government  to  subsist  the  army  as  far  as 
practicable  upon  the  enemy's  country,  has  produced  a  decided  revolution 
in  the  feelings  and  practices  of  the  soldiery.  Unless  these  innovations  are 
guarded  by  far  more  stringent  safeguards  against  irregular  and  unauthor 
ized  plundering,  we  shall  have  let  loose  upon  the  country,  at  the  close  of 
the  war,  a  torrent  of  unbridled  and  unscrupulous  robbers.  Rapid  strides 
towards  villainy  have  been  made  during  the  last  few  weeks  ;  men,  who  at 
home  would  have  shuddered  at  the  suggestion  of  touching  another's  prop 
erty,  now  appropriate  remorselessly  whatever  comes  within  their  reach. 
Thieving,  they  imagine,  has  now  become  an  authorized  practice." 

The  military  movements  in  Virginia  were  now  of  surpassing  interest. 
Pope  was  across  the  Rappahannock,  with  a  strong  advance  guard  south 
of  Culpepper  Court-House,  and  near  Gordons ville.  The  enemy  also  ap 
peared  in  force  at  Fredericksburg,  and  threatened  the  railroad  from 
Gordonsville  to  Richmond,  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  co-operating  with 
the  movement  of  Pope. 

From  early  indications  Gen.  Lee  was  inclined  to  believe  that  McClellan 
would  not  again  operate  on  the  Peninsula,  but  had  concluded  to  transport 
most  of  his  forces  to  the  Rappahannock,  and  form  a  junction  with  Pope. 
But  it  was  necessary  to  be  very  careful  in  making  any  movement  between 
the  two  forces,  and  to  await,  as  far  as  possible,  the  full  development  of  the 
enemy's  designs.  To  meet  the  advance  of  Pope,  and  restrain,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  atrocities  which  he  threatened  to  perpetrate  upon  defenceless 
citizens,  Gen.  Jackson,  witli  his  own  and  E well's  division,  was  ordered  to 
proceed  towards  Gordonsville,  on  the  13th  of  July.  Upon  reaching  that 
vicinity,  he  ascertained  that  the  force  under  Gen.  Pope  was  superiour  to 
his  own,  but  the.  uncertainty  that  then  surrounded  the  designs  of  McClel 
lan,  rendered  it  inexpedient  to  reinforce  him  from  the  army  at  Richmond. 
He  was  directed  to  observe  the  enemy's  movements  closely,  and  to  avail 
himself  of  any  opportunity  to  attack  that  might  arise. 

McClellan,  who  was  still  at  Westover,  on  James  River,  continuing  to 
manifest  no  intention  of  resuming  active  operations,  and  Gen.  Pope's  ad 
vance  having  reached  the  Rapidan,  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill,  with  his  division, 
was  ordered,  on  the  27th  of  July,  to  join  Gen.  Jackson.  At  the  same 
time,  in  order  to  keep  McClellan  stationary,  or,  if  possible,  to  cause  him  to 
withdraw,  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  commanding  south  of  James  River,  was  directed 
to  threaten  his  communications,  by  seizing  favourable  positions  below 
Westover,  from  which  to  attack  the  transports  in  the  river.  That  officer 
selected  Coggin's  Point,  opposite  Westover.  On  the  night  of  the  31st  of 
July,  Gen.  French,  accompanied  by  Brig.-Gen.  Pendleton,  chief  of  artil 
lery,  placed  forty-three  guns  in  position  within  range  of  the  enemy's  ship 
ping  in  the  river,  and  of  the  camps  on  the  north  side,  upon  both  of  which 


302  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

% 

fire  was  opened,  causing  consternation,  and  inflicting  serious  damage. 
The  guns  were  withdrawn  before  daybreak,  with  the  loss  of  one  killed  and 
two  wounded  by  the  gunboats  and  batteries  of  the  enemy.  This  attack 
caused  Gen.  McClellan  to  send  a  strong  force  to  the  south  bank  of  the  river, 
which  entrenched  itself  on  Coggin's  Point. 

While  the  main  body  of  Gen.  Lee's  army  awaited  the  development  of 
McClellan's  intentions,  Gen.  Jackson,  reinforced  by  A.  P.  Hill,  determined 
to  assume  the  offensive  against  Pope,  whose  army,  still  superiour  in  num 
bers,  lay  north  of  the  Rapidan. 

Only  a  portion  of  Gen.  Pope's  army  was  at  Culpepper  Court-House. 
The  forces  of  Banks  and  Sigel,  and  one  of  the  divisions  of  McDowell's 
corps,  had  been  concentrated  there ;  Banks'  corps  being  pushed  forward 
five  miles  south  of  the  town.  Gen.  Jackson,  who  was  anxious  to  meet  his 
old  acquaintance  of  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  resolved  to  attack  this  portion 
of  the  Federal  army,  before  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  ;  and  on  the  7th 
August  moved  from  Gordonsville  for  that  purpose. 


BATTLE   OF    CEDAR   RUN. 

On  the  9th,  Jackson's  command  arrived  within  eight  miles  of  Culpepper 
Court-House,  when  the  enemy  was  found  near  Cedar  Run,  a  short  distance 
northwest  of  Slaughter's  Mountain.  Early's  brigade,  of  Swell's  division, 
was  thrown  forward  on  the  road  to  Culpepper  Court-House.  The  remain 
ing  two  brigades,  those  of  Trimble  and  Hays,  diverging  to  the  right,  took 
position  on  the  western  slope  of  Slaughter's  Mountain.  Jackson's  own 
division,  under  Brig.-Gen.  Winder,  was  placed  on  the  left  of  the  road. 
The  battle  opened  with  a  fierce  fire  of  artillery,  which  continued  for  about 
two  hours,  during  which  Gen.  Winder,  while  directing  the  movements  of 
his  batteries,  was  killed. 

It  was  now  above  five  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  there  had  scarcely 
been  any  demonstration  beyond  that  of  artillery.  Gen.  Banks,  about  this 
time,  sent  word  to  Pope,  who  was  at  Culpepper  Court-House,  seven  miles 
away  from  the  field,  that  the  enemy  had  made  no  considerable  demonstra 
tion  upon  him,  and  that  he  hardly  expected  a  battle  that  afternoon.  But 
the  obtuse  Federal  commander,  despite  his  lesson  in  the  Shenandoah  Yal 
ley,  was  again  to  be  deceived  by  his  wily  and  vigorous  adversary.  Banks' 
courier  had  but  just  started,  when  an  advance  of  the  Federal  infantry  un 
covered,  what  had  been  unknown  to  their  commander,  the  flanking  force 
of  Confederates  on  the  slopes  of  the  mountain.  The  infantry  fight  soon 
extended  to  the  left  and  centre.  Early  became  warmly  engaged  with  the 
enemy  on  his  right  and  front.  He  had  previously  called  for  reinforce 
ments.  As  Gen.  Hill  had  arrived  with  his  division,  one  of  his  brigades, 


BATTLE    OF    CEDAK   RUN.  303 

Gen.  Thomas',  was  sent  to  Early,  and  joined  him  in  time  to  render  efficient 
service.  Whilst  the  attack  upon  Early  was  in  progress,  the  main  body  of 
the  Federal  infantry  moved  down  from  the  wood,  through  the  corn  and 
wheat-fields,  and  fell  with  great  vigour  upon  our  extreme  left,  and,  by  the 
force  of  superiour  numbers,  bearing  down  all  opposition,  turned  it,  and 
poured  a  destructive  lire  into  its  rear.  At  this  critical  moment,  Branch's 
brigade,  of  Hill's  division,  with  Winder's  brigade  further  to  the  left,  met 
the  Federal  forces,  flushed  with  their  temporary  triumph,  and  drove  them 
back  with  terrible  slaughter,  through  the  woods.  The  fight  was  still 
maintained  with  obstinacy,  between  the  enemy  and  the  two  brigades  just 
named,  when,  reinforcements  coming  up,  a  general  charge  was  made, 
which  drove  the  enemy  across  the  field  into  the  opposite  woods,  strewing 
the  narrow  valley  with  his  dead.  At  every  point  of  their  line  the  Fed 
erals  fell  back.  It  had  been  one  of  the  most  rapid  and  severe  engagements 
of  the  war.  The  attack  of  Banks  had  failed  ;  his  centre  and  left  were  irre 
parably  broken ;  and  night  alone  saved  him  from  the  severe  penalty  of 
pursuit. 

The  next  day,  Gen.  Jackson  remained  in  position,  and,  becoming  satis 
fied  that  Banks  had  been  reinforced,  proceeded  to  bury  the  dead,  and  col 
lect  the  arms  from  the  battle-field,  and  at  night  returned  to  the  vicinity  of 
Gordonsville.  The  official  report  of  his  loss  was  223  killed  and  1,060 
wounded.  It  was  closely  estimated  that  the  enemy's  loss  was  at  least  two 
thousand,  including  four  hundred  prisoners  in  our  hands. 

Shortly  after  the  victory  at  Cedar  Kun,  it  became  apparent  to  Gen.  Lee 
that  Pope's  army  was  being  largely  increased.  The  corps  of  Maj.-Geii. 
Burnside,  from  North  Carolina,  which  had  reached  Fredericksburg,  was 
reported  to  have  moved  up  the  Eappahannock,  a  few  days  after  the  battle, 
to  unite  with  Gen.  Pope,  and  a  part  of  Gen.  McClellan's  army  was  be 
lieved  to  have  left  Westover  for  the  same  purpose.  In  this  condition  of 
affairs  it  was  promptly  decided  by  Gen.  Lee,  that  the  most  effectual  way 
to  relieve  Richmond  from  any  danger  of  attack,  would  be  to  reinforce 
Gen.  Jackson,  and  advance  upon  Pope.  On  the  13th  August,  Maj.-Gen. 
Longstrect,  with  his  division,  and  two  brigades,  under  Gen.  Hood,  were 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Gordonsville.  At  the  same  time,  Gen.  Stuart  was 
directed  to  move  with  the  main  body  of  his  cavalry  to  that  point,  leaving 
a  sufficient  force  to  observe  the  enemy  still  remaining  in  Fredericksburg, 
and  to  guard  the  railroad.  Gen.  R.  II.  Anderson  was  also  directed  to 
leave  his  position  on  James  River,  and  follow  Longstreet.  On  the  16th,  the 
troops  began  to  move  from  the  vicinity  of  Gordonsville  towards  the  Rapi- 
dan,  on  the  north  side  of  which,  extending  along  the  Orange  and  Alex 
andria  Railroad,  in  the  direction  of  Culpepper  Court-House,  the  Federal 
army  lay  in  great  force. 

It  was  intended  that  Longstreet  and  Jackson  should  cross  the  Rapidan, 


304:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

and  attack  the  enemy's  left  flank  ;  but  Pope  taking  the  alarm,  hastily  re 
treated  beyond  the  Rappahannock.  While  Gen.  Lee  was  making  demon 
strations  at  various  points  of  the  river,  Jackson's  forces,  some  twenty-five 
thousand  strong,  left  the  main  body  on  the  25th  August,  and  proceeded 
towards  the  head-waters  of  the  Rappahannock.  He  was  encumbered  with 
no  baggage,  and  moved  with  great  rapidity.  Crossing  the  river  about 
four  miles  above  "Waterloo,  he  pushed  rapidly  towards  Salem,  and,  turning 
the  head  of  his  column,  proceeded  eastward  parallel  with  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad,  until  he  reached  the  village  of  Gainesville.  The  design  of 
this  rapid  and  adventurous  movement  of  Jackson  was,  to  move  around  the 
enemy's  right,  so  as  to  strike  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad.  Long- 
street,  in  the  mean  time,  was  to  divert  his  attention  by  threatening  him  in 
front,  and  follow  Jackson  as  soon  as  the  latter  should  be  sufficiently 
advanced. 

On  the  26th  August,  Gen.  Jackson  was  between  the  large  army  of  Pope 
and  the  Federal  capital.  It  was  a  situation  of  extreme  peril.  He  was  in 
the  rear  of  an  enemy  much  more  powerful  than  himself,  far  from  all  sup 
ports,  liable  to  be  attacked  by  superiour  numbers  from  Washington,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  in  danger  of  annihilation  if  Pope  should  face  about  and 
co-operate  with  a  force  moving  in  that  direction.  The  enemy  was  being 
heavily  reinforced.  The  corps  of  Heintzelman  and  Porter,  probably  twenty 
thousand  strong,  joined  Pope  on  the  26th  and  27th  of  August,  at  Warren- 
ton  Junction.  Another  portion  of  McClellan's  army,  transported  from 
Westover,  consisting  of  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Suinner,  were  at  Alex 
andria,  intending  to  reinforce  Pope's  lines ;  making  altogether  an  array 
of  force  and  a  situation  in  which  the  Federal  Government  had. reason  to 
expect  a  certain  and  splendid  victory.  It  seemed  indeed  that  Jackson  had 
marched  into  the  jaws  of  destruction,  and  had  thrust  into  Pope's  hands  the 
opportunity  of  an  easy  and  brilliant  conquest. 

But  Jackson's  designs  upon  Pope's  stores  at  Bristoe  and  Manassas 
Station  as  well  as  upon  his  communications  with  Washington,  were  an  im 
portant  part  of  his  expedition,  were  effectively  carried  out,  and  were 
accomplished  before  Pope  could  realize  that  such  a  force  was  in  his  rear, 
and  that  the  demonstration  upon  his  depots  of  supplies  was  not  a  mere 
guerilla  foray.  The  amount  of  stores  captured  by  Jackson  was  large.  At 
Manassas,  eight  pieces  of  artillery  were  taken,  and  more  than  three  hun 
dred  prisoners.  Here  there  was  a  vast  accumulation  of  supplies :  fifty 
thousand  pounds  of  bacon,  one  thousand  barrels  of  corn-beef,  two  thou 
sand  barrels  of  salt  pork,  two  thousand  barrels  of  flour,  quartermasters' 
ordnance,  and  sutlers'  stores,  deposited  in  buildings,  and  filling  two  trains 
of  cars.  Having  appropriated  all  that  his  army  could  use,  Gen.  Jackson 
ordered  the  remainder  of  these  stores  to  be  destroyed,  to  avoid  recapture 
by  the  enemy. 


THE    SECOND   BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  305 

On  the  27th  August,  a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy  under  Brig.- 
Gen.  Taylor,  approached  from  the  direction  of  Alexandria,  and  pushed 
forward  boldly  towards  Manassas  Junction.  After  a  sharp  engagement, 
the  enemy  was  routed  and  driven  back,  leaving  his  killed  and  wounded  on 
the  field,  Gen.  Taylor  himself  being  mortally  wounded  during  the  pursuit. 
In  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  advanced  upon  Gen.  Ewell  at  Bristoe,  from 
the  direction  of  Warrenton  Junction.  They  were  attacked  by  three  regi 
ments  and  the  batteries  of  Swell's  division,  and  two  columns,  of  not  less 
than  a  brigade  each,  were  broken  and  repulsed.  Their  places  were  soon 
supplied  by  fresh  troops  ;  and  it  was  apparent  the  Federal  commander  had 
now  become  aware  of  the  situation  of  affairs,  and  had  turned  upon  Gen. 
Jackson  with  his  whole  force.  Gen.  Ewell,  upon  perceiving  the  strength 
of  the  enemy,  withdrew  his  command,  part  of  which  was  at  the  time  en 
gaged,  and  rejoined  Gen.  Jackson  at  Manassas  Junction,  having  first  de 
stroyed  the  railroad  bridge  over  Broad  Kun.  The  enemy  halted  at 
Bristoe. 

THE   SECOND  BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS. 

It  being  evident  that  the  design  of  Pope  was  to  fall  upon  Jackson,  and 
annihilate  him  in  his  isolated  position,  that  alert  Confederate  commander 
rapidly  withdrew  from  Manassas,  and  took  a  position  west  of  the  turnpike 
road  from  Warrenton  to  Alexandria,  where  he  could  more  rapidly  unite 
with  the  approaching  column  of  Longstreet. 

Taliaferro's  division  moved,  during  the  night,  by  the  road  to  Sudley, 
and  crossing  the  turnpike  near  Groveton,  halted  on  the  west  side,  where  it 
was  joined  by  the  divisions  of  Hill  and  Ewell.  Perceiving  during  the 
afternoon  of  the  28th,  that  the  enemy,  approaching  from  the  direction  of 
Warrenton,  was  moving  down  the  turnpike  towards  Alexandria,  thus  ex 
posing  his  left  flank,  Gen.  Jackson  advanced  to  attack  him.  A  fierce  and 
sanguinary  conflict  ensued,  which  continued  until  about  nine  o'clock  in  the 
night,  when  the  enemy  slowly  fell  back,  and  left  us  in  possession  of  the 
field. 

The  next  morning,  the  29th,  the  enemy  had  taken  a  position  to  inter 
pose  his  army  between  Gen.  Jackson  and  Alexandria,  and  about  ten 
o'clock,  opened  with  artillery  upon  the  right  of  Jackson's  line.  The  troops 
of  the  latter  were  disposed  in  the  rear  of  Groveton,  along  the  line  of  the 
unfinished  branch  of  the  Manassas  Gap  Eailroad,  and  extended  from  a 
point  a  short  distance  west  of  the  turnpike  towards  Sudley  Mill — Jackson's 
division,  under  Brig.-Gen.  Starke,  being  on  the  right,  Swell's,  under  Gen. 
Lawton,  in  the  centre,  and  A.  P.  Hill  on  the  left.  The  Federal  army  was 
evidently  concentrating  upon  Jackson,  with  the  design  of  overwhelming 
him  before  the  arrival  of  Longstreet. 
20 


306  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  latter  officer  was  already  approaching  the  critical  field  of  battle  on 
a  rapid  march.  The  preceding  day  he  had  reached  Thoroughfare  Gap — 
a  wild,  rude  opening  through  the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  varying  in  width 
from  one  hundred  to  two  hundred  yards.  The  enemy  held  a  strong  posi 
tion  on  the  opposite  gorge,  and  had  succeeded  in  getting  his  sharpshooters 
in  position  on  the  mountain.  Brig. -Gen.  D.  R.  Jones  advanced  two  of 
his  brigades  rapidly,  and  soon  drove  the  enemy  from  his  position  on  the 
mountain.  Brig.-Gen.  Hood,  with  his  own  and  Gen.  "Whiting's  brigade, 
was  ordered,  by  a  footpath  over  the  mountain,  to  turn  the  enemy's  right, 
and  Brig.-Gen.  Wilcox  with  his  own  and  Brig.-Gen.  Featherstone's  and 
Pryor's  brigades,  was  ordered  through  Hope  well  Gap,  three  miles  to  our  left, 
to  turn  the  right  and  attack  the  enemy  in  rear.  The  movement  was  so  suc 
cessful  that  the  enemy,  after  a  brief  resistance,  retreated  during  the  night. 

Early  the  next  morning,  Longstreet's  columns  were  united,  and  the 
advance  to  join  Gen.  Jackson  was  resumed.  The  noise  of  battle  was  heard 
before  Longstreet  reached  Gainesville.  The  march  was  quickened.  The 
excitement  of  battle  seemed  to  give  new  life  and  strength  to  his  jaded 
men.  On  a  rapid  march  he  entered  the  turnpike  near  Gainesville,  moving 
down  towards  Groveton,  the  head  of  his  column  coming  upon  the  field  in 
rear  of  the  enemy's  left,  which  had  already  opened  with  artillery  upon 
Jackson's  right,  as  previously  described.  Longstreet  took  position  on  the 
right  of  Jackson,  Hood's  two  brigades,  supported  by  Evans,  being  deployed 
across  the  turnpike,  and  at  right  angles  to  it. 

The  timely  appearance  of  Longstreet  gave  a  new  aspect  to  the  field ; 
and  the  enemy,  discovering  his  movements,  showed  a  disposition  to  with 
draw  his  left  from  the  attack.  He  changed  his  front,  so  as  to  meet  the 
advance  of  Hood  and  Evans.  However,  about  two  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  another  effort  was  directed  against  Jackson,  this  time  against  his 
left,  occupied  by  the  division  of  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill.  The  attack  was  received 
by  his  troops  with  great  steadiness.  The  enemy  was  repeatedly  repulsed, 
but  again  pressed  the  attack  with  fresh  troops.  Once  he  succeeded  in 
penetrating  an  interval  between  Gen.  Gregg's  brigade  on  the  extreme  left, 
and  that  of  Gen.  Thomas,  but  was  quickly  driven  back  with  great  slaugh 
ter.  The  contest  was  close  and  obstinate,  the  combatants  sometimes  deliv 
ering  their  fire  at  ten  paces.  At  last  Early's  brigade  was  ordered  up,  and 
drove  the  enemy  back  with  heavy  loss.  While  this  action  was  taking 
place  on  Jackson's  left,  Gen.  Longstreet  ordered  Hood  and  Evans  to  ad 
vance,  but  before  the  order  could  be  obeyed,  Hood  was  himself  attacked, 
and  his  command  at  once  became  warmly  engaged.  Reinforced  by  Wil- 
cox's  and  Kemper's  brigades,  Hood  pressed  forward ;  and  after  a  severe 
contest,  the  enemy  was  repulsed,  fell  back,  and  was  closely  followed  by 
our  troops,  who  continued  to  advance  until  about  nine  o'clock  in  the  night, 
when  the  action  ceased. 


THE   SECOND  BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  307 

The  action  of  this  day  was  not  a  general  or  decisive  one.  The  enemy 
appears  to  have  had  no  settled  plan  of  attack,  and  to  have  experimented 
on  the  strength  of  our  lines.  But  whatever  the  significance  of  the  action, 
success  was  plainly  with  the  Confederates ;  they  had  driven  the  enemy, 
advanced  their  positions,  and  were  now  prepared  for  a  renewal  of  the  en 
gagement  on  the  scene  of  the  first  great  battle  of  the  war. 

The  decisive  contest  was  yet  to  take  place ;  although  Pope,  quick  to 
boast,  and  unscrupulous  in  his  official  dispatches,  had  already  telegraphed 
to  "Washington  that  he  had  won  a  great  victory,  and  was  master  of  the 
field.  As  the  morning  of  the  30th  broke,  the  Confederates  were  under 
arms  ;  the  pickets  of  the  two  armies  were  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of 
each  other ;  and  cannonading  along  the  lines  betokened  the  approaching 
contest.  The  troops  of  Jackson  and  Longstreet  maintained  their  positions 
of  the  previous  day.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  three  regiments  of  his  cavalry, 
was  posted  on  Jackson's  left,  and  R.  H.  Anderson's  division,  which  arrived 
during  the  forenoon,  was  held  in  reserve  near  the  turnpike.  The  line  of 
battle  stretched  for  a  distance  of  about  five  miles  from  Sudley  Springs  on 
the  left  to  the  Warrenton  road,  and  thence  in  an  oblique  direction  towards 
the  southwest.  The  disposition  of  the  enemy's  forces  was,  Gen.  Heintzel- 
man  on  the  extreme  right,  and  Gen.  McDowell  on  the  extreme  left,  while 
the  army  corps  of  Gen.  Fitz-John  Porter  and  Sigel,  and  Reno's  division 
of  Gen.  Burnside's  army,  were  placed  in  the  centre. 

For  a  good  part  of  the  day,  the  action  was  fought  principally  with 
artillery.  But  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  having 
massed  his  troops  in  front  of  Gen.  Jackson,  advanced  against  his  position 
in  strong  force.  His  front  line  pushed  forward  until  engaged  at  close 
quarters  by  Jackson's  troops,  when  its  progress  was  checked,  and  a  fierce 
and  bloody  struggle  ensued.  A  second  and  third  line,  of  great  strength, 
moved  up  to  support  the  first,  but  in  doing  so,  came  within  easy  range  of 
a  position  a  little  in  advance  of  Longstreet's  left.  He  immediately  ordered 
up  two  batteries,  and  two  others  being  thrown  forward  about  the  same 
time  by  Col.  S.  D.  Lee,  under  their  well-directed  and  destructive  fire  the 
supporting  lines  were  broken,  and  fell  back  in  confusion.  Their  repeated 
efforts  to  rally  were  unavailing,  and  Jackson's  troops  being  thus  relieved 
from  the  pressure  of  overwhelming  numbers,  began  to  press  steadily  for 
ward,  driving  the  enemy  before  them.  He  retreated  in  confusion,  suffer 
ing  severely  from  our  artillery,  which  advanced  as  he  retired.  Gen.  Long- 
street,  anticipating  the  order  for  a  general  advance,  now  threw  his  whole 
command  against  the  Federal  centre  and  lett.  Hood's  two  brigades,  fol 
lowed  by  Evans,  led  the  attack.  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  came  gallantly 
to  the  support  of  Hood,  while  the  three  brigades  under  Wilcox  moved  for 
ward  on  his  left,  and  those  of  Kemper  on  his  right.  D.  R.  Jones  advanced 
on  the  extreme  right,  and  the  whole  line  swept  steadily  on. 


308  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  magnificent  array  swept  the  enemy  before  them,  pausing  only  to 
drive  them  from  each  successive  position.  It  was  the  most  sublime  spec 
tacle  that  was  ever  witnessed  on  a  battle-field.  As  far  as  the  eye  could 
range,  a  line  of  bayonets  glittered  in  the  sun.  Now  it  could  be  observed 
passing  through  open  fields.  Again  it  would  disappear  in  the  woods.  A 
brief  pause  would  ensue,  followed  by  the  clatter  of  artillery  riding  to  the 
front,  and  the  awful  roar  of  the  guns.  Then  a  shout  would  proclaim  that  the 
enemy  was  again  in  retreat,  and  the  advance  swept  on,  its  bayonets  catch 
ing  now  and  then  the  light  of  the  sun,  while  sheets  of  artillery  fire  blazed 
through  clouds  of  smoke  and  dust.  The  ground  which  the  men  traversed 
was  in  many  places  red  with  blood.  In  wood  and  field,  across  creeks  and 
brooks,  the  roar  of  battle  continued,  and  long  lines  of  smoke  curling  over 
tree-tops  wafted  away  on  the  evening  breeze.  Lines  of  ambulances  and 
stretchers  followed  the  grand  advance  as  it  swept  on  in  its  deliberate  work 
of  destruction,  leaving  scenes  of  carnage  in  its  rear.  Groans  and  death- 
cries  arose  on  every  hand,  mingling  with  the  distant  roar  and  rush  of  bat 
tle.  Still  the  advance  was  relentless.  As  the  masses  of  fugitives  were 
driven  across  Bull  Run,  many  were  literally  dragged  and  crushed  under 
the  water,  the  crowds  of  frenzied  men  pressing  and  trampling  upon  each 
other  in  the  stream.  The  wounded  and  dying  of  both  armies  lined  the 
banks.  Some,  in  the  endeavour  to  drink,  had  tumbled  in,  and  from  weak 
ness  unable  to  extricate  themselves,  had  been  drowned ;  others  in  the 
water  clung  to  branches,  and  thus  sustained  themselves  for  a  little  while, 
and  then  were  seen  to  let  go  their  hold  and  disappear.  The  meadows 
were  trodden  down,  wet  and  bloody.  Hundreds  of  bodies  had  been  ridden 
over  and  crushed  by  artillery  or  cavalry.  In  front  was  the  brilliant  spec 
tacle  of  a  valourous  army  in  steady,  relentless  pursuit :  in  the  rear  was  the 
ground,  torn,  scarred,  bloody,  piled  with  heaps  of  dead  and  dying,  as 
monuments  of  war's  horrours. 

The  pursuit  continued  until  10  p.  M.  The  enemy  escaped  to  the  strong 
position  of  Centreville,  about  four  miles  beyond  Bull  Run,  where  his  flight 
was  arrested  by  the  appearance  of  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner,  nine 
teen  thousand  strong.  The  next  day  Gen.  Jackson  was  directed  to  proceed 
by  Sudley's  Ford  to  the  Little  River  turnpike,  to  turn  the  enemy's  right, 
and  intercept  his  retreat  to  Washington.  Jackson's  progress  was  retarded 
by  the  inclemency  of  the  weather  and  the  fatigue  of  his  troops,  who,  in 
addition  to  their  arduous  marches,  had  fought  three  severe  engagements 
in  as  many  days.  He  reached  Little  River  turnpike  in  the  evening,  and 
the  next  day,  September  1st,  advanced  by  that  road  towards  Fairfax  Court 
House.  The  enemy,  in  the  meantime,  was  falling  back  rapidly  towards 
Washington,  and  had  thrown  out  a  strong  force  to  Germantown,  on  the 
Little  River  turnpike,  to  cover  his  line  of  retreat  from  Centreville.  The 
advance  of  Jackson's  column  encountered  the  enemy  at  Ox  Hill,  near  Ger- 


THE   SECOND  BATTLE   OP   MANASSAS.  309 

mantown,  about  5  p.  M.  Line  of  battle  was  at  once  formed,  and  two  bri 
gades  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  those  of  Branch  and  Field,  were  thrown 
forward  to  attack  the  enemy,  and  ascertain  his  strength  and  position.  A 
cold  and  drenching  rain-storm  drove  in  the  faces  of  our  troops  as  they 
advanced  and  gallantly  engaged  the  enemy.  They  were  subsequently  sup 
ported  by  the  brigades  of  Gregg,  Thomas,  and  Fender ;  also  of  Hill's 
division,  which,  with  part  of  E well's,  became  engaged.  The  conflict  was 
maintained  by  the  enemy  until  dark,  when  he  retreated,  having  lost  two 
general  officers,  one  of  whom,  Major-Gen.  Kearney,  was  left  dead  on  the 
field.*  Longstreet's  command  arrived  after  the  action  was  over,  and  the 
next  morning  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  conducted  his  retreat  so 
rapidly,  that  the  attempt  to  intercept  him  was  abandoned.  The  proximity 
of  the  fortifications  around  Alexandria  and  Washington  rendered  further 
pursuit  useless ;  and  the  Confederates  rested  near  Chantilly,  the  enemy 
being  followed  only  by  the  cavalry,  who  continued  to  harass  him  until  he 
reached  the  shelter  of  his  entrenchments. 

In  the  series  of  engagements  on  the  plains  of  Manassas,  more  than 
seven  thousand  prisoners  were  taken,  in  addition  to  about  two  thousand 
wounded  left  in  our  hands.  Thirty  pieces  of  artillery,  upwards  of  twenty 
thousand  of  small  arms,  numerous  colours,  and  a  large  amount  of  stores, 
besides  those  taken  by  Gen.  Jackson  at  Manassas  Junction,  were  captured. 
Pope  confessed  to  a  loss  of  eight  thousand  killed  and  wounded  in  the  bat 
tle  of  the  29th ;  and  it  may  be  safely  concluded  that  in  the  series  of 
engagements,  his  total  loss  was  not  less  than  twenty-five  thousand. 

He  had  sustained  a  most  decisive  defeat.  It  was  a  dark  hour  for  the 
Northern  people.  Elated  by  Pope's  false  dispatches  from  the  field,  they 
had  been  counting  on  a  splendid  victory,  and  few  were  prepared  to  hear 
of  the  retreat  and  total  demoralization  of  the  army  in  three  days.  Now 
the  war  was  transferred  from  the  gates  of  Richmond  to  those  of  Washing 
ton.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Government  in  the  latter  city  attempted  to 
misrepresent  the  situation,  and  to  support  Pope's  ludicrous  claim  that  he 
was  a  victor.  Such  a  claim  was  actually  made  by  Pope  even  after  he  had 
'been  driven  to  Centreville ;  and  the  correspondence  on  that  occasion  be 
tween  him  and  Halleck  might  be  taken  as  a  burlesque  on  Yankee  official 
dispatches,  if  the  originals  did  not  exist  in  Washington.  On  the  night  of 
the  30th  of  August,  Pope,  at  Centreville,  had  dispatched  to  Halleck,  at 
Washington  :  "  The  enemy  is  badly  whipped,  and  we  shall  do  well  enough. 
Do  not  be  uneasy.  We  will  hold  our  own  here.  We  have  delayed  the 

*  Gen.  Kearney  met  his  death  in  a  singular  manner.  He  was  out  reconnoitering,  when  he  sud 
denly  came  upon  a  Georgia  regiment.  Perceiving  danger,  he  shouted,  "  Don't  fire — I'm  a  friend ! " 
but  instantly  wheeled  his  horse  round,  and,  lying  flat  down  upon  the  animal,  had  escaped  many 
bullets,  when  one  struck  him  at  the  bottom  of  the  spine,  and,  ranging  upwards,  killed  him  almost 
instantly. 


310  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

enemy  as  long  as  possible  without  losing  the  army.  We  have  damaged 
him  heavily,  and  I  think  the  army  entitled  to  the  gratitude  of  the  coun 
try"  And  Halleck  replied  :  "  My  dear  General,  you  have  done  nobly." 
But  the  Northern  public  was  in  no  humour  to  join  in  the  congratulation, 
or  to  be  amused  by  such  stuff  in  official  dispatches.  A  terrible  situation 
was  before  their  eyes.  The  Confederates  had  won  the  crowning  victory 
of  the  campaign  in  Virginia  ;  they  would  certainly  attempt  a  new  adven 
ture  ;  and  so  greatly  had  they  risen  in  the  opinion  of  their  enemies,  that 
no  project  was  thought  too  extravagant,  or  enterprise  too  daring,  for  the 
troops  of  Lee  and  Jackson. 

The  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy  had  been  rapid,  deci 
sive,  and  brilliant.  The  armies  of  Gens.  McClellan  and  Pope  had  now 
been  brought  back  to  the  point  from  which  they  set  out  on  the  campaigns 
of  the  spring  and  summer.  The  objects  of  those  campaigns  had  been  frus 
trated,  and  the  designs  of  the  enemy  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina,  and 
in  Western  Virginia,  thwarted  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  main  body  of  his 
forces  from  those  regions.  Northeastern  Virginia  was  freed  from  the  pres 
ence  of  Federal  soldiers  up  to  the  entrenchments  of  Washington,  and  as 
Lee's  army  marched  towards  Leesburg,  information  was  received  that  the 
troops  which  had  occupied  Winchester  had  retired  to  Harper's  Ferry  and 
Martinsburg. 

The  war  was  thus  transferred  from  the  interiour  to  the  frontier ;  the 
supplies  of  rich  and  productive  districts  were  made  accessible  to  our 
armies ;  our  forces  were  advancing  upon  the  lines  of  the  Potomac  with 
increased  numbers,  improved  organization,  and  the  prestige  of  victory ; 
and  the  Northern  public,  which,  a  little  more  than  two  months  ago,  was 
expecting  the  fall  of  Eichmond  and  the  surrender  of  the  Confederate  cause, 
now  trembled  for  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio,  and  contemplated  the  probabili 
ty  of  the  Confederate  occupation  of  Washington  city. 

A  large  majority  of  the  Southern  people  had  long  been  in  favour  of 
transferring  the  war  to  the  enemy's  country  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment.  Their  own  experiences  of  the  rigour  of  the  war  made  them 
naturally  anxious  to  visit  its  hardships  and  penalties  upon  the  Northern 
people  in  their  own  homes  ;  it  was  declared  that  it  was  necessary  to  give 
the  enemy  some  other  realization  of  the  war  than  that  of  an  immense 
money  job,  in  which  many  profited ;  and  military  science  was  adduced  to 
explain  that  the  offensive  was  the  proper  character  to  give  to  every  war, 
and  that  the  ulterior  design  to  take  it  should  be  the  end  of  all  the  actions 
of  the  belligerents. 

On  the  3d  September,  Gen.  Lee's  army  moved  towards  Leesburg,  and 
it  was  soon  understood  that  he  designed  crossing  the  Upper  Potomac,  and 
transferring  hostilities  to  the  soil  of  Maryland.  But  in  this  first  experi 
ment  of  Confederate  invasion,  it  must  be  remarked  that  Gen.  Lee's  designs 


INVASION   OF    MARYLAND.  311 

and  expectations  were  much  more  moderate  than  those  commonly  enter 
tained  by  the  Confederate  public.  He  did  not  desire  to  permit  the  season 
for  active  operations  to  pass  without  endeavouring  to  inflict  further  injury 
upon  the  enemy ;  and  as  the  works  around  Washington  and  Alexandria 
were  too  strong  to  be  attacked,  it  was  decided  to  find  a  new  field  of  opera 
tions  across  the  Potomac,  somewhere  between  the  Blue  Ridge  and  the 
Federal  capital. 

When  Lee  crossed  the  Potomac,  his  army  still  continued  to  be  divided 
into  three  commands — viz.,  the  corps  of  Gen.  Jackson,  consisting  of  the 
divisions  of  Gens.  A.  P.  Hill,  Ewell,  and  his  own  division  ;  and  that  of 
Gen.  Longstreet,  composed  of  the  divisions  of  Gens.  McLaws,  Walker, 
Anderson,  and  Hood ;  and  a  division  under  Gen.  D.  II.  Hill,  which  usually 
acted  independently  of  either  of  the  generals  commanding  corps.  The 
cavalry,  under  Gen.  Stuart,  continued  to  cover  the  advance  of  the  army. 
The  scene  of  operations  selected  was  the  country  between  Washington  and 
the  range  of  hills  bearing  the  name  of  South  Mountain,  and  forming  a 
continuation  of  the  chain  of  the  Blue  Ridge  on  the  northern  side  of  the 
Potomac. 

On  the  5th  September  the  army  crossed  the  fords  of  the  Potomac,  and 
on  the  6th  Jackson's  corps  entered  Frederick  City  (Maryland),  situated  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Monocacy  River,  a  tributary  of  the  Potomac.  The 
divisions  of  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  followed  Jackson's  corps  across  the 
Potomac,  and  the  line  of  the  Monocacy  River  was  for  a  short  time  occu 
pied  by  the  Confederate  forces. 

At  Frederick,  Gen.  Lee  issued  the  following  proclamation  to  the  peo 
ple  of  Maryland,  to  explain  the  reasons  that  had  induced  him  to  enter 
their  territory,  and  to  reassure  their  supposed  preference  for  the  Confed 
erate  cause : 


"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA, 

"Near  FKEDEUICK,  Monday,  Sept.  8th,  1862. 

"  To  THE  PEOPLE  OF  MAEYLAND  : 

"  It  is  right  that  you  should  know  the  purpose  that  has  brought  the  army  under  my 
command  within  the  limits  of  your  State,  so  far  as  that  purpose  concerns  yourselves. 
The  people  of  the  Confederate  States  have  long  watched  with  the  deepest  sympathy  the 
wrongs  and  outrages  that  have  been  inflicted  upon  the  citizens  of  a  commonwealth  allied 
to  the  States  of  the  South  by  the  strongest  social,  political,  and  commercial  ties,  and  re 
duced  to  the  condition  of  a  conquered  province.  Under  the  pretence  of  supporting  the 
Constitution,  but  in  violation  of  its  most  valuable  provisions,  your  citizens  have  been 
arrested  and  imprisoned,  upon  no  charge,  and  contrary  to  all  the  forms  of  law.  A  faith 
ful  and  manly  protest  against  this  outrage,  made  by  an  illustrious  Marylander,  to  whom, 
in  tetter  days,  no  citizen  appealed  for  right  in  vain,  was  treated  with  contempt  and 
scorn.  The  Government  of  your  chief  city  has  been  usurped  by  armed  strangers  ;  your 
Legislature  has  been  dissolved  by  the  unlawful  arrest  of  its  members  ;  freedom  of  speech 
and  of  the  press  has  been  suppressed  ;  words  have  been  declared  ofiences  by  an  arbitrary 


312  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

• 

decree  of  the  Federal  Executive,  and  citizens  ordered  to  be  tried  by  military  commissions 
for  what  they  may  dare  to  speak. 

"Believing  that  the  people  of  Maryland  possess  a  spirit  too  lofty  to  submit  to  such  a 
Government,  the  people  of  the  South  have  long  wished  to  aid  you  in  throwing  off  this 
foreign  yoke,  to  enable  you  again  to  enjoy  the  inalienable  rights  of  freemen,  and  restore 
the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  your  State.  In  obedience  to  this  wish,  our  army 
has  come  among  you,  and  is  prepared  to  assist  you  with  the  power  of  its  arms  in  regain 
ing  the  rights  of  which  you  have  been  so  unjustly  despoiled.  This,  citizens  of  Maryland, 
is  our  mission,  so  far  as  you  are  concerned.  No  restraint  upon  your  free  will  is  intend 
ed  ;  no  intimidation  will  be  allowed  within  the  limits  of  this  army,  at  least.  Mary- 
landers  shall  once  more  enjoy  their  ancient  freedom  of  thought  and  speech.  We  know 
no  enemies  among  you,  and  will  protect  all  of  you,  in  every  opinion.  It  is  for  you  to 
decide  your  destiny,  freely,  and  without  constraint.  This  army  will  respect  your  choice, 
whatever  it  may  be  ;  and  while  the  Southern  people  will  rejoice  to  welcome  you  to  your 
natural  position  among  them,  they  will  only  welcome  you  when  you  come  in  of  your 
own  free  wilL 

" R.  E.  LEE,  General  Commanding" 

The  response  of  the  people  of  Maryland  to  this  appeal  was  not  what 
Gen.  Lee  had  been  led  to  expect ;  it  was  equivocal,  timid,  inconsiderable. 
Instead  of  the  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  recruits  which  he  had  believed  he 
would  obtain  on  the  soil  of  Maryland,  he  found  the  people  there  content 
to  gaze  with  wonder  on  his  ragged  and  poorly-equipped  army,  but  with 
little  disposition  to  join  its  ranks.  It  is  true  that  he  had  penetrated  that 
part  of  the  State  which  was  not  well  affected  towards  the  South,  but  in 
close  neighbourhood  and  sympathy  with  Pennsylvania ;  and  that  whatever 
Southern  sympathy  there  might  be  in  Eastern  Maryland,  and  in  the  noble 
city  of  Baltimore,  it  could  scarcely  reach  him  when  it  was  held  back  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet,  and  suppressed  in  the  shadow  of  Federal  forts.  Fred 
erick  City,  indeed,  was  not  without  some  display  of  welcome.  But  expres 
sions  of  confidence  and  joy  appeared  to  have  been  lost  in  the  one  prevail 
ing  sentiment  of  wonder  that  the  ragged  men,  stained  with  rain,  and  dust, 
and  dirt,  so  devoid  of  all  the  pomp  of  war,  so  unlike  what  they  had  been 
accustomed  to  see  of  soldiers,  could  be  the  army  which  had  defeated  in  so 
many  engagements  the  apparently  splendid  troops  of  the  North,  and  which 
had  been  heralded  by  imagination  as  a  shining  host,  bearing  aloft  the 
emblem  of  victory,  and  kindling  in  the  breast  of  the  spectator  the  passion 
for  glory.* 

*  The  correspondent  of  a  Northern  journal  thus  writes  of  the  appearance  of  the  famous  Jackson 
and  the  troops  he  led  into  Maryland  : 

"  Old  Stonewall  was  the  observed  of  all  observers.  He  was  dressed  in  the  coarsest  kind  of  home 
spun,  seedy  and  dirty  at  that ;  wore  an  old  hat  which  any  Northern  beggar  would  consider  an  insult 
to  have  offered  him  ;  and  in  his  general  appearance  was  in  no  respect  to  be  distinguished  from  the 
•mongrel,  bare-footed  crew  who  followed  his  fortunes.  I  had  heard  much  of  the  decayed  appearance 
of  the  rebel  soldiers,  but  such  a  looking  crowd !  Ireland  in  her  worst  straits  could  present  no  paral 
lel  ;  and  yet  they  glory  in  their  shame  !  " 


313 


It  had  been  supposed  by  Gen.  Lee  that  the  advance  upon  Frederick 
would  lead  to  the  evacuation  of  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry,  thus 
opening  the  line  of  communication  through  the  valley.  This  not  having 
occurred,  it  became  necessary  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  those  positions, 
before  concentrating  the  army  west  of  the  mountains.  To  accomplish  this 
with  the  least  delay,  Gen.  Jackson  was  directed  to  proceed  with  his  com 
mand  to  Martirisburg,  and,  after  driving  the  enemy  from  that  place,  to 
move  down  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac  upon  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  the  14th  of  September  Gen.  Jackson  had  succeeded  in  investing 
Harper's  Ferry,  with  its  garrison  of  nearly  thirteen  thousand  men,  on 
three  sides.  A  division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  under  McLaws,  had  been 
sent  to  attack  and  shut  it  up  on  the  Maryland  side,  and  now  occupied  the 
fertile  tract  of  country  which  is  enclosed  by  the  continuation  of  the  Mary 
land  Heights  and  the  South  Mountain  spur  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  two 
ranges  run  nearly  parallel  for  a  little  distance  from  the  river,  with  an  in 
tervening  space  of  about  two  miles  in  breadth,  but  the  South  Mountain 
branches  off  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Boonsboro',  forming  what  is  called 
the  "  Pleasant  Yalley." 

But  at  this  time  occurred  a  most  critical  movement  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  originating  in  one  of  those  little  accidents  which  sometimes  discon 
certs  the  schemes  of  the  greatest  commanders.  After  the  defeat  of  Pope, 
McClellan  had  again  been  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Federal  armies  in  and 
around  Washington.  He  was  evidently  at  a  loss  to  understand  Lee's 
movements  ;  he  remained  inactive  for  several  valuable  days  ;  and  he  was 
restrained  by  President  Lincoln's  fears,  who  was  anxious  lest  Gen.  Lee, 
having,  by  a  feint  of  advance  into  Maryland,  drawn  the  army  from  Wash 
ington,  should  turn  around  and  capture  the  city  by  a  coup  de  main.  But 
accident,  at  last,  revealed  to  him,  not  only  the  precise  nature  of  Lee's 
plans,  but  the  exact  disposition  of  his  forces. 


Of  the  curiosity  displayed  towards  Jackson,  a  Confederate  officer,  who  shared  the  campaign  in 
Maryland,  gives  the  following  amusing  account : 

"  Crowds  were  continually  hanging  round  his  headquarters,  and  peeping  through  the  windows,  as 
if  anxious  to  catch  him  at  his  "  incantations."  Others,  again,  actually  thought  that  he  was  contin 
ually  praying,  and  imagined  that  angelic  spirits  were  his  companions  and  counsellors ;  and  it  was  not 
until  the  great  man  had  mounted  his  old  horse,  and  frequently  aired  himself  in  the  streets,  that  many 
began  to  think  him  less  than  supernatural.  His  shabby  attire  and  unpretending  deportment  quite 
disappointed  the  many  who  expected  to  see  a  great  display  of  gold  lace  and  feathers  ;  and  when  he 
ordered  his  guards  to  clear  his  quarters  of  idle  crowds,  many  went  away  muttering,  '  Oh !  he's  no 
great  shakes  after  all ! ' " 


314  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

A  copy  of  the  order  directing  the  movement  of  the  army  from  Frede 
rick  had  been  sent  to  D.  H.  Hill ;  and  this  vain  and  petulant  officer,  in  a 
moment  of  passion,  had  thrown  the  paper  on  the  ground.  It  was  picked 
up  by  a  Federal  soldier,  and  McClellan  thus  strangely  became  possessed 
of  the  exact  detail  of  his  adversary's  plan  of  operations. 

His  first  thought  was  to  relieve  Harper's  Ferry.  He  immediately 
began  to  push  forward  rapidly,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  13th  was 
reported  approaching  the  pass  in  South  Mountain  on  the  Boonesboro'  and 
Frederick  road.  By  penetrating  the  mountains  at  this  point,  he  would 
reach  the  rear  of  McLaws,  and  be  enabled  to  relieve  the  garrison  at  Har 
per's  Ferry.  To  prevent  this,  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill  was  directed  to  guard  the 
Boonesboro'  Gap,  and  Lorigstreet  ordered  to  march  from  Hagerstown  to  his 
support. 

The  small  command  of  Gen.  Hill  repelled  the  repeated  assaults  of  the 
Federal  army,  and  held  it  in  check  for  five  hours.  Several  attacks  on  the 
centre  were  gallantly  repulsed  by  Colquitt's  brigade,  and  Rodes,  on  the 
left,  maintained  his  position  against  heavy  odds  with  the  utmost  tenacity. 
Longstreet,  leaving  one  brigade  at  Hagerstown,  had  hurried  to  the  assist 
ance  of  Hill,  and  readied  the  scene  of  action  between  three  and  four,  p.  M. 
His  troops,  much  exhausted  by  a  long,  rapid  march  and  the  heat  of  the 
day,  were  disposed  on  both  sides  of  the  turnpike.  The  battle  continued 
with  great  animation  until  night.  On  the  south  of  the  turnpike,  the  ene 
my  was  driven  back  some  distance,  and  his  attack  on  the  centre  repulsed 
with  loss.  His  great  superiourity  of  numbers  enabled  him  to  extend  beyond 
both  of  the  Confederate  flanks.  By  this  means  he  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  summit  of  the  mountain,  beyond  our  left,  and  pressing  heavily  from 
that  direction,  gradually  forced  our  troops  back,  after  an  obstinate  resist 
ance.  Darkness  put  an  end  to  the  contest.  The  effort  to  force  the  pass 
age  of  the  mountains  had  failed,  but  it  was  manifest  that,  without  rein 
forcements,  we  could  not  hazard  a  renewal  of  the  engagement,  as  the 
enemy  could  easily  turn  either  flank.  Information  was  also  received  that 
another  large  body  of  Federal  troops  had,  during  the  afternoon,  forced 
their  way  through  Crampton's  Gap,  only  five  miles  in  rear  of  McLaws. 
Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  determined  by  Gen.  Lee  to  retire  to 
Sharpsburg,  where  he  would  be  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy, 
should  he  move  against  McLaws,  and  where  he  could  more  readily  unite 
with  the  rest  of  the  army. 

The  resistance  that  had  been  offered  to  the  enemy  at  Boonesboro', 
secured  sufficient  time  to  enable  Gen.  Jackson  to  complete  the  reduction 
of  Harper's  Ferry.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  when  he  found  that  the 
troops  of  Walker  and  McLaws  were  in  position  to  cooperate  in  the  attack, 
he  ordered  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  to  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank,  and  enter  Har 
per's  Ferry.  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  observing  a  hill  on  the  enemy's  extreme  left, 


BATTLE    OF   SHARPSBURG.  315 

occupied  by  infantry  without  artillery,  and  protected  only  by  abattis  of 
felled  timber,  directed  Gen.  Fender  with  his  own  brigade,  and  those  of 
Archer  and  Col.  Brockenbrough,  to  seize  the  crest,  which  was  done  with 
slight  resistance.  At  the  same  time  he  ordered  Gens.  Branch  and  Gregg 
to  march  along  the  Shenandoah,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  ravines  in 
tersecting  its  steep  banks,  to  establish  themselves  on  the  plain  to  the  left 
and  rear  of  the  enemy's  works.  This  was  accomplished  during  the  night. 
Under  the  direction  of  Col.  Crutchfield,  Gen.  Jackson's  chief  of  artillery, 
ten  guns,  belonging  to  Ewell's  division,  were  posted  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Shenandoah,  so  as  to  enfilade  the  enemy's  entrenchments  on  Bolivar 
Heights,  and  take  his  nearest  and  most  formidable  works  in  reverse.  Gen. 
McLaws,  in  the  meantime,  made  his  preparations  to  prevent  the  force 
which  had  penetrated  at  Crampton's  Gap  from  coming  to  the  relief  of  the 
garrison. 

The  attack  on  the  garrison  began  at  dawn.  A  rapid  and  vigorous  fire 
was  opened  from  the  batteries  of  Gen.  Jackson  and  those  on  Maryland 
and  Loudoun  Heights.  In  about  two  hours  the  garrison  surrendered. 
Seventy-three  pieces  of  artillery,  about  thirteen  thousand  small  arms,  and 
a  large  quantity  of  military  stores,  fell  into  our  hands. 

Leaving  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Federal  troops, 
and  secure  the  captured  property,  Gen.  Jackson,  with  his  two  other  divi 
sions,  set  out  at  once  for  Sharpsburg,  ordering  Gens.  McLaws  and  Walker 
to  follow  without  delay.  Gen.  Jackson  arrived  early  on  the  16th,  and 
Gen.  Walker  came  up  in  the  afternoon.  The  progress  of  McLaws  was 
slow,  and  he  did  not  reach  the  battle-field  at  Sharpsburg,  until  some  time 
after  the  engagement  of  the  17th  began. 


BATTLE    OF    SHARPSBURG. 

Gen.  Lee  was  now  prepared  to  deliver  battle,  and  to  meet  the  mighty 
Federal  host  with  about  forty  thousand  men.  McClellan's  force  was  cer 
tainly  not  less  than  ninety  thousand  men.  We  have  placed  here  the  own 
official  estimate  of  each  commander  of  the  strength  of  his  respective  army, 
as  the  justest  exhibition  of  the  disproportion  of  the  forces  joined  in  the 
battle  of  Sharpsburg. 

The  commands  of  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  occupied  a  position  along 
the  range  of  hills  between  the  town  and  the  Antietam,  nearly  parallel  to 
the  course  of  that  stream  ;  Longstreet  on  the  right  of  the  road  to  Boones- 
boro',  and  Hill  on  the  left.  The  extreme  left  was  held  by  Jackson,  his 
right  resting  upon  the  Hagerstown  road,  and  his  left  extending  towards 
the  Potomac. 

As  the  sun  of  the  17th  September  rose,  the  batteries  on  either  side  opened 


316  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

fire.  The  heaviest  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  was  directed  against  our 
left,  and,  under  cover  of  it,  a  large  force  of  infantry  attacked  Gen.  Jack 
son.  This  heroic  commander  held  the  strongest  part  of  a  line  which  ex 
tended  over  four  miles.  The  advance  of  the  enemy  was  met  by  his  troops 
with  the  utmost  resolution,  and  for  several  hours  the  conflict  raged  with 
great  fury  and  alternate  success.  Hood's  two  brigades  were  moved  to  the 
support  of  Jackson.  The  enemy's  lines  were  broken  and  forced  back  ;  but 
fresh  numbers  advanced  to  their  support,  and  the  Federals  began  to  gain 
ground.  The  desperate  resistance  they  encountered,  however,  delayed 
their  progress  until  the  troops  of  Gen.  McLaws  arrived,  and  those  of  Gen. 
Walker  could  be  brought  from  the  right.  With  these  timely  reinforce 
ments  the  tide  changed ;  the  Confederates  again  advanced,  and  the  enemy 
were  driven  back  in  confusion,  closely  followed  by  our  troops,  beyond  the 
position  occupied  at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement.  The  enemy  re 
newed  the  assault  on  our  left  several  times,  but  was  repulsed  with  loss. 
He  finally  ceased  to  advance  his  infantry,  and  for  several  hours  kept  up  a 
furious  fire  from  his  numerous  batteries,  under  which  our  troops  held  their 
position  with  great  coolness  and  courage. 

The  attack  on  our  left  was  speedily  followed  by  one  in  heavy  force  on 
the  centre.  This  was  met  by  part  of  Walker's  division,  and  the  brigades 
of  G.  B.  Anderson  and  Rodes,  of  D.  H.  Hill's  command,  assisted  by  a  few 
pieces  of  artillery.  The  enemy  was  repulsed,  and  retired  behind  the  crest 
of  a  hill,  from  which  they  kept  up  a  desultory  fire. 

Gen.  R.  H.  Anderson's  division  came  to  Hill's  support,  and  formed  in 
rear  of  his  line.  At  this  time,  by  a  mistake  of  orders,  Gen.  Rodes'  brigade 
was  withdrawn  from  its  position.  The  enemy  immediately  pressed  through 
the  gap  thus  created,  and  G.  B.  Anderson's  brigade  was  broken,  and  re 
tired.  The  heavy  masses  of  the  enemy  again  moved  forward,  being  op 
posed  only  by  four  pieces  of  artillery,  supported  by  a  few  hundreds  of 
men,  belonging  to  different  brigades.  The  firm  front  presented  by  this 
small  force,  and  the  well  directed  fire  of  the  artillery,  under  Captain  Mil 
ler,  of  the  Washington  Artillery,  and  Captain  Boyce's  South  Carolina 
battery,  checked  the  progress  of  the  enemy,  and  in  about  an  hour  and  a 
half  he  retired. 

While  the  attack  on  the  centre  and  left  was  in  progress,  the  enemy 
made  repeated  efforts  to  force  the  passage  of  the  bridge  over  the  Antietam, 
opposite  the  right  wing  of  Gen.  Longstreet,  commanded  by  Brig.-Gen.  D. 
R.  Jones.  This  bridge  was  defended  by  Gen.  Toombs  with  two  regiments 
of  his  brigade.  Gen.  Toombs'  small  command  repulsed  five  different 
assaults,  made  by  a  greatly  superiour  force,  and  maintained  its  position 
with  distinguished  gallantry. 

In  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  began  to  extend  his  line,  as  if  to  cross  the 
Antietam  below  the  bridge,  and  at  four,  p.  M.,  Toombs'  regiments  retired 


BATTLE    OF   8HARPSBTJEG.  317 

from  the  position  they  had  so  bravely  held.  The  enemy  immediately 
crossed  the  bridge  in  large  numbers,  and  advanced  against  Gen.  Jones, 
who  held  the  crest  with  less  than  two  thousand  men.  After  a  determined 
and  brave  resistance,  he  was  forced  to  give  way,  and  the  enemy  gained  the 
summit. 

Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  had  arrived  from  Harpers  Ferry,  having  left  that 
place  at  half-past  seven,  A.  M.  He  was  now  ordered  to  reinforce  Gen. 
Jones.  Hill's  batteries  were  thrown  forward,  and  united  their  fire  with 
those  of  Gen.  Jones.  The  progress  of  the  enemy  was  immediately  arrest 
ed,  and  his  line  began  to  waver.  At  this  moment  Gen.  Jones  ordered 
Toombs  to  charge  the  flank,  while  Archer,  supported  by  Branch  and  Gregg, 
moved  upon  the  front  of  the  Federal  line.  The  enemy  made  a  brief  resist 
ance,  then  broke,  and  retreated  in  confusion  towards  the  Antietam,  pur 
sued  by  the  troops  of  Hill  and  Jones,  until  he  reached  the  protection  of 
the  batteries  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river. 

It  was  now  nearly  dark,  and  the  enemy  had  massed  a  number  of  bat 
teries  to  sweep  the  approaches  to  the  Antietam,  on  the  opposite  side  of 
which  the  corps  of  Gen.  Porter,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  now  ap 
peared,  to  dispute  our  advance.  Our  troops  were  much  exhausted,  and 
greatly  reduced  in  numbers  by  fatigue  and  the  casualties  of  battle.  Under 
these  circumstances,  it  was  deemed  injudicious  to  push  our  advantage 
further,  in  the  face  of  fresh  troops  of  the  enemy  much  exceeding  the  num 
ber  of  our  own.  They  were  accordingly  recalled. 

This  repulse  of  the  enemy  ended  the  engagement.  The  sum  of  the 
day's  work  was,  that  every  effort  of  the  enemy  to  dislodge  us  from  our 
position  had  been  defeated  with  severe  loss.  The  conflict  had  been  pro 
tracted  and  sanguinary.  The  spoils  of  the  victory  were  not  great.  A  few 
prisoners  and  guns  were  taken.  As  for  our  loss,  it  had  indeed  been  heavy, 
amounting  to  not  less  than  two  thousand  killed  and  six  thousand  wounded  ; 
including  among  the  former,  two  general  officers,  Gens.  Branch  and  Starke. 
The  Federals,  having  been  the  assailants,  their  loss  was  yet  more  severe, 
reaching  the  terrible  aggregate  of  twelve  thousand  dead  or  disabled  men. 
Their  sacrifice  of  officers  had  been  serious.  Gens.  Mansfield  and  Reno 
were  killed,  and  twelve  other  Generals  were  among  the  wounded. 

Gen.  Lee  had  especial  reasons  for  not  renewing  the  battle  the  next  day. 
The  arduous  service  in  which  his  troops  had  been  engaged,  their  great 
privations  of  rest  and  food,  and  the  long  marches,  without  shoes,  over 
mountain  roads,  had  greatly  reduced  their  ranks  before  the  action  began  ; 
and  they  had  been  seriously  diminished  in  the  terrible  action  they  had  just 
fought.  Although  too  weak  to  assume  the  offensive,  Gen.  Lee  awaited 
without  apprehension  a  renewal  of  the  attack.  The  day  passed  without 
any  demonstration  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  who,  from  the  reports  re 
ceived,  was  expecting  the  arrival  of  reinforcements.  As  Gen.  Lee  could 


318  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

not  look  for  a  material  increase  of  strength,  and  the  enemy's  numbers  could 
be  largely  and  rapidly  augmented,  it  was  not  thought  to  be  prudent  to  wait 
until  he  should  be  ready  again  to  offer  battle.  During  the  night  of  the 
18th  September,  his  army  was  accordingly  withdrawn  to  the  south  side 
of  the  Potomac,  crossing  near  Shepherdstown  without  loss  or  molestation. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  by  what  successive  steps  the  North  constructed 
the  pretence  of  a  victory  at  Sharpsburg.  McClellan  never  claimed  a  vic 
tory  until  assured  of  Lee's  retreat  into  Virginia.  On  the  19th,  he  tele 
graphed  to  Washington  :  "  I  do  not  know  if  the  enemy  is  falling  back  to 
an  interiour  position,  or  recrossing  the  river.  We  may  safely  claim  the  vic 
tory  as  ours."  He  did  not  assert  this  until  more  than  thirty  hours  had 
elapsed  subsequent  to  the  engagement  at  Sharpsburg !  Some  few  hours 
after  the  above  telegram,  he  consoled  the  authorities  at  Washington  by 
saying  :  "  Our  victory  is  complete  !  The  enemy  is  driven  back  into  Vir 
ginia.  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  are  now  safe  !  " 

If  McClellan  was  under  the  impression  that  he  had  won  a  victory,  he 
showed  but  little  disposition  to  improve  it,  or  to  gather  its  fruits.  He  at 
tempted  no  pursuit ;  and  when,  some  days  later,  a  force  he  had  thrown 
across  the  Potomac  was  dislodged  by  an  attack  of  A.  P.  Hill's  division, 'he 
wrote  to  Washington  asking  for  reinforcements  ;  and  on  the  27th  Septem 
ber  renewed  the  application,  stating  his  purpose  to  be  to  hold  the  army 
where  it  was,  and  to  attack  Lee,  should  he  attempt  to  recross  into  Mary 
land.  Meanwhile  the  Confederate  army  moved  leisurely  towards  Mar- 
tinsburg,  and  remained  in  the  vicinity  of  Bunker  Hill  and  Winchester,  to 
recruit  after  a  campaign  which  has  few  parallels  in  history  for  active  ope 
ration  and  brilliant  results. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 


THE  WESTERS   THEATKE    OF    THE  WAR. — VALLEY    OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI. — EVACUATION  OF 

OOEINTH. IMPORTANT  OBJECTS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. ITS  SUCCESS. THE  HALLECK-POPE 

DISPATCH. — AN  ENORMOUS  FALSEHOOD. — GEN.  BEAUREGARD's  COMMENTS  ON  IT. — CAPTURE 
OF  MEMPHIS. — AN  UNEQUAL  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIVER. — BOMBARDMENT  OF  VICKSBURG. — 
GREAT  IMPORTANCE  OF  THIS  POINT. — PREPARATIONS  FOR  ITS  DEFENCE  BY  VAN  DORN. — 
THE  IRON-CLAD  ARKANSAS. SHE  RUNS  THE  GAUNTLET  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  FLEET. THRILL 
ING  SCENE  OF  THE  ADVENTURE. FAILURE  OF  THE  FIRST  ATTEMPT  OF  THE  ENEMY  UPON 

VICKSBURG. — ENGAGEMENT  AT  BATON  EOUGE. — SUCCESS  OF  BRECKlNRIDGE's  ATTACK. — 

HE  WAITS  FOR  THE  IRON-CLAD  ARKANSAS. SHE  BECOMES  UNMANAGEABLE  AND  IS  FIRED 

BY  HER  CREW. — WITHDRAWAL  OF  BRECKINRIDGE  FROM  BATON  ROUGE. — CONFEDERATE 
OCCUPATION  OF  PORT  HUDSON. — THE  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN. — GEN.  BRAGG  IN  COMMAND 
OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY  IN  THE  WEST. — HOW  GEN.  BEAUREGARD  WAS  RETIRED. — 
BRAGG'S  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  KENTUCKY. — MORGAN'S  RAID. — DISPOSITION  OF 

THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  WEST  OF  THE  ALLEGHANY  MOUNTAINS. CO-OPERATION  OF  KIRBY 

SMITH  WITH  BRAGG'S  COLUMN. — BATTLE  OF  RICHMOND. — KIRBY  SMITH  IN  A  POSITION 
TO  THREATEN  BOTH  CINCINNATI  AND  LOUISVILLE. — BRAGG5S  MOVEMENT  TO  INTERCEPT 

BUELL. THE  LATTER  CONCENTRATING  AT  BOWLING  GREEN. GREAT  SUCCESS  OF  BRAGG'S 

MOVEMENT  SO  FAR HIS   BOASTFUL   DISPATCH  TO  RICHMOND.— HIS  POLITICAL  OBJECT 

IN   INVADING  KENTUCKY. HIS   PROCLAMATION    AT    GLASGOW. — SURRENDER    OF    THE 

FEDERAL  GARRISON  AT  MUMFORDSVILLE. — BRAGG5S  WHOLE  ARMY  BETWEEN  NASH 
VILLE  AND  LOUISVILLE. — HIS  SPLENDID  OPPORTUNITY. — HE  DOES  NOT  USE  IT. — HE 
PERMITS  BUELL  TO  PASS  TO  LOUISVILLE  WITHOUT  A  BATTLE. — HIS  WEAK  EXCUSE  FOR 

A  FATAL  ERROUR. THE  FEDERALS  NOW  ABLE  TO  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  KENTUCKY. 

— BRAGG'S  UNCERTAIN  MOVEMENTS. — HIS  DISARRANGED  PLAN  OF  BATTLE. — GEN.  FOLK'S 
DISOBEDIENCE  OF  ORDERS. BATTLE  OF  PERRY VILLE. BRAGG'S  UNFORTUNATE  DISTRIBU 
TION  OF  FORCES. MISAPPREHENSION  OF  KIRBY  SMITH. WITHERS'  DIVISION  NOT  IN 

THE  FIGHT. THE  ENEMY  DRIVEN. ARRIVAL  OF   ANOTHER  OF  HIS  CORPS  UPON  THE 

FIELD. BRAGG  RETIRES  UPON  BRYANTSVILLE.  —  HE  DETERMINES  TO  EVACUATE  KENTUCKY. 

— RETREAT   THROUGH   CUMBERLAND   GAP. DISAPPOINTMENT  AT  RICHMOND. — ERROURS 

OF  THE  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN. — HOW  FAR  IT  WAS  A  CONFEDERATE  SUCCESS. ITS  LARGE 

CAPTURES. NORTH  ALABAMA  AND  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE  REDEEMED. BRAGG  IN  FRONT 

OF  NASHVILLE. — OPERATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTHWEST.— BATTLE  OF  CORINTH. — MOVEMENTS 
OF  VAN  DORN  AND  PRICE. — THE  AFFAIR  OF  IUKA. — VAN  DORN's  REASONS  FOR  ATTACK 
ING  CORINTH. GALLANT  AND  IMPETUOUS  CHARGE  OF  PRICE'S  TROOPS. — THE  SECOND 

DAY'S  FIGHT. — MISMANAGEMENT  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  ENEMY'S  WORKS. — TERRIBLE 


320  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

SLAUGHTER  AT  COLLEGE  HILL. — THE  CONFEDERATES  REPULSED. — AFFAIR  ON  THE  HATCHIE 
EIVER. — VAN  DORN'S  RETREAT. — REVIEW  OF  THE  SUMMER  AND  AUTUMN  CAMPAIGNS  OJ 
1862. — GLORY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMS. — REFLECTION  OF  THE  LONDON  TIMES  ON  THE 
(I 


WHILE  the  events  we  have  related  in  the  two  preceding  chapters  were 
taking  place  in  Virginia  and  on  its  borders,  an  important  campaign  was 
occurring  in  the  country  west  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains,  and  in  the 
valley  of  the  Mississippi  River ;  and  while  Lee  entered  Maryland,  Bragg 
invaded  Kentucky,  threatening  the  line  of  the  Ohio,  thus  in  every  direction 
bringing  the  front  of  the  war  to  the  enemy's  own  territory.  But  before 
reaching  that  period  wherein  the  Confederate  arms  in  the  West  were 
carried  to  the  frontier,  as  by  a  parallel  movement  with  the  operations  in 
Virginia,  it  is  necessary  to  recount  a  number  of  preceding  events  in  the 
Western  theatres  of  the  war,  in  which  the  lights  of  victory  and  shadows 
of  defeat  were  strangely  mingled. 


EVACUATION   OF   CORINTH. 

At  the  last  point  of  our  narrative  of  operations  in  the  West,  Gen. 
Beauregard  was  holding  Corinth ;  an  important  strategic  position,  pro 
tecting  his  communications  by  the  two  railroads  intersecting  there.  The 
trans-Mississippi  campaign  being  considered  closed  for  some  time,  Price 
and  Yan  Dorn,  with  a  division  of  Missourians  and  some  Arkansas  troops, 
had  crossed  the  Mississippi  and  joined  Beauregard,  with  a  view  of  ope 
rating  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river.  It  was  soon  ascertained  that  the 
immense  forces  of  Grant  and  Buell,  combined  under  command  of  Halleck, 
were  slowly  advancing.  The  movement  of  the  enemy  threatened  Beau- 
regard's  left,  along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  railroad,  while  he  had  already 
pushed  along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  road,  camping  about  three 
miles  from  Corinth.  To  foil  the  design  of  the  enemy  ;  to  protect  his 
most  important  line  of  Southern  communication  ;  to  obtain  a  better 
position  to  fortify ;  and  to  secure  the  health  of  his  troops,  Gen.  Beau- 
regard  decided  to  evacuate  Corinth.  The  objects  of  the  movement  were 
all  important.  Our  main  railroad  communication  with  Richmond  via 
Chattanooga,  was  in  the  enemy's  possession,  and  the  only  line  of  com 
munication  we  now  had  with  the  Confederate  capital  was  the  devious 
one,  by  way  of  Mobile,  Alabama,  and  Georgia.  Corinth  was  inde 
fensible.  It  was  a  wretched  site  for  a  camp,  utterly  destitute  of  water, 
good  or  bad,  and  what  little  could  be  obtained,  was  scooped  up  from  the 
sand,  or  from  pools  fed  by  occasional  rains. 

The  evacuation  was  commenced  on  the  30th  of  May.     Remaining  in 


EVACUATION   OF   CORINTH.  321 

rear  of  the  Tuscnmbia  and  its  affluents,  some  six  miles  from  Corinth,  long 
enough  to  collect  stragglers,  Gen.  Beauregard  resumed  his  march,  con-, 
centrating  his  main  forces  at  Baldwin.  On  the  7th  of  June  he  left  Bald 
win,  it  offering  no  advantages  of  a  defensive  character,  and  assembled 
the  main  body  of  his  forces  at  Tupelo.  The  position  selected  was  an 
excellent  one  to  protect  the  south  branches  of  the  Mobile  and  New 
Orleans  railroads.  The  movement  of  Gen.  Beauregard  was  a  surprise 
to  the  enemy,  and  a  decided  success.  His  effective  force  did  not  exceed 
forty-seven  thousand  men  of  all  arms,  and  he  had  skilfully  avoided  attack 
from  an  enemy  superiour  in  numbers.  By  holding  Corinth,  he  had  gained 
time,  and  held  the  enemy  in  check  without  a  battle ;  and  by  retreating 
when  he  did,  he  out-generaled  Halleck,  rendered  him  powerless  to^move, 
and  saved  Mississippi  from  the  inroad  of  a  large  army,  which  would  have 
followed  him  into  the  interiour  at  an  earlier  season  of  the  year,  but  was 
'now  unable  to  do  so,  from  weakened  forces  and  the  great  heats.* 

Gen.  Halleck  attempted  to  break  the  news  of  his  discomfiture  by  a 
naming  official  despatch  to  Washington,  in  which  he  was  assisted  by 
Gen.  John  Pope,  then  acting  under  him,  to  one  of  the  most  monstrous 
falsehoods  of  the  war.  This  false  despatch  is  so  characteristic  of  the  Fed 
eral  method  in  dealing  with  the  facts  of  the  war,  that  :t  may  be  copied 
here  for  a  general  lesson  to  the  reader  : 

*  The  correspondent  of  a  Northern  journal  thus  betrays  the  disappointment  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  damage  to  his  expectations  and  plans  in  Beauregard's  evacuation  of  Corinth  : 

"I  went  all  over  the  tented  field  of  the  enemy — all  over  the  fortifications — all  over  the  town — 
talked  with  the  frank  druggist  and  the  sturdy  Irishman  that  had  worked  upon  the  railroad.  And  so 
do  I  write  what  I  saw  hi  grief,  mortification,  chagrin,  and  shame.  I  said  yesterday  :  '  I'll  write  no 
more  ;  others  may ;  I  can't.  Patriotism  will  not  let  me  write  what  I  have  seen,  and  can  swear  to.' 
When  I  write  such  words  as  I  am  sometimes  compelled  to,  if  I  write  at  all,  I  am  afraid  lest,  in  ex 
posing  military  imbecility,  I  shall  wound  and  damage  our  beautiful  commonwealth,  that  struggles  so 
tremendously  for  existence  and  perpetuity. 

"  But  I  do  religiously  believe  that  it  is  best  now  for  the  commonwealth  to  hear  and  heed  what  is 
bitter,  undisputed  fact — the  Confederate  strategy  since  the  battle  of  Shiloh  has  been  as  successful  as 
it  has  been  superiour.  Taking  the  enemy's  stand-point,  and  writing  when  and  where  I  do,  I  cannot 
possibly  imagine  how  it  could  have  been  more  eminent  for  perfection  and  success.  Taking  our 
stand-point — the  stand-point  of  the  Union's  hopes  and  Halleck's  fame— I  cannot  possibly  imagine 
how  it  could  have  been  more  mortifyingly  disastrous.  If  the  attack  at  Shiloh  was  a  surprise  to  Gen. 
Grant,  the  evacuation  of  Corinth  was  no  less  a  surprise  to  Gen.  Halleck.  If  the  one  ruined  Grant, 
the  other  has  laid  out  in  pallid  death  the  military  name  and  fame  of  Major-Gen.  Halleck. 

"  The  druggist  says  he  was  two  weeks  getting  away.  But  aside  from  such  testimony,  could  the 
army  of  Beauregard  be  removed  so  cleanly,  and  completely,  and  noiselessly,  during  a  night,  or  day 
and  night,  or  two  days  and  two  nights  ?  Did  it  require  the  tremendous  concussion  of  the  magazine 
explosion  to  get  into  our  ears — what  we  could  not  get  into  our  eyes — the  evacuation  ?  Why,  that 
was  the  last  act  of  the  mortifying  drama.  On  Friday  morning  we  went  in.  The  prisoners  that  we 
captured  amounted  to  about  four  hundred.  Four  hundred  !  Even  the  beggarly  picket  regiments 
and  light  artillery  that  fought  us  so  boldly,  got  away.  Those  that  we  caught  declare  that  they  were 
kept  in  ignorance  of  the  movements  at  Corinth,  and  were  as  much  surprised  at  the  evacuation  as 
ourselves.  Corinth  has  been  searched  in  vain  for  a  spiked  or  disabled  gun.  Shame  on  us,  what  a 
clean  piece  of  evacuation  it  was." 
21 


322  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

"HEADQUARTERS,  June  4, 1862. 

"  Gen.  Pope,  with  forty  thousand  men,  is  thirty  miles  south  of  Corinth,  pushing  the 
enemy  hard.  He  already  reports  ten  thousand  prisoners  and  deserters  from  the  enemy, 
and  fifteen  thousand  stand  of  arms  captured. 

"  Thousands  of  the  enemy  are  throwing  away  their  arras.  A  farmer  said,  that  when 
Beauregard  learned  that  Col.  Elliot  had  cut  the  railroad  on  his  line  of  retreat,  he  became 
frantic,  and  told  his  men  to  save  themselves  the  best  way  they  could. 

u  We  have  captured  nine  locomotives  and  a  number  of  cars.  One  of  the  former  is 
already  prepared,  and  is  running  to-day.  Several  more  will  be  in  running  order  in  two 
or  three  days.  The  result  is  all  I  could  possibly  desire. 

"  H.  W.  HALLEOK,  Major- General  Commanding." 


Gen.  Beauregard's  comments  on  the  above,  published  in  the  Mobile 
Register,  were  to  the  following  effect : 


"HEADQUARTERS,  "WESTERN  DEPABTMENT,  Jnne  17th. 

" GENTLEMEN:  My  attention  has  just  been  called  to  the  dispatch  of  Major-Gen.  Hal- 
leek,  commanding  the  enemy's  forces,  which,  coming  from  such  a  source,  is  most  remark 
able  in  one  respect — that  it  contains  as  many  misrepresentations  as  lines. 

"  Gen.  Pope  did  not  '  push  hard '  upon  me  with  forty  thousand  men  thirty  miles  from 
Corinth  on  the  4th  inst.,  for  my  troops  occupied  a  defensive  line  in  the  rear  of  '  Twenty 
Mile  Creek,'  less  than  twenty-five  miles  from  Corinth,  until  the  8th  inst.,  when  the  want 
of  good  water  induced  me  to  retire  at  my  leisure  to  a  better  position.  Moreover,  if  Gen. 
Pope  had  attempted,  at  any  time  during  the  retreat  from  Corinth,  to  push  hard  upon 
me,  I  would  have  given  him  such  a  lesson  as  would  have  checked  his  ardour ;  but  he 
was  careful  to  advance  only  after  my  troops  had  retired  from  each  successive  position. 

u  The  retreat  was  conducted  with  great  order  and  precision,  doing  much  credit  to  the 
officers  and  men  under  my  orders,  and  must  be  looked  upon,  in  every  respect,  by  the 
country,  as  equivalent  to  a  brilliant  victory. 

"  Gen.  Pope  must  certainly  have  dreamed  of  taking  ten  thousand  prisoners  and  fifteen 
thousand  stand  of  arms ;  for  we  positively  never  lost  them.  About  one  or  two  hundred 
stragglers  would  probably  cover  all  the  prisoners  he  took,  and  about  five  hundred  dam 
aged  muskets  is  all  the  arms  he  got.  These  belonged  to  a  convalescent  camp,  four  miles 
south  of  Corinth,  evacuated  during  the  night,  and  were  overlooked  on  account  of  the 
darkness.  The  actual  number  of  prisoners  taken  during  the  retreat  was  about  equal  on 
both  sides,  and  they  were  but  few. 

"  Major-Gen.  Halleck  must  be  a  very  credulous  man,  indeed,  to  believe  the  absurd 
story  of  '  that  farmer.'  He  ought  to  know  that  the  burning  of  two  or  more  cars  on  a 
railroad  is  not  sufficient  to  make  '  Beauregard  frantic  '  and  ridiculous,  especially  when  I 
expected  to  hear  every  moment  of  the  capture  of  the  marauding  party,  whose  departure 
from  Farmington  had  been  communicated  to  me  the  day  before,  and  I  had  given,  in  con 
sequence,  all  necessary  orders ;  but  a  part  of  my  forces  passed  Booneville  an  hour  before 
the  arrival  of  Colonel  Elliot's  command,  and  the  other  part  arrived  just  in  time  to  drive 
it  away  and  liberate  the  convalescents  captured ;  unfortunately,  however,  not  in  time  to 
save  four  of  the  sick,  who  were  barbarously  consumed  in  the  station-house.  Let  Col. 
Elliot's  name  descend  to  infamy  as  the  author  of  such  a  revolting  deed.  Gen.  Halleck 
did  not  capture  nine  locomotives.  It  was  only  by  the  accidental  destruction  of  a  bridge, 
before  some  trains  had  passed,  that  he  got  seven  engines  in  a  damaged  condition,  the  cars 
having  been  burned  by  my  orders. 


CAPTURE   OF   MEMPHIS.  323 

"  It  is,  in  fiict,  easy  to  see  how  little  the  enemy  respect  truth  and  justice  when  speak 
ing  of  their  military  operations,  especially  when,  through  inability  or  over-confidence, 
they  meet  with  deserved  failure. 

"If  the  result  be  all  he  desired,  it  can  be  said  that  Major-Gen.  Halleck  is  easily 
satisfied ;  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  his  Government  and  people  will  be  of  the  like 
opinion. 

"  I  attest  that  all  we  lost  at  Corinth  and  during  the  retreat  would  not  amount  to  one 
day's  expense  of  his  army.  G.  T.  BEAUEEGAED." 


CAPTURE   OF   MEMPHIS. 

A  few  days  after  Gen.  Beanregard's  movement  from  Corinth,  the  city 
of  Memphis  having  been  abandoned  by  the  Confederate  garrison  departing 
to  another  scene  of  action,  was  easily  captured  by  the  large  Federal  fleet 
in  the  Mississippi  River.  The  capture  was  made  on  the  6th  of  June. 
The  evacuation  of  Forts  Pillow  and  Randolph  had  taken  place  two  days 
before.  In  the  river  near  Memphis  was  a  small  fleet  of  Confederate  boats. 
It  consisted  of  the  General  Yan  Dorn,  (flag-ship,)  General  Price,  General 
Bragg,  Jeff.  Thompson,  General  Lovefl,  General  Beauregard,  Sumter,  and 
Little  Rebel,  all  under  the  command  of  Coin.  Montgomery.  Each  of  these 
boats  carried  an  armament  of  two  guns,  with  the  exception  of  the  Jeff. 
Thompson,  which  had  four. 

The  Federal  gunboats  consisted  of  the  following  :  the  gunboat  Benton, 
(flag-ship  of  Com.  Davis,)  mounting  fourteen  guns ;  gunboat  St.  Louis, 
thirteen  guns ;  gunboat  Mound  City,  thirteen  guns ;  gunboat  Louisville, 
thirteen  guns ;  gunboat  Cairo,  thirteen  guns ;  gunboat  Caronclelet,  thir 
teen  guns ;  three  mortar-boats,  and  twenty  rams  and  transports.  This 
overwhelming  force  advanced,  with  several  of  their  rams  in  front,  their 
iron-clad  gunboats  in  the  centre,  two  and  three  abreast,  and  their  mortar- 
boats  and  transports  bringing  up  their  rear. 

The  unequal  fight  lasted  but  a  few  hours.  The  Jeff.  Thompson,  Beau- 
regard,  Sumter,  and  Bragg  were  respectively  disabled,  run  ashore,  or  set 
on  fire,  their  crews  meanwhile  escaping  to  the  woods.  The  Jeff.  Thompson 
was  blown  up,  the  Beauregard  sunk  near  the  shore,  her  upper-works 
remaining  above  the  surface.  The  Sumter  and  Bragg  were  the  only 
boats  that  could  be  brought  off,  and  these  were  subsequently  anchored 
in  front  of  the  city,  with  the  odious  flag  of  the  invaders  flying  at  their 
mast-heads.  The  Confederate  loss  did  not  exceed  fifty  in  killed  and 
wounded,  and  one  hundred  prisoners.  On  the  boats  captured  and 
destroyed,  there  was  but  a  small  quantity  of  stores  and  munitions,  and 
everything  in  the  city  of  value  to  the  government  had  been  removed. 
Beyond  the  mere  fact  of  obtaining  possession  of  the  position,  the  victory 
of  the  enemy  was  a  barren  one. 


324:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 


BOMBARDMENT   OF    VICKSBURG. 

But  the  enemy  was  now  to  attempt  a  much  more  important  step 
towards  opening  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River — a  result  persis 
tently  demanded  by  the  Northwestern  States  as  the  price  of  their  con 
tributions  to  the  war,  and  their  support  of  the  Administration  at 
Washington. 

The  Confederates  had  been  prompt  to  perceive  the  great  importance 
of  Yicksburg ;  and  on  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  Gen.  Lovell  had  ordered 
a  detail  of  his  force  to  garrison  the  place  and  construct  works  for  its 
defence.  It  was  the  most  important  point  in  the  Yalley  of  the  Mississippi. 
Thousands  of  men,  supplies,  and  ?nateriel  were  continually  crossing  the 
river — much  of  our  provisions  for  the  armies  in  the  East  and  West  being 
derived  from  Texas,  parts  of  Louisiana,  and  Arkansas.  Could  the  Federals 
obtain  possession  of  Yicksburg,  all  the  agricultural  products  of  the  North 
ern  and  Western  States  would  pass  down  unmolested  to  the  Gulf ;  the 
enemy  would  gain  free  access  to  the  whole  river  front,  supply  themselves 
abundantly  with  cotton,  sugar,  molasses,  and  other  products,  disjoin  the 
east  and  west  Mississippi  States,  and,  having  the  Confederacy  fairly  on 
its  flanks,  could  operate  with  impunity  upon  numberless  points,  divide 
our  forces,  and  open  a  new  prospect  of  subjugation. 

When  in  the  summer  of  1862,  Gen.  Earl  Yan  Dorn  was  assigned  to 
the  defence  of  Yicksburg,  he  found  the  city  besieged  by  a  powerful  fleet 
of  war  vessels,  and  an  army.  Many  of  the  citizens  retired  to  the  interiour, 
while  the  Confederate  troops  marched  in,  and  pitched  their  tents  in  the 
valleys  and  on  the  hills  adjacent  in  convenient  position  to  support  batteries 
and  strike  assailants.  Breekinridge's  division  occupied  the  city.  Additional 
guns  were  brought  up  from  Mobile,  from  Richmond,  from  Columbus  and 
elsewhere,  and  put  in  battery,  preparatory  for  a  grand  trial  of  artillery 
with  the  enemy's  fleet. 

The  attacking  force  of  the  enemy  was  at  first  confined  to  Porter's  mortar 
fleet,  and  Farragut's  gunboats,  with  their  attendant  array  in  transports, 
which  had  ascended  the  river  from  New  Orleans.  The  evacuation  of  Fort 
Pillow,  and  the  fall  of  Memphis,  opened  the  new  danger  of  a  combination 
between  the  upper  and  lower  fleets  of  the  enemy.  The  junction  was 
effected  early  in  July,  and  thus  a  force  of  more  than  forty  gunboats, 
mortar-boats,  rams  and  transports  lay  in  menace  before  the  city.  On 
the  12th  of  July  it  opened  fire. 

While  the  enemy  had  been  completing  his  preparations  for  the  bom 
bardment  of  Yicksburg,  the  Confederates  had  been  engaged  in  a  well- 
masked  enterprise,  and  Com.  Lynch  having  improvised  a  ship-yard  near 


ENGAGEMENT  AT  BATON  EOUGE.  325 

Yazoo  City,  had  been  hard  at  work,  night  and  day,  fitting  out  a  ram, 
called  the  Arkansas.  At  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  Eiver,  a  raft  had  been 
built,  to  afford  some  sort  of  protection  to  the  fleet  of  river  passenger  and 
freight  boats,  that  had  escaped  from  New  Orleans,  and  were  now  concealed 
in  this  river,  and  to  put  bounds  to  the  enemy's  curiosity.  One  of  these 
vessels  was  razeed  by  Com.  Lynch,  and  the  construction  of  the  ungainly 
Arkansas  begun.  Four  large  guns  were  placed  aboard  ;  and  on  the  15th 
of  July,  Gen.  Van  Dorn  issued  an  order  to  prepare  her  for  immediate  and 
active  service,  it  being  intended  to  use  her  as  part  of  his  force  for  the 
relief  of  Vicksburg. 

In  the  early  morning  of  this  day,  this  rough  ungainly  vessel,  which  it 
was  anticipated  might  compete  with  the  deeds  of  the  famous  Virginia  in 
Hampton  Roads,  passed  through  the  raft  of  the  Yazoo,  and  commenced 
the  fearful  gauntlet  of  the  enemy's  vessels  drawn  up  in  parallel  lines  to 
receive  her  when  passing  the  channel  of  the  Mississippi  Kiver.  Frigates, 
rams,  gunboats — all  were  ready  to  annihilate  that  iron-clad  mass  of  timber 
slowly  floating  towards  them.  Presently  an  iron-clad  left  her  position, 
and  boldly  steaming  up  between  the  lines  of  dark  hulls,  opened  fire  at  a 
considerable  distance.  The  Arkansas  was  silent,  and  nothing  was  seen 
but  a  rush  of  steam  as  the  monster  slowly  entered  the  channel.  Once 
her  bow  gun  was  fired,  smashing  the  boiler  and  machinery  of  one  of  the 
enemy's  vessels.  A  few  moments  more,  and  a  terrific  fire  from  both  of  the 
enemy's  squadrons  was  poured  upon  the  strange  vessel,  which  appeared 
now  as  a  mass  of  sparks  floating  between  parallel  lines  of  curling  smoke. 
On  the  bluff  were  a  thousand  breathless  spectators  of  the  fearful  scene. 
The  Arkansas  moved  on.  Fighting  at  long  range,  the  Federal  fleet  slowly 
followed,  and  the  nearer  she  approached  the  bluff,  the  quicker  the  Arkansas 
fought.  At  last  finding  her  safe  under  the  Confederate  batteries,  the 
enemy  gave  up  the  chase,  and  amid  cheers  from  the  excited  spectators  on 
the  bluff  and  a  salvo  of  artillery,  the  Arkansas  slowly  turned  the  point 
and  was  moored  before  Vicksburg  ! 

With  the  failure  to  destroy  or  take  the  Arkansas,  the  siege  of  Vicks 
burg  practically  ended.  The  attack  on  the  batteries  soon  ceased,  and  the 
enemy,  baffled  and  enraged  by  an  unexpected,  determined  and  persistent 
defence,  vented  his  wrath  in  impotent  and  barbarian  effort  to  destroy  the 
city.  On  the  27th  of  July,  both  fleets  disappeared,  foiled  in  their  struggle 
to  reduce  the  place.  The  casualties  on  our  side,  during  the  entire  siege, 
were  twenty-two  killed  and  wounded.  Not  a  gun  was  dismounted,  and 
but  two  were  temporarily  disabled. 


ENGAGEMENT  AT  EATON  KOUGE. 

Satisfied  of  the  enemy's   disappearance  from  Vicksburg,  Gen.  Van 


326  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

Dorn  resolved  to  strike  a  blow  before  he  had  time  to  organize  and  mature 
a  new  scheme  of  assault.  The  Federals  held  Baton  Rouge,  the  capital  of 
Louisiana,  forty  miles  below  the  mouth  of  Red  River,  with  a  land  force  of 
about  three  thousand  five  hundred  men,  in  conjunction  with  four  or  five 
gunboats,  and  some  transports.  It  was  a  matter  of  great  necessity  to  us 
that  the  navigation  of  Red  River  should  be  opened  as  high  as  Yicksburg. 
Supplies,  much  needed,  existed  there,  difficult  to  be  obtained  from  any 
other  quarter,  and  strong  military  reasons  demanded  that  WQ  should  hold 
the  Mississippi  at  two  points,  to  facilitate  communications  and  co-operation 
between  Yan  Dorn's  district  and  the  trans-Mississippi  department.  The 
capture  of  Baton  Rouge,  and  the  forces  of  the  enemy  at  that  point,  would 
open  the  Mississippi,  secure  the  navigation  of  Red  River,  then  in  a  state 
of  blockade,  and  might  make  practicable  the  recapture  of  JSTew  Orleans. 

To  secure  these  objects,  orders  were  given  to  Gen.  Breckinridge  to 
move  upon  Baton  Rouge  with, a  force  of  five  thousand  men,  picked  from 
the  troops  at  Yicksburg,  and  there  was  added  to  his  command  the  effective 
force  of  Gen.  Ruggles,  then  at  Camp  Moore,  making  a  total  force  of  six 
thousand  men.  To  ensure  the  success  of  the  plan,  the  Arkansas  was  or 
dered  to  co-operate  with  the  land  force  by  a  simultaneous  attack  from  the 
river.  All  damages  sustained  by  the  Arkansas  from  the  fleets  of  the 
enemy  had  been  repaired,  and  when  she  left  the  wharf  at  Yicksburg  for 
Baton  Rouge,  she  was  deemed  to  be  as  formidable,  in  attack  or  defence,  as 
when  she  defied  a  fleet  of  forty  vessels  of  war,  many  of  them  iron-clads. 

By  epidemic  disease  the  land  force  under  Gen.  Breckinridge  was  re 
duced  to  less  than  three  thousand  effective  men,  within  the  period  of  ten 
days  after  he  reached  Camp  Moore.  Advised,  however,  by  telegram  every 
hour  of  the  progress  of  the  Arkansas  towards  Baton  Rouge,  and  counting 
on  her  co-operation,  Breckinridge,  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  August,  de 
termined  to  attack  the  enemy  with  his  whole  effective  force,  then  reduced 
to  about  two  thousand  five  hundred  men.  The  attack  was  gallantly  made ; 
and  the  enemy,  driven  from  all  his  positions,  was  forced  to  seek  protection 
under  the  cover  of  his  gunboats. 

Breckinridge  had  listened  in  vain  for  the  guns  of  the  Arkansas.  She 
never  reached  the  scene  of  contest.  After  arriving  within  a  short  distance 
of  Baton  Rouge,  in  ample  time  for  joint  action  at  the  appointed  hour  of 
attack,  she  had  suddenly  become  unmanageable,  from  a  failure  in  her 
machinery,  which  all  the  efforts  of  her  engineers  could  not  repair.  Lieut. 
Stevens,  her  commander,  moored  her  to  the  shore ;  and  on  the  cautious 
approach  of  the  enemy,  he  landed  her  crew,  cut  her  from  her  moorings, 
fired  her  with  his  own  hands,  and  turned  her  adrift  down  the  river.  With 
every  gun  shotted,  the  Confederate  flag  floating  from  her  prow,  and  not  a 
man  on  board,  the  Arkansas  bore  down  upon  the  enemy.  It  was  a  strange 
spectacle,  this  vessel,  abandoned  by  commander  and  crew,  and  dedicated 


THE  KENTUCKY  CAMPAIGN.  327 

to  sacrifice,  yet  fighting  a  battle  like  a  tiling  of  life.  Her  guns  were  dis 
charged  as  the  flames  reached  them,  and  when  her  last  shot  was  fired,  the 
explosion  of  her  magazine  ended  the  brief  career  of  the  Arkansas. 

Unable,  without  the  co-operation  of  this  vessel,  to  penetrate  the  cover 
of  the  enemy's  gunboats,  Gen.  Breckinridge  withdrew  his  troops  at  ten 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  He  had  fought  a  brilliant  action,  but  was  unable 
to  pursue  his  victory  further.  Our  casualties  amounted  to  four  hundred 
and  sixty-seven.  The  force  of  the  enemy  brought  into  action,  was  not  less 
than  forty-five  hundred  men.  We  had  eleven  pieces  of  field  artillery. 
They  brought  to  bear  on  us  not  less  than  eighteen  pieces,  exclusive  of  the 
guns  of  the  fleet.  In  one  respect  the  contrast  between  the  opposing  forces 
was  very  strking.  The  Federal  troops  were  well  clothed,  and  their  en 
campments  showed  the  presence  of  every  comfort  and  even  luxury.  Our 
men  had  little  transportation,  indifferent  food,  and  no  shelter.  Half  of 
them  had  no  coats,  and  hundreds  of  them  were  without  either  shoes  or 
socks  ;  yet  no  troops  ever  behaved  with  greater  gallantry,  and  even  reck 
less  audacity. 

Advised  of  the  result  of  Gen.  Breckinridge's  expedition,  Gen.  Yan  Dorn 
immediately  ordered  the  occupation  of  Port  Hudson,  a  point  selected  for 
its  eligibility  of  defence,  and  for  its  capacity  for  offensive  annoyance  of 
the  enemy,  established  batteries,  manned  them  with  experienced  gunners, 
and  guarded  them  by  an  adequate  supporting  force,  holding  Baton  Rouge, 
in  the  meanwhile,  in  menace.  The  effect  of  these  operations  was  the  evac 
uation  of  Baton  Rouge  by  the  enemy,  and  his  disappearance  from  the 
Mississippi  between  the  capital  of  Louisiana  and  Yicksburg.  The  results 
sought  by  the  movement  against  Baton  Rouge  were  thus,  to  a  great 
extent,  obtained.  The  Confederates  held  two  points  of  the  Mississippi- 
more  than  two  hundred  miles  of  distance  intervening — unmolested  by  the 
enemy,  and  closed  to  him.  The  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  River,  from 
the  mouth  of  Red  River  to  Yicksburg,  was  opened  to  our  commerce,  giving 
us  also  the  important  advantage  of  water  connection,  by  the  latter  river, 
with  the  most  important  portion  of  the  trans-Mississippi  region,  from  which 
indispensable  supplies  were  drawn. 


THE   KENTUCKY   CAMPAIGN. 

But  while  the  Confederate  situation  on  the  Mississippi  River  was  thus 
satisfactory,  Gen.  Bragg,  who  now  commanded  the  whole  Confederate 
army  of  the  West,  in  place  of  Gen.  Beauregard,  was  preparing  for  an  im 
portant  campaign,  the  object  of  which  was  to  relieve  Western  Tennessee 
and  Alabama  from  the  presence  of  the  enemy  by  an  advance  against  Ken 
tucky,  with  possibly  the  ultimate  object  of  capturing  and  holding  Louis- 


328  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ville  on  the  Ohio,  and  occupying  permanently  the.  eastern  portion  of  the 
State. 

In  the  lull  of  operations  incident  to  the  position  of  his  army  at  Tupelo, 
after  the  successful  evacuation  of  Corinth,  Gen.  Beauregard  had  sought  to 
recuperate  his  health  by  a  short  respite  from  duty.  He  turned  over  the 
command  to  Gen.  Bragg,  with  instructions  looking  to  the  preparation  of 
the  army  for  the  field  at  once  on  his  return,  which  he  anticipated  would 
be  in  three  weeks.  But  no  sooner  had  President  Davis  heard  of  this  step, 
than  he  telegraphed  Gen.  Bragg  to  assume  permanent  command — taking 
the  opportunity  to  inflict  upon  Gen.  Beauregard  a  mark  of  his  displeasure, 
and  in  fact  to  encourage  the  curious  report  in  Richmond  that  he  had  be 
come  insane,  and  was  no  longer  fitted  for  a  command. 

Gen.  Bragg's  expedition  was  preceded  by  extended  raids  of  Morgan  and 
Forrest  into  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  The  former,  who  had  at  first  at 
tracted  attention  as  a  captain  of  irregular  cavalry,  and  was  now  a  brigadier- 
general  in  the  Confederate  service,  in  the  month  of  July,  with  a  force  num 
bering  less  than  two  entire  regiments  of  cavalry,  penetrated  the  State  of 
Kentucky,  passed  through  seventeen  towns,  destroyed  millions  of  dollars 
worth  of  United  States  property,  and  returned  to  Tennessee  with  a  loss  in 
all  his  engagements  of  not  more  than  ninety  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing. 

The  campaign  of  Gen.  Bragg  was  to  take  place  amid  intricate  and 
formidable  combinations  of  the  enemy.  In  the  country  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghany  the  Federal  Government  had  prepared  an  extensive  programme  of 
operations.  In  the  south,  Gen.  Butler  occupied  JSTew  Orleans,  whilst 
Admirals  Farragut  and  Porter  guarded  the  Lower  Mississippi,  and  bom 
barded  Yicksburg.  Commanding  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  in  the  neigh 
bourhood  of  Corinth,  with  his  advance  as  far  south  as  Holly  Springs  and 
his  right  at  Memphis,  was  Gen.  Grant,  with  Gens.  Sherman,  Rosecrans, 
and  McClernand  under  his  command.  Further  east  wras  the  Federal 
Gen.  Mitchell,  between  Corinth  and  Chattanooga,  opposed  to  a  small  force 
under  Gen.  Adams ;  whilst  threatening  Eastern  Tennessee,  was  Buell's 
army,  and  occupying  Cumberland  Gap,  was  Gen.  Morgan. 

Early  in  August  four  divisions  of  Bragg's  command  were  concentrated 
near  Chattanooga,  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  artillery,  cavalry,  and 
baggage  train,  which  necessarily  moved  across  the  country  by  land.  A 
conference  was  held  here  with  Gen.  Kirby  Smith,  commanding  the  De^ 
partment  of  East  Tennessee  ;  and  it  was  soon  determined  that  all  his  force 
should  be  used  to  operate  upon  the  enemy's  left  at  Cumberland  Gap,  and 
he  was  requested  to  confer  with  Brig.-Gen.  Humphrey  Marshall,  command 
ing  in  Southwestern  Virginia,  with  whom  he  was  already  in  correspond 
ence,  to  secure  his  co-operation  also  in  the  movement. 

After  returning  to  Knoxville,  Gen.  Smith  asked  for  further  assistance  ; 


BATTLE   OF    RICHMOND.  329 

and  two  fine  brigades,  under  Brig.-Gen.  F.  R.  Cleburne  and  Col.  Preston 
Smith  were  sent  to  him,  in  addition  to  the  division  which  had  gone  from 
Tupelo.  The  remainder  of  Bragg's  immediate  command,  the  Army  of  the 
Mississippi,  divided  between  Maj.-Gen.  Polk  and  Hardee,  made  every 
preparation,  and  awaited  only  its  baggage  train  and  artillery  to  cross  the 
Tennessee  River,  and  enter  upon  its  arduous  and  perilous  campaign  over 
the  mountains  dividing  East  and  Middle  Tennessee. 

The  movement  of  the  artillery  and  wagons  across  the  mountain  region 
of  North  Alabama  having  been  successfully  accomplished,  late  in  August, 
Bragg  commenced  crossing  the  river  at  Chattanooga,  with  very  limited 
means.  The  enemy,  with  a  largely  superiour  force,  occupied  the  lines  of 
the  railroads  from  Decatur  to  Bridgeport,  Alabama,  from  Decatur  to  Nash 
ville,  and  from  Nashville  to  Stevenson,  with  large  detached  commands  at 
McMinnville  and  Cumberland  Gap.  Having  crossed  the  river  at  Chatta 
nooga,  the  column  took  up  its  line  of  march  on  the  28th  August,  over 
"YValdron's  Ridge  and  the  Cumberland  Mountain  for  Middle  Tennessee. 
Gen.  Kirby  Smith  had  already  successfully  passed  through  Northeastern 
Tennessee,  and  gained  the  rear  of  Cumberland  Gap,  held  by  the  enemy  in 
strong  force  well  fortified. 

Leaving  a  sufficient  force  to  hold  the  enemy  in  observation,  his  dis- 
lodgment  being  considered  impracticable,  Smith  moved,  as  authorized, 
with  the  remainder  of  his  command,  on  Lexington,  Kentucky.  This  rich 
country,  full  of  supplies  so  necessary  to  us,  was  represented  to  be  occupied 
by  a  force  which  could  make  but  feeble  resistance.  Hurrying  forward  by 
forced  marches  through  a  wild  and  mountainous  country,  the  Confederates 
appeared  in  front  of  the  town  of  Richmond  on  the  29th  of  August. 


BATTLE   OF    RICHMOND. 

Gen.  Cleburne's  division,  which  was  in  advance,  came  upon  the  enemy's 
advance  about  six  miles  from  Richmond,  early  in  the  day,  and  drove  it 
from  the  field,  before  the  remainder  of  the  column  was  brought  into  action. 

Falling  back  about  three  miles  and  a  half,  and  receiving  reinforcements, 
the  enemy  again  made  a  stand,  and  were  again  driven  from  the  field  in 
confusion.  Gen.  Smith  did  not  pursue  rapidly,  and  the  enemy  formed  his 
line-  of  battle  in  the  outskirts  of  Richmond,  his  forces  having  swelled  to  the 
number  of  ten  thousand  men,  Gen.  Nelson  commanding. 

The  enemy's  centre  and  left  was  here  attacked  by  Preston  Smith's 
division,  while  Churchill,  with  a  brigade,  moved  to  the  left.  Under  the 
combined  attack,  the  Federals  were  utterly  routed,  and  retreated  in  terrible 
confusion.  A  detachment  of  Confederate  cavalry  came  in  upon  their 
flank,  and  scattered  them  in  all  directions,  capturing  all  their  artillery 


330  THE    LOST   CA.TJSE. 

and  trains.  Not  a  regiment  escaped  in  order.  In  the  last  engagement  we 
took  prisoners  from  thirteen  regiments.  Our  loss,  killed  and  wounded, 
was  about  four  hundred ;  that  of  the  enemy  over  one  thousand,  and  his 
prisoners  about  five  thousand.  The  immediate  fruits  of  the  victory  were 
nine  pieces  of  artillery,  some  ten  thousand  small  arms,  and  large  quantities 
of  supplies. 

Pushing  forward  from  Richmond,  the  Confederate  force  entered  Lex- 

O  ' 

ington  on  the  2d  September,  and  Frankfort  on  the  17th,  and  was  thus  in  a 
position  to  threaten  either  Cincinnati,  about  eighty  miles,  or  Louisville, 
about  fifty  miles  distant. 

The  movement  of  Kirby  Smith  made  it  necessary  for  Gen.  Bragg  to 
intercept  Gen.  Buell,  now  rapidly  moving  towards  Nashville,  or  to  move 
towards  the  right,  so  as  to  secure  a  junction  with  Smith  when  necessary. 
On  reaching  Middle  Tennessee,  it  was  found  that  the  enemy's  main  force, 
by  use  of  railroads  and  good  turnpikes,  had  concentrated  in  Nashville,  and 
was  strongly  fortified.  With  a  heavy  demonstration  against  this  position, 
Bragg's  force  was  thrown  rapidly  to  Glasgow,  reaching  that  point  the  13th 
of  September,  before  any  portion  of  the  enemy  passed  Bowling  Green. 
As  soon  as  the  movement  was  discovered,  the  enemy  moved  in  haste  by 
rail  and  turnpike,  but  reached  Bowling  Green  only  in  time  to  find  the 
Confederates  had  seized  and  now  held  both  roads  near  Cave  City. 

So  far  the  Confederate  movements  in  Kentucky  were  a  decided  success, 
and  promised  the  most  important  results.  The  enemy's  communications 
were  severed,  and  his  forces  separated,  whilst  our  own  connections  were 
secured.  Without  firing  a  gun,  we  had  also  compelled  the  evacuation  of 
all  Northern  Alabama  and  Middle  Tennessee,  south  of  the  Cumberland. 
On  the  12th  September,  Bragg  sent  a  fulsome  despatch  to  Richmond, 
greatly  exciting  the  hopes  of  the  Government  there.  He  telegraphed : 
"  My  advance  will  be  in  Glasgow  to-day,  and  I  shall  be  with  them  to 
morrow  ;  my  whole  force  will  be  there  on  the  14th.  We  shall  then  be 
between  Buell  and  Kirby  Smith,  for  which  I  have  been  struggling.  The 
troops  are  in  good  tone  and  condition,  somewhat  footsore  and  tired,  but 
cheerful.  They  have  submitted  most  heroically  to  privations  and  hard 
ships,  and  have  maintained  their  reputation  for  discipline.  Our  greatest 
want  has  been  breadstuffs,  but  we  shall  be  in  a  plentiful  country  at  Glas 
gow  and  beyond.  With  arms  we  can,  not  only  dear  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky,  but  I  confidently  trust,  hold  them  loth.  Gen.  Buell,  with  the 
larger  portion  of  his  army,  is  concentrating  at  Bowling  Green.  Prom 
Glasgow  we  can  examine  him  and  decide  on  the  future." 

Gen.  Bragg  had  a  political  object  in  invading  Kentucky,  which  was  to 
afford  a  rallying  point  for  what  he  believed  to  be  the  Secession  sentiment 
of  the  State.  From  his  headquarters  at  Glasgow  he  issued  a  proclamation, 
informing  the  people  of  Kentucky  that  he  had  come  with  the  Confederate 


CENSURE   OF   GEN.   BRAGG.  331 

army  of  the  West  to  offer  them  an  opportunity  to  free  themselves  from  the 
tyranny  of  a  despotic  ruler.  They  came  not  as  conquerours  or  despoilers, 
but  to  restore  to  them  the  liberties  of  which  they  had  been  deprived  by  a 
cruel  and  relentless  foe  ;  to  guaranty  to  all  the  sanctity  of  their  homes  and 
altars,  to  punish  with  a  rod  of  iron  the  despoilers  of  their  peace,  and  to 
avenge  the  cowardly  insults  to  their  women. 

On  the  17th  September,  the  Federal  garrison  at  Mumfordsville  surren 
dered  to  Gen.  Bragg's  advanced  divisions.  Hardee's  wing  moved  by  Cave 
City,  direct  upon  Mumfordsville,  and  Polk,  by  another  road,  crossed  the 
river  some  miles  to  the  right,  and  gained  the  enemy's  rear  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  16th.  An  immediate  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  garrison  was 
made,  and  the  next  morning  an  unconditional  surrender  was  obtained. 
We  secured  4,267  prisoners,  10  pieces  of  artillery,  5,000  small  arms,  and 
a  proportional  quantity  of  ammunition,  horses,  mules,  and  military  stores. 

Bragg's  whole  army  was  now  on  the  road  between  Nashville  and 
Louisville — the  road  by  which  Buell  would  be  forced  to  march  if  he  sought 
to  interpose  his  army  between  the  Confederates  and  the  Ohio.  It  was 
apparently  an  excellent  opportunity  of  striking  not  only  a  military  but  a 
political  blow  against  the  Federal  cause  in  Kentucky.  Bragg  might  press 
on,  and,  in  conjunction  with  Kirby  Smith,  capture  Louisville,  or  he  might, 
with  equal  forces,  meet  Buell  in  the  field,  and  force  him  back  to  Nashville. 
He  adopted  neither  course.  After  the  success  of  Mumfordsville,  he  suf 
fered  Buell  and  his  wagon  trains  to  pass  between  him  and  the  Ohio  River, 
almost  within  sight  of  his  lines,  while  he  marched  away  to  Bardstown,  and 
thence  to  Frankfort.  Thus  Buell  entered  Louisville,  and  Gen.  Morgan, 
who  had,  by  Kirby  Smith's  advance,  been  cut  off  with  his  detachment  at 
Cumberland  Gap,  effected  his  retreat  to  Cincinnati ;  the  first  road  between 
Nashville  and  Louisville  having  been  left  open  by  Bragg's  march  to  Frank 
fort  from  the  west,  the  second  between  Cumberland  Gap  and  Nashville  by 
Kirby  Smith's  march  to  the  same  point  from  the  east,  the  great  oppor 
tunity  of  the  Kentucky  campaign  was  lost,  and  the  Federals  were  able  to 
resume  the  offensive  in  that  State. 

The  remarkable  failure  of  Gen.  Bragg  to  deliver  battle  at  Mumfords 
ville  was  the  subject  of  much  censure  and  criticism,  which  never  obtained 
any  reply  from  him  but  a  weak  and  insufficient  explanation  in  his  official 
report.  He  there  alleged  that  his  movement  towards  Bardstown  was  to 
procure  subsistence  ;  that  his  army  was  reduced  to  three  days'  rations,  and 
that  "  a  serious  engagement  would  not  fail,  whatever  its  results,  to  materi 
ally  cripple  him." 

Gen.  Polk,  left  at  Bardstown  in  command,  was  directed  by  Gen.  Bragg, 
if  pressed  by  a  force  too  large  to  justify  his  giving  battle,  to  fall  back  in 
the  direction  of  the  new  depot,  near  Bryantsville,  in  front  of  which  it  was 
proposed  to  concentrate  for  action.  Arriving  in  Lexington  on  the  1st 


332  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

October,  Gen.  Bragg  met  the  Provisional  Governor  of  the  State,  who  had 
previously  been  invited  to  accompany  him,  and  arranged  for  his  installa 
tion  at  the  Capitol  on  the  4th.  The  available  forces  of  Kirby  Smith,  just 
returned  to  Lexington,  were  ordered  immediately  to  Frankfort.  Learning 
of  a  heavy  movement  of  the  enemy  from  Louisville,  Gen.  Bragg  ordered 
Polk,  "  to  move  from  Bardstown  with  his  whole  available  force,  by  way 
of  Bloomfield  towards  Frankfort,  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear," 
and  informed  him  that  Smith  would  attack  in  front. 

The  plan  of  battle,  however,  was  disarranged,  as  Polk,  after  a  council 
of  his  officers,  decided  not  to  risk  the  attack,  but  to  move  as  originally  in 
structed  by  Bragg  towards  Harrodsburg.  Proceeding  rapidly  to  that  point 
himelf,  Gen.  Bragg  was  met  there  by  Polk  on  the  6th  of  October,  with  the 
head  of  the  column  which  had  marched  from  Bardstown  on  the  3d.  It 
was  now  determined  to  concentrate  all  the  forces  in  front  of  Lexington, 
and  to  make  a  battle  there.  But  before  this  order  was  put  in  full  opera 
tion,  information  was  received  that  the  enemy,  in  limited  force,  was  press 
ing  upon  Gen.  Hardee  at  Perry ville ;  that  he  was  nowhere  concentrated 
against  us,  but  was  moving  by  separate  columns  ;  his  right  near  Lebanon, 
a  corps  in  front  of  Perry  ville,  and  his  left,  two  entire  corps,  extending  by 
way  of  Macksville  to  Frankfort,  a  line  of  at  least  sixty  miles. 

Written  orders  were  given  to  Gen.  Polk  to  move  Cheatham's  division, 
now  at  Harrodsburg,  back  to  Perryville,  and  to  proceed  to  that  point  him 
self,  "  attack  the  enemy  immediately,  rout  him,  and  then  move  rapidly  to 
join  Maj. -Gen.  Smith,"  as  before  ordered;  and  it  was  added,  "  ~No  time 
should  be  lost  in  this  movement."  Meanwhile,  during  the  same  day,  Gen. 
Bragg  had  received  repeated  and  urgent  applications  from  Gen.  Smith 
(near  Frankfort)  by  express,  representing  the  enemy  to  be  in  strong  force 
in  his  immediate  front,  and  earnestly  asking  for  reinforcements.  Accord 
ingly,  Withers'  division  had  been  detached  and  sent  to  him,  and  was  far 
on  the  way  thither  at  the  time  when  the  movement  to  Perryville  was 
ordered. 

BATTLE   OF    PERRYVILLE. 

It  thus  happened  that  by  misapprehension,  Bragg  had  made  an  unfor 
tunate  distribution  of  his  forces,  and  deceived  as  to  the  real  strength  of  the 
enemy  in  the  vicinity  of  Perryville,  was  forced  to  give  battle  there  at  seri 
ous  disadvantage.  Polk  arrived  at  Perryville  with  Cheatham's  division 
before  midnight  of  the  7th,  and  the  troops  were  placed  by  Gen.  Hardee  in 
the  line  of  battle  previously  established.  Our  forces  now  in  this  position 
consisted  of  three  divisions  of  infantry,  about  14,500 — and  two  small 
brigades  of  cavalry,  about  1,500  strong. 

It  was  past  noon  of  the  8th  October  when  the  action  commenced.     It 


333 

was  fought  by  our  troops  with  a  gallantry  and  persistent  determination  to 
conquer,  which  the  enemy  could  not  resist ;  and  though  he  was  largely 
more  than  two  to  our  one,  he  was  driven  from  the  field  with  terrible  loss. 
Night  closed  the  operation  just  as  a  third  corps  of  the  enemy  threw  the 
head  of  its  columns  against  our  left  flank.  We  had  entire  possession  of 
the  battle-field,  with  thousands  of  the  enemy's  killed  and  wounded,  several 
batteries  of  artillery,  and  six  hundred  prisoners. 

In  the  progress  of  the  engagement,  we  had  advanced  so  far  as  to  expose 
our  left  flank  to  the  third  corps  under  McCook,  just  arrived  from  the  direc 
tion  of  Lebanon.  Gen.  Bragg,  therefore,  caused  our  line,  which  rested 
upon  the  field  till  midnight,  to  fall  back  to  its  original  position. 

Assured  that  the  enemy  had  concentrated  his  three  corps  against  him, 
and  finding  that  his  loss  had  already  been  quite  heavy  in  the  unequal  con 
test  against  the  two  corps  under  Crittenden  and  Gilbert,  Gen.  Bragg  gave 
the  order  to  fall  back  at  daylight  on  Harrodsburg,  and  sent  instructions  to 
Smith  to  move  his  command  to  form  a  junction  with  him,  at  that  place. 
Thence,  on  the  llth,  the  whole  force  was  retired  upon  Bryantsville. 

Gen.  Bragg  was  now  no  longer  able  to  attack  and  rout  an  enemy 
largely  superiour  in  numbers  ;  and  to  evacuate  Kentucky  had  become  an 
imperative  necessity.  The  season  of  autumnal  rains  was  approaching ; 
the  rough  and  uneven  roads  leading  over  the  stupendous  mountains  of 
Eastern  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  to  and  through  Cumberland  Gap,  would 
then  become  utterly  impassable  to  an  army.  Should  Bragg  remain  till 
then,  and  meet  with  a  reverse,  his  army  would  be  lost.  Accordingly  all 
necessary  arrangements  were  made,  and  the  troops  put  in  motion  by  two 
columns,  under  Polk  and  Smith,  on  the  13th  October  for  Cumberland  Gap. 
After  a  rapid  march,  with  some  privations  in  the  absence  of  baggage 
trains,  which  had  been  sent  ahead,  the  Confederate  forces  passed  the  Gap 
with  immaterial  loss  from  the  19th  to  the  24th  of  October. 

This  retreat  of  Bragg  was  certainly  a  sore  disappointment  to  the  hopes 
which  his  first  movements  in  Kentucky  had  occasioned  and  his  sensational 
despatches  had  unduly  excited.  His  campaign  was  long  a  theme  of  vio 
lent  criticism  in  the  Confederacy.  The  detachment  of  Kirby  Smith  and 
the  operation  on  different  lines  in  Kentucky  ;  the  loss  of  the  opportunity 
at  Mumfordsville  ;  and  the  failure  to  assemble  all  the  Confederates  in  the 
field  at  Perry ville,  were  pointed  out  as  so  many  errours  in  the  campaign. 
But  the  popular  mind  in  criticising  military  operations  is  too  prone  to  for 
get  what  is  accomplished,  while  pointing  out  what  might  have  been  at 
tempted.  The  Kentucky  campaign  was  in  a  great  measure  a  Confederate 
success.  Though  compelled  to  yield  a  portion  of  the  valuable  territory 
from  which  we  had  driven  the  enemy,  the  fruits  of  the  campaign  were 
large.  With  a  force  enabling  us  at  no  time  to  put  more  than  forty  thou 
sand  men,  of  all  arms,  and  in  all  places  in  battle,  we  had  redeemed  North 


334  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Alabama  and  Middle  Tennessee,  and  had  recovered  possession  of  Cumber 
land  Gap,  the  gateway  to  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy.  We  had  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured  no  less  than  twenty-five  thousand  of  the  enemy  ; 
taken  over  thirty  pieces  of  artillery,  seventeen  thousand  small  arms,  some 
two  million  cartridges  for  the  same  ;  destroyed  some  hundreds  of  wagons, 
and  brought  off  several  hundred  more,  with  their  teams  and  harness  com 
plete  ;  replaced  our  jaded  cavalry  horses  by  a  fine  mount ;  lived  two  months 
upon  supplies  wrested  from  the  enemy's  possession ;  secured  material  to 
clothe  the  army ;  and,  finally,  secured  subsistence  from  the  redeemed 
country  to  support  not  only  Bragg's  army,  but  also  large  forces  in  other 
parts  of  the  Confederacy.  In  four  weeks  after  passing  Cumberland  Gap, 
Bragg's  army  was  found,  with  serried  ranks,  in  front  of  the  enemy  at  Nash 
ville  ;  better  organized,  better  disciplined,  better  clothed  and  fed,  in  better 
health  and  tone,  and  in  larger  numbers  than  when  it  entered  on  the  can> 
paign,  though  it  had  made  a  march  at  least  three  times  as  long  as  that  of 
the  enemy  in  reaching  the  same  point,  and  was  moreover  entirely  self- 
sustained. 


OPERATIONS   IN   THE   SOUTHWEST. BATTLE   OF    CORINTH. 

When  Gen.  Bragg  moved  into  Kentucky,  he  left  to  Yan  Dorn  and 
Price  the  enemy  in  West  Tennessee.  These  orders  were  however  changed, 
and  Price  was  directed  to  follow  Rosecrans  across  the  Tennessee  River 
into  Middle  Tennessee,  whither  it  was  then  supposed  he  had  gone.  To 
make  a  demonstration  in  favour  of  Price,  Gen.  Yan  Dorn  marched  his 
whole  command  on  the  20th  day  of  September  to  within  seven  miles  of 
Bolivar,  driving  three  brigades  of  the  enemy  back  to  that  place,  and 
forcing  the  return  from  Corinth  of  one  division,  which  had  been  sent  there 
to  strengthen  Grant's  army. 

Gen.  Price,  in  obedience  to  his  orders,  marched  in  the  direction  of 
luka,  to  cross  the  Tennessee,  but  was  not  long  in  discovering  that  Rose 
crans  had  not  crossed  that  stream.  This  officer,  in  connection  with  Grant, 
attacked  him  on  the  19th  day  of  September,  and  compelled  him  to  fall 
back  towards  Baldwin,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad.  On  the  25th 
Yan  Dorn  received  a  despatch,  by  courier,  from  Price,  stating  that  he 
was  at  Baldwin,  and  was  then  ready  to  join  with  his  forces  in  an  attack  on 
Corinth,  as  had  been  previously  suggested.  The  forces  met  at  Ripley,  on 
the  28th  September,  according  to  agreement,  and  marched  the  next  morn 
ing  towards  Pocahontas,  which  place  was  reached  on  the  1st  October. 

The  disposition  of  the  enemy's  forces  at  this  time  was  as  follows : 
Sherman,  at  Memphis,  with  about  six  thousand  men  ;  Hurlburt,  afterwards 
Ord,  at  Bolivar,  with  about  eight  thousand  ;  Grant  (headquarters  at  Jack- 


BATTLE   OF   CORINTH.  335 

son),  with  about  three  thousand  ;  Kosecrans  at  Corinth,  with  about  fifteen 
thousand,  together  with  the  following  outposts,  viz. :  Rienzi,  twenty-five 
hundred  ;  Bumsville,  Jacinto,  and  luka,  about  six  thousand  ;  at  important 
bridges,  and  on  garrison  duty,  about  two  or  three  thousand,  making  in  the 
aggregate  about  forty-two  thousand  (42,000)  men  in  West  Tennessee. 
Memphis,  Jackson,  Bolivar,  and  Corinth  were  fortified,  the  works  mount 
ing  siege  guns,  the  outposts  slightly  fortified,  having  field  pieces.  Mem 
phis,  Bolivar,  and  Corinth  are  in  the  arc  of  a  circle,  the  chord  of  which, 
from  Memphis  to  Corinth,  makes  an  angle  with  a  due  east  line  about  fifteen 
degrees  south.  Bolivar  is  about  equi-distant  from.  Memphis  and  Corinth, 
somewhat  nearer  the  latter,  and  is  at  the  intersection  of  the  Hatchie  River 
and  the  Mississippi  Central  and  Ohio  Railroad. 

It  was  a  situation  in  which  the  enemy  could  scarcely  determine  at 
what  point  the  Confederates  would  make  their  principal  attack.  In  the 
event  of  operations  being  conducted  against  Bolivar,  Rosecrans  was  pre 
pared  to  fall  on  the  Confederate  right  rear,  whilst  if  Corinth  should  be  at 
tacked,  a  similar  duty  would  devolve  on  the  garrison  of  Bolivar. 

Gen.  Yan  Dorn  determined  to  attempt  Corinth.  He  had  a  reasonable 
hope  of  success.  Field  returns  at  Ripley  showed  his  strength  to  be  about 
twenty-two  thousand  men.  Rosecrans  at  Corinth  had  about  fifteen  thou 
sand,  with  about  eight  thousand  additional  men  at  outposts,  from  twelve 
to  fifteen  miles  distant.  He  might  surprise  him,  and  carry  the  place  be 
fore  these  troops  could  be  brought  in.  Yan  Dorn  therefore  marched 
towards  Pocahontas,  threatening  Bolivar,  then  turned  suddenly  across  the 
Hatchie  and  Tuscumbia,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  October,  attacked 
Corinth  without  hesitation,  and  did  surprise  that  place  before  the  outpost 
garrisons  were  called  in. 

Rosecrans'  forces  occupied  a  position  outside  the  defences  of  the  town, 
three  divisions  forming  the  first  two  lines,  and  one  division  slightly  in  rear 
as  a  reserve.  He  was  anxious  to  retire  slowly  within  the  inner  line  of 
works,  and  gave  orders  to  that  effect ;  but  Price's  troops,  flushed  with  the 
excitement  of  an  attack,  and  anxious  to  wipe  out  the  recollection  of  their 
repulse  at  luka,  advanced  rapidly,  and  pressed  hard  on  the  Federal  centre, 
capturing  two  guns  from  Davies'  division,  and  driving  the  Federals  within 
their  inner  line  of  redoubts. 

Gen.  Yan  Dorn  anticipated  an  easy  success  on  the  following  morning, 
and  telegraphed  to  Richmond  the  announcement  of  a  great  victory.  It 
would  seem  that  he  was  entirely  unaware  of  the  strength  of  the  enemy's 
works  at  Corinth,  and  of  the  trial  which  yet  remained  for  the  courage  and 
devotion  of  his  troops. 

The  Confederate  plan  of  battle  for  the  next  day  was,  that  Price  should 
open  with  a  large  battery  of  artillery,  and  then  attack  in  force  with  his 
left,  and  that  while  thus  engaged,  Lovell's  division  should  press  forward, 


336  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

• 

and  attack  with  vigour  on  our  right.  Gen.  Hebert,  who  commanded  a 
division  on  the  left,  was  to  lead  in  the  attack.  Daylight  came,  and  there 
was  no  attack  on  the  left.  Of  this  failure  to  execute  his  orders,  Gen.  Yan 
Dorn  says,  in  his  official  report :  "  A  staff  officer  was  sent  to  Hebert  to 
inquire  the  cause.  That  officer  could  not  be  found.  Another  messenger 
was  sent,  and  a  third ;  and  about  seven  o'clock  Gen.  Hebert  came  to  my 
headquarters,  and  reported  sick."  Gen.  Price  then  put  Brig.-Gen.  Green 
in  command  of  the  left  wing  ;  and  it  was  eight  o'clock  before  the  proper 
dispositions  for  the  attack  at  this  point  were  made.  In  the  mean  time,  the 
centre,  held  by  Maury's  division,  became  engaged  with  the  enemy's  sharp 
shooters,  and  the  battle  was  brought  on,  and  extended  along  the  whole 
centre  and  left  wing.  One  brigade  after  another  went  gallantly  into  the 
action,  and,  pushing  forward  through  direct  and  cross-fire,  over  every  ob 
stacle,  reached  Corinth,  and  planted  their  colours  on  the  last  stronghold 
of  the  enemy.  A  hand  to  hand  contest  was  being  enacted  in  the  very 
yard  of  Gen.  Rosecrans'  headquarters,  and  in  the  streets  of  the  town. 
The  enemy  was  followed  and  driven  from  house  to  house  with  great 
slaughter.  In  the  town  were  batteries  in  mask,  supported  by  heavy  re 
serves,  behind  which  the  retreating  enemy  took  shelter,  and  which  opened 
upon  our  troops  a  most  destructive  fire  at  short  range.  The  heavy  guns 
of  College  Hill — the  enemy's  most  important  work — were  for  a  moment 
.silenced,  and  all  seemed  about  to  be  ended,  when  a  heavy  fire  from  fresh 
troops  from  luka,  Burnsville,  and  Rienzi,  that  had  succeeded  in  reaching 
Corinth  in  time,  poured  into  our  thinned  ranks. 

Our  troops  gave  way.  They  were  pushed  down  College  Hill,  and 
followed  by  the  enemy  through  the  woods  and  over  the  ground  they  had 
gained  by  such  desperate  courage.  At  the  very  time  the  day  was  lost, 
Lovell's  division  was  advancing,  and  was  on  the  point  of  assaulting  the 
enemy's  works,  when  he  received  orders  to  throw  one  of  his  brigades 
(Yillepigues')  rapidly  to  the  centre,  to  cover  the  broken  ranks  thrown 
back  from  Corinth.  The  movement  was  well  executed,  and  the  enemy 
did  not  dare  to  press  his  success. 

The  next  day  it  was  determined  by  Yan  Dorn  to  fall  back  towards 
Ripley  and  Oxford,  and  thus  again  take  position  behind  the  lagoons  and 
swamps  of  Mississippi.  The  movement  was  accomplished  with  but  little 
molestation  from  the  enemy,  beyond  an  affair  in  crossing  the  Hatchie,  in 
which  Gen.  Ord,  who  commanded  the  enemy's  advance,  was  held  in  check 
and  punished.  The  following  was  found  to  be  our  loss  in  the  severest  con 
flicts  with  the  enemy,  and  on  the  march  to  and  from  Corinth,  viz. :  killed, 
594- ;  wounded,  2,162  ;  prisoners  and  missing,  2,102.  One  piece  of  artil 
lery  was  driven  in  the  night  by  a  mistake  into  the  enemy's  lines,  and  cap 
tured.  Four  pieces  were  taken  at  the  Hatchie  bridge,  the  horses  being 
shot.  Two  pieces  of  artillery  were  captured  from  the  enemy  at  Corinth 


RESULTS   OF   THE   AUTUMN  CAMPAIGNS   OP  1862.  337 

by  Gen.  Lo veil's  division,  one  of  which  was  brought  off.  Five  pieces  were 
also  taken  by  Gen.  Price's  corps,  two  of  which  were  brought  off— thus 
resulting  in  a  loss  to  us  of  only  two  pieces.  The  enemy's  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded,  by  his  own  account,  was  2,127.  We  took  over  three 
hundred  prisoners. 

The  retreat  from  Corinth  was  not  a  rout.  But  the  engagement  there 
was  a  serious  disaster  to  the  Confederates,  and  cost  Yan  Dorn  his  com 
mand  ;  censured  as  he  was  for  having  carried  his  men  against  works,  the 
strength  of  which  he  had  underrated,  and  then  having  failed  to  make 
proper  combinations  in  the  attack.  This  event  may  be  said  to  have  closed 
for  some  time  the  campaign  in  the  West.  It  had  not  completed  all  the 
expectations  of  the  Southern  public.  It  is  true  that  the  country  between 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  was  re-occupied  by  the  Confederate  forces ; 
but  the  decisive  event  of  the  campaign  was  the  retreat  from  Kentucky, 
and  as  public  expectation  in  the  South  had  been  disappointed  when  Lee 
retired  across  the  Potomac,  so  did  it  experience  a  similar  feeling  when  it 
was  known  that  Bragg  had  retreated  through  the  Cumberland  Mountains. 

These  were  the  two  turning-points  of  the  autumn  campaigns  of  1862. 
Whatever  the  territorial  results  of  these  campaigns,  their  moral  effect  was 
great,  and  the  position  of  the  Confederates  was  now  very  different  from 
what  it  had  been  in  the  early  part  of  the  year.  The  glory  of  their  arms 
now  attracted  the  attention  of  the  world.  They  had  carried  their  arms 
from  Chattanooga  to  Louisville,  and,  although  forced  to  retire,  had  proved 
that  the  subjugation  of  the  West  was  a  task  which  the  enemy  had  only 
commenced.  They  had  raised  the  siege  of  Eichmond,  threatened  Wash 
ington,  and  beaten  the  enemy  back  in  that  quarter  to  what  had  been  the 
threshold  of  the  war.  The  London  Times  declared  that  the  history  of 
these  campaigns  comprised  a  list  of  military  achievements  almost  without 
parallel,  and  added  :  "  Whatever  may  be  the  fate  of  the  new  nationality, 
or  its  subsequent  claims  to  the  respect  of  mankind,  it  will  assuredly  begin 
its  career  with  a  reputation  for  genius  and  valour  which  the  most  famous 
nations  may  envy." 


CHAPTEE   XX. 

THE  TWO  MAIN  THEATEE3    OF  THE  WAR. — OPEBATIONS  IN  VIRGINIA. — BATTLE  OF  FEEDEBICKS- 
BUEG. PEELIMINAEY  MOVEMENTS   OF   THE   TWO  AEMIES. — EXPEDITION  OF  STUAET's  OAV- 

ALEY  INTO  PENNSYLVANIA. — EEMOVAL  OF  M'CLELLAN. — THE  TEUE  SEASONS  FOE  IT. — 
GEN.  BTTBNSIDE'S  "  ON  TO  EIOHMOND." — HIS  MOVEMENT  TOWAEDS  FEEDEEIOKSBUEG. — 
THE  SUEEENDEB  OF  THE  TOWN  DEMANDED. IT  IS  ABANDONED  BY  THE  CITIZEN-POPULA 
TION. — SOEEOWFTJL  SCENES. — BTJENSIDE  FOECES  THE  PASSAGE  OF  THE  E  APPAH  ANNOOK.  — 
THE  CONFEDEEATK  POSITION. — BUENSIDE'S  HOPE  TO  STJEPRISE  GEN.  LEE. — HOW  DISAP 
POINTED. THE  CONFEDEEATE  LINE  OF  BATTLE. THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  CONFEDEEATE 

EIGHT. — YOUNG  PELHAM's  GALLANTEY. — THE  OONFEDEEATE  EIGHT  BEOKEN. — THE  BATTLE 
EESTOEED. — INTEREST  OF  THE  FIELD  ON  THE  LEFT. — THE  ATTACK  ON  MAEYE's  AND  WIL- 
LIS'  HILLS. — GALLANTEY  OF  THE  FEDEEALS. — THEY  MAKE  SIX  ATTACKS. — A  TEEEIBLE 
SCENE  OF  OAENAGE. — BUENSIDE'S  AEMY  DEIVEN  INTO  FEEDEEICKSBUEG. — HIS  APPALLING 
EXTREMITY. — EXPECTATIONS  IN  EICHMOND  OF  THE  DESTEUCTION  OF  HIS  AEMY. — HE 

ESCAPES  ACROSS  THE  EAPPAHANNOCK. GEN.  LEE's  OWN  EXPLANATION  OF  HIS  FAILURE 

TO  FOLLOW  UP  HIS  VICTOEY. COMPAEATIVE  LOSSES  IN  THE  BATTLE. — DEATH  OF  GENS. 

GEEGG  AND  OOBB. — GEN.  LEE's  SENTIMENT  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  OBJECTS  OF  THE  WAE. 

OPEEATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE. — BATTLE   OF   MURFREESBORO'. THE   SITUATION   IN   THE 

WEST. — THE  LINES  IN  TENNESSEE  AND  MISSISSIPPI. — EOSECBA^'  ADVANCE  FEOM  NASH 
VILLE. — CONFLICTING  STATEMENTS  OF  HIS  FOECE. — POSITION  OF  GEN.  BEAGG's  AEMY 
AROUND  MURFREESBOEO'. — BRAGG  ANTICIPATES  THE  FEDERAL  ATTACK. — HAEDEE  COM 
MENCES  THE  BATTLE. — HE  DEIVES  THE  ENTIEE  EIGHT  WING  OF  THE  FEDEEALS. — DESPE 
RATE  SITUATION  OF  EOSECRANS. HIS  SANG-FROID. HE  DEVELOPES  A  NEW  LINE  OF  BAT 
TLE. — THE  CONFEDERATES  RENEW  THE  ATTACK. — HOW  BRAGG  LOST  AN  OPPORTUNITY. — 
SPLENDID  CHARGE  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATES. — THE  DAY  UNDECIDED,  BUT  THE  ADVANTAGE 
WITH  THE  CONFEDEEATES. — BEAGG's  "  HAPPY  NEW  YEAE." — BEECKINEIDGE  ATTEMPTS  TO 
DISLODGE  THE  ENEMY. — "  THE  BLOODY  CEOSSING  OF  STONE  EIVEE." — EEPULSE  OF  BEECK 
INEIDGE. WHY  BEAGG  DETEEMINED  TO  EETEEAT. THE  EESULTS  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MUR- 

FREESBORO'  IN  FAVOUR  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — A  PECULIARITY  OF  GEN.  BRAGG. — HIS 

ELOQUENT  TEIBUTE  TO  THE  PEIVATE  SOLDIEE  OF  THE  CONFEDEBAOY. OPEEATIONS  IN  THE 

TEANS-MISSISSIPPI. — THE  CAMPAIGN  WEST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  FEEBLE  AND  IREEGULAR. — 
GEN.  HINDMAN'S  COMMAND. — HIS  EXTRAVAGANT  ADDRESS  TO  HIS  SOLDIEES. — BATTLE  OF 

PRAIRIE  GROVE. HINDMAN's  FIBST  SUCCESS  AND  UNFORTUNATE  DELAY. — HIS  BLUNDERS 

AND  EXTRAORDINAEY  EETEEAT. — CONDITION  OF  THE  TEANS-MISSISSIPPI  COUNTS Y. — HIND- 
MAN'S  "  GOVERNMENT  AD  INTERIM." — HIS  DESPOTIC  ORDERS. — AN  EXTRAORDINAEY  LIST 
OF  OUTRAGES. — VIRTUE  AND  FIDELITY  OF  THE  OONFEDEEATE  STATES  WEST  OF  THE  MISSIS 
SIPPI  RIVER. 


BATTLE    OF   PREDERICKSBDRG.  339 


ABOUT  the  close  of  the  year  1862,  two  heavy  battles  were  fought  on  the 
two  main  theatres  of  the  war,  Virginia  and  Tennessee,  and  were  the  great 
topics  of  the  period  referred  to. 


OPERATIONS   IN   VIRGINIA. BATTLE   OF    FREDERICKSBURG. 

After  Lee's  retreat  into  Virginia,  McClellan  appeared  to  be  concen 
trating  in  and  near  Harper's  Ferry,  but  made  no  forward  movement.  On 
the  6th  October  President  Lincoln  had  ordered  an  immediate  advance, 
recommending  that  McClellan  should  take  the  interiour  line  between 
Washington  and  Lee's  forces,  and  make  an  early  battle.  McClellan  hesi 
tated,  and  seemed  disposed  to  spend  time  in  complaints  of  inadequate  sup 
plies,  and  in  incessant  demands  for  reinforcements.  Meanwhile,  to  ascer 
tain  the  position  and  designs  of  the  enemy,  Gen.  Lee  ordered  the  famous 
cavalry  commander  Gen.  Stuart  to  cross  the  Potomac  above  Williamsport, 
to  reconnoitre  the  Federal  positions,  and,  if  practicable,  to  enter  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  do  all  in  his  power  to  impede  and  embarrass  the  military  opera 
tions  of  the  enemy.  The  order  was  executed  with  skill,  address,  and 
courage.  Gen.  Stuart,  with  twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  cavalry,  passed 
through  Maryland,  occupied  Chambersburg,  and  destroyed  a  large  amount 
of  public  property,  making  the  entire  circuit  of  Gen.  McClellan's  army, 
and  thwarting  all  the  arrangements  by  which  that  commander  had  report 
ed  his  capture  certain. 

About  the  last  of  October,  the  Federal  army  began  to  incline  eastward- 
ly  from  the  mountains,  moving  in  the  direction  of  Warren  ton.  As  soon  as 
this  intention  developed  itself,  Longstreet's  corps  was  moved  across  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  about  the  3d  of  November,  took  position  at  Culpepper 
Court  House,  while  Jackson  advanced  one  of  his  divisions  to  the  east  side 
of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  enemy  gradually  concentrated  about  Warrenton, 
his  cavalry  being  thrown  forward  beyond  the  Rappahannock,  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Culpepper  Court  House,  and  occasionally  skirmishing  with  our 
own,  which  was  closely  observing  his  movements. 

Here  McClellan's  hesitation  and  timidity  were  very  evident.  Weeks 
wore  on  without  any  decided  movement.  The  beautiful  autumn  weather 
had  passed,  without  any  demonstration  of  moment  from  the  enemy,  and 
now  cold,  bleak  November  whistled  over  the  fields  and  mountains  of  Vir 
ginia.  But  on  the  5th  of  November  there  was  an  unusual  sensation  and 
stir  in  the  Federal  camp,  for  on  that  day  a  messenger  arrived  at  Warren- 
ton,  and  delivered  to  McClellan  an  order  to  resign  the  command  of  the 
army  to  Gen.  Burnside,  and  to  report  himself  at  Trenton  in  New  Jersey. 
The  order  was  unexpected.  Whatever  the  military  demerits  of  McClellan, 


340  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

it  was  undoubtedly  designed  at  "Washington  as  a  coup  d'etat,  with  reference 
to  the  fall  elections  of  1862,  and  influenced  by  the  argument  that  a  time 
when  the  Administration  party  was  incurring  defeat  in  the  elections,  it 
was  dangerous  to  allow  a  political  opponent  to  possess  the  confidence  and 
to  hold  the  chief  command  of  the  main  army. 

Gen.  Burnside  found  at  his  command  a  splendid  army.  It  was  now 
divided  into  three  grand  divisions,  each  consisting  of  two  corps,  and  com 
manded  by  Gens.  Sumner,  Hooker,  and  Franklin.  It  was  at  once  pro 
posed  by  Burnside  to  move  from  Warrenton  to  a  new  line  of  operations, 
and  to  make  a  campaign  on  the  Lower  Rappahannock.  His  plan  was  to 
march  rapidly  down  the  left  bank  of  that  river,  to  cross  by  means  of  pon 
toons  at  Fredericksburg,  and  to  advance  on  Richmond  by  Hanover  Court 
House.  For  this  plan  of  operations  against  the  Confederate  capital,  the 
advantages  were  claimed  that  it  would  avoid  the  necessity  of  the  long  lines 
of  communication  which  would  have  to  be  held  in  case  of  a  movement 
against  Richmond  by  Gordonsville  ;  that,  in  fact,  the  Federal  army,  after 
arriving  at  Fredericksburg,  would  be  at  a  point  nearer  to  Richmond  than 
it  would  be  even  if  it  should  take  Gordonsville  ;  and  that  it  would  all  the 
time  be  as  near  Washington  as  would  be  the  Confederates,  thus  covering 
that  city  and  defeating  the  objection  to  the  adoption  of  the  line  of  the 
Peninsular  campaign. 

On  the  15th  November,  it  was  known  by  Gen.  Lee  that  the  enemy 
was  in  motion  towards  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad,  and  one  regi 
ment  of  infantry,  with  a  battery  of  light  artillery,  was  sent  to  reinforce  the 
garrison  at  Fredericksburg.  On  the  17th,  it  was  ascertained  that  Sumner's 
corps  had  marched  from  Catlett's  Station,  in  the  direction  of  Falmouth, 
and  information  was  also  received  that,  on  the  15th,  some  Federal  gunboats 
and  transports  had  entered  Acquia  Creek.  This  looked  as  if  Fredericks 
burg  was  again  to  be  occupied,  and  McLaws'  and  Ransom's  divisions,  ac 
companied  by  W.  H.  Lee's  brigade  of  cavalry  and  Lane's  battery,  were 
ordered  to  proceed  to  that  city.  To  ascertain  more  fully  the  movements  of 
the  enemy,  Gen.  Stuart  was  directed  to  cross  the  Rappahannock.  On  the 
morning  of  the  18th,  he  forced  a  passage  at  Warren  ton  Springs,  in  the  face 
of  a  regiment  of  cavalry  and  three  pieces  of  artillery,  guarding  the  ford, 
and  reached  Warrenton  soon  after  the  last  of  the  enemy's  column  had  left. 
The  information  he  obtained  confirmed  the  impression  that  the  whole  Fed 
eral  army,  under  Burnside,  was  moving  towards  Fredericksburg.  On  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  therefore,  the  remainder  of  Longstreet's  corps  was 
put  in  motion  for  that  point. 

It  arrived  there  before  any  large  body  of  the  enemy  had  appeared.  It 
is  true  that  the  Stafford  Heights  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  were  held 
by  a  Federal  detachment  many  days  ere  the  approach  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  but  they  had  never  attempted  to  cross  over  into  the  town.  Picket 


BATTLE   OF   FKEDERICKSBUKG.  341 

firing  was  now  constant  along  the  river.  But  there  were  many  who  yet 
believed  that  Burnside  had  no  serious  intention  of  attacking,  regarding  his 
demonstration  at  the  river  as  a  harmless  display  of  force  to  divert  atten 
tion  from  his  real  designs. 

Such  surmise  was  soon  banished  from  the  mind.  On  the  21st  it  be 
came  apparent  that  Gen.  Burnside  was  concentrating  his  whole  army  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock.  On  the  same  day,  Gen.  Sumner 
summoned  the  corporate  authorities  of  Fredericksburg  to  surrender  the 
place,  and  threatened,  in  case  of  refusal,  to  bombard  the  city  at  nine 
o'clock,  next  morning.  The  weather  had  been  tempestuous  for  two  days, 
and  a  storm  was  raging  at  the  time  of  the  summons.  It  was  impossible  to 
prevent  the  execution  of  the  threat  to  shell  the  city,  as  it  was  completely 
exposed  to  the  batteries  on  Stafford  Hills,  which  were  beyond  our  reach. 
The  city  authorities  were  informed  by  Gen.  Lee  that  while  his  forces  would 
not  use  the  place  for  military  purposes,  its  occupation  by  the  enemy  would 
be  resisted,  and  directions  were  given  for  the  removal  of  the  women  and 
children  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

The  threatened  bombardment  did  not  take  place.  But  the  inhabitants 
were  advised  to  leave  the  town  in  view  of  the  imminence  of  a  collision  be 
tween  the  two  armies,  and  almost  the  entire  population,  without  a  murmur 
abandoned  their  homes.  The  country  around  for  miles  was  strewn  with 
tents  and  rude  shelters,  where  the  women  arid  children  of  the  town  had 
betaken  themselves ;  and  along  the  roads,  in  the  rude  blasts  of  winter, 
wandered  many  of  the  poor  without  aught  of  worldly  property  beyond 
some  scanty  packs  of  food  and  clothing  borne  on  their  backs. 

Gen.  Burnside  now  commenced  his  preparations  to  force  the  passage 
of  the  Rappahannock  and  advance  upon  Richmond.  Lee's  left  wing,  un 
der  Jackson,  had  not  yet  arrived,  although  it  was  rapidly  pushing  forward. 
On  his  arrival,  the  disposition  of  the  Confederate  forces  was  soon  made. 
D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  stationed  near  Port  Royal,  and  the  rest  of  Jack 
son's  corps  so  disposed  as  to  support  Hill  or  Longstreet,  as  occasion  might 
require.  Our  lines  in  the  vicinity  of  Fredericksburg  extended  from  the 
river  about  a  mile  and  a  half  above,  along  the  range  of  hills  in  the  rear  of 
the  city  to  the  Richmond  Railroad.  As  these  hills  were  commanded  by 
the  opposite  heights,  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  earthworks  were  con 
stmcted  upon  their  crests,  at  the  most  eligible  positions  for  artillery. 

On  the  Stafford  Heights  the  enemy  had  an  array  of  military  force  the 
most  brilliant  and  magnificent  of  modern  times.  Burnside's  total  numeri 
cal  strength  was  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men.  A  more  than 
ordinary  powerful  artillery  was  attached  to  the  army,  of  which  no  less 
than  one  hundred  and  forty-three  guns,  overlooking  the  town  of  Fredericks 
burg,  commanded  the  course  of  the  river  and  the  opposite  bank.  The 
Confederates  numbered  about  eighty  thousand  men.  They  were  drawn 


342  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

up  along  the  heights  in  the  rear  of  Frederickslmrg,  which,  retiring  in  a 
semi-circle  from  the  river,  embrace  within  their  arms  a  plain  six  miles  in 
length,  and  from  two  to  three  in  depth.  It  seemed  as  if  nature  had  pre 
pared  here  an  arena  for  one  of  the  grandest  conflicts  of  arms  that  had  yet 
been  witnessed  in  the  war.  The  landscape,  stretching  from  the  hills  to  the 
river,  was  like  an  amphitheatre ;  the  intrenched  Confederates  holding  an 
upper  tier  of  seats,  and  the  stage  being  the  valley  in  which  were  placed  the 
red-brick  buildings  of  Fredericksburg.  Outside  of  the  town  a  few  houses 
were  scattered  here  and  there  over  the  scene,  and  the  leafless  woods  added 
to  the  bleak  aspect  of  the  country.  Small  detachments  of  the  Confederate 
forces  were  quartered  in  the  deserted  houses,  from  which  rose  few  and 
feeble  clouds  of  smoke  ;  while  on  the  banks  of  the  river  the  active  picket 
walked  his  post  through  piercing  winds  and  sleet  and  rain. 

Before  dawn,  on  the  llth  December,  our  signal  guns  announced  that 
the  enemy  was  in  motion.  About  two,  A.  M.,  he  commenced  preparations 
to  throw  bridges  over  the  Rappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  and  one 
about  a  mile  and  a  quarter  below,  near  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run.  Two 
regiments  of  Barksdale's  brigade,  McLaws'  division,  the  Seventeenth  and 
Eighteenth  Mississippi,  guarded  these  points,  the  former,  assisted  by  the 
Eighth  Florida,  of  Anderson's  division,  being  at  the  upper.  The  rest  of 
the  brigade,  with  the  Third  Georgia  regiment,  also  of  Anderson's  division, 
was  held  in  reserve  in  the  city.  From  daybreak  until  four,  p.  M.,  the 
troops,  sheltered  behind  the  houses  on  the  river  bank,  repelled  the  repeated 
efforts  of  the  enemy  to  lay  his  bridges  opposite  the  town,  driving  back  his 
working  parties,  and  their  supports,  with  great  slaughter. 

At  the  lower  point  of  the  river  near  Deep  Run  there  was  no  such  pro 
tection.  Here  the  enemy  made  a  prodigious  effort  to  lay  his  pontoons, 
and  swarms  of  men  could  be  seen  moving  to  and  fro  with  beams  and  boats. 
Our  sharpshooters  maintained  an  annoying  fire,  and  for  a  moment  the 
enemy  retired.  Then  commenced  a  terrible  cannonade,  as  more  than  a 
hundred  guns  were  pointed  at  the  city.  Houses  fell,  timbers  crashed,  dust 
rose,  flames  ascended,  while  there  poured  out  from  the  city  a  stream  of  un 
lucky  citizens  who  had  remained  too  long,  or  had  screened  themselves  in 
hope  of  the  enemy's  speedy  arrival.  Unable  to  withstand  the  fire  of  the 
batteries  and  a  superiour  force  of  the  enemy's  infantry  on  the  river  banks, 
our  troops  were  withdrawn  ;  and  soon  loud  cheers  from  the  Federals  an 
nounced  that  the  bridge  was  completed.  Burnside's  advance  into  Freder 
icksburg  was  bravely  resisted  until  dark.  But  Gen.  Lee  had  accomplished 
the  most  important  condition  for  a  successful  battle ;  he  had  gained  the 
necessary  time  for  the  concentration  of  his  forces. 

It  had  been-  Burnside's  hope,  by  rapidly  crossing  the  river  to  take  Lee 
at  a  serious  disadvantage.  He  had  discovered  that  a  large  portion  of  the 
Confederate  force  had  been  thrown  down  the  river,  and  it  was  his  design 


BA1TLE   OP   FREDEKICK8BURG.  34:3 

to  separate,  by  a  vigorous  attack,  the  forces  on  the  river  below  from  the 
forces  behind  and  on  the  crest  in  the  rear  of  Fredericksburg.  But  in  this 
prospect  he  was  disappointed.  He  found  Lee  in  compact  lines  prepared  to 
receive  him ;  and  availing  himself  of  the  dense  fogs  on  the  river,  he  con 
tinued  during  the  12th  December,  to  cross  his  men  at  and  below  Fredericks- 
burg  very  much  at  his  leisure,  and  without  material  interruption. 

Our  artillery  could  only  be  used  with  effect  when  the  occasional  clear 
ing  of  the  mist  rendered  the  enemy's  columns  visible.  His  batteries  on 
the  Stafford  Heights  fired  at  intervals  upon  our  position.  Longstreet's 
corps  constituted  our  left,  with  Anderson's  division  resting  upon  the  river, 
Eansom's  division  supported  the  batteries  on  Marye's  and  Willis'  Hills,  at 
the  foot  of  which  Cobb's  brigade,  of  McLaws'  division,  and  the  24th  North 
Carolina,  of  Ransom's  brigade,  were  stationed,  protected  by  a  stone  wall. 
The  Washington  Artillery,  under  Col.  Walton,  occupied  the  redoubts  on 
the  crest  of  Marye's  Hill,  and  those  on  the  heights  to  the  right  and  left, 
were  held  by  part  of  the  reserve  artillery,  Col.  E.  P.  Alexander's  bat 
talion,  and  the  division  batteries  of  Anderson,  Ransom,  and  McLaws. 
A.  P.  Hill,  of  Jackson's  corps,  was  posted  between  Longstreet's  extreme 
right  and  Hamilton's  Crossing,  on  the  railroad.  His  front  line,  consisting 
of  the  brigades  of  Pender,  Lane,  and  Archer,  occupied  the  edge  of  a  wood. 
Lieut.-Col.  Walker,  with  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery,  was  posted  near  the 
right,  supported  by  two  Virginia  regiments.  Early  and  Taliaferro's  divi 
sions  composed  Jackson's  second  line — D.  H.  Hill's  division  his  reserve. 
Gen.  Stuart,  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  his  horse  artillery,  occupied 
the  plain  on  Jackson's  right,  extending  to  Massaponax  Creek. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the  plain  on  which  the  Federal  army  lay, 
was  still  enveloped  in  fog,  making  it  impossible  to  discern  its  operations. 
At  an  early  hour  the  batteries  on  the  heights  of  Stafford  began  to  play 
upon  Longstreet's  position.  In  the  intervals  of  the  fire,  noises  from  the 
valley  and  loud-toned  commands  told  of  marching  and  counter-marching 
in  the  fog  and  mists.  The  rattle  of  picket-firing  on  our  right  gave  tokens 
of  the  impending  battle.  All  was  feverish  expectation.  A  little  past  nine 
o'clock  the  sun  lifted  the  foggy  veil  from  the  valley,  and  there  stood  the 
Federal  array,  right,  left,  and  centre,  just  on  the  point  of  moving. 

Dense  masses  appeared  in  front  of  A.  P.  Hill,  stretching  far  up  the 
river,  in  the  direction  of  Fredericksburg.  As  they  advanced,  Maj.  Pelharn, 
of  Stuart's  horse  artillery,  who  was  stationed  near  the  Port  Royal  road 
with  one  section,  opened  a  rapid  and  well-directed  enfilade  fire,  which 
arrested  their  progress.  Four  batteries  immediately  turned  upon  him,  but 
he  sustained  their  heavy  fire  with  a  courage  that  in  half  an  hour  made 
him  one  of  the  most  famous  names  in  the  Confederacy.  Thirty  Federal 
cannon  were  striving  in  vain  to  silence  him  ;  and  yet  the  young  artillerist 

mly  twenty-two  years  of  age — was  firm  as  a  rock,  his  unyielding  courage 


344  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

and  composure  under  the  deadliest  fire  making  him  for  a  time  a  spectacle 
for  the  whole  field. 

Meanwhile  the  enemy  extended  his  left  down  the  Port  Royal  road,  and 
his  numerous  batteries  opened  with  vigour  upon  Jackson's  line.  Eliciting 
no  response,  his  infantry  moved  forward  to  seize  the  position  occupied  by 
Lieut.-Col.  Walker.  The  latter,  reserving  his  fire  until  their  line  had  ap 
proached  within  less  than  eight  hundred  yards,  opened  upon  it  with  such 
destructive  effect  as  to  cause  it  to  waver,  and  soon  to  retreat  in  confusion. 

About  one,  p.  M.,  the  main  attack  on  the  right  began  by  a  furious  can 
nonade,  under  cover  of  which  three  compact  lines  of  infantry  advanced 
against  Hill's  front.  They  were  received  as  before  by  our  batteries,  by 
whose  fire  they  were  momentarily  checked,  but  soon  recovering,  they 
pressed  forward,  until  coming  within  range  of  our  infantry,  the  contest  be 
came  fierce  and  bloody.  Here  at  one  time  the  enemy  broke  the  Confed 
erate  line,  turning  the  left  of  Archer  and  the  right  of  Lane.  But  reinforce 
ments  from  Jackson's  second  line  were  rapidly  brought  forward,  and  re 
stored  the  battle.  After  a  severe  contest,  the  enemy  was  routed,  driven 
from  the  woods  ;  and  although  largely  reinforced,  he  was  driven  back,  and 
pursued  to  the  shelter  of  the  railroad  embankment.  Here  he  was  gallantly 
charged  by  the  brigades  of  Hoke  and  Atkinson,  and  driven  across  the  plain 
to  his  batteries.  The  repulse  of  the  enemy  on  our  right  was  now  decisive, 
and  the  attack  was  not  renewed,  although  his  batteries  kept  up  active  fire 
at  intervals,  and  sharpshooters  skirmished  along  the  front  during  the  rest 
of  the  afternoon. 

While  these  events  were  transpiring  on  our  right,  the  enemy,  in  formi 
dable  numbers,  made  repeated  and  desperate  assaults  on  the  left  of  our  line. 
Here  was  fixed  the  chief  interest  of  the  field.  Fresh  divisions  had  crossed 
the  river  at  Fredericksburg,  and  the  mass  of  Burnside's  army  was  now  con 
centrated  in  front  of  Longstreet's  strong  position.  Strong  columns  of  at 
tack  were  formed  under  the  withering  fire  of  the  Confederate  batteries  to 
attack  Marye's  and  Willis'  Hills  towering  immediately  in  their  front.  All 
the  batteries  on  the  Stafford  Heights  directed  their  fire  upon  the  positions 
occupied  by  the  Confederate  artillery  with  a  view  to  silence  it,  and  cover 
the  movement  of  the  infantry. 

Our  artillery  did  not  reply  to  the  furious  cannonade.  Bat  as  the 
masses  of  the  enemy  came  forward — one  immediately  in  front  and  one  on 
«ach  flank  of  Marye's  Hill — the  Washington  artillery  corps  poured  into 
these  dense  lines  of  infantry  a  rapid  and  destructive  fire.  Still,  the  enemy, 
notwithstanding  the  havoc  caused  by  our  batteries,  pressed  on  with  great 
determination.  His  ranks  were  frequently  broken  ;  but  at  last  his  lines 
had  staggered  within  one  hundred  yards  of  the  foot  of  the  hill.  At  this 
time  our  infantry  suddenly  rose  and  poured  such  rapid  volleys  into  them, 
that  the  advance  was  impeded  by  their  own  dead.  As  the  columns  halted 


BATTLE   OF    FREDERICKSBURG.  34:5 

and  staggered  and  swayed  or  broke,  our  men  from  breastworks  and  rifle- 
pits,  and  from  every  imaginable  place,  were  pouring  into  their  bleeding 
masses  showers  of  small  shot.  It  was  too  much  for  human  endurance. 
Six  different  attacks,  or  rather  frantic  dashes,  were  directed  against  the 
almost  impregnable  position  of  the  foe.  It  was  an  exhibition  of  courage 
that  was  worthy  of  a  better  cause  and  deserved  a  better  direction.  It  was 
no  longer  a  scientific  battle,  but  a  wholesale  slaughter  of  human  beings, 
In  vain  Sumner  pushed  forward  French,  Hancock,  and  Howard ;  each 
division  was  repulsed  with  terrible  loss ;  the  Irish  brigade  advanced  im 
petuously,  and  almost  perished  within  a  short  distance  of  the  Confederate 
guns ;  all  was  in  vain  ;  and  Gen.  Burnside,  who,  two  miles  across  the  river, 
sat  upon  the  heights,  glass  in  hand,  saw  the  successive  defeat  of  each  as 
saulting  column.  When  night  closed  in,  the  shattered  masses  of  the  enemy 
had  disappeared  in  the  town,  leaving  the  field  covered  with  dead  and 
wounded. 

Burnside  was  now  at  an  appalling  extremity.  His  shattered  army  was 
cowering  beneath  the  houses  of  Fredericksburg,  with  a  river  in  its  rear, 
which,  though  threaded  by  pontoon  bridges,  would  have  been  impassable 
under  the  pressure  of  attack.  The  thought  in  Richmond  was  that  the  time 
had  at  last  come  when  the  consequences  of  a  great  Confederate  victory 
would  be  pursued,  and  its  results  completed  ;  and  the  public  waited  with 
impatience  to  hear  that  Gen.  Lee  had  assumed  the  offensive,  and  despatched 
his  crippled  enemy  on  the  banks  of  the  river.  The  North  trembled  for  the 
same  result.  One  day  might  decide  the  fate  of  the  large  and  yet  mag 
nificent  remnants  of  Burnside's  army  ;  they  might  be  annihilated,  or  take 
the  alternative  of  capitulation  ;  and  the  great  event  might  put  a  new  aspect 
on  the  war,  which  had  so  long  lingered  in  the  trail  of  wasted  and  unfruit 
ful  blood.  Expectation  was  high  in  Richmond ;  there  was  a  keen  impa 
tience  for  the  finishing  blow.  But  in  the  midst  of  these  feelings  came  the 
astounding  news  that  two  days  had  passed  without  any  renewal  of  the 
battle  on  Gen.  Lee's  part,  and  that  on  the  succeeding  night  Burnside  had 
crossed  the  river  without  a  single  effort  at  interruption,  and  that  a  great 
Federal  army,  supposed  to  be  in  the  jaws  of  destruction,  was  now  quietly 
reorganizing  in  perfect  security  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 

Various  excuses  have  been  made  for  Gen.  Lee's  omission  to  assume  the 
offensive,  and  realize  the  proper  result  of  his  victory  at  Fredericksburg. 
These  excuses  have  mostly  originated  in  the  generosity  of  friends  and  ad 
mirers.  But  the  great  commander  himself,  averse  to  all  efforts  of  others 
to  cover  up  any  failure  of  his  own,  and  insensible  to  the  offers  of  misrepre 
sentation  made  to  him  by  flatterers,  has  nobly  and  candidly  confessed  his 
errour.  In  an  official  report  he  says  :  "  The  attack  on  the  13th  had  been 
so  easily  repulsed,  and  by  so  small  a  part  of  our  army,  that  it  was  not 
supposed  the  enemy  would  limit  his  effort  to  one  attempt,  which,  in  view 


346  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

of  the  magnitude  of  liis  preparations,  and  the  extent  of  his  force,  seemed 
to  be  comparatively  insignificant.  Believing,  therefore,  that  he  would 
attack  us,  it  was  not  deemed  expedient  to  lose  the  advantages  of  our  posi 
tion,  and  expose  the  troops  to  the  fire  of  his  inaccessible  batteries  beyond 
the  river,  by  advancing  against  him.  But  we  were  necessarily  ignorant 
of  the  extent  to  which  he  had  suffered,  and  only  became  aware  of  it,  when, 
on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  it  was  discovered  that  he  had  availed  himself 
of  the  darkness  of  night,  and  the  prevalence  of  a  violent  storm  of  wind  and 
rain,  to  recross  the  river." 

The  battle  of  Fredericksburg  presented  a  disproportion  of  loss  on  the 
Federal  and  Confederate  sides,  such  as  no  battle  of  the  war  had  as  yet  ex 
hibited.  A  great  victory,  measured  by  the  list  of  casualties,  had  been  ob 
tained  by  the  Confederates  with  a  comparatively  small  loss.  Gen.  Burn- 
side,  in  his  official  report,  stated :  "  Our  killed  amounts  to  1,152,  our 
wounded  to  about  9,000,  and  our  prisoners  to  about  700."  A  few  days 
after  he  despatched  :  "  On  the  authority  of  our  medical  director,  the  whole 
number  of  wounded  is  between  six  and  seven  thousand."  Gen.  Lee,  in  his 
official  despatch,  writes  :  "  Our  loss  during  the  entire  operations,  since  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  began,  amounts  to  about  eighteen  hundred  killed 
and  wounded."  Among  the  killed  were  two  conspicuous  names — Brig.- 
Gen.  Maxcy  Gregg  of  South  Carolina,  and  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  K.  K.  Cobb 
of  Georgia — men,  who,  aside  from  military  merit,  had  earned  the  reputa 
tion  of  statesmen,  and  had  adorned  the  councils  of  the  South  by  brilliant 
eloquence  and  chivalrous  sentiment.  "  The  country,"  wrote  Gen.  Lee, 
"  consents  to  the  sacrifice  of  such  men  as  these,  and  the  gallant  soldiers 
who  fell  with  them,  only  to  secure  the  inestimable  blessing  they  died  to 
obtain."  This  sentiment  was  written  when  the  cause1  of  the  Confederacy 
was  above  all  earthly  things  in  the  minds  of  its  people,  and  when  the 
dying  words  of  Gregg  were  commemorated  like  a  phrase  of  antique  hero 
ism  :  "  Tell  the  Governor  of  South  Carolina  I  cheerfully  yield  my  life  for 
the  independence  of  my  State  !  " 


OPERATIONS   IN   TENNESSEE. BATTLE   OF   MURFREESBORO. 

Our  last  notice  of  operations  on  the  "Western  theatre  of  the  war,  left 
Gen.  Bragg  in  front  of  Nashville.  The  bulk  of  his  army  had  gone  into 
camp  at  Murfreesboro,  while  the  brigades  of  Forrest  and  Wagner,  about 
five  thousand  effective  cavalry,  were  absent,  annoying  Grant's  rear  in  West 
Tennessee,  and  breaking  the  enemy's  railroad  communications  in  Northern 
Kentucky.  The  main  Federal  army  now  in  Tennessee,  under  command  of 
Gen.  Eosecrans,  maintained  itself  with  some  difficulty  at  Nashville  and  on 
the  line  of  the  Cumberland.  It  was  only  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  forces 


BATTLE   OF    MURFKEESBOEO.  347 

which  threatened  the  Confederacy  from  the  West ;  for  Grant  was  moving 
from  West  Tennessee  into  Mississippi,  while'  a  strong  detached  force  under 
Sherman  was  organizing  for  a  separate  expedition  down  the  Mississippi 
River  against  Vicksburg.  The  Confederate  positions  were  the  lines  of  the 
Tallahatchie  River,  the  approaches  by  rail  into  Mississippi  and  the  forti 
fications  at  Yicksburg.  Such  was  the  situation  in  the  West  at  the  close 
of  the  year  1862,  when  Bragg  confronted  Rosecrans,  and  prepared  for  an 
important  battle,  likely  to  decide  the  fate  of  Tennessee. 

In  the  absence  of  Bragg' s  cavalry,  Rosecrans  determined  to  seize  the 
opportunity  for  attack,  and  to  advance  from  Nashville.  He  prepared  to 
force  the  passage  of  Stone  River  north  of  Murfreesboro,  and  on  the  26th 
December  commenced  to  move  his  forces  ;  McCook,  with  three  divisions, 
forming  the  right  column,  Thomas  the  centre  with  two  divisions,  and  Crit- 
tenden  the  left  with  three  divisions.  The  total  of  this  force  has  been 
officially  stated  by  Rosecrans  at  about  forty-seven  thousand  men  ;  but 
Gen.  Bragg  declares  that  from  papers  captured  from  the  enemy  in  the 
subsequent  battle,  it  was  discovered  that  his  strength  was  nearly,  if  not 
quite  seventy  thousand  men,  while  we  had  on  the  field  on  the  morning  of 
the  battle,  less  than  thirty-five  thousand  men,  of  which  thirty  thousand 
were  infantry  and  artillery. 

The  Confederate  army  was  collected  in  and  around  Murfreesboro ; 
Folk's  corps  and  three  brigades  of  Breckinridge's  division  holding  the 
town.  The  three  cavalry  brigades  of  Wheeler,  Wharton,  and  Fegram, 
occupied  the  entire  front  of  our  infantry,  and  covered  all  approaches  within 
ten  miles  of  Nashville.  It  was  thus  impossible  that  any  movement  of  the 
enemy  could  take  place  without  due  notice  being  received  at  the  Confed 
erate  headquarters.  When  it  was  known  that  he  was  advancing,  prepara 
tions  were  made  to  receive  him ;  the  detached  portion  of  Hardee's  corps 
at  Eagleville  was  brought  up  ;  and  on  the  28th  December  our  main  force 
of  infantry  and  artillery  was  concentrated  in  front  of  Murfreesboro,  whilst 
the  cavalry,  supported  by  three  brigades  of  infantry  and  three  batteries  ol 
artillery,  impeded  the  advance  of  the  enemy  by  constant  skirmishing  and 
sudden,  unexpected  attacks. 

The  whole  force  of  the  enemy  was  concentrated  on  and  near  the  direct 
road  on  the  west  of  Stone  River.  Crittenden's  corps  formed  the  left  of  the 
line,  Thomas  the  centre,  of  which  Negley's  division  was  drawn  up  in  ad 
vance,  and  Rousseau's  in  reserve,  and  McCook's  corps  the  right.  The  road 
and  the  river  divided  both  armies  into  two  wings.  The  ground  was  favour 
able  to  manoeuvre — large  open  fields,  densely  wooded  tracts  of  cedar  and 
thinner  ones  of  oak  ;  the  gentle  swells  of  the  land  were  scarcely  increased  by 
the  banks  of  Stone  River,  which  ran  through  the  lines  of  both  armies,  was 
ford  able  at  almost  every  point  for  infantry,  and  at  short  intervals  practi 
cable  for  artillery.  The  Confederate  line  of  battle  was  about  nine  miles  in 


34:8  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

length.  Folk's  corps,  consisting  of  Withers'  and  Cheatham's  divisions, 
formed  our  left  wing.  Hardee's  corps,  consisting  of  Breckinridge's  and 
Cleburne's  divisions,  with  McCown's  division,  held  in  reserve  on  his  right 
flank,  was  formed  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  its  left  resting  near  the 
Nashville  road,  and  its  right  extending  towards  the  Lebanon  pike. 

On  the  night  of  the  30th  December  both  armies  bivouacked  at  a  distance 
not  greater  in  some  places  than  five  hundred  yards,  the  camp-fires  of  the  two 
being  within  distinct  view.  Both  commanders  prepared  to  attack  the  next 
day.  Rosecrans  drew  up  an  elaborate  plan  of  battle,  and  expressed  uneasi 
ness  at  McCook's  position  on  the  right.  By  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  • 
of  the  31st  December,  the  troops  were  preparing  for  the  battle. 

But  the  enemy's  attack  had  been  anticipated.  At  the  break  of  day  on 
the  cold  and  cloudy  morning,  Gen.  Hardee  gave  the  order  to  advance,  and 
commenced  the  battle  by  a  rapid  and  impetuous  charge  on  McCook's- posi 
tion.  The  enemy  here  was  taken  completely  by  surprise ;  general  and 
staff-officers  were  not  mounted  ;  artillery  horses  not  hitched,  and  infantry 
not  formed.  One  of  McCook's  divisions,  after  a  sharp  but  fruitless  contest, 
was — to  use  the  words  of  Gen.  Rosecrans  himself — "  crumbled  to  pieces." 
Hardee  continued  to  push  the  enemy,  pursuing  his  victorious  career  for 
miles,  while  captured  artillery,  flying  battalions,  and  hosts  of  prisoners, 
attested  the  rout.  The  entire  right  wing  of  Rosecrans  was  being  driven  in 
the  greatest  disorder,  and  it  appeared  that  the  day  was  already  decided. 
McCook's  corps  was  driven  for  six  miles  towards  the  centre.  For  hours 
continued  the  rapid  movement  of  the  noise  of  battle  towards  the  north, 
and,  at  last,  the  streams  of  fugitives  and  stragglers  passing  towards  the 
Nashville  road,  and  making  their  way  in  the  greatest  disorder  through  the 
cane-brakes,  convinced  Rosecrans,  of  what  had  been  before  reported  to 
him,  that  McCook's  corps  was  utterly  routed.  The  Federal  commander 
was  remarkable  for  self-possession  and  sang-froid.  As  report  of  disaster 
after  disaster  came  to  him,  he  remarked :  "  We  will  soon  rectify  it."  He 
was  incorrectly  told  that  McCook  was  killed  "  We  cannot  help  it,"  he 
replied  ;  "  men  who  fight  must  be  killed.  Never  mind  ;  let  us  fight  this 
battle."  It  was  a  crisis  in  which  such  cool  words  were  remarkable.  It 
was  now  near  noon,  and  Rosecrans  had  his  right  wing  broken ;  he  had 
already  lost  twenty-eight  pieces  of  cannon,  and  not  less  than  five  thousand 
prisoners  ;  and  it  was  in  such  circumstances  that  he  was  to  prepare  a  new 
disposition  of  his  forces,  and  impart  a  new  inspiration  to  dispute  what  re 
mained  of  the  day. 

A  new  line  of  battle  was  rapidly  developed.  Rousseau's  division  was 
hurried  forward  from  the  centre,  and  Crittenden  was  ordered  to  abandon 
all  idea  of  an  advance,  and  to  march  as  quickly  as  possible  two  out  of  his 
three  divisions  to  support  the  right  wing.  These  movements  were  masked 
by  immense  cedar  forests.  The  whole  of  the  Federal  right  and  centre  was 


I  BATTLE   OF   MFRFREESBOKO.  349 

now  drawn  up  nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  position  it  held  in  the  morn 
ing.  The  right  of  the  left  wing  held  the  angle  of  high  ground  between 
the  rail  and  river.  Here  the  enemy  massed  his  artillery,  and  seemed  to 
bid  defiance  to  the  hitherto  victorious  career  of  the  Confederates. 

Finding  that  the  enemy  had  concentrated  such  a  force  on  Hardee's 
front  as  to  check  his  further  j>r  ogress,  Gen.  Bragg  sent  orders  for  Breckin- 
ridge's  division  to  move  from  the  right  to  reinforce  Polk ;  but  there  was  a 
considerable  delay  in  carrying  out  this  order,  owing  to  a  threat  of  an  ad 
vance  on  the  Federal  left,  and  a  rumour  of  fresh  forces  appearing  on  the 
Lebanon  pike.  "  These  unfortunate  misrepresentations,"  said  Gen.  Bragg, 
"  on  that  part  of  the  field  which,  with  proper  caution,  could  not  have  ex 
isted,  withheld  from  active  operations  three  fine  brigades  until  the  enemy 
had  succeeded  in  checking  our  progress,  had  re-established  his  lines,  and 
had  collected  many  of  his  broken  battalions." 

Having  settled  the  question  that  no  movement  was  being  made  against 
our  right,  and  none  to  be  apprehended,  Breckinridge  was  ordered  to  leave 
two  brigades  to  support  the  battery  on  his  side  of  Stone  River — and  with 
the  remainder  of  the  force  to  cross  to  the  left,  and  report  to  Polk.  By  the 
time  this  could  be  accomplished  it  was  too  late  to  send  this  force  to  Har 
dee's  support,  who  was  unable  to  make  further  progress,  and  he  was 
directed  to  maintain  his  position.  Polk  was  directed  with  these  reinforce 
ments  to  throw  all  the  force  he  could  collect  upon  the  enemy's  extreme 
left,  and  thereby  either  carry  that  strong  point  which  had  so  far  resisted 
us  so  successfully — or  failing  in  that,  at  least  to  draw  off  from  Hardee's  front 
the  formidable  opposition  there  concentrated.  The  three  brigades  of  Jack 
son,  Preston,  and  Adams  were  successively  reported  for  their  work. 

Upon  this  flank,  his  strongest  defensive  position  resting  on  the  river- 
bank,  the  enemy  had  concentrated  not  less  than  twenty  pieces  of  artillery, 
masked  almost  from  view,  but  covering  an  open  space  in  front  of  several  hun 
dred  yards,  supported  right  and  left  and  rear  by  heavy  masses  of  infantry. 
A  terrible  trial  awaited  the  devoted  men  who  were  to  attack  this  position. 
As  they  pressed  up  to  the  edge  of  the  cedar  forest,  and  swarmed  out  into 
the  open  field,  it  was  a  grand  scene.  Every  feature  of  it  was  keenly  cut 
and  clearly  defined.  The  day  was  one  of  surpassing  beauty.  The  gray 
suits  of  the  Confederates  dotted  the  dark  line  of  the  cedars  ;  presently  they 
could  be  seen  to  thicken  in  order  of  battle,  with  the  bright  glitter  of  their 
steel  flashing  in  the  heavy  green  of  the  thicket.  As  they  passed  into 
the  open  field,  the  hostile  array  imparted  sublimity  to  the  spectacle.  Great 
masses  of  troops  moved  steadily  forward,  careless  of  the  batteries,  which 
tore  open  their  ranks,  and  scattered  them  bleeding  upon  the  soil.  They 
marched  through  the  destroying  storm  dauntlessly.  Two  attempts  were 
made  to  carry  the  enemy's  position.  But  each  time  the  whole  extent  of 
their  lines  was  engirdled  with  a  belt  of  flame  and  smoke,  and  the  ground 


350  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

strewn  with  their  dead.  For  two  hours  the  battle  raged  with  horrible 
slaughter,  and  neither  side  receded  until  near  five  o'clock.  Then  the 

o  ' 

nearly  exhausted  armies  suspended  operations  for  the  night,  excepting  the 
play  of  a  few  batteries. 

It  had  been  a  desperate  but  undecided  contest.  The  advantage  was 
with  the  Confederates.  They  had  driven  the  enemy's  right  almost  upon 
his  left,  captured  nearly  one-third  of  his  artillery,  compelled  him  to  change 
front  under  fire,  and  occupied  that  part  of  the  field  from  which  he  had 
been  driven  in  the  morning.  Rosecrans  had  shown  a  great  power  in 
handling  troops,  and  had  performed  a  manoeuvre  requiring  high  qualities 
of  generalship  ;  for  he  had  successfully  formed  a  new  line  in  presence  of 
an  enemy  and  under  his  attacks. 

The  next  day — 1st  January,  1863 — Gen.  Bragg  telegraphed  to  Rich 
mond  :  "  God  has  granted  us  a  happy  New  Year."  The  exultation  of  the 
despatch  was  extravagant,  and  was  certainly  not  justified  by  what  ensued. 
The  first  of  January  passed  without  any  important  event.  Breckinridge 
had  been  transferred  to  the  right  of  Stone  River  to  resume  the  command 
of  that  position,  now  held  by  two  of  his  brigades.  It  was  soon  reported 
that  no  change  had  occurred,  except  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  from  the 
advanced  position  occupied  by  his  left  flank.  Finding,  upon  further  ex 
amination,  that  this  was  the  case,  the  right  flank  of  Folk's  corps  was 
thrown  forward  to  occupy  the  ground  for  which  we  had  so  obstinately  con 
tended  the  evening  before.  This  shortened  our  lines  considerably,  and 
gave  us  possession  of  the  centre  of  the  battle-field,  from  which  we  gleaned 
the  spoils  and  trophies  throughout  the  day,  and  transferred  them  rapidly 
to  the  rear. 

On  the  2d  January,  Yan  Cleve's  division  of  the  enemy's  forces  was 
thrown  across  the  river,  and  occupied  the  eminence  from  which  Gen. 
Folk's  line  was  commanded  and  enfiladed.  The  dislodgement  of  this  force 
or  the  withdrawal  of  Folk's  line  was  an  evident  necessity.  The  latter  in 
volved  consequences  not  to  be  entertained.  Orders  were  accordingly 
given  for  the  concentration  of  the  whole  of  Breckinridge's  division  in  front 
of  the  position  to  be  taken.  An  addition  was  made  to  his  command  of  ten 
Napoleon  guns,  and  the  cavalry  forces  of  "Wharton  and  Pegram,  about  two 
thousand  men,  were  ordered  to  join  in  the  attack  on  his  right.  The  in 
structions  given  to  Breckinridge  were  to  drive  the  enemy  back,  crown  the 
hill,  intrench  his  artillery,  and  hold  the  position. 

The  attack  was  made  at  4  p.  M.  Van  Cleve's  division  gave  way,  re 
tired  in  confusion  across  the  river,  and  was  closely  followed  by  the  Con 
federates.  The  enemy,  however,  had  disposed  his  batteries  on  the  hill  on 
the  west  side  of  the  river,  and  Negley's  division  was  ordered  up  to  meet 
the  onset.  The  firing  was  terrific.  In  about  half  an  hour  the  Confeder 
ates  lost  two  thouand  men.  Breckinridge's  command  was  driven  back  in 


BATTLE   OF   MUKFBEESBORO.  351 

considerable  disorder  ;  but  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  was  checked  by  An 
derson's  brigade  of  Mississippians,  which  was  thrown  forward  from  Folk's 
line,  staggered  the  enemy,  and  saved  all  the  guns  not  captured  before  its 
arrival. 

Next  day  the  rain  fell  in  torrents.  Each  General  anticipated  an  attack 
from  his  opponent,  and  neither  appeared  willing  to  commence  a  new  bat 
tle.  Meanwhile  Bragg  was  deceived  into  the  belief  that  the  enemy  was 
receiving  reinforcements,  and  in  view  of  the  exhausted  condition  of  his 
army,  determined  to  withdraw  from  the  unequal  contest.  In  the  night  of 
the  3d  January,  the  retreat  was  commenced  without  molestation  from  the 
enemy.  The  next  day  Rosecrans  moved  into  Murfreesboro,  and  Bragg 
retired  to  Tullahoma,  which,  as  a  base  of  operations,  and  as  a  position  of 
defence,  offered  great  advantages. 

The  occupation  of  Murfreesboro  afforded  the  North  some  pretence  of 
claiming  a  victory.  But  the  position  was  of  little  importance,  and  the 
works  neither  extensive  nor  strong.  The  actual  results  of  the  battle  were 
in  favour  of  the  Confederates.  Our  loss  exceeded  ten  thousand,  nine 
thousand  of  whom  were  killed  or  wounded.  As  our  offset  to  this  loss,  we 
had  taken  considerably  over  six  thousand  prisoners,  and  had  captured  over 
thirty  pieces  of  cannon,  sixty  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  ambulances, 
mules,  and  horses,  with  a  large  amount  of  other  valuable  property,  all  of 
which  was  secured  and  appropriated  to  proper  uses.  Besides  all  this  se 
cured,  we  destroyed  not  less  than  eight  hundred  wagons,  mostly  laden  with 
various  articles,  such  as  arms,  ammunition,  provisions,  baggage,  clothing, 
medicine,  and  hospital  stores.  We  had  lost  only  three  pieces  of  artillery, 
all  in  Breckinridge's  repulse.  Rosecrans  gave  his  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  as  8,778.  Of  this  estimate  Gen.  Bragg  remarks  :  "  One  corps, 
commanded  by  Maj.-Gen.  Thomas  L.  Crittenden,  which  was  least  exposed 
in  the  engagement,  report  over  five  thousand  killed  and  wounded.  As  the' 
enemy  had  two  other  corps,  and  a  separate  division,  third  of  a  corps,  and 
cavalry,  his  loss  is  safely  estimated  at  three  thousand  killed  and  sixteen 
thousand  wounded.  Adding  the  six  thousand  two  hundred  and  seventy- 
three  prisoners,  we  have  a  total  of  twenty-five  thousand  two  hundred  and 
seventy-three." 

The  battle  of  Murfreesboro  was  the  subject  of  much  criticism  in  the 
Confederacy,  and  the  occasion  of  various  commentaries.  Gen.  Bragg  was 
famous  for  his  profuse  censure  of  his  officers,  and  his  ascription  of  every 
failure  in  his  campaigns  to  the  fault  of  some  subordinate  officer.  He  never 
wrote  an  official  report  without  such  unpleasant  and  suspicious  element  of 
recrimination  in  it.  He  made  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro  a  text  of  censure 
of  his  subordinates ;  he  declared  that  the  remissness  of  Breckinridge,  on 
the  first  day  of  action,  checked  Hardee's  success,  and  made  the  victory  in 
complete.  But  he  found  in  this  terrible  battle  the  occasion  of  a  beautiful 


852  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

and  memorable  tribute  to  the  private  soldier  of  the  Confederacy.  He 
wrote  :  "  To  the  private  soldier  a  fair  word  of  praise  is  due,  and  though  it 
is  so  seldom  given  and  so  rarely  expected,  that  it  may  be  considered  out 
of  place,  I  cannot,  in  justice  to  myself,  withhold  the  opinion  ever  enter 
tained,  and  so  often  expressed  during  our  struggle  for  independence.  In 
the  absence  of  instructions  and  discipline  of  our  armies,  and  of  the  confi 
dence  which  long  associations  produce  between  veterans,  we  have,  in  a 
great  measure,  to  trust  to  the  individuality  and  self-reliance  of  the  private 
soldier.  Without  the  incentive  or  the  motive  which  controls  the  officer, 
who  hopes  to  live  in  history,  without  the  hope  of  reward,  actuated  only  by 
a  sense  of  duty  and  patriotism,  he  has  in  this  great  contest  justly  judged 
that  the  cause  was  his  own,  and  gone  into  it  witJi  a  determination  to  con 
quer  or  die,  to  be  free  or  not  to  be.  at  all.  No  encomium  is  too  high,  no 
honour  too  great  for  such  a  soldier.  However  much  of  credit  and  glory 
may  be  given,  and  probably  justly  given,  to  the  leaders  in  the  struggle, 
history  will  yet  award  the  main  honour,  where  it  is  due,  to  the  private  sol 
dier,  who,  without  hope  of  reward,  and  with  no  other  incentive  than  a 
conscientiousness  of  rectitude,  has  encountered  all  the  hardships,  and  has 
suffered  all  the  privations.  "Well  has  it  been  said :  The  first  monument 
our  Confederacy  raises,  when  our  independence  shall  have  been  won, 
should  be  a  lofty  shaft,  pure  and  spotless,  bearing  this  inscription :  '  To 
the  unknown  and  unrecorded  dead.'  " 


OPERATIONS    IN   THE   TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. 

In  other  quarters  of  the  war  less  important  than  Virginia  and  Tennes 
see,  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1862  was  without  considerable  interest. 
Since  the  commands  of  Price  and  Van  Dorn  had  moved  east  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  the  campaign  in  the  extensive  country  west  of  that  river  had  be 
come  feeble  and  irregular.  It  was  marked,  however,  by  one  battle — that 
of  Prairie  Grove — the  dimensions  of  which  were  large  for  that  campaign, 
and  the  results  of  no  little  importance  to  the  country  of  the  Trans-Mis 
sissippi. 

In  the  latter  months  of  1862,  Maj.-Gen.  T.  C.  Hindman  was  command 
ing  what  was  known  as  the  District  of  Arkansas.  Lieut.-Gen.  Hoimes 
was  commanding  the  Trans-Mississippi  department,  with  his  headquarters 
at  Little  Rock.  Gen.  Blunt,  commanding  about  seven  thousand  Federal 
troops,  had  advanced  from  Springfield  as  far  as  Cane  Hill,  Arkansas, 
driving  Gen.  Marmaduke,  who  was  commanding  a  small  division  of 
cavalry.  Gen.  Hindman,  with  about  eight  thousand  Missouri,  Texas,  and 
Arkansas  infantry  and  artillery,  was  at  Yan  Buren.  It  was  considered 
necessary  to  oppose  the  further  advance  of  Blunt ;  and  accordingly,  on  the 


OPERATIONS   IN   THE   TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.  353 

1st  December,  Gen.  Hindman  put  his  whole  force  in  motion  to  meet  the 
enemy,  and,  if  possible,  drive  him  back,  as  a  large  supply  of  quartermaster 
and  commissary  stores  had  been  collected  at  Van  Buren. 

Owing  to  delays  occasioned  by  crossing  the  river  and  the  bad  condition 
of  our  transportation,  the  command  did  not  reach  the  camp  on  Cove  Creek 
until  the  evening  of  the  5th.  The  position  was  six  miles  from  Cane  Hill, 
the  same  where  Gen,  Price  halted  on  his  retreat  from  Springfield  in  the 
winter  of  1861.  "When  Gen.  Hindman  reached  this  place,  he  learned  that 
Blunt  was  camped  at  Cane  Hill,  and  that  Gen.  Herron,  with  five  thousand 
men,  was  pushing  on  rapidly  from  Springfield  to  reinforce  him.  It  was 
immediately  determined  by  Hindman  to  meet  this  latter  force,  and,  de 
feating  it,  to  turn  upon  Blunt,  and  force  him  to  surrender.  He  issued  an 
extravagant  address  to  his  soldiers,  and  designated  the  enemy  opposed  to 
them  as  a  combination  of  "  Pin  Indians,  free  negroes,  Southern  tories, 
Kansas  Jayhawkers,  and  hired  Dutch  cut-throats."  He  declared  that  un 
less  this  ruthless  force  was  defeated,  the  country  would  be  ruined. 

In  order  that  Gen.  Hindman's  plan  of  operations  might  bo  effectual,  it 
was  necessary  to  engage  Blunt's  attention  so  as  to  prevent  his  falling  back 
to  Fayetteville,  and  forming  a  junction  with  Herron.  For  this  purpose, 
early  in  the  morning  of  the  6th  December,  a  regiment  of  cavalry  was  sent 
to  drive  in  the  enemy's  outposts  nearest  us.  At  sunrise,  the  llth  Missouri 
infantry  were  pushed  forward  as  far  as  the  cavalry  had  advanced,  to  de 
ploy  as  if  to  invite  attack.  It  only  succeeded  in  developing  a  party  of 
Indians,  who  declined  attacking.  In  the  evening,  Hindman's  whole  force 
was  moved  up  to  the  ground  occupied  by  the  llth  Missouri  infantry,  and 
a  regiment  of  cavalry  was  ordered  to  drive  in  the  skirmishers,  and  feel 
the  main  body.  Some  desultory  fighting  ensued,  and  continued  until 
nightfall. 

Hindman's  whole  command,  resting  on  their  arms,  were  ordered  to 
move  at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  on  the  roads  towards  Fayetteville,  to 
attack  Herron's  force  approaching  the  field  of  battle.  A  regiment  of 
cavalry  was  ordered  to  remain  with  one  battery  of  light  field  pieces,  and 
to  commence  shelling  the  enemy  in  front  at  daylight.  The  next  morning, 
the  command  struck  the  Fayetteville  and  Cane  Hill  road,  and  surprised 
the  advance-guard  of  Herron's  force,  capturing  two  hundred  prisoners. 

This  success  appears  to  have  confused  Gen.  Hindman,  and,  instead  of 
atacking  Herron  immediately  and  with  vigour,  he  divided  his  force,  send 
ing  Parsons'  brigade  in  the  direction  of  Cane  Hill,  as  if  expecting  an  attack 
from  Blunt.  Meanwhile,  Blunt,  anticipating  a  flank  movement,  had  fallen 
back,  and  Hindman  made  a  new  disposition  of  his  forces.  But  valuable 
time  had  been  lost,  and  the  attack  was  not  made  on  Herron's  force  until 
halt-past  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  In  our  line  of  battle,  the  Arkansas 
troops  were  on  the  right  flank,  the  First  Missouri  brigade  forming  the 
23 


354  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

centre,  the  Second  Missouri  brigade  the  left,  and  the  Texan  troops  the 
reserve.  The  action  had  scarcely  commenced,  when  Gen.  Blunt,  who, 
having  burned  his  stores  and  his  train,  had  made  a  rapid  movement,  by  an 
obscure  road  leading  through  a  valley,  reached  the  battle-field.  The  new 
force  appeared  upon  the  Confederate  left.  It  was  necessary  for  the  First 
Missouri  brigade  to  change  its  front  from  the  east  to  the  north,  to  meet  the 
charge  which  the  enemy  was  now  preparing  to  make.  Just  as  the  evolu 
tion  was  completed,  the  combined  forces  of  the  enemy  advanced  to  the 
charge.  It  was  gallantly  met  by  the  two  Missouri  brigades.  As  night 
fell,  the  action  was  decided.  The  enemy  was  driven  from  the  field  ;  Blunt 
swinging  around,  uniting  with  Herron,  and  both  retreating.  The  Federal 
forces  fell  back  six  miles. 

The  evidences  of  victory  were  with  the  Confederates.  Their  loss  was 
about  two  hundred  killed  and  five  hundred  wounded  ;  that  of  the  enemy, 
by  his  own  accounts,  exceeded  a  thousand.  It  appears,  however,  that 
Hindman,  who  had  blundered  during  the  day,  although  he  had  yet  suc 
ceeded  in  driving  the  combined  forces  of  Herron  and  Blunt,  was  so  im 
pressed  with  the  fact  they  had  formed  a  junction,  that  he  determined  to 
retreat  during  the  night.  The  wheels  of  his  artillery  were  muffled,  and 
the  Confederates  actually  retreated  from  a  field  of  victory.  Thus  termi 
nated  the  battle  of  Prairie  Grove  (as  it  was  called  by  the  Confederates) ; 
the  importance  of  which  was  that  it  virtually  decided  the  war  north  of 
the  Arkansas  River. 

The  country  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  suffered  from  peculiar  causes  in 
the  war.  A  great  part  of  it  not  only  laboured  under  military  inconi- 
petency ;  but  singular  disorders  affected  the  whole  population,  and  an 
enormous  despotism  cursed  the  land.  Gen.  Hindman,  who  had  but  a  weak 
head  in  military  matters,  exhibited  an  iron  hand  in  the  management  of 
other  affairs,  usurped  all  authority  in  the  country  he  occupied,  and  exer 
cised  a  tyrannical  rule,  that  only  finds  a  parallel  in  antique  despotism. 
His  conduct  was  made  the  subject  of  a  special  investigation  in  the  Congress 
at  Kichmond.  It  was  discovered  that  he  had  established  within  his  mili 
tary  lines  what  he  was  pleased  to  call  a  "  government  ad  interim"  He 
superseded  the  entire  civil  authority  ;  he  deliberately  amplified  the  con 
scription  law  by  proclamation  ;  he  declared  martial  law  throughout  Ar 
kansas  and  the  northern  portion  of  Texas ;  and  he  demanded,  under  the 
penalty  of  death,  the  services  of  all  whom  he  had  tyrannically  embraced 
in  his  conscription  lists.  Crops  were  ravaged  ;  cotton  burned,  or  appro 
priated  to  unknown  purposes  ;  while  straggling  soldiers,  belonging  to  dis 
tant  commands,  traversed  the  country,  armed  and  lawless,  robbing  the 
people  of  their  property  under  the  pretence  of  "  impressing  "  it  for  the 
Confederate  service.  To  a  great  part  of  the  country  within  the  limits  of 
his  command  Hindman  extended  no  protection  whatever.  Hostile  Indians 


CRUELTIES   AND   DISORDERS   OF    GEN.    HINDMAN.  355 

began  collecting  on  the  border,  and  Federal  emissaries  were  busy  among 
the  Cherokees  and  Creeks,  inciting  disaffection.  Detachments  of  Federal 
cavalry  penetrated,  at  will,  into  various  parts  of  the  upper  half  of  Ar 
kansas,  plundering  and  burning  houses,  stealing  horses  and  slaves,  destroy 
ing  farming  utensils,  murdering  men  loyal  to  the  Confederacy,  or  carrying 
them  into  captivity,  forcing  the  oath  of  allegiance  on  the  timid,  and  dis 
seminating  disloyal  sentiments  among  the  ignorant. 

Such  a  condition  of  affairs  could  not  long  be  tolerated,  although  the 
statements  of  it  were  slow  in  reaching  Kichmond,  and  obtaining  the  just 
consideration  of  the  Government  there.  The  cruelties  and  disorders  of 
Hindman — notoriously  the  favourite  of  President  Davis — became  at  last 
so  enormous  in  Arkansas,  that  it  was  unsafe  that  he  should  remain  there 
longer,  when  he  was  brought  across  the  Mississippi  River,  and  assigned  to 
some  special  duty.  It  was  indeed  remarkable  that  the  people  of  the  Trans- 
Mississippi,  with  such  an  experience  of  maltreatment,  and  in  spite  of  a  con 
viction  that  the  concerns  of  this  distant  portion  of  the  Confederacy  were 
grossly  neglected  at  Bichnaond,  should  yet  have,  even  to  the  latest  period 
of  the  war,  faithfully  kept  and  fondly  cherished  their  attachment  to  the 
vital  principle  of  our  struggle  and  the  common  cause  of  our  arms.  It  was 
an  exhibition  of  devotion  and  of  extraordinary  virtue  in  the  Confederate 
States  west  of  the  Mississippi  River  that  should  be  omitted  in  no  historic 
record  of  the  war. 


CHAPTEE    XXI. 

REVIEW  OF  POLITICAL  QUESTIONS  IN  THE  WAR. — THE  THEEAD  OF  ANTI-SLAVERY  LEGISLATION. 
— PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S  HESITATION. — THE  OPPOSITION  TO  HIS  ADMINISTRATION. — SCHEME 
OF  COMPENSATED  EMANCIPATION. — HOW  VISIONARY. — MR.  LINCOLN'S  MOTIVES  IN  SUG 
GESTING  IT. THE  PRESIDENT  AND  THE  CHICAGO  DEPUTATION. — HIS  CHARACTERISTIC  DIS 
COURSE  ON  SLAVERY. — HIS  REFERENCE  TO  THE  POPE'S  BULL  AGAINST  THE  COMET. — POLIT 
ICAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  SHARPSBURG. — THE  MASK  DROPPED. — THE  PROCLA 
MATION  OF  EMANCIPATION. — MISREPRESENTATIONS  OF  IT. — AN  ACT  OF  MALICE  TOWARDS 
THE  MASTER,  NOT  ONE  OF  MERCY  TO  THE  SLAVE. — PRETENCE  OF  "  MILITARY  NECESSITY." 

— DISHONOUR  OF  THE  PLEA. — PROOF  OF  ITS   FALSEHOOD. EFFECT  OF   THE  EMANCIPATION 

PROCLAMATION  ON  THE  CONFEDERATES. — PRESIDENT  DAVIS1  COMMENTARY. — SPIRIT  OF 
THE-  PRESS  AND  PEOPLE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY. — EFFECT  OF  THE  PROCLAMATION  IN  THE 
NORTH. — ANALYSIS  OF  THE  NORTHERN  ELECTIONS  OF  1862. — THE  DEMOCRATIC  PROTEST 
AGAINST  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S  ADMINISTRATION. — SPEECH  OF  MR.  COX  IN  THE  FED 
ERAL  CONGRESS. — SUPPOSED  DESIGN  OF  "  RECONSTRUCTION  "  OF  THE  UNION. — HOW  THE 

IDEA  WAS  TREATED  IN  RICHMOND. SAVAGE  DENUNCIATIONS  OF  IT. — VICE-PRESIDENT 

STEPHENS'  DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE  OR  DEATH. — MILITARY  OPERATIONS  IN  THE 

EARLY  MONTHS  OF  1863. GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF  THE  WAR  IN  THE  WINTER  SEASON. — 

THE  RECAPTURE  OF  GALVESTON  BY  THE  CONFEDERATES. — FIGHT  BETWEEN  THE  COTTON- 
BOATS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  FLEET. — THE  HARRIET  LANE  CAPTURED. — THE  OTHER  FEDERAL 
VESSELS  SURRENDER,  BUT  ESCAPE  UNDER  WHITE  FLAGS. — RENEWED  ATTEMPTS  AGAINST 
VIOKSBURG. — SHAMEFUL  FAILURE  OF  SHERMAN'S  EXPEDITION. — THIRD  ATTEMPT  UPON 

VICK8BURG  MADE   BY   GEN.  GRANT. ITS  FAILURE. — ATTEMPT   OF   FARRAGUT's   FLEET   TO 

RUN  PAST  PORT  HUDSON. — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI. — CAPTURE  OF  ARKANSAS 
POST  BY  THE  FEDERALS. — ITS  IMPORTANCE. — ATTACK  OF  AN  IRON-CLAD  FLEET  UPON 
CHARLESTON. TRIAL  BETWEEN  IRON-CLADS  AND  ARTILLERY. COMBAT  OF  THE  KEOKUK 

AND  FORT  SUMTER. — COMPLETE  TRIUMPH  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — THE  PRESTIGE  OF 
u 


THE  beginning  of  the  year  1862 — when  the  heavy  operations  of  the 
war  on  land  were  suspended  by  the  rigour  of  winter — presents  a  conve 
nient  period  for  review  of  some  political  questions  in  the  war. 

The  thread  of  Anti-Slavery  legislation  appeared  for  some  time  to  have 
been  broken  with  the  decree  of  emancipation  in  the  District  of  Columbia. 
President  Lincoln  evidently  hesitated  to  identify  his  Administration  fur 
ther  with  the  radical  party  in  the  war.  A  formidable  opposition  was  gath 
ering  in  the  North  with  especial  reference  to  the  Anti-Slavery  acts  of  the 
Government  at  Washington  ;  it  was  declared  that  these  acts  were  divert- 


THE  ANTI-SLAVERY   LEGISLATION.  357 

ing  the  war  to  the  ends  of  fanaticism,  and  that  the  Government  had  delib 
erately  violated  the  pledge  contained  in  the  resolution  offered  by  Mr. 
Crittenden  of  Kentucky,  and  passed  almost  unanimously  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  at  the  beginning  of  the  civil  conflict,  to  the  effect  that  the 
war  should  not  be  waged  in  hostility  to  the  institutions  of  any  of  the 
States.  President  Lincoln,  as  we  have  already  seen,  had  been  advised,  in 
the  summer  of  1862,  that  McClellan  disapproved  of  any  infraction  of  the 
laws  of  civilized  and  Christian  warfare ;  that  he  disapproved  of  arbitrary 
arrests  in  places  where  the  insurrection  did  not  prevail ;  that  he  did  not 
contemplate  any  seizure  of  private  property  for  the  support  of  the  army,  or 
measures  for  punishing  or  desolating  the  region  invaded  ;  but  that  he  ear 
nestly  desired  that  the  war  should  be  carried  on  as  a  duel  between  organized 
armies,  and  not  against  non-combatants  ;  that  the  institutions  of  the  States 
should  be  protected  ;  that  no  proclamation  of  freedom,  incensing  a  servile 
race  to  indiscriminate  massacre  of  helpless  whites,  and  inviting  the  destruc 
tion  of  unoffending  blacks,  should  be  permitted  ;  in  fine,  that,  wherever  it 
was  possible,  the  military  should  be  subordinate  to  the  civil  authority,  and 
the  Constitution  alone  should  be  the  guide  and  glory  of  heroic  sacrifice. 

It  is  remarkable  that  President  Lincoln,  in  the  summer  of  1862,  gave 
no  distinct  and  decided  evidence  that  this  plan  of  action  was  obnoxious  to 
him.  His  course  at  this  time  on  the  slavery  question  was  rather  disposed 
to  conciliate  both  parties  in  the  North ;  and  he  did  nothing  more  than 
make  a  bungling  experiment  at  compromise  in  proposing  a  scheme  of 
compensated  emancipation,  which  being  excessively  visionary  and  imprac 
ticable,  soon  passed  out  of  the  public  mind.  It  was  readily  seen  by  men 
of  all  parties  that  this  scheme  would  create  a  pecuniary  burden  whfch  the 
Government  would  be  utterly  unable  to  carry  along  with  the  expenses  of 
the  war.  At  the  rate  of  $300,  it  was  calculated  that  the  slaves  in  the  in 
surgent  States  would  be  worth  $1,049,508,000 ;  and  adding  the  cost  of 
compensation  to  the  Border  States,  at  the  same  rate,  the  aggregate  expense 
of  emancipation  would  be  $1,185,840,300.  There  was  no  disposition  on 
the  part  of  the  tax-paying  public  to  meet  such  liabilities  in  addition  to  the 
war  debt ;  and  the  scheme  of  compensated  emancipation  never  went  fur 
ther  than  a  record  of  votes  in  Congress.  That  body  passed  a  resolution 
that  "  the  United  States  ought  to  co-operate  with  any  State  which  may 
adopt  gradual  abolishment  of  slavery,  giving  to  such  State  pecuniary  aid, 
to  be  used  by  such  State  in  its  discretion,  to  compensate  for  the  inconve 
niences,  public  and  private,  produced  by  such  a  change  of  system."  In 
pursuance  of  this  resolution,  President  Lincoln  transmitted  to  Congress  the 
draft  of  a  bill  upon  the  subject.  The  bill  was  referred  to  a  committee,  but 
no  action  was  taken  upon  it,  nor  did  any  of  the  Border  States  respond  to 
the  President's  invitation  to  take  the  initiative  in  his  scheme,  and  try  the 
virtue  of  the  resolution  adopted  by  Congress. 


358  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

But  although  the  scheme  of  compensated  emancipation  was  visionary 
with  regard  to  the  objects  it  professed,  it  is  quite  possible  that  it  may  have 
served  a  secret  purpose  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  that  it  was  really  intended  to 
test  the  sentiment  of  both  sections  of  the  country,  and  to  prepare  the  way 
for  the  more  vigorous  treatment  of  the  subject  of  slavery.  The  time  was 
coming  when  he  would  have  to  decide  between  the  conservative  and  radi 
cal  elements  of  the  North,  and  determine  a  question  which  was  being 
pressed  upon  him  by  public  sentiments  which  could  not  be  compromised. 
On  the  15th  September,  1862,  a  memorial  was  presented  to  him  by  a  depu 
tation  from  Chicago,  praying  for  the  immediate  issue  of  a  proclamation  of 
emancipation.  Mr.  Lincoln  entertained  the  delegation  with  a  long  and 
rambling  discourse.  He  was  represented  in  the  Northern  newspapers  to 
have  made  the  following  characteristic  and  interesting  reply  : 

"  The  subject  presented  in  the  memorial  is  one  upon  which  I  have  thought  much  for 
weeks  past,  and  I  may  may  even  say  for  months.  I  am  approached  with  the  most  oppo 
site  opinions  and  advice,  and  that  by  religious  men,  who  are  equally  certain  that  they 
represent  the  Divine  will.  I  am  sure  that  either  the  one  or  the  other  class  is  mistaken  in 
that  belief,  and  perhaps  in  some  respects  both.  I  hope  it  will  not  be  irreverent  for  me 
to  say  that  if  it  is  probable  that  God  would  reveal  His  will  to  others,  on  a  point  so  con 
nected  with  my  duty,  it  might  be  supposed  He  would  reveal  it  directly  to  me ;  for,  unless 
I  am  more  deceived  in  myself  than  I  often  am,  it  is  my  earnest  desire  to  know  the  will 
of  Providence  in  this  matter.  And  if  I  can  learn  what  it  is,  I  will  do  it !  These  are  not, 
however,  the  days  of  miracles ;  and  I  suppose  it  will  be  granted  that  I  am  not  to  expect 
a  direct  revelation.  I  must  study  the  plain  physical  facts  of  the  case,  ascertain  what  is 
possible,  and  learn  what  appears  to  be  wise  and  right. 

"  The  subject  is  difficult,  and  good  men  do  not  agree.  For  instance,  the  other  day, 
four  gentlemen  of  standing  and  intelligence  from  New  York,  called  as  a  delegation  on 
business  connected  with  the  war ;  but  before  leaving,  two  of  them  earnestly  besought  me 
to  proclaim  general  emancipation,  upon  which  the  other  two  at  once  attacked  them. 
You  know  also  that  the  last  session  of  Congress  had  a  decided  majority  of  anti-slavery 
men,  yet  they  could  not  unite  on  this  policy.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the  religious 
people.  "Why,  the  rebel  soldiers  are  praying  with  a  great  deal  more  earnestness,  I  fear, 
than  our  own  troops,  and  expecting  God  to  favour  their  side :  for  one  of  our  soldiers, 
who  had  been  taken  prisoner,  told  Senator  Wilson,  a  few  days  since,  that  he  met  nothing 
so  discouraging  as  the  evident  sincerity  of  those  he  was  among  in  their  prayers.  But  we 
will  talk  over  the  merits  of  the  case. 

"  What  good  would  a  proclamation  of  emancipation  from  me  do,  especially  as  we  are 
now  situated  ?  I  do  not  want  to  issue  a  document  that  the  whole  world  will  see  must 
necessarily  be  inoperative,  like  the  Pope's  bull  against  the  comet !  Would  my  word  free 
the  slaves,  when  I  cannot  even  enforce  the  Constitution  in  the  rebel  States  ?  Is  there  a 
single  court,  or  magistrate,  or  individual  that  could  be  influenced  by  it  there  ?  And  what 
reason  is  there  to  think  it  would  have  any  greater  effect  upon  the  slaves  than  the  late 
law  of  Congress,  which  I  approved,  and  which  offers  protection  and  freedom  to  the  slaves 
of  rebel  masters  who  come  within  our  lines  ?  Yet  I  cannot  learn  that  that  law  has  caused 
a  single  slave  to  come  over  to  us.  And  suppose  they  could  be  induced  by  a  proclama 
tion  of  freedom  from  me  to  throw  themselves  upon  us,  what  should  we  do  with  them  ? 
How  can  we  feed  and  care  for  such  a  multitude  ?  Gen.  Butler  wrote  me  a  few  days  since 


PROCLAMATION    OF   EMANCIPATION-.  359 

that  lie  was  issuing  more  rations  to  the  slaves  who  have  rushed  to  him  than  to  all  the 
white  troops  under  his  command.     They  eat,  and  that  is  all." 

Such  were  the  views  entertained  by  Mr.  Lincoln  on  the  15th  day  of 
September,  1862,  on  the  subject  of  emancipation.  The  time  of  this  con 
ference  was  significant.  The  progress  of  the  war  was  inauspicious ;  the 
Confederates  had  penetrated  the  North,  and  were  actually  threatening 
Washington ;  and  at  all  such  periods  of  wavering  confidence  in  the  war, 
the  Northern  Government  was  singularly  prompt  to  incline  towards  the 
moderate  party,  and  to  hold  up  in  its  progress  to  radicalism.  It  was  cer 
tainly  no  tune  to  decide  domestic  institutions  in  the  Confederacy  when 
that  belligerent  was  actually  threatening  the  existence  of  the  Government 
at  Washington.  But  at  this  precise  conjuncture  of  politics  the  battle  of 
Sharpsburg  was  fought ;  the  mask  was  dropped  ;  and  on  the  22d  Septem 
ber,  1862,  President  Lincoln  issued  a  preliminary  proclamation  of  emanci 
pation,  of  which  the  following  is  the  important  portion  : 

"  That  on  the  first  day  of  January,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hun 
dred  and  sixty- three,  all  persons  held  as  slaves  within  any  States  or  designated  part  of  a 
State,  the  people  whereof  shall  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States,  shall  be 
then,  thenceforward,  and  forever  free ;  and  the  Executive  Government  of  the  United 
States,  including  the  military  and  naval  authority  thereof,  will  recognize  and  maintain 
the  freedom  of  such  persons,  and  will  do  no  act  or  acts  to  repress  such  persons,  or  any  of 
them,  in  any  efforts  they  may  make  for  their  actual  freedom. 

"  That  the  Executive  will,  on  the  first  day  of  January  aforesaid,  by  proclamation,  des 
ignate  the  States  and  parts  of  States,  if  any,  in  which  the  people  thereof  respectively  shall 
then  be  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States ;  and  the  fact  that  any  State,  or  the  people 
thereof,  shall  on  that  day  be  in  good  faith  represented  in  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  by  members  chosen  thereto  at  elections  wherein  a  majority  of  the  qualified  voters 
of  such  State  shall  have  participated,  shall,  in  the  absence  of  strong  countervailing  testi 
mony,  be  deemed  conclusive  evidence  that  such  State,  and  the  people  thereof,  are  not 
then  in  rebellion  against  the  United  States." 

This  was  followed  by  the  proclamation  of  1st  January,  1863,  designat 
ing  the  States  in  which  emancipation  should  take  immediate  effect ;  the 
notice  of  one  hundred  days,  counting  from  the  preliminary  proclamation, 
having  expired. 

Thus  was  consummated  the  triumph  of  the  Abolition  party  of  the 
North.  Thus  was,  at  last,  avowed  the  war  upon  slavery,  and  thus  delib 
erately  planned  the  robbery  of  the  Southern  people  to  the  extent  of  two 
thousand  millions  of  dollars.  It  is  true  that  this  proclamation  was  for  tke 
time  of  no  effect,  and  that  when  it  was  issued  it  was  worth  no  more  than 
the  paper  on  which  its  bold  iniquity  was  traced  ;  nevertheless,  it  was  the 
avowal  of  a  principle,  the  declaration  of  a  wish,  the  deliberate  attempt  of 
the  Chief  Magistrate  of  a  nation  to  do  that  which  was  repugnant  to  civiliz- 


360  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ation  and  all  morals.  The  misrepresentation  of  the  emancipation  procla 
mation,  as  a  deed  of  philanthropy,  was  absurd  enough.  A  candid  world 
found  no  difficulty  in  interpreting  it  as  an  act  of  malice  towards  the  master 
rather  than  one  of  mercy  to  the  slave.  A  crime  was  attempted  in  the 
name  of  liberty  and  humanity ;  and  various  hypocritical  pretences  were 
used  to  cover  up  what  was  an  unholy  infatuation,  a  ruthless  persecution, 
a  cruel  and  shameful  device,  adding  severity  and  bitterness  to  a  wicked 
and  reckless  war. 

The  new  measure  was  adopted  in  the  name  of  a  "  military  necessity" 
Aside  from  its  falsehood,  the  plea  was  one  that  dishonoured  the  North,  and 
placed  it  in  shameful  inconsistency.  Again  and  again  it  had  been  pro 
claimed  to  the  world,  that  "  the  rebellion  was  weak,  and  would  be  crushed 
out  in  sixty  days ; "  at  other  times,  it  was  declared  that  "  Union  men 
abounded  in  the  South,  and  would  welcome  Federal  troops  as  deliverers ; 
and  yet  now  the  invader  was  so  hopeless  of  his  task,  that  it  was  a  "  military 
necessity  "  that  he  obtain  help  of  slaves  !  If  the  proclamation  had  been 
designed  as  a  "  military  necessity,"  it  was  very  clear  that  it  should  end 
with  the  war,  and  be  confined  to  the  special  mission  for  which  it  had  been 
invoked.  The  fact  was  that  the  real  design  was  political,  not  military ; 
that  emancipation  was  not  the  exigency  of  the  war,  but  the  permanent 
triumph  of  fanaticism  under  a  false  pretence.  We  shall  see  at  a  future  time 
how  beyond  the  point  of  this  proclamation  the  Anti-Slavery  legislation  at 
"Washington  was  enlarged  by  the  establishment  of  a  Bureau  of  Freedmen's 
Affairs,  to  determine  all  questions  relating  to  persons  of  African  descent, 
and  finally,  by  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution,  the  effect  of  which  was 
to  entomb  slavery  forever,  to  erect  emancipation  into  a  constitutional  re 
form,  and  thus  exhibit  and  confirm  what  was  its  original  design. 

The  effect  of  the  emancipation  proclamation  on  the  Confederates  was 
decided.  It  secured  a  new  lease  of  war,  and  animated  the  people  of  the 
South  to  desperate  exertion.  In  a  message,  communicated  on  the  12th 
January,  1863,  to  the  Congress  at  Kichmond,  President  Davis  said  :  "  The 
proclamation  will  have  a  salutary  effect  in  calming  the  fears  of  those  who 
have  constantly  evinced  the  apprehension  that  this  war  might  end  by  some 
reconstruction  of  the  old  Union,  or  some  renewal  of  close  political  relations 
with  the  United  States.  These  fears  have  never  been  shared  by  me,  nor 
have  I  been  able  to  perceive  on  what  basis  they  could  rest.  But  the 
proclamation  affords  the  fullest  guaranty  of  the  impossibility  of  such  a 
result.  It  has  established  a  state  of  things  which  can  lead  to  but  one  of 
three  consequences — the  extermination  of  the  slaves,  the  exile  of  the  whole 
white  population  of  the  Confederacy,  or  absolute  and  total  separation  of 
these  States  from  the  United  States."  The  entire  newspaper  press  of  the 
Confederacy  echoed  the  sentiment  of  the  President.  It  was  declared  that 
the  outrage  of  forcible  emancipation  would  awaken  a  deeper  resentment 


THE   DEMOCRATIC   PAKTY   IN   THE   NOKTH.  361 

than  ever  inflamed  the  people  of  the  South  before  ;  that  it  had  quenched 
the  last  sentiment  of  respect  that  lingered  in  their  breasts  for  the  United 
States  Government ;  that  it  would  unite  them  more  resolutely  than  ever, 
and  make  it  to  the  individual  interest  of  every  person  in  the  bounds  of  the 
Confederacy  to  sustain  and  strengthen  it  with  every  dollar  and  every  arm, 
and  every  prayer,  and  every  energy  of  manly  virtue  and  Christian  en 
couragement. 

The  effect  of  the  proclamation  in  the  North  was  to  strengthen  the  Oppo 
sition  ;  and  the  preliminary  announcement  of  emancipation  in  September, 
1862,  was  undoubtedly  a  main  element  of  success  in  the  Democratic  tri 
umphs  in  the  fall  elections  of  that  year.  The  gains  of  the  Democratic 
party  at  this  time  were  the  subject  of  great  concern  to  those  in  power  at 
Washington.  In  the  face  of  a  majority  of  107,000  against  them  in  1860, 
the  Democrats  had  carried  the  State  of  New  York.  The  metropolis  of 
New  York  was  carried  by  a  Democratic  majority  of  31,000 — a  change  of 
48,000  votes  in  twelve  months.  "Within  the  great  States  of  New  Jersey, 
New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois,  the  results  of  the 
popular  elections  were  a  more  or  less  emphatic  avowal  of  opposition  to  the 
schemes  of  those  who  were  using  the  power  of  the  Government  for  narrow 
and  sectional  and  despotic  purposes.  The  significance  of  these  elections 
was  not  only  confined  to  the  issue  of  emancipation.  A  large  portion  of  the 
Northern  people  pronounced  against  the  entire  policy  of  Mr.  Lincoln's 
Administration.  They  condemned  that  relic  of  the  worst  times  of  French 
tyranny,  the  lettres  de  cachet ;  they  raised  their  voices  against  irrespon 
sible  arrests  ;  they  complained  of  the  small  measure  of  success  in  the  war, 
and  the  disappointment  of  the  hopes  of  the  people  in  this  regard ;  and 
while  protesting  against  the  edict  of  emancipation,  they  reminded  Mr. 
Seward  of  his  declaration,  made  on  the  10th  March,  3  862,  in  a  letter  to 
Mr.  Adams  in  London,  that  such  a  measure  "  would  re-invigorate  the 
declining  insurrection  in  every  part  of  the  South." 

On  the  15th  December,  1862,  Mr.  Cox,  Democratic  member  from  Ohio, 
in  a  speech  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  described  the  condition  of  the 
North,  and  exhibited  a  bill  of  particulars  against  Mr.  Lincoln's  Adminis^ 
tration,  which  may  be  taken  as  a  declaration  of  the  principles  and  views 
of  his  party.  He  stated  that  the  present  cost  of  the  war  to  the  North  was 
$1,000,000  per  day,  which  was  not  being  replaced  ;  for  all  that  was  spent 
in  war  was,  by  the  laws  of  economy,  a  loss  to  those  who  spend  it,  as  a  mere 
pecuniary  transaction,  and  not  counting  ultimate  and  moral  results.  He 
declared  that  since  Mr.  Lincoln's  Administration  came  into  power  there 
had  been  lost  to  the  country,  merely  as  a  matter  of  business,  not  counting 
debt;  and  taxes  of  a  national  or  State  character,  at  least  three  hundred  mil 
lions  in  the  destruction  of  property,  interference  with  established  business, 
increase  in  wages,  spoliation  of  railroads,  depots,  produce,  corn,  wheat, 


362  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

flour,  cotton,  hay,  crops,  &c.  He  pointed  out  the  fact  that  the  Govern 
ment  had  devised  a  system  of  taxation  by  tariff  which  imposed  a  burden 
on  the  "West,  to  benefit  manufacturing  in  New  England,  and  paid  in 
directly  sixty  millions  into  the  treasury  and  hundreds  of  millions  into  the 
pockets  of  capitalists,  from  the  consumers,  who  were  mostly  farmers  in  the 
West.  He  complained  of  a  system  of  internal  taxation,  costing  for  collec 
tion  some  four  millions  extra,  which  might  have  been  saved,  and  levying 
in  one  year  $150.000,000  as  interest  only  on  a  great  national  debt,  and 
with  an  army  of  newly-made  office-holders,  with  exorbitant  salaries.  He 
stated  that  within  six  hundred  and  fifty-one  days,  a  party  had  succeeded 
which  proposed,  by  legislation  and  proclamation,  to  break  down  a  labour 
system  in  eleven  States,  of  four  millions  of  negroes,  whose  industry  had 
been  productive  hitherto,  worth,  on  or  before  the  4th  of  March,  1861,  an 
average  of  $500  apiece,  being  in  all  two  thousand  millions  of  dollars.  He 
prophesied  that  when  this  capital  was  destroyed  the  objects  of  this  pseudo- 
philanthropy  would  remain  on  hand,  North  and  South,  as  a  mass  of  de 
pendent  and  improvident  black  beings,  for  whose  care  the  tax  would  be 
almost  equal  to  the  war-tax,  before  their  condition  would  again  be  fixed 
safely  and  prosperously.  He  concluded  with. the  summary  and  startling 
statement  that  within  these  six  hundred  and  fifty-one  days  the  rights  of 
personal  liberty,  freedom  from  arrest  without  process,  freedom  for  press 
and  speech,  and  the  right  of  habeas  corpus  had  been  suspended  and  limited, 
and,  at  times,  destroyed ;  and  in  the  place  of  resurrected  and  promised 
liberty  to  four  million  blacks,  the  North  had  the  destruction  of  that  lib 
erty  which  the  past  eight  hundred  years  had  awarded  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race. 

The  triumphs  of  the  Democratic  party  had  taken  place  in  the  most 
powerful  and  populous  States  of  the  North.  The  States  in  which  the  party 
gained  in  the  fall  elections  of  1862  contained  a  majority  of  the  Free  State 
population  ;  had  two-thirds  of  the  wealth  of  the  North  ;  and  furnished  a 
majority  of  the  troops  in  the  field  against  us.  This  important  and  impos 
ing  demonstration  of  public  opinion  in  the  North  was  interpreted  by  the 
Republican  party  as  significant  of  a  Democratic  design  of  "  reconstruc 
tion,"  in  which  the  Southern  States  might  be  brought  back  into  the  Union 
with  new  constitutional  guaranties.  But  this  idea,  if  it  was  ever  seriously 
entertained  by  the  Democratic  party  of  the  North,  found  enough  to  dis 
courage  it  in  the  manner  in  which  the  bare  suggestion  of  it  was  cried  down 
in  all  parts  of  the  Confederacy,  and  by  every  organ  of  public  opinion 
there.  The  Confederate  press  desperately  and  savagely  denounced  the 
idea  of  "  reconstruction."  The  Examiner  said  of  the  Northern  people  : 
"  They  do  not  yet  understand  that  we  are  resolute  to  be  rid  of  them  for 
ever,  and  determined  rather  to  die  than  to  live  with  them  in  the  same 
political  community  again."  The  Dispatch  declared:  "We  warn  the 


EARLY   MONTHS   OF   1863.  363 

Democrats  and  conservatives  of  the  North  to  dismiss  from  their  minds  at 
once  the  miserable  delusion  that  the  South  can  ever  consent  to  enter  again, 
upon  any  terms,  the  old  Union.  If  the  North  will  allow  us  to  write  the 
Constitution  ourselves,  and  give  us  every  guaranty  we  would  ask,  we  would 
sooner  be  under  the  Government  of  England  or  France  than  under  a 
Union  with  men  who  have  shown  that  they  cannot  keep  good  faith,  and 
are  the  most  barbarous  and  inhuman,  as  well  as  treacherous  of  mankind. 
.  .  .  .  But  do  not  expect  us  to  degrade  ourselves  and  cast  dishonour 
upon  the  graves  of  our  kindred  by  ever  returning  to  the  embrace  of  those 
whose  hands  are  dripping  with  the  tears  and  blood  of  our  people."  The 
leaders  and  politicians  of  the  Confederacy  were  not  behind  the  press  in 
denouncing  the  idea  of  any  possible  reunion  with  the  North.  Alexander 
H.  Stephens,  Yice-President  of  the  Confederate  States,  made  a  speech  in 
North  Carolina,  which  in  view  of  the  sequel  attached  to  this  man,  is  a 
curious  personal  reminiscence  of  the  war.  He  said  :  "  As  for  reconstruc 
tion,  such  a  thing  was  impossible — such  an  idea  must  not  be  tolerated  for 
an  instant.  Reconstruction  would  not  end  the  war,  but  would  produce  a 
more  horrible  war  than  that  in  which  we  are  now  engaged.  The  only 
terms  on  which  we  can  obtain  permanent  peace  is  final  and  complete  sep 
aration  from  the  North.  Rather  than  submit  to  anything  short  of  that, 
let  us  resolve  to  die  like  men  worthy  of  freedom." 

It  appeared  indeed  that  the  people  of  the  South  had  fully  made  up 
their  minds ;  that  they  were  prepared  to  suffer  all  the  calamities  of  the 
most  protracted  war  ;  and  that  they  would  never,  on  any  terms,  politically 
affiliate  with  a  people,  who  were  guilty  of  an  invasion  of  their  soil,  and 
whose  atrocities  in  the  war  had  caused  the  whole  civih' zed  world  to  shudder. 


MILITARY   OPERATIONS   IN   THE    EARLY    MONTHS    OF    1863. 

Before  reaching  the  great  campaign  of  1863,  dated  with  the  fighting 
months  of  summer,  we  find  certain  minor  operations  of  the  war  within  the 
period  of  winter  and  early  spring,  of  which  we  may  co'veniently  give  here 
a  summary  account.  The  heavy  rains  of  winter  and  early  spring  pre 
vented  heavy  movements  on  land,  and  this  period  in  the  history  of  the  war 
we  shall  generally  find  occupied  by  attempts  of  the  enemy  on  the  seacoast 
or  by  amphibious  expeditions  on  the  inland  waters  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  most  important  of  the  events  referred  to  as  preceding  what  may  be 
indicated  as  the  grand  campaign  of  1863,  were  the  recapture  of  Galveston 
by  the  Confederates  ;  renewed  attempts  of  the  enemy  on  Yicksburg,  with 
some  other  enterprises  on  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi ;  and  the  repulse  of 
the  Federal  fleet  at  Charleston.  The  narrative  of  these  events  is  mostly  a 
story  of  successes  for  the  Confederates — the  sum  of  which  was  considerable, 


364:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

and  the  effect  a  spirited  preparation  and  an  auspicious  prospect  for  the 
larger  issues  of  the  year. 

Gen.  Magruder,  who  had  been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Con 
federate  forces  in  Texas,  found  the  harbours  of  this  coast  in  the  possession 
of  the  enemy  from  the  Sabine  River  to  Corpus  Christi,  and  the  line  of  the 
Rio  Grande  virtually  abandoned.  He  resolved  to  regain  the  harbours,  if 
possible,  and  to  occupy  the  Valley  of  the  Rio  Grande  in  force.  The  first 
step  of  his  enterprise  contemplated  the  expulsion  of  the  enemy's  vessels 
from  the  harbour  of  Galveston,  and  the  re-possession  of  that  town.  Having 
assembled  all  the  moveable  artillery  that  could  be  collected  in  the  neigh 
bourhood,  he  occupied  in  force  the  works  erected  opposite  the  island  on 
which  the  town  of  Galveston  stands,  and  commanding  the  railway  bridge 
which  connects  it  with  the  mainland.  He  also  fitted  up  as  gunboats  two 
steamers,  the  Bayou  City  and  the  Neptune,  making  them  shot-proof,  by 
means  of  bulwarks  of  cotton  bales.  The  enemy's  fleet,  then  lying  in  the 
waters  of  Galveston,  consisted  of  the  Harriet  Lane,  carrying  four  heavy 
guns,  and  two  24-pounder  howitzers,  commanded  by  Capt.  "Wainwright ; 
the  Westfield,  flag-ship  of  Commodore  Renshaw  ;  a  large  propeller,  mount 
ing  eight  heavy  guns ;  the  Owasco,  a  similar  ship  to  the  Westfield,  mount 
ing  eight  heavy  guns  ;  the  Clifton,  a  steam  propeller,  four  heavy  guns ;  the 
Sachem,  a  steam  propeller,  four  heavy  guns ;  two  armed  transports ;  two 
large  barques  ;  and  an  armed  schooner. 

The  enemy's  land  forces — a  few  hundred  men — were  stationed  at  the 
end  of  a  long  wharf,  and  were  crowded  into  large  buildings  immediately 
under  the  guns  of  the  steamships.  The  approaches  landward  to  this  posi 
tion  were  impeded  by  two  lines  of  strong  barricades,  and  communication 
with  the  shore  was  destroyed  by  the  removal  of  portions  of  the  wharf  in 
front  of  the  barricades.  It  thus  became  necessary  for  storming  parties  to 
advance  by  wading  through  the  water,  and  to  mount  on  the  end  of  the 
wharf  by  scaling  ladders. 

It  was  arranged  by  Gen.  Magruder  that  the  naval  and  military  opera 
tions  should  be  simultaneous,  and  should  commence  before  daybreak  on  the 
1st  January,  1863.  The  co-operation  of  the  cotton-boats  with  the  land 
forces  was  extremely  difficult  to  obtain — the  distance  the  former  had  to  run 
being  thirty  miles.  The  attack  was  opened  a  little  past  midnight  by  a 
shot  from  our  land  batteries.  The  moon  had  gone  down,  but  the  Federal 
ships  were  still  visible  by  the  light  of  the  stars.  Leading  the  centre  as 
sault,  Gen.  Magruder  approached  to  within  two  squares  of  the  wharves, 
where  the  enemy's  land  forces  were  stationed,  and  where  he  was  within 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  formidable  fleet.  While  Magruder 
engaged  the  vessels  with  artillery,  the  storming  party  advanced  to  the 
assault ;  the  men  wading  through  the  water,  and  bearing  with  them  their 
scaling  ladders  with  which  they  endeavoured  to  reach  the  end  of  the  wharf 


RECAPTURE   OF   GALVESTON.  365 

on  which  the  enemy  was  stationed.  A  severe  conflict  took  place  at  this 
point,  the  Confederates  being  exposed  to  a  fire  of  grape,  canister,  and 
shell,  and  at  last  being  compelled  to  take  the  shelter  of  the  buildings  near 
the  wharf. 

As  the  morning  advanced,  our  fire  still  continuing,  the  long-expected 
j  cotton-boats  came  dashing  down  the  harbour,  and  engaged  the  Harriet 
'  Lane,  which  was  the  nearest  of  the  enemy's  ships,  in  gallant  style,  running 
into  her,  one  on  each  side,  and  pouring  on  her  deck  a  deadly  fire  of  rifles 
and  shot-guns.  The  gallant  Capt.  Wamwright  fought  his  ship  admirably. 
He  succeeded  in  disabling  the  Neptune,  and  attempted  to  run  down  the 
Bayou  City.  The  Confederate  boat  adroitly  evaded  the  deadly  stroke ; 
although,  as  the  vessels  passed  each  other,  she  lost  her  larboard  wheel- 
house  in  the  shock.  Again  the  Bayou  City,  while  receiving  several  broad 
sides  almost  at  the  cannon's  mouth,  poured  into  the  Harriet  Lane  a  de 
structive  fire  of  small  arms.  Turning  once  more,  she  drove  her  prow  into 
the  iron  wheel  of  the  Harriet  Lane,  thus  locking  the  two  vessels  together. 
Followed  by  officers  and  men,  Commodore  Leon  Smith  leaped  to  the  deck 
of  the  hostile  ship,  and  after  a  moment  of  feeble  resistance  she  was  ours. 

After  the  surrender,  the  Owasco  passed  along  side,  pouring  into  the 
Harriet  Lane  a  broadside  at  close  quarters ;  but  she  was  soon  forced  to 
back  out  by  the  effect  of  our  musketry.  Commodore  Smith  then  sent  a 
flag  to  Commodore  Eenshaw,  whose  ship,  the  Westfield,  had,  in  the  mean 
time,  been  run  aground,  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  whole  fleet,  and 
giving  three  hours  time  to  consider.  These  propositions  were  accepted  by 
the  commanding  officer,  and  all  the  enemy's  vessels  were  immediately 
brought  to  anchor  with  white  flags  flying.  Within  an  hour  of  the  expira 
tion  of  the  period  of  truce,  Gen.  Magruder  sent  another  flag  to  Commodore 
Renshaw,  whose  ship  was  among  the  most  distant,  claiming  all  his  vessels 
immediately  under  our  guns  as  prizes,  and  giving  him  further  time  to  con 
sider  the  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  whole  fleet.  This  message  was 
borne  by  two  Confederate  officers.  While  they  were  on  their  way  in  a 
boat,  to  fulfil  their  mission,  Commodore  Renshaw  blew  up  his  ship,  and 
was  himself  accidentally  blown  up  with  it.  They  boarded  the  ship  of  the 
next  in  command,  who  dropped  down  the  bay,  still  having  them  on  board, 
and  carried  them  some  distance  towards  the  bar,  while  still  flying  the 
white  flag  at  the  mast-head.  Meanwhile,  the  first  period  of  truce  having 
expired,  the  enemy's  ships  under  our  guns,  discovering  that  the  Confeder 
ate  boats  and  their  prize  were  too  much  damaged  to  pursue,  and  re 
gardless  of  the  white  flags  still  flying  at  their  mast-heads,  gradually  crept 
off.  The  small  Federal  force  which  held  the  wharf,  perceiving  that  they 
were  abandoned  by  the  fleet,  surrendered  as  prisoners. 

The  capture  of  Galveston  was  thus  completed  ;  besides  which  we  had 
taken  one  fine  steamship  and  two  barques,  run  ashore  the  flag-ship  of  the 


366  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

commodore,  and  driven  off  two  war  steamers,  breaking  the  blockade  of  the 
port,  and  temporarily  reopening  it  to  commerce. 

We  have  already  noticed  some  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  open  the  Mis 
sissippi  Kiver,  and  to  renew  commercial  communication  between  the 
Northwestern  States  and  their  natural  port  at  New  Orleans.  The  interest 
of  the  war  in  the  "West,  after  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro',  may  be  said  to 
have  culminated  in  Yicksburg,  and  the  campaign  in  the  State  of  Missis 
sippi  was  chiefly  important  in  so  far  as  it  affected  the  operations  for  the 
reduction  of  this  town,  which  closed  the  course  of  the  great  river  to  the 
Federal  fleets. 

The  second  attempt  against  Yicksburg  was  to  be  made  by  Gen.  Sher 
man,  who  in  the  latter  part  of  December,  1862,  with  four  divisions  under 
his  command,  accompanied  by  several  gunboats,  commenced  the  descent  of 
the  Mississippi  River.  The  expedition  was  a  shameful  failure.  Sherman, 
having  landed  his  forces,  attempted  to  capture  the  town  from  the  north 
western  side,  and  during  the  last  days  of  December,  there  was  some  desul 
tory  fighting,  when  the  Federal  commander,  without  making  any  concen 
trated  attack  on  the  Confederate  position,  abandoned  the  enterprise,  and 
re-embarked  his  troops  at  Milliken's  Bend.  The  weak  and  disgraceful 
issue  of  this  expedition  is  chiefly  remarkable  for  its  connection  with  the 
name  of  a  commander  declared  incompetent,  at  this  period  of  the  war,  and 
yet  destined  to  win  the  reputation  of  a  hero  from  the  fickle  multitude  of 
the  North. 

After  Sherman's  failure,  Gen.  Grant  made  the  third  attempt  upon 
Yicksburg,  endeavouring,  by  combined  naval  and  military  operations,  to 
turn^the  rear  of  the  line  of  defence.  Several  expeditions  were  planned  in 
the  spring  months  of  1863,  to  turn  the  defences  of  the  town,  by  means  of 
the  vast  network  of  rivers,  such  as  the  Tallahatchie,  Yazoo  Pass,  and  Sun 
flower,  which  connect  the  Mississippi  Kiver  with  the  Yazoo.  These  expe 
ditions  terminated  without  success,  and  are  chiefly  memorable  for  devasta 
tions  of  the  country,  which,  indeed,  was  the  usual  resource  of  the  enemy 
whenever  disappointed  in  the  accomplishment  of  military  results. 

While  Grant  was  thus  operating  against  Yicksburg,  an  attempt  was 
made  by  the  lower  Federal  fleet,  under  Farragut,  to  pass  the  batteries  at 
Port  Hudson,  so  as  to  co-operate  with  Admiral  Porter's  fleet  on  the  upper 
waters.  On  the  night  of  the  14th  March,  the  Hartford,  Farragut's  flag 
ship,  steamed  slowly  up  the  river,  passing  the  first  of  the  line  of  batteries, 
followed  by  the  Richmond,  Mississippi,  Monongahela,  Genesee,  Albatross, 
Kineo,  the  iron-clad  Essex,  the  gunboat  Sachem,  and  a  mortar  flotilla  of 
six  schooners.  The  Confederate  batteries  were  silent,  waiting  to  bring  the 
whole  fleet  under  their  guns  before  they  went  to  work.  Presently  there 
was  one  grand,  long,  deafening  roar,  and  the  battle  was  commenced.  A 
great  fire  had  been  lighted  on  the  river's  bank,  near  one  of  the  most  for- 


NAVAL   ATTACK   ON   CHARLESTON.  367 

raidable  works,  to  throw  light  across  the  stream  and  to  illumine  the  ene 
my's  vessels.  The  artillerists  on  shore  had  no  difficulty  in  sighting  their 
guns.  The  sheets  of  flame  that  poured  from  the  sides  of  the  vessels  at 
each  discharge,  lit  up  nearly  the  whole  stretch  of  river,  placing  each  craft 
in  strong  relief  against  the  black  sky.  The  fleet  soon  lost  its  orderly  line 
of  battle.  The  Hartford  was  struck,  but  being  a  swift  vessel,  succeeded, 
with  her  consort,  the  Albatross,  in  running  past  the  batteries.  The  Rich 
mond,  and  the  vessels  following  her,  turned  round  ;  but  as  the  Mississippi 
was  executing  this  manoeuvre,  a  shot  tore  off  her  rudder,  and  another  went 
crushing  through  the  machinery.  She  drifted  aground  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  river.  She  was  being  rapidly  torn  to  pieces  by  shot  from  the  bat 
teries,  when  her  commander  abandoned  her.  Lightened  by  the  departure 
of  the  crew,  and  influenced  by  the  current,  she  floated  off,  stern  foremost, 
down  the  river,  in  a  sheet  of  flame,  exploding  her  magazine,  and  sinking 
near  Providence  Island.  The  enterprise  against  Port  Hudson  had  proved 
a  failure,  and  Gen.  Banks,  who  was  advancing  from  Baton  Rouge  to  take 
part  in  the  anticipated  siege,  was  content  to  march  back  again. 

So  far  the  Confederate  strongholds  on  the  Mississippi  had  bid  defiance 
to  the  foe,  and  months  of  costly  preparation  for  their  reduction  had  been 
spent  in  vain.  But  after  Sherman's  repulse  from  Yicksburg  some  com 
pensation  was  sought  in  an  easier  enterprise,  and  McClernand,  who  suc 
ceeded  him  in  command,  organized  an  expedition  of  two  corps  cParmee, 
and  a  fleet  of  three  iron-clads,  and  several  gunboats,  against  Arkansas 
Post,  a  village  on  the  Arkansas  River,  about  fifty  miles  from  its  mouth. 
The  position  had  been  fortified  by  the  Confederates,  and  was  held  by  Gen. 
Churchill  with  about  thirty-three  hundred  effective  men.  On  the  llth 
January,  a  combined  attack  was  arranged  between  Gen.  McClernand  and 
Admiral  Porter.  Before  the  final  assault  was  made,  the  garrison,  finding 
themselves  unable  to  reply  to  the  fire  of  the  gunboats,  and  overwhelmed 
by  superiour  numbers,  hoisted  a  white  flag,  and  surrendered.  The  im 
portance  of  this  capture  by  the  enemy  was,  that  he  obtained  a  fortified 
point  guarding  the  navigation  of  the  Arkansas  River,  and  shutting  out  its 
commerce  from  the  Mississippi. 

For  some  time  the  enemy  had  been  making  preparations  for  an  attack 
on  Charleston  from  the  sea.  There  was  an  especial  desire  in  the  North  to 
capture  and  punish  this  city,  where  the  first  movements  of  the  war  had 
commenced,  and  it  was  fondly  hoped  that  on  the  anniversary  of  the  first 
capture  of  Sumter  there  would  .be  a  change  of  flags,  and  the  Federal  ensign 
would  again  float  from  its  walls.  To  accomplish  this  pleasant  event,  a 
large  fleet,  including  many  iron-clads  built  after  the  model  of  the  Monitor, 
had  been  assembled  at  Port  Royal,  under  command  of  Admiral  Dupont, 
and  about  the  first  of  April  was  ready  for  action  at  the  mouth  of  Charles 
ton  Harbour.  There  were  seven  iron-clads  of  the  Monitor  pattern ; 


368  THE    LOST    CAUSE. 

other  descriptions  of  iron-clads  were  exemplified  in  the  Keokuk  and  Iron 
sides,  the  latter  being  an  armour-plated  frigate,  with  an  armament  of 
eighteen  10,  11,  and  15-inch  guns.  It  was  to  be  a  trial  between  new  forces 
of  tremendous  power.  The  defences  at  Charleston  had  been  materially 
strengthened  by  Gen.  Beanregard,  who  had  been  assigned  to  the  coast 
service ;  and  it  was  thought  scarcely  possible  that  any  floating  thing  could 
breast  unharmed  the  concentrated  storm  of  heavy  metal  from  the  guns  of 
Sumter,  Moultrie,  and  Battery  Bee,  the  three  principal  works  in  the  throat 
of  the  harbour.  A  test  was  at  last  to  be  obtained  of  a  long-mooted  ques 
tion,  and  iron-clads,  which  were  claimed  to  be  the  most  impenetrable  ves 
sels  ever  constructed,  were  to  come  within  point-blank  range  of  the  most 
numerous  and  powerful  batteries  that  had  ever  been  used  in  a  single  en 
gagement. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  7th  April,  the  line  of  iron-clads,  comprising 
seven  Monitors,  the  Ironsides,  and  Keokuk,  entered  the  channel,  and  passed 
Battery  Bee,  and  along  the  front  of  Morris  Island.  ~No  sound  came  from 
the  batteries  ;  not  a  man  was  seen  on  the  decks  of  the  iron-clads  ;  the  sea 
was  smooth  as  glass,  and  thus  calmly  and  majestically  the  whole  line  of 
vessels  passed  the  outer  batteries.  At  ten  minutes  after  three,  the  fleet, 
having  come  within  range,  Fort  Sumter  opened  its  batteries,  and,  almost 
simultaneously,  the  white  smoke  could  be  seen  puffing  from  the  low  sand 
hills  of  Morris  and  Sullivan's  Islands  indicating  that  the  batteries  there 
had  become  engaged.  Five  of  the  iron-clads  forming  in  line  of  battle  in 
front  of  Fort  Sumter,  maintained  a  very  rapid  return  fire,  occasionally 
hurling  their  fifteen-inch  shot  and  shell  against  Fort  Moultrie  and  minor 
batteries,  but  all  directing  their  chief  efforts  against  the  east  face  of  Fort 
Sumter.  The  firing  became  terrific.  The  Ironsides,  from  her  position, 
engaged  Fort  Moultrie ;  Battery  Bee  mingled  the  hoarse  thunder  of  its  guns 
in  the  universal  din,  and  the  whole  expanse  of  the  harbour  entrance,  from 
Sullivan's  Island  to  Cumrnings'  Point,  became  enveloped  in  the  smoke 
and  constant  flashes  of  the  conflict.  The  iron-clads  kept  constantly  shift 
ing  their  position ;  but,  whichever  way  they  went,  their  ports  always 
turned  towards  the  battlements  of  Sumter,  pouring  forth  their  terrible 
projectiles  against  the  walls  of  that  famous  stronghold. 

Presently  the  Keokuk  pushed  ahead  of  her  companions,  placed  herself 
within  less  than  nine  hundred  yards  of  the  fort,  and  seemed  to  challenge 
it  to  combat.  A  circle  of  angry  flashes  radiated  towards  her  from  all  sides ; 
she  had  made  herself  the  target  of  the  most  powerful  guns  the  Confeder 
ates  could  command.  In  a  few  moments,  she  was  disabled,  and  crept 
slowly  out  of  fire.  The  remainder  of  the  fleet,  more  or  less  severely  in 
jured,  withdrew,  and  in  thirty  minutes  from  the  time  when  the  first  gun 
opened,  the  action  was  over,  and  a  victory  obtained,  which  went  far  to  im 
peach  the  once  dreaded  power  of  the  iron-clads  of  the  enemy.  Admiral 


NAVAL   ATTACK   ON   CHARLESTON.  369 

Dupont,  "  convinced  of  the  utter  impracticability  of  taking  the  city  of 
Charleston  with  the  force  under  his  command,"  retired  to  Port  Royal, 
leaving  the  stranded,  riddled  wreck  of  the  iron-clad  Keokuk  as  evidence 
of  his  defeat.  All  his  vessels  had  sustained  serious  injury.  The  Confeder 
ates,  with  but  two  death  casualties,  had  driven  off  an  iron-clad  fleet,  ob 
tained  a  complete  triumph,  and  destroyed  the  prestige  of  the  description 
of  vessel  named  after  the  Monitor,  the  first  of  its  class. 

24 


CHAPTEE    XXII. 

MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  THE  EARLY  MONTHS   OF   1863. — EARLY  RESUMPTION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN 

IN  VIRGINIA. THE    NEW   FEDERAL  FAVOURITE,  "  FIGHTING  JOE   HOOKER." — THE  BATTLB 

OF  CHANOELLORSVILLE. — HOOKER'S  PLAN  OF  OPERATIONS. — HIS  FLAMING  ADDRESS  TO  HIS 
TROOPS. — CRITICAL  SITUATION  OF  GEN.  LEE. — SURROUNDED  BY  AN  ENEMY  MORE  THAN 
THREEFOLD  HIS  NUMBERS. — CALMNESS  AND  SELF-POSSESSION  OF  LEE. — HIS  DELIBERATE 
DISPOSITIONS  FOR  ATTACK. — THE  FLANK-MARCH  OF  STONEWALL  JACKSON. — HOW  HE 
EMERGED  FROM  "  THE  WILDERNESS." — FALL  OF  STONEWALL  JACKSON. — THE  IMPETUS  OF 

THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTACK  CEASES. — HOW.  GEN.  LEE  RECEIVED  THE  NEWS  OF  JACKSON'S 
FALL. — THE  BATTLE  IN  FRONT  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE. — HOOKER'S  ARMY  CRIPPLED  AND 
DRIVEN. — SEDGWICK'S  ADVANCE  FROM  FREDERICKSBURG. — IT  ARRESTS  LEE'S  PURSUIT  OF 
HOOKER.— THE  FIGHT  NEAR  SALEM  CHURCH. — SEDGWICK5S  FORCE  ROUTED. — HOOKER 
RETREATS  ACROSS  THE  RIVER. — HIS  TERRIBLE  LOSSES. — CHANCELLORSVILLE,  THE  MASTER 
PIECE  OF  LEE'S  MILITARY  LIFE. — REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  VICTORY. — STARTLING  OFFICIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS  AS  TO  THE  NUMBERS  OF  CONFEDERATE  ARMIES. — PARTICULARS  OF  THE 
DEATH  OF  JACKSON. — EXACT  REPORT  OF  HIS  LAST  WORDS. — CHARACTER  OF  STONEWALL 
JACKSON. — HIS  GREAT  AMBITION. — EARLY  MISCONCEPTIONS  OF  THE  MAN. — HOW  HE  WAS 
RIDICULED. — HIS  DIFFERENCE  WITH  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. — HIS  RESIGNATION  SENT  IN,  BUT 
RECALLED. — JACKSON'S  MILITARY  CAREER. — HIS  GENIUS. — HIS  PIETY. — HIS  EPICENE 
NATURE. — PERSONAL  APPEARANCE  OF  THE  HERO. — WHAT  VIRGINIA  OWES  TO  HIS  MEMORY. 

THE  military  situation* in  the  spring  months  of  1863  may  be  described 
by  a  few  general  lines  drawn  through  the  country,  and  bounding  the  main 
theatres  of  the  war.  In  Virginia  either  army  was  in  view  of  the  other 
from  the  heights  overlooking  the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  whilst  the  coun 
try  between  the  Eappahannock  and  the  Potomac  was  at  various  times 
visited  by  detachments  of  Stuart's  daring  cavalry.  The  army  of  Ten 
nessee  was  tied  to  no  special  line  of  operations  ;  it  was  embarrassed  by  no 
important  point,  such  as  Eichmond  requiring  to  be  defended  ;  it  had  thus 
greatly  the  advantage  over  the  army  of  Virginia  ;  and  yet  we  have  seen, 
and  shall  continue  to  see,  that  it  was  far  inferiour  in  activity  and  enter 
prise  to  the  latter,  and  that,  while  Gen.  Lee  was  overthrowing  every  army 
that  came  against  him,  Bragg  was  idle,  or  constantly  yielding  up  territory 
to  a  conquering  foe.  From  March  till  June,  in  1863,  Gen.  Bragg's  forces 
remained  idly  stretching  from  Shelbyville  to  the  right,  while  the  Federals, 


MILITARY   SITUATION  IN  THE   SPKING  OF   1863.  371 

holding  a  line  from  Franklin  to  Woodbury,  again  and  again,  afforded 
opportunities  of  attack  on  detached  masses  which  the  dull  Confederate 
commander  never  used.  West  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains  the  war  had 
travelled  steadily  southward  to  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  and  Arkansas.  In 
Mississippi  we  held  the  line  of  the  Tallahatchie  and  the  town  of  Vicksburg, 
while  Grant  threatened  the  northern  portion  of  the  State,  and  McClernand 
menaced  Yicksburg.  West  of  the  Mississippi  the  war  had  been  pushed  to 
the  banks  of  the  Arkansas  River,  the  Federals  held  Yan  Buren,  and  Hind- 
man's  weak  and  shifting  tactics  opposed  an  uncertain  front  to  further 
advance  of  the  enemy  in  this  distant  territory. 

The  great  campaign  of  1863  was  to  open  in  Virginia.  There  were 
especial  reasons  at  Washington  for  an  early  resumption  of  the  campaign. 
The  Democratic  party  was  gaining  strength,  in  the  absence  of  any  grand 
success  in  the  war ;  and  the  term  of  service  of  many  of  the  Federal  sol 
diers  in  Virginia  was  so  near  expiration  that  it  was  thought  advisable  to 
try  again  the  issue  of  battle  at  a  period  somewhat  earlier  in  the  year  than 
the  date  of  former  operations  against  Richmond.  A  change  of  command 
ers,  which  had  come  to  be  the  usual  preliminary  of  the  resumption  of  Fed 
eral  campaigns,  was  not  omitted.*  Gen.  Joe  Hooker  was  raised  from  the 

*  Mr.  Headley,  a  Northern  authour,  in  his  interesting  work,  "  The  Campaigns  of  Sherman  and 
Grant,"  makes  the  following  very  just  commentary  on  the  Northern  mania  for  a  "  change  of  com 
manders."  Referring  to  the  achievements  of  these  two  popular  heroes  of  the  war,  he  says  : 

"  It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  they  were  the  only  two  great  generals  the  war  had  produced,  or 
the  only  ones  who  were  able  to  bring  it  to  a  successful  issue.  It  is  an  errour  to  imagine,  as  many 
do,  that  the  Government  kept  casting  about  for  men  fit  to  do  the  work  these  men  did,  and,  after 
long  searching,  at  length  found  them.  Several  were  displaced,  who  would  have,  doubtless,  suc 
ceeded  in  bringing  us  ultimate  victory,  had  they  been  allowed  a  fair  trial.  The  errour  was  in  sup 
posing  that  men,  capable  of  controlling  such  vast  armies,  and  carrying  on  a  war  of  such  magnitude 
and  covering  almost  a  continent  in  its  scope,  were  to  be  found  ready-made.  They  were  not  to  leap 
forth,  like  Minerva  from  the  head  of  Jupiter,  completely  panoplied  and  ready  for  the  service  to 
which  they  were  determined.  A  war  of  such  magnitude,  and  covering  the  territories  that  ours  did, 
would  have  staggered  the  genius  of  Napoleon,  or  the  skill  of  Wellington,  even  at  the  close  of 
their  long  experience  and  training.  To  expect,  therefore,  that  officers,  who  had  never  led  ten 
thousand  men  to  battle,  were  suddenly  to  become  capable  of  wielding  half  a  million,  was  absurd. 
Both  the  army  and  the  leaders,  as  well  as  the  nation,  had  to  grow  by  experience  to  the  vastness  of 
the  undertaking.  A  mighty  military  genius,  capable  at  once  of  comprehending  and  controlling  the 
condition  of  things,  would  have  upset  the  government  in  six  months.  Trammelled,  confined,  and 
baffled  by  '  ignorance  and  unbelief,'  it  would  have  taken  matters  into  its  own  hand.  Besides, 
such  prodigies  do  not  appear  every  century.  We  were  children  in  such  a  complicated  and  wide- 
sweeping  struggle ;  and,  like  children,  were  compelled  to  learn  to  walk  by  many  a  stumble. 
Greene,  next  to  Washington,  was  the  greatest  general  our  revolutionary  war  produced ;  yet,  in 
almost  his  first  essay,  he  lost  Fort  Washington,  with  its  four  thousand  men,  and  seriously  crippled 
his  great  leader.  But  Washington  had  the  sagacity  to  discern  his  military  ability  beneath  his 
failure,  and  still  gave  him  his  confidence.  To  a  thinking  man,  that  was  evidently  the  only  way  for 
us  to  get  a  competent  general — one  capable  of  planning  and  carrying  out  a  great  campaign.  Here 
was  our  vital  errour.  The  Government  kept  throwing  dice  for  able  commanders.  It  is  true  that 
experience  will  not  make  a  great  man  out  of  a  naturally  weak  one ;  but  it  is  equally  true  that 
without  it,  a  man  of  great  natural  military  capacity  will  not  be  equal  to  vast  responsibilities  and 


372  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

position  of  corps  commander  to  that  of  general-in-chief,  and  appointed  to 
take  command  of  the  fifth  attempt  against  Richmond.  He  was  an  im 
mense  braggart.  His  popular  designation  was  "  Fighting  Joe  Hooker." 
He  had  made  himself  famous  in  the  newspapers  by  his  fierce  criticisms  of 
McClellan's  campaigns  ;  had  predicted  certain  capture  of  Richmond  under 
his  own  leadership  ;  and  was  just  the  man  whose  boastful  confidence 
might  kindle  anew  the  hopes  of  the  credulous  people  of  the  North. 


THE   BATTLE   OF    CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 

On  the  27th  of  April  Hooker  began  his  grand  movement  over  the 
Rappahannock.  His  great  numerical  force  enabled  him  to  divide  his 
army,  and  yet  to  maintain  his  superiority  at  all  points.  His  left  wing, 
under  Sedgwick,  crossed  at  Fredericksburg,  intending  to  attack  and 
occupy  the  heights  above  the  town,  and  seize  the  railway  to  Richmond. 
Meanwhile  the  stronger  portion  of  his  army  crossed  the  river  some  miles 
above  Fredericksburg,  at  the  United  States',  Ely's,  and  Germania  fords, 
and  began  to  move  toward  Chancellorsville— the  name  of  a  place  marked 
by  a  large  house,  formerly  a  tavern,  and  a  few  out-houses,  about  eleven 
miles  above  Fredericksburg,  and  about  four  miles  south  of  the  point  of 
confluence  of  the  Rapidan  and  the  Rappahannock.  On  the  30th  April, 
having  got  all  his  forces  across  the  river,  he  issued  a  flaming  address, 
announcing  that  "  the  operations  of  the  last  three  days  have  determined 
that  our  enemy  must  ingloriously  fly,  or  come  out  from  behind  their  de 
fences  and  give  us  battle  on  our  own  ground,  where  certain  destruction 
awaits  him."  So  confident  was  he  of  success  that  he  declared  that  Lee's 
army  was  "  the  property  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac."  Indeed,  his 
chief  concern  appears  to  have  been  to  cut  off  Lee's  retreat ;  and  as  his 
army  crossed  the  river,  the  cavalry  was  to  move  around  the  Confederate 
position,  one  body  under  Averill,  marching  on  Gordonsville,  the  other 
under  Stoneman,  interposing  between  Lee's  army  and  Richmond,  to  cut 
the  lines  of  rail  and  destroy  his  communications.  The  disposition  of 
forces  was  such  that  the  Northern  newspapers  declared  that  it  was  at 
once  conclusive  of  the  fate  of  Lee  and  of  the  Confederacy  itself.  Never 

combinations.  Our  experience  proved  this ;  for  both  Grant  and  Sherman  came  very  near  sharing 
the  fate  of  many  that  preceded  them.  Nothing  but  the  President's  friendship  and  tenacity  saved 
the  former  after  the  battle  of  Pittsburgh  Landing.  His  overthrow  was  determined  on  ;  while  the 
latter  was  removed  from  the  department  of  Kentucky,  as  a  crazy  man.  Great  by  nature,  they 
were  fortunately  kept  where  they  could  grow  to  the  new  and  strange  condition  of  things,  and  the 
magnitude  of  the  struggle  into  which  we  had  been  thrown.  If  the  process  of  changing  com 
manders  the  moment  they  did  not  keep  pace  with  the  extravagant  expectations  of  the  country,  and 
equally  extravagant  predictions  of  the  Government,  had  been  continued,  we  should  have  been 
floundering  to  this  day  amid  chaos  and  uncertainty." 


BATTLE    OP    CHANCELLOKSVILLE.  373 

were  such  strains  of  exultation  heard  in  New  Fork  and  Washington  since 
the  first  field  of  Manassas.  The  common  conversation  was  that  the  Con 
federates  were  between  two  fires ;  that  Hooker  had  them  just  where  he 
wanted  them ;  that  they  could  not  retreat ;  that  they  would  be  annihi 
lated  ;  that  "  the  rebellion  "  was  nearly  at  an  end. 

Gen.  Lee  was  certainly  now  in  the  most  trying  situation  of  the  war. 
He  was  out-numbered  by  an  enemy,  whose  force,  compared  with  his  own, 
was — as  we  have  the  precise  statement  of  Gen.  Lee  himself — as  ten  to 
three  /  and  he  was  threatened  by  two  attacks,  the  inferiour  of  which — that 
of  Sedgwick  at  Fredericksburg — was  equal  in  numbers  to  his  whole  army. 
Despite  desertions  and  the  difficulties  of  the  recruiting  service,  the  strength 
of  the  Federal  army  operating  in  Northern  Virginia  had  been  kept  up  to 
about  150,000  men.  Gen.  Lee  had  less  than  50,000  men.  He  had  been 
compelled  to  detach  nearly  a  third  of  the  army  with  which  he  had  fought 
at  Fredericksburg  to  confront  demonstrations  of  the  enemy  on  the  coasts 
of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina ;  and  Longstreet  had  been  sent  to  com 
mand  the  department  which  included  Eichmond  and  its  vicinity,  together 
with  the  State  of  North  Carolina,  placed  under  the  immediate  supervision 
of  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill. 

There  was  nothing  more  remarkable  about  the  great  Confederate  com 
mander  than  his  cheerful  self-possession,  his  calm,  antique  courage  in  the 
most  trying  and  terrible  circumstances  of  life.  There  was  no  expression 
of  uneasiness  on  his  part ;  no  sign  of  dismay  in  the  calm,  grand  face  ;  and 
the  quiet  and  collected  orders  which  he  gave,  alone  indicated  a  movement 
almost  unexampled  in  its  daring  to  crush  the  enemy  whose  numbers  had 
enveloped  him.  He  watched  the  movement  of  Sedgwick  at  Fredericks 
burg,  as  well  as  the  one  higher  up  the  river  under  Hooker,  until  he  had 
penetrated  the  enemy's  design,  and  seen  the  necessity  of  making  a  rapid 
division  of  his  own  forces  to  confront  him  on  two  different  fields. 

On  the  29th  of  April,  Gen.  Lee  drew  back  his  army  in  the  direction  of 
Chancellorsville,  leaving  Early's  division  to  guard  Marye's  Heights  at  • 
Fredericksburg.  At  Chancellorsville  he  learned  from  Gen.  Anderson, 
who,  with  two  brigades — Posey's  and  Mahone's — had  been  guarding  the 
upper  fords  of  the  river,  that  the  main  body  of  the  Federal  army  was  ad 
vancing  from  that  direction,  and  threatened  his  left  rear.  A  force  nearly 
one  hundred  thousand  strong  was  on  what  had  formerly  been  the  left  rear 
of  the  Confederates  and  was  now  the  front.  Taking  from  the  account  the 
forces  left  at  Fredericksburg,  Lee  was  out-numbered  nearly  three  to  one. 
His  army  consisted  of  Jackson's  three  divisions  and  two  of  Longstreet's 
former  corps — McLaw's  and  Anderson's.  He  had  in  his  rear  Sedgwick's 
force,  which  equalled  in  strength  his  whole  army  ;  and  it  appeared,  indeed, 
that  he  would  be  crushed,  or  forced  to  retreat  with  both  flanks  exposed  along 
the  Richmond  rail,  which  was  already  at  the  mercy  of  Stoneman's  cavalry. 


374  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

On  the  1st  of  May  Hooker  ordered  an  advance  to  be  made  from  Chan- 
cellorsville  in  the  direction  of  Fredericksburg.  At  the  close  of  the  day 
his  army  held  the  ground  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Banks'  Ford 
to  Chancellorsville,  and  thence  with  the  right  thrown  back,  covered  the 
road  to  Germania  Ford.  But  while  Gen.  Lee  kept  the  enemy  amused  this 
day  by  several  attacks  and  feints,  preparations  were  in  progress  for  a  flank 
march,  in  which  the  terrible  Stonewall  Jackson  was  to  try  again  the  suc 
cess  of  his  favourite  movements. 

The  flank  march  of  Jackson  commenced  at  night ;  his  corps  consisting 
of  three  divisions,  under  A.  P.  Hill,  Rodes,  and  Trimble.  He  was  directed 
to  move  by  a  road  behind  the  line-of-battle  to  the  road  that  led  to  Ger 
mania  Ford,  where  the  extreme  right  of  the  Federal  army — Howard's  corps 
— rested.  The  route  lay  through  the  Wilderness,  a  district  of  country 
covered  with  scrubby  oaks  and  a  thick,  tangled  undergrowth.  Availing 
himself  of  its  cover,  Jackson  marched  around  the  right  flank  of  Hooker's 
army,  without  that  general  having  any  knowledge  of  the  critical  move 
ment  which  was  in  progress  almost  within  reach  of  his  guns.  Near  sunset 
of  the  2d  of  May,  he  was  in  position  at  "Wilderness  Church.  The  two 
divisions  of  McLaw  and  Anderson  kept  up  a  succession  of  feints  on  Hook 
er's  front,  while  Jackson,  with  stealthy  and  alert  movement,  prepared  to 
fall  like  a  raging  tiger  upon  his  flank. 

But  few  hours  of  day-light  were  left  when  Jackson  commenced  his 
attack.  It  was  sudden  and  furious.  Marching  rapidly  from  the  direction 
of  Germania  Ford,  he  fell  suddenly  on  Howard's  corps  in  the  forest.  The 
yell  of  his  soldiers  was  the  only  signal  of  attack.  The  whole  corps  of  the 
enemy  was  broken  ;  it  retreated  in  confusion  and  dismay  ;  in  vain  Hooker 
interposed  himself  to  check  the  flight ;  his  right  wing  was  being  fiercely 
driven  down  upon  Anderson's  and  McLaw's  sturdy  veterans,  and  the  fate 
of  his  army  hung  in  a  balance. 

Presently  there  was  a  halt  in  the  pursuit.  The  enemy  had  succeeded 
in  rallying  some  of  his  artillery  near  a  stone  wall  directly  in  the  line  of 
the  retreat.  Then  Jackson,  in  company  with  a  number  of  his  own  and  a 
part  of  A.  P.  Hill's  staff,  rode  forward  to  reconnoitre,  and  proceeded 
beyond  the  front  line  of  skirmishers.  When  he  had  finished  his  observa 
tions,  he  rode  back  in  the  twilight  to  rejoin  his  men,  that  he  might  order 
a  fresh  attack.  A  North  Carolina  regiment  mistook  the  party,  as  they 
galloped  through  the  foliage,  for  the  enemy.  Some  one  cried  out  "  Caval 
ry,"  "  charge  !  "  and  immediately  the  regiment  fired.  Jackson  fell,  struck 
by  three  balls,  two  through  the  left  arm,  and  another  penetrating  the  palm 
of  the  right  hand.  He  was  placed  on  a  litter  ;  one  of  the  bearers  was  shot 
down  by  the  enemy's  skirmishers ;  the  General,  falling,  received  a  severe 
contusion  of  the  side,  and  was  for  two  hours  nearly  pulseless  from  the 
shock.  For  five  minutes  he  lay  actually  within  the  line  of  the  Federal 


BATTLE   OF   CHANCELLORSVILLE.  375 

skirmishers,  and  under  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery.  Some  of  his  men  becom 
ing  aware  of  his  danger,  rushed  forward,  and  plucked,  from  the  terrible 
fire  of  artillery,  the  prostrate  form  of  their  beloved  commander.  He  was 
placed  in  an  ambulance,  and  carried  to  the  field  hospital  at  Wilderness 
Eun. 

With  Jackson's  fall  the  impetus  of  the  Confederate  attack  ceased. 
Gen.  Stuart,  who  succeeded  to  the  command,  renewed  the  fight  at  nine 
o'clock,  and  continued  it  until  the  enemy's  right  had  been  doubled  in  qn 
his  centre  in  and  around  Chancellorsville.  But  the  fiery  energy  of  Jackson 
was  wanting  to  carry  forward  the  troops,  and  to  make  what  was  already 
a  severe  repulse  of  the  enemy  a  terrible  and  irremediable  disaster. 

A  messenger  was  despatched  to  Gen.  Lee,  with  the  intelligence  of  the 
wounding  of  his  great  lieutenant.  He  found  the  General  on  a  bed  of 
straw  about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning.  He  told  him  that  Jackson  was 
severely  wounded,  and  that  it  had  been  his  intention  to  press  the  enemy 
next  day — Sunday — if  he  had  not  fallen.  Gen.  Lee  quietly  said,  "  These 
people  shall  be  pressed  to-day."  The  grand,  simple  commander  never  had 
any  other  name  for  the  enemy  than  "  these  people."  He  rose  from  his 
bed  of  straw,  partook  of  his  simple  fare  of  ham  and  cracker,  sallied  forth, 
and  made  such  dispositions  as  rendered  that  Sabbath-day  a  blessed  one  for 
the  Confederacy. 

At  clay-break,  on  the  3d,  the  three  divisions  of  Jackson's  old  corps 
advanced  to  the  attack.  Meanwhile  Anderson's  division  was  pushed  for 
ward  by  Gen.  Lee  to  assault  the  strongly-entrenched  position  of  the  enemy 
in  front  of  Chancellorsville.  On  one  side  the  Federals  were  being  forced 
back  in  the  direction  of  Chancellorsville.  On  the  other  side  Anderson's 
men  pressed  through  the  woods,  over  the  fields,  up  the  hills,  into  the  very 
mouths  of  the  enemy's  guns,  and  forced  him  to  take  shelter  behind  a 
second  line  of  entrenchments  in  rear  of  Chancellorsville.  There  were 
ladies  at  Hooker's  headquarters,  in  the  large  house  which  gave  the  name 
to  the  battle-field.  They  were  taken  away  by  one  of  Hooker's  staff,  as  the 
firing  became  hot.  One  of  the  ladies  fainted.  It  was  a  forlorn  sight  to 
see  that  troupe  passing  through  the  Federal  lines  at  such  a  time.  Soon 
after  they  left,  the  house,  which  was  a  large  and  elegant  structure,  took 
fire,  and  burned  to  the  ground.  Hooker's  headquarters  were  transferred 
to  the  rear,  and  his  crippled  army,  surrounded  on  all  sides,  except  toward 
the  river,  was  anxious  now  only  for  retreat. 

It  was  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning.  The  capture  or  destruction  of 
Hooker's  army  now  appeared  certain.  But  just  then  news  was  received 
that  Sedgwick,  who  had  crossed  the  river  at  Fredericksbnrg,  had  taken 
Marye's  Heights,  which  had  been  held  by  Barksdale's  brigade,  less  than 
two  thousand  men,  and  six  pieces  of  the  Washington  Artillery.  The  hill 
was  flanked,  and  its  brave  defenders,  who  had  held  it  against  three 


376  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

assaults,  were  cut  off  from  their  supports,  and  compelled  to  surrender. 
Gen.  Early,  finding  that  Sedgwick  had  gained  this  position  on  his  left,  and 
was  pressing  forward  his  forces  towards  Chancellorsville,  withdrew,  and 
took  up  a  position  near  Salem  Church,  about  five  miles  from  Fredericks- 
burg,  where  he  threw  up  some  slight  field-works. 

The  movement  of  Sedgwick  made  it  necessary  for  Gen.  Lee  to  arrest 
the  pursuit  of  Hooker,  and  caused  him  to  send  back  towards  Fredericks- 
burg  the  division  of  McLaw  to  support  Early  and  check  the  enemy's 
advance.  On  the  evening  of  the  3d,  Sedgwick's  advanced  troops  were 
driven  back  without  difficulty.  On  the  4th  the  battle  was  renewed.  The 
enemy  was  evidently  attempting  to  establish  communication  with  Hooker 
along  the  river  road,  and  for  this  purpose  had  massed  a  heavy  force 
against  McLaw's  left.  A  portion  of  Anderson's  force  was  marched  fifteen 
miles  to  his  support ;  but  Gen.  Lee,  who  had  come  upon  the  field,  having 
discovered  the  enemy's  design,  ordered  Anderson  to  unite  with  Early,  so 
as  to  attack  that  part  of  the  enemy's  line  which  he  had  weakened  by  his 
demonstration  on  McLaw,  and  thus  threaten  his  communication  with 
Fredericksburg.  The  combined  attack  was  made  just  before  sunset. 
Sedgwick's  men  hardly  waited  to  receive  it ;  they  fled  precipitately 
towards  Banks'  Ford  ;  and  during  the  night  they  recrossed  the  river  in  the 
condition  of  an  utterly  defeated  and  demoralized  army. 

Thus,  on  the  night  of  the  4th  of  May  ended  the  remarkable  series  of 
battles  on  the  lines  of  the  Eappahannock.  There  had  been  three  distinct 
engagements  :  that  of  the  Wilderness,  where  Jackson  succeeded  in  turning 
the  enemy's  flank  ;  that  most  properly  called  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville, 
around  which  point  the  enemy  centred  and  made  -his  best  fight ;  and  that  of 
Salem  Church  which  closed  with  Sedgwick's  rout  and  retreat  across  the  river. 

The  enemy  was  now  driven  from  every  point  around  Fredericksburg, 
and  it  but  remained  to  make  short  work  of  Hooker  at  United  States  Ford. 
That  commander,  cowed  and  hemmed  in  within  his  straitened  lines  by  a 
few  Confederate  divisions,  had  scarcely  fired  a  gun  while  Sedgwick's 
corps,  a  few  miles  off,  was  being  overwhelmed  and  driven  back  in  dis 
graceful  confusion.  He  called  a  council  of  war,  and  determined  to  retreat. 
The  night  of  the  5th  afforded  him  the  opportunity  ;  there  was  a  drenching 
storm  of  wind  and  rain ;  pontoons  were  laid ;  the  several  corps  crossed 
the  river ;  and  the  next  morning  the  enemy's  whole  force  was  over  the 
river,  and  on  the  inarch  to  its  former  camps  at  Falmouth.* 

*  It  is  curious  to  notice  the  hardy  falsehoods  of  official  dispatches.  Although  Hooker  had  sus 
tained  one  of  the  worst  defeats  in  the  war,  he  issued  the  following  rubbish  in  a  congratulatory 
address  (!)  to  his  army : 

"  General  Order,  No.  49. 

"  The  Major-General  Commanding  tenders  to  the  army  his  congratulations  on  its  achievements 
of  the  last  seven  days.  If  it  has  not  accomplished  all  that  was  expected,  the  reasons  are  well- 


BATTLE   OF   CHANCELLORSVILLE.  377 

The  loss  of  the  enemy  was  terrible.  We  had  taken  nearly  eight  thou 
sand  prisoners ;  Northern  accounts  stated  Sedgwick's  loss  at  five  thousand  ; 
that  of  Hooker  in  killed  and  wounded  was  probably  twice  as  large ;  and 
but  little  is  risked  in  putting  all  his  losses  at  twenty-five  thousand  men. 
Gen.  Lee's  loss  was  less  than  ten  thousand.  He  had  won  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  victories  on  record  ;  illustrated  the  highest  quality  of  general 
ship,  the  self-possession  and  readiness  of  a  great  commander,  and  con 
firmed  a  reputation  now  the  first  in  war.  Indeed,  this  reputation  had  not 
properly  commenced  in  the  Seven  Days  Battles  around  Richmond  ;  for  it 
was  only  when  Lee  moved  out  to  the  lines  of  the  Eappahannock  that  there 
commenced  the  display  of  his  great  tactical  abilities.  He  had  now  fought 
the  most  difficult  and  brilliant  battle  of  the  war.  Amid  all  the  achieve 
ments  and  wonders  of  his  future  career,  Chancellors ville  must  ever  remain 
the  master-piece  of  his  military  life. 

Now  and  then  there  were  developed  in  the  South  certain  facts  and 
figures  concerning  the  war,  officially  verified,  and  so  unlike  the  stories  of 
the  newspaper  and  the  printed  catchpenny,  that  the  public  mind  was 
startled  from  former  convictions,  and  put  on  a  new  train  of  inquiry.  This 
was  especially  so  with  reference  to  the  unequal  match  of  force  in  the  war. 
The  Southern  people  had  a  general  impression  that  they  were  largely  out 
numbered  in  the  contest ;  that  the  Xorth  was  greatly  superiour  in  men, 
material,  and  all  the  apparatus  of  conquest.  But  their  notions  of  this  in 
equality  were  vague,  and  in  no  instance  came  up  to  the  full  measure  of 

known  to  the  army.     It  is  sufficient  to  say,  that  they  were  of  a  character  not  to  be  foreseen  or  pre 
vented  by  human  sagacity  or  resources. 

"  In  withdrawing  from  the  south  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  before  delivering  a  general  battle 
to  our  adversaries,  the  army  has  given  renewed  evidence  of  its  confidence  in  itself  and  its  fidelity 
to  the  principles  it  represents. 

"  By  fighting  at  a  disadvantage,  we  would  have  been  recreant  to  our  trust,  to  ourselves,  to  our 
cause,  and  to  our  country.  Professedly  loyal  and  conscious  of  its  strength,  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  will  give  or  decline  battle  whenever  its  interests  or  honour  may  command  it. 

"  By  the  celerity  and  secrecy  of  our  movements,  our  advance  and  passage  of  the  river  was  un 
disputed,  and  on  our  withdrawal  not  a  rebel  dared  to  follow  us.  The  events  of  the  last  week  may 
well  cause  the  heart  of  every  officer  and  soldier  of  the  army  to  swell  with  pride. 

u  We  have  added  new  laurels  to  our  former  renown.  We  have  made  long  marches,  crossed 
rivers,  surprised  the  enemy  in  his  entrenchments,  and  wherever  we  have  fought  we  have  inflicted 
heavier  blows  than  those  we  have  received. 

"  We  have  taken  from  the  enemy  5,000  prisoners  and  fifteen  colours,  captured  seven  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  placed  hors  de  combat  18,000  of  our  foe's  chosen  troops. 

"  We  have  destroyed  his  depots,  filled  with  vast  amounts  of  stores,  damaged  his  communica 
tions,  captured  prisoners  within  the  fortifications  of  his  capital,  and  filled  his  country  with  fear  and 
consternation. 

"  We  have  no  other  regret  than  that  caused  by  the  loss  of  our  brave  companions,  and  in  this 
we  are  consoled  by  the  conviction  that  they  have  fallen  in  the  holiest  cause  ever  submitted  to  the 
arbitration  of  battle. 

"  Bv  command  of  Major-General  HOOKER, 

"  S.  WILLIAMS,  Assistant- Adjt.-General." 


378  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  Northern  advantage  in  this  respect.  It  was  the  policy  of  the  Confed 
erate  Government  to  keep  all  military  matters  secret,  and  to  give,  even  to 
our  own  people,  exaggerated  impressions  of  the  strength  of  our  forces  in 
the  Held.  Our  armies  were  always  popularly  accounted  much  larger  than 
they  really  were,  and  a  pleasant  delusion  was  maintained,  until  some  occa 
sion  would  bring  out  official  figures,  and  shock  the  public  with  surprise. 
Who  would  have  supposed,  until  Beauregard's  official  figures  were  pub 
lished,  that  the  army  of  the  First  Manassas  numbered  less  than  thirty 
thousand  men,  and  that  five  Confederate  regiments  on  that  field  held  in 
check,  for  two  hours,  a  column  of  fifteen  thousand  Federal  infantry? 
Who  would  have  imagined,  looking  at  the  newspapers  of  the  day,  that 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who  was  popularly  expected,  in  the  first  year  of 
the  war,  to  take  Cincinnati,  and  to  march  to  the  Northern  Lakes,  never 
had  more  than  twenty-odd  thousand  men  to  meet  all  the  emergencies  of  the 
early  campaign  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  ?  Who  would  have  believed, 
unless  on  the  official  authority  of  the  great  Confederate  Chieftain  himself, 
that  Gen.  Lee  whipped  "  the  finest  army  on  the  planet"  under  Hooker,  with 
less  than  one-third  his  force  ?  These  are  matters  of  official  history,  and  stand 
in  sharp  contrast  to  the  swollen  narratives  of  the  newspaper,  and  in  singular 
relations  to  the  Northern  assertion  of  martial  prowess  in  the  war. 

While  the  great  victory  of  Chancellorsville  was  causing  joy  and  con 
gratulation  throughout  the  Confederacy,  Gen.  Stonewall  Jackson  lay 
dying  at  a  small  farm-house,  a  few  miles  from  where  he  had  led  his  last 
and  most  famous  attack.  No  one  had  supposed  that  his  wounds  would 
prove  mortal ;  it  had  already  been  announced  from  his  physician  that 
amputation  had  been  decided  upon,  and  he  would  probably  very  soon 
thereafter  be  in  a  condition  to  be  removed  to  Richmond.  But  while  prep 
arations  were  being  made  there  to  receive  the  distinguished  sufferer,  there 
came  the  appalling  news  that  an  attack  of  pneumonia  had  supervened, 
and  that  there  were  no  hopes  of  his  recovery.  He  expired  on  Sunday,  the 
eighth  day  of  his  suffering.  He  had  declared  :  "  If  I  live  it  will  be  for 
the  best — and  if  I  die,  it  will  be  for  the  best ;  God  knows  and  directs  all 
things  for  the  best."  His  last  moments  were  mostly  occupied  with  lively 
expressions  of  that  trust  and  confidence  in  God,  which  had  marked  his  life 
for  many  years,  and  which  he  had  carried  into  all  the  details  of  his  wonder 
ful  career.  There  were  various  reports  of  his  last  words.  They  were  not 
religious  ones.  His  last  utterance  in  the  delirium  that  preceded  death 
was  :  "  Tell  Major  Hawks  to  send  forward  provisions  to  the  men.  Let  us 
cross  over  the  river  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the  trees."  And  thus 
passed  over  the  dark  river  and  into  eternal  rest,  the  spirit  of  the  great 
man,  whose  exploits  had  been  amongst  the  most  brilliant  in  the  military 
history  of  the  world,  and  whose  character  must  ever  remain  an  interesting 
subject  for  the  student  of  mankind. 


CHARACTER   OF    "  STONEWALL 


"  STONEWALL  "   JACKSON.  379 


CHARACTER  OF   "  STONEWALL  "   JACKSON. 

THERE  was  probably  no  more  ambitious  man  in  the  Southern  Con 
federacy  than  "  Stonewall "  Jackson.     The  vulgar  mind  thinks  that  it 
easily  discovers  those  who  are  the  ambitious  men  in  a  community, 
readily  designates  as  such  those  who  aspire  to  office  and  public  positions, 
who  seek  sensations,  court  notoriety  in  newspapers,  and  hold  up  their 
hands  for  the  applause  of  the  multitude.     But  ambition,  in  its  true  and 
noble  sense,  is  very  different  from  these  coarse  bids  for  popular  favour. 
There  is  a  class  of  apparently  quiet  minds  which,  choosing  seclusion  and 
mystery,  and  wearing  an  air  of  absence,  or  even  misanthropy,  moving  in 
their  daily  walks  with  an  appearance  of  profound  -unconcern,  are  yet 
living  for  history,  and  are  daily  and  nightly  consumed  with  the  fires  of 
ambition.     It  is  this  sort  of  ambition  which  cherishes  and  attempts  ideals  ; 
which  is  founded  on  a  deep  and  unconquerable  self-esteem ;   and  which 
is  often  haughtily  and  even  grimly  silent,  from  a  consciousness  of 
powers,  or  an  ever  present  belief  in  its  destiny. 

Of  such  an  order  of  ambition  those  who  knew  Gen.  Jackson  best 
declare  that  he  was  singularly  possessed.  He  believed  in  his  destiny, 
whatever  religious  name  he  chose  to  attach  to  that  transcendental  and 
ravishing  sentiment ;  he  was  fond  of  repeating  to  his  intimate  friends  that 
"mystery  was  the  secret  of  success;"  and  because  he  went  about  his 
work  with  a  silent  and  stern  manner,  that  was  no  proof  of  the  opinion 
of  the  populace,  that  he  was  simply  a  machine  of  conscientious  motives, 
with  no  sentiment  in  his  composition  but  that  of  duty. 

It  is  not  unfrequently  the  experience  of  truly  great  men,  that  they 
have  to  live  through  a  period  of  utter  misapprehension  of  their  worth, 
and  often  of  intense  ridicule.     Such  was  the  painful  experience  of  Gen. 
Jackson      At  the  Virginia  Military  School  at  Lexington,  where  he  was  a 
professor  before  the  war,  he  was  thought  to  be  stupid  and  harmless,  and 
he  was  often  the  butt  of  the  academic  wit  of  that  institution.     Col.  Gillem, 
who  tauo-ht  tactics  there,  was  taken  to  be  the  military  genius  of  the  place, 
and  afterwards  gave  evidence  of  the  correctness  of  this  appreciation  by 
actually  losing,  during  the  war,  in  the  mountains  of  Northwestern  Vir 
ginia  the  only  regiment  that  he  was  ever  trusted  to  command      At  the 
battle  of  Manassas,  despite  the  critical  and  splendid  service  which L  Jad 
son  did  there  (for  he  stayed  the  retreat  in  the  rear  of  the  Eobmson  House 
and  in  the  subsequent  charge  pierced  the  enemy's  centre),  his  stiff  and  odd 
ficnire  drew  upon  him  the  squibs  of  all  the  newspaper  correspondents  on 
the  field     His  habit  of  twisting  his  head,  and  interpolating 
his  remarks  was  humorously  described  in  the  Charleston  Mercury.     At  a 


380  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

later  period  of  his  military  career,  when  he  made  his  terrible  wintry 
march  in  1861-2,  from  Winchester  to  Bath  and  Romney,  and  became 
involved  in  differences  with  Gen.  Loring,  it  was  actually  reported  that  he 
was  insane.  A  colonel  came  to  Richmond  with  the  report  that  Jackson 
had  gone  mad  ;  that  his  mania  was  that  a  familiar  spirit  had  taken  posses 
sion  of  a  portion  of  his  body  ;  and  that  he  was  in  the  habit  of  walking  by 
himself  and  holding  audible  conversations  with  a  mysterious  being. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Gen.  Jackson  came  under  the  fitful  cloud 
of  President  Davis'  displeasure ;  and  he  was  so  much  affected  by  the 
course  of  the  Richmond  authorities  towards  him  in  his  affair  with  Loring, 
that,  at  one  time,  he  determined  to  resign.  The  extreme  sensibility  of  his 
nature,  and  his  ardent  ambition,  were  unmasked  in  the  letters  he  wrote  his 
wife,  alluding  to  the  then  probable  close  of  his  military  career,  and  sub 
mitting  to  what  he  supposed  "  the  will  of  God  "  in  this  abrupt  termination 
of  his  hopes.  But  it  was  not  decreed  by  Providence  that  the  Confederate 
cause  should  then  lose  the  services  of  Jackson,  and  its  chief  ornament  be 
plucked  from  it,  and  its  great  pillar  of  strength  cast  down  through  a  pal 
try  official  embroilment  in  Richmond.  By  the  earnest  persuasions  of 
Governor  Letcher  and  others,  Gen.  Jackson  was  induced  to  withdraw  his 
letter  of  resignation ;  and  that  sword  which  might  have  been  dropped  in 
an  obscure  quarrel  was  yet  to  carve  out  the  most  brilliant  name  in 
the  war. 

The  fame  of  Jackson  was  first  secured,  and  permanently  erected  in 
the  popular  heart,  by  his  splendid  and  ever-memorable  campaign  in  the 
valley  of  Yirginia,  in  the  spring  of  1862.  In  that  campaign,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  the  period  of  three  weeks,  he  fought  four  battles ;  recovered 
Winchester ;  captured  four  thousand  prisoners ;  secured  several  million 
dollars'  worth  of  stores ;  chased  Banks'  army  out  of  Virginia  and  across 
the  Potomac,  and  accomplished  a  list  of  deeds  that  threw  the  splendour 
of  sunlight  over  the  fortunes  of  the- Confederacy,  and  broke,  at  the  critical 
moment,  the  heaviest  shadows  of  defeat  and  misfortune  that  had  so  far 
befallen  them.  In  the  Seven  Days  Battles  the  name  of  Jackson  again 
rose  like  a  star.  And  yet  it  was  to  gather  new  effulgence,  when  the 
names  of  Second  Manassas  and  the  Wilderness  were  to  be  inscribed,  alike 
on  the  banners  of  the  Confederacy  and  the  escutcheon  of  his  own  fame. 

Jackson's  intense  religious  character  has  naturally  come  in  for  a  large 
share  of  public  admiration  and  curiosity.  To  his  merits  as  a  commander, 
he  added  the  virtues  of  an  active,  humble,  consistent  Christian,  restraining 
profanity  in  his  camp,  welcoming  army  colporteurs,  distributing  tracts, 
and  anxious  to  have  every  regiment  in  his  army  supplied  with  a  chaplain. 
Prayer-meetings  and  "  revivals  "  were  common  occurrences  in  his  camp, 
and  in  these  he  was  quite  as  active  and  conspicuous  as  in  the  storm  and 
action  of  battle.  It  was  said  that  he  treated  the  itinerant  preachers  and 


CHARACTER  OF    "  STONEWALL  "   JACKSON.  381 

"  circuit-riders  "  who  flocked  to  liis  camp  with  much  more  distinction 
than  any  other  visitors  ;  and  the  story  is  told  how,  on  one  occasion,  when 
the  horse  driven  by  one  of  these  itinerants  balked  at  a  hill,  Jackson  him 
self  insisted  upon  leading  and  assisting  the  animal  up  the  acclivity  in  the 
astonished  sight  of  his  whole  army. 

His  nature  was  epicene.  We  but  seldom  see  a  combination  of  femi 
nine  tenderness  with  a  really  strong  will ;  but  when  we  do,  we  see  masked 
iron  in  the  man,  and  discover  the  rarest  and  loftiest  type  of  greatness. 
Such  a  combination  was  most  sincere  and  striking  in  Jackson.  An 
authentic  anecdote  is  told  of  him,  illustrating  his  extreme  tenderness  to 
whatever  was  weak  or  helpless.  Stopping  at  the  house  of  a  friend,  one 
wintry  night,  he  showed  much  concern  for  a  little  delicate  girl  of  the 
family,  and  counselled  them  to  see  that  her  bed  was  comfortable.  After 
the  family  had  retired,  Jackson  was  seen  to  leave  his  chamber  and  ap 
proach  the  bedside  of  the  little  girl,  where  for  some  moments  he  busied 
himself  tucking  the  bedclothes  around  her,  and  making  the  little  creature 
as  snug  as  possible. — The  large,  rough  hand  that  did  this  gentle  task,  was 
the  same  that  wielded  the  thunderbolt  of  battle,  and  that  cleft  like  flam 
ing  lightning  the  hosts  of  the  Wilderness. 

Jackson's  habits  in  the  field  were  those  of  almost  superhuman  endur 
ance.  Neither  heat  nor  cold  appeared  to  make  the  slightest  impression 
upon  him.  He  cared  nothing  for  good  quarters  and  dainty  fare.  He 
often  slept  on  the  ground,  wrapped  in  his  blanket.  His  vigilance  was 
marvellous ;  he  never  seemed  to  sleep  ;  he  let  nothing  pass  without  his 
personal  scrutiny.  His  active  determination  and  grim  energy  in  the  field, 
were  scarcely  to  be  expected  from  one  who,  in  preceding  years,  had  been 
a  quiet  professor  in  a  college  of  youths.  As  for  the  rapidity  of  his 
marches,  that  was  something  portentous.* 

*  An  officer  on  the  staff  of  Jackson,  at  the  time  he  was  ordered  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
writes  as  follows,  in  a  pleasant  private  letter,  of  his  experiences  of  the  campaign,  and  of  the  pecu 
liarities  of  the  commander : 

"  When  we  were  ordered  up  the  Valley  with  old  Jackson,  it  was  considered  to  be  a  source  of 
congratulation  to  all  for  going  into  active  service ;  but,  believe  me,  I  would  have  willingly  gone 
back  into  winter-quarters  again  after  a  week's  trial,  for  Jackson  is  the  greatest  marcher  in  the 
world.  When  we  first  moved  up  here,  our  orders  were  for  a  march  to  Charlestown  ;  next  day  we 
moved  back  to  Winchester  ;  in  a  few  days  again  back  to  Charlestown ;  and  thence,  from  one  place  to 
another,  until  at  last  I  began  to  imagine  that  we  were  commanded  by  some  peripatetic  philosophical 
madman,  whose  forte  was  pedestrianism.  With  little  or  no  baggage,  we  are  a  roving,  hungry, 
hardy  lot  of  fellows.  '  Stonewall '  may  be  a  very  fine  old  gentleman,  and  an  honest,  good-tempered, 
industrious  man,  but  I  should  admire  him  much  more  in  a  state  of  rest  than  continually  seeing  him 
moving  in  front.  And  such  a  dry  old  stick,  too  !  As  for  uniform,  he  has  none — his  wardrobe  isn't 
worth  a  dollar ;  and  his  horse  is  quite  in  keeping,  being  a  poor,  lean  animal,  of  little  spirit  or 
activity.  And  don't  he  Seep  his  aides  moving  about !  Thirty  miles'  ride  at  night  through  the  mud 
is  nothing  of  a  job  ;  and  if  they  don't  come  up  to  time,  I'd  as  soon  face  the  devil,  for  Jackson  takes 
no  excuses  when  duty  is  on  hand.  He  is  solemn  and  thoughtful,  speaks  but  little,  and  always  in  a 


382  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  London  Times,  a  journal  whose  judgments  of  men  were  taken  in 
the  cotemporary  world  almost  as  the  sentences  of  history,  frequently 
compared  Jackson  to  Napoleon.  "  He  was,"  said  this  great  organ  of 
European  opinion,  "  one  of  the  most  consummate  Generals  that  this  cen 
tury  has  produced.  *  *  *  That  mixture  of  daring  and  judgment, 
which  is  the  mark  of  c  Heaven-born '  Generals  distinguished  him  beyond 
any  man  of  his  time.  Although  the  young  Confederacy  has  been  illus 
trated  by  a  number  of  eminent  soldiers,  yet  the  applause  and  devotion 
of  his  countrymen,  confirmed  by  the  judgment  of  European  nations, 
have  given  the  first  place  to  Jackson.  The  military  feats  he  accom 
plished  moved  the  minds  of  the  people  with  astonishment,  which 
it  is  only  given  to  the  highest  genius  to  produce.  The  blows  he 
struck  at  the  enemy  were  as  terrible  and  decisive  as  those  of  Bonaparte 
himself." 

There  can  be  no  doubt  in  history  of  the  military  genius  of  Jackson. 
There  is  a  certain  ignorant  idea  of  genius  as  a  thoughtless  and  careless 
disposition  of  mind,  which  gets  its  inspirations  without  trouble,  and  never 
descends  to  actual  labour.  Such  was  not  the  genius  of  Jackson  ;  and  such 
is  not  true  genius.  He  was  an  active,  laborious  thinker ;  he  wrestled  with 
great  thoughts ;  he  had  his  silent  calculations ;  but  having  once  appre 
hended  the  true  thought,  and  got  to  a  point  in  his  meditations,  he 
acted  with  a  rapidity,  a  decision,  and  a  confidence,  that  scorned 
hesitation,  refused  longer  to  think,  and  took  the  appearance  of  im 
petuous  inspiration. 

Danger,  in  a  certain  sense,  intoxicated  him.  But  it  did  not  produce 
that  intoxication  which  confuses  the  mind,  or  makes  it  giddy  with  a  crowd 
of  images.  It  was  that  sort  of  intoxication  which  strings  the  nerve,  stimu 
lates  the  brain,  concentrates  the  faculties,  and  gives  a  consciousness  of 
power  that  is  for  the  moment  irresistible.  In  battle,  he  was  not  much  in 
motion ;  but  his  eyes  glowed  ;  his  face  was  blazoned  with  the  fire  of  the 
conflict ;  his  massive  jaw  stiffened ;  his  voice  rang  out  sharp  and  clear ; 
every  order  and  remark  was  as  quick  and  pertinent  as  if  it  had  been 
studied  for  hours.  One  could  scarcely  recognize  in  this  figure  of  intense 
activity,  all  alive,  with  every  faculty  at  play,  the  man  who  used  to  occupy 
himself  with  rambling  soliloquies  in  the  rear  of  his  tent ;  who  presented  the 
appearance  of  an  inanimate  figure-head  in  his  pew  at  the  Presbyterian 

calm,  decided  tone  ;  and  from  what  he  says  there  is  no  appeal,  for  he  seems  to  know  every  hole  and 
corner  of  this  valley  as  if  he  had  made  it,  or,  at  least,  as  if  it  had  been  designed  for  his  own  use. 
He  knows  all  the  distances,  all  the  roads,  even  the  cow-paths  through  the  woods,  and  goat-tracks 
along  the  hills.  I  have  frequently  seen  him  approach  in  the  dead  of  night,  and  enter  into  conversa 
tions  with  sentinels,  and  ride  off  through  the  darkness.  In  my  opinion,  Jackson  will  assuredly  make 
his  mark  in  this  war,  for  his  untiring  industry  and  eternal  watchfulness  must  tell  upon  a  numerous 
enemy  unacquainted  with  the  country,  and  incommoded  by  large  baggage-trams." 


CHARACTER   OF    "  STONEWALL  "   JACKSON.  383 

church  in  Lexington  ;  and  who  often  got  up  out  of  his  camp-bed  at  night 
to  spend  hours  in  silent  prayer  and  meditation. 

It  may  readily  be  imagined  that  the  wonderful  career  of  Jackson  and 
his  personal  eccentricities  drew  upon  him  a  crowd  of  apocryphal  anecdotes 
in  the  newspapers.  Some  of  them  were  very  absurd.  His  person  was  as 
variously  represented  in  newspaper  paragraphs  as  if,  instead  of  being 
familiar  to  thousands,  he  inhabited  the  dim  outlines  of  another  century.' 
One  journal  described  him  as  an  absurdly  ugly  man  with  red  hair ; 
another  gave  his  portrait  as  that  of  an  immense  brain,  and  features  on 
which  nature  had  stamped  the  patent  of  nobility.  One  newspaper  cor 
respondent  declared  that  he  always  wore  the  brim  of  his  cap  on  the  mid 
dle  of  his  nose.  Another  declared  that  he  was  an  execrable  rider,  and 
looked  like  a  loose  jum ping-jack  on  horseback. 

There  is  a  popular  disposition  to  discover  something  curious  or  gro 
tesque  in  great  men.  But  there  was  really  but  little  of  this  sort  to  be 
discovered  in  Jackson,  and  scarcely  anything  that  could  be  pointed  out  as 
objects  of  vulgar  curiosity.  It  is  true  his  figure  was  queer  and  clumsy ; 
but  the  features  of  his  face  were  moulded  in  forms  of  simple  grandeur ; 
and  its  expression  was  as  unaffected  as  that  of  Lee  himself.  He  was  not 
an  ugly  man.  The  vulgar  might  call  him  such  ;  and  the  newspaper  pas 
sion  for  caricature  did  so  represent  him.  Nor  did  he  have  in  face  or 
figure  those  marks  which  the  silly  admiration  of  woman  expects  to  find  in 
military  heroes.  He  did  not  wear  long,  greasy  hair  falling  over  his  shoul 
ders  ;  he  did  not  stand  in  dramatic  attitudes ;  he  did  not  keep  his  eyes 
unnaturally  stretched ;  he  did  not  thrust  out  his  chest,  as  if  anxious  to 
impose  himself  upon  public  attention.  His  features  were  singularly  sim 
ple  and  noble.  A  broad  forehead,  rising  prominently  over  his  eyes,  and 
retreating  at  that  easy  angle  which  gives  a  certain  majesty  to  the  face, 
covered  a  massive  brain  ;  his  nostrils  were  unusually  large ;  his  jaw 
heavy  and  well-set ;  and,  although  his  features  were  coarse,  they  were 
combined  in  that  expression  of  dignity  and  power  which,  to  the  intelligent 
and  appreciative,  even  among  women,  is  the  greatest  charm  of  the  mascu 
line  face. 

The  death  of  Jackson  cast  a  shadow  on  the  fortunes  of  the  Con 
federacy,  that  reached  to  the  catastrophe  of  the  war.  It  was  not  only  a 
loss  to  his  country;  it  was  a  calamity  to  the  world :  a  subtraction  from 
the  living  generation  of  genius  :  the  extinction  of  a  great  light  in  the  tem 
ples  of  Christianity.  The  proposition  was,  eagerly  made  in  the  South  to 
erect  to  his  memory  a  stately  monument.  The  State  of  Virginia  sent  an 
artist  to  Europe  to  execute  his  statue.  Thousands  followed  him  to  the 
grave,  and  consecrated  it  with  tributes  of  affection  and  the  testimonies 
of  devotion.  "Who,  then,  regarding  this  fervour  of  admiration  and 
gratitude,  could  have  supposed  that  the  Southern  mind  could  ever 


384-  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

become  so  chilled  in  any  change  of  events,  or  in  any  mutation  of  for 
tune,  as  to  forget  alike  its  debts  of  gratitude  and  its  objects  of  pride 
in  the  glorious  past ;  and  that  the  time  could  ever  come  when  the 
household  effects  of  Stonewall  Jackson  would  be  sold  under  the  hammer 
of  an  auctioneer,  and  the  family  of  this  man  committed  to  the  trials  and 
chances  of  poverty ! 


CHAPTEE   XXIII. 

VIOKSBURG,  TUB  SECOND  PRIZE  OF  THE  WAR. — GEN.  GRANT. — WHAT  HIS  PEESISTENCT  WAS 
WORTH. — HIS  NEW  SCHEME  OF  ATTACK. — TWO  PARTS  OF  THE  ENTEEPEISE. — PORTER'S 
GUNBOATS  EUN  THE  BATTERIES.— GEANT'8  MAECH  FEOM  MILLIKEN'S  BEND. — BLINDNESS 
OF  GEN.  PEMBERTON  AT  VICKSBUEG. — ANTECEDENTS  AND  CHAEACTEE  OF  THIS  COM 
MANDER. — HIS  EXTREME  INCOMPETENCT. — PEESIDENT  DAVIS  BLAMED. — HIS  CAPEICE  AND 
OBSTINACY. — GRANT  CROSSES  THE  MISSISSIPPI  AND  MOVES  TOWARDS  PORT  GIBSON. — GEN. 

JOHNSTON'S  TELEGRAM  TO  PEMBERTON. — CEITICAL  OPPOETUNITY  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. — 
PEMBEETON  EEFUSES  TO  USE  IT,  AND  DISREGARDS  JOHNSTON'S  DESPATCH. — BATTLE  OF 

POET  GIBSON. — EXTRAOEDINARY  VALOUR  OF  BOWEN's  COMMAND. GRANT  TURNS  GRAND 

GULF  AND  MOVES  UPON  JACKSON.  — GEN.  JOHNSTON'S  ARRIVAL  AT  JACKSON. — SITUATION 
AND  STRENGTH  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES. — EVACUATION  OF  JACKSON. — JOHNSTON 

OFFERS  A  SECOND  OPPORTUNITY  OF  ATTACK  TO  PEMBERTON. THE  LATTER  DISOBEYS  THE 

ORDER  AND  COMMITS  A  FATAL  EREOUR. — SHERMAN'S  INCENDIARY  RECORD  IN  JACKSON. — 

HIS  USE  OF  THE  FIEE-BEAND. GEANT  FORCES  BATTLE  UPON  PEMBERTON. BATTLE  OF 

BAKER'S  CREEK. — TREMENDOUS  EXERTIONS  OF  STEVENSON'S  DIVISION. — GEN.  LORING 
FAILS  TO  SUPPORT  HIM,  REMAINS  INACTIVE,  AND  IS  CUT  OFF  IN  THE  RETREAT. — PEMBER- 
TON'8  NEW  POSITION  UPON  THE  BIG  BLACK. — ITS  STRENGTH. — IT  IS  SHAMEFULLY  ABAN 
DONED. — DISGRACEFUL  RETREAT  OF  PEMBERTON's  AEMY. THE  FATE  OF  VICKSBURG  VIR 
TUALLY  DECIDED  AT  THE  BIG  BLACK. — GEN.  JOHNSTON  ORDERS  THE  EVACUATION  OF 

VICKSBURG. PEMBERTON  ENTRAPPED  THERE. SIEGE  AND  SURRENDER  OF  VICKSBUEG. 

CONFIDENCE  OF  THE  GARRISON  RESTORED. PROSPECT  OF  RELIEF  FROM  JOHNSTON. — HOW 

IT  WAS  VISIONARY. — TWO  ASSAULTS  OF  THE  ENEMY  REPULSED. — .PAINFUL  OPERATIONS  OF 

SIEGE. — SUFFERINGS  OF  THE  GARRISON. JOHNSTON  HAS  SOME  HOPE  OF  EXTRICATING  THE 

GARRISON. — TAYLOR'S  ATTACK  AND  REPULSE  AT  MILLIKEN'S  BEND. — PEMBERTON'S  DE 
SPATCH  TO  JOHNSTON. — THE  REPLY  :  "  SOMETHING  MAY  YET  BE  DONE  TO  SAVE  VICKS 
BURG." — JOHNSTON  PREPAEES  TO  ATTACK  ON  7TH  JULY. — PEMBEETON  SURRENDERS  ON 

FOURTH    OF    JULY. — HIS    CONFERENCE  WITH   GRANT. A  TERRIBLE  DAY'S  WORK. EXTENT 

OF  THE   DISASTER   TO   THE    CONFEDERATE  CAUSE. — SURRENDER  OF  POET   HUDSON. — OTHER 

EVENTS  IN  THE  REGION  OF  THE    MISSISSIPPI  CONNECTED  WITH  THE  FALL  OF  VICKSBUEG. 

OPERATIONS   IN   THE   TEANS-MISSISSIPPI. — BATTLE  OF  HELENA. — OBJECT  OF  GEN.  HOLMES' 

MOVEMENT  ON  HELENA. AN  EXTEAORDINABY  MAECH. AN   EXTEAORDINARY  COUNCIL  OF 

GEAVE- 
OF  GEN. 

HOLMES. — THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  LOWER  LOUISIANA. — GEN.  TAYLOR'S  CAPTURE  OF  BRA  SHEAR 
CITY  AND  ITS  FORTS. — HIS  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  LAFOURCHE  COUNTRY. — HIS  SUCCESSES 
NEUTRALIZED  BY  THE  FALL  OF  VICKSBURG  AND  PORT  HUDSON. — BANKS  RETURNS  TO  NEW 
ORLEANS  AND  THE  ENEMY  HOLDS  THE  ENTIRE  LINE  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI. 

25 


386  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 


THE  object  of  the  enemy's  operations,  second  to  Richmond,  was  dis 
tinctly  the  possession  of  Yicksburg  and  the  opening  of  the  whole  length 
of  the  Mississippi  River.  Enormous  efforts  had  been  made  to  obtain  these 
two  great  prizes.  Five  attempts  upon  Richmond  had  failed.  Three  at 
tempts  upon  Vicksburg — that  of  Porter's  fleet ;  that  of  Sherman's  army  ; 
and  that  of  Grant,  which  may  be  designated  as  an  attempt  to  force  a  pas 
sage  to  the  rear  of  the  town,  including  the  project  of  a  canal  across  the 
isthmus  and  the  enterprises  known  as  the  Yazoo  Pass  and  Sunflower  Ex 
peditions — had  accomplished  nothing.  Foiled  again  at  Chancellorsville,  in 
the  great  aim  of  the  Virginia  campaign,  the  enemy  turned  with  renewed 
vigour  upon  the  second  object  of  the  war,  and  public  attention  was  im 
mediately  directed  to  the  great  campaign  likely  to  decide  the  fate  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley. 

Gen.  Grant  had  already  obtained  a  great  reputation  for  persistency — a 
slight  title  to  merit,  it  may  be  remarked,  when  a  commander  has  at  his 
disposal  abundant  means,  and  at  his  back  a  government  so  generous  and 
rich  as  never  to  call  its  officers  into  account  for  the  loss  of  life  and  of 
treasure  in  any  case  of  ultimate  success.  He  now  proposed  to  change  his 
plan  of  operations  against  Vicksburg.  He  determined  to  invest  the  town, 
and  having  turned  the  defences  on  the  Mississippi  and  Yazoo  Rivers,  to 
cut  off  the  defenders  from  all  communication  with  the  east.  One  part  of 
the  enterprise  was  to  run  Porter's  gunboats  and  a  number  of  transports 
past  the  works  at  Yicksburg ;  while  a  land  force,  consisting  of  two  corps, 
under  Grant  in  person,  should  march  from  Milliken's  Bend  to  Carthage,  a 
distance  of  thirty-five  miles,  interrupted  by  marshes  and  streams.  Both 
movements  succeeded.  On  the  16th  and  22d  April,  two  fleets  of  gunboats 
and  transports  ran  the  batteries  with  insignificant  disaster,  and  repeated  the 
lesson  that  had  been  taught  more  than  once  in  the  war,  that,  unless  where 
obstructions  have  been  placed,  steamers  will  run  the  gauntlet  of  almost 
any  fire.  By  the  last  of  April,  Grant,  having  marched  down  the  west 
bank  of  the  river,  and  joined  Porter's  gunboats  at  Carthage,  was  ready  to 
execute  the  next  step  in  his  scheme  of  attacking  Vicksburg  from  the  south 
east. 

His  adventure  was  a  complete  surprise  to  Gen.  Pemberton  at  Vicks 
burg.  This  commander,  who  had  been  appointed  to  what  the  Confed 
erates  designated  as  the  department  of  Mississippi  and  East  Louisiana,  had 
been  so  blind  as  to  suppose  Grant's  object  was  not  Vicksburg,  but  Bragg's 
army  in  Tennessee,  and  as  late  as  the  middle  of  April,  he  had  proposed  to 
order  troops  to  Tullahoma,  under  the  delusion  that  Rosecrans  would  be 
reinforced  from  Grant's  army.  The  mistake  was  characteristic  of  a  com 
mander  who  was  in  no  way  qualified  for  the  great  trust  to  which  he  had 
been  exalted.  The  appointment  of  Gen.  Pemberton  to  the  defence  of 


CHARACTER  OF  GEN.  PEMBERTON.  387 

Yicksburg  was  an  unfortunate  one ;  it  was  probably  the  most  unpopular 
single  act  of  President  Davis,  who  was  constantly  startling  the  public  by 
the  most  unexpected  and  grotesque  selections  for  the  most  important 
posts  of  the  public  service.  Pemberton  had  not  yet  fought  a  battle  in  the 
war.  He  was  a  Pennsylvanian  by  birth  ;  he  had  been  a  major  in  the  old 
United  States  service ;  and  from  this  inconsiderable  rank,  without  a  single 
record  of  meritorious  service  in  the  Confederacy,  he  had  been  raised  by  a 
stroke  of  President  Davis'  pen  to  the  position  of  a  lieu t?en ant-general,  and 
put  in  command  of  a  post  second  in  importance  to  the  Confederate  capital. 
He  had  previously  had  some  uneventful  commands  at  Norfolk  and  at 
Charleston.  He  was  removed  thence  in  consequence  of  frequent  protests  ; 
but  in  each  instance  with  promotion,  as  if  the  President  was  determined  to 
mark  his  contempt  for  a  public  opinion  which  did  not  appreciate  his 
favourite,  or  hoped  to  inspire  a  dull  brain  by  adding  another  star  to  his 
collar.  He  was  sent  to  Vicksburg  with  a  larger  command  and  a  more 
extensive  field,  to  show  eventually  the  accuracy  of  the  public  judgment  as 
to  his  capacity  even  for  subordinate  positions.  With  armies  so  intelligent 
as  those  of  the  Confederacy,  no  man  unfitted  for  command  could  long 
maintain  their  confidence  and  respect.  He  might  intrench  himself  with  all 
the  forms  and  parade  of  the  schools ;  but  intelligent  soldiers  easily  pene 
trated  the  thin  disguise,  and  distinguished  between  the  pretender  and  the 
man  of  ability.  So  it  was  at  Yicksburg.  Pemberton  had  already  given 
there  early  evidence  of  his  unfitness  for  command.  While  Grant  was 
assiduously  engaged  under  his  eye,  for  months,  in  preparing  the  powerful 
armament  which  was  to  spend  its  force  on  the  devoted  fortress,  his  adver 
sary  took  no  notice  of  the  warning.  The  water  batteries,  which  might 
have  been  strengthened,  were  afterwards  found  to  be  so  imperfect  as  to 
inflict  but  slight  damage  on  the  gunboats,  and  permit  the  run  of  all  the 
transports  of  a  large  army  with  equal  impunity.  The  fortifications  of 
Grand  Gulf,  where  Grant  was  now  making  his  next  demonstration,  had 
been  neglected,  until  the  tardy  attempt  rendered  the  accumulation  of  guns 
and  stores  there  an  easy  prey  to  the  enemy.  Yicksburg,  with  an  abun 
dant  country  around  it,  had  only  two  months'  instead  of  twelve  months' 
provisions.  How  was  Pemberton  engaged  ?  Immersed  in  official  trifles, 
laboriously  engaged  in  doing  nothing,  while  the  murmurs  around  him  and 
the  friction  of  events  had  developed  personal  characteristics  which,  with 
want  of  confidence  of  officers  and  men,  rendered  him  highly  unpopular. 
Of  a  captious  and  irritable  nature,  a  narrow  mind,  the  slave  of  the  forms 
and  fuss  of  the  schools,  Gen.  Pemberton  was  one  of  those  men  whose  idea 
of  war  began  with  a  bureau  of  clothing  and  equipment,  and  ended  with  a 
field-day  or  dress-parade.  Warning  after  warning  was  sounded ;  but 
President  Davis  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  them,  not,  perhaps,  that  he  cared 
especially  for  Pemberton,  but  because  his  own  vanity  was  so  exacting  that 


388  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

even  to  question  his  infallibility  of  selection  was  an  offence  not  to  be  con 
doned. 

Gen.  Grant,  having  effected  a  junction  with  the  gunboats  below  Vicks- 
burg,  next  determined  to  turn  the  works  at  Grand  Gulf,  which  defended 
the  mouth  of  the  Big  Black  River,  by  landing  at  a  point  lower  down  the 
river.  Accordingly  he  inarched  by  its  right  flank,  crossed  opposite  Bruins- 
burg,  and  on  the  30th  April  landed  on  the  left  bank,  and  immediately 
pushed  forward  towards  Port  Gibson,  a  small  town  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Big  Black  River. 

Gen.  Pemberton,  who  appeared  to  have  been  at  last  aroused  to  a  sense 
of  the  danger  of  his  position,  telegraphed  the  news  of  Grant's  movement  to 
Gen.  Johnston,  nominally  commanding  the  Western  armies,  and  then  at 
Tullahoma  with  Bragg.  He  received  orders  to  attack  at  once.  Gen. 
Johnston  despatched  :  u  If  Grant  crosses  the  river,  unite  all  your  troops  to 
beat  him.  Success  will  give  back  what  was  abandoned  to  win  it."  It 
was  the  critical  opportunity  of  the  campaign.  Grant  had  landed  with 
about  50,000  men.  By  drawing  all  his  forces  from  different  posts,  leaving 
only  enough  in  Yicksburg  to  answer  Porter's  chronic  bombardment,  Gen. 
Pemberton  could  have  concentrated  nearly  40,000  troops,  and  these,  with 
the  advantage  of  a  difficult  country,  and  with  slight  field-works,  might  at 
all  events  have  delayed  Grant  until  Vicksburg  was  provisioned,  and  Johns 
ton  had  arrived  with  reinforcements.  But  we  shall  see  that  the  bewil 
dered  commander,  without  the  resolution  to  risk  a  decisive  battle,  com 
mitted  the  unpardonable  errour  of  allowing  his  army  to  be  cut  up  in  detail 
by  an  enemy  with  massed  forces. 


BATTLE   OF    POKT   GIBSON. 

The  only  Confederate  force  which  was  to  meet  the  enemy's  advance 
towards  Port  Gibson  was  a  division  of  troops  under  Gen.  Bowen.  This 
brave  and  devoted  officer  had  been  left  with  a  few  thousand  men  to  con 
front  an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy,  as  Gen.  Pemberton  had  insisted 
upon  putting  the  Big  Black  River  between  the  enemy  and  the  bulk  of  his 
own  forces,  which  he  declared  were  necessary  to  cover  Vicksburg.  Gen. 
Bowen  had  fifty-five  hundred  men.  He  was  opposed  by  the  corps  of  Gen. 
McClernand,  numbering  probably  twenty  thousand  men.  An  engagement 
ensued  on  the  banks  of  a  small  stream,  which  crossed  the  road  from  Bruins- 
burg.  The  enemy,  by  the  extraordinary  valour  and  constancy  of  the 
small  force  of  Confederates,  was  kept  back  for  an  entire  day,  until  just 
before  sunset  Gen.  Bowen  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  executing  a  retreat 
without  confusion,  and  saving  the  bulk  of  his  army. 

The  position  of  Grand  Gulf  turned,  and  the  battle  of  Fort  Gibson  won, 


GEN.  JOHNSTON'S  DESPATCHES  TO  PEMBEKTON.  389 

Grant  pushed  his  column  direct  towards  Jackson.  Gen.  Johnston  reached 
Jackson  on  the  night  of  the  13th  May.  lie  received  there  a  despatch 
from  Gen.  Pemberton,  dated  12th  May,  asking  for  reinforcements,  as  the 
enemy,  in  large  force,  was  moving  from  the  Mississippi,  south  of  the  Big 
Black,  apparently  toward  Edwards's  Depot,  "  which  will  be  the  battle 
field,  if  I  can  forward  sufficient  force,  leaving  troops  enough  to  secure  the 
safety  of  the  place." 

Before  Johnston's  arrival  at  Jackson,  Grant,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
beaten  Gen.  Bowen  at  Port  Gibson,  made  good  the  landing  of  his  army, 
occupied  Grand  Gulf,  and  was  marching  upon  the  Jackson  and  Vicks- 
burg  Railroad. 

On  reaching  Jackson,  Gen.  Johnston  found  there  the  brigades  of  Gregg 
and  Walker,  reported  at  six  thousand ;  learned  from  Gregg  that  Maxcy's 
brigade  was  expected  to  arrive  from  Port  Hudson  the  next  day ;  that 
Gen.  Pemberton 's  forces,  except  the  garrison  of  Port  Hudson  (five  thou 
sand)  and  of  Yicksburg,  were  at  Edwards's  Depot — the  General's  head 
quarters  at  Bovina ;  that  four  divisions  of  the  enemy,  under  Sherman, 
occupied  Clinton,  ten  miles  west  of  Jackson,  between  Edwards's  Depot  arid 
ourselves.  Gen.  Johnston  was  aAvare  that  reinforcements  were  on  their 
way  from  the  East,  and  that  the  advance  of  those  under  Gen.  Gist  would 
probably  arrive  the  next  day,  and  with  Maxcy's  brigade,  swell  his  force  to 
about  eleven  thousand. 

Upon  this  information  he  sent  to  Gen.  Pemberton  a  despatch,  inform 
ing  him  of  his  arrival,  and  of  the  occupation  of  Clinton  by  a  portion  of 
Grant's  army,  urging  the  importance  of  re-establishing  communications, 
and  ordering  him  to  come  up,  if  practicable,  on  Sherman's  rear  at  once, 
and  adding :  "  To  beat  such  a  detachment  would  be  of  immense  value. 
The  troops  here  could  co-operate.  All  the  strength  you  can  quickly 
assemble  should  be  brought.  Time  is  all-important." 

On  the  14th  May,  the  enemy  advanced  by  the  Raymond  and  Clinton 
roads  upon  Jackson.  Johnston  did  not  propose  to  defend  the  town  ;  he 
had  no  sufficient  force  to  do  so  ;  he  therefore  ordered  Gregg  and  Walker 
to  fall  back  slowly,  offering  such  resistance  to  the  march  of  the  Federal 
columns  as  to  allow  time  to  remove  or  destroy  the  stores  accumulated  in 
Jackson.  This  work  accomplished,  Gen.  Johnston  retreated  by  the  Can 
ton  road,  from  which  alone  he  could  form  a  junction  with  Pemberton. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  Grant  was  now  between  the  two  Confederate 
armies ;  but  he  was  superiour  in  numbers  not  only  to  each,  but  to  both 
united.  Johnston  had  proposed  the  brilliant  hazard  of  crushing  an  im 
portant  detachment  of  the  enemy  at  Clinton,  and  had  urged  the  para 
mount  necessity  of  re-establishing  communications  between  the  two  Con 
federate  forces.  Pemberton  appears  to  have  been  completely  blind  to  these 
considerations.  In  disobedience  of  the  orders  of  his  superiour,  and  in 


390  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

opposition  to  the  views  of  a  majority  of  the  council  of  war,  composed  of  all 
his  generals  present,  before  whom  he  placed  the  subject,  he  decided  to 
make  a  movement  by  which  the  union  with  Johnston  would  be  impossible. 
It  was  a  fatal  errour.  The  irresolute  commander  had,  at  first,  expected  to 
fight  at  Edwards's  Depot,  being  unwilling  to  separate  himself  further  from 
Yicksburg.  "When  he  received  Johnston's  order  to  march  on  Sherman's 
rear  at  Clinton,  and  when  the  council  of  war,  called  by  him,  approved  the 
movement,  he  hesitated,  did  not  move  for  twenty-eight  hours,  and  invented 
a  compromise,  in  which  equally  abandoning  his  own  preconceived  plan 
of  battle,  and  disobeying  the  orders  of  Gen.  Johnston,  he  moved,  not 
to  risk  an  attack  on  Sherman,  but  in  another  direction  towards  Ray 
mond,  flattering  himself  that  he  was  about  to  cut  the  enemy's  com 
munications. 

The  delay  and  aberration  of  Pemberton  left  Jackson  at  the  mercy  of 
the  enemy,  and  opened  the  way  to  Yicksburg.  On  the  15th  April  Gen. 
Sherman's  corps  marched  into  Jackson.  The  incendiary  record  of  this 
famous  officer  commenced  here  ;  the  first  of  his  long  list  of  conflagrations 
and  peculiar  atrocities  dates  with  the  burning,  the  plunder,  and  sack  of 
Jackson.  The  little  town  of  two  main  streets,  with  detached  villas,  inhab 
ited  by  wealthy  planters,  was  surrendered  to  a  soldiery  licensed  to  rob, 
burn,  and  destroy.  Private  houses,  the  Catholic  church,  the  hotel,  the 
penitentiary,  and  a  large  cotton-factory  were  burned.  As  Sherman's 
troops  marched  out,  a  volume  of  smoke  rose  over  the  devoted  town,  while 
here  and  there  rolled  up  fiercely  great  masses  of  flame  attesting  the  infer 
nal  work  of  the  man  who,  not  content,  in  the  nineteenth  century  and  in  a 
civilized  country,  to  fight  with  the  sword,  had  taken  a  weapon  from  an 
other  age — in  the  fire-brand  of  the  savage. 

Meanwhile  Grant,  having  ascertained  Pemberton's  movement,  directed 
McClernand's  and  McPherson's  corps  to  move  by  the  Jackson  and  Yicks 
burg  railroad,  and  by  the  road  from  Raymond  to  meet  him.  Sherman 
had  been  ordered  to  evacuate  Jackson  and  to  take  a  similar  direction. 
Pemberton's  disposable  force  consisted  of  seventeen  thousand  five  hundred 
men.  On  the  16th  May,  while  moving  on  the  road  to  Raymond,  a  courier 
handed  him  a  despatch  from  Gen.  Johnston,  stating  that,  as  the  attack  on 
Sherman  had  failed,  the  only  means  by  which  a  union  could  now  be 
effected  between  the  two  forces,  was  that  Pemberton  should  move  directly 
to  Clinton,  whither  Johnston  had  retired.  An  order  of  counter-march  was 
issued.  But  already  heavy  skirmishing  was  going  on  in  Pemberton's 
front ;  he  found  it  impossible  to  extricate  himself  for  a  reverse  movement ; 
and  his  situation  was  such  that  he  was  compelled  to  give  battle  on  the 
ground  selected  by  the  enemy. 


391 


The  Confederate  line  of  battle  was  formed  in  a  bend  ol  what  was 
known  as  Baker's  Creek,  across  the  Jackson  and  Vicksburg  railroad. 
After  a  desultory  fire,  the  battle  commenced  in  earnest  about  noon ; 
Hovey's  division  attacking  the  centre  of  Pemberton's  line,  held  by  Steven 
son's  division,  while  two  other  divisions  of  the  enemy  threatened  to  turn 
the  Confederate  left.  To  relieve  the  centre,  Gen.  Loring  was  ordered  to 
attack  with  his  own  division  and  that  of  Bowen.  Gen.  Loring  did  not 
attack.  The  enemy  remained  steadily  in  his  front,  in  heavy  force,  occupy 
ing  a  series  of  ridges,  wooded,  and  commanding  each  other,  and  forming  a 
very  strong  position. 

Meanwhile  Stevenson's  sixty-five  hundred  troops  bore  the  brunt  of  the 
battle,  sustained  the  heavy  and  repeated  attacks  of  the  enemy,  broke 
Hovey's  line,  and  drove  it  in  disorder.  But  there  were  three  other  di 
visions  of  Grant's  army  marching  from  Raymond,  and  about  to  come  into 
action.  The  only  reinforcements  that  came  to  Stevenson's  overtasked 
troops,  were  two  brigades  of  Bowen.  Loring  was  inactive  ;  he  again  dis 
obeyed  orders  to  move  to  the  left,  and  remained  engaged  with  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  in  his  front.  Stevenson  continued  the  unequal  battle 
until  the  enemy's  division  from  Raymond  had  arrived  on  the  field,  when 
the  Confederate  line  at  last  gave  way  and  broke  in  confusion  from  the 
field. 

Gen.  Loring  states  that  he  was  making  dispositions  for  an  attack  upon 
the  enemy's  right,  by  which  he  hoped  to  u  overwhelm  it  and  retrieve  the 
day,"  when  he  received  orders  from  Pemberton  to  retreat  and  bring  up  the 
rear.  If  such  an  attack  was  designed,  it  was  too  late ;  the  day  was  already 
lost.  The  retreat  of  the  Confederates  was  by  the  ford  and  bridge  of 
Baker's  Creek.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  realized  that  they  were  leaving  the 
field,  he  moved  forward  in  heavy  force.  The  retreat  was  covered  with 
great  spirit.  Brigadier-Gen.  Tilghman,  of  Loring's  command,  having 
become  separated  from  it,  was  left  with  less  than  fifteen  hundred  effective 
men  to  sustain  the  attack  of  six  or  eight  thousand  of  the  enemy,  with  a 
fine  park  of  artillery.  But  he  was  advantageously  posted  ;  he  not  only 
kept  the  enemy  in  check,  but  repulsed  him  on  several  occasions,  and  thus 
kept  open  the  only  line  of  retreat  left  to  the  army.  He  was  killed  as  he 
was  serving  with  his  own  hands  a  twelve-pound  howitzer.  His  bold  stand 
saved  a  large  portion  of  the  army ;  but  the  retreating  columns  were  not 
yet  across  the  stream.  A  message  was  sent  to  Gen.  Loring  :  "  For  God's 
sake,  hold  your  position  until  sundown,  and  save  the  army."  A  few 
moments  later,  a  despatch  was  received  from  Gen.  Bowen,  stating  that  the 


392  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

enemy  had  crossed  the  bridge  and  out-flanked  him,  that  he  had  been  com 
pelled  precipitately  to  fall  back,  and  that  Loring  must  do  his  best  to  save 
his  division.  Gen.  Loring,  having  ascertained  that  it  was  impossible  to 
attempt  the  passage  of  the  Big  Black  at  any  point,  determined  to  force  the 
rear  of  the  enemy  between  Raymond  and  Utica,  and  to  make  his  retreat 
through  the  east  and  effect  a  junction  with  the  forces  of  Gen.  Johnston  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Jackson.  He  succeeded  in  doing  so  with  the  loss  of 
his  artillery. 

On  the  following  day,  17th  May,  Pemberton's  shattered  and  demoral 
ized  forces  had  taken  up  a  position  upon  the  east  bank  of  the  Big  Black 
River.  The  position  was  a  strong  one  in  a  bend  of  the  river,  sheltered  by 
patches  of  wood,  with  marshes  extending  on  either  side  towards  the  river. 
The  works  were  provided  with  a  sufficient  quantity  of  artillery  ;  they  were 
manned  by  a  considerable  force ;  and  the  position  might  have  been  held 
against  largely  superiour  numbers.  But  the  events  of  the  previous  day 
had  demoralized  the  troops ;  they  abandoned  their  position  at  the  first 
assault  of  a  Federal  brigade  ;  they  left  in  the  enemy's  possession  eighteen 
pieces  of  artillery  ;  they  scattered  in  wild  and  tumultuous  flight.  "  The 
retreat,"  says  Gen.  Pemberton  himself,  "  became  a  matter  of  sauve  qui 
peut"  By  nightfall  the  fugitive  disordered  troops  were  pouring  into 
the  streets  of  Yicksburg,  and  the  citizens  beheld  with  dismay  the 
army  that  had  gone  out  to  fight  for  their  safety,  returning  to  them 
under  the  shame  of  defeat,  and  in  the  character  of  a  wild  and  blas 
phemous  mob. 

The  fate  of  Yicksburg  may  be  said  to  have  been  virtually  decided, 
when  Pemberton  was  driven  into  it,  and  the  lines  of  the  enemy  drawn 
around  it.  Gen.  Johnston  so  regarded  it.  "When  he  learned  of  the  disas 
ter  at  Baker's  Creek,  he  despatched  to  Pemberton  :  "  If  Haynes's  Bluff  be 
untenable,  Yicksburg  is  of  no  value  and  cannot  be  held.  If,  therefore, 
you  are  invested  in  Yicksburg,  you  must  ultimately  surrender.  Under 
such  circumstances,  instead  of  losing  both  troops  and  place,  you  must,  if 
possible,  save  the  troops.  If  it  is  not  too  late,  evacuate  Yicksburg  and  its 
dependencies,  and  march  to  the  northeast."  Before  the  despatch  was 
received  Gen.  Pemberton  had  fallen  back  to  Yicksburg. 

Of  this  unfortunate  situation  Gen.  Johnston  writes :  "  Had  the  battle 
of  Baker's  Creek  not  been  fought,  Gen.  Pemberton's  belief  that  Yicksburg 
was  his  base,  rendered  his  ruin  inevitable.  He  would  still  have  been  be 
sieged,  and  therefore  captured.  The  larger  force  he  would  have  carried 
into  the  lines,  would  have  added  to  and  hastened  the  catastrophe.  His 
disasters  were  due,  not  merely  to  his  entangling  himself  with  the  advanc 
ing  columns  of  a  superiour  and  unobserved  enemy,  but  to  his  evident 
determination  to  be  besieged  in  Yicksburg,  instead  of  manoeuvring  to  pre 
vent  a  siege." 


SIEGE   OF  VICKSBTJRG.  393 


SIEGE   AND   SURRENDER   OF   VICKSBURG 

4,  Gen.  Pemberton  had  in  Yicksburg  eight  thousand  fresh  troops,  not 
demoralized  by  defeat.  When  he  arrived  in  town  from  the  battle-field  at 
Big  Black,  a  general  feeling  of  distrust  was  expressed  in  his  competency, 
and  the  place  was  regarded  as  lost.  Every  one  expected  Grant's  army  to 
march  into  Yicksburg  that  night,  while  there  was  no  means  of  defence  and 
no  spirit  in  the  troops.  Gen.  Pemberton  set  to  work,  reorganizing  the 
army  for  the  last  desperate  struggle.  Gen.  Baldwin  went  out  to  review 
the  line  of  defences,  and  imagining  that  the  first  assault  would  be  made  on 
the  left  wing,  he  petitioned  to  be  assigned  to  hold  that  position  with  his 
veteran  troops,  upon  whose  fidelity  and  courage  he  could  depend.  The 
army  was .  placed  in  position  on  the  lines,  and  placed  in  the  ditches,  with 
Gen.  Baldwin  on  the  left,  and  Gen.  Lee  on  the  right.  The  centre  was 
held  by  Gens.  Pemberton,  Smith,  and  Forney.  As  these  dispositions  were 
made,  the  confidence  of  the  troops  was  gradually  restored ;  they  saw  the 
purpose  of  defence  ;  and  they  were  entertained  with  the  prospect  that  their 
besieged  condition  would  soon  be  relieved  by  Johnston's  army. 

But  such  prospect  was  not  a  little  visionary.  The  truth  of  the  situa 
tion  was  that  Pemberton  had  trapped  himself  in  Yicksburg,  to  surrender 
to  famine  what  could  not  be  won  by  assault.  Gen.  Johnston  had  come  to 
the  Mississippi  Department  with  no  army  of  his  own,  beyond  a  few  troops, 
to  take  charge  of  Pemberton's,  which  he  found  broken  to  pieces,  and  the 
remnants  sheltered  in  Yicksburg.  To  collect  a  new  army  by  appeals  to 
the  Richmond  authorities,  the  Governor  of  Mississippi,  and  other  quar 
ters,  became  his  only  resource.  With  all  his  efforts  only  twenty  thousand 
men  could  be  raised,  many  of  them  raw  troops,  without  field-guns  and 
proper  equipment ;  while  Grant  had  been  reinforced  to  eighty  thousand 
men,  besides  the  co-operation  of  Porter's  fleet.  He  had  also  entrenched 
himself  on  every  side  with  a  difficult  river  between  himself  and  Johnston. 
For  the  latter  to  have  dashed  himself  against  the  enemy  in  such  circum 
stances,  might  have  been  esteemed  an  act  of  magnificent  daring ;  but  it 
would  not  have  been  war.  If  Pemberton,  instead  of  crowding  super- 
serviceable  troops  in  a  fortress  to  consume  its  scant  supplies,  or  become 
the  victims  of  disease  or  war,  had  thrown  sufficient  garrison  into  Yicks 
burg,  and  kept  at  large  twenty  thousand  men,  he  could  have  so  reinforced 
Johnston  as  to  have  enabled  him  to  act  promptly  before  Grant  had 
entrenched  himself,  and  thus  relieve  Yicksburg  from  the  purpose  of  his 
efforts,  by  giving  him  occupation  outside.  But  none  of  these  things  were 
done.  Johnston's  resources  were  utterly  inadequate  to  any  good  purpose  ; 
he  could  not  collect  a  sufficient  force  to  break  the  investment  of  Yicks- 


394:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

burg ;  and  the  prospect  even  of  making  a  diversion  or  opening  communi 
cation  with  the  garrison  was  uncertain  and  difficult. 

Vicksburg  was  invested  by  the  enemy  on  the  eastern  side :  Sherman 
holding  the  right  of  the  lines,  McPherson  the  centre,  and  McClernand  the 
left.  A  new  base  of  supplies  was  established,  leading  from  the  Yazoo 
directly  to  the  rear.  Guns  were  planted  in  opposition  to  the  long,  fortified 
series  of  works  of  the  Confederates. 

On  the  19th  May,  the  division  of  Gen.  Blair,  and  a  brigade  of  Sher 
man's  division  assaulted  what  was  thought  to  be  a  weak  place  in  the  Con 
federate  line  of  defence.  They  were  severely  repulsed.  On  the  22d  a 
more  concerted  attack  was  ordered  by  Gen.  Grant,  and  the  whole  line  was 
bombarded  by  cannon.  At  an  early  hour  the  left,  under  McClernand, 
gained  a  foot-hold  at  an  angle  of  the  works,  but  was  dislodged ;  and  the 
eiiemy  withdrew  from  the  attack,  after  having  suffered  a  loss  of  some 
twenty-five  hundred  men  disabled.  The  attempt  to  take  Vicksburg  by 
storm  seems  to  have  been  abandoned  after  this ;  and  it  was  determined  to 
reduce  the  position  by  siege  and  parallel  works. 

And  now  commenced  a  terrible  task.  Fort  was  erected  against  fort, 
and  trench  dug  against  trench.  The  enemy's  sappers  constructed  their 
corridors  and  passages  and  pits  amid  a  blazing  fire  of  hostile  musketry,  and 
the  fiercest  rays  of  the  summer  sun.  The  Confederates,  confined  to  the 
narrow  limits  of  the  trenches,  with  their  limbs  cramped  and  swollen,  never 
had,  by  day  or  by  night,  the  slightest  relief.  They  were  exposed  to  burn 
ing  suns,  drenching  rains,  damp  fogs,  and  heavy  dews.  The  citizens, 
women,  and  children,  prepared  caves  in  the  hill,  where  they  took  refuge 
during  the  almost  incessant  bombardment.  Thus,  through  the  months  of 
May  and  June  continued  the  weary  siege.  The  spirits  of  the  troops  were 
in  a  measure  kept  up  by  news  received  from  Johnston's  army,  by  means  of 
messengers  who  found  a  way  through  the  swamps  and  thickets  of  the 
Yazoo. 

Although  Gen.  Johnston  was  too  weak  to  save  Yicksburg,  he  enter 
tained  some  hope  of  extricating  the  garrison.  With  this  view  Gen.  Taylor, 
commanding  in  the  Trans-Mississippi,  was  ordered  to  co-operate  with 
Pemberton  from  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi.  But  the  movement 
miscarried ;  Taylor's  attack  on  the  Federal  camp  at  Milliken's  Bend  was 
repulsed  ;  and  all  hope  of  help  from  the  West  was  ultimately  abandoned. 

On  the  22d  June  a  despatch  was  received  from  Pemberton  by  Gen. 
Johnston,  suggesting  that  the  latter  should  make  to  Grant  "  propositions 
to  pass  this  army  out,  with  all  its  arms  and  equipages,"  and  renewing  his 
(Pemberton's)  hope  of  his  being  able,  by  force  of  arms,  to  act  with  John 
ston,  and  expressing  the  opinion  that  he  could  hold  out  for  fifteen  days 
longer.  Johnston  was  moved  by  the  determined  spirit  of  the  despatch. 
He  replied :  "  Something  may  yet  be  done  to  save  Vicksburg.  Postpone 


SURRENDER  OF   VICKSBURG.  395 

both  of  the  modes  suggested  of  merely  extricating  the  garrison.  Nego 
tiations  with  Grant  for  the  relief  of  the  garrison,  should  they  become  neces 
sary,  must  be  made  by  you.  It  would  be  a  confession  of  weakness  on  my 
part,  which  I  ought  not  to  make,  to  propose  them.  "When  it  becomes 
necessary  to  make  terms,  they  may  be  considered  as  made  under  my 
authority." 

On  the  29th  June,  field  transportation  and  other  supplies  having  been 
obtained,  Johnston's  army  marched  toward  the  Big  Black,  and  on  the 
evening  of  July  1st  encamped  between  Brownsville  and  the  river. 

Keconnoissances,  which  occupied  the  second  and  third,  convinced  Gen. 
Johnston  that  the  attack  north  of  the  railroad  was  impracticable.  He 
determined,  therefore,  to  make  the  examinations  necessary  for  the  attempt 
south  of  the  railroad — thinking,  from  what  was  already  known,  that  the 
chance  for  success  was  much  better  there,  although  the  consequences  of 
defeat  might  be  more  disastrous. 

On  the  night  of  the  3d  July  a  messenger  was  sent  to  Gen.  Pemberton 
with  information  that  an  attempt  to  create  a  diversion  would  be  made  to 
enable  him  to  cut  his  way  out,  and  that  Johnston  hoped  to  attack  the  ene 
my  about  the  Yth. 

On  the  Fourth  of  July  Pemberton  surrendered  Vicksburg.  The  expla 
nation  has  been  made  in  his  behalf  that  he  never  received  Johnston's  de 
spatches,  encouraging  the  hope  that  both  Vicksburg  and  the  garrison  might 
be  saved  ;  and  Gen.  Pemberton  has  declared  that  had  he  received  these  de 
spatches  :  "  I  would  have  lived  upon  an  ounce  a  day,  and  have  continued 
to  meet  the  assaults  of  all  Grant's  army,  rather  than  have  surrendered  the 
city  until  Gen.  Johnston  had  realized  or  relinquished  that  hope." 

As  it  was,  he  determined  to  surrender  Vicksburg  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  Fourth  of  July  for  the  very  singular  reason  that  it  would  gratify  the 
enemy's  "  vanity  "  to  enter  the  stronghold  of  the  great  river  on  that  par 
ticular  day,  and  that  such  a  concession  might  procure  better  terms  than  at 
any  other  time.  The  preliminary  note  for  terms  was  despatched  on  the  3d 
July.  Correspondence  on  the  subject  continued  during  the  day,  and  was 
not  concluded  until  nine  o'clock  the  next  morning.  Gen.  Pemberton 
afterwards  icame  out,  and  had  a  personal  interview  with  Grant,  in  front  of 
the  Federal  line,  the  two  sitting  for  an  hour  and  a  half  in  close  com 
munion.  A  spectator  says  :  "  Grant  was  silent  and  smoking,  while  Pum- 
berton,  equally  cool  and  careless  in  manner,  was  plucking  straws  and 
biting  them  as  if  in  merest  chit-chat." 

It  was  a  terrible  day's  work  for  such  a  display  of  sangfroid.  It  was 
the  loss  of  one  of  the  largest  armies  which  the  Confederates  had  in  the 
field  ;  the  decisive  event  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  ;  the  virtual  surrender 
of  the  great  river  ;  and  the  severance  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The 
numbers  which  surrendered  at  the  capitulation  of  Vicksburg  were  twenty- 


396  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

three  thousand  men,  with  three  Major-Generals,  and  nine  Brigadiers,  up 
wards  of  ninety  pieces  of  artillery,  and  about  forty  thousand  small-arms. 
"Weakness  from  fatigue,  short  rations,  and  heat,  had  left  thousands  of  the 
troops  decrepit.  Six  thousand  of  them  were  in  the  hospitals,  and  many  of 
them  were  crawling  about  in  what  should  be  convalescent  camps.  Four 
thousand  citizens  and  negroes,  besides  Pemberton's  army,  included  all  the 
souls  within  the  walls  of  Yicksburg.  When  we  consider  that  these  people 
had  for  a  month  and  a  half  been  in  daily  terrour  of  their  lives,  never  being 
able  to  sleep  anight  in  their  homes,  but  crawling  into  caves,  unable  to  move 
except  in  the  few  peaceful  intervals  in  the  heat  of  the  day,  we  may  appre 
ciate  what  a  life  of  horrour  was  theirs. 

The  first  result  of  the  surrender  of  Yicksburg,  was  the  fall  of  Port 
Hudson,  and  the  consequent  supremacy  of  the  Federal  arms  along  the 
entire  length  of  the  Mississippi.  Gen.  Banks  had  invested  this  place  ;  he 
had  made  two  assaults  on  the  27th  May  and  on  the  14th  June ;  and  he  had 
been  repulsed  by  Gen.  Gardner,  who  held  the  place  with  about  five  thou 
sand  men.  "When  the  news  was  communicated  to  Gardner  that  Vicksburg 
had  surrendered,  knowing  that  all  hope  of  relief  was  at  an  end,  he  deter 
mined  that  it  was  useless  to  prolong  resistance,  and  on  the  9th  July  surren 
dered  himself  and  the  garrison  as  prisoners  of  war. 

These  events  on  the  Mississippi  constituted  a  reverse,  which  the  re 
sources  of  the  Confederacy,  neither  in  men  nor  means,  could  endure  with 
out  great  strain.  Across  the  river  the  train  of  disaster  appears  to  have 
extended.  The  fall  of  the  strongholds  of  the  Mississippi  resulted  in  the  re 
treat  of  our  army  from  Little  Rock,  and  the  surrender  to  the  enemy  of  the 
important  valley  in  which  it  was  situated  ;  while  a  campaign  auspiciously 
begun  in  Lower  Louisiana  was  abandoned  in  consequence  of  the  release  of 
Banks'  forces  from  the  siege  of  Port  Hudson.  To  these  events  we  must 
now  take  the  reader  so  as  to  gather  up  the  several  threads  of  the  narrative 
of  the  war  in  the  West. 


OPERATIONS   IN   THE    TRANS-MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE    OF    HELENA. 

In  the  month  of  May  it  was  deemed  advisable  by  Gen.  E.  Kirby  Smith, 
then  commanding  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  that  a  demonstration 
should  be  made  on  the  west  side  of  the  river  in  order  that  Yicksburg 
might  be  relieved.  He  accordingly  directed  Gen.  Holmes  to  put  the 
troops  in  Arkansas  in  motion  to  operate  against  Helena,  a  place  on  the 
west  side  of  the  river  eighty  miles  south  of  Memphis  and  three  hundred 
miles  north  of  Yicksburg.  It  was  occupied  by  a  garrison  of  four  thousand 
Federal  troops,  with  a  gunboat  in  the  river. 

On  the  morning  of  May  31st  most  of  the  troops  in  Arkansas  were  put 


BATTLE   OF    HELENA.  397 

in  motion  for  an  advance.  The  weather  was  very  wet,  the  creeks  all  fall, 
and  the  ground  covered  with  water.  For  the  expedition  Gen.  Holmes  had 
Price's  Division  of  infantry,  consisting  of  Parsons'  Missouri  Brigade  num 
bering  1,000,  and  McKay's  Arkansas  Brigade  of  400  ;  Pagan's  Brigade  of  Ar 
kansas  infantry,  numbering  1,500  ;  and  Marmaduke's  Division  of  Arkansas 
and  Missouri  cavalry,  numbering  2,000  ;  making  a  total  of  4,900.  These 
several  commands  formed  a  junction  at  Jacksonport,  and  on  the  morning  of 
22d  June  commenced  their  march  in  the  direction  of  Helena.  It  was  a  toil 
some  and  dangerous  march — one  of  the  most  extraordinary  recorded  in  the 
history  of  the  war.  The  infantry  were  in  water  to  their  waists  on  two-thirds 
of  the  road.  Heavy  details  of  worn-out  men  were  employed  in  dragging  the 
wagons  through  difficult  places.  The  mules  would  be  unhitched,  a  long  rope 
fastened  to  the  wagon,  and  a  hundred  men  pull  it  through.  There  was  no 
pontoon  train,  and  over  the  swollen  streams  bridges  of  floating  logs  would  be 
constructed,  which  a  loaded  wagon  would  sink  several  feet  under  water.  In 
making  this  terrible  march,  twelve  days  were  consumed,  and  on  the  evening 
of  the  3d  July  the  jaded  men  had  reached  within  four  miles  of  Helena. 

Precious  time  had  been  lost.  A  council  of  war  was  called,  in  which 
occurred  a  remarkable  scene.  Gen.  Holmes  explained  the  strength  of  the 
position  to  be  attacked.  Helena  was  surrounded  by  a  range  of  rough, 
wooded  hills,  which  shut  it  into  the  river,  except  a  narrow  bottom  next  the 
river,  both  above  and  below.  The  place  was  defended  by  three  prominent 
forts,  one  protecting  the  approach  by  the  north,  one  at  the  south,  and  the 
"  Grave- Yard  "  fort,  in  the  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  city. 

Gen.  Price  was  not  in  favour  of  an  attack.  He  argued  that  the  enemy 
was  doubtless  expecting  them,  and  had  concentrated  as  many  troops  as  he 
deemed  sufficient  to  defend  the  place,  and  that,  if  it  had  been  necessary  to 
call  troops  from  Yicksburg  for  this  purpose,  the  object  of  the  expedition  had 
already  been  accomplished,  and  the  only  action  of  the  troops  should  be  to 
operate  so  as  to  detain  such  reinforcements  at  Helena.  He  thought  this 
might  be  done  most  effectually  by  surrounding  the  place,  cutting  off  the 
enemy's  supplies,  both  from  the  country  and  the  river,  and  harassing  him 
by  picket-fighting.  Even  if  Helena  were  taken,  he  thought  it  would  be  a 
dearly -bought  victory ;  it  was  untenable ;  and  if  any  of  the  garrison 
escaped,  and  doubtless  they  had  transports  in  waiting,  their  expulsion 
would  but  strengthen  the  enemy  at  Vicksburg,  thereby  defeating  the  very 
object  of  the  expedition. 

Gen.  Holmes  wanted  the  eclat  of  victory.  He  replied  with  warmth : 
"  Gen.  Price,  I  intend  to  attack  Helena  immediately,  and  capture  the 
place,  if  possible.  This  is  my  fight.  If  I  succeed,  I  want  the  glory  ;  and 
if  I  fail,  I  am  willing  to  bear  the  odium."  Then  turning  to  the  other 
officers,  he  said  :  "  At  twelve  o'clock,  to-night,  we  move  towards  Helena." 
Gen.  Marmaduke,  with  his  command,  was  ordered 'to  attack  the  northern 


398  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

fort ;  Gen.  Fagan  was  to  attack  the  southern  fort ;  and  Gen.  Price  was 
to  assault  and  capture  the  centre  fort — the  attack  to  commence  simulta 
neously  at  day-light. 

About  day-break  the  first  gun  fired  was  by  the  battalion  of  sharp 
shooters  belonging  to  Parsons'  brigade,  who  encountered  an  outpost  of  the 
enemy.  Price  moved  in  column  of  division,  the  9th  Missouri  Infantry  in 
advance.  The  hills  were  high,  the  ravines  deep  ;  but  the  men  pressed  for 
ward  in  good  order,  the  enemy  shelling  them  at  every  step  of  the  march. 
When  the  last  ridge  was  reached,  the  command  was  halted,  and  the  men 
rested  and  closed  up,  ready  for  the  assault.  They  were  now  within  two 
or  three  hundred  yards  of  the  fort.  By  this  time  the  firing  had  com 
menced  on  the  right  and  left,  and  it  was  known  that  Fagan  and  Marma- 
duke  were  at  work.  The  command  was  given  by  Gen.  Price  to  charge 
with  fixed  bayonets.  The  troops  moved  in  gallant  style,  at  the  run,  over 
and  through  fallen  timber  and  roughly  constructed  abatis,  up  hills,  and  into 
gullies.  They  were  never  checked  once,  and  were  soon  in  possession  of 
the  fort. 

Price's  division  had  done  the  work  assigned  it.  Heavy  guns  from  the 
gunboat  in  the  river  now  commenced  playing  upon  the  captured  fort. 
The  men  sheltered  themselves,  as  well  as  they  could,  and  awaited  further 
orders.  Meanwhile  Fagan  had  moved  against  the  southern  fort,  and  when 
within  two  hundred  yards  of  it,  had  commenced  a  fire  of  small-arms, 
which  provoked  such  a  heavy  response  of  artillery,  that  his  men  were  com 
pelled  to  fall  back.  Twice  was  the  assault  repeated,  and  with  the  same 
result.  Marmaduke  met  with  no  better  success.  Gen.  Holmes,  seeing  the 
failures  of  Fagan  and  Marmaduke,  ordered  two  regiments  of  Parsons'  bri 
gade  to  attack  the  southern  fort  in  the  rear.  The  movement  was  attempt 
ed  ;  but  under  the  fire  of  the  gunboat  and  the  cross-fire  of  the  other  two 
forts,  and  that  of  the  whole  infantry  force  of  the  enemy,  it  was  impossible 
to  advance.  Fagan  and  Marmaduke  having  withdrawn  their  forces,  it 
became  necessary  to  attempt  the  withdrawal  of  Price's  division.  With  the 
whole  force  of  the  enemy  concentrated  upon  this  division,  and  separated  as 
it  was  from  any  support,  its  retreat  was  one  of  mortal  peril  at  every  step. 
It  was  accomplished  with  heavy  loss.  The  battle  was  lost ;  six  hundred 
Confederates  had  been  disabled,  and  about  four  hundred  taken  prisoners. 
Gen.  Holmes  the  next  morning  commenced  his  march  back  to  Little  Rock. 
The  white  flag  had  been  run  up  at  Vicksburg  ;  all  hope  of  the  connection 
of  the  Trans:Mississippi  with  the  eastern  portions  of  the  Confederacy  was 
at  an  end  ;  and  Gen.  Holmes  had  made  the  first  step  of  the  retreat  which, 
at  last  abandoning  Little  Rock,  was  to  surrender  to  the  enemy  the  most 
valuable  portion  of  Arkansas.* 

*  An  esteemed  correspondent  writes  us  these  personal  incidents  of  the  Battle  of  Helena : 


CAMPAIGN  IN  LOWER  LOUISIANA.  399 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  LOWER  LOUISIANA. 

Almost  cotemporary  with  these  disastrous  events  was  a  remarkable 
episode  of  success  in  the  lower  country  of  the  Trans-Mississippi, 
which  had,  at  one  time,  kindled  in  the  South  the  hope  of  the  re 
capture  of  New  Orleans,  but  finally  came  to  naught  on  account  of  in 
sufficient  forces. 

In  the  latter  part  of  June,  Gen.  "  Dick  "  Taylor,  who  commanded  in 
Lower  Louisiana,  organized  an  expedition  upon  Brashear  City  and  its  forts. 
Col.  Majors,  who  commanded  a  "brigade  of  cavalry  on  the  Atchafalaya, 
was  ordered  to  open  communication  by  way  of  the  lakes  with  Gens.  Mou- 
ton  and  Green,  who  were  to  co-operate  in  front  of  the  enemy's  position- 
The  junction  having  been  made  by  Majors,  after  a  successful  campaign 
through  the  Lafourche  country,  a  combined  attack  was  made  on  Brasliear 
City  on  the  22d  June,  and  the  forts  taken  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet 
Eighteen  hundred  prisoners  were  captured,  nearly  five  million  dollars 
worth  of  stores,  and  a  position  occupied  that  was  the  key  to  Louisiana 
and  Texas. 

It  was  thought  that  the  capture  of  Brashear  City  might  force  the  enemy 
to  raise  the  siege  of  Port  Hudson,  and  that  Banks  would  be  driven  to  the 
choice  of  abandoning  his  operations  against  this  place  or  losing  New  Or 
leans.  But  these  expectations  failed  ;  the  second  diversion  to  relieve 
Yicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  was  too  late ;  and  Gen.  Taylor,  learning  of 
the  fall  of  these  strongholds  and  the  consequent  release  of  Banks'  forces, 

"  Gen.  Holmes  is  a  brave  man,  and  was  under  the  hottest  fire.  After  the  centre  fort  had  been 
captured,  and  the  heavy  fire  from  the  gunboat  and  the  two  other  forts  had  been  opened  on  it,  Gen. 
Holmes  was  standing  on  the  parapet,  eagerly  looking  for  Fagan,  who  was  his  favourite,  to  plant  his 
colours  on  the  fort  he  was  attacking.  While  thus  standing,  Gen.  Parsons,  who  was  sheltering  him 
self  in  the  fort,  bawled  out :  "  Come  down,  General !  you  will  be  hit.  Don't  you  hear  the  shot 
whistling  around  you ? "  "I  have  the  advantage  of  you,  Gen.  Parsons,  I  am  deaf,  and  cannot 
hear  them." 

"  Another  incident  of  the  battle  should  be  recorded  as  a  just  tribute  to  the  memory  of  a  brave 
man.  At  the  battle  of  Prairie-Grove,  Lt.  Richard  Spencer,  of  the  9th  Missouri  Infantry,  was  taken 
sick,  and  was  unable  to  engage  in  the  fight.  While  at  Jacksonport  en  route  for  Helena,  he  was 
again  taken  sick.  At  Prairie-Grove  his  colonel  had  accused  him  of  cowardice,  and  said  that  his  sick 
ness  was  a  mere  excuse  to  keep  out  of  the  fight.  When  the  command  left  Jacksonport,  the  surgeon  of 
the  regiment  advised  Lieut.  Spencer  to  remain  in  hospital,  which  he  refused  to  do.  On  the  march, 
the  surgeon  noticing  that  he  was  quite  unwell,  repeatedly  urged  him  to  ride  in  an  ambulance,  which 
he  declined.  Once  on  the  march  it  became  necessary  to  detail  an  officer  to  remain  in  charge  of  some 
baggage,  and  Spencer  was  detailed  for  the  purpose.  He  refused  to  obey  the  order,  and  told  his  col 
onel  that  he  had  been  accused  of  cowardice  for  not  going  into  the  former  fight,  and  that  now  he  was 
determined  to  go  if  he  had  to  drag  his  body  into  action  ;  that  he  had  rather  die  than  live  under  such 
an  imputation.  He  was  finally  excused  from  remaining  with  the  baggage.  Scarcely  able  to  walk,  he 
marched  to  Helena,  led  his  company  into  the  fort,  and  was  shot  dead  through  the  head." 


400  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

was  no  longer  able  to  hold  the  Lafourche  country,  and  was  compelled  to 
abandon  the  territory  he  had  won.  The  last  serious  effort  on  the  line  of 
the  Mississippi  was  at  an  end ;  a  great  prize  had  passed  in  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  beyond  redemption ;  and  it  was  already  said,  by  extravagant 
newspapers  in  Washington  and  New  York,  that  the  dawn  of  a  conquered 
peace  was  breaking  upon  the  country. 


OHAPTEK    XXIV. 

FAVOURABLE  ASPECTS  OF  CONFEDERATE  AFFAIRS  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHANCELLORS VILLE. — 
ALTERNATIVE  OF  CAMPAIGNS  IN  RICHMOND. — VIRGINIA  AND  TENNESSEE. — WHAT  DECIDED 
THE  CAMPAIGN  INTO  PENNSYLVANIA. — REORGANIZATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIR 
GINIA. ITS  GRAND  PREPARATIONS  ON  THE  PLAINS  OF  CULPEPPER. — EWELL's  MOVEMENT 

UPON  WINCHESTER. — HIS  CAPTURES. — ORDER  OF  LEE?S  MARCH  TO  THE  POTOMAC. — HOOKER 
OUT-GENERALLED  AND  BLINDED. — LEE's  MARCH  TO  GETTYSBURG,  A  MASTER-PIECE  OF 
STRATEGY. — CONDUCT  OF  HIS  TROOPS  IN  THE  ENEMY'S  TERRITORY. — GEN.  LEE  ABSTAINS 
FROM  "  RETALIATION." — COMMENT  OF  THE  RICHMOND  "  EXAMINER." — GEN.  HOOKER  RE 
LIEVED,  AND  MEADE  PUT  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  FEDERAL  ARMY. — ALARM  IN  THE  NORTH. — 
MEADE  MARCHES  TOWARDS  GETTYSBURG. — THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG. — A  CONFEDERATE 
VICTORY  THE  FIRST  DAY. — HOW  IT  WAS  NOT  IMPROVED. — A  GREAT  ERROUR. — THE  CRITICAL 
HEIGHTS  OF  GETTYSBURG  TAKEN  BY  THE  ENEMY. — CEMETERY  RIDGE. — "  ROUND  TOP." — 
THE  CONFEDERATE  LINE  OF  BATTLE. — WHY  GEN.  LEE  DETERMINED  TO  ATTACK.— ACTION 
OF  THE  SECOND  DAY. — LONGSTREETJS  DESPERATE  ENGAGEMENT. — TEMPORARY  POSSESSION 

OF  "  ROUND  TOP." — SUCCESSES  ON  THE  CONFEDERATE   LEFT. ACTION  OF  THE  THIRD  DAY- 

— AN    OMINOUS     SILENCE. — SUDDEN    AND     TERRIBLE    CANNONADE. — HEROIC     CHARGE     OF 

PICKETT'S  DIVISION. — SUBLIME  DEVOTION  OF  THE  VIRGINIANS. — THEY  TAKE  THE  KEY  OF 
THE  ENEMY'S  POSITION. — THE  SHOUT  OF  VICTORY. — PETTIGREW'S  SUPPORT  FAILS. — THE 
DAY  LOST. — GEN.  LEE  RALLYING  HIS  TROOPS. — HIS  SUBSEQUENT  RETREAT  TO  THE  POTO 
MAC. — SUCCESS  OF  TH^feETREAT. — HE  RETIRES  TO  THE  LINE  OF  THE  RAPIDAN. — GETTYS 
BURG  THE  CLIMACTERIC  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY. — HISTORY  OF  THE  PEACE  MIS 
SION  OF  VICE-PRESIDENT  STEPHENS  AS  CONNECTED  THEREWITH. AN  OSTENSIBLE  LETTER 

OF  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. — HOW  THE  MISSION  WAS  REPULSED. — THE  HONOURABLE  POSITION 
OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRESIDENT. 

A  SINGLE  day  before  the  fall  of  Yicksburg  occurred,  far  away,  what 
may  be  emphatically  entitled  the  most  important  lattle  of  the  war.  It  was 
fought  on  the  soil  of  Pennsylvania,  on  whose  wheat-fields  President  Davis 
had  declared,  on  the  floor  of  the  United  States  Senate  in  Washington,  when 
war  was  first  threatened,  should  be  carried  the  contest  for  the  rights  of 
the  South. 

During  the  few  weeks  following  the  brilliant  victory  of  Chancellors- 
ville,  never  did  affairs  look  so  propitious  for  the  Confederates.  The  safety 
of  Yicksburg  was  not  then  seriously  questioned  ;  Bragg  confronted  Rose- 
26 


402  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

crans  with  a  force  strong  enough  to  hold  him  at  bay  ;  and  the  Confederates 
had  the  choice  of  two  campaigns :  either  to  reinforce  Bragg  from  Lee's 
army,  over  a  distance  that  might  be  accomplished  in  ten  days,  with  two 
lines  of  railroad  as  far  as  Chattanooga,  or  to  change  the  defensive  attitude 
in  Virginia,  and  make  a  second  experiment  of  the  invasion  of  the  North. 
The  alternative  of  these  campaigns  was  suggested  in  Richmond.  The 
latter  was  decided  upon.  It  was  thought  advisable  to  clear  Virginia  of 
the  Federal  forces,  and  put  the  war  back  upon  the  frontier  ;  to  relieve  the 
Confederate  commissariat ;  to  counterbalance  the  continual  retreat  of  the 
armies  of  Tennessee  and  Mississippi  by  an  advance  into  Northern  territory, 
offer  a  counterpoise  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy  in  the  "West,  and  pos 
sibly  relieve  the  pressure  there  on  the  Confederate  armies.  These  reasons 
determined  an  offensive  campaign  of  Lee's  army. 

Gen.  Longstreet  was  recalled  from  North  Carolina ;  and  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  preparatory  to  the  campaign,  was  re-organized,  and 
divided  into  three  equal  and  distinct  corps.  To  Gen.  Longstreet  was 
assigned  the  command  of  the  first  corps,  consisting  of  the  divisions  of 
McLaw,  Hood,  and  Pickett ;  to  Gen.  Ewell,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  com 
mand  of  Jackson's  old  corps,  were  assigned  the  divisions  of  Early,  Rodes, 
and  Johnson  ;  and  to  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  was  the  third  corps  given,  consisting 
of  the  divisions  of  Anderson,  Pender,  and  Heth.  Each  of  these  three  corps 
numbered  about  25,000  men,  making  the  total  strength  of  the  army  75,000, 
irrespective  of  the  cavalry. 

On  the  plains  near  Culpepper  were  the  preparations  made  for  the 
grand  campaign.  It  was  the  beautiful  month  of  May.  All  was  bustle 
and  activity  ;  the  freshness  of  the  air  and  the  glow  of  expectation  animated 
the  busy  scene.  Trains  were  hurried  up  filled  with  munitions  of  war  ;  new 
and  splendid  batteries  of  artillery  were  added  to  the  army  ;  the  troops,  as 
far  as  possible,  were  newly  equipped,  and  ordnance  trains  were  filled  to 
their  utmost  capacity.  The  cavalry,  15,000  strong,  were  reviewed  at 
Brandy  Station  ;  crowds  of  ladies  attended  the  display ;  and  Gen.  Stuart, 
the  gallant  commander,  whose  only  weakness  was  military  foppery  and  an 
inofdinate  desire  of  female  admiration,  rode  along  the  lines  on  a  horse 
almost  covered  with  bouquets.  Nearly  a  week  was  consumed  in  review 
ing  cavalry,  infantry,  and  artillery.  By  the  first  of  June  all  was  in  readi 
ness,  and  the  advance  was  ordered. 

Gen..Ewell's  corps,  in  the  lead,  pushed  rapidly  forward,  and  marched 
across  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains,  by  way  of  Front  Royal,  into  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley  upon  Winchester.  Here  he  surprised  Gen.  Milroy,  defeated 
him  ;  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  the  Federal  general,  with  a  few  of  his 
officers,  escaped  through  the  Confederate  lines  under  cover  of  the  night, 
and  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Three  thou 
sand  prisoners,  thirty  pieces  of  artillery,  over  one  hundred  wagons,  and  a 


403 

great  quantity  of  stores  were  captured  in  and  near  "Winchester,  and  seven 
hundred  men  surrendered  to  Gen.  Eodes  at  Martinsburg.  With  this  aus 
picious  opening  of  the  campaign,  Ewell  promptly  moved  up  to  the  Poto 
mac,  where  he  occupied  all  the  fords. 

Longstreet's  corps  had  been  directed  to  march  on  Culpepper,  his  right 
flank  guarded  by  detachments  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  which  watched  the  fords 
of  the  Rappahannock,  while  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  remained  near  Fredericks- 
burg,  to  deceive  the  enemy  by  an  appearance  of  strength.  These  move 
ments  were  not  entirely  unobserved  by  Gen.  Hooker.  He  had  reason  to 
suppose  that  some  of  the  Confederate  forces  had  been  withdrawn  from  his 
front ;  and  accordingly,  on  the  5th  of  June,  a  strong  reconnoissance  was 
sent  across  the  river  on  Lee's  right.  But  the  skilful  Confederate  com 
mander,  who  was  now  performing  a  great  master-piece  of  strategy,  suc 
ceeded  in  masking  his  real  strength,  and  leading  Hooker  to  suppose  that 
his  entire  army  was  still  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Fredericksburg.  On  the 
7th  June  another  reconnoissance  was  directed,  and  an  expedition  of  cavalry, 
which  had  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  Beverly's  and  Kelly's  Fords,  at 
tacked  Gen.  Stuart  at  Brandy  Station.  This  force  of  the  enemy  was  routed 
by  Stuart,  and  forced  to  recross  the  river,  after  having  lost  four  hundred 
prisoners  and  three  pieces  of  artillery.  Although  this  later  reconnoissance 
developed  to  a  certain  extent  the  direction  of  Gen.  Lee's  march,  Hooker 
was  too  dull  to  comprehend  its  importance,  and,  never  dreaming  of  any 
movement  into  the  Northern  territory  beyond  perhaps  a  raid  for  commis 
sary  purposes,  contented  himself  with  making  a  disposition  of  his  forces  to 
cover  Washington,  and  taking  up  a  strong  position  between  Manassas  and 
Centreville,  so  as  to  interpose  his  army  between  the  Confederate  forces  and 
what  he  supposed  to  be  the  object  of  their  campaign. 

Lee  marched  rapidly  forward  in  pursuance  of  his  plans.  He  had  played 
with  the  enemy  so  as  to  mislead  him  entirely.  Hooker  followed  Lee  to 
the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  but  was  so  uncertain  whether  he  meant  to 
give  battle  there,  or  move  up  the  Valley,  that  time  was  lost,  and  instead 
of  bringing  the  point  to  an  issue  at  once  in  Virginia,  the  Federal  com 
mander  had  to  hastily  cross  the  Potomac,  and  take  position  in  Maryland. 
Lee  crossed  the  Potomac  in  the  vicinity  of  Shepherdstown,  on  the  24th  of 
June.  The  corps  of  Ewell  had  preceded  him  two  days  before,  and  on  the 
23d  had  occupied  Chambersburg.  On  the  27th  of  June  the  whole  of  Lee's 
army  was  at  Chambersburg.  An  advance  on  Harrisburg  had  been  con 
templated  ;  but  the  design  was  abandoned  on  the  29th,  in  consequence  of 
the  information  that  the  Federal  army  was  moving  northwards,  and  so 
menacing  the  communication  of  the  Confederate  army  with  the  Potomac. 
To  check  the  enemy's  advance,  therefore,  Gens.  Lougstreet,  Hill,  and 
Ewell  were  ordered  to  proceed  to  Gettysburg.  Thus  within  twenty  days 
the  great  Confederate  commander  had  brought  his  entire  army  from  Fred- 


4:04:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ericksburg,  by  the  way  of  the  Shenandoah  Yalley  to  Gettysburg  in  Penn 
sylvania,  without  obstruction,  and  executed  a  wonderful  feat  of  strategy. 
It  is  true  that  other  commanders  in  the  war  had  made  longer  marches  and 
accomplished  more  magnificent  distances.  But  to  estimate  properly  the 
generalship  of  Lee,  it  must  be  remembered  that  when  he  set  out  on  this 
expedition,  he  was  confronted  by  one  of  the  largest  and  best  appointed 
armies  the  enemy  ever  had  in  the  field ;  that  Winchester,  Martinsburg, 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  Berryville  were  garrisoned  by  hostile  forces  ;  that  the 
Federal  cavalry  were  in  splendid  condition  ;  and  yet  in  the  face  of  all  these 
facts,  he  had  marched  along  the  Rappahannock,  over  the  passes  of  the 
Blue  Eidge,  up  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  and  across  the  fords  of  the  Poto 
mac  into  Pennsylvania,  without  his  progress  being  arrested. 

"When  the  Confederate  army  obtained  a  footing  on  the  soil  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  there  were  many  people  who  supposed  that  as  here  there  was  no 
friendly  disposition  of  the  invaded,  no  reputation  of  political  sympathy,  as 
in  Maryland,  to  interpose  between  them  and  the  penalties  of  war,  the 
troops  would  be  prompt  to  exact  a  severe  retribution  for  the  cruelties  of 
the  enemy  displayed  in  the  desolated  homes  and  fields  of  the  South.  But 
no  such  thing  occurred  ;  no  such  expectation  was  answered.  On  the  con 
trary,  no  sooner  had  Gen.  Lee  crossed  the  line  than  he  announced  that 
private  property  would  be  respected,  and  proceeded,  by  general  orders,  to 
restrain  all  excesses  of  his  troops,  and,  in  fact,  to  give  to  the  invaded  peo 
ple  of  Pennsylvania  a  protection  which  even  those  of  the  South  had  not 
always  had  against  the  impressments  and  other  exactions  of  the  war.  No 
house  was  entered  without  authority  ;  no  granary  was  pillaged  ;  no  prop 
erty  was  taken  without  payment  on  the  spot ;  and  vast  fields  of  grains 
were  actually  picketed  by  Confederate  guards,  mounted  on  almost  starved 
horses. 

So  far  as  these  orders  of  Gen.  Lee  maintained  the  discipline  and  morals 
of  his  troops,  prevented  them  from  degenerating  into  ruffians,  and  declined 
retaliation  of  this  sort,  they  were  generally  sustained  by  the  public  opinion 
of  his  countrymen,  for  exasperated  as  they  were  by  what  they  had  ex 
perienced  of  the  enemy's  barbarities  in  their  own  homes,  the  Southern 
people  were  so  proud  of  their  reputation  for  chivalry,  and  plumed  them 
selves  so  much  on  this  account,  that  they  were  willing  to  sacrifice  for  it  al 
most  any  other  passion  of  the  war.  But  there  was  an  obvious  distinction 
in  this  matter,  and  the  Richmond  Examiner  indicated  it  in  a  striking  and 
powerful  censure  of  Gen.  Lee's  course.  It  was  said  that  only  a  few  persons 
in  the  South  recommended  retaliation  in  kind ;  that  it  was  not  advised 
that  houses  should  be  burned,  or  robbed,  jewelry  stolen,  and  women  raped 
in  Pennsylvania,  in  exact  imitation  of  the  acts  of  Northern  troops  in  Vir 
ginia  and  Mississippi ;  but  that  such  guard  on  the  discipline  and  honour 
of  Confederate  soldiers  was  not  inconsistent  with  a  devastation  of  the 


GEN.  LEE'S   MODERATION.  405 

enemy's  country,  done  with  the  deliberation  of  general  orders,  and  by  the 
army  acting  in  line  of  battle ;  and  that  such  retribution,  while  it  could 
have  brought  no  historical  discredit  on  the  Confederate  arms,  was  due  the 
suffering  people  of  the  South,  was  necessary  to  teach  the  enemy  a  lesson, 
and  indicated  a  kind  of  operation  which,  removed  from  the  enemy's  own 
barbarity,  would  equally  avoid  that  weak  warfare  which  irritated  instead 
of  alarming  an  invaded  people,  and  thus  strengthened  their  forces  and  ob 
tained  recruits  for  them  on  their  own  soil.  Gen.  Lee  appears  never  to 
have  comprehended  this  argument.  We  shall  see  hereafter  in  what  coin 
his  civilities  in  Pennsylvania  were  paid  back,  and  how,  notwithstanding 
the  constant  exertions  of  the  Confederates,  for  what  President  Davis  termed 
the  reputation  of  "  Christian  warriours,"  the  ingenious  falsehoods  of  an 
enemy,  himself  constantly  in  the  commission  of  the  worst  atrocities,  en 
titled  them  the  worst  of  savages,  and  turned  upon  them  the  phrase  of 
"  rebel  barbarities"  But  surely  one  reflection  here  cannot  escape  the 
world.  It  is  the  extreme  improbability  of  such  "^barbarity "  on  the 
part  of  a  people  who,  in  the  third  year  of  the  war,  exhibited  this  magna 
nimity  in  Pennsylvania,  and  even  in  the  character  of  an  invading  army, 
declined  to  take  advantage  of  some  of  the  most  ordinary  penalties 
of  war. 

On  the  28th  of  June,  Gen.  Hooker,  at  his  own  request,  was  relieved 
from  the  command  of  the  Federal  army,  and  Gen.  Meade,  whose  antece 
dents  were  those  of  an  efficient  corps  and  division  commander,  was  ap 
pointed  to  succeed  him.  A  great  alarm  pervaded  the  North.  The  Gov 
ernors  of  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  Maryland,  and  Western  Vir 
ginia  called  out  their  militia  forces.  But  these  feverish  displays  were  of 
little  consequence.  It  was  easily  seen  by  the  intelligent  that  the  security 
of  the  North  rested  upon  Meade's  army,  and  on  the  strongly  fortified  lines 
of  Washington,  and  that  if  this  array  was  once  broken,  hastily  levied 
militia  could  afford  no  protection  against  Lee's  army,  and  that  thus  the 
war  was  about  to  culminate  in  a  grand  contest  of  regular  arms.  It  was  a 
sharp,  fearful  issue.  Gen.  Meade  found  himself  in  command  of  a  splendid 
army  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men.  He  comprehended 
the  necessity  of  rapid  and  decisive  action.  .Rapidly  organizing  his  forces, 
he  marched  out  to  meet  the  Confederates.  Making  a  disposition  of  his 
forces  so  as  to  cover  both  Washington  and  Baltimore  at  the  same  time,  he 
moved  forward  cautiously  until  his  advance  reached  Gettysburg.  About 
one  mile  from  the  town,  a  line  of  entrenchments  was  thrown  up  on  a  range 
of  hills,  and  a  heavy  force  moved  forward  through  and  beyond  the  town  to 
watch  the  movements  of  his  adversary. 


406  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 


THE   BATTLE    OF    GETTYSBUKG. 

The  great  battle  opened  on  the  1st  July.  The  enemy's  advance,  con 
sisting  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  was  met  by  Heth's  division,  and  shortly 
thereafter  Ewell  hurled  the  main  body  of  his  corps  on  the  Federal  column. 
When  within  one  mile  of  the  town,  the  Confederates  made  a  desperate 
charge.  The  Federal  line  was  broken  ;  the  enemy  was  driven  in  terrible 
confusion  ;  the  streets  of  the  small  town  soon  became  thronged  with  fugi 
tives  ;  and  Ewell,  sweeping  all  before  him,  charged  through  the  town, 
strewing  every  step  of  his  progress  with  the  enemy's  dead,  and  taking  five 
thousand  prisoners.  The  crowded  masses  of  fugitives  poured  through  the 
town  in  rout  and  confusion,  ascending  the  slopes  of  a  hill  towards  a  ceme 
tery  that  covered  its  apex. 

It  was  not  later  than  five  o'clock  in  the  evening,  but  the  success  was 
not  followed  up.  As  Ewell  and  Hill  prepared  for  a  fresh  attack,  they 
were  halted  by  Gen.  Lee,  who  deemed  it  advisable  to  abstain  from  press 
ing  his  advantage  until  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  his  army.  The  un 
fortunate  inaction  of  a  single  evening  and  night  enabled  Meade  not  only, 
on  his  part,  to  bring  up  all  his  forces,  but  to  post  them  on  an  almost  im 
pregnable  line,  which  the  Confederates  had  permitted  a  routed  detach 
ment  of  a  few  thousand  men  to  occupy  and  hold. 

The  failure  of  Gen.  Lee  to  follow  up  the  victory  of  the  1st,  enabled  the 
enemy  to  take  at  leisure,  and  in  full  force,  one  of  the  strongest  positions  in 
any  action  of  the  war,  and  to  turn  the  tables  of  the  battle-field  completely 
upon  the  Confederates.  On  the  night  of  the  1st  July,  Gen.  Meade,  in 
person,  reached  the  scene  of  action,  and  concentrated  his  entire  army  on 
those  critical  heights  of  Gettysburg,  that  had  bounded  the  action  of  the 
first  day,  designated  by  the  proper  name  of  Cemetery  Ridge.  This  ridge, 
which  was  just  opposite  the  town,  extended  in  a  westerly  and  southerly 
direction,  gradually  diminishing  in  elevation  till  it  came  to  a  very  promi 
nent  ridge,  called  "  Round  Top,"  running  east  and  west.  The  Confederates 
occupied  an  exteriour  ridge,  less  elevated,  distant  from  the  lines  occupied 
by  the  Federals  from  a  mile  to  a  mile  and  a  half.  On  this  sunken  parallel 
was  arranged  the  Confederate  line  of  battle — Ewell's  corps  on  the  left,  be 
ginning  at  the  town  with  Early's  division,  then  Rodes'  division ;  on  the 
right  of  Rodes'  division  was  the  left  of  Hill's  corps,  commencing  with 
Heth's,  then  Fender's  and  Anderson's  divisions.  On  the  right  of  Ander 
son's  division  was  Longstreet's  left,  McLaw's  division  being  next  to  Ander 
son's,  and  Hood  on  the  extreme  right  of  our  line,  which  was  opposite  the 
eminence  upon  which  the  enemy's  left  rested. 

There  was  long  a  persistent  popular  opinion  in  the  South  that  Gen.  Lee, 


BATTLE   OF    GETTYSBURG.  407 

having  failed  to  improve  the  advantage  of  the  first  day,  did  wrong  there 
after  to  fight  at  Gettysburg.  But  this  charge  must  be  discussed  with  care. 
Gen.  Lee,  himself,  has  explained  how  a  battle  was  forced  upon  him.  He 
says  :  "  It  had  not  been  intended  to  fight  a  general  battle  at  such  distance 
from  our  base,  unless  attacked  by  the  enemy  ;  but  finding  ourselves  unex 
pectedly  confronted  by  the  Federal  army,  it  became  a  matter  of  difficulty 
to  withdraw  through  the  mountains  with  our  large  trains.  At  the  same 
time  the  country  was  unfavourable  for  collecting  supplies,  while  in  the  pres 
ence  of  the  enemy's  main  body,  as  he  was  enabled  to  restrain  our  foraging 
parties  by  occupying  the  passes  of  the  mountains  with  regular  and  local 
troops.  A  battle  thus  became,  in  a  measure,  unavoidable.  Encouraged 
by  the  successful  issue  of  the  first  day,  and  in  view  of  the  valuable  results 
which  would  ensue  from  the  defeat  of  the  army  of  Gen.  Meade,  it  was 
thought  advisable  to  renew  the  attack." 

It  is  true  that  the  position  of  the  enemy  was  one  of  extraordinary 
strength.  But  the  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia  was  in  an  extraordinary 
state  of  proficiency  ;  it  was  flushed  with  victory  ;  it  had  accomplished  so 
many  wonders  in  the  past  that  it  was  supposed  to  be  equal  to  anything 
short  of  a  miracle  ;  and  when,  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  Gen.  Lee  recon 
noitred  the  field,  and  scanned  the  heights  which  looked  upon  him  through 
brows  of  brass  and  iron,  he  was  noticed  to  rise  in  his  stirrups,  and  mutter 
an  expression  of  confidence.  He  decided  to  attack. 

The  action  of  the  2d  July  did  not  commence  until  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.  Under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire  from  the  Confederate  batteries, 
Longstreet  advanced  against  the  Federal  left,  and  Ewell,  from  Gettysburg 
and  Rocky  Creek,  moved  forward  Johnson's,  Rodes',  and  Early's  divisions 
against  the  right,  his  guns  keeping  up  a  continuous  fire  on  the  slopes  of 
Cemetery  Hill.  Whilst  the  two  corps  on  the  flanks  advanced  to  the  attack, 
Anderson's  division  received  orders  to  be  prepared  to  support  Longstreet, 
and  Fender  and  Heth  to  act  as  a  reserve,  to  be  employed  as  circumstances 
might  require. 

Longstreet,  having  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  Hood's  and  McLaw's 
divisions,  attacked  with  great  fury.  The  first  part  of  the  enemy's  line  he 
struck  was  Sickles'  corps,  which  he  hurled  back  with  terrible  loss  on  the 
heights  in  its  rear.  The  Confederates  delivered  their  fire  at  short  musket 
range,  then  charged  up  the  steep  ascent  with  the  peculiar  yell  of  the 
Southern  soldier.  Meade,  seeing  that  the  real  attack  was  against  his  left, 
hurried  reinforcements  rapidly  from  his  centre.  For.  two  hours  the  battle 
raged  with  sublime  fury,  and  on  the  semi-circle  of  Round  Top  trembled 
the  fiery  diadem  of  victory  and  all  the  issues  of  the  day.  The  fire  was 
fearful  and  incessant ;  three  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  belched  forth  death 
and  destruction  on  every  side ;  the  tumultuous  chorus  made  the  earth 
tremble  ;  and  a  dense  pall  of  smoke  fitly  constituted  a  sulphurous  canopy 


408  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

for  scenes  of  infernal  horrour.  Longstreet,  with  hat  in  hand,  seemed  to 
court  the  death  which  avoided  him.  At  one  moment  it  was  thought  the 
day  was  won.  Three  brigades  of  Anderson's  division  moved  up,  had  made 
a  critical  attack,  and  Wilcox  and  "Wright  almost  gained  the  ridge ;  but 
reinforcements  reached  the  Federals  ;  and,  unsupported  by  the  remainder 
of  Anderson's  division,  Longstreet's  men  failed  to  gain  the  summit  of  the 
hill,  or  to  drive  back  the  enemy  from  the  heights  of  the  Eound  Top. 

On  the  Confederate  left,  E well's  success  had  been  better.  He  had 
moved  forward  to  the  assault  of  Cemetery  Hill ;  Johnson's  division  forced 
its  way  across  the  broken  ground  near  Kocky  Creek,  sustaining  consider 
able  loss  from  the  fire  poured  down  upon  it  from  the  higher  ground ; 
Early's  division  advanced  to  storm  the  ridge  above  Gettysburg,  and  Rodes 
on  the  right  moved  forward  in  support.  But  the  attack  was  not  simul 
taneous.  Hayes'  and  Hoke's  brigades  of  Early's  division,  succeeded  in 
capturing  the  first  line  of  breastworks,  but  were  driven  back  by  the  weight 
of  numbers.  Johnson,  however,  gained  important  ground,  and  when  night 
fell,  still  retained  hold  of  th$  position  he  had  seized  on  the  right  bank  of 
Rocky  Creek. 

The  summary  of  the  second  day's  action  was  that  the  Confederates  had 
obtained  some  advantage  ;  that  the  Round  Top  had,  at  least,  been  tempo 
rarily  in  their  possession,  showing  that  it  was  not  impregnable ;  that  on 
the  left,  important  positions  had  been  taken  ;  and  so  the  result  was  such  as 
to  lead  Gen.  Lee  to  believe  that  he  would  ultimately  be  able  to  dislodge 
the  enemy,  and  to  decide  the  Confederate  commander  upon  a  last,  su 
preme  effort  for  decisive  victory. 

The  morning  of  the  3d  July  wore  away  with  but  little  incident  of  con 
flict.  On  the  extreme  left,  where  Johnson  occupied  the  right  bank  of 
Rocky  Creek,  there  was  some  desultory  action ;  but  Gen.  Lee  did  not  at 
tempt  to  assist  this  part  of  the  line,  hoping  to  retrieve  whatever  might 
occur  there  by  a  vigorous  movement  against  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  po 
sition.  Early  in  the  morning  he  ascended  the  College  cupola  in  Gettys 
burg  to  reconnoitre.  Pickett's  division  of  three  brigades,  numbering  less 
than  five  thousand  men,  which  had  been  left  to  guard  the  rear,  reached  the 
field  of  Gettysburg  on  the  morning  of  the  3d.  This  body  of  Virginia 
troops  was  now  to  play  a  part  the  most  important  in  the  contest,  and  on 
this  summer  day  to  make  a  mark  in  history,  to  survive  as  long  as  the  lan 
guage  of  glorious  deeds  is  read  in  this  world. 

About  noon  there  was  a  deep  calm  in  the  warm  air.  Gen.  Lee  deter- 
.  mined  to  mass  his  artillery  in  front  of  Hill's  corps,  and  under  cover  of  this 
tremendous  fire  to  direct  the  assault  on  the  enemy's  centre.  To  this  end 
more  than  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery  were  placed  in  position.  On  the 
opposite  side  of  the  valley  might  be  perceived  the  gradual  concentration 
of  the  enemy  in  the  woods,  the  preparations  for  the  mighty  contest  that 


BATTLE   OF   GETTYSBURG.  409 

was  at  last  to  break  the  ominous  silence  with  a  sound  of  conflict  such  as 
was  scarcely  ever  before  heard  on  earth.  It  was  a  death-like  silence.  At 
12.  30,  P.  M.,  the  shrill  sound  of  a  Whitworth  gun  pierced  the  air.  In 
stantly  more  than  two  hundred  cannon  belched  forth  their  thunder  at  one 
time.  It  was  absolutely  appalling.  An  officer  writes  :  "  The  air  was  hid 
eous  with  most  discordant  noise.  The  very  earth  shook  beneath  our  feet, 
and  the  hills  and  rocks  seemed  to  reel  like  a  drunken  man.  For  one  hour 
and  a  half  this  most  terrific  fire  was  continued,  during  which  time  the 
shrieking  of  shell,  the  crash  of  falling  timber,  the  fragments  of  rocks  flying 
through  the  air,  shattered  from  the  cliffs  by  solid  shot,  the  heavy  mutter- 
ings  from  the  valley  between  the  opposing  armies,  the  splash  of  bursting 
shrapnell,  and  the  fierce  neighing  of  wounded  artillery  horses,  made  a  pic 
ture  terribly  grand  and  sublime." 

Into  this  scene  of  death  moved  out  the  Confederate  column  of  assault 
Pickett's  division  proceeded  to  descend  'the  slope  of  hills  and  to  move 
across  the  open  ground.  The  front  was  thickly  covered  with  skirmishers  ; 
then  followed  Kemper's  and  Garnett's  brigades,  forming  the  first  line,  with 
Armistead  in  support.  On  the  flanks  were — Heth's  division,  commanded 
by  Pettigrew,  of  Hill's  corps,  and  Wilcox's  brigade  of  McLaw's  corps, 
the  former  on  the  left,  the  latter  on  the  right  of  the  Yirginians.  Pickett 
led  the  attack.  The  five  thousand  Yirginians  descended  the  hill  with  the 
precision  and  regularity  of  a  parade.  As  they  reached  the  Emmittsburg 
road,  the  Confederate  guns,  which  had  fired  over  their  heads  to  cover  the 
movement,  ceased,  and  there  stood  exposed  these  devoted  troops  to  the  im- 
interrupted  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  while  the  fringe  of  musketry  fire 
along  a  stone  wall  marked  the  further  boundary  of  death  to  which  they 
marched.  No  halt,  no  waver.  Through  half  a  mile  of  shot  and  shell 
pressed  on  the  devoted  column.  It  was  no  sudden  impetus  of  excitement 
that  carried  them  through  this  terrible  ordeal  ;  it  was  no  thin  storm  of  fire 
which  a  dash  might  penetrate  and  divide.  In  every  inch  of  air  was  the 
wing  of  death.  Against  the  breadth  of  each  man's  body  reared  the  red 
crest  of  Destruction. 

Steadily  the  Yirginians  press  on.  The  name  of  Yirginia  was  that  day 
baptized  in  fire,  and  illuminated  forever  in  the  temple  of  History.  There 
had  been  no  such  example  of  devotion  in  the  war.  Presently  wild  cries 
ring  out ;  the  smoke-masked  troops  are  in  the  enemy's  works ;  there  is  a 
hand-to-hand  contest,  and  again  and  again  the  Confederate  flag  is  lifted 
through  the  smoke  over  the  shrinking  columns  of  the  enemy.  Garnett  i§ 
dead.  Armistead  is  mortally  wounded.  Kemper  is  shot  down.  Every 
brigadier  of  the  division  is  killed  or  wounded.  But  Pickett  is  unscathed 
in  the  storm  ;  his  flashing  sword  has  taken  the  key  of  the  enemy's  position, 
and  points  the  path  of  the  conflict  through  his  broken  columns  ;  the  glad 
shout  of  victory  is  already  heard  ;  and  on  the  distant  hill  of  observation, 


4:10  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

where  a  little  group  of  breathless  spectators  had  watched  the  scene,  Long- 
street  turns  to  Gen.  Lee  to  congratulate  him  that  the  day  is  won. 

Yain  !  vain  !  Overlooking  the  field,  Gen.  Lee  saw  that  the  troops  of 
Pettigrew's  division  had  wavered.  Another  moment,  and  they  had  fallen 
back  in  confusion,  exposing  Pickett's  division  to  attack  both  from  front 
and  flank.  The  courage  of  Yirginians  could  do  no  more.  Overwhelmed, 
almost  destitute  of  officers,  and  nearly  surrounded,  the  magnificent  troops 
of  Pickett  gave  way.  Slowly  and  steadily  they  yielded  ground,  and,  un 
der  the  heavy  fire  which  the  artillery  poured  into  their  broken  ranks,  they 
retraced  their  steps  across  the  fatal  valley. 

Gen.  Lee  was  never  known  to  betray  on  any  battle-field  a  sign,  either 
of  exultation  or  disappointment.  As  he  witnessed  the  last  grand  effort  of 
his  men,  and  saw  it  fail,  he  was  seen  for  a  moment  to  place  his  finger 
thoughtfully  between  his  lips.  Presently  he  rode  quietly  in  front  of  the 
woods,  rallying  and  encouraging  the  broken  troops,  uttering  words  of  cheer 
and  encouragement.  To  a  foreign  military  officer  of  rank,  who  had  come 
to  witness  the  battle,  he  said  very  simply  :  "  This  has  been  a  sad  day  for 
us,  Colonel — a  sad  day ;  but  we  can't  expect  always  to  gain  victories." 
There  was  no  dramatic  circumstance  about  him ;  no  harangue  ;  but  nothing 
could  be  more  affecting,  nothing  more  sublime  than  to  witness  that  when 
this  plain  gentleman  rode  through  the  throng  of  broken  troops,  saying  such 
simple  words  as,  "  Never  mind,"  "  We'll  talk  of  this  afterwards,"  "  Now  we 
want  all  good  men  to  rally,"  every  fugitive  paused,  and  badly  wounded 
men  took  off  their  hats  to  cheer  him  !  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
never  knew  such  a  thing  as  panic.  It  never  needed  a  harangue  to  stir  its 
blood  on  a  battle-field.  It  never  had  a  dramatic  accessory  to  its  courage. 
Lee's  presence  alone  was  inspiration,  order,  recovery.  An  English  colonel, 
who  rode  by  the  side  of  the  great  Confederate  commander,  remarks : 
"  Gen.  Lee  and  his  officers  were  evidently  fully  impressed  with  a  sense  of 
the  situation  ;  yet  there  was  much  less  noise,  fuss,  or  confusion  of  orders, 
than  at  any  ordinary  field-day  ;  the  men,  as  they  were  rallied  in  the  wood, 
were  brought  up  in  detachments,  and  lay  down  quiet  and  coolly  in  the 
positions  assigned  to  them." 

The  enemy  did  not  move  from  his  works,  and  the  new  crisis  for  which 
Gen.  Lee  had  so  quietly  prepared,  did  not  come.  Night  fell  over  the  third 
scene  of  bloodshed.  The  Confederate  loss  in  this  frightful  series  of  engage 
ments  exceeded  ten  thousand  men.  Some  of  the  details  of  this  loss  exhibit 
instances  of  desperate  conflict  which  shock  the  heart.  In  Pickett's  divi 
sion,  out  of  twenty-four  regimental  officers  only  two  escaped  unhurt.  The 
Ninth  Yirginia  went  in  two  hundred  and  fifty  strong,  and  came  out  with 
only  thirty-eight  men.  In  another  part  of  the  field  the  Eighth  Georgia 
rivalled  this  ghastly  record  of  glory.  It  went  into  battle  with  thirty-two 
officers,  out  of  which  twenty-four  vrere  killed  or  wounded.  The  Federal 


EETJREAT   OF   THE   CONFEDERATES.  411 

loss  in  the  engagement  proper  of  Gettysburg  is  not  known.  Gen.  Meade 
acknowledged  to  the  total  loss  during  the  campaign  of  23,186  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.  Nearly  half  of  these  are  to  be  found  in  the  total 
of  prisoners,  including  the  captures  at  Winchester. 

Tfre  morning  of  the  4th  July  dawned  upon  the  two  armies  still  confront 
ing  each  other.  They  occupied  precisely  the  same  ground  that  each  occu 
pied  on  the  first  day's  fight.  No  disposition  was  shown  by  either  to  attack 
the  other.  About  twelve  o'clock  Lee  made  preparations  to  withdraw  such 
of  the  wounded  as  could  be  transported  in  ambulances  and  wagons. 
These  were  placed  in  line,  and,  under  a  strong  escort,  sent  back  towards 
the  Potomac.  This  consumed  the  afternoon  and  night  of  the  4th.  On  the 
morning  of  the  5th  July  the  Confederate  line  of  battle  was  drawn  in,  leav 
ing  a  heavy  skirmish  line  to  confront  the  Federals.  By  midnight  of  the 
5th,  Lee's  rear  guard  was  well  out  from  Gettysburg,  and  retiring  in  perfect 
order.  There  was  no  excitement,  no  panic.  The  entire  wagon  and  supply 
trains,  every  piece  of  artillery,  large  herds  of  cattle  and  horses,  and  about 
seven  thousand  prisoners,  were  all  brought  off  safely. 

On  reaching  Hagerstown,  Lee  found  that  the  recent  rain  had  so  swollen 
the  Potomac  that  the  army  could  not  recross  in  safety.  Line  of  battle  was 
again  formed,  with  the  left  resting  upon  Hagerstown,  and  the  right  upon 
the  Potomac.  Hastily  constructed  earthworks  were  thrown  up,  and  every 
preparation  was  made  to  receive  the  Federals,  who,  it  was  reported,  were 
rapidly  advancing.  Meade  followed  up  the  pursuit,  but  showed  no  dispo 
sition  to  attack.  He  was  too  badly  crippled  to  offer  battle.  No  disposi 
tion  was  evinced  on  either  side  to  bring  on  an  engagement.  Lee  continued 
in  this  position  until  the  pontoons  were  constructed  for  the  passage  of  his 
army  over  the  river.  He  crossed  over  in  face  of  the  enemy,  who  had 
arrived  on  the  12th,  and  taken  up  position,  "  with  no  loss  of  material,  ex 
cept  a  few  disabled  wagons  and  two  pieces  of  artillery."  * 

*  The  following  official  communication  from  Gen.  Lee  makes  its  own  commentary  on  the  unrelia 
bility  of  despatches  of  Federal  generals  : 

"  HEADQUARTER  ABMY   NORTHERN  VIRGINIA,  2lst  July,  1863. 

"  Gen.  S.  Cooper,  Adjutant  and  Inspector- General  C.  S.  A.  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  General — I  have  seen  in  Northern  papers  what  purported  to  be  an  official  despatch  from  Gen. 
Meade,  stating  that  he  had  captured  a  brigade  of  infantry,  two  pieces  of  artillery,  two  caissons,  and 
a  large  number  of  small  arms,  as  this  army  retired  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac,  on  the  13th 
and  14th  hist. 

"  This  despatch  has  been  copied  into  the  Richmond  papers,  and  as  its  official  character  may 
cause  it  to  be  believed,  I  desire  to  state  that  it  is  incorrect.  The  enemy  did  not  capture  any  organ 
ized  body  of  men  on  that  occasion,  but  only  stragglers  and  such  as  were  left  asleep  on  the  road,  ex 
hausted  by  the  fatigue  and  exposure  of  one  of  the  most  inclement  nights  I  have  ever  known  at  this  sea 
son  of  the  year.  It  rained  without  cessation,  rendering  the  road  by  which  our  troops  marched  to 
the  bridge  at  Falling  Waters  very  difficult  to  pass,  and  causing  so  much  delay  that  the  last  of  the 
troops  did  not  cross  the  river  at  the  bridge  until  1  p.  M.,  on  the  14th,  While  the  column  was  thus 
detained  on  the  road,  a  number  of  men,  worn  down  with  fatigue,  lay  down  in  barns  and  by  the  road- 


4:12  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  pursuit  of  Lee  was  resumed  by  a  flank  movement  of  the  Federal 
army,  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Berlin,  and  moving  down  the  London  Yal- 
ley.  The  cavalry  were  pusbed  into  several  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
Mountains,  but  despite  all  efforts  of  the  Federal  forces,  Gen.  Lee  succeeded 
in  once  more  establishing  his  men  on  the  Rapidan,  while  the  enemy  took 
position  on  the  Rappahannock,  and  thus  terminated  the  campaign. 
Meade,  by  the  final  battle  of  Gettysburg,  had  saved  the  North ;  but  he  had 
yet  left  unfulfilled  the  task  which  his  countrymen  had  allotted  to  him,  of 
cutting  off  and  destroying  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Gettysburg  may  be  taken  as  the  grand  climacteric  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy.  It  was  the  customary  phrase  of  John  M.  Daniel,  editor  of 
the  Richmond  Examiner,  that  on  the  3d  July,  on  the  heights  of  Gettys 
burg,  the  Confederates  were  "within  a  stones  throw  of  peace"  The  ex 
pression  is  not  extravagant,  when  we  reflect  what  would  have  been  the 
moral  effect  of  defeating  Meade's  army,  and  uncovering  New  York,  Phila 
delphia,  and  "Washington  ;  when,  too,  the  fate  of  Yicksburg  was  not  de 
cided,  and  the  vitals  of  the  Confederacy  were  untouched. 

It  was  in  anticipation  and  in  assurance  of  a  victory  so  decisive  that  the 
Confederates  had  prepared  their  first  distinct  proposition  of  peace.  The 
proper  history  of  "  peace  negotiations  "  commences  a  few  days  before  Get 
tysburg.  When  Lee  crossed  the  Pennsylvania  line,  a  mission  was  pre 
pared  in  Richmond  and  entrusted  to  Yice-President  Stephens,  who  was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Washington  with  the  following  letter,  intended  to 
mask  his  real  intentions.  This  letter,  apart  from  its  use  as  a  decoy  to  the 
real  diplomatic  matter  in  hand,  has  a  certain  independent  interest : 

"  RICHMOKD,  2d  July,  1863. 

"  Hon.  Alex.  H.  Stephens,  Richmond,  Va. : 

"  SIR  :  Having  accepted  your  patriotic  offer  to  proceed  as  a  military  commissioner, 
tinder  flag  of  truce,  to  Washington,  you  will  herewith  receive  your  letter  of  authority  to 
the  Oommander-in-Chief  of  the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States. 

"  This  letter  is  signed  by  me  as  Oommander-in-Chief  of  the  Confederate  land  and 
naval  forces. 

"  You  will  perceive,  from  the  terms  of  the  letter,  that  it  is  so  worded  as  to  avoid  any 
political  difficulties  in  its  reception.  Intended  exclusively  as  one  of  those  communica 
tions  between  belligerents  which  public  law  recognizes  as  necessary  and  proper  between 

ride,  and  though  officers  were  sent  back  to  arouse  them,  as  the  troops  moved  on,  the  darkness  and 
rain  prevented  them  from  finding  all,  and  many  -were  in  this  way  left  behind.  Two  guns  were 
left  in  the  road.  The  horses  that  drew  them  became  exhausted,  and  the  officers  went  forward  to 
procure  others.  When  they  returned,  the  rear  of  the  column  had  passed  the  guns  so  far  that  it  was 
deemed  unsafe  to  send  back  for  them,  and  they  were  thus  lost  No  arms,  cannon,  or  prisoners  were 
taken  by  the  enemy  in  battle,  but  only  such  as  were  left  behind  under  the  circumstances  I  have  de 
scribed.  The  number  of  stragglers  thus  lost  I  am  unable  to  state  with  accuracy,  but  it  is  greatly 
exaggerated  in  the  despatch  referred  to. 

«R.  E.  LEE,  General? 


MISSION   OF  VICE-PRESIDENT   STEPHENS.  413 

hostile  forces,  care  has  been  taken  to  give  no  pretext  for  refusing  to  receive  it  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  involve  a  tacit  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Confederacy. 

"  Your  mission  is  simply  one  of  humanity,  and  has  no  political  aspect. 

"  If  objection  is  made  to  receiving  your  letter  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not  addressed 
to  Abraham  Lincoln  as  President  instead  of  Commander-in-Chief,  &c.,  then  you  will  pre 
sent  the  duplicate  letter,  which  is  addressed  to  him  as  President,  and  signed  by  me  as 
President.  To  this  letter  objection  may  be  made  on  the  ground  that  I  am  not  recognized 
to  be  President  of  the  Confederacy.  In  this  event,  you  will  decline  any  further  attempt 
to  confer  on  the  subject  of  your  mission,  as  such  conference  is  admissible  only  on  a  foot 
ing  of  perfect  equality. 

"  My  recent  interviews  with  you  have  put  yon  so  fully  in  possession  of  my  views  that 
it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  give  you  any  detailed  instructions,  even  were  I  at  this  moment 
well  enough  to  attempt  it. 

"  My  whole  purpose  is,  in  one  word,  to  place  this  war  on  the  footing  of  such  as  are 
waged  by  civilized  people  in  modern  times,  and  to  divest  it  of  the  savage  character  which 
has  been  impressed  on  it  by  our  enemies,  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  and  protests.  War  is 
full  enough  of  unavoidable  horrours,  under  all  its  aspects,  to  justify,  and  even  to  demand, 
of  any  Christian  ruler  who  maybe  unhappily  engaged  in  carrying  it  on,  to  seek  to  restrict 
its  calamities,  and  to  divest  it  of  all  unnecessary  severities.  You  will  endeavour  to 
establish  the  cartel  for  the  exchange  of  prisoners  on  such  a  basis  as  to  avoid  the  constant 
difficulties  and  complaints  which  arise,  and  to  prevent  for  the  future  what  we  deem  the 
unfair  conduct  of  our  enemies,  in  evading  the  delivery  of  prisoners  who  fall  into  their 
hands,  in  retarding  it  by  sending  them  on  circuitous  routes,  and  by  detaining  them  some 
times  for  months  in  camps  and  prisons,  and  in  persisting  in  taking  captive  non-com 
batants. 

"  Your  attention  is  also  called  to  the  unheard-of  conduct  of  Federal  officers  in  driving 
from  their  homes  entire  communities  of  women  and  children,  as  well  as  of  men,  whom 
they  find  in  districts  occupied  by  their  troops,  for  no  other  reason  than  because  these  un 
fortunates  are  faithful  to  the  allegiance  due  to  their  States,  and  refuse  to  take  an  oath  of 
fidelity  to  their  enemies. 

"  The  putting  to  death  of  unarmed  prisoners  has  been  a  ground  of  just  complaint  in 
more  than  one  instance,  and  the  recent  execution  of  officers  of  our  army  in  Kentucky,  for 
the  sole  cause  that  they  were  engaged  in  recruiting  service  in  a  State  which  is  claimed 
as  still  one  of  the  United  States,  but  is  also  claimed  by  us  as  one  of  the  Confederate 
States,  must  be  repressed  by  retaliation  if  not  unconditionally  abandoned,  because  it 
would  justify  the  like  execution  in  every  other  State  of  the  Confederacy,  and  the  practice 
is  barbarous,  uselessly  cruel,  and  can  only  lead  to  the  slaughter  of  prisoners  on  both  sides, 
a  result  too  horrible  to  contemplate  without  making  every  effort  to  avoid  it. 

"  On  these  and  all  kindred  subjects  you  will  consider  your  authority  full  and  ample 
to  make  such  arrangements  as  will  temper  the  present  cruel  character  of  the  contest,  and 
full  confidence  is  placed  in  your  judgment,  patriotism,  and  discretion  that,  while  carrying 
out  the  objects  of  your  mission,  you  will  take  care  that  the  equal  rights  of  the  Confed 
eracy  be  always  preserved. 

"Very  respectfully, 

"JEFFERSON  DAVIS." 

Mr.  Stephens  proceeded  only  as  far  as  Fortress  Monroe,  where  he  was 
intercepted  by  a  despatch  peremptorily  forbidding  his  access  to  the  Federal 
capital.  Whether  the  authorities  there  were  aware  or  not  of  the  real  na 
ture  of  his  mission  it  is  since  ascertained  that,  apart  from  the  written  text 


414:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

which  it  bore,  it  was  to  sound  the  Washington  Government  on  the  ques 
tion  of  peace.  There  could  be  no  other  proper  conclusion,  judging  from 
the  importance  of  the  emissary,  and  the  absurd  futility  of  his  going  to 
Washington  merely  to  protest  against  the  enemy's  cruelties  in  conducting 
the  war. 

The  whole  explanation  of  the  affair  is  that  Mr.  Stephens  was  fully  em 
powered  in  certain  contingencies,  to  propose  peace  ;  that  President  Davis 
had  sent  him  on  this  extraordinary  visit  to  Washington,  anticipating  a 
great  victory  of  Lee's  army  in  Pennsylvania  ;  that  the  real  design  of  the 
mission  was  disconcerted  by  the  fatal  day  of  Gettysburg,  which  occurred 
when  Mr.  Stephens  was  near  Fortress  Monroe  ;  and  that  it  was  in  the  in 
solent  moments  of  this  Federal  success  that  he  was  so  sharply  rebuffed  by 
the  Washington  authorities.  Considering  the  conjuncture  of  the  occasion 
and  the  circumstances  in  whiph  the  President  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
sought  to  signalize  what  he  supposed  would  be  a  great  victory  of  his  arms, 
by  a  distinct  and  formal  proposition  of  peace  at  Washington,  it  may  be 
said  that,  notwithstanding  the  disappointment  of  the  event,  and  the  jeer 
of  the  enemy,  Mr.  Davis  occupied  a  proud  position  in  this  matter,  and  one 
that  merited  the  applause  of  the  Christian  world. 


CHAPTEE    XXY. 

GETTYSBURG  AND  VICZSBURG  TWIN  DISASTERS  FOE  THE  CONFEDERATES. — THEIE  EFFECT  ON 
THE  CONFEDERATE  CURRENCY. THE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFED 
ERACY. — THE  MODERN  SYSTEM  OF  PUBLIC  CREDITS  AN  ENCOURAGEMENT  TO  WAR. — REVIEW 
OF  FINANCIAL  EXPERIMENTS  IN  THE  MODERN  WARS  OF  EUROPE. — THE  THREE  CONSPICD- 
OUS  EXAMPLES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN,  FRANCE  AND  RUSSIA. — THE  GREAT  FINANCIAL  ERROUR 

IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR. HOW     A    BANK     OF     EXCHEQUER   WOULD    HAVE    OPERATED    IN 

THE  WAR. — THE  RULB  OF  REFLUX  IN  CURRENCY. — BRIEF  STATEMENT  OF  FINANCIAL 
CONDITION  OF  NORTH  AND  SOUTH  AT  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR. — SUSPENSION  OF  THE  SOUTHERN 
BANKS  IN  THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR. — AMOUNT  OF  SPECIE  IN  THE  SOUTH  AT  THE 
COMMENCEMENT  OF  THE  WAR. — PRINCIPAL  MEASURES  OF  CONFEDERATE  FINANCE. — HOW 
THE  SOUTHERN  BANKS  BECAME  INVOLVED. — PRACTICAL  RESULTS  OF  THEIR  LOAN  TO  THE 
GOVERNMENT. — "  MAKING  MONEY  BY  MACHINERY." — SALES  OF  CONFEDERATE  BONDS. — 
SPECIAL  OCCASIONS  FOE  THIS  INVESTMENT. — UNEQUAL  TO  RELIEVE  THE  CURRENCY. — 
RATES  OF  DEPRECIATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  MONEY. — RICHMOND,  THE  CENTRE  OT 
FINANCE  AND  TRADE. — GOLD  NOT  A  MEASURE  OF  VALUE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY. — REASONS 
FOR  ITS  EXTRAORDINARY  APPRECIATION  THERE. — COMPARISON  OF  CONFEDERATE  MONEY 

WITH  THE  CONTINENTAL  CURRENCY  IN  THE  REVOLUTION  OF   1776. TWO  CAPITAL  CAUSES 

OF  THE  DEPRECIATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  MONEY. — THE  INFLUENCE  OF  SPECULATION. — 
HOW  THE  ENGROSSERS  MANAGED  IN  RICHMOND. — SUMMARY  OF  THE  MISMANAGEMENT  OF 
THE  CONFEDERATE  FINANCES. 

GETTYSBURG  and  Yicksburg  were  twin  victories  for  the  Federals — twin 
disasters  for  the  Confederates.  They  marked  the  line  where  the  war 
turned,  and  the  fortunes  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  declined.  The  dis 
aster  of  Yicksburg  was  a  shock  to  the  whole  internal  economy  of  the 
South  ;  and  this  period  of  military  disaster  was  coincident  with  a  distress 
in  material  resources,  in  which  some  men  already  thought  to  discover  signs 
of  the  fatal  decay  of  the  Confederacy.  Money  has  been  designated  as  "  the 
sinews  of  war  ; "  and  when  it  is  known  that  the  Confederate  currency  de 
clined  a  thousand  per  cent,  on  the  news  of  these  military  disasters,  it  may 
well  be  comprehended  what  occasions  of  alarm  and  anxiety  they  were. 
The  whole  concern  of  the  Confederate  finances  invites  a  studious  consider 
ation,  which  may  well  take  place  here  at  a  period  which  affected  so  much 


416  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

their  virtue  and  integrity.  And  the  subject  is  so  distinct  that,  without 
regard  to  any  particular  date  of  our  narrative,  we  may  extend  our  view  of 
it  through  the  whole  period  of  the  war. 


THE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY. 

The  South  was  in  a  condition  of  complete  isolation  in  the  war.  The 
laws  of  finance  were  less  disturbed  by  extraneous  influences  than  was  ever 
the  case  in  any  country  of  equal  extent,  population  and  civilization  before. 
The  community  consisted  of  several  millions  of  people,  occupying  a  large 
territory  without  a  specie  circulation,  and  compelled  to  establish  a  thor 
oughly  artificial  system  of  finance  adapted  to  the  condition  of  war.  The 
case  was  anomalous.  Yery  valuable  lessons  in  finance  might  be  learned 
from  the  history  of  the  Confederate  system,  if  space  were  allowed  to  trace 
its  development,  step  by  step,  throughout  its  extraordinary  career,  and  to 
mark  the  influence  which  it  exerted  upon  the  social  condition,  the  public 
and  private  morals,  and  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy.  It  may  be  said 
generally  that  the  result  of  the  war  was  powerfully  influenced  by  the  con 
dition  of  the  Confederate  finances,  as  much  so  as  by  any  other  cause. 

It  is  the  most  striking  peculiarity  of  modern  wars  that  they  are  conduct 
ed  chiefly  by  means  of  credit  in  the  form  of  paper  issues.  The  system 
was  inaugurated  by  Great  Britain ;  and  its  result  is  the  mammoth  debt 
of  the  British  government.  The  revolutionary  governments  of  France,  as 
they  succeeded  each  other  in  the  various  stages  of  transition  between  the 
autocracy  of  the  Bourbons  and  the  Empire,  copied  the  British  example, 
and  created  enormous  debts  which  shared  the  fate  of  the  ephemeral  pow 
ers  which  incurred  them.  All  the  governments  of  Europe,  with  scarcely 
an  exception,  now  labour  under  the  burden  of  obligations  incurred  in  expen 
sive  wars.  In  proportion  with  the  facility  of  public  credit,  has  been  the 
magnitude  of  the  scale  on  which  modern  wars  have  been  conducted.  And 
if  in  America  the  people  have  reason  to  boast  of  the  stupendous  magnitude 
of  the  armies  which  they  brought  into  the  field,  and  of  the  extent  and  cost 
liness  of  their  military  operations,  the  marvellous  exhibition  will  be  found 
to  have  been  due,  not  so  much  to  the  boundlessness  of  their  resources,  as 
to  the  lavish  and  reckless  manner  in  which  they  employed  a  credit  never 
before  brought  into  requisition.  Nor  would  it  be  over-stepping  the  bounds 
of  truth  to  say,  that  the  war  spirit  in  either  section  was  fed  and  stimulated, 
in  a  very  great  degree,  by  the  profits  which  the  heavy  public  expendi 
tures  brought  to  large  classes  of  persons  directly  responsible  for  the  war, 
and  connected  with  its  operations.  This  modern  scheme  of  throwing  the 
burden  of  debts  incurred  in  war  upon  the  shoulders  of  posterity  has  done 
more  to  stimulate  costly  and  bloody  conflicts  between  nations  and  peoples, 


SYSTEMS   OF   CREDIT   IN    WAR.  417 

than  all  the  harmonizing  influences  of  modern  civilization  and  Christianity 
have  done  to  restrain  them.  Until  the  system  of  credit  is  counterbalanced 
by  some  other  scheme,  by  which  the  persons  immediately  connected  with 
the  public  operations  shall  be  impoverished  rather  than  enriched  by  a  state 
of  war,  we  shall  have  no  occasion  to  expect  the  Millennium. 

The  three  most  conspicuous  examples  of  the  abuse  of  credit  for  purposes 
of  war,  antecedent  to  those  furnished  by  the  two  belligerents  in  the  Amer 
ican  conflict,  were  those  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia.  The  debt 
of  the  British  government  at  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  was  eight 
hundred  and  eighty-five  millions  of  pounds  sterling.  In  March,  ]  863,  after 
a  lapse  of  nearly  half  a  century,  embracing  the  costly  expenditures  of  the 
Crimean  war,  it  had  been  reduced,  by  dint  of  resolute  taxation,  no  lower 
than  the  amount  of  seven  hundred  and  eighty  million  pounds  sterling, 
or  about  thirty-nine  hundred  millions  of  dollars. 

The  amount  of  Assign ats  issued  by  the  Revolutionary  authorities  of 
France,  counting  all  the  different  series,  reached  the  enormous  amount  of 
forty  thousand  millions  of  francs.*  These  were  followed  by  a  second  species 
of  paper  money  called  Mandates,  to  the  amount  of  twenty-four  hundred  mil 
lions  of  francs.  The  great  bulk  of  both  these  forms  of  circulation,  amount 
ing  in  the  aggregate  to  more  than  forty-two  thousand  millions  of  francs,  or 
eighty-five  hundred  millions  of  dollars,  proved  a  loss  to  their  holders ;  a 
circumstance  which  is  thought  to  have  been  fortunate  for  France  rather 
than  otherwise,  in  proving  the  means  of  divesting  her,  at  the  same  time 
with  the  burden  itself,  of  the  spurious  authorities  that  had  imposed  it. 

The  British  debt  was  contracted  almost  altogether  in  the  form  of  bonds 
at  long  dates,  upon  the  faith  of  which  the  Bank  of  England  put  forth  a 
proportionate  amount  of  its  own  notes  of  circulation.  It  is  true  that  the 
Exchequer  bills  issued  by  government  for  temporary  purposes,  went  direct 
ly  into  the  hands  of  the  public ;  but  they  also  soon  found  their  way,  for 
the  most  part,  into  the  Bank  of  England  ;  and  constituted,  like  the  bonds, 
a  basis  of  additional  circulation.  In  this  respect,  it  will  be  observed,  the 
English  and  French  systems  were  essentially  different.  In  England  the 
circulation  was  not  identical  with  the  debentures  of  government,  but  was 
issued  through  the  agency  of  a  banking  company,  which  made  of  the  gov 
ernment  bonds  a  basis  for  the  security  of  the  circulation.  In  France,  the 
government  itself  put  forth  its  obligations  in  the  form  of  a  currency,  de 
clared  it  to  be  the  medium  of  exchange  by  law,  and  denounced  heavy  penal 
ties  against  the  refusal  to  accept  it  as  money.  The  comparative  merits  of 
the  two  systems  were  strikingly  exemplified  by  the  result.  The  French 
issues,  as  we  have  seen,  went  on  augmenting  in  volume  until  they  reached 

*  The  statement  seems  incredible  ;  but  it  is  made  on  the  authority  of  the  American  Encyclo 
pedia. 

27 


418  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

forty-two  thousand  millions  of  francs  (in  the  aggregate  of  Assic/nats  and 
Mandates),  and  continued  to  decline  in  value  until  the  whole  mass  of  cir 
culation  became  utterly  valueless.  The  volume  of  currency  in  England, 
on  the  other  hand,  never  reached  an  unmanageable  aggregate.  The 
circulating  notes  of  the  Bank  of  England  never  aggregated  quite  thirty 
millions  of  pounds  sterling,  or  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  dollars. 
Nor  did  the  pound  sterling,  in  proper  form,  ever  experience  a  depreciation 
comparable  with  that  which  has  generally  attended  the  excessive  issue  of 
paper  currency,  during  a  state  of  war,  in  other  countries  ;  for  the  pound 
sterling  note  of  England  reached  its  maximum  depreciation  in  1814,  when 
it  sank  to  the  value  of  £5  105.  to  the  ounce,  or  about  1.55  to  the  unit  in 
gold.  We  shall  see  that  in  the  United  States,  during  the  war,  the  green 
back  dollar  sank  to  the  value  of  2.85  for  one  in  gold  ;  and  that  the  Con 
federate  paper  dollar  sank  at  the  end,  to  the  low  value  of  60  for  one. 

During  the  protracted  wars  which  the  Russian  Empire  prosecuted  for  a 
long  series  of  years  upon  its  Circassian  frontier,  a  large  employment  of 
credit  was  found  to  be  requisite.  An  expedient  similar  to  that  employed  by 
Great  Britain  was  resorted  to,  in  the  establishment  of  an  institution  called 
the  Sank  of  Assignats.  This  establishment  furnished  the  proper  currency 
of  the  Empire  for  many  years,  and  its  circulation  is  believed  never  to  have 
exceeded  in  periods  of  the  most  pressing  military  exigency  more  than  eight 
hundred  and  thirty-six  millions  of  roubles.  A  most  remarkable  circum 
stance  connected  with  the  history  of  this  circulation  is,  that  it  underwent 
a  most  excessive  appreciation,  above  gold  in  value,  during  the  winter  of 
Napoleon's  Russian  campaign,  rising  in  value  as  the  invader  approached 
the  heart  of  the  country,  and  receding  as  he  retired. 

Unfortunately  for  themselves,  neither  of  the  two  belligerents  in  Amer 
ica  took  any  measures  for  establishing  a  proper  relation  between  the  efflux 
and  reflux  of  the  currency,  during  the  gigantic  war  which  we  have  under 
consideration.  If  a  Bank  of  Exchequer  had  been  established  at  the  begin 
ning,  endowed  with  functions  like  those  exercised  by  the  Bank  of  England 
during  the  first  two  decades  of  the  present  century,  having  entire  control 
of  the  circulation,  and  acting  as  the  principal  factor  of  the  government  in 
the  negotiation  of  its  bonds,  the  evils  of  a  ruinously  depreciated  currency 
might  have  been  avoided.  As  it  was,  each  new  demand  of  the  govern 
ment  for  money,  instead  of  being  supplied  by  the  sale  of  bonds,  and  the 
receipt  of  a  part  of  the  circulation  already  outstanding,  was  met  by  a  new 
and  additional  issue  of  notes  ;  those  previously  issued  still  remaining,  for 
the  most  part  not  needed  and  not  employed,  in  the  hands  of  the  public. 
There  was  thus  a  perpetual  efflux  of  notes  of  circulation  ;  and  no  returning 
influx,  to  keep  up  an  active  demand  for  them  and  to  sustain  their  value. 
The  public  credit  was  made  the  prey  of  a  multitude  of  sharpers  and 
brokers,  who  could  all  have  been  kep^  in  due  subordination  by  a  great  bank- 


FINANCIAL   CONDITION   OF   THE   NOKTH   AND   SOUTH.  419 

ing  corporation,  having  a  capital  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars,  able 
to  u  place  "  the  public  bonds  as  rapidly  as  funds  were  needed ;  and,  by 
means  of  large  discounts,  establishing  a  steady  reflux  current  of  circulation 
back  into  its  own  coffers.  It  is  one  of  the  plainest  maxims  of  finance  that 
if  a  currency  be  issued  in  a  continuous  stream,  without  any  measure  being 
taken  to  establish  a  counter-current  of  the  same  circulation  back  into  the 
source  from  which  it  issued,  depreciation  is  inevitable.  Where  a  circula 
tion  is  put  forth  through  the  agency  of  a  bank,  it  is  done  in  the  process 
of  discounting  the  negotiable  paper  of  punctual  men  of  business  ;  and  the 
reflux  is  created  by  the  return  of  the  same  amount  of  circulation  into  the 
bank  in  payment  of  the  discounted  paper  when  it  falls  due.  Every  piece 
of  paper  that  is  discounted,  has  its  pay-day ;  and  the  reflux  of  currency 
corresponds  with  the  efflux.  The  bank  may  fail ;  but  this  efflux  is  not 
relaxed  by  that  fact  alone ;  for  the  necessity  of  paying  the  negotiable  paper 
which  it  held  under  discount,  will  absorb  precisely  the  amount  of  circula 
tion  which  was  issued  in  the  act  of  discounting  it.  A  powerful  bank  of 
exchequer,  however  unnecessary  or  vicious  a  part  of  our  Federal  machinery 
it  may  be  in  periods  of  peace,  is  an  admirable  agency  in  time  of  war  for 
regulating  the  heavy  circulation  which  is  always  found  to  be  one  of  the 
necessary  attendants  of  a  state  of  warfare. 

Neither  of  the  two  belligerent  governments  in  the  American  war  took 
the  proper  pains,  if  they  took  any  pains  at  all,  to  ensure  a  healthful  reflux 
current  into  the  Treasury  of  the  circulation  which  they  so  profusely  issued. 
The  outgo  of  circulation  was  enormous  and  continuous  ;  while  there  was 
no  income  at  all,  or  if  there  was  any,  none  sufficient  to  create  any  sensible 
demand  for  the  currency,  or  to  impart  any  stable  value  to  it. 

Let  us  see  briefly,  for  purposes  of  illustration,  what  was  the  financial 
condition  of  the  two  belligerents  at  the  close  of  the  war.  The  aggregate 
debt  incurred  by  the  Federal  government,  in  the  progress  of  the  war,  has 
been  officially  stated,  in  frequent  monthly  bulletins  from  the  Treasury 
Department,  at  about  two  thousand  eight  hundred  millions  of  dollars.  It 
is  the  generally  received  opinion  in  financial  and  official  circles  that  the 
debt,  when  all  audited  and  settled,  will  reach  the  round  sum  of  three 
thousand  millions  of  dollars.  There  was  outstanding  in  the  United  States 
in  the  form  of  currency  issued  from  the  Federal  Treasury,  on  the  31st  of 
July,  1865,  the  aggregate  sum  of  seven  hundred  and  eleven  millions  of 
dollars  ;  composed  of  five  p£r  cent,  notes,  six  per  cent,  compound  interest 
notes,  greenbacks  not  bearing  interest,  and  fractional  currency.  Up  to 
that  date,  the  circulation  of  the  National  Banks  had  reached  one  hundred 
and  fifty  seven  millions,  and  the  supposed  amount  of  the  notes  of  State 
banks  still  in  circulation,  was  about  eighty  millions.  The  aggregate  cir 
culation  in  the  Northern  States,  therefore,  had  reached,  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  the  prodigious  amount  of  about  nine  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of 


420  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

dollars.  The  circulation  of  the  Bank  of  England,  we  have  seen,  did  not 
exceed,  at  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions 
of  dollars,  which  is  not  one-sixth  of  the  amount  of  the  circulation  which 
the  war  left  in  the  North.  The  price  of  gold  in  New  York,  compared  with 
greenbacks,  for  several  months  after  the  close  of  the  war  fluctuated  near 
the  point  of  one  for  one  and  forty-five  hundred  ths  ;  while  the  maximum 
depreciation  of  paper,  during  the  war,  was  two  and  eighty-five  hundredths. 
The  maximum  depreciation  of  the  pound  sterling  note  in  England  was  one 
and  fifty-five  hundredths. 

The  total  cost  of  the  war  to  the  Confederate  government  had  reached 
at  its  close,  according  to  the  opinion  of  intelligent  officers  of  the  Treasury, 
about  thirty-five  hundred  millions  of  dollars.  Of  this  total  about  twenty- 
five  hundred  millions  consisted  of  eight,  seven,  six,  and  four  per  cent, 
bonds  of  long  dates ;  of  Treasury  notes  outstanding  of  both  the  old  and 
new  issue ;  of  unsettled  accounts  due  from  government,  audited  or  in  the 
process  of  being  audited  in  the  accounting  departments  ;  and  of  debt  that 
had  been  cancelled  in  the  form  of  the  old  currency,  and  income  received  in 
the  form  of  taxes.  The  residue  of  the  expenditure  remained  in  the  form 
of  unpaid  claims  against  Government  in  the  hands  of  the  people,  for  prop 
erty  purchased  or  impressed  and  damages  sustained  from  the  army. 
In  fact,  the  cost  of  the  war  on  the  Confederate  side,  measured  in  Confed 
erate  currency,  was  nearly  the  same  as  that  on  the  Federal  side ;  for  it 
is  to  be  observed  that  the  three  thousand  millions  of  dollars  at  which  the 
Federal  debt  is  generally  estimated,  embraces  only  the  Federal  debt  prop 
er  ;  and  does  not  embrace  the  expenditures  made  by  States,  cities,  counties, 
and  corporations  generally.  An  intelligent  authority  classifies  the  war 
debt  of  the  North  as  follows :  Federal  debt,  three  thousand  millions ; 
State  debt  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  millons ;  city  debt,  one  hundred 
millions ;  and  county  debt  five  hundred  millions  ;  making  a  grand  aggre 
gate  of  about  three  thousand  seven  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  dollars. 
The  municipal  indebtedness  of  the  South,  incurred  on  account  of  the  war, 
was  very  inconsiderable.  The  complete  disorganization  which  attended  the 
disastrous  termination  of  the  struggle  renders  it  impossible  to  arrive  at  an 
exact  knowledge  as  yet  either  of  the  Confederate  debt  or  of  the  municipal 
debt ;  but  the  latter  was  comparatively  so  inconsiderable  as  to  constitute 
scarcely  an  appreciable  element  in  the  grand  total  of  the  Confederate 
finances.  The  system  of  bounties  was  wholly  unknown  at  the  South  ; 
a  patriotic  public  opinion  and  an  energetic  conscription  sufficing  to  force 
every  man  of  self-respect  into  the  army,  or  into  some  branch  of  the  public 
service.  The  bounty  system,  with  its  frauds  and  corruptions,  was  a  feature 
of  the  war  known  only  to  the  North. 

We  come  now  to  speak  more  exclusively  of  the  course  of  finance  in  the 
Southern  States.  Early  in  the  winter  of  the  first  year  of  the  war,  and 


FINANCIAL   MEASURES   OF   THE   CONFEDERACY.  421 

rather  earlier  than  was  supposed  to  be  necessary,  the  banks  of  the  South 
ern  States  suspended  specie  payments.  The  specie  in  their  vaults  at  the 
time,  as  shown  by  their  published  reports,  was  about  thirty  millions  of 
dollars  in  the  total,  and  the  paper  circulation  outstanding,  in  the  form  of 
bank  notes,  was  about  fifty  millions.  An  estimate  of  the  quantity  of 
specie  at  the  time  in  circulation  among  the  people  of  the  South  must  be 
conjectural ;  but  the  weight  of  intelligent  opinion  is  in  favour  of  the  con 
clusion  that  this  amount  did  not  exceed  twenty  millions  of  dollars.  Thus 
the  war  found  the  South  in  possession  of  only  about  fifty  millions  of  coin, 
and  with  a  paper  circulation  afloat  of  about  the  same  amount.  No  reports 
were  made  to  the  Confederate  authorities  by  the  banks,  of  their  accounts, 
and  the  foregoing  data  are  derived  from  reports  made  shortly  antecedent 
to  the  war.  The  specie  in  the  hands  of  the  people  was  of  course  imme 
diately  hoarded  ;  and  was  afterwards  employed  to  a  great  extent  in  contra 
band  trade  ;  that  in  the  vaults  of  the  banks  remained  for  a  long  time  un 
used  ;  but  afterwards  was  in  part  secreted,  in  part  taken  possession  of  by 
the  Confederate  Government,  or  turned  over  to  its  custody,  and  some  of 
it  captured.  Yet  much  of  it  must  have  gone  abroad  through  the  blockade 
during  the  war,  as  the  termination  of  the  struggle  revealed  a  very  small 
portion  of  the  thirty  millions,  at  first  held  by  the  banks,  as  still  in  their 
possession. 

The  suspension  of  the  banks  early  in  the  winter  of  1861-'62  was  not 
from  any  inability  to  protect  their  circulation.  This  latter  had  recently 
gone  down  very  much  in  amount ;  and  the  banks  were  abundantly  able  to 
provide  for  it.  The  suspension  was  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  prevent 
ing  the  drain  of  specie  which  would  have  resulted  from  the  large  purchases 
of  merchandise  at  the  North  which  the  prospect  of  a  long  embargo  would 
have  induced.  The  specie  was  saved  ;  but  it  proved  a  curse  rather  than  a 
blessing  to  the  country.  If  by  some  talismanic  power  every  dollar  of  it 
could  have  been  transformed  into  iron  coins  like  those  of  Lycurgus,  the 
Confederacy  would  have  been  a  gainer.  It  was  extensively  used  in  the 
smuggling  trade  throughout  the  war,  and  the  goods  brought  in  through  its 
agency  were  sold  at  such  enormous  prices  in  Confederate  currency  as  to 
contribute  very  powerfully  to  the  discredit  of  that  circulation  among  the 
people.  True,  the  patriotic  men  and  women  of  the  country  prided  them 
selves  in  homespun  ;  but  far  too  many  manifested  a  more  eager  desire  for 
exotic  fabrics  than  ever  before. 

The  first  financial  measure  of  the  Confederate  Government  was  the 
issuing  of  the  fifteen  million  loan,  bearing  eight  per  cent,  interest,  payable 
in  specie,  for  which  an  export  duty  of  one-eighth  of  a  cent  per  pound  on 
cotton  was  levied  and  pledged.  The  second  financial  measure  was  the 
negotiation  of  heavy  loans  from  most  of  the  banks  in  the  form  of  discounts 
upon  negotiable  notes  drawn  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  After 


422  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

these  measures  other  loans  in  heavy  amounts,  upon  bonds  at  long  dates, 
were  periodically  made  ;  and  the  baneful  system  was  instituted  of  Treas 
ury  notes  put  out  in  the  form  of  notes  of  circulation,  in  amounts  ranging 
from  the  fractions  of  a  dollar  up  to  notes  of  five  hundred  dollars.  If  to 
these  measures  we  add  the  cotton  bonds,  which  were  employed  in  England 
and  Europe  for  the  purchase  of  war  material,  and  the  cotton  loan  upon 
which  they  were  based  at  home,  we  shall  have  mentioned  all  the  leading 
measures  of  finance  employed  by  the  Confederacy. 

The  fifteen  million  loan  was  early  disposed  of  at  satisfactory  rates.  For 
a  time  the  interest  which  had  been  stipulated  to  be  paid  in  specie  was  actu 
ally  discharged  according  to  the  terms  of  the  contract ;  but  before  the  close 
of  the  war  the  bondholders  were  either  not  paid  at  all  or  consented  to  ar 
rangements  less  difficult  to  the  Treasury  than  the  payment  of  specie.  This 
fifteen  million  loan  in  fact  produced  sore  inconvenience  to  the  Government 
during  the  later  years  of  the  war,  and  was  the  first  subject  with  reference 
to  which  it  was  obliged  to  forfeit  its  faith  to  the  holders  of  its  paper. 

The  temporary  loans  negotiated  from  the  banks  were  easily  provided 
for.  By  the  time  that  the  loans  matured,  the  Treasury  was  able  to  dis 
charge  them  by  means  of  the  Treasury  notes  prepared  for  circulation. 
But  it  was  found  in  the  sequel  that  these  accommodations  cost  the  banks 
dearly.  It  has  already  been  mentioned  that  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the 
circulation  of  the  Southern  banks  was  quite  inconsiderable  in  amount.  To 
meet  the  demand  of  the  Government  for  loans,  the  banks  very  consider 
ably  increased  their  outstanding  circulation  ;  in  fact,  they  doubled,  and,  in 
many  instances,  qradruplecl  it ;  a  thing  which  was  perfectly  safe  during  a 
suspension  of  specie  payments.  Indeed,  a  large  increase  of  circulation  was 
found  to  be  quite  necessary,  after  the  disappearance  of  specie  and  under 
the  stimulus  imparted  by  the  war  to  all  branches  of  trade.  The  fifty  mil 
lions  of  currency  found  in  circulation  by  the  war  was  wholly  inadequate 
to  the  active  state  of  business  superinduced  by  the  war.  The  banks  accom 
plished  two  objects  by  one  measure.  In  granting  a  loan  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  they  placed  a  large  amount  of  funds  in  the  hands  of  the 
Confederate  Government ;  and  they  supplied,  by  the  same  act,  the  de 
ficiency  of  currency  which  was  so  stringently  felt  by  the  people.  But  the 
act  proved  their  ruin.  The  notes  of  circulation  which  they  thus  put  forth, 
following  that  law  of  finance  which  makes  a  base  currency  drive  out  of 
circulation  one  less  base,  were  hoarded.  The  bank  notes,  when  lent  by 
these  institutions  to  the  Government  soon  spread  over  the  country.  They 
were  succeeded  by  similar  paper  issued  in  the  form  of  currency  by  the 
Confederate  Government.  The  Treasury  notes  were  distrusted,  and  in 
proportion  as  they  were  distrusted,  the  notes  of  the  banks  were  hoarded. 
The  law  of  finance  which  has  been  adverted  to  had  a  quick  and  striking  ex 
emplification.  The  notes  of  the  old  familiar  banks  of  the  States  were  reserved 


FINANCIAL    MEASURES    OF  THE   CONFEDERACY.  423 

and  put  away  by  the  people,  and  did  not  emerge  from  their  retreat  until 
after  the  close  of  the  war.  They  then  began  again  to  be  seen  in  the  hands 
of  the  people.  But  they  had  come  forth  from  their  hiding  places  too  late. 
The  banks  had  been  ruined,  and  were  found  unable  to  pay  any  part  of 
their  debts  except  a  percentage  upon  their  circulation.  The  notes  of  the 
different  institutions  varied  in  market  value  according  to  the  accidental  cir 
cumstances  wThich  influenced  the  original  amount  of  accommodations  which 
they  had  granted  in  1861  to  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

In  the  aggregate  these  accommodations  had  considerably  exceeded  the 
capital  stock  of  the  banks.  The  Confederate  Treasury  had  paid  off  the 
accommodation  notes  due  the  banks  with  Treasury  notes.  The  whole 
amount  of  private  discounts  due  the  banks  from  individuals  were  dis 
charged  by  the  agency  of  the  same  medium.  Thus  the  whole  capital  stock 
and  assets  of  the  banks  were  soon  transformed  into  Treasury  notes  ;  while 
the  heavy  amount  of  their  own  notes  which  they  had  lent  to  the  Gov 
ernment,  disappeared  from  circulation  and  went  into  private  hoards, 
where  they  could  not  be  reached.  They  had  a  heavy  debt  outstanding, 
which  could  not  be  discharged  ;  and  their  whole  available  means  consisted 
of  a  daily  depreciating  currency,  which  they  were  obliged  to  receive  in 
payment  of  all  dues  to  themselves.  At  the  close  of  the  war  this  currency 
turned  into  dead  leaves,  and  they  were  left  in  the  possession  of  no  assets  at 
all  except  the  small  amount  of  real  estate  occupied  by  their  counting 
houses,  and  the  small  modicum  of  specie  which  they  had  been  able  to  save 
from  taxes,  impressment,  and  robbery.  Stockholders  thus  lost  all  their 
shares,  and  the  value  of  assets  in  hand  was  sufficient  to  meet  but  a  meagre 
percentage  of  the  outstanding  circulation,  which  the  banks  had  impru 
dently  put  forth  in  originally  granting  such  liberal  loans  to  the  Confeder 
ate  Government. 

With  the  negotiation  of  the  fifteen  million  loan,  and  the  exhaustion  of 
the  means  of  the  banks,  all  regular  financiering  ceased  with  the  Confed 
erate  Government.  After  that,  money  was  manufactured  by  machinery  to 
meet  the  wants  of  the  Government,  and  paid  out  as  rapidly  as  it  was 
needed.  Thus  the  volume  of  the  circulation  increased  almost  in  equal 
ratio  with  the  expenditures  of  the  Government.  Considerable  loans  in  the 
form  of  bonds  at  long  dates  were  authorized,  and  a  good  deal  of  success  was 
obtained  in  disposing  of  the  bonds.  But  these  sales  were  exceedingly  out 
of  proportion  to  the  magnitude  of  the  expenditures  ;  and  the  heavy  margin 
of  deficiency  wras  boldly  made  up  by  the  issue  of  Treasury  notes.  "We 
might  recite  here  in  detail  the  various  acts  of  Congress  that  were  passed 
authorizing  the  different  loans  and  directing  the  preparation  and  employ 
ment  of  Treasury  notes  of  circulation.  But  the  recital  would  be  tedious, 
dreary,  and  insipid.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  no  measure  whatever  was  taken 
to  secure  a  reflux  of  the  circulation  to  the  source  of  issue,  and  thereby  to 


424:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

restrict  the  volume  of  currency  within  manageable  limits,  and  create  a 
demand  for  it  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  its  value. 

The  patriotism  of  the  people,  however,  provided  a  partial  demand  for 
these  notes.  The  growing  redundance  of  currency  produced  high  prices  ; 
and  high  prices  produced  large  funds  for  investment  in  the  hands  of  the 
wealthy  classes.  These  made  it  a  point  of  patriotism  to  invest  their  sur 
plus  capital  in  the  securities  of  the  Government.  Legislatures  authorized 
and  the  courts  directed  the  funds  held  by  fiduciaries  to  be  invested  in  the 
eight  and  seven  per  cent,  bonds  of  the  Confederacy.  Necessity  also  came 
in  aid  of  patriotism  to  promote  these  investments.  The  great  majority  of 
capitalists  knew  not  what  better  disposition  to  make  of  their  Treasury  notes 
than  to  convert  them  into  Confederate  bonds.  The  bonds  drew  interest ; 
the  notes  drew  none ;  except  indeed  those  hundred  dollar  seven-thirty 
notes,  which  in  fact  were  bonds.  For  a  brief  period  after  the  first  rise  of 
prices  consequent  upon  the  inflation,  real  estate  came  briskly  into  market, 
and  a  great  deal  of  it  changed  hands.  But  this  species  of  investment  soon 
terminated.  Speculation  in  the  necessaries  of  life  and  in  the  staples  of  the 
country  was  resorted  to  extensively  by  the  class  of  men  known  as  sharpers ; 
but  it  was  distasteful  to  respectable  people  and  highly  disreputable  in  pub 
lic  opinion.  The  consequence  was,  that  the  wealthy  and  respectable  capi 
talists,  who  were  men  of  public  spirit  and  patriotic  impulses,  eschewed 
these  questionable  operations,  and  converted  their  treasury  notes  into  in 
terest-bearing  bonds,  drawn  at  long  dates.  Many,  indeed,  in  an  unbounded 
faith  in  the  success  of  the  Confederacy,  purchased  negroes ;  but  the  amount 
of  this  property  available  for  purchase  was  very  small  in  proportion  to  the 
vast  capital  accumulated  in  the  hands  of  the  people. 

It  so  happened,  therefore,  that  the  very  redundance  of  the  currency 
produced  in  partial  degree  a  remedy  for  its  own  cure.  The  very  excess  of 
circulation  produced  a  necessity  for  its  conversion  into  bonds.  But  the 
misfortune  was,  that  the  remedy,  as  long  as  it  lasted,  always  came  too  late 
for  the  cure  of  the  evil.  It  did  not  come  into  action  until  the  depreciation 
of  the  currency  had  taken  place.  The  reflux  did  not  return  by  a  natural 
flow,  but  resulted  from  a  damming-up  process.  A  competent  agency 
should  have  been  employed,  which  should  have  watched,  directed,  and 
controlled  the  movement  from  the  beginning ;  an  agency  clothed  with 
absolute  power  over  the  circulation,  and  endowed  with  a  sufficient  capital 
to  ensure  a  ready  sale  at  reasonable  prices  of  the  public  bonds. 

The  progress  of  the  depreciation  of  the  Confederate  money  was  at  first 
gradual ;  but  afterwards  very  rapid.  In  January,  1862,  a  dollar  in  gold 
was  worth  at  the  brokers'  shops  in  Richmond  one  dollar  twenty  cents  in 
currency.  In  July,  1862,  it  was  still  worth  one  dollar  twenty  cents.  In 
January,  1863,  it  had  fallen  to  three  dollars  ten  cents.  In  midsummer, 
1863,  the  value  varied  from  twelve  to  twenty.  It  afterwards,  as  we  shall 


DEPRECIATION    OF    CONFEDERATE   MONEY.  425 

see,  fell  much  lower.  It  must  be  observed,  however,  that  these  brokers' 
rates,  were  invariably  a  long  period  in  advance  of  the  rates  acted  upon  in 
the  interiour.  As  late  as  the  summer  of  1862,  Confederate  money  was 
taken  at  par  in  the  settlement  of  all  transactions  originating  before  the  warx 
and  made  the  basis  of  the  general  transactions  of  the  country  at  the  old 
rate  of  prices.  The  brokers'  rates  were  either  unknown  to  the  people  or 
totally  disregarded  by  them.  Not  until  the  volume  of  the  currency  had 
swollen  beyond  all  reasonable  proportion,  did  the  people  at  large  consent 
to  fix  a  depreciated  value  upon  this  money.  Even  then  they  did  so  under 
compulsion.  Remorseless  speculators  had  succeeded  in  engrossing  the 
entire  stock  of  many  of  the  comforts  and  prime  necessities  of  life.  These 
were  held  at  exorbitant  prices  ;  and  in  order  to  compass  the  means  of  pur 
chasing  them,  the  yeomanry  of  the  country  were  obliged  to  rate  their  own 
property  at  higher  prices  in  Confederate  money  than  the  old  prices  obtain 
ing  before  the  war.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  Richmond  rates  of 
Confederate  money  were,  throughout  the  war,  far  below  those  which  pre 
vailed  in  the  Confederacy  at  large  ;  and  it  is  a  general  fact,  that  the  rates 
of  this  money  improved  as  the  distance  from  Richmond  increased.  This 
fact  was  partly  due  to  the  circumstance,  that  Richmond  was  the  great  focus 
of  Government  disbursements,  and  was  constantly  flooded  to  excess  with 
the  currency  ;  partly  to  the  circumstance,  that  it  was  the  base  from  which 
all  smuggling  operations  were  carried  on,  at  which  of  course  gold  for  the 
smuggling  trade  was  more  in  demand,  and  commanded  the  highest  prices  ; 
and  thirdly,  to  the  circumstance  that  it  was  the  centre  and  resort  of  the 
speculating  classes,  and  the  principal  depository  of  their  wares,  at  which 
the  final  sales  and  last  profits  on  the  commodities  bought  up  in  the  country 
for  speculation,  were  realized.  It  may  be  remarked,  without  a  material 
aberration  from  the  truth,  that  after  the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  war 
had  elapsed,  and  the  Confederate  money  had  become  very  redundant,  the 
business  of  the  country,  at  a  distance  from  Richmond,  was  done,  for  prob 
ably  as  long  a  period  as  twelve  months,  upon  the  basis  of  five  for  one  in 
Confederate  currency.  After  that  period,  the  change  of  rate  to  fifteen  or 
twenty  for  one  was  rather  abrupt ;  and  upon  the  latter  basis  transactions 
proceeded  for  another  twelve  months  ;  after  which  the  rate  was  very  un 
settled  in  the  interiour. 

Another  observation  must  be  made  with  reference  to  the  brokers'  prices 
of  gold.  A  comparison  of  Confederate  money  with  gold  did  not,  during 
the  war,  afford  a  true  criterion  of  the  value  of  either  commodity.  Gold 
was  unnaturally  scarce  and  dear  in  the  Confederacy.  The  old  dollar's  value, 
in  property  not  affected  by  the  condition  of  war,  was  not  sufficient  to  pur 
chase  a  dollar  in  gold.  Real  estate  did  not  approximate  the  prices  in  gold 
which  it  had  commanded  before  the  war.  Boarding  at  the  best  hotels 
could  be  procured  for  fifty  cents  a  day  in  gold,  which  had  cost  two  dollars 


426  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

and  fifty  cents  before  the  war.  A  suit  of  clothing  which  before  the  war 
would  have  cost  thirty  dollars,  could  now  be  obtained  for  ten  or  fifteen  in 
gold.  In  short,  gold  had  greatly  appreciated  in  the  Confederacy,  and  the 
gold  dollar  no  longer  represented  the  old  dollar's  worth.  The  extraordi 
nary  demand  for  it  produced  by  blockade  running,  and  the  smuggling 
trade,  and  the  small  supply  of  it  which  the  war  had  found  in  the  Confed 
eracy,  rendered  still  smaller  by  the  process  of  hoarding,  had  imparted  to 
it  an  extraordinary  value.  It  had  thus  ceased  to  be  a  standard  of  value, 
and  had  become  a  very  scarce  commodity  of  commerce.  The  real  value 
of  Confederate  money  is  not  to  be  estimated  by  the  quantity  of  gold  which 
it  commanded  at  the  brokers'  shops. 

The  case  of  gold  was  different  at  the  North,  from  that  which  we  have 
just  described.  There  commerce  was  unaffected  by  a  blockade  ;  the  usual 
supplies  of  gold  continued  to  be  received ;  no  extraordinary  demands  of 
specie  for  exportation  were  experienced,  and  it  remained,  throughout  the 
period  of  war,  as  accurate  and  reliable  a  standard  of  value  as  ever.  The 
depreciation  of  Federal  currency  can  therefore  be  measured  with  absolute 
certainty  by  comparing  it  with  gold.  In  the  Confederacy,  however,  the 
case  was  not  the  same.  As  we  have  seen,  gold  bore  an  abnormal  value  ; 
and  conclusions  in  regard  to  the  depreciation  of  Confederate  money  founded 
merely  upon  its  relation  to  gold,  would  be  erroneous.  The  old  dollar's 
worth,  if  it  could  be  definitely  ascertained,  in  such  commodities  as  were 
not  affected  by  the  condition  of  war,  would  be  the  true  standard  of  value. 
Until  the  final  six  or  eight  months  of  the  Confederacy,  the  general  transac 
tions  of  the  interiour  country  proceeded  on  a  basis  of  value  for  Confederate 
money  measured  by  the  old  dollar's  worth,  which  was  much  higher  than 
the  values  furnished  by  the  brokers'  quotations  in  Richmond. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  similarity  of  career  which  is  presented 
in  the  cases  of  the  money  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  and  of  the  Con 
gress  of  the  first  American  Confederation.  We  have  already  stated  the 
gradual  depreciation  of  the  one.  The  progress  of  the  depreciation  in  the 
old  Continental  money,  though  somewhat  more  tardy,  was  in  the  same 
degree.  In  May,  1777,  the  Continental  paper  dollar  was  worth  at  the  rate 
of  two  and  two-thirds  for  one  in  specie.  In  December  it  was  worth  four 
for  one.  In  March,  1778,  it  was  worth  five  for  one  ;  in  December,  six  for 
one.  In  February,  1779,  it  was  worth  ten  for  one  ;  in  June,  twenty  ;  in 
September,  twenty-four  ;  in  December,  thirty-nine.  After  the  year  1779  it 
seemed  to  have  no  value.  The  total  amount  of  this  old  Continental  money 
that  was  issued,  was  two  hundred  millions  of  dollars  ;  and  it  was  worth  to 
those  who  received  it,  at  the  period  when  paid  out  by  the  Government, 
only  thirty-six  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars.  A  similar  scaling  of  the 
money  of  the  Confederate  Treasury  would  reduce  the  cost  of  the  war  on  the 
Southern  side  to  less  than  a  thousand  millions  of  dollars.  The  differ- 


COMMERCIAL   SPECULATION   IN  THE  WAK.  427 

ence  between  that  sum  and  the  nominal  cost  measures  the  aggregate  de 
preciation  of  the  money. 

The  principal  cause  of  the  depreciation  of  this  money,  in  the  last  twelve 
months  of  the  war,  was  the  distrust  of  success  entertained  by  the  classes 
who  controlled  the  value  of  the  money.  The  principal  causes  of  its  depre 
cation  in  the  antecedent  period,  were  the  excessive  issues  of  it  by  Govern 
ment,  and  the  influence  of  speculation.  It  is  probably  useless  to  declaim 
against  a  vice  so  prejudicial  as  speculation  to  both  the  individual  and  general 
interests  of  a  country  circumstanced  like  the  Confederacy.  It  is  a  display  of 
the  worst  form  of  selfishness ;  a  selfishness  that  feeds  upon  the  privation,  want, 
and  necessity  of  fellow-citizens  engaged  in  mortal  struggle  with  a  formi 
dable  public  enemy  ;  a  selfishness  that  appropriates  all  that  it  can  grasp,  at 
a  time  when  each  individual  should  give  up  for  the  general  good  all  that 
can  be  spared  ;  a  selfishness  worse  than  that  for  which  Ananias  and  Sap- 
phira  were  struck  down  by  the  hand  of  God,  inasmuch  as  it  seeks  not  only 
to  withhold  what  is  one's  own,  but  to  engross  also  whatever  else  can  be 
compassed  by  craft  and  greed.  The  best  communities  contain  persons  of 
this  sordid  temper  ;  and  the  temptation  to  its  indulgence  in  a  country  iso 
lated  and  beleaguered  by  armies  and  blockading  fleets,  where  the  supplies 
of  every  article  are  limited,  are  too  strong  to  be  resisted  by  the  class 
whose  inclinations  are  set  in  that  direction.  The  speculation  commenced 
in  such  articles  as  cut  nails,  salt,  and  leather.  There  were  but  two  nail 
factories  in  the  Confederacy,  and  the  stocks  of  these  establishments  were 
accessible  and  easily  engrossed.  Within  the  first  six  months  of  the  warh 
the  entire  stock  of  cut  nails  in  the  Confederacy  were  in  the  hands  of  less 
than  half  a  dozen  speculators  in  Eichmond ;  and  the  price  was  abruptly 
put  up  from  four  dollars  to  seven,  and  then  to  ten  per  keg.  There  was  but 
one  considerable  saline  in  the  Confederacy,  and  this  was  operated  by  a  single 
firm,  which  ran  up  the  price  of  this  prime  necessary  of  life,  within  two  years, 
from  the  ante-war  price  of  one  cent  per  pound,  to  twenty-five  cents  per 
pound  in  specie  or  fifty  cents  in  Treasury  notes.  Leather  was  one  of  those 
articles  which,  though  tanned  in  very  numerous  establishments  conducted 
on  a  small  scale  throughout  the  country,  yet  was  everywhere  found  to  be  in 
smaller  quantity  than  was  needed  by  the  people,  and  which  might  safely 
be  bought  up  right  and  left  wherever  found.  These  are  but  examples  of 
the  subjects  of  the  speculation  and  extortion  that  became  rife  throughout 
the  Confederacy.  The  effect  was  greatly  to  augment  and  aggravate  the 
burden  of  the  war  upon  the  people  ;  but  its  most  serious  evil  was  in  the 
depreciating  influence  it  exerted  upon  the  currency.  The  great  mass  of 
the  people  were  desirous  to  receive  this  money  at  the  normal  rates  ;  but, 
finding  themselves  obliged  to  pay  extortionate  prices  for  commodities 
which  they  stood  in  need  of  purchasing,  they  were  driven,  against  their 
will,  to  demand  increased  prices  for  the  products  and  property  which  they 


428  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

sold.  The  fury  and  intensity  of  speculation  forced  the  people  into  reluc 
tant  acquiescence  in  the  depreciation  of  the  currency.  But  there  is  this 
consolatory  observation  to  be  made  on  the  subject:  namely,  that  the 
classes  who  devoted  themselves  assiduously  to  speculation,  as  a  general 
rule,  came  out  losers  at  the  close  of  the  war  ;  while  the  masses  of  people 
who  eschewed  this  disreputable  avocation,  generally  saved  a  comfortable 
portion  of  their  original  means. 

That  the  depreciation  of  the  Confederate  currency  was  partially  super 
induced  by  speculation  and  circumstances  other  than  its  mere  redundancy, 
is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  fact,  that  the  grand  total  of  circulation  in  the 
North  reached  the  stupendous  figure  of  nine  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of 
dollars,  while  the  depreciation  of  greenbacks,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  was 
less  than  one  and  a  half  for  one.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  depreciation  is 
not  the  necessary  result  of  mere  redundancy,  and  may  be  prevented  by 
provident  and  timely  measures.  The  ability  with  which  the  Federal 
finances  were  conducted,  especially  in  avoiding  this  depreciation,  is  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  incidents  of  the  war. 

If  early  and  proper  measures  had  been  adopted,  the  Confederate  cur 
rency  would  doubtless,  likewise,  have  proved  as  manageable  as  any  other 
branch  of  the  Confederate  finances.  These  measures  should  have  looked 
to  the  provision  of  an  adequate  demand  for  the  circulation  that  was  issued 
in  such  profusion.  This  demand  could  have  been  abundantly  established 
by  means  of  taxation,  of  the  sale  of  Government  bonds  of  long  dates,  and 
by  the  intervention  of  a  system  of  discounts  through  the  instrumentality 
of  a  Bank  of  Exchequer.  The  circulation  should  not  have  been  issued 
directly  from  the  Treasury.  It  should  have  been  placed  under  the  abso 
lute  control  of  an  issuing  agency,  which  would  have  served  as  a  regulator 
and  balance-sheet  in  the  movement,  and  preserved  an  equilibrium  between 
the  efflux  and  influx  of  the  circulation.  Taxation  should  have  been  im 
posed  from  the  beginning,  and  executed  promptly  ;  not  postponed  several 
years,  and  then  tardily  put  in  force.  The  sales  of  bonds  should  have  been 
conducted  by  a  great  and  respectable  banking  institution,  directed  by  emi 
nent  and.  reputable  financiers ;  not  entrusted  to  ignorant  and  irrespon 
sible  stock  and  exchange  brokers.  Such  a  financial  institution  could  have 
established  and  maintained  an  influx  of  the  circulation  commensurate  with 
the  efflux.  "With  this  reflux  in  full  flow,  the  volume  of  the  currency  might 
have  been  increased  with  impunity.  And,  if,  besides,  the  circulation  had 
been  in  the  form  of  notes  of  the  bank,  rather  than  in  that  of  notes  of  the 
Treasury  ;  then,  when  the  unfortunate  end  came,  the  debts  due  to  the 
bank  would  still  have  given  a  partial  value  to  this  circulation ;  and  pre 
vented  the  total  wreck  of  cash  means  which  at  last  overtook  the  people  of 
the  South. 


CHAPTER    XXYI. 

THE  NEW  ATTEMPT  UPON  FOET  6UMTER  AND  CHARLESTON. — GEN.  GILLMOEE's  COMMAND. — HIS 
PLAN  OF  OPEEATIONS. — WHAT  WAS  PROPOSED  BY  THE  REDUCTION  OF  THE  WORKS  ON  MOE- 
EIS  ISLAND. — A  BASE  OF  OPERATIONS  ON  FOLLY  ISLAND. — HOW  GEN.  BEAUREGARD  WAS 

BLINDED  AND  DECEIVED. — FORTY-SEVEN  GUNS  OF  THE  ENEMY  UNMASKED. — THE  ASSAULT 
ON  FORT  WAGNEE. — GALLANTRY  OF  A  CONNECTICUT  REGIMENT. — THE  ASSAULT  EEPULSED. 
— GEN.  BEAUEEGARD'S  PLANS. — HIS  OBJECT  IN  HOLDING  MORRIS  ISLAND. — SECOND  ASSAULT 

ON  FORT  WAGNER  IN  CONJUNCTION  WITH  DAHLGREN's  FLEET. — THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF 
FORT  WAGNER. — PROFOUND  AND  SIGNIFICANT  SILENCE  OF  THE  GARRISON. — ADVANCE  OF 
THE  STORMING  COLUMN. — ITS  REPULSE. — TERRIBLE  SCENES  OF  CARNAGE. — SIEGE  OPERA 
TIONS. — APPEALS  TO  THE  SOUTH  CAROLINA  PLANTERS,  AND  THEIR  INDIFFERENCE. — GILL- 
MORE  PREPARES  TO  BOMBARD  AND  DESTROY  CHARLESTON. — "  THE  GREEK  FIRE." — "  THE 
SWAMP  ANGEL." — GILLMORE's  NOTICE  OF  BOMBARDMENT. — SHARP  AND  MEMORABLE  REPLY 
OF  GEN.  BEAUREGARD. — COWARDLY  REJOICINGS  IN  THE  NORTH. — THE  BOMBARDMENT  A 
FAILURE. — ATTEMPTED  DEMOLITION  OF  FORT  SUMTER. — HOW  FAR  THE  FORT  WAS  INJURED 
BY  THE  BOMBARDMENT. — GILLMORE  ANNOUNCES  ITS  REDUCTION. — THE  ANNOUNCEMENT 
FALSE  AND  ABSUED. — PROGRESS  OF  THE  SIEGE  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  FORT  WAGNER. — A 

TERRIFIC  FIRE  OPENED  UPON  IT. — SURPASSING  GRANDEUR  OF  THE  SCENE. GILLMORE  PLANS 

ANOTHER  ASSAULT  UPON  THE  FORT. — THE  CONFEDERATES  EVACUATE  IT  AND  MORRIS 
ISLAND. — WHAT  GEN.  BEAUREGARD  ACCOMPLISHED  BY  THE  RETENTION  OF  MORRIS  ISLAND 
FOR  TWO  MONTHS. — THE  ISLAND  NOT  THE  KEY  TO  CHARLESTON. — ADMIRAL  DAHLGREN 
REFUSES  TO  ASCEND  THE  HARBOUR  WITH  HIS  IRON-CLADS. — HE  SUMMONS  FOET  SUMTER  TO 
SURRENDER. — BEAUREGARD's  REPLY. — A  BOAT- ATTACK  ON  THE  FORT. — ITS  DISASTROUS 
REPULSE. — THE  ENEMY'S  OPERATIONS  AGAINST  CHARLESTON  DEGENEEATE  INTO  A  CHEONIC 
AND  FEUITLESS  BOMBAEDMENT. — DISAPPOINTMENT  IN  THE  NORTH. 

THE  most  remarkable  military  event  of  the  midsummer  of  1863  was 
the  successful  defence  of  Charleston  against  a  most  imposing  demonstration 
of  the  enemy's  power  by  land  and  by  sea.  AVe  have  seen  how  unsuccessful 
was  the  naval  attack  upon  this  city  in  April,  1863.  It  was  not  long,  however, 
before  another  attempt  was  planned  upon  Fort  Sumter  and  Charleston,  the 
steps  of  which  were  the  military  occupation  of  Morris  Island  and  the  estab 
lishment  of  batteries  on  that  island  to  assist  in  the  reduction  of  Fort 
Sumter.  The  establishment  of  these  batteries  and  the  reduction  of  the 
Confederate  works— Fort  Wagner  and  Battery  Gregg — was  a  matter  of 


430  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

great  engineering  skill,  and  Gen.  Q.  A.  Gillmore  was  selected  to  command 
the  land  forces  of  the  enemy  engaged  in  these  operations.  Morris  Island 
was  on  the  south  side  of  the  entrance  to  the  harbour,  about  three  and  a 
half  miles  in  length,  low,  narrow,  and  sandy,  and  separated  from  the  main 
land  adjacent  to  it  by  soft,  deep,  and  impracticable  marshes.  Its  capture, 
although  principally  designed  to  open  a  way  to  the  enemy's  iron-clads, 
would  also  serve  the  purpose  of  making  the  blockade  of  Charleston  har 
bour  more  thorough  and  complete,  by  allowing  a  portion  or  all  of  the 
blockading  fleet  to  lie  inside  the  bar.  But  the  most  important  object,  as 
we  have  indicated,  was  to  secure  a  position  whence  it  was  hoped  Fort 
Sumter  might  be  demolished,  and  the  co-operation  of  a  heavy  artillery  fire 
extended  to  the  fleet,  when  it  was  ready  to  move  in,  run  by  the  batteries 
on  James  and  Sullivan's  Islands,  and  reach  the  city. 

Gen.  Gillmore  assumed  command  on  the  12th  June,  and  at  once  pro 
posed  to  commence  a  base  of  operations  on  Folly  Island.  This  island,  the 
south  end  of  which  controlled  the  waters  of  Stone  Harbour  and  Inlet  and 
the  water  approaches  from  James  Island,  had  been  occupied  in  force  by 
the  enemy  since  the  7th  April.  But  Gen.  Beauregard  appears  to  have  had 
no  idea  of  what  was  going  on  there ;  he  never  made  a  reconnoisance  of 
the  enemy's  outposts  on  the  island ;  and  he  was  bitterly  accused  in  the 
Richmond  Sentinel,  the  organ  of  President  Davis'  administration,  for  a 
want  of  vigilance,  which  had  permitted  the  enemy,  unknown  to  him,  to 
construct  a  base  of  operations  actually  within  speaking  distance  of  his 
pickets.  It  is  true  that  the  enemy  threw  up  earthworks  and  mounted 
heavy  guns  on  Folly  Island  under  a  screen  of  thick  undergrowth  ;  but  it  is 
certainly  to  the  last  degree  surprising  that  he  should  have  succeeded  in 
secretly  placing  in  battery  forty-seven  pieces  of  artillery  so  near  to  the 
Confederate  lines  that  a  loud  word  might  have  revealed  the  work,  and  ex 
posed  moreover  to^a  flank  and  reverse  view  from  their  tall  observatories  on 
James  Island.  Indeed  there  was  a  circumstance  yet  more  curious.  A 
blockade  runner  had  been  chased  ashore  just  south  of  the  entrance  to  Light 
house  Inlet,  and  it  actually  occurred  that  the  vessel  was  wrecked  by 
Confederate  soldiers  within  pistol  range  of  the  enemy's  battery  on 
Folly  Island,  without  their  being  in  the  least  aware  of  such  a  grim 
neighbour. 

This  battery  was  ready  to  open  fire  on  the  6th  July.  A  plan  of  attack 
upon  Morris  Island  was  now  deliberately  formed,  one  part  of  which  was  a 
strong  demonstration  of  Gen.  Terry's  division,  some  four  thousand  infantry, 
on  James  Island  so  as  to  draw  off  a  portion  of  the  Confederate  force  on 
Morris  Island.  While  this  demonstration  was  taking  place,  two  thousand 
men  of  Gen.  Strong's  brigade  were  to  embark  in  small  boats  in  Folly 
Eiver,  effect  a  landing  on  Morris  Island,  and,  at  a  given  signal,  attempt  to 
carry  Fort  Wagner  by  assault.  The  batteries  on  the  north  end  of  Folly 


ASSAULT   ON   FOKT   WAGNER.  431 

Island  were  also  ordered  to  be  unmasked,  by  opening  out  the  embrasures 
and  cutting  away  the  brushwood  in  front  of  them. 

At  daybreak  of  the  10th  July,  forty  launches  containing  Strong's  as 
saulting  column  crept  up  Folly  River  with  muffled  oar-locks ;  the  iron 
clad  fleet  crossed  the  bar,  and  took  up  its  position  in  the  main  ship-channel 
off  Morris  Island  ;  two  hundred  axemen  suddenly  sprung  from  behind  the 
batteries  on  Folly  Island,  and  felled  the  trees  which  hid  them  from  view ; 
embrasure  after  embrasure  was  laid  bare  ;  and  at  five  o'clock  the  first  gun 
was  heard  from  the  suddenly  revealed  battery,  and  the  dense  white  smoke 
which  rose  above  the  tall  pines  marked  the  new  line  of  conflict.  Mean 
while  the  assaulting  column  had  landed  ;  the  Confederate  lines  were  drawn 
within  eight  hundred  yards  of  Fort  Wagner ;  and  offensive  operations  were 
suspended  for  the  day. 

An  assault  on  Fort  Wagner  was  ordered  at  five  o'clock  the  next  morn 
ing.  The  Seventh  Connecticut  Regiment  was  to  take  the  lead,  followed 
by  the  Seventy-Sixth  Pennsylvania  and  Ninth  Maine.  Gen.  Strong,  who 
led  the  assaulting  column,  gave  a  Cromwellian  order :  "  Aim  low,  and 
put  your  trust  in  God  !  "  The  Connecticut  soldiers  took  the  double-quick, 
and  with  a  cheer  rushed  for  the  works.  Before  they  reached  the  outer 
works,  they  got  a  terrible  fire  from  the  Confederate  rifles,  and  the  fort 
opened  with  three  8-inch  howitzers,  heavily  charged  with  grape  and  canis 
ter.  The  men  went  over  the  outer  works  with  an  extraordinary  courage, 
that  must  be  recorded  to  their  honour,  and  were  advancing  to  the  crest  of 
the  parapet,  when  it  was  discovered  that  the  regiments  which  were  to  sup 
port  them  had  staggered  back  and  lost  their  distance.  The  Connecticut 
regiment  was  left  to  effect  its  retreat  through  a  sheet  of  fire.  Nearly  one 
half  of  them  were  killed  or  wounded.  But  the  loss  of  the  Confederates 
wras  quite  as  large.  Gen.  Beauregard  estimated  his  losses  in  opposing  the 
landing  of  the  enemy  at  three  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  including  six 
teen  officers.  The  attack  was  undoubtedly  a  surprise  to  him,  as  he  had 
persisted  in  the  belief  that  the  demonstration  against  Charleston  would  be 
made  by  the  old  route — James  Island — and  accordingly  had  almost  strip 
ped  Morris  Island  of  his  artillerymen  and  infantry,  to  meet  the  advance 
of  Terry. 

But  although  the  assault  on  Fort  Wagner  was  repulsed,  the  remissness 
of  Gen.  Beauregard  with  respect  to  the  battery  on  Folly  Island  was  to  cost 
dear  enough.  It  compelled  the  evacuation  of  all  the  fortified  positions  of 
the  Confederates  on  the  south  end  of  Morris  Island ;  in  fact,  surrendered 
all  the  island  except  about  one  mile  on  the  north  end,  which  included  Fort 
Wagner  and  Fort  Gregg  on  Cumming's  Point ;  and  virtually  made  the 
reduction  of  these  works  but  a  question  of  time.  It  was  very  clear  that 
the  enemy,  having  once  obtained  a  foothold  on  Morris  Island,  would  even 
tually  compel  an  evacuation  by  the  operations  of  siege,  and  that  it  was  im- 


4:32  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

possible  to  defend  forever  a  small  island  cut  off  from  communication  by  an 
enormous  fleet.  It  only  remained  for  Gen.  Beauregard  to  repair  as  far  as 
possible  the  errour  lie  had  already  committed,  and  to  find  some  compensa 
tion  for  what  had  already  occurred.  And  well  did  he  do  this  secondary 
duty.  Admitting  the  impracticability  of  defending  Morris  Island  after  the 
position  of  the  enemy  on  it  was  fully  established  and  covered  by  the  iron 
clads,  Gen.  Beauregard  yet  appreciated  the  opportunity  of  holding  the 
island  long  enough  to  replace  Sumter  by  interiour  positions,  and  saw  clearly 
that  every  day  of  defence  by  Wagner  was  vital  to  that  of  Charleston. 
For  two  months  this  policy  was  successful. 

Gen.  Gillmore  was  not  content  with  his  first  essay  to  take  Fort  Wagner 
by  storm.  He  held  a  conference  with  Admiral  Dahlgren,  commanding 
the  fleet,  and  determined  to  attempt,  with  the  combined  fire  of  the  land 
batteries  and  the  gunboats,  to  dismount  the  principal  guns  of  the  work, 
and  either  drive  the  Confederates  from  it,  or  open  the  way  to  a  successful 
assault.  Batteries  were  accordingly  established,  and  were  ready  to  open 
fire  on  the  18th  July,  when  the  enemy's  fleet,  consisting  of  four  Monitors, 
the  Ironsides,  a  frigate,  and  four  gunboats,  some  of  which  threw  shell  from 
mortars,  closed  in  opposite  Fort  Wagner. 

About  noon  the  enemy's  vessels  commenced  hurling  their  heaviest  shot 
and  shell  around,  upon,  and  within  Fort  Wagner,  and,  with  intervals  of 
but  a  very  few  minutes,  continued  this  terrible  fire,  until  one  hour  after  the 
sun  had  gone  down.  Yast  clouds  of  sand,  mud,  and  timber  were  sent  high 
up  into  the  air.  Forty-eight  hours  the  Monitors  and  the  Ironsides  had 
kept  up  a  continuous  fire,  and  Fort  Wagner  had  not  surrendered.  For 
eight  hours,  fifty-four  guns  from  the  land  batteries  had  hurled  their  shot 
and  shell  within  her  walls,  and  still  she  flaunted  the  battle-flag  of  the  Con 
federacy  in  the  face^of  the  enemy.  Once  during  the  day  the  flag  was  shot 
down.  Immediately  it  was  run  up  about  ten  feet  above  the  parapet,  a 
little  cluster  of  men  rallied  around  it,  waved  their  hats,  and  then  disap 
peared,  and  were  not  again  seen  during  the  day.  There  was  no  other  sign 
of  human  life  about  the  fort.  It  appeared  as  if  the  garrison  was  dead  or 
conquered.  u  But,"  said  a  Federal  officer,  who  watched  the  scene,  l{  there 
were  a  few  later  developments  that  proved  their  opinion  was  the  correct 
one  who  said  this  profound  silence  on  the  rebel  side  was  significant,  not  of 
defeat  and  disaster,  but  of  ultimate  success  in  repulsing  our  assault ;  that 
they  were  keeping  themselves  under  cover  until  they  could  look  into  the 
eyes  of  our  men,  and  send  bullets  through  their  heads,  and  would  then 
swarm  by  thousands  with  every  conceivable  deadly  missile  in  their  hands, 
and  drive  us  in  confusion  and  with  terrible  slaughter  back  to  our  en 
trenchments." 

Gillmore  had  selected  the  time  of  twilight  for  the  storming  party  to 
move  to  the  attack,  in  order  that  it  might  not  be  distinctly  seen  from  the 


SECOND   ASSAULT   ON   FOET  WAGNER.  433 

James  Island  and  Sullivan's  Island  batteries,  and  from  Fort  Sumter.  But 
this  time  there  was  to  be  no  surprise.  As  the  bombardment  relaxed,  it 
was  known  at  Fort  Wagner  that  such  a  demonstration  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy  was  not  without  its  object ;  and  every  man  was  ordered  by  Gen. 
Taliaferro,  who  commanded  the  fort,  to  the  parapet  to  prepare  for  the  ex 
pected  assault  of  the  enemy. 

At  dusk  the  assaulting  column  was  formed  on  the  beach.  A  regiment 
of  negro  soldiers,  the  Fifty-fourth  Massachusetts,  was,  for  peculiar  reasons, 
put  in  the  extreme  advance.  There  were  eleven  regiments  in  solid  column. 
As  the  head  of  it  debouched  from  the  first  parallel,  a  tremendous  fire  from 
the  barbette  guns  on  Fort  Sumter,  from  the  batteries  on  Cumming's  Point, 
and  from  all  the  guns  on  Fort  Wagner,  opened  upon  it.  The  guns  from 
Wagner  swept  the  beach,  and  those  from  Sumter  and  Cumming's  Point 
enfiladed  it  on  the  left.  Still  the  column  staggered  on  within  eighty  yards 
of  the  fort.  And  now  a  compact  and  most  destructive  musketry  fire  was 
poured  upon  it  from  the  parapet,  along  which  gleamed  a  fringe  of  fire. 
In  five  minutes  the  first  line  of  the  enemy  had  been  shot,  bayoneted,  or 
were  in  full  retreat.  The  First  Brigade,  under  the  lead  of  Gen.  Strong, 
failed  to  take  the  fort.  The  Second  recoiled  ;  and  the  few  troops  that  had 
clambered  to  the  parapet,  now  found  the  most  desperate  task  to  effect  a 
retreat.  It  was  a  night  black  with  tempest.  Even  if  they  surrendered, 
the  shell  of  Sumter  were  thickly  falling  around  them  in  the  darkness,  and, 
as  prisoners,  they  could  not  be  safe  until  victory,  decisive  and  unques 
tioned,  rested  with  one  or  the  other  belligerent.  It  was  a  retreat  of  untold 
horrours.  Men  rolled  in  the  ditch,  or  dragged  their  bloody  bodies  through 
the  sand-hills,  on  their  hands  and  knees.  About  midnight  there  was 
silence  at  last ;  the  battle  was  over  ;  the  ocean  beach  was  crowded  with 
the  dead,  the  dying,  and  the  wounded.  The  loss  of  the -enemy  was  severe 
— fifteen  hundred  and  fifty  killed  and  wounded,  according  to  his  own 
statement,  which  must  have  been  below  the  truth,  as  the  Confederates 
buried  six  hundred  of  his  dead  left  on  the  field.  Their  own  loss  was  not 
more  than  one  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded. 

After  this  second  successful  defence  of  Fort  Wagner  the  remainder  of 
the  month  of  July,  and  the  early  part  of  August,  were  employed  by  the 
enemy  in  erecting  siege-works,  and  mounting  heavy  siege-guns,  preparatory 
to  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter,  as  it  was  found  that  Fort  Wagner  did 
not  interfere  with  the  engineer  corps  at  work.  Meanwhile  Gen.  Beauregard 
and  the  Mayor  of  Charleston  issued  another  urgent  appeal  to  the  landed  pro 
prietors  and  others  to  send  in  their  negroes  to  work  on  the  fortifications  ; 
and  the  Governor  of  the  State  made  an  even  stronger  appeal.  There  was, 
however,  much  indifference  shown  in  promptly  responding  ;  and  though  an 
act  of  the  Legislature  had  been  passed  involving  a  penalty  on  refusal,  many  of 
the  planters  preferred  paying  it  to  allowing  their  negroes  to  be  so  emploved. 
28 


4-34:  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

But  to  the  desultory  operations  on  Fort  Wagner  a  remarkable  episode 
was  to  take  place.  Gen.  Gillmore  flattered  himself  that  he  had  discovered 
the  precise  point  where  to  establish  a  battery  from  which  he  would  be  able 
to  batter  down  the  forts  in  the  harbour  and  even  the  city  of  Charleston. 
It  was  said  that  he  had  at  his  disposal  pieces  whose  range  and  effects  sur 
passed  all  conception  ;  and  Northern  newspapers  were  filled  with  the  story 
of  a  new  discovery  called  "  the  Greek  Fire,"  which  was  to  be  poured 
upon  Charleston,  and  consume  "  the  cradle  of  secession."  The  prospect  of 
what  such  devilish  agents  of  destruction  might  accomplish  was  pleasing  to 
many  of  the  Northern  people  ;  it  was  announced  that  Gillmore  was  experi 
menting  in  liquid  fire,  that  he  had  made  a  new  style  of  bombs,  and  many 
other  pyrotechnic  inventions,  and  that  he  might  soon  be  expected  to  "  roll 
his  fire-shells  through  the  streets  of  Charleston." 

The  point  whence  such  work  was  to  be  accomplished,  and  where  Gill- 
more  thought  to  discover  the  vitals  of  Charleston,  was  nearly  midway  be 
tween  Morris  and  James  Islands,  seven  thousand  yards  distant  from  the 
lower  end  of  Charleston  city.  Here,  on  the  marsh-mud — -where  a  crab 
might  crawl,  but  where  a  man  would  sink  in  a  few  minutes  to  the  depth 
of  twenty-five  feet — there  was  prepared  a  plan  of  a  battery  for  one  8-inch 
Parrott  rifle  (300-pounder).  It  was  a  singular  achievement  of  labour  and 
skill.  The  work  had  to  be  done  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  it  was  neces 
sary  to  hide  the  pieces  of  wood  during  the  day  with  grass  and  sea- weed. 
In  the  night-time  piles  were  driven  in  the  mud-shoal  which  separated  the 
two  islands ;  fifteen  thousand  bags  of  sand,  about  one  hundred  and  ten 
pounds  each,  were  brought  in  the  vessels  to  make  a  terre-plein  and  a  para 
pet.  The  work  was  executed  in  fourteen  nights,  from  the  2d  till  the  18th 
of  August.  After  breaking,  by  its  great  weight,  several  trucks,  the  mon 
ster  gun  was  finally  hauled  up,  and  placed  in  position,  and  Charleston, 
four  miles  and  a  half  away,  little  dreamed  that  the  "  Swamp  Angel  "  * — 

*  The  following  effusion  of  a  Northern  writer  gives  an  explanation  of  this  name,  in  which  blas 
phemy  and  devilish  hate  are  united.  The  poetry  reads  like  the  exultation  of  a  fiend. 

The  "  Swamp  Angel"  hears  the  traitor  boasting  of  security,  and  sends  forth  its  dreadful  warn 
ing  that  "  nowhere  in  these  United  States  are  traitors  safe  from  the  avenging  wrath  of  the  Re 
public." 

"  Flaunting,  and  boasting,  and  brisk,  and  gay, 
The  streets  of  the  city  shine  to-day. 
Forts  without,  our  army  within, 
To  think  of  surrender  were  deadly  sin  ; 
For  the  foe  far  over  the  wave  abide, 
And  no  guns  can  reach  o'er  the  flowing  tide. 
They  can't  ?    Through  the  air,  with  a  rush  and  a  yell, 
Come  the  screech  and  the  roar  of  the  howling  shell ; 
And  the  populous  city  is  still  alive 
"With  the  bees  that  are  leaving  the  ancient  hive ; 
And  the  market-places  are  waste  and  bare, 
And  the  smoke  hangs  thick  in  the  poisoned  air ; 
And  the  ruins  alone  shall  remain  to  tell 
Where  the  hymn  of  destruction  was  sung  by  the  shell." 


GILLMOKE'S  ATTEMPT  TO  FIRE  CHARLESTON.  435 

as  this  new  agent  of  destruction  was  called — was  looking  into  her 
streets. 

On  the  21st  August,  Gen.  Gillmore  addressed  to  Gen.  Beauregard  a 
demand  for  the  evacuation  of  Morris  Island  and  Fort  Sumter,  and  threat 
ening,  if  not  complied  with,  "  in  less  than  four  hours,  a  fire  would  be 
opened  on  the  city  of  Charleston,  from  batteries  already  established  within 
easy  and  effective  reach  of  the  heart  of  the  city." 

The  reply  of  Gen.  Beauregard  was  memorable.  He  wrote,  in  a  letter  ad 
dressed  to  Gillmore  :  u  It  would  appear,  sir,  that  despairing  of  reducing  these 
works,  you  now  resort  to  the  novel  means  of  turning  your  guns  against  the 
old  men,  the  women  and  children,  and  the  hospitals  of  a  sleeping  city  ;  an 
act  of  inexcusable  barbarity,  from  your  own  confessed  point  of  view,  inas 
much  as  you  allege  that  the  complete  demolition  of  Fort  Sumter  within  a 
few  hours  by/ your  guns  seems  to  you  a  matter  of  certainty;  and  your 
omission  to  attach  your  signature  to  such  a  grave  paper,  must  show  the 
recklessness  of  the  course  upon  which  you  have  adventured,  while  the  fact 
that  you  knowingly  fixed  a  limit  for  receiving  an  answer  to  your  demand, 
which  made  it  almost  beyond  the  possibility  of  receiving  any  reply  within 
that  time,  and  that  you  actually  did  open  fire  and  threw  a  number  of  the 
most  destructive  missiles  ever  used  in  war  into  the  midst  of  a  city  taken 
unawares,  and  filled  with  sleeping  women  and  children,  will  give  you  a 
bad  eminence  in  history — even  in  the  history  of  this  war."  H 

If  the  enemy's  execution  had  equalled  his  desire,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
the  city  of  Charleston  would  have  been  reduced  to  ruins  and  ashes  ;  women 
and  children  murdered  indiscriminately  ;  and  an  outrage  committed  that 
would  have  shocked  the  sensibilities  of  the  world.  But  happily  Gen.  Gill- 
more  was  not  able  to  do  what  he  threatened,  and  what  that  cowardly  hate 
in  the  North,  whose  invocation  against  the  South  was,  "  Kill  all  the  inhab 
itants,"  waited  for  him  to  accomplish.  The  attempted  bombardment  of 
Charleston  was  a  failure.  Some  few  missiles  from  the  Federal  batteries 
on  Morris  Island  reached  the  city.  Twelve  8-inch  shells  fell  in  the  streets  ; 
several  flew  in  the  direction  of  St.  Michael's  steeple ;  but  fortunately  no 
one  was  injured.  The  "  Swamp  Angel  "  fired  only  a  few  shots.  At  the 
thirty-sixth  discharge  the  piece  burst,  blowing  out  the  entire  breech  in 
rear  of  the  vent.  No  guns  were  placed  in  the  Marsh  Battery  after  this  ; 
the  "  Greek  Fire  "  proved  a  humbug  ;  and  firing  upon  the  city  was  not 
resumed  until  after  all  of  Moms  Island  came  into  the  enemy's  possession. 

The  formidable  strength  of  Fort  Wagner,  as  developed  in  the  unsuccess 
ful  assault  of  the  18th  July,  induced  Gen.  Gillmore  to  modify  his  plan  of 
operations,  and  while  pressing  the  siege  of  Fort  Wagner  by  regular  ap 
proaches,  to  turn  his  fire  over  the  heads  of  both  this  work  and  Fort  Gregg 
upon  the  walls  of  Sumter.  It  was  thus  determined  to  attempt  the  demoli 
tion  of  Fort  Sumter  from  ground  already  in  the  enemy's  possession,  so  that 


436  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  iron-clad  fleet  could,  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  enter  upon  the  ex 
ecution  of  their  part  of  the  joint  programme.  The  early  elimination  of  this 
famous  fort  from  the  conflict,  considered  simply  as  auxiliary  to  the  reduc 
tion  of  Fort  Wagner,  was  greatly  to  be  desired,  and  elaborate  arrangements 
were  at  once  commenced  to  place  the  breaching  guns  in  position. 

On  the  18th  August,  Gillmore  opened  heavily  against  the  east  face  ol 
Fort  Sumter  from  his  land  batteries  enfilading  it.  The  cannonade  was 
continued  throughout  the  day,  nine  hundred  and  forty-three  shots  being 
fired.  The  effect  was  to  batter  the  eastern  face  heavily,  doing  consider 
able  damage,  and  to  disable  one  ten-inch  gun  and  a  rifled  forty-two 
pounder.  On  the  22d  the  enemy  threw  six  hundred  and  four  shots  at  the 
fort,  disabling  some  of  the  barbette  guns,  demolishing  the  arches  of  the 
northwest  face,  and  scaling  the  eastern  face  severely.  The  next  day  the 
fire  from  the  enemy's  land  batteries  was  kept  up  on  Surnter,  disabling  the 
only  ten-inch  columbiad  that  remained,  and  the  three  rifled  forty-two- 
pounders  in  the  northern  salient  of  the  second  tier.  The  eastern  face  was 
badly  scaled,  and  the  parapet  seriously  injured. 

On  the  24:th  August  Gen.  Gillmore  reported  to  Washington  "  the  prac 
tical  demolition  of  Fort  Sumter  as  the  result  of  our  seven  days'  bombard 
ment  of  that  work."  The  assertion  was  insolent  and  absurd.  Fort  Sum 
ter  had,  indeed,  been  severely  injured  ;  but  it  was  in  one  respect  stronger 
than  ever ;  for  the  battering  down  of  the  upper  walls  had  rendered  the 
casern atecf  base  impregnable,  and  the  immense  volume  of  stone  and  debris 
which  protected  it,  was  not  at  all  affected  by  the  enemy's  artillery.  Al 
though  apparently  a  heap  of  ruins,  it  still  afforded  shelter  to  the  Confed 
erate  heroes,  who  raised  the  standard  of  the  South  each  time  it  was  beaten 
down  ;  and  it  was  still  protected  by  the  batteries  of  Fort  Wagner,  which 
the  Federals  had  vainly  endeavoured  to  carry  by  assault.  Gen.  Gillmore 
must,  at  all  hazard,  overcome  this  obstacle.  He  opened  the  trenches  by 
means  of  the  rolling  sap,  making  work  enough  for  a  company  of  miners. 
Five  parallels  were  established  in  succession,  and  two  batteries  were  con 
structed,  with  ~bandages,  under  fire  of  James  and  Sullivan's  Islands.  From 
this  moment  Fort  Wagner  received  more  fire  than  she  could  return  ;  solid 
shot  and  shells  fell  right  and  left ;  no  living  soul  could  remain  upon  the 
parapets  ;  everything  was  shattered  in  pieces  ;  the  arches  of  the  casemates 
commenced  to  crumble  in,  and  to  crush  the  defenders  who  had  sought 
refuge  there. 

For  two  days  and  nights  the  fort  had  been  subjected  to  the  most  terrific 
fire  that  any  earthwork  had  undergone  in  all  the  annals  of  warfare.  All 
the  light  mortars  of  the  enemy  were  moved  to  the  front,  and  placed  in  bat 
tery  ;  the  rifled  guns  were  trained  upon  the  fort ;  and  powerful  calcium 
lights  aided  the  night  work  of  the  cannoniers  and  sharpshooters  and 
blinded  the  Confederates.  It  was  a  scene  of  surpassing  grandeur.  The 


FEDERAL   OCCUPATION   OF   MORRIS   ISLAND.  437 

calcium  lights  turned  night  into  day,  and  brought  the  minutest  details  of 
the  fort  into  sharp  relief.  For  forty-two  consecutive  hours,  seventeen 
siege  and  coehorn  mortars  unceasingly  dropped  their  shells  into  the  work, 
while  thirteen  heavy  Parrott  rifles — 100,  200,  and  300-pounders — pounded 
away  at  short  though  regular  intervals.  Peal  on  peal  of  artillery  rolled 
over  the  waters ;  a  semi-circle  of  the  horizon  was  lit  up ;  an  autumnal 
moon  hung  in  the  misty  sky ;  and  ear  and  eye  were  alike  appealed  to 
with  emotions  of  sublimity  and  grandeur.  The  shock  of  the  rapid  dis 
charges  trembled  through  the  city,  calling  hundreds  of  citizens  to  the  bat 
tery,  wharves,  steeples,  and  various  look-outs,  where,  with  an  interest  never 
felt  before,  they  gazed  on  a  contest  that  might  decide  the  fate  of  Charles 
ton  itself. 

On  the  night  of  the  6th  September,  Gen.  Gillmore  ordered  an  assault 
on  Fort  Wagner  at  the  hour  of  low  tide  on  the  following  morning.  The 
assault  was  to  be  made  in  three  columns.  About  midnight  a  deserter  re 
ported  to  him  that  the  Confederates  were  evacuating  the  island.  The  work 
of  evacuation  had  commenced  at  nine  o'clock  that  night,  and  was  already 
concluded.  All  the  garrison  had  got  off  upon  the  Chicora,  an  iron-clad 
gunboat  of  the  Confederates,  and  fourteen  barges.  Fort  Gregg  had  been 
equally  abandoned.  Morris  Island  was  thus  the  prize  of  the  enemy,  who 
now  possessed  themselves  of  Cumming's  Point,  from  which  they  could 
plainly  see  Charleston  at  a  distance  of  four  miles. 

The  Northern  public  at  once  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  Gillmore 
had  the  key  of  Charleston,  and  had  at  last  opened  the  gate  to  the  Monitors 
and  iron-clads,  which,  at  leisure,  might  ascend  the  harbour.  Gillmore  him 
self  insisted  that  he  had  done  his  part  of  the  work ;  that  "  Fort  Sumter 
was  a  shapeless  and  harmless  mass  of  ruins ; "  and  he  indicated  that  it 
only  remained  for  Admiral  Dahlgren,  with  his  fleet,  to  enter  upon  the 
scene,  and  accomplish  the  reduction  of  Charleston.  But  from,  this  view 
the  Federal  admiral  dissented ;  he  indicated  that  Gen.  Beauregard  had 
accomplished  a  new  object  by  his  long  retention  of  Morris  Island  ;  that,  in 
fact,  he  had  replaced  Sumter  by  an  interiour  position,  had  obtained  time 
to  convert  Fort  Johnson  from  a  forlorn  old  fort  into  a  powerful  earthwork, 
and  had  given  another  illustration  of  that  new  system  of  defence  practised 
at  Comorn  and  Sebastapol,  where,  instead  of  being  any  one  key  to  a  plan 
of  fortification,  there  was  the  necessity  of  a  siege  for  every  battery,  in 
which  the  besiegers  were  always  exposed  to  the  fire  of  others.  He  was 
unwilling,  too,  to  risk  the  destructive  defences  and  infernal  machines  with 

O'  ' 

which  the  passes  were  blockaded.  The  Confederates  had  given  out  that 
by  no  possibility  could  one  of  the  gunboats  escape  these,  and  Dahlgren's 
squadron  of  iron-clads  and  Monitors  did  not  dare  venture  far  up  the  har 
bour  past  Fort  Kipley  and  within  range  of  the  immediate  defences  of  the  city. 
Gillmore  claimed  that  he  had  reduced  Fort  Sumter ;  but  the  Confed- 


438  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

erate  flag  still  floated  over  it.  It  had  been  held  through  the  siege  and  can 
nonade  by  the  First  South  Carolina  Artillery,  under  Col.  Alfred  Bhett,  until 
its  armament  had  been  disabled ;  and  the  services  of  the  artillerymen  being 
elsewhere  required,  Gen.  Beauregard  determined  that  it  should  be  held  by 
infantry.  On  the  night  of  the  4th  September,  the  Charleston  Battalion, 
under  Maj.  Blake,  relieved  the  garrison ;  Maj.  Stephen  Elliot  relieving 
Col.  Ehett  in  command  of  the  post.  On  the  7th  of  September,  Admiral 
Dahlgren,  determined  to  test  Gillmore's  assertion  that  Sumter  was  a 
"  harmless  mass  of  ruins,"  summoned  the  fort  to  surrender.  Gen.  Beaure 
gard  telegraphed  to  Maj.  Elliot  to  reply  to  Dahlgren  that  he  could  have 
Fort  Sumter  when  he  took  it  and  held  it,  and  that  in  the  mean  time  such 
demands  were  puerile  and  unbecoming. 

In  the  evening  of  the  7th  September,  the  iron-clads  and  Monitors  ap 
proached  Fort  Sumter  closer  than  usual,  and  opened  a  hot  fire  against  it. 
In  the  night  of  the  9th  September  thirty  of  the  launches  of  the  enemy  at 
tacked  Fort  Sumter.  Preparations  had  been  made  for  the  event.  At  a 
concerted  signal,  all  the  batteries  bearing  on  Sumter  assisted  by  one  gunboat 
and  a  ram,  were  thrown  open.  The  enemy  was  repulsed,  leaving  in  our 
hands  one  hundred  and  thirteen  prisoners,  including  thirteen  officers. 
There  were  also  taken  four  boats  and  three  colours,  and  the  original  flag 
of  Fort  Sumter,  which  Maj.  Anderson  was  compelled  to  lower  in  1861, 
and  which  Dahlgren  had  hoped  to  replace. 

After  this  repulse  of  the  Federals  in  their  last  attack  upon  Fort  Sum 
ter,  but  little  more  was  done  during  the  year  by  the  enemy,  except 
bombarding  the  forts  and  shelling  Charleston  at  intervals  during  day  and 
night,  until  this  became  so  customary  that  it  no  longer  excited  dismay  or 
was  an  occasion  of  alarm  to  even  women  and  children.  The  city  was  in 
tact  and  safe ;  Gillmore  had  expended  many  thousand  lives  and  thrown 
shell  enough  to  build  several  iron-clads  to  obtain  a  position  that  proved 
worthless  ;  Admiral  Dahlgren  feared  the  destruction  of  a  fleet  which  had 
cost  so  much  sacrifice,  and  refused  to  ascend  the  harbour ;  and  the  demon 
stration  upon  Charleston  degenerated  into  the  desultory  record  of  a  fruit 
less  bombardment.  The  Northern  public  appeared  to  sicken  of  the  experi 
ment  of  Parrott  guns  and  monster  artillery,  and  read  with  disgust  the  daily 
bulletins  of  how  many  hundred  useless  shots  had  been  fired,  and  of  how 
much  ammunition  had  been  grandly  expended  in  a  great  noise  to  little  pur 
pose.  "  How  many  times,"  asked  an  indignant  Philadelphia  paper,  u  has 
Fort  Sumter  been  taken  ?  How  many  times  has  Charleston  been  burned  ? 
How  often  have  the  people  been  on  the  eve  of  starvation  and  surrender  ? 
How  many  times  has  the  famous  Greek  Fire  poured  the  rain  of  Sodom 
and  the  flames  of  hell  upon  the  secession  city  ?  We  cannot  keep  the  count 
— but  those  can  who  rang  the  bells  and  put  out  the  flags,  and  invoked  the 
imprecations,  and  rejoiced  at  the  story  of  conflagration  and  ruin." 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

GEN.  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON'S  PEOPHECY  OF  THE  FATE  OF  TENNESSEE. — CHARACTER  AND  EXTRA 
ORDINARY  FORESIGHT  OF  THIS  COMMANDER. — HOW  TENNESSEE  WAS  SACRIFICED  TO  THE 
ATTEMPTED  DEFENCE  OF  VICKSBURG. — BRAGG's  ARMY  FLANKED  AT  HOOVER's  GAP. — IT 
COMMENCES  A  RETREAT  TO  CHATTANOOGA. — EXPEDITION  OF  JOHN  MORGAN. — HOW  IT  AF 
FECTED  THE  WESTERN  CAMPAIGN  AND  EMBARRASSED  BURNSIDE. MORGAN'S  CIRCUIT 

THROUGH  KENTUCKY,  INDIANA,  AND  OHIO. — WHAT  HE  ACCOMPLISHED. — HIS  ANXIETY  FOE 

RETREAT. CUT   OFF   ON  THE   OHIO   RIVER. — TERRIBLE   SCENES   IN  THE  ATTEMPT  TO  SWIM 

THE  RIVER. — CAPTURE  OF  MORGAN  AND  THE  BULK  OF  HIS  COMMAND. — CRUEL  AND  INFA 
MOUS  TREATMENT  OF  THE  DISTINGUISHED  CAPTIVE  AND  HIS  OFFICERS. — SURRENDER  OF 
CUMBERLAND  GAP. — PRESIDENT  DAVIS5  COMMENTARY  ON  THIS  EVENT. — RECOIL  OF  SERIOUS 
CHARGES  UPON  THE  RICHMOND  ADMINISTRATION. — BURNSIDE's  INVASION  OF  EAST  TENNES 
SEE. — GEN.  FRAZIER  IN  COMMAND  AT  CUMBERLAND  GAP. — HIS  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH 
GEN.  BUCKNER. — THE  DEFENCES  OF  THE  GAP  IMPERFECT. — INSUFFICIENCY  OF  THE  GARRI 
SON. — WHY  GEN.  FRAZIER  SURRENDERED  IT. — TWO  LINES  OF  OPERATIONS  NOW  OPENED 
AGAINST  CHATTANOOGA. — THE  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA. — TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  COUN 
TRY  AROUND  CHATTANOOGA. — MOVEMENTS  OF  ROSECEANS. — HE  THREATENS  A  FLANK 
MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  ROME. — THE  CONFEDERATES  EVACUATE  CHATTANOOGA. — BEAGG's 
NEW  LINE  FROM  LEE's  AND  GORDON'S  MILLS  TO  LAFAYETTE. — LONGSTREET's  CORPS  ON  THE 
WAY  FROM  VIRGINIA  TO  REINFORCE  HIM. —  ROSECRANS  PURSUES  THE  CONFEDERATES,  AND 
EXPOSES  HIMSELF  IN  DETAIL. — TEE  LOST  OPPORTUNITY  IN  M?LEMORE's  COVE. — LINES  OF 

EOSECRANS'  ADVANCE. — BRAGG  RESOLVES  TO  ADVANCE  AND  ATTACK   HIM. ARRIVAL   OF 

LONGSTREET  WITH  FIVE  BRIGADES. — THE  ENEMY  ANTICIPATES  A  FLANK  MOVEMENT  BY 
BRAGG. — A  SEVERE  ENCOUNTER. —  CLEBURNE's  GALLANT  CHARGE. — THE  CONFEDERATE  PLAN 
OF  BATTLE  FOE  THE  NEXT  DAY. — GEN  POLK  TO  OPEN  THE  ACTION. — A  STRANGE  DELAY. — 
A  SINGULAE  BREAKFAST  SCENE. — GEN.  BRAGG  FURIOUS. — THE  CONFEDERATE  EIGHT  WING 
BEATEN  BACK. — CRITICAL  CONDITION  OF  THE  FIELD. — LONGSTREET's  ATTACK. — HE  SAVES 
THE  DAY. — THE  ENEMY  UTTERLY  ROUTED. CHICKAMAUGA  A  BRILLIANT  BUT  UNPRO 
DUCTIVE  VICTORY. 

THERE  was  no  Confederate  commander  so  remarkable  for  long  foresight 
and  for  the  most  exact  fulfilment  of  prophetic  words  as  Gen.  Joseph  E. 
Johnston.  He  was  more  profound  than  Lee  ;  his  mind  could  range  over 
larger  fields  ;  at  all  times  of  the  war  his  cool,  sedate  judgments  were  so  in 
opposition  to  the  intoxicated  senses  of  the  Confederate  people,  that  he  was 


44:0  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

rather  unpopular  than  otherwise,  and  rested  his  reputation  on  the  apprecia 
tive  and  intelligent,  who  steadily  marked  him  as  the  military  genius  of  the 
Confederacy.  It  remained  for  the  sequel  to  justify  the  reputation  of  this 
greatest  military  man  in  the  Confederacy,  who,  cooler  even  than  Lee  him 
self,  without  ardour,  made  up  almost  exclusively  of  intellect,  saw  more 
clearly  than  any  other  single  person  each  approaching  shadow  of  the  war, 
and  prophesied,  with  calm  courage,  against  the  madness  of  the  Administra 
tion  at  Richmond  and  the  extravagant  vanity  of  the  people. 

When  the  Yicksburg  campaign  was  decided  upon  at  Richmond,  Gen. 
Johnston  then  warned  the  authorities  there  that  they  should  make  choice 
between  Mississippi  and  Tennessee ;  and  in  urging  the  retention  of  the 
latter  State,  he  declared,  with  singular  felicity  of  expression,  that  it  was 
u  the  shield  of  the  South."  In  six  weeks  after  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro, 
our  army  in  Tennessee  was  as  strong  as  when  it  fought  that  battle,  and, 
with  ordinary  generalship,  might  have  driven  Rosecrans  from  the  State. 
But  when  Stevenson's  division  was  sent  to  the  lines  of  the  Mississippi, 
Johnston  saw  the  errour ;  he  sent  to  Richmond  a  protest  against  it,  which 
he  thought  of  such  historical  importance  as  to  duplicate  and  to  copy  care 
fully  among  his  private  memoranda  ;  and  he  then  predicted  that  the  Rich 
mond  Administration,  in  trying  to  hold  the  Mississippi  River  and  Ten 
nessee,  would  lose  both,  and  that  the  enemy,  once  pressing  the  northern 
frontier  of  Georgia,  would  obtain  a  position  that  would  eventually  prove 
the  critical  one  of  the  war. 

With  his  forces  reduced  for  the  defence  of  Yicksburg,  Gen.  Bragg  in 
sisted  upon  regarding  his  army  in  Tennessee  as  one  merely  of  observation. 
Rosecrans  was  in  his  front,  and  Burnside,  who  commanded  what  was 
called  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  was  in  a  position,  by  an  advance  to 
wards  Knoxville,  to  threaten  his  rear.  In  July,  Gen.  Bragg  occupied  a 
ridge  extending  from  Bellbuckle  towards  Bradyville,  very  strong  by  na 
ture  on  the  right  and  made  strong  by  fortifications  on  the  left,  in  front  of 
Shelbyville.  An  injudicious  disposition  of  forces  left  Hoover's  Gap  unde 
fended  by  our  army.  Rosecrans  advanced  upon  Hoover's  Gap.  Three 
brigades  of  Confederates  moved  rapidly  up,  and  held  them  in  the  Gap  over 
forty  hours.  This  position  gained  placed  Rosecrans  on  Bragg's  flank, 
who,  to  save  his  army,  commenced  a  retreat,  which  was  eventually  con 
tinued  to  Chattanooga. 


EXPEDITION    OF   JOHN   MORGAN. 

As  part  of  the  general  plan  of  action  in  the  West,  and  an  important 
contribution  to  the  success  of  Gen.  Bragg's  retreat,  we  must  notice  here  a 
remarkable  expedition  of  the  famous  cavalier,  Gen.  John  Morgan,  the 


EXPEDITION  OF  JOHN  MORGAN.  441 

effect  of  which,  although  its  immediate  event  was  disaster,  was  to  create 
an  important  diversion  of  Burnside's  army,  large  detachments  of  which 
were  drawn  after  Morgan  into  and  through  Kentucky,  and  to  prevent  that 
Federal  commander  from  getting  in  rear  of  Bragg's  army  at  the  time  it 
was  menaced  in  front  by  Rosecrans,  at  Shelbyville. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  month  of  June  the  command  of  Gen.  Morgan, 
consisting  of  detachments  from  two  brigades,  and  numbering  nearly  three 
thousand  men,  approached  the  banks  of  the  Cumberland.  The  passage 
of  the  river  was  weakly  contested  by  three  Ohio  regiments,  which  had  ad 
vanced  from  Somerset,  Kentucky.  Gen.  Morgan  was  obliged  to  build  a 
number  of  boats,  and  commenced  crossing  the  river  on  the  1st  July.  By 
ten  o'clock  next  morning  his  whole  regiment  was  over  the  river  ;  the  ad 
vance  proceeding  to  Columbia,  where,  after  a  brief  engagement,  the  enemy 
was  driven  through  the  town. 

Passing  through  Columbia,  Gen.  Morgan  proceeded  towards  Green  Eiver 
Bridge,  and  attacked  the  enemy's  stockade  there  with  two  regiments,  send 
ing  the  remainder  of  his  force  across  at  another  ford.  The  place  was  judi 
ciously  chosen  and  skilfully  defended  ;  and  the  result  was  that  the  Confed 
erates  were  repulsed  with  severe  loss — about  twenty-five  killed  and  twenty 
wounded. 

At  sunrise  on  the  4th  July,  Gen.  Morgan  moved  on  Lebanon.  The 
Federal  commander  here — Col.  Hanson — made  a  desperate  resistance; 
placing  his  forces  in  the  depot  and  in  various  houses,  and  only  surrender 
ing  after  the  Confederates  had  fired  the  buildings  in  which  he  was  posted. 
About  six  hundred  prisoners  were  taken  here,  and  a  sufficient  quantity  of 
guns  to  arm  all  of  Morgan's  men  who  were  without  them. 

Rapid  marches  brought  Morgan  to  Bradensburg  on  the  7th  July  ;  and 
the  next  day  he  crossed  the  Ohio,  keeping  in  check  two  gunboats,  and  dis 
persing  a  force  of  militia  posted  with  artillery  on  the  Indiana  shore.  When 
the  pursuing  column  of  the  enemy,  which  had  increased  now  to  seven 
regiments  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  reached  the  banks  of  the  river,  it 
was  to  find  the  passenger  boat  on  which  Gen.  Morgan  had  effected  a  cross 
ing  in  flames,  and  to  see  far  back  on  the  opposite  shore  the  rear-guard  of 
his  force  rapidly  disappearing  in  the  distance. 

On  the  9th  July  Morgan  marched  on  to  Corydon,  fighting  near  four 
thousand  State  militia,  capturing  three-fourths  of  them,  and  dispersing  the 
remainder.  He  then  moved  without  a  halt  through  Salisbury  and  Palmyra 
to  Salem,  where  he  destroyed  the  railroad  bridge  and  track  and  a  vast 
amount  of  public  stores.  Then  taking  the  road  to  Lexington,  after  riding 
all  night,  he  reached  that  point  at  daylight,  capturing  a  number  of  sup 
plies,  and  destroying  during  the  night  the  depot  and  track  at  Yienna,  on 
the  Jeffersonville  and  Indianapolis  Railroad.  Leaving  Lexington,  he 
passed  on  north  to  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Railroad  near  Yernon,  where, 


442  THE    LOST   CA.TJSE. 

finding  Gen.  Manson  with  a  heavy  force  of  infantry,  he  skirmished  with 
him  two  hours  as  a  feint,  while  the  main  command  moved  round  the  town 
to  Dupont,  where  squads  were  sent  out  to  cut  the  roads  between  Yernon 
and  Seymour  on  the  west,  Yernon  and  Lawrenceburg  on  the  east,  Yernon 
and  Madison  on  the  south,  and  Yernon  and  Columbus  on  the  north. 

From  Yernon  Gen.  Morgan  proceeded  to  Yersailles,  capturing  five 
hundred  militia  there  and  gathering  on  the  road.  From  Yersailles  he 
moved  without  interruption  across  to  Harrison,  Ohio,  destroying  the  track 
and  burning  small  bridges  on  the  Lawrenceburg  and  Indianapolis  Rail 
road.  At  Harrison  he  burned  a  fine  bridge.  Leaving  Harrison  at  dusk, 
he  moved  around  Cincinnati,  passing  between  that  city  and  Hamilton,  de 
stroy  ing  the  railroad,  and  a  scout  running  the  Federal  pickets  into  the  city, 
the  whole  command  marched  within  seven  miles  of  it.  Daylight  of  the 
14th  found  him  eighteen  miles  east  of  Cincinnati. 

The  adventurous  commander  had  now  performed  a  wonderful  circuit ; 
he  had  traversed  two  enormous  States,  destroying  property,  probably  to 
the  extent  of  ten  millions  of  dollars  ;  he  had  cut  an  entire  net  of  railroads  ; 
he  had  paroled  nearly  six  thousand  prisoners,  and  thrown  several  millions 
of  people  into  frantic  consternation.  He  had  done  his  work,  and  the 
anxiety  now  was  to  escape.  It  was  no  easy  matter.  The  country  had 
been  aroused,  and  it  was  reported  that  twenty-five  thousand  men  were  un 
der  arms  to  pursue  or  to  intercept  "  the  bloody  invader." 

After  passing  Cincinnati,  the  jaded  command  of  Confederates  proceeded 
towards  Dennison,  and  making  a  feint  there,  struck  out  for  the  Ohio. 
Daily  were  they  delayed  by  the  annoying  cry  of  "  Axes  to  the  front,"  a 
cry  that  warned  them  of  bushwackers,  ambuscades,  and  blockaded  roads. 
It  appeared  that  every  hillside  contained  an  enemy  and  every  ravine  a 
blockade.  It  was  not  until  the  evening  of  the  19th  July,  that  the  com 
mand,  dispirited  and  worn  down,  reached  the  river  at  a  ford  above 
Poinroy. 

At  4  p.  M.,  two  companies  were  thrown  across  the  river,  and  were  in 
stantly  opened  upon  by  the  enemy.  A  scout  of  three  hundred  men  were 
sent  down  the  river  a  half  mile,  who  reported  back  that  they  had  found  a 
small  force  behind  rifle-pits,  and  asked  permission  to  charge.  The  rifle- 
pits  were  charged,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  captured.  A 
courier,  arriving  about  the  same  time,  reported  that  a  gunboat  had  ap 
proached  near  our  battery,  and  upon  being  fired  upon  had  retired  pre 
cipitately. 

Gen.  Morgan  finding  this  report  correct,  and  believing  that  he  had 
sufficient  time  to  cross  the  command,  was  using  every  exertion  to  accom 
plish  the  task,  when  simultaneously  could  be  heard  the  discharge  of  artil 
lery  from  down  the  river — a  heavy,  drumming  sound  of  small  arms  in  the 
rear  and  right ;  and  soon  from  the  banks  of  the  river,  came  up  three  black 


CAPTUBE  OF  JOHN   MOEGAN.  443 

columns  of  infantry,  firing  upon  our  men,  who  were  in  close  column,  prepar 
ing  to  cross.  Seeing  that  the  enemy  had  every  advantage  of  position,  an 
overwhelming  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  that  his  men  were  becom 
ing  completely  environed,  the  command  was  ordered  by  Gen.  Morgan  to 
move  up  the  river  double-quick.  Three  companies  of  dismounted  men,  and 
perhaps  two  hundred  sick  and  wounded  were  left  in  the  enemy's  posses 
sion.  The  bulk  of  the  command  pressed  rapidly  to  Belleville,  about  four 
teen  miles,  on  a  running  fight,  and  commenced  fording,  or  rather  swim- 
ing,  at  that  point.  Three  hundred  and  thirty  men  had  effected  a  crossing, 
when  again  the  enemy's  gunboats  were  upon  them — one  iron-clad  and  two 
transports.  It  was  a  terrible  adventure  now  to  cross  the  river  ;  but  even 
under  the  hot  fire  a  party  of  officers,  headed  by  Col.  Adam  R.  Johnson, 
plunged  into  the  stream,  and  commenced  the  struggle  of  life  and  death. 
Of  the  fearful  scene  which  ensued,  one  of  the  party  writes  :  "  The  Colonel's 
noble  mare  falters,  strikes  out  again,  and  boldly  makes  the  shore.  Wood- 
son  follows.  My  poor  mare,  being  too  weak  to  carry  me,  turned  over,  and 
commenced  going  down ;  encumbered  by  clothing,  sabre,  and  pistols,  I 
made  but  poor  progress  in  the  turbid  stream.  An  inherent  love  of  life 
actuated  me  to  continue  swimming.  Behind  me  I  heard  the  piercing  call 
of  young  Rogers  for  help  ;  on  my  right,  Capt.  Helm  was  appealing  to  me 
for  aid  ;  and  in  the  rear  my  friend,  Capt.  McClain,  was  sinking.  Grad 
ually  the  gunboat  was  nearing  me.  Should  I  be  able  to  hold  up  until  it 
came ;  and  would  I  then  be  saved  to  again  undergo  the  horrours  of  a 
Federal  bastile  ?  But  I  hear  something  behind  me  snorting !  I  feel  it 
passing  !  Thank  God  !  I  am  saved  !  A  riderless  horse  dashes  by  ; 
I  grasp  his  tail ;  onward  he  bears  me,  and  the  shore  is  reached.  Col. 
Johnson,  on  reaching  the  shore,  seizes  a  ten-inch  piece  of  board,  jumps  into 
a  leaky  skiff,  and  starts  back  to  aid  the  drowning.  He  reaches  Capt. 
Helm,  but  Capt.  McClain  and  young  Rogers  are  gone." 

Gen.  Morgan  was  not  of  the  fortunate  party  that  escaped  across  the 
river.  With  two  hundred  of  his  men  he  broke  through  the  enemy's  lines 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Ohio,  and  .continued  his  flight  in  the  direction  of 
New  Lisbon,  with  the  design  of  reaching  the  river  higher  up.  Forces  were 
despatched  to  head  him  off,  and  the  brave  cavalier,  who  had  so  often  given 
occasion  of  surprise  and  mystery  to  the  enemy,  was,  at  last,  brought  to  bay 
at  a  point  on  the  river  where  there  was  no  escape,  except  by  fighting  his 
way  through,  or  leaping  from  a  lofty  and  almost  perpendicular  precipice. 
Here  he  surrendered  himself  and  the  remnant  of  his  command. 

Of  the  infamous  treatment  of  this  distinguished  captive  and  his  com 
rades,  the  following  memorandum  was  made  in  the  War  Department  at 
Richmond,  signed  by  Lieut.-Col.  Alston,  as  a  personal  witness :  "  They 
were  carried  to  Cincinnati,  and  from  thence  he  [Gen.  Morgan]  and  twenty- 
eight  of  his  officers  were  selected  and  carried  to  Columbus,  Ohio,  where 


4:4:4:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

they  were  shaved  and  their  hair  cut  very  close  by  a  negro  convict.  They 
were  then  marched  to  the  bath  room,  and  scrubbed,  and  from  there  to  their 
cells  where  they  were  locked  up.  The  Federal  papers  published,  with 
great  delight,  a  minute  account  of  the  whole  proceedings.  Seven  days 
afterwards,  forty-two  more  of  Gen.  Morgan's  officers  were  conveyed  from 
Johnson's  Island  to  the  penitentiary ',  and  subjected  to  the  same  in 
dignities." 

But  these  hardships  and  outrages  did  not  break  the  spirit  of  these  brave 
men.  The  very  officer  who  made  the  memorandum  quoted  above,  dared 
to  write  in  his  jail-journal  this  sentiment  of  defiance  :  "  There  are  a  hun 
dred  thousand  men  in  the  South  who  feel  as  I  do,  that  they  would  rather 
an  earthquake  should  swallow  the  whole  country  then  yield  to  our  oppres 
sors — men  who  will  retire  to  the  mountains  and  live  on  acorns,  and  crawl 
on  their  bellies  to  shoot  an  invader  wherever  they  can  see  one." 


SURRENDER   OF    CUMBERLAND   GAP. 

In  the  month  of  September  occurred  the  surrender  of  Cumberland  Gap 
— a  misfortune  which  President  Davis  declared  "  laid  open  Eastern  Tennes 
see  and  Southwestern  Yirginia  to  hostile  operations,  and  broke  the  line  of 
communication  between  the  seat  of  Government  and  Middle  Tennessee  " 
— and  an  event  which  some  of  the  Richmond  papers  characterized  as  "  one 
of  the  most  disgraceful  of  the  war."  These  serious  charges  demand  a 
close  investigation  of  the  subject ;  and  it  will  be  seen  that  Cumberland 
Gap  is  but  another  instance  in  which  such  charges,  on  a  detail  of  facts,  re 
coil  upon  the  Richmond  Administration  itself. 

About  the  last  of  August,  1863,  the  Federal  forces  under  Gen.  Burn- 
side,  entered  Tennessee,  and  occupied  Knoxville  on  the  2d  September.  A 
large  part  of  these  forces  passed  through  the  Cumberland  Mountains  from 
Kentucky  into  Tennessee  at  Big  Creek  Gap,  forty  miles  south  of  Cumber 
land  Gap,  which  latter  position  was  held  by  Gen.  Frazier  for  the  Confed 
erates.  On  the  21st  August,  Gen.  Buckner,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Confederate  forces  in  East  Tennessee,  ordered  Gen.  Frazier  to  hold  "  the 
Gap,"  which  was  an  important  protection  to  that  country  and  to  South 
western  Yirginia  ;  stating,  moreover,  that  if  the  enemy  broke  through  be 
tween  this  post  and  Big  Creek  Gap — the  left  and  rear  of  Gen.  Frazier — he 
(Buckner)would  check  them.  This  despatch  left  Gen.  Frazier  under  the 
impression  that  he  would  be  protected  in  his  rear.  But  on  the  30th 
August  Gen.  Buckner  again  despatched  to  Frazier  to  evacuate  the  Gap 
with  all  speed,  to  burn  and  destroy  everything  that  could  not  be  trans 
ported,  and  to  report  to  Gen.  S.  Jones  at  Abingdon,  Virginia,  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  miles  distant. 


DEFENCES  OF  CUMBERLAND  GAP.  445 

Gen.  Frazier  was  not  satisfied  of  the  genuineness  of  this  order  ;  he  sus 
pected  some  trick  of  the  enemy  ;  he  had  been  left  under  the  recent  and 
emphatic  impression  that  East  Tennessee  was  to  be  held ;  and  he  tele 
graphed  in  cipher  to  Gen.  Buckner,  stating  that  he  had  about  forty  days' 
rations,  that  he  believed  he  could  hold  the  position,  and  asking  to  be  in 
formed  if  his  superiour  insisted  upon  the  order  of  evacuation.  The  order 
was  countermanded  within  twenty-four  hours,  and  Buckner's  last  instruc 
tions  were  to  hold  the  Gap. 

Knoxville  had  at  this  time  been  abandoned ;  and  Gen.  Buckner  and 
his  forces  were  at  Loudon,  about  thirty  miles  southwest  of  Knoxville,  at 
the  crossing  of  the  Holstem  or  Tennessee  River.  Gen.  Frazier  prepared 
for  a  vigorous  defence  of  the  Gap.  It  was  not  the  "  easily  defensible 
pass  "  which  President  Davis  declared  it  to  be.  There  were  three  public 
roads  uniting  in  it :  the  Virginia  Eoad,  leading  eastward  to  Powell's  Val 
ley  ;  the  Kentucky  Road,  running  through  the  Gap  from  Knoxville  into 
Kentucky ;  and  the  Harlan  Road,  leading  along  the  north  side  of  the 
mountain.  In  consequence  of  the  broken  nature  of  the  country,  declivities, 
ravines,  etc.,  the  artillery  commanded  these  roads  very  imperfectly.  The 
Kentucky  Road  to  the  south  at  various  points  in  its  windings  could  be 
reached  within  range  of  the  guns  ;  but  neither  of  the  other  roads  could  be 
commanded  with  artillery  for  a  greater  distance  than  about  four  hundred 
yards.  Batteries  were  placed  to  defend  these  approaches.  But  the  char 
acter  of  the  ground  permitted  an  enemy  to  approach  in  many  directions 
over  the  spaces  between  the  roads.  The  line  of  proper  outward  defences 
for  the  force  in  Gen.  Frazier's  command  was  about  two  miles  in  circuit, 
which  comprised  the  various  rifle-pits  placed  at  irregular  intervals,  as  the 
surface  indicated  proper  points  for  their  location  on  or  near  the  summit  of 
the  mountain.  An  unfinished  block-house  in  an  isolated  position,  about  a 
mile  and  a  half  from  the  Gap,  was  defended  by  one  gun.  This  position 
had  a  limited  command  of  the  space  around  it,  owing  to  the  steep  declivity 
and  broken  ground ;  but  as  it  commanded  the  works  of  the  Gap,  it  was 
important  to  prevent  its  occupation  by  the  enemy.  The  rifle-pits  and  ar 
tillery  epaulements  were  very  incomplete,  owing  to  the  rocky  nature  of  the 
ground,  the  want  of  tools,  and  blasting  powder,  and  the  small  force  of 
workmen  that  could  be  spared  from  other  necessary  duties.  There  were 
several  approaches  to  the  Gap  by  ravines  and  depressions  through  which 
an  enemy  could  throw  a  large  force  under  cover  of  darkness  or  heavy  fog. 
The  chief  defences  had  been  prepared  to  meet  a  force  on  the  north  side  ; 
and  these  were  the  reliance  of  Gen.  Frazier  when  he  expressed  the  opinion 
that  he  would  be  able  to  hold  the  position,  as  he  anticipated  an  attack  only 
from  that  direction. 

Ten  thousand  men  should  have  been  assigned  for  the  permanent  de 
fence  of  this  position.     The  fact  was  that  the  force  at  Gen.  Frazier's  com- 


44:6  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

mand  amounted  to  seventeen  hundred  men,  with  one  hundred  rounds  of 
ammunition.  Of  the  situation,  Gen.  Frazier  writes  :  "  I  will  express  the 
opinion  arrived  at,  after  a  full  knowledge  of  all  the  conditions,  gained  dur 
ing  a  month,  that  an  assaulting  force,  equal  to  the  garrison  could  carry  it 
as  easily  as  the  open  field,  if  guided,  or  informed  of  its  weak  points,  by 
disaffected  persons  in  the  vicinity — especially  during  the  prevalence  of 
fogs,  which  greatly  demoralized  the  men,  who  were  unaccustomed  to  ser 
vice  and  had  never  been  in  action." 

On  the  4th  September,  Gen.  Frazier  was  informed  that  the  enemy  was 
in  possession  of  Knoxville,  and  had  started  a  heavy  force  towards  the  Gap, 
and  was  running  the  cars  to  Morristown,  within  forty  miles  of  his  post. 
He  was  also  informed  that  a  large  force,  said  to  be  sixteen  regiments  and 
two  trains  of  artillery,  were  at  Barboursville,  Kentucky,  en  route  for  the 
Gap.  Not  believing  that  so  large  a  force  of  the  enemy  would  be  sent 
against  him  from  Knoxville  until  after  successful  engagement  with  Gen. 
Buckner,  Gen.  Frazier  sent  a  cavalry  regiment  to  meet  the  force  said  to 
be  advancing  from  Knoxville,  engage  it,  and  uncover  its  strength.  This 
force  of  cavalry,  six  hundred  strong,  was  cut  off,  and  compelled  to  retreat 
to  Jonesville,  thirty-six  miles  distant. 

On  the  Tth  September,  Gen.  Shacldeford,  who  had  approached  the  Gap 
from  the  south  side,  demanded  its  surrender.  On  the  following  day,  Col. 
De  Coucy,  who  had  come  up  with  a  brigade  oil  the  Kentucky  side,  made 
the  same  demand  on  his  part. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  8th  September,  Gen.  Frazier  assembled  his 
regimental  commanders,  and  had  an  informal  conference  with  them. 
There  was  no  council  of  war,  and  no  votes  were  taken.  There  was  a  divi 
sion  of  opinion  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued,  but  the  officers  separated  on 
the  final  understanding  to  make  a  determined  defence  and  with  the  expec 
tation  that  Gen.  Buckner  would  soon  relieve  the  garrison. 

On  the  9th  September  reinforcements  joined  the  enemy  on  the  Tennes 
see  side,  and  Gen.  Frazier  received  a  summons  to  surrender  from  Gen. 
Burnside  himself.  He  had  also  received  information  about  this  time  that 
the  Confederate  forces  at  London  Bridge  had  burned  the  bridge,  and  that 
Buckner  had  retreated  towards  Chattanooga.  Gen.  Burnside's  presence 
at  the  Gap,  so  unexpected,  was  deemed  by  the  garrison  sufficient  proof 
that  he  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  Confederate  forces  further  south,  and 
that  all  hope  of  succour  from  Gen.  Buckner  was  at  an  end.  In  the  after 
noon  of  the  preceding  day,  Gen.  Frazier  had  received  a  despatch  from 
Gen.  S.  Jones,  commanding  at  Abingdon,  Virginia,  to  the  effect  that  he 
should  not  give  up  the  Gap  without  a  stubborn  resistance,  and  that  he 
would  send  a  force  which  he  thought  strong  enough  to  relieve  the  garrison. 

Of  what  ensued  on  the  reception  of  this  despatch,  Gen.  Frazier  gives 
the  following  explanation  :  "  I  asked  the  courier  if  any  troops  had  arrived 


BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  44:7 

i 

at  Abingdon,  or  if  it  was  known  there  that  Gen.  Buckner  had  burned  Lou- 
don  Bridge  and  retreated  south,  and  also  if  they  knew  that  Gen.  Burnside 
had  moved  north  with  a  large  force.  He  replied,  that  there  were  no 
troops  in  Abingdon,  but  some  were  expected,  and  that  they  were  ignorant 
of  recent  operations  in  Eastern  Tennessee.  I  thus  perceived  that  Gen. 
Jones  was  ignorant  of  my  situation,  and  of  the  enemy's  late  movements, 
and  knowing  that  the  entire  force  under  Gen.  Jones  could  not  cope  suc 
cessfully  with  Gen.  Burnside,  and  that  Gen.  Lee  could  not  reinforce  him 
to  any  extent,  as  Gen.  Meade  was  reported  as  pressing  him,  in  East  Vir 
ginia,  I  concluded,  if  Gen.  Jones  should  attempt  to  relieve  me,  that  the 
relieving  force  would  be  destroyed,  and  the  occupation  of  the  Virginia  salt 
works  follow,  of  course.  The  despatch  of  Gen.  Jones  referred  to  I  de 
stroyed,  fearing  it  might  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  show  the  weak 
ness  of  Gen.  Jones,  and  lead  to  an  attack  upon  him  to  destroy  these  salt 
works.  I  thus  perceived  that  my  command  could  effect  nothing  by  a  tem 
porary  resistance,  and  that  even  could  I  hope  to  cut  my  way  out,  and  at 
tempt  an  escape  up  the  valley,  I  should  be  thwarted  in  the  attempt  with 
out  artillery  or  cavalry,  as  the  enemy  had  a  formidable  force  of  these  arms, 
and  could  cut  me  up,  or  capture  my  forces  in  detail.  I  also  reflected,  that 
such  a  step,  if  partially  successful,  would  draw  the  enemy  towards  Abing 
don,  and  probably  result  in  extending  their  operations  to  that  place  ;  when 
a  surrender  of  the  Gap  would  probably  satisfy  his  desire  for  conquest  at 
that  time." 

About  midday  of  the  9th  September,  Gen.  Burnside  sent  in  a  second 
demand  for  surrender,  stating  that  sufficient  time  for  consultation  had  been 
allowed,  and  that  he  had  a  force  large  enough  to  carry  the  position  by 
assault,  and  wished  to  spare  the  effusion  of  blood.  After  an  attempt  to 
make  terms,  Gen.  Frazier  surrendered  unconditionally. 

The  occupation  of  Cumberland  Gap  gave  Burnside  an  uninterrupted 
line  of  communication  from  Knoxville  to  Chattanooga,  and  opened  the  way 
to  the  consummation  of  the  plan  of  the  enemy,  which  was  to  move  against 
Chattanooga  on  a  double  line  of  operations,  and  make  there  a  new  and 
formidable  front  directly  against  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy. 


THE   BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA. 

Chattanooga  is  one  of  the  great  gate-ways  through  the  mountains  to 
the  champaign  country  of  Georgia  and  Alabama.  It  is  situated  at  the 
mouth  of  the  valley  formed  by  Lookout  Mountain  and  the  Missionary 
Ridge.  The  first-named  eminence  is  a  vast  palisade  of  rocks,  rising 
twenty-four  hundred  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea,  in  abrupt,  rocky  cliffs, 
from  a  steep,  wooded  base.  East  of  Missionary  Ridge  is  another  valley, 


44:8  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

following  the  course  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  and  having  its  head  in 
McLemore's  Cove. 

Immediately  after  crossing  the  mountains  to  the  Tennessee  River,  Rose- 
crans,  who  was  moving  with  a  force  of  effective  infantry  and  artillery, 
amounting  to  fully  seventy  thousand  men,  threw  a  corps  by  way  of  Se- 
quatchie  Valley — a  canon  or  deep  cut  splitting  the  Cumberland  range 
parallel — hoping  to  strike  the  rear  of  Gen.  Buckner's  command,  whilst 
Burnside  occupied  him  in  front.  Buckner,  however,  was  directed  by 
Gen.  Bragg  to  withdraw  to  the  Hiawassee ;  and  the  enemy  then  com 
menced  a  movement  against  the  Confederate  left  and  rear,  showing  plainly 
that  he  intended  a  flank  march  towards  Rome. 

To  save  the  State  of  Georgia,  Chattanooga  had  to  be  abandoned.  Gen. 
Bragg,  having  now  united  with  him  the  forces  of  Buckner,  evacuated 
Chattanooga  on  the  7th  September,  and,  after  a  severe  march  through  the 
dust,  which  was  ankle  deep,  took  position  from  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  to 
Lafayette,  on  the  road  leading  south  from  Chattano.oga,  and  fronting  the 
east  slope  of  Lookout  Mountain. 

Gen.  Bragg' s  effective  force,  exclusive  of  cavalry,  was  a  little  over 
thirty-five  thousand  men.  But  in  view  of  the  great  conflict  that  was  to 
ensue,  Gen.  Longstreet's  corps  was  on  the  way  from  Virginia  to  reinforce 
him,  and  with  this  prospect  it  was  determined  to  meet  the  enemy  in  front, 
whenever  he  should  emerge  from  the  mountain  gorges.  During  the  9th 
September,  it  was  ascertained  that  Rosecrans,  supposing  that  Bragg  was 
retreating,  had  pressed  on  his  columns  to  intercept  him,  thus  exposing  him 
self  in  detail,  and  that  a  large  force  of  Thomas'  corps  was  moving  up  McLe 
more's  Cove.  Cheatham's  division  was  moved  rapidly  forward  to  Lafay 
ette  in  front ;  a  portion  of  D.  H.  Hill's  corps  occupied  Catlett's  Gap  in 
Pigeon  Mountain  (a  spur  of  Lookout,  about  fifteen  miles  from  Chatta 
nooga),  flanking  the  enemy  on  his  right ;  while  Gen.  Hindman,  in  conjunc 
tion  with  Hill,  was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  immediately  in  the 
Cove. 

The  attack  was  delayed ;  a  day  was  lost,  and  with  it  the  opportunity 
of  crushing  a  column  of  the  enemy  ;  and  when  Hindman,  with  whom  Gen. 
D.  H.  Hill  had  contumaciously  refused  to  co-operate,  and  who  had  there 
fore  to  await  the  junction  of  Buckner's  command,  was  at  last  ready  to 
move,  Thomas  had  discovered  his  errour,  retreated  to  the  mountain  passes, 
and  thus  rescued  the  Federal  centre  from  the  exposed  position  in  McLe 
more's  Cove. 

To  understand  the  advance  of  Rosecrans'  army,  it  would  seem  that 
Thomas'  and  McCook's  corps  crossed  the  Tennessee  at  Bridgeport,  march 
ing  over  Sand  Mountain  into  Will's  Yalley,  and  thence  down  McLemore's 
Cove  in  the  direction  of  Lafayette.  Crittenden's  corps  had  crossed  above 
Chattanooga  at  Harrison's,  and  was  moved  in  the  direction  of  Ringgold. 


BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  449 

A  portion  of  Parke's  corps  of  Burnside's  array,  and  a  brigade  of  his  cavalry, 
came  down  from  Knoxville  to  London  and  Cleveland. 

A  council  of  war  was  held  by  Gen.  Bragg  at  Lafayette,  on  the  15th, 
and  it  was  resolved  to  advance  towards  Chattanooga,  and  attack  the  enemy 
wherever  he  could  be  found.  By  the  19th  he  had  moved  his  army  by 
divisions,  and  crossed  it  at  several  fords  of  the  Chiekamauga,  and  bridges 
north  of  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills.  Longstreet  had  reached  Ringgold  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  same  day.  The  reinforcements  which  he  brought 
were  five  brigades  of  his  corps,  about  five  thousand  effective  infantry  and 
no  artillery.  It  was  contemplated  by  Gen.  Bragg  to  make  a  flank  move 
ment,  and  turn  the  enemy's  left,  so  as  to  get  his  forces  between  him  and 
Chattanooga,  and  thus  cut  off  his  retreat,  believing  that  the  main  force  of 
the  enemy  was  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills,  and  upon  which  he  had  intend 
ed  to  move.  But  he  was  anticipated ;  and  as  he  was  preparing  for  the 
movement  the  enemy  commenced  a  counter-attack,  Thomas'  corps  making 
a  desperate  effort  to  turn  the  right  wing  of  the  Confederates.  The  attack 
was  gallantly  met  by  Walker's  division,  whose  troops  broke  through  two 
lines,  and  captured  two  batteries.  But  the  enemy  was  largely  reinforced 
here,  and  hurrying  forward  his  multiplied  numbers  to  recover  his  lost 
ground,  when  Cheatham,  who  had  been  in  reserve,  moved  forward  with 
his  veterans,  and  met  the  shock  of  battle.  It  was  a  terrible,  doubtful,  and 
long  encounter.  Our  lines  wavered  before  the  desperate  struggle  of  the 
enemy,  and  for  three  hours  the  fight  was  kept  up  with  varied  success. 

It  was  near  sunset  when  Cleburne — "  the  Stonewall  Jackson  of  the 
West " — who  commanded  a  division  in  Hill's  corps,  passed  to  the  front 
over  the  bloody  ground  that  had  been  so  stubbornly  contested  by  Cheat- 
ham,  charging  the  enemy  up  to  the  very  breastworks.  A  crashing  fire 
of  musketry  from  the  enemy  made  Cleburne's  men  reel,  when  forward 
dashed  his  batteries,  and  opened  a  terrific  fire  on  the  enemy's  works,  while 
the  division  charged  with  such  impetuosity  that  the  enemy  recoiled,  and 
were  driven  half  a  mile  from  their  line  of  battle. 

That  night  the  Confederate  troops  slept  on  the  field  surrounded  by  the 
dead.  !N"o  cheerful  fire  dispelled  the  gloom,  and  profound  silence  brooded 
over  the  field  of  carnage. 

The  proper  commanders  were  summoned  by  Gen.  Bragg,  and  received 
specific  information  and  instructions  touching  the  disposition  of  the  troops 
for  the  grand  and  decisive  action,  of  the  next  day.  The  whole  force  was 
divided  for  the  next  morning  into  two  commands,  and  assigned  to  the  two 
senior  Lieut.-Generals,  Longstreet  and  Polk  :  the  former  on  the  left, 
where  all  his  own  troops  were  stationed,  the  latter  continuing  his  command 
of  the  right.  Lieut.-Gen.  Longstreet  reached  Gen.  Bragg's  headquarters 
about  11  p.  M.,  and  immediately  received  his  instructions.  After  a  few 
hours'  rest,  he  moved  at  daylight  to  his  line  just  in  front  of  Bragg's  posi- 
29 


450  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

tion.  Lient.-Gen.  Polk  was  ordered  to  assail  the  enemy  on  the  extreme 
right  at  day-dawn  on  the  20th,  and  to  take  np  the  attack  in  succession 
rapidly  to  the  left.  The  left  wing  was  to  await  the  attack  by  the  right, 
take  it  up  promptly  when  made,  and  the  whole  line  was  then  to  be 
pushed  vigorously  and  persistently  against  the  enemy  throughout  its  extent. 

At  dawn,  Gen.  Bragg  was  in  the  saddle,  surrounded  by  his  staff,  eager 
ly  listening  for  the  sound  of  Folk's  guns.  The  sun  rose,  and  was  mounting 
the  sky,  and  still  there  was  no  note  of  attack  from  the  right  wing.  Bragg 
chafed  with  impatience,  and  at  last  despatched  one  of  his  staff-officers, 
Maj.  Lee,  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  Folk's  delay,  and  urge  him  to  a  prompt 
and  speedy  movement.  Gen.  Folk,  notwithstanding  his  clerical  antece 
dents,  was  noted  for  his  fondness  of  military  ostentation,  and  carried  a 
train  of  staff  officers  whose  numbers  and  superb  dress  were  the  occasions 
of  singular  remark.  Maj.  Lee  found  him  seated  at  a  comfortable  break 
fast,  surrounded  by  brilliantly  dressed  officers,  and  delivered  his  message 
with  military  bluntness  and  brevity.  Gen.  Folk  replied  that  he  had  or 
dered  Hill  to  open  the  action,  that  he  was  waiting  for  him,  and  he  added  : 
"  Do  tell  Gen.  Bragg  that  my  heart  is  overflowing  with  anxiety  for  the 
attack — overflowing  with  anxiety,  sir."  Maj.  Lee  returned  to  the  com 
manding-general,  and  reported  the  reply  literally.  Bragg  uttered  a  terri 
ble  exclamation,  in  which  Folk,  Hill,  and  all  his  generals  were  included. 
a  Maj.  Lee,"  he  cried,  "  ride  along  the  line,  and  order  every  captain  to  take 
his  men  instantly  into  action."  In  fifteen  minutes  the  battle  was  joined  ; 
but  three  hours  of  valuable  time  had  been  lost,  in  which  Eosecrans  was 
desperately  busy  in  strengthening  his  position. 

It  was  10  o'clock  when  the  battle  opened  on  the  right  wing  of  the  Con 
federates,  and  the  command  "  forward  "  ran  down  their  ranks.  Breckin- 
ridge  moved  forward  writh  his  division,  but,  after  a  severe  contest,  was 
pressed  back.  Had  the  reserve  ordered  forward  to  Breckinridge's  support 
come  up  in  time,  the  enemy's  position  might  have  been  carried,  and  pre 
vented  the  conflict  of  the  afternoon.  As  it  was,  notwithstanding  the  par 
tial  repulse,  several  pieces  of  artillery  were  captured  and  a  large  number 
of  prisoners. 

At  the  same  time  each  succeeding  division  to  the  left  gradually  be 
came  engaged  with  the  enemy,  extending  to  Longstreet's  wing.  Walker's 
division  advanced  to  the  relief  of  Breckinridge,  and,  after  an  engagement 
of  half  an  hour,  was  also  compelled  to  retire  under  the  severe  fire  of 
the  enemy.  The  gallant  Tennesseans,  under  Cheatham,  then  advanced  to 
the  relief  of  Walker,  but  even  they  wavered  and  fell  back  under  the  ter 
rible  fire  of  the  enemy.  Cleburne's  division,  which  had  several  times 
gallantly  charged  the  enemy,  had  also  been  checked,  and  Stuart's  division, 
occupying  the  centre  and  left  of  our  line,  detached  from  Buckner's  corps, 
had  recoiled  before  the  enemy. 


BATTLE   OF   CHICK AMAUGA.  451 

About  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Gen.  Longstreet  asked  Gen. 
Bragg  for  some  of  the  troops  of  the  right  wing,  but  was  informed  by  him 
that  they  had  been  beaten  back  so  badly  that  they  could  be  of  no  service. 
Longstreet  had  but  one  division  that  had  not  been  engaged,  and  hesitated 
to  venture  to  put  it  in,  as  the  distress  upon  the  Confederate  right  seemed 
to  be  almost  as  great  as  that  of  the  enemy  upon  his  right.  He  therefore 
concluded  to  hold  Preston's  division  for  the  time,  and  urge  on  to  renewed 
efforts  the  brave  men  who  had  already  been  engaged  many  hours.  The 
enemy  had  obtained  some  heights  near  the  Crawfish  Spring  Road,  and 
strong  ground  upon  which  to  rally.  Here  he  gathered  most  of  his  broken 
forces,  and  reinforced  them.  After  a  long  and  bloody  struggle,  Johnson 
and  Hindman  gained  the  heights.  Kershaw  made  a  handsome  attack  upon 
the  heights,  simultaneously  with  Johnson  and  Hindman,  but  was  not 
strong  enough  for  the  work.  It  was  evident  that  with  this  position  gained 
Longstreet  would  be  complete  master  of  the  field.  He  therefore  ordered 
Gen.  Buckner  to  move  Preston  forward.  Before  this,  however,  Gen. 
Buckner  had  established  a  battery  of  twelve  guns,  raking  down  the  enemy's 
line  which  opposed  our  right  wing,  and  at  the  same  time  having  fine  play 
upon  any  force  that  might  attempt  to  reinforce  the  hill  that  he  was  about 
to  attack.  Gen.  Stewart,  of  his  corps,  was  also  ordered  to  move  against 
any  such  force  in  flank.  The  combination  was  well-timed  and  arranged. 
Preston  dashed  gallantly  at  the  hill.  Stewart  flanked  a  reinforcing  col 
umn,  and  captured  a  large  portion  of  it.  At  the  same  time,  the  fire  of  the 
battery  struck  such  terrour  into  a  heavy  force  close  under  it,  that  there 
were  taken  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  Preston's  assault,  though  not  a 
complete  success  at  the  onset,  taken  in  connection  with  the  other  opera 
tions,  crippled  the  enemy  so  badly  that  his  ranks  were  badly  broken,  and 
by  a  flank  movement  and  another  advance  the  heights  were  gained.  These 
reinforcements  were  the  enemy's  last  or  reserve  corps,  and  a  part  also  of 
the  line  that  had  been  opposing  our  right  wing  during  the  morning.  The 
enemy  broke  up  in  great  confusion  along  Longstreet's  front,  and,  about 
the  same  time,  the  right  wing  made  a  gallant  dash,  and  gained  the  line 
that  had  been  held  so  long  and  obstinately  against  it.  A  simultaneous 
and  continuous  shout  from  the  two  wings  announced  our  success  complete. 
The  enemy  had  fought  every  man  that  he  had,  and  every  one  had  been  in 
turn  beaten.  The  day  had  been  certainly  saved  by  Longstreet ;  but  it  is 
but  justice  to  add  that  his  masterly  manoeuvre  was  followed  up,  and  com 
pleted  by  Gen.  Polk,  and  that  it  was  under  their  combined  attack  that  the 
enemy  at  last  gave  up  the  field. 

The  enemy  was  totally  routed  from  right,  left,  and  centre,  and  was  in 
full  retreat  to  Chattanooga,  night  alone  preventing  further  pursuit.  Polk's 
wing  captured  twenty-eight  pieces  of  artillery,  and  Longstreet's  twenty- 
one,  making  forty-nine  pieces  of  cannon,  both  wings  taking  nearly  an 


452  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

equal  number  of  prisoners,  amounting  to  over  eight  thousand,  with  fifteen 
thousand  stand  of  arms,  and  forty  stands  of  regimental  colours.  The 
enemy's  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  could  not  have  been  less 
than  twenty  thousand.  Our  own  loss  was  heavy,  and  was  computed  by 
Gen.  Bragg  as  "  two-fifths  of  his  army."  The  enemy  was  known  to  have 
had  all  his  available  force  on  the  field,  including  his  reserve,  with  a  por 
tion  of  Burnside's  corps,  numbering  not  less  than  eighty  thousand,  while 
our  force  was  not  fifty  thousand.  Nothing  was  more  brilliant  in  all  of 
Napoleon's  Italian  campaigns.  Chickamauga  was  equally  as  desperate  as 
the  battle  of  Arcola ;  but  it  was  productive  of  no  decisive  results,  and  we 
shall  see  that  it  was  followed,  as  many  another  brilliant  victory  of  the 
Confederates,  by  almost  immediate  consequences  of  disaster. 


CHAPTEE    XXYIII. 

CONFERENCE    OF    GENS.    BRAGG    AND    LONGSTREET    THE    DAY  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHIOKA- 

MAUGA. — LONGSTREET'S  PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN  NORTH  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  BIVEE. — WHY  GEN. 
BRAGG  DECLINED  IT. — HIS  INTESTMENT  OF  CHATTANOOGA. — HE  CUTS  OFF  THE  ENEMY'S 
SUPPLIES. — HE  HOPES  TO  STAEVE  THE  GARRISON  INTO  8URRENDEB. — REOBGANIZATION  OF 
THE  FEDERAL  ARMIES  IN  THE  WEST. — GEN.  GRANT'S  NEW  AND  LAEGE  COMMAND. — HIS 
FIRST  TASK  TO  BELIEVE  THOMAS  IN  CHATTANOOGA. — HIS  SUCCESSFUL  LODGMENT  ON  THE 
SOUTH  SIDE  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  RIVEE. — SURPRISE  OF  LONGSTREET. — THE  CONFEDERATES 
RETREAT  TO  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN. — LONGSTREET  MAKES  A  NIGHT  ATTACK  ON  THE  ENEMY'S 

NEW  POSITION,  BUT  IS  REPULSED. — THE  ENEMY  ACCOMPLISHES  THE  BELIEF  OF  CHATTA 
NOOGA. — DETACHMENT  OF  LONGSTEEET  FBOM  BEAGG's  FEONT  TO  OPEEATE  AGAINST  KNOX- 

VILLE. — THIS  UNFOBTUNATE  MOVEMENT  THE  WOEK  OF  PEESIDENT  DAVIS. MILITAEY  PBAG- 

MATISM  AND  VANITY  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATE  PEESIDENT. — GBANT  DETEEMINES  TO  TAKE  THE 
OFFENSIVE. — THE  BATTLE  OF  MISSIONAEY  EIDGE. — EXTEAOEDINAEY  STEENGTHOF  THE  CON 
FEDERATE  POSITION. — TWO  ATTACKS  EEPULSED. — GENEEAL  ADVANCE  OF  THE  FEDEEAL 
LINES  TO  THE  CEEST  OF  MISSIONAEY  EIDGE. — AUDACITY  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. — BAD  CONDUCT 
OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  TROOPS. — A  SHAMEFUL  PANIC. — CAUSES  OF  THE  EXTRAORDINABY 
MISCONDUCT  OF  BRAGG's  ARMY. — IT  FALLS  BACK  TO  DALTON. — LONGSTREET'S  EXPEDITION 
AGAINST  KNOXVILLE. — HIS  PURSUIT  OF  BUBNSIDE. — HIS  UNSUCCESSFUL  ASSAULT  ON  FOBT 
6ANDEES  AT  KNOXVILLE. — HE  EETBEATS  TO  BOGEESVILLE,  IS  CUT  OFF  FBOM  VIRGINIA, 
AND  SPENDS  THE  WINTER  IN  NORTH-EASTERN  TENNESSEE. — OPERATIONS  IN  VIEGLNIA  IN 
THE  FALL  OF  1863. — LEE  ATTEMPTS  TO  FLANK  MEADE  AND  GET  BETWEEN  HIM  AND  WASH 
INGTON. — AN  EXTRAORDINARY  ADVENTURE  OF  STUAET's  CAVALBY. — MEADE  BETBEATS  TO 

AND  BEYOND  BULL  BUN. FAILUEE  OF  LEE^S   FLANK   MOVEMENT. — INCIDENTS   OF    SUCCESS 

FOE  THE  CONFEDERATES. — LEE  EETIEE8  TO  THE  BAPPAHANNOCK. — AFFAIB  OF  EAPPAHAN- 
NOCK  BEIDGE. — AFFAIB  OF  GEEMANIA  FOBD. — DESULTOEY  OPEEATIONS  BETWEEN  LEE'S 
LINES  AND  EAST  TENNESSEE. — AVEBILL's  BAID. — CLOSE  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1863  IN 
VIBGINIA. 

THE  morning  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  Gen.  Bragg  stopped  at 
the  bivouac  of  Longstreet,  and  asked  his  views  as  to  future  movements. 
Gen.  Longstreet  suggested  crossing  the  river  above  Chattanooga,  so  as 
to  make  ourselves  sufficiently  felt  on  the  enemy's  rear,  as  to  force  his  evacu 
ation  of  Chattanooga — indeed,  force  him  back  upon  Nashville,  and,  if  we 
should  find  our  transportation  inadequate  for  a  continuance  of  this  move- 


4:54:  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

ment,  to  follow  up  the  railroad  to  Knoxville,  destroy  Burnside,  and  from 
there  threaten  the  enemy's  railroad  communication  in  rear  of  Nashville. 

The  reasons  which  induced  Gen.  Bragg  to  decline  this  plan  of  cam 
paign  were  detailed  in  a  report  to  the  War  Department  at  Bichmond,  in 
which  he  wrote :  "  The  suggestion  of  a  movement  by  our  right,  imme 
diately  after  the  battle,  to  the  north  of  the  Tennessee,  and  thence  upon 
Nashville,  requires  notice  only  because  it  will  find  a  place  on  the  files  of 
the  Department.  Such  a  movement  was  utterly  impossible  for  want  of 
transportation.  Nearly  half  our  army  consisted  of  reinforcements  just  be 
fore  the  battle,  without  a  wagon  or  an  artillery  horse,  and  nearly,  if  not 
quite,  a  third  of  the  artillery  horses  on  the  field  had  been  lost.  The  rail 
road  bridges,  too,  had  been  destroyed  to  a  point  south  of  Ringgold,  and  on 
all  the  road  from  Cleveland  to  Knoxville.  To  these  insurmountable  diffi 
culties  were  added  the  entire  absence  of  means  to  cross  the  river,  except 
by  fording  at  a  few  precarious  points  too  deep  for  artillery,  and  the  well- 
known  danger  of  sudden  rises,  by  which  all  communication  would  be  cut 
off,  a  contingency  which  did  actually  happen  a  few  days  after  the  visionary 
scheme  was  proposed.  But  the  most  serious  objection  to  the  proposition 
was  its  entire  want  of  military  propriety.  It  abandoned  to  the  enemy  our 
entire  line  of  communication,  and  laid  open  to  him  our  depots  of  supplies, 
whilst  it  placed  us  with  a  greatly  inferiour  force  beyond  a  difficult  and,  at 
times,  impassable  river,  in  a  country  affording  no  subsistence  to  men  or 
animals.  It  also  left  open  to  the  enemy,  at  a  distance  of  only  ten  miles, 
our  battle-field,  with  thousands  of  our  wounded  and  his  own  and  all  the 
trophies  and  supplies  we  had  won.  All  this  was  to  be  risked  and  given 
up  for  what  ?  To  gain  the  enemy's  rear,  and  cut  him  off  from  his  depot 
of  supplies  by  the  route  over  the  mountains,  when  the  very  movement 
abandoned  to  his  unmolested  use  the  better  and  more  practicable  route  of 

half  the  length  on  the  south  side  of  the  river Our  supplies 

of  all  kinds  were  greatly  reduced,  the  railroad  having  been  constantly  oc 
cupied  in  transporting  troops,  prisoners,  and  our  wounded,  and  the  bridges 
having  been  destroyed  to  a  point  two  miles  south  of  Binggold.  These 
supplies  were  ordered  to  be  replenished,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  seen  that 
we  could  be  subsisted,  the  army  was  moved  forward  to  seize  and  hold  the 
only  communication  the  enemy  had  with  his  supplies  in  the  rear.  His 
important  road,  and  the  shortest  by  half  to  his  depot  at  Bridgeport,  lay 
along  the  south  bank  of  the  Tennessee.  The  holding  of  this  all-important 
route  was  confided  to  Lieut.-Gen.  Longstreet's  command,  and  its  posses 
sion  forced  the  enemy  to  a  road  double  the  length,  over  two  ranges  of 
mountains,  by  wagon  transportation.  At  the  same  time,  our  cavalry,  in 
large  force,  was  thrown  across  the  river  to  operate  on  this  long  and  difficult 
route.  These  dispositions,  faithfully  sustained,  ensured  the  enemy's  speedy 
evacuation  of  Chattanooga  for  want  of  food  and  forage.  Possessed  of  the 


GRANT'S  BELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA.  455 

shortest  roacl  liis  depot  and  the  one  by  which  reinforcements  must  reach  him, 
we  held  him  at  our  mercy ,  and  his  destruction  was  only  a  question  of  time" 

This  was  a  bold  statement  of  Bragg ;  but  it  seemed  that  for  once  a  least 
his  swollen  boasts  were  to  be  realized,  and  the  enemy  at  Chattanooga 
starved  into  surrender.  Starvation  or  retreat  stared  in  the  face  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland ;  its  supplies  had  to  be  dragged  for  sixty  miles 
across  the  country  and  over  abominable  roads  ;  and  even  if  it  ventured  on 
retreat,  it  would  have  to  abandon  its  artillery  and  most  of  its  materiel.  At 
this  critical  period,  Gen.  Rosecrans  was  relieved,  Gen.  Thomas  succeeding 
him  ;  and  a  few  days  afterwards,  Gen.  Grant  arrived,  having  been  placed 
in  command  of  a  military  division,  composed  of  the  departments  of  the 
Ohio,  Cumberland,  and  Tennessee,  in  which  were  the  armies  of  Gens. 
Burnside,  Thomas,  and  Sherman. 

It  was  the  first  task  of  Grant  to  relieve  Thomas  in  Chattanooga.  Rein 
forced  by  Hooker  with  two  corps,  it  was  decided  that  this  force  should  cross 
the  Tennessee  River  at  Bridgeport,  making  a  lodgment  on  the  south  side 
of  it,  three  miles  below  where  Lookout  Mountain  abuts  on  the  river — this 
movement  being  intended  to  open  navigation  to  the  ferry,  thus  shortening 
land  transportation,  and  securing  certain  supplies  to  the  Federal  army. 

Four  thousand  men  were  detailed  to  execute  this  movement.  Fifty 
pontoons,  carrying  twelve  hundred  men,  were  floated  on  the  night  of  the 
26th  October  down  the  river,  passing  three  miles  in  front  of  Longstreet's 
pickets,  without  drawing  their  attention.  The  alarm  was  not  given  until 
the  enemy  attempted  a  landing  at  the  ferry  ;  and  another  body  of  three 
thousand  Federals,  who  had  marched  down  to  a  concealed  camp  opposite, 
being  quickly  ferried  across,  the  Confederates  were  forced  back  and  com 
pelled  to  retreat  to  Lookout  Mountain.  In  less  than  forty  hours  a  whole 
corps  of  the  enemy  was  across  the  river.  A  portion  of  this  force  halted  in 
a  position  plainly  visible  from  Lookout  Mountain  ;  and  a  night  attack  on 
the  29th  October  was  planned  upon  it  by  Longstreet,  who  hoped  by  a  sur 
prise  to  frustrate  the  entire  movement,  and  to  capture  the  whole  of  Hook 
er's  wagon  train.  The  attack  failed  from  insufficient  force ;  it  was  made 
with  only  six  Confederate  regiments,  and  was  withdrawn  after  three  hours' 
fighting  with  considerable  loss.  Grant's  lodgment  on  the  south  side  of 
the  Tennessee  was  now  assured  ;  he  was  in  firm  possession  of  the  new  lines 
of  communication  ;  he  had  attained  all  the  results  he  had  anticipated  ;  and 
his  relief  of  Chattanooga  was  now  to  be  taken  as  an  accomplished  fact. 

But  although  the  Federal  army  near  Chattanooga  had  now  no  fears  of 
starvation  or  retreat,  Grant  hesitated  to  assume  the  offensive  against  the 
strong  positions  in  his  front.  Gen.  Sherman  had  been  ordered  from  the 
region  of  the  Mississippi  with  four  divisions  ;  but  before  his  arrival,  Grant 
obtained  the  astounding  news  that  Longstreet,  with  eleven  thousand  in 
fantry,  had  been  detached  from  Bragg's  front  (although  the  Confederates 


456  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

were  in  momentary  expectation  of  battle,  already  overmatched  by  num 
bers,  and  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  drawing  reinforcements  from  every 
quarter),  and  that  this  veteran  commander,  with  the  best  part  of  the  army, 
had  gone  to  Knoxville  to  attack  Burnside,  and  with  the  visionary  project 
of  regaining  East  Tennessee,  and  perhaps  through  its  gateways  again  pen 
etrating  Kentucky,  and  making  the  battle-ground  of  the  Confederacy  in 
this  impossible  country. 

This  extraordinary  military  movement  was  the  work  of  President 
Davis,  who  seems,  indeed,  to  have  had  a  singular  fondness  for  erratic  cam 
paigns.  His  visits  to  every  battle-field  of  the  Confederacy  were  ominous. 
He  disturbed  the  plans  of  his  generals  ;  his  military  conceit  led  him  into 
the  wildest  schemes  ;  and  so  much  did  he  fear  that  the  public  would  not 
ascribe  to  him  the  hoped-for  results  of  the  visionary  project,  that  his  van 
ity  invariably  divulged  it,  and  successes  were  foretold  in  public  speeches 
with  such  boastful  plainness,  as  to  put  the  enemy  on  his  guard  and  inform 
him  of  the  general  nature  of  the  enterprise.  On  the  12th  October  Presi 
dent  Davis  visited  the  field  of  Chickamauga.  He  planned  the  expedition 
against  Knoxville.  He  was  in  furious  love  with  the  extraordinary  de 
sign,  and  in  a  public  address  to  the  army  he  could  not  resist  the  tempta 
tion  of  announcing  that  "  the  green  fields  of  Tennessee  would  shortly  again 
be  theirs." 

The  announcement  of  this  enterprise  alone  remained  to  determine 
Grant  to  attack.  Burnside  was  instructed  to  lure  Longstreet  to  Knox 
ville,  and  retire  within  his  fortifications,  where  he  could  stand  a  protracted 
siege.  Lookout  Mountain  had  been  evacuated  by  the  Confederates,  and 
Bragg  had  moved  his  troops  up  to  the  top  of  Missionary  Eidge. 


THE   BATTLE   OF    MISSIONARY   RIDGE. 

On  the  25th  November,  the  enemy  prepared  for  the  grand  assault, 
Sherman's  force  having  come  up,  and  occupied  the  northern  extremity  of 
Missionary  Ridge.  Hooker  had  scaled  the  rugged  height  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  the  Federal  forces  maintained  an  unbroken  line,  with  open 
communications,  from  the  north  end  of  this  dizzy  eminence,  through  Cheat 
Yalley,  to  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge.  There  were  more  than 
eighty  thousand  veteran  troops  in  this  formidable  line.  The  Confederate 
army,  numbering  not  half  so  many,  had  yet  a  position  that  should  have 
decided  the  day.  They  held  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  from  McFarlan's  Gap 
almost  to  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga ;  the  position  was  four  to  six 
hundred  feet  in  elevation  ;  and  it  had  been  strengthened  by  breastworks 
wherever  the  ascent  was  easy.  The  position  was  such  that  the  enemy  was 


BATTLE   OF   MISSIONARY   RIDGE.  457 

exposed  to  an  artillery  fire  while  in  the  plain,  and  to  the  infantry  fire  when 
he  attempted  the  ascent  of  the  hill  or  mountain. 

The  right  wing  of  the  Confederates  was  held  by  Hardee,  with  the  divi 
sions  of  Cleburne,  "Walker,  Cheatham,  and  Stevenson.  Breckinridge  com 
manded  on  the  left  his  old  division,  Stewart's,  and  part  of  Buckner's  and 
Hindman's.  The  enemy's  first  assault  was  made  upon  Hardee,  who  re 
pulsed  it  with  great  slaughter.  The  attack  was  made  here  by  Sherman, 
and  his  bleeding  columns  staggered  on  the  hill.  A  second  attack  on  the 
Confederate  left  wing  was  ordered  at  noon,  and  repulsed.  It  was  late  in 
the  afternoon,  when,  with  an  audacity  wholly  unexpected,  Grant  ordered 
a  general  advance  of  his  lines  to  the  crest  of  Missionary  Ridge.  As  the 
Federal  columns  moved  up  at  a  rapid  rate,  in  face  of  the  batteries,  whose  ill- 
directed  and  purposeless  fire  did  not  serve  to  check  them,  a  brigade  in  the 
Confederate  centre  gave  way,  and  in  a  few  moments,  what  had  been  a  regular 
and  vigorous  battle,  became  a  disgraceful  panic  and  an  unmitigated  rout. 
J^"ever  was  a  victory  plucked  so  easily  from  a  position  so  strong.  Avail 
ing  himself  of  the  first  gap  in  the  Confederate  line,  the  enemy  turned  upon 
their  flanks,  and  poured  into  them  a  terrible  enfilading  fire,  that  scattered 
them  in  contusion.  The  day  was  shamefully  lost.  Gen.  Bragg  attempted 
to  rally  the  broken  troops ;  he  advanced  into  the  fire,  and  exclaimed, 
"  Here  is  your  commander,"  and  was  answered  with  the  derisive  shouts  of 
an  absurd  catch-phrase  in  the  army,  "  Here's  your  mule." 

An  army  notoriously  lacking  confidence  in  their  commander ;  made 
weak  and  suspicious  by  the  detachment  from  it  of  Longstreet's  veteran 
divisions ;  and  utterly  demoralized  by  one  of  Bragg's  freaks  of  organiza 
tion  before  the  battle,  in  shuffling  over  all  the  commands,  and  putting  the 
men  under  new  officers,  abandoned  positions  of  great  strength  ;  broke  into 
a  disorderly  retreat  from  a  line  which  might  easily  have  been  held  against 
twice  their  numbers  ;  and  gave  to  the  Confederacy  what  President  Davis 
unwillingly  pronounced  "  the  mortification  of  the  first  defeat  that  had  re 
sulted  from  misconduct  by  the  troops." 

The  consequence  of  this  disaster  was  that  Gen.  Bragg  left  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy  all  of  his  strong  positions  on  Lookout  Mountain,  Chattanooga 
Valley,  and  Missionary  Ridge,  and  finally  retired  with  his  whole  army  to 
a  position  some  twenty  or  thirty  miles  to  the  rear.  His  army  was  put  in 
motion  on  the  road  to  Ringgold,  and  thence  to  Dalton.  Grant  claimed 
as  the  fruits  of  his  victory  seven  thousand  prisoners,  and  forty-seven  pieces 
of  artillery. 


LONGSTREET'S  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  KNOXVTLLE. 
We  have  seen  that  in  the  beginning  of  November  Longstreet  had  been 


4:58  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

despatched  by  Bragg  up  the  valley  towards  Knoxville,  where  Burnside 
was  operating.  A  part  of  the  army  of  the  latter  lay  at  London,  where 
Longstreet  first  struck  and  drove  the  enemy,  capturing  at  Lenoir  Station 
a  train  of  eighty-five  wagons,  many  of  them  loaded  with  valuable  medical 
stores.  At  Bean  Station  he  captured  thirty  wagons,  a  quantity  of  forage. 
and  some  horses ;  and  in  the  Clinch  Valley,  forty  other  wagons,  ladeu 
with  sugar  and  coffee.  Burnside  continued  to  fall  back  upon  Knoxville. 
but  was  overtaken  at  Campbell's  Station  on  the  16th  of  November.  Here 
he  was  severely  pressed  by  Longstreet,  who  hoped  to  break  the  retreal 
into  a  rout.  A  running  fight  of  two  miles  ensued,  and  Burnside  reached 
Knoxville  at  daylight  the  next  morning ;  Longstreet  advancing,  and  laying 
regular  siege  to  the  place. 

But  while  he  was  investing  the  place,  news  came  of  the  great  disastei 
at  Missionary  Ridge,  and  Longstreet,  well  understanding  that  Grant  would 
now  detach  a  column  to  relieve  Knoxville,  saw  the  necessity  of  quid 
work,  and  determined  to  risk  an  assault  upon  the  place.  On  a  hill  neai 
the  Kingston  road  was  a  work,  called  Fort  Sanders,  which  commandec 
the  approaches  to  the  town.  It  was  a  very  strong  work,  and  in  front  of  il 
were  felled  trees,  with  the  tops  turning  in  all  directions,  and  making  ar 
almost  impassable  mass  of  brush  and  timber.  A  space  around  the  fort  was 
cleared,  and  the  ditch  in  front  was  about  ten  feet  deep,  with  the  parapei 
nearly  twenty  feet  high. 

In  the  morning  of  the  29th  November,  the  assaulting  column,  consist 
ing  of  three  brigades  of  McLaw's  division,  moved  up  the  slope,  and  was 
met  by  a  heavy  artillery  fire,  which  fearfullly  mowed  down  the  advancing 
soldiers.  Still  onward  they  pushed,  struggling  through  the  network  oi 
fallen  timber  and  other  devices  laid  down  to  impede  them.  But,  the  in 
tricate  passage  by  which  they  had  to  mount,  was  too  difficult  for  then 
easily  to  master.  The  foremost  parties  stumbled  and  fell  over  each  othej 
in  confusion  ;  at  the  same  time  the  enemy's  fire  poured  fiercer  and  fierce] 
on  their  heads.  The  embrasures  of  the  fort,  and  the  whole  line  of  the 
parapet  blazed  forth  at  once.  Nevertheless,  this  did  not  effectually  stoj 
the  advance.  Pushing  on  over  every  obstacle,  they  soon  reached  within  pis 
tol-shot  of  the  fort ;  then,  suddenly,  the  enemy's  guns  launched  forth  fron 
every  quarter,  and  the  Confederate  line  was  shattered.  Some,  however 
managed  to  spring  into  the  ditch,  and  clamber  up  the  glacis,  planting  theii 
flag  almost  side  by  side  with  the  Federal  colours.  They  were  not  sup 
ported,  however,  by  the  rest  of  the  charging  column  ;  and  the  attack  was 
withdrawn  after  a  loss  of  some  seven  hundred  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners. 

The  assault  having  failed,  and  news  of  Sherman's  approach  from  Chat 
tanooga  reaching  him,  Longstreet  had  no  other  alternative  than  to  raise 
the  siege,  and  occupy  a  new  line  of  operations.  He  retreated  towards  Rut- 


OPERATIONS   IN   VIRGINIA.  469 

ledge  up  the  valley,  pursued  by  the  combined  forces  of  Burnside  and  Sher 
man.  On  the  13th  December,  he  reached  Bean  Station,  where,  being  hard 
pressed  by  the  enemy,  he  turned  and  attacked  his  advance,  driving  him 
back  to  Russellville.  Having  shaken  off  the  enemy  here,  Longstreet  pro 
ceeded  to  take  a  position  in  Northeastern  Tennessee,  establishing  his  head 
quarters  at  liogersville.  He  had  hoped  to  find  his  railroad  communica 
tions  with  Virginia  open  ;  but  at  this  time  Averill's  raid  had  cut  the  rail 
road,  compelling  Longstreet  to  fall  back  upon  his  own  resources,  and  com 
pletely  isolating  him  in  a  wild  and  difficult  country.  The  weather  was 
bitterly  cold  ;  the  mountains  were  covered  with  snow  ;  more  than  half  of 
the  men  were  barefooted  ;  and  the  cavalry  was  engaged  in  daily  skir 
mishes  with  the  enemy,  while  gleaning  supplies  east  of  a  line  drawn  from 
Cumberland  Gap  to  Cleveland.  In  February,  1864,  the  lines  of  communi 
cation  with  Yirginia  were  repaired  ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  rigour  of 
winter  broke  that  the  hardy  soldiers  under  Longstreet  united  again  with 
Gen.  Lee  in  Yirginia,  and  were  on  the  old  ground  about  Gordonsville. 


OPERATIONS   IN   VIRGINIA   IN   THE   FALL   OF    1863. 

While  such  was  the  train  of  disaster  that  followed  the  brilliant  but  ill- 
starred  victory  of  Chickamauga,  the  record  of  the  operations  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Yirginia  was  comparatively  slight,  and  afforded  but  little 
compensation  with  reference  to  the  general  fortunes  of  the  war.  From 
July  until  October,  Gen.  Lee  quietly  rested  on  the  Kapidan,  without  any 
incident  beyond  a  grand  review  of  his  army.  Longstreet  had  been  de 
tached  from  him ;  Meade  had  lost  two  corps  under  Hooker,  which  had 
been  sent  to  balance  the  Confederate  reinforcement  on  the  Tennessee  lines ; 
and  the  two  armies,  thus  diminished,  continued  to  watch  each  other,  until 
the  public,  North  and  South,  became  anxious  and  clamorous  for  fresh 
struggles  and  a  new  excitement. 

That  excitement  was  suddenly  given.  In  October,  Gen.  Lee  prepared 
to  put  into  execution  a  campaign,  which  promised  the  most  brilliant  re 
sults,  as  its  ultimate  object  appears  to  have  been  to  flank  Meade,  and  get 
between  the  enemy  and  Washington.  The  movement  commenced  on  the 
9 tli  October,  when  Gen.  Lee  with  a  portion  of  his  command  crossed  the 
river,  and  by  circuitous  and  concealed  roads  contrived  to  get  up  near  Cul- 
pepper  without  notice  of  the  enemy.  A  cavalry  division  and  a  detach 
ment  of  infantry  under  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee  remained  to  hold  the  lines  south 
of  the  Kapidan  and  to  make  a  show  of  force  there  to  deceive  the  enemy  ; 
while  Gen.  Stuart  advanced  with  Hampton's  division  to  protect  from  ob 
servation  the  flank  of  the  army  then  moving  towards  Madison  Court- 
House. 


460  THE  LOST  CAUSE, 

On  the  llth  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  army  was  at  Culpepper ;  the 
command  of  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  uniting  with  that  of  Stuart,  quickly  fol 
lowed  ;  and  Lee  had  now  so  manoeuvred  that  he  had  actually  turned 
Meade's  flank.  But  unfortunately  for  the  success  of  the  movement,  the 
Federal  commander  had  taken  timely  alarm  ;  he  had  crossed  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  and  was  rapidly  retreating  along  the  line  of  railroad  running  to 
Alexandria. 

On  the  12th,  Lee  arrived  on  the  Eappahannock,  at  Warrenton  Springs, 
after  a  skirmish  with  the  Federal  cavalry  at  Jeffersonton.  That  night, 
Gen.  Stuart  pushed  on  to  Warrenton.  He  had  guarded  the  flank  of  the 
army,  driven  off  the  enemy's  forces  everywhere,  and  performed  invaluable 
service.  The  next  day  the  army  pushed  on,  the  cavalry  now  in  advance. 
Meade's  army  was  at  this  time  across  the  Rappahannock,  and  believed  to 
have  halted  at  Warrenton  Junction,  and  between  that  point  and  Catlett's 
Station.  Two  thousand  cavalry  were  sent  down  from  "Warrenton  to  recon 
noitre  in  the  direction  of  Catlett's.  On  arriving  near  the  latter  place,  they 
found  the  enemy  were  moving  heavy  columns  of  infantry  along  the  rail 
road  towards  Manassas ;  and  they  thereupon  immediately  turned  to  re 
trace  their  steps  toward  Warrenton  ;  but  on  reaching  a  road  which  crossed 
their  route,  leading  from  Warrenton  Junction  to  Manassas,  they  found 
that  the  enemy  were  also  moving  infantry  in  large  masses  along  this  road. 
They  were  thus  completely  hemmed  in.  Nothing  remained  but  to  "  lay 
low,"  in  camp  parlance,  within  a  distance  of  the  enemy  where  every  word 
of  command  could  be  distinctly  heard. 

The  body  of  Confederate  cavalry  was  concealed  in  a  thicket  of  pines. 
The  accidental  discharge  of  a  fire-arm,  the  neighing  of  a  horse,  the  rattling 
of  an  artillery  chain,  would  have  discovered  them  to  the  enemy.  The 
night  was  passed  in  fearful  suspense.  Stuart  gave  his  officers  and  men  to 
understand  that  surrender  was  not  to  be  thought  of,  but  that  the  enemy 
was  to  be  fought  to  the  last.  A  council  of  war  having  been  called,  it  was 
resolved,  as  the  best  thing  that  could  be  done  under  the  circumstances,  to 
desert  the  nine  pieces  of  horse  artillery,  and  for  the  cavalry  in  six  columns 
to  endeavour  to  cut  their  way  through  the  enemy.  But  after  some  reflec 
tion,  Stuart  resolved  not  to  do  this.  At  daybreak  the  rear-guard  of  the 
enemy  were  seen  in  camp  cooking  their  breakfasts,  not  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
distant.  Gen.  Stuart  had  sent  several  scouts  on  foot  through  the  enemy's 
lines  to  announce  his  situation  to  Gen.  Lee.  He  ordered  them  to  put  on 
infantry  knapsacks,  and,  shouldering  muskets,  to  advance  in  the  darkness 
to  the  road,  fall  into  the  enemy's  column,  and,  crossing  it,  to  make  their 
way  to  Warrenton,  and  say  to  Gen.  Lee  that  he  was  surrounded,  and  he 
"  must  send  some  of  his  people  to  help  him  out."  Three  of  the  scouts 
reached  Warrenton  in  safety. 

The  last  division  of  the  enemy  halted  and  bivouacked  opposite  Stuart 


LEE'S  FLAKE  MOVEMENT.  461 

and  within  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  of  his  position — so  close  that  he 
could  hear  the  Federal  cavalrymen  pouring  out  oats  to  feed  their  horses. 
During  the  night  two  of  Meade's  staff  straggled  into  his  lines,  and  were 
taken  prisoners.  At  daylight  next  morning,  Stuart  was  informed  by  the 
cracking  of  skirmishers'  muskets,  that  Lee  had  received  his  message,  and 
was  sending  "  some  of  his  people  "  to  help  him.  As  Lee's  advancing  col 
umns  attracted  the  enemy's  attention,  Stuart,  from  the  rear,  opened  on  them 
with  grape  and  canister.  The  enemy  was  much  disordered  by  the  cannon 
ade  from  so  unexpected  a  quarter,  and,  taking  advantage  of  the  confusion, 
Stuart  limbered  up  his  guns,  and,  with  cavalry  and  artillery,  dashed  through 
the  hostile  ranks,  and  rejoined  Gen.  Lee.  The  enemy  suffered  a  loss  of  one 
hundred  and  eighty  killed  in  this  affair. 

Lee's  whole  army  was  reunited  at  "Warrenton,  and  a  halt  was  made  to 
supply  the  troops  with  provisions.  On  the  14th,  he  again  pushed  on  in 
two  columns,  and,  by  different  roads  towards  Bristoe  Station,  where  the 
rear-guard  of  Meade,  under  Gen.  "Warren,  was  attacked  by  the  advance  of 
Gen.  Hill.  As  Hill's  corps  approached  the  station,  what  appeared  to  be 
a  small  portion  of  the  enemy  was  discovered  behind  a  long  embankment 
of  the  railroad,  and  two  brigades  of  Heth's  division  were  ordered  to  dis 
lodge  them.  A  severe  action  ensued,  in  which  Hill  was  repulsed,  with 
three  or  four  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  loss  of  five  pieces  of 
artillery. 

Before  the  main  body  of  Lee's  army  could  get  up  the  action  was  over  ; 
Meade  had  retreated  across  Broad  Run ;  and  the  next  morning  was  re 
ported  to  be  fortifying  beyond  Bull  Run.  The  enemy  had  thus  been  forced 
back  to  the  old  battle-fields  around  Centre ville  and  Manassas.  Gen.  Lee 
deemed  it  unwise  to  continue  the  pursuit  further,  as  the  entrenchments 
around  Washington  and  Alexandria  rendered  it  impossible  to  turn  Meade's 
position ;  and  the  country  affording  no  subsistence  to  the  Confederate 
army,  while  the  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  was  at  the  door  of  his  maga 
zines,  it  returned  to  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock. 

The  flank  movement  had  failed  in  what  it  had  designed ;  but  it  was 
accompanied  with  a  considerable  success  in  the  Yalley  district ;  the  sum 
of  its  incidents  was  in  favour  of  the  Confederates,  and  its  visible  fruits 
were  large.  Gen.  Imboden,  who  commanded  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley, 
had  been  left  to  guard  the  mountain  passes,  while  the  flank  movement  and 
advance  of  Lee  was  in  progress.  He  not  only  performed  this  service,  but 
on  the  18th  October,  pressed  on  to  Charlestown,  took  the  town  with  four 
hundred  and  thirty-four  prisoners,  and  brought  off  a  large  amount  of  cap 
tured  property. 

The  entire  movement  of  October  cost  the  Confederates  about  one  thou 
sand  men.  Its  fruits  were  two  thousand  four  hundred  and  thirty-six  pris 
oners,  including  forty-one  commissioned  officers.  The  railroad  was  do- 


462  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

stroyed  from  Manassas  to  Rappahannock  Station ;  and  Gen.  Lee  having 
placed  his  troops  again  in  position,  on  both  sides  of  the  railway,  upon  the 
line  of  the  Rappahannock,  Ewell  on  the  right,  Hill  upon  the  left,  and  the 
cavalry  protecting  each  flank,  quietly  awaited  the  time  when  Meade,  re 
pairing  the  railroad,  should  again  advance  and  confront  him. 

On  the  6th  November  the  enemy  came  in  force  upon  Lee's  army  at 
Rappahannock  Station  and  Kelly's  Ford.  Near  the  latter  place  the  enemy 
crossed  the  river ;  and  Gen.  Rodes,  who  had  fallen  back  before  superiour 
numbers,  was  reinforced  by  Johnson's  division.  To  meet  the  demonstra 
tion  at  the  bridge  near  which  Swell's  corps  was  stationed,  Early's  division 
was  put  in  motion,  and  the  two  brigades  of  Hoke  and  Hayes  were  passed 
to  the  other  side,  to  hold  the  north  bank,  and  watch  the  enemy's  front.  It 
was  believed  that  these  troops  would  be  able  to  maintain  their  position  if 
attacked,  the  nature  of  the  position  being  such  that  the  enemy  could  not 
attack  with  a  front  more  extended  than  their  own  ;  and  that  even  if  they 
were  compelled  to  withdraw,  they  might  do  so  safely  under  cover  of  the 
guns  on  the  banks  of  the  river. 

The  night  was  excessively  dark  ;  a  high  wind  effectually  prevented  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  being  heard  ;  and  taking  advantage  of  these  cir 
cumstances,  two  entire  Federal  corps  advanced  to  overwhelm  the  small 
force  of  Confederates  exposed  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  The  first  line 
of  the  enemy  was  broken  and  shattered ;  but  the  second  and  third  lines 
continued  to  advance,  overwhelming  Hayes,  and,  by  a  movement  towards 
the  left,  enclosing  Hoke's  brigade  in  a  manner  that  rendered  escape  im 
possible.  Owing,  it  is  said,  to  an  opposite  wind,  no  information  was  ob 
tained  of  the  attack  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  until  too  late  for  the 
artillery  stationed  there  to  aid  in  repelling  it.  The  darkness  of  the  night 
and  the  fear  of  injuring  our  own  men,  who  were  surrounded  by  and  com 
mingled  with  the  enemy,  prevented  Gen.  Early  from  using  artillery  ;  and 
the  unlucky  commander  witnessed  the  loss  of  the  greater  portion  of  two 
of  his  brigades,  without,  as  he  declared,  the  possibility  of  an  effort  to  ex 
tricate  them.  Many  of  our  men  effected  their  escape  in  the  confusion ; 
some  by  swimming  the  river,  and  others  by  making  their  way  to  the 
bridge,  passing  over  under  a  shower  of  balls.  But  not  less  than  two  thou 
sand  prisoners  were  left  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  was  the  cost  to  us 
of  this  unfortunate  surprise. 

On  the  27th  November,  another  incident,  but  without  general  signifi 
cance,  occurred  on  the  line  of  the  Kappahannock.  On  that  day  Meade  again 
advanced  upon  the  Confederates  at  Germania  Ford,  his  immediate  object 
being  to  get  in  the  rear  of  Johnson's  division,which  was  posted  in  the  ad 
vance  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  river.  In  the  action  thus  brought 
on,  the  enemy  was  punished  and  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  several  hundred 
in  killed  and  wounded.  The  next  day,  Meade  withdrew  from  the  front, 


CLOSE   OF   THE   CAMPAIGN   OF   1863.  463 

and  re-occupied  his  position  about  Brandy  Station  on  the  Orange  and  Alex 
andria  Railroad.  This  virtually  ended  the  campaign  for  the  year  1863. 

In  other  parts  of  Virginia  there  were  operations  about  the  close  of  the 
year,  which  must  be  very  briefly  and  generally  referred  to,  as  they  belong 
to  a  very  minor  theatre  of  the  war.  That  theatre  lay  between  Gen.  Lee's 
lines  in  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee  in  the  district  commanded  by  the 
active  and  eccentric  Gen.  Sam  Jones,  and  almost  constantly  disturbed  by 
incursions  and  raids  of  the  enemy.  Here  the  great  annoyance  was  from 
the  famous  Federal  raider  Averill,  who,  after  a  various  and  unequal  career, 
succeeded  in  December,  1863,  in  striking  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Rail 
road  at  Salem,  and  badly  severing  what  was  at  that  time  the  most  impor 
tant  line  of  communication  in  the  Confederacy. 

Gen.  Lee  finding  no  prospect  of  Longstreet's  arrival  or  other  reinforce 
ment  from  the  West,  retired  to  the  old  line  of  the  Rapidan.  The  Federal 
forces  went  into  winter-quarters  on  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock  about  the 
6th  December  ;  the  Confederate  army  did  the  same  on  the  Rapidan  ;  and 
the  curtain  of  winter  dropped  on  the  great  scenes  of  the  war  in  Virginia. 


CHAPTER   XXIX. 

EFFECT  OF  THE  FEDEEAL  SUCCESSES  OF  1863  ON  THE  NOBTHEEN  ELECTIONS. — ESTIMATE  IN  THE 
RICHMOND  NEWSPAPEES  OF  THE  DEMOCBATIO  ALLIANCE   IN   THE  NOETH. — LOSSES   OF  THE 

DEMOCEATIO  PAETY  IN  THE  ELECTIONS    OF    1863. PBESIDENT   LINCOLN^    TEIUMPH. — HIS 

ADMINISTEATION  STEENGTHENED. — IT  VENTUEE8  TO  NEW  LENGTHS. — AEEEST  OF  ME.  VAL- 
LANDIGHAM. — PEOTESTS  OF  THE  DEMOCEATIO  PAETY. — THEIE  WOETHLESS  AND  EIDICULOUS 
CHAEACTEE. — NEW  AND  VIGOEOUS  MEASUEE8  OF  WAE  AT  WASHINGTON. — SOAECITY  OF 
MEN  AND  OF  FOOD  THE  TWO  CONCEENS  AT  EIOHMOND. — MEAGEE  EESULTS  OF  THE  OON- 

8CEIPTION    LAW. AN    ALAEMING    STATEMENT    FEOM   THE    CONFEDEEATE    SECEETAEY    OF 

WAE. — DIMINUTION  OF  SUBSISTENCE  IN  THE  CONFEDEEACY. — SUFFEEING  AMONG  THE 
PEOPLE  AND  AEMY. — HISTOEY  OF  THE  OONFEDEEATE  COMMISSAEIAT. — EEPOET  OF  THE 
MEAT  SUPPLIES  IN  THE  OONFEDEBACY  IN  JANUAEY,  1862. — EFFECT  OF  THE  CAMPAIGNS  IN 
KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE  ON  THE  QUESTION  OF  SUBSISTENCE. — PEOPOSITION  TO  GET 
MEAT  THEOUGH  THE  ENEMY 's  LINES. — OBSTINATE  OBJECTIONS  OF  PEESIDENT  DAVIS. — HIS 
MANIA  ABOUT  COTTON. — THE  CONFEDEEATE  STATES  DEAINED  OF  MEAT  IN  THE  SECOND 
YEAE  OF  THE  WAE. — STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSAEY  NOETHEOP. — ATTEMPT  TO  GET  SUPPLIES 
THEOUGH  THE  BLOCKADE. — HOW  MISMANAGED. — THE  CEENSHAW  CONTEACT. — SMALL 
YIELD  OF  IMPEESSMENTS. — THE  WHOLE  CONFEDEEATE  POLICY  OF  SUBSISTENCE  A  FAILUEE. 
— AN  EXTEAOEDINAEY  DEVICE  OF  SEOEETAEY  SEDDON. — HOW  IT  PLAYED  INTO  THE  HANDS 
OF  SPECULATOES. — EEFLECTION  UPON  THE  WANT  OF  THE  COMMEEOIAL  OE  BUSINESS  FAC 
ULTY  IN  THE  SOUTHEEN  MIND. — A  STOCK  OF  CHILDISH  EXPEDIENTS. 

THE  Federal  successes  of  1863  produced  a  well-defined  effect  upon 
political  parties  in  the  North,  and  the  elections  there  of  this  year  were  in 
remarkable  contrast  to  those  of  1862.  It  is  significant  of  the  little  virtue 
of  all  the  political  organizations  of  the  North  during  the  time  of  the  war 
that  opposition  to  the  administration  at  Washington  was  checked  at  every 
success  of  its  arms,  and  declined  in  exact  proportion  as  its  military  power 
ascended.  The  weak  instinct  of  politicians  readily  took  to  the  stronger 
side  ;  and  although  there  was  a  large  party  in  the  Confederacy  that  looked 
for  a  certain  co-operation  of  the  Democratic  party  in  the  North,  it  was 
readily  understood  by  the  intelligent  that  that  co-operation  was  only  to  be 
obtained  by  making  the  Confederate  side  the  stronger,  by  increasing  the 
prospects  of  its  success  by  victories  in  the  field — in  short,  that  the  only 


ELECTIONS   OF   1863,  465 

hope  of  peace  for  the  South  was  in  the  vigour  of  her  resistance  and  the 
pressure  of  the  enemy's  necessities.  This  estimate  of  the  Democratic 
alliance  in  the  North  was  plainly  enough  stated  in  the  Richmond  journals 
and  put  in  very  blunt  English.  In  anticipation  of  the  elections  of  1863, 
the  Richmond  Enquirer  said  :  "  It  is  nothing  to  us  which  of  their  factions 
may  devour  their  *  spoils  ; '  just  as  little  does  it  signify  to  us  whether  they 
recover  or  do  not  recover  that  constitutional  liberty  which  they  so  wan 
tonly  threw  away  in  the  mad  pursuit  of  Southern  conquest  and  plunder. 
But  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to  aid  in  stimulating  disaffection 
among  Yankees  against  their  own  government,  and  in  demoralizing  and 
disintegrating  society  in  that  God-abandoned  country.  We  can  do  this 
only  in  one  way — namely,  by  thrashing  their  armies  and  carrying  the  war 
to  their  own  firesides.  Then,  indeed,  conscientious  constitutional  princi 
ples  will  hold  sway  ;  peace  platforms  will  look  attractive  ;  arbitrary  arrests 
will  become  odious,  and  habeas  corpus  be  quoted  at  a  premium.  This  is 
the  only  way  we  can  help  them.  In  this  sense  and  to  this  extent,  those 
Democrats  are  truly  our  allies,  and  we  shall  endeavour  to  do  our  duty  by 
them." 

The  Democratic  party  in  the  North  went  into  the  fall  elections  of  1863 
on  the  issue  of  a  general  opposition  to  the  Lincoln  Administration  ;  at  the 
same  time  promising  a  vigorous  "  constitutional  "  prosecution  of  the  war. 
The  result  was  a  triumph  of  the  Administration  from  Minnesota  to  Maine ; 
the  Democrats  were  everywhere  defeated ;  and  the  significance  of  this 
defeat  was  that  opposition  to  the  authorities  at  Washington  had  been  sub 
dued  either  by  the  strong  hand  of  lawless  power  or  by  the  appliance  of 
selfish  arguments,  that  they  had  no  longer  anything  to  fear,  and  that  the 
overthrow  of  free  government  in  the  North  was  complete.  President  Lin 
coln  wrote  that  "  the  crisis  was  past."  The  elections  of  1863  had  given 
him,  as  it  were,  a  carte  blanche  for  his  government.  Certainly  no  more 
striking  illustration  could  be  given  of  this  fact  than  the  arrest  and  exile  of 
Mr.  Yallandigham,  who  was  probably  the  most  talented  and  prominent 
representative  of  the  so-called  "  peace  party  "  in  the  North,  and  had  stood 
as  Democratic  candidate  for  Governor  of  Ohio.  This  single  act  of  the 
Washington  Administration  is  sufficient  illustration  of  the  license  it  had 
now  assumed  in  the  insolent  and  giddy  moments  of  military  success,  and 
the  lengths  to  which  it  now  dared  to  go  in  defying  the  Constitution,  and 
involving  the  liberties  of  its  own  people  with  the  designs  of  the  war.* 

*  The  following  correspondence,  with  reference  to  the  case  of  Mr.  Vallandigham,  discusses  the 
whole  subject  of  Military  Arrests,  and  covers  a  topic  in  the  war  so  large  and  important,  that  a  full 
copy  of  it  is  afforded  for  the  reference  of  the  reader : 
"  To  His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States  : 

"  The  undersigned,  officers  of  a  public  meeting  held  at  the  city  of  Albany  on  the  sixteenth  day  of 
May,  instant,  herewith  transmit  to  your  Excellency  a  copy  of  the  resolutions  adopted  at  the  said 
30 


466  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

It  is  true  that  the  outrage  upon  Mr.  Vallandigham,  and,  through  him, 
upon  the  whole  body  of  American  liberties,  was  the  occasion  of  some  forcible 

meeting,  and  respectfully  request  your  earnest  consideration  of  them.  They  deem  it  proper  on  their 
personal  responsibility  to  state  that  the  meeting  was  one  of  the  most  respectable  as  to  numbers  and 
character,  and  one  of  the  most  earnest  in  the  support  of  the  Union  ever  held  in  this  city. 

"  Yours,  with  great  regard, 

"  ERASTUS  CORNING,  President. 

"  RESOLUTIONS. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Democrats  of  New  York  point  to  their  uniform  course  of  action  during  the 
two  years  of  civil  war  through  which  we  have  passed,  to  the  alacrity  which  they  have  evinced  in  fill 
ing  the  ranks  of  the  army,  to  their  contributions  and  sacrifices,  as  the  evidence  of  their  patriotism 
and  devotion  to  the  cause  of  our  imperilled  country.  Never  in  the  history  of  civil  wars  has  a  gov 
ernment  been  sustained  with  such  ample  resources  of  means  and  men  as  the  people  have  voluntarily 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Administration. 

"  Resolved,  That  as  Democrats  we  are  determined  to  maintain  this  patriotic  attitude,  and,  despite 
of  adverse  and  disheartening  circumstances,  to  devote  all  our  energies  to  sustain  the  cause  of  the 
Union,  to  secure  peace  through  victory,  and  to  bring  back  the  restoration  of  all  the  States  under  the 
safeguards  of  the  Constitution. 

"  Resolved,  That  while  we  will  not  consent  to  be  misapprehended  upon  these  points,  we  are  deter 
mined  not  to  be  misunderstood  in  regard  to  others  not  less  essential.  We  demand  that  the  Admin 
istration  shall  be  true  to  the  Constitution ;  shall  recognize  and  maintain  the  rights  of  the  States  and 
the  liberties  of  the  citizen ;  shall  everywhere,  outside  of  the  lines  of  necessary  military  occupation 
and  the  scenes  of  insurrection,  exert  all  its  powers  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  civil  over  mili 
tary  law. 

"  Resolved,  That  in  view  of  these  principles  we  denounce  the  recent  assumption  of  a  military  com 
mander  to  seize  and  try  a  citizen  of  Ohio,  Clement  L.  Vallandigham,  for  no  other  reason  than  words 
addressed  to  a  public  meeting,  in  criticism  of  the  course  of  the  Administration,  and  in  condemnation 
of  the  military  orders  of  that  General. 

"  Resolved,  That  this  assumption  of  power  by  a  military  tribunal,  if  successfully  asserted,  not 
only  abrogates  the  right  of  the  people  to  assemble  and  discuss  the  affairs  of  government,  the  liberty 
of  speech  and  of  the  press,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  the  law  of  evidence,  and  the  privilege  of  habeas 
corpus,  but  it  strikes  a  fatal  blow  at  the  supremacy  of  law,  and  the  authority  of  the  State  and  fed 
eral  constitutions. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States — the  supreme  law  of  the  land — has 
defined  the  crime  of  treason  against  the  United  States  to  consist  '  only  in  levying  war  against  them, 
or  adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  comfort ; '  and  has  provided  that  '  no  person 
shall  be  convicted  of  treason,  unless  on  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act,  or  on 
confession  in  open  court.'  And  it  further  provides  that  '  no  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a 
capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except 
in  cases  arising  in  the  land  and  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia,  when  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war 
or  public  danger  ;'  and  further,  that  'in  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right 
of  a  speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  and  district  wherein  the  crime  was  com 
mitted.' 

"  Resolved,  That  these  safeguards  of  the  rights  of  the  citizen  against  the  pretensions  of  arbitrary 
power  were  intended  more  especially  for  his  protection  in  times  of  civil  commotion.  They  were 
secured  substantially  to  the  English  people,  after  years  of  protracted  civil  war,  and  were  adopted  into 
our  Constitution  at  the  close  of  the  Revolution.  They  have  stood  the  test  of  seventy-six  years  of 
trial,  under  our  republican  system,  under  circumstances  which  show  that,  while  they  constitute  the 
foundation  of  all  free  government,  they  are  the  elements  of  the  enduring  stability  of  the  republic. 

"  Resolved,  That,  in  adopting  the  language  of  Daniel  Webster,  we  declare,  '  it  is  the  ancient  and 
undoubted  prerogative  of  this  people  to  canvass  public  measures  and  the  merits  of  public  men.'  It 


AKREST   OF   VALLANDIGHAM.  467 

expressions  of  public  indignation.  A  Democratic  meeting  in  New  Jersey 
resolved  "  that  in  the  illegal  seizure  and  banishment  of  the  Hon.  C.  L. 

is  a  '  home-bred  right,'  a  fireside  privilege.  It  has  been  enjoyed  in  every  house,  cottage,  and  cabin 
in  the  nation.  It  is  as  undoubted  as  the  right  of  breathing  the  air  or  walking  on  the  earth.  Belong 
ing  to  private  life  as  a  right,  it  belongs  to  public  life  as  a  duty,  and  it  is  the  last  duty  which  those 
whose  representatives  we  are  shall  find  us  to  abandon.  Aiming  at  all  times  to  be  courteous  and  tem 
perate  in  its  use,  except  when  the  right  itself  is  questioned,  we  shall  place  ourselves  on  the  extreme 
boundary  of  our  own  right,  and  bid  defiance  to  any  arm  that  would  move  us  from  our  ground. 
'  This  high  constitutional  privilege  we  shall  defend  and  exercise  in  all  places — in  tune  of  peace,  in 
time  of  war,  and  at  all  times.  Living,  we  shall  assert  it ;  and  should  we  leave  no  other  inheritance 
to  our  children,  by  the  blessing  of  God  we  will  leave  them  the  inheritance  of  free  principles  and  the 
example  of  a  manly,  independent,  and  constitutional  defence  of  them.' 

"  Resolved,  That  in  the  election  of  Governor  Seymour,  the  people  of  this  State,  by  an  emphatic 
majority,  declared  their  condemnation  of  the  system  of  arbitrary  arrests  and  their  determination  to 
stand  by  the  Constitution.  That  the  revival  of  this  lawless  system  can  have  but  one  result — to 
divide  and  distract  the  North,  and  destroy  its  confidence  in  the  purposes  of  the  Administration. 
That  we  deprecate  it  as  an  element  of  confusion  at  home,  of  weakness  to  our  armies  in  the  field,  and 
as  calculated  to  lower  the  estimate  of  American  character  and  magnify  the  apparent  peril  of  our 
cause  abroad.  And  that,  regarding  the  blow  struck  at  a  citizen  of  Ohio  as  aimed  at  the  rights  of 
every  citizen  of  the  North,  we  denounce  it  as  against  the  spirit  of  our  laws  and  Constitution,  and 
most  earnestly  call  upon  the  President  of  the  United  States  to  reverse  the  action  of  the  military  tribu 
nal  which  has  passed  a  *  cruel  and  unusual  punishment '  upon  the  party  arrested,  prohibited  in  terms 
by  the  Constitution,  and  to  restore  him  to  the  liberty  of  which  he  has  been  deprived. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  President,  Yice-Presidents,  and  Secretary  of  this  meeting  be  requested  to 
transmit  a  copy  of  these  resolutions  to  his  Excellency  the  President  of  the  United  States,  with  the 
assurance  of  this  meeting  of  their  hearty  and  earnest  desire  to  support  the  Government  in  every  con 
stitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  existing  rebellion. 


"PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S  REPLY. 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  June  12,  1863. 
u  Hon.  Erastus  Corning  and  others: 

"  GENTLEMEN  :  Your  letter  of  May  19th,  inclosing  the  resolutions  of  a  public  meeting  held  at 
Albany,  New  York,  on  the  16th  of  the  same  month,  was  received  several  days  ago. 

"  The  resolutions,  as  I  understand  them,  are  resolvable  into  two  propositions— first,  the  expres 
sion  of  a  purpose  to  sustain  the  cause  of  the  Union,  to  secure  peace  through  victory,  and  to  support 
the  Administration  hi  every  constitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  rebellion  ;  and  second 
ly,  a  declaration  of  censure  upon  the  Administration  for  supposed  unconstitutional  action,  such  as 
the  making  of  military  arrests.  And  from  the  two  propositions  a  third  is  deduced,  which  is,  that 
the  gentlemen  composing  the  meeting  are  resolved  on  doing  their  part  to  maintain  our  common  Gov 
ernment  and  country,  despite  the  folly  or  wickedness,  as  they  may  conceive,  of  any  Administration. 
This  position  is  eminently  patriotic,  and  as  such,  I  thank  the  meeting  and  congratulate  the  nation 
for  it.  My  own  purpose  is  the  same  ;  so  that  the  meeting  and  myself  have  a  common  object,  and  can 
have  no  difference,  except  in  the  choice  of  means  or  measures  for  effecting  that  object. 

"  And  here  I  ought  to  close  this  paper,  and  would  close  it,  if  there  were  no  apprehension  that 
more  injurious  consequences  than  any  merely  personal  to  myself  might  follow  the  censures  systemat 
ically  cast  upon  me  for  doing  what,  in  my  view  of  duty,  I  could  not  forbear.  The  resolutions  prom 
ise  to  support  me  hi  every  constitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  rebellion  ;  and  I  have 
not  knowingly  employed,  nor  shall  knowingly  employ,  any  other.  But  the  meeting,  by  their  resolu 
tions,  assert  and  argue  that  certain  military  arrests,  and  proceedings  following  them,  for  which  I  am 
ultimately  responsible,  are  unconstitutional.  I  think  they  are  not.  The  resolutions  quote  from  the 


468  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Vallandigham,  the  laws  of  the  country  have  been  outraged,  the  name  of 
the  United  States  disgraced,  and  the  rights  of  every  citizen  menaced,  and 

Constitution  the  definition  of  treason,  and  also  the  limiting  safeguards  and  guarantees  therein  pro- 
Tided  for  the  citizen  on  trial  for  treason,  and  on  his  being  held  to  answer  for  capital  or  otherwise 
infamous  crimes,  and,  in  criminal  prosecutions,  his  right  to  a  speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  impartial 
jury.  They  proceed  to  resolve  '  that  these  safeguards  of  the  rights  of  the  citizens  against  the  pre 
tensions  of  arbitrary  power  were  intended  more  especially  for  his  protection  in  times  of  civil  commo 
tion.'  And,  apparently  to  demonstrate  the  proposition,  the  resolutions  proceed  :  '  They  were  secured 
substantially  to  the  English  people  after  years  of  protracted  civil  war,  and  were  adopted  into  our 
Constitution  at  the  close  of  the  Revolution.'  Would  not  the  demonstration  have  been  better,  if  it 
could  have  been  truly  said  that  these  safeguards  had  been  adopted  and  applied  during  the  civil  wars 
and  during  our  Revolution,  instead  of  after  the  one  and  at  the  close  of  the  other  ?  I,  too,  am  devo 
tedly  for  them  after  civil  war,  and  before  civil  war,  and  at  all  tunes,  '  except  when,  in  cases  of  rebel 
lion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require '  their  suspension.  The  resolutions  proceed  to  tell  us 
that  these  safeguards  '  have  stood  the  test  of  seventy-six  years  of  trial,  under  our  republican  system, 
under  circumstances  which  show  that  while  they  constitute  the  foundation  of  all  free  government, 
they  are  the  elements  of  the  enduring  stability  of  the  republic.'  No  one  denies  that  they  have  so 
stood  the  test  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  present  rebellion,  if  we  accept  a  certain  occurrence  at  New 
Orleans  ;  nor  does  any  one  question  that  they  will  stand  the  same  test  much  longer  after  the  rebel 
lion  closes.  But  these  provisions  of  the  Constitution  have  no  application  to  the  case  we  have  in 
hand,  because  the  arrests  complained  of  were  not  made  for  treason — that  is,  not  for  the  treason 
defined  in  the  Constitution,  and  upon  the  conviction  of  which  the  punishment  is  death ;  nor  were 
the  proceedings  following,  in  any  constitutional  or  legal  sense,  '  criminal  prosecutions.'  The  arrests 
were  made  on  totally  different  grounds,  and  the  proceedings  following  accorded  with  the  grounds  of 
the  arrests.  Let  us  consider  the  real  case  with  which  we  are  dealing,  and  apply  to  it  the  parts  of 
the  Constitution  plainly  made  for  such  cases. 

"  Prior  to  my  installation  here  it  had  been  inculcated  that  any  State  had  a  lawful  right  to  secede 
from  the  Union,  and  that  it  would  be  expedient  to  exercise  the  right  whenever  the  devotees  of  the 
doctrine  should  fail  to  elect  a  President  to  their  own  liking.  I  was  elected  contrary  to  their  liking ; 
and  accordingly,  so  far  as  it  was  legally  possible,  they  had  taken  seven  States  out  of  the  Union,  had 
seized  many  of  the  United  States  forts,  and  had  fired  upon  the  United  States  flag,  all  before  I  was 
inaugurated,  and,  of  course,  before  I  had  done  any  official  act  whatever.  The  rebellion  thus  begun 
soon  ran  into  the  present  civil  war  ;  and,  in  certain  respects,  it  begun  on  very  unequal  terms  between 
the  parties.  The  insurgents  had  been  preparing  for  it  more  than  thirty  years,  while  the  Government 
had  taken  no  steps  to  resist  them.  The  former  had  carefully  considered  all  the  means  which  could 
be  turned  to  their  account.  It  undoubtedly  was  a  well-pondered  reliance  with  them  that  in  their  own 
unrestricted  efforts  to  destroy  Union,  Constitution,  and  law,  all  together,  the  Government  would,  in 
great  degree,  be  restrained  by  the  same  Constitution  and  law  from  arresting  their  progress.  Their 
sympathizers  pervaded  all  departments  of  the  Government  and  nearly  all  communities  of  the  people. 
From  this  material,  under  cover  of  '  liberty  of  speech,'  '  liberty  of  the  press,'  and  habeas  corpus,  they 
hoped  to  keep  on  foot  amongst  us  a  most  efficient  corps  of  spies,  informers,  suppliers,  and  aiders  and 
abettors  of  their  cause  in  a  thousand  ways.  They  knew  that  in  times  such  as  they  were  inaugurat 
ing,  by  the  Constitution  itself,  the  habeas  corpus  might  be  suspended  ;  but  they  also  knew  they  had 
friends  who  would  make  a  question  as  to  who  was  to  suspend  it ;  meanwhile  their  spies  and  others 
might  remain  at  large  to  help  on  their  cause.  Or  if,  as  has  happened,  the  executive  should  suspend 
the  writ,  without  ruinous  waste  of  time,  instances  of  arresting  innocent  persons  might  occur,  as  are 
always  likely  to  occur  in  such  cases ;  and  then  a  clamor  could  be  raised  in  regard  to  this,  which 
might  be,  at  least,  of  some  service  to  the  insurgent  cause.  It  needed  no  very  keen  perception  to  dis 
cover  this  part  of  the  .enemy's  programme  so  soon  as  by  open  hostilities  their  machinery  was  fairly 
put  in  motion.  Yet,  thoroughly  imbued  with  a  reverence  for  the  guaranteed  rights  of  individuals,  I 
was  slow  to  adopt  the  strong  measures  which  by  degrees  I  have  been  forced  to  regard  as  being  with 
in  the  exceptions  of  the  Constitution  and  as  indispensable  to  the  public  safety.  Nothing  is  better 


DEMOCRATIC   PROTESTS.  469 

that  it  is  now  the  duty  of  a  law-respecting  people  to  demand  of  the 
Administration  that  it  at  once  and  forever  desist  from  such  deeds  of  des- 

known  to  history  than  that  courts  of  justice  are  utterly  incompetent  to  such  cases.  Civil  courts  are 
organized  chiefly  for  trials  of  individuals,  or,  at  most,  a  few  individuals  acting  in  concert ;  and  this 
in  quiet  tunes,  and  on  charges  of  crimes  well  defined  in  the  law.  Even  in  times  of  peace,  bands  of 
horse-thieves  and  robbers  frequently  grow  too  numerous  and  powerful  for  the  ordinary  courts  of  jus 
tice.  But  what  comparison  in  numbers  have  such  bands  ever  borne  to  the  insurgent  sympathizers 
even  in  many  of  the  loyal  States  ?  Again,  a  jury  too  frequently  has  at  least  one  member  more  ready 
to  hang  the  panel  than  to  hang  the  traitor.  And  yet,  again,  he  who  dissuades  one  man  from  volun 
teering,  or  induces  one  soldier  to  desert,  weakens  the  Union  cause  as  much  as  he  who  kills  a  Union 
soldier  in  battle.  Yet  this  dissuasion  or  inducement  may  be  so  conducted  as  to  be  no  defined  crime 
of  which  any  civil  court  would  take  cognizance. 

"  Ours  is  a  case  of  rebellion — so  called  by  the  resolutions  before  me — in  fact,  a  clear,  flagrant, 
and  gigantic  case  of  rebellion  ;  and  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  that  '  the  privilege  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended  unless  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public 
safety  may  require  it,'  is  the  provision  which  specially  applies  to  our  present  case.  This  provision 
plainly  attests  the  understanding  of  those  who  made  the  Constitution,  that  ordinary  courts  of  justice 
are  inadequate  to  '  cases  of  rebellion ' — attests  their  purpose  that,  in  such  cases,  men  may  be  held  in 
custody  whom  the  courts,  acting  on  ordinary  rules,  would  discharge.  Habeas  corpus  does  not  dis 
charge  men  who  are  proved  to  be  guilty  of  defined  crime ;  and  its  suspension  is  allowed  by  the  Con 
stitution  on  purpose  that  men  may  be  arrested  and  held  who  cannot  be  proved  to  be  guilty  of  defined 
crime,  '  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require  it.'  This  is  precisely 
our  present  case — a  case  of  rebellion,  wherein  the  public  safety  does  require  the  suspension.  In 
deed,  arrests  by  process  of  courts,  and  arrests  in  cases  of  rebellion,  do  not  proceed  together  alto 
gether  upon  the  same  basis.  The  former  is  directed  at  the  small  percentage  of  ordinary  and  con 
tinuous  perpetration  of  crime,  while  the  latter  is  directed  at  sudden  and  extensive  uprisings  against 
the  government,  which,  at  most,  will  succeed  or  fail  in  no  great  length  of  time.  In  the  latter  case, 
arrests  are  made,  not  so  much  for  what  has  been  done  as  for  what  probably  would  be  done.  The 
latter  is  more  for  the  preventive  and  less  for  the  vindictive  than  the  former.  In  such  cases  the  pur 
poses  of  men  are  much  more  easily  understood  than  in  cases  of  ordinary  crime.  The  man  who 
stands  by  and  says  nothing  when  the  peril  of  his  government  is  discussed  cannot  be  misunderstood. 
If  not  hindered,  he  is  sure  to  help  the  enemy  ;  much  more,  if  he  talks  ambiguously — talks  for  his 
country  with  '  buts,'  and  '  ifs,'  and  '  ands.'  Of  how  little  value  the  constitutional  provisions  I  have 
quoted  will  be  rendered,  if  arrests  shall  never  be  made  until  defined  crimes  shall  have  been  com 
mitted,  may  be  illustrated  by  a  few  notable  examples.  General  John  C.  Breckinridge,  General  Rob 
ert  E.  Lee,  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  General  John  B.  Magruder,  General  William  B.  Preston, 
General  Simon  B.  Buckner,  and  Commodore  Franklin  Buchanan,  now  occupying  the  very  highest 
places  in  the  rebel  war  service,  were  all  within  the  power  of  the  government  since  the  rebellion 
began,  and  were  nearly  as  well  known  to  be  traitors  then  as  now.  Unquestionably,  if  we  had  seized 
and  held  them,  the  insurgent  cause  would  be  much  weaker.  But  no  one  of  them  had  then  com 
mitted  any  crime  defined  in  the  law.  Every  one  of  them,  if  arrested,  would  have  been  discharged  on 
habeas  corpus,  were  the  writ  allowed  to  operate.  In  view  of  these  and  similar  cases,  I  think  the 
time  not  unlikely  to  come  when  I  shall  be  blamed  for  having  made  too  few  arrests  rather  than  too 
many. 

"  By  the  third  resolution,  the  meeting  indicate  their  opinion  that  military  arrests  may  be  consti 
tutional  in  localities  where  rebellion  actually  exists,  but  that  such  arrests  are  unconstitutional  ia 
localities  where  rebellion  or  insurrection  does  not  actually  exist.  They  insist  that  such  arrests  shall 
not  be  made  '  outside  of  the  lines  of  necessary  military  occupation  and  the  scenes  of  insurrection.' 
Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  Constitution  itself  makes  no  such  distinction,  I  am  unable  to  believe  that 
there  is  any  such  constitutional  distinction.  I  concede  that  the  class  of  arrests  complained  of  can 
be  constitutional  only  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  may  require  them  ; 
and  I  insist  that  in  such  cases  they  are  constitutional  wherever  the  public  safety  does  require  them, 


470  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

potism  and  crime."  To  a  meeting  in  Philadelphia,  Mr.  Fernando  Wood 
wrote  :  "  Do  not  let  us  forget  that  those  who  perpetrate  such  outrages  as 

as  well  in  places  to  which  they  may  prevent  the  rebellion  extending  as  in  those  where  it  may 
be  already  prevailing ;  as  well  where  they  may  restrain  mischievous  interference  with  the  raising 
and  supplying  of  armies  to  suppress  the  rebellion,  as  where  the  rebellion  may  actually  be  ;  as  well 
where  they  may  restrain  the  enticing  men  out  of  the  army,  as  where  they  would  prevent  mutiny  in 
the  army ;  equally  constitutional  at  all  places  where  they  will  conduce  to  the  public  safety,  as 
against  the  dangers  of  rebellion  or  invasion.  Take  the  particular  case  mentioned  by  the  meeting. 
It  is  asserted,  in  substance,  that  Mr.  Vallandigham  was,  by  a  military  commander,  seized  and  tried 
'  for  no  other  reason  than  words  addressed  to  a  public  meeting,  in  criticism  of  the  course  of  the 
Administration,  and  in  condemnation  of  the  military  orders  of  the  general.'  Now,  if  there  be  no 
mistake  about  this — if  this  assertion  is  the  truth  and  the  whole  truth — if  there  was  no  other  reason 
for  the  arrest,  then  I  concede  that  the  arrest  was  wrong.  But  the  arrest,  as  I  understand,  was  made 
for  a  very  different  reason.  Mr.  Vallandigham  avows  his  hostility  to  the  war  on  the  part  of  the  Union ; 
and  his  arrest  was  made  because  he  was  labouring,  with  some  effect,  to  prevent  the  raising  of  troops, 
to  encourage  desertions  from  the  army,  and  to  leave  the  rebellion  without  an  adequate  military  force 
to  suppress  it.  He  was  not  arrested  because  he  was  damaging  the  political  prospects  of  the  Adminis 
tration,  or  the  personal  interests  of  the  commanding  general,  but  because  he  was  damaging  the  army, 
upon  the  existence  and  vigour  of  which  the  life  of  the  nation  depends.  He  was  warring  upon  the 
military,  and  this  gave  the  military  constitutional  jurisdiction  to  lay  hands  upon  him.  If  Mr.  Vallan 
digham  was  not  damaging  the  power  of  the  country,  then  his  arrest  was  made  on  mistake  of  fact, 
which  I  would  be  glad  to  correct  on  reasonably  satisfactory  evidence. 

"  I  understand  the  meeting,  whose  resolutions  I  am  now  considering,  to  be  in  favour  of  suppress 
ing  the  rebellion  by  military  force — by  armies.  Long  experience  has  shown  that  armies  cannot  be 
maintained  unless  desertion  shall  be  punished  by  the  severe  penalty  of  death.  The  case  requires, 
and  the  law  and  the  Constitution  sanction,  this  punishment.  Must  I  shoot  a  simple-minded  soldier 
boy  who  deserts,  while  I  must  not  touch  a  hair  of  a  wily  agitator  who  induces  him  to  desert  ?  This 
is  none  the  less  injurious  when  effected  by  getting  a  father  or  brother  or  friend  into  a  public  meet 
ing,  and  there  working  upon  his  feelings  till  he  is  persuaded  to  write  the  soldier  boy  that  he  is 
fighting  in  a  bad  cause,  for  a  wicked  administration  of  a  contemptible  government,  too  weak  to 
arrest  and  punish  him  if  he  shall  desert.  I  think  that  in  such  a  case  to  silence  the  agitator  and  save 
the  boy  is  not  only  constitutional,  but  withal  a  great  mercy. 

"  If  I  be  wrong  on  this  question  of  constitutional  power,  my  errour  lies  in  believing  that  certain 
proceedings  are  constitutional  when,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  requires  them, 
which  would  not  be  constitutional  when,  in  absence  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the  public  safety  does 
not  require  them.  In  other  words,  that  the  Constitution  is  not  in  its  application  in  all  respects  the 
same,  in  cases  of  rebellion  or  invasion  involving  the  public  safety,  as  it  is  in  times  of  profound  peace 
and  public  security.  The  Constitution  itself  makes  the  distinction  ;  and  I  can  no  more  be  persuaded 
that  the  government  can  constitutionally  take  no  strong  measures  in  time  of  rebellion,  because  it 
can  be  shown  that  the  same  could  not  be  lawfully  taken  in  time  of  peace,  than  I  can  be  persuaded 
that  a  particular  drug  is  not  good  medicine  for  a  sick  man,  because  it  can  be  shown  not  to  be  good 
food  for  a  well  one.  Nor  am  I  able  to  appreciate  the  danger  apprehended  by  the  meeting  that  the 
American  people  will,  by  means  of  military  arrests  during  the  rebellion,  lose  the  right  of  public  dis 
cussion,  the  liberty  of  speech  and  the  press,  law  of  evidence,  trial  by  jury  and  habeas  corpus, 
throughout  the  indefinite  peaceful  future,  which  I  trust  lies  before  them,  any  more  than  I  am  able 
to  believe  that  a  man  could  contract  so  strong  an  appetite  for  emetics  during  temporary  illness  as  to 
persist  in  feeding  upon  them  during  the  remainder  of  his  healthful  life. 

"  In  giving  the  resolutions  that  earnest  consideration  which  you  request  of  me,  I  cannot  over 
look  the  fact  that  the  meeting  speak  as  *  democrats.'  Nor  can  I,  with  full  respect  for  their  known 
intelligence,  and  the  fairly  presumed  deliberation  with  which  they  prepared  their  resolutions,  be  per 
mitted  to  suppose  that  this  occurred  by  accident,  or  in  any  way  other  than  that  they  preferred  to 
designate  themselves  '  democrats '  rather  than  '  American  citizens.'  In  this  time  of  national  peril  I 


DEMOCRATIC   PROTESTS.  471 

the  arrest  and  banishment  of  Mr.  Vallandigham  do  so  as  necessary  war 
measures.  Let  us,  therefore,  strike  at  the  cause  and  declare  for  peace  and 

would  have  preferred  to  meet  you  upon  a  level  one  step  higher  than  any  party  platform,  because  I 
am  sure  that,  from  such  more  elevated  position,  we  could  do  better  battle  for  the  country  we  all  love 
than  we  possibly  can  from  those  lower  ones  where,  from  the  force  of  habit,  the  prejudices  of  the 
past  and  selfish  hopes  of  the  future,  we  are  sure  to  expend  much  of  our  ingenuity  and  strength  in 
finding  fault  with  and  aiming  blows  at  each  other.  But  since  you  have  denied  me  this,  I  will  yet  be 
thankful,  for  the  country's  sake,  that  not  all  democrats  have  done  so.  He  on  whose  discretionary 
judgment  Mr.  Vallandigham  was  arrested  and  tried  is  a  democrat,  having  no  old  party  affinity  with 
me  ;  and  the  judge  who  rejected  the  constitutional  view  expressed  in  these  resolutions,  by  refusing 
to  discharge  Mr.  Vallandigham  on  habeas  corpus,  is  a  democrat  of  better  days  than  these,  having  re 
ceived  his  judicial  mantle  at  the  hands  of  President  Jackson.  And  still  more,  of  all  those  demo 
crats  who  are  nobly  exposing  their  lives  and  shedding  their  blood  on  the  battle-field,  I  have  learned 
that  many  approve  the  course  taken  with  Mr.  Vallandigham,  while  I  have  not  heard  of  a  single  one 
condemning  it.  I  cannot  assert  that  there  are  none  such.  And  the  name  of  President  Jackson 
recalls  an  instance  of  pertinent  history.  After  the  battle  of  New  Orleans,  and  while  the  fact  that 
the  treaty  of  peace  had  been  concluded  was  well  known  in  the  city,  but  before  official  knowledge 
of  it  had  arrived,  General  Jackson  still  maintained  martial  or  military  law.  Now  that  it  could  be 
said  the  war  was  over,  the  clamor  against  martial  law,  which  had  existed  from  the  first,  grew  more 
furious.  Among  other  things  a  Mr.  Louaillier  published  a  denunciatory  newspaper  article.  Gen. 
Jackson  arrested  him.  A  lawyer  by  the  name  of  Morel  procured  the  United  States  Judge  Hall  to 
order  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  relieve  Mr.  Louaillier.  Gen.  Jackson  arrested  both  the  lawyer  and 
the  judge.  A  Mr.  Hollander  ventured  to  say  of  some  part  of  the  matter  that '  it  was  a  dirty  trick.' 
Gen.  Jackson  arrested  him.  When  the  officer  undertook  to  serve  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  Gen. 
Jackson  took  it  from  him,  and  sent  him  away  with  a  copy.  Holding  the  judge  in  custody  a  few 
days,  the  General  sent  him  beyond  the  limits  of  his  encampment,  and  set  him  at  liberty,  with  an 
order  to  remain  till  the  ratification  of  peace  should  be  regularly  announced,  or  until  the  British 
should  have  left  the  Southern  coast.  A  day  or  two  more  elapsed,  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of 
peace  was  regularly  announced,  and  the  judge  and  others  were  fully  liberated.  A  few  days  more, 
and  the  judge  called  Gen.  Jackson  into  court  and  fined  him  a  thousand  dollars  for  having  arrested 
him  and  the  others  named.  The  General  paid  the  fine,  and  there  the  matter  rested  for  nearly  thirty 
years,  when  Congress  refunded  principal  and  interest.  The  late  Senator  Douglas,  then  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  took  a  leading  part  in  the  debates,  in  which  the  constitutional  question  was 
much  discussed.  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  whom  the  journals  would  show  to  have  voted  for  the 
measure. 

"  It  may  be  remarked,  first,  that  we  had  the  same  Constitution  then  as  now  ;  secondly,  that  we 
then  had  a  case  of  invasion,  and  now  we  have  a  case  of  rebellion  ;  and  thirdly,  that  the  permanent 
right  of  the  people  to  public  discussion,  the  liberty  of  speech  and  the  press,  the  trial  by  jury,  the 
law  of  evidence,  and  the  habeas  corpus,  suffered  no  detriment  whatever  by  that  conduct  of  Gen. 
Jackson,  or  its  subsequent  approval  by  the  American  Congress. 

"  And  yet,  let  me  say  that,  in  my  own  discretion,  I  do  not  know  whether  I  would  have  ordered 
the  arrest  of  Mr.  Vallandigham.  While  I  cannot  shift  the  responsibility  from  myself,  I  hold  that, 
as  a  general  rule,  the  commander  in  the  field  is  the  better  judge  of  the  necessity  in  any  particular 
case.  Of  course,  I  must  practise  a  general  directory  and  revisory  power  in  the  matter. 

"  One  of  the  resolutions  expresses  the  opinion  of  the  meeting  that  arbitrary  arrests  will  have 
the  effect  to  divide  and  distract  those  who  should  be  united  in  suppressing  the  rebellion,  and  I  am 
specifically  called  on  to  discharge  Mr.  Vallandigham.  I  regard  this  as,  at  least,  a  fair  appeal  to  me 
on  the  expediency  of  exercising  a  constitutional  power  which  I  think  exists.  In  response  to  such 
appeal  I  have  to  say,  it  gave  me  pain  when  I  learned  that  Mr.  Vallandigham  had  been  arrested — 
that  is,  I  was  pained  that  there  should  have  seemed  to  be  a  necessity  for  arresting  him — and  that  it 
will  afford  me  great  pleasure  to  discharge  him  so  soon  as  I  can,  by  any  means,  believe  the  public 
safety  will  not  suffer  by  it.  I  further  say  that,  as  the  war  progresses,  it  appears  to  me,  opinion  and 


472  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

against  the  war."  But  these  protests  were  within  narrow  limits ;  they 
effected  nothing ;  they  were  absolutely  worthless.  The  savage  wit  of 

action,  which  were  in  great  confusion  at  first,  take  shape  and  fall  into  more  regular  channels,  so 
that  the  necessity  for  strong  dealing  with  them  gradually  decreases.  I  have  every  reason  to  desire 
that  it  should  cease  altogether,  and  far  from  the  least  is  my  regard  for  the  opinions  and  wishes  of 
those  who,  like  the  meeting  at  Albany,  declare  their  purpose  to  sustain  the  Government  in  every 
constitutional  and  lawful  measure  to  suppress  the  rebellion.  Still  I  must  continue  to  do  so  much 
as  may  seem  to  be  required  by  the  public  safety.  A.  LINCOLN." 


REPLY  OF  THE  ALBANY  DEMOCRACY. 

"  To  His  Excellency  Abraham  Lincoln,  President  of  the  United  States : 

"  SIR  :  Your  answer,  which  has  appeared  in  the  public  prints,  to  the  resolutions  adopted  at  a 
recent  meeting  in  the  city  of  Albany  affirming  the  personal  rights  and  liberties  of  the  citizens  of 
this  country,  has  been  referred  to  the  undersigned,  the  committee  who  prepared  and  reported  those 
resolutions.  The  subject  will  now  receive  from  us  some  further  attention,  which  your  answer  seems 
to  justify,  if  not  to  invite.  We  hope  not  to  appear  wanting  hi  the  respect  due  to  your  high  posi 
tion  if  we  reply  with  a  freedom  and  earnestness  suggested  by  the  infinite  gravity  and  importance 
of  the  questions  upon  which  you  have  thought  proper  to  take  issue  at  the  bar  of  public  opinion. 

"  You  seem  to  be  aware  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  you  have  sworn  to 
protect  and  defend,  contains  the  following  guarantees,  to  which  we  again  ask  your  attention  :  First. 
Congress  shall  make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press.  Second.  The  right 
of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons  against  unreasonable  seizures  shall  not  be  violated,  and 
no  warrant  shall  issue  but  upon  probable  cause  supported  by  oath.  Third.  No  person,  except  sol 
diers  and  mariners  in  the  service  of  the  Government,  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital  or  infa 
mous  crime,  unless  on  presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  nor  shall  any  person  be  deprived 
of  life,  liberty,  or  property  without  due  process  of  law.  Fourth.  In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the 
accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  of  a  speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  or  district 
in  which  the  crime  shall  have  been  committed,  and  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him. 

"  You  are  also,  no  doubt,  aware  that  on  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  these  invaluable  provi 
sions  were  proposed  by  the  jealous  caution  of  the  States,  and  were  inserted  as  amendments  for  a 
perpetual  assurance  of  liberty  against  the  encroachments  of  power.  From  your  earliest  reading  of 
history,  you  also  know  that  the  great  principles  of  liberty  and  law  which  underlie  these  provisions 
were  derived  to  us  from  the  British  Constitution.  In  that  country  they  were  secured  by  magna 
cfiarta  more  than  six  hundred  years  ago,  and  they  have  been  confirmed  by  many  and  repeated 
statutes  of  the  realm.  A  single  palpable  violation  of  them  in  England  would  not  only  arouse  the 
public  indignation,  but  would  endanger  the  throne  itself.  For  a  persistent  disregard  of  them, 
Charles  the  First  was  dethroned  and  beheaded  by  his  rebellious  subjects. 

"The  fact  has-  already  passed  into  history  that  the  sacred  rights  and  immunities  which  were 
designed  to  be  protected  by  these  constitutional  guarantees  have  not  been  preserved  to  the  people 
during  your  administration.  In  violation  of  the  first  of  them,  the  freedom  of  the  press  has  been 
denied.  In  repeated  instances  newspapers  have  been  suppressed  in  the  loyal  States  because  they 
criticised,  as  constitutionally  they  might,  those  fatal  errours  of  policy  which  have  characterized  the 
conduct  of  public  affairs  since  your  advent  to  power.  In  violation  of  the  second  of  them,  hundreds, 
and  we  believe  thousands,  of  men  have  been  seized  and  immured  in  prisons  and  bastiles,  not  only 
without  warrant  upon  probable  cause,  but  without  any  warrant,  and  for  no  other  cause  than  a  con 
stitutional  exercise  of  the  freedom  of  speech.  In  violation  of  all  these  guarantees,  a  distinguished 
citizen  of  a  peaceful  and  loyal  State  has  been  torn  from  his  home  at  midnight  by  a  band  of  soldiers, 
acting  under  the  order  of  one  of  your  generals,  tried  before  a  military  commission,  without  judge  or 
jury,  convicted  and  sentenced  without  even  the  suggestion  of  any  offence  known  to  the  Constitution 


DEMOCRATIC   PKOTESTS.  473 

John  Mitchel  in  Richmond  had  this  reply  in  one  of  its  journals :  "  This 
would  sound  very  well  if  the  said  '  declaring  for  peace '  could  have  any 

or  laws  of  this  country.  For  all  these  acts  you  avow  yourself  ultimately  responsible.  In  the  spe 
cial  case  of  Mr.  Vallandigham,  the  injustice  commenced  by  your  subordinate  was  consummated  by 
a  sentence  of  exile  from  his  home  pronounced  by  you.  That  great  wrong,  more  than  any  other 
which  preceded  it,  asserts  the  principles  of  a  supreme  despotism. 

"  These  repeated  and  continued  invasions  of  constitutional  liberty  and  private  right  have  occa 
sioned  profound  anxiety  in  the  public  mind.  The  apprehension  and  alarm  which  they  are  calcu 
lated  to  produce  have  been  greatly  enhanced  by  your  attempt  to  justify  them.  Because  in  that 
attempt  you  assume  to  yourself  a  rightful  authority  possessed  by  no  constitutional  monarch  on 
earth.  We  accept  the  declaration  that  you  prefer  to  exercise  this  authority  with  a  moderation  not 
hitherto  exhibited.  But,  believing  as  we  do  that  your  forbearance  is  not  the  tenure  by  which 
liberty  is  enjoyed  in  this  country,  we  propose  to  challenge  the  grounds  on  which  your  claims  of 
supreme  power  are  based.  While  yielding  to  you,  as  a  constitutional  magistrate,  the  deference  to 
which  you  are  entitled,  we  cannot  accord  to  you  the  despotic  power  you  claim,  however  indulgent 
and  gracious  you  may  promise  to  be  in  wielding  it. 

"We  have  carefully  considered  the  grounds  on  which  your  pretensions  to  more  than  legal 
authority  are  claimed  to  rest ;  and  if  we  do  not  misinterpret  the  misty  and  cloudy  forms  of  expres 
sion  in  which  those  pretensions  are  set  forth,  your  meaning  is,  that  while  the  rights  of  the  citizen 
are  protected  by  the  Constitution  in  time  of  peace,  they  are  suspended  or  lost  in  time  of  war,  when 
invasion  or  rebellion  exists.  You  do  not,  like  many  others  in  whose  minds  reason  and  the  love  of 
regulated  liberty  seem  to  be  overthrown  by  the  excitements  of  the  hour,  attempt  to  base  this  con 
clusion  upon  a  supposed  military  necessity  existing  outside  of  and  transcending  the  Constitution, 
a  military  necessity  behind  which  the  Constitution  itself  disappears  in  a  total  eclipse.  We  do  not 
find  this  gigantic  and  monstrous  heresy  put  forth  in  your  plea  for  absolute  power,  but  we  do 
find  another  equally  subversive  of  liberty  and  law,  and  quite  as  certainly  tending  to  the  establish 
ment  of  despotism.  You  claim  to  have  found,  not  outside  but  within  the  Constitution,  a  principle 
or  germ  of  arbitrary  power,  which  in  time  of  war  expands  at  once  into  an  absolute  sovereignty, 
wielded  by  one  man,  so  that  liberty  perishes,  or  is  dependent  on  his  will,  his  discretion,  or  his  caprice. 
This  extraordinary  doctrine  you  claim  to  derive  wholly  from  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  which, 
in  case  of  invasion  or  rebellion,  permits  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  to  be  suspended.  Upon  this 
ground  your  whole  argument  is  based. 

"  You  must  permit  us  to  say  to  you,  with  all  due  respect,  but  with  the  earnestness  demanded  by 
the  occasion,  that  the  American  people  will  never  acquiesce  in  this  doctrine.  In  their  opinion  the 
guarantees  of  the  Constitution  which  secure  to  them  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press,  immunity 
from  arrest  for  offences  unknown  to  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  before  the 
tribunals  provided  by  those  laws,  instead  of  military  commissions  and  drum-head  courts-martial,  are 
living  and  vital  principles  in  peace  and  in  war,  at  all  times  and  under  all  circumstances.  No  sophis 
try  or  argument  can  shake  this  conviction,  nor  will  the  people  require  its  confirmation  by  logical 
sequences  and  deductions.  It  is  a  conviction  deeply  interwoven  with  the  instincts,  the  habits,  and 
the  education  of  our  countrymen.  The  right  to  form  opinions  upon  public  measures  and  men,  and 
to  declare  those  opinions  by  speech  or  writing,  with  the  utmost  latitude  of  expression,  the  right  of 
personal  liberty,  unless  forfeited  according  to  established  laws  and  for  offences  previously  defined  by 
law,  the  right  when  accused  of  crime  to  be  tried  where  law  is  administered,  and  punishment  is  pro 
nounced  only  when  the  crime  is  legally  ascertained  ;  all  these  are  rights  instantly  perceived  without 
argument  or  proof.  No  refinement  of  logic  can  unsettle  them  in  the  minds  of  freemen  ;  no  power 
can  annihilate  them  ;  and  no  force  at  the  command  of  any  chief  magistrate  can  compel  their  sur 
render. 

"  So  far  as  it  is  possible  for  us  to  understand,  from  your  language,  the  mental  process  which  has 
led  you  to  the  alarming  conclusions  indicated  by  your  communication,  it  is  this  :  The  habeas  corpus 
is  a  remedial  writ,  issued  by  courts  and  magistrates  to  inquire  into  the  cause  of  any  imprisonment 
or  restraint  of  liberty,  on  the  return  of  which  and  upon  due  examination  the  person  imprisoned  is 


474:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

effect  whatever  in  bringing  about  pence.  If  a  man  in  falling  from  a  tower 
could  arrest  his  fall  by  declaring  against  it,  then  the  declarations  of  Demo- 
discharged,  if  the  restraint  is  unlawful,  or  admitted  to  bail  if  he  appears  to  have  been  lawfully 
arrested,  and  is  held  to  answer  a  criminal  accusation.  Inasmuch  as  this  process  may  be  suspended 
in  time  of  war,  you  seem  to  think  that  every  remedy  for  a  false  and  unlawful  imprisonment  is  abro 
gated  ;  -and  from  this  postulate  you  reach,  at  a  single  bound,  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  liberty 
under  the  Constitution  which  does  not  depend  on  the  gracious  indulgence  of  the  Executive  only. 
This  great  heresy  once  established,  and  by  this  mode  of  induction  there  springs  at  once  into  exist 
ence  a  brood  of  crimes  or  offences  undefined  by  any  rule,  and  hitherto  unknown  to  the  laws  of  this 
country ;  and  this  is  followed  by  indiscriminate  arrests,  midnight  seizures,  military  commissions, 
unheard-of  modes  of  trial  and  punishment,  and  all  the  machinery  of  terror  and  despotism.  Your 
language  does  not  permit  us  to  doubt  as  to  your  essential  meaning,  for  you  tell  us,  that '  arrests  are 
made  not  so  much  for  what  has  been  done,  as  for  what  probably  would  be  done.'  And,  again : 
'  The  man  who  stands  by  and  says  nothing  when  the  peril  of  his  government  is  discussed,  cannot 
be  misunderstood.  If  not  hindered  (of  course  by  arrest)  he  is  sure  to  help  the  enemy,  and  much 
more  if  he  talks  ambiguously,  talks  for  his  country  with  "  buts  "  and  "  ifs  "  and  "  ands." '  You 
also  tell  us  that  the  arrests  complained  of  have  not  been  made  '  for  the  treason  defined  in  the  Con 
stitution,'  nor  '  for  any  capital  or  otherwise  infamous  crimes,  nor  were  the  proceedings  following  in 
any  constitutional  or  legal  sense  criminal  prosecutions."  The  very  ground,  then,  of  your  justifica 
tion  is,  that  the  victims  of  arbitrary  arrest  were  obedient  to  every  law,  were  guiltless  of  any  known 
and  defined  offence,  and  therefore  were  without  the  protection  of  the  Constitution.  The  suspension 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  instead  of  being  intended  to  prevent  the  enlargement  of  arrested  crim 
inals  until  a  legal  trial  and  conviction  can  be  had,  is  designed,  according  to  your  doctrine,  to  sub 
ject  innocent  men  to  your  supreme  will  and  pleasure.  Silence  itself  is  punishable,  according  to  this 
extraordinary  theory,  and  still  more  so  the  expression  of  opinions,  however  loyal,  if  attended  with 
criticism  upon  the  policy  of  the  government.  We  must  respectfully  refuse  our  assent  to  this  theory 
of  constitutional  law.  We  think  that  men  may  be  rightfully  silent  if  they  so  choose,  while  clam 
orous  and  needy  patriots  proclaim  the  praises  of  those  who  wield  power ;  and  as  to  the  '  buts,'  the 
1  ifs,'  and  the  '  ands,'  these  are  Saxon  words  and  belong  to  the  vocabulary  of  freemen. 

"  We  have  already  said  that  the  intuition  of  a  free  people  instantly  rejects  these  dangerous  and 
unheard-of  doctrines.  It  is  not  our  purpose  to  enter  upon  an  elaborate  and  extended  refutation  of 
them.  We  submit  to  you,  however,  one  or  two  considerations,  in  the  hope  that  you  will  review  the 
subject  with  the  earnest  attention  which  its  supreme  importance  demands.  We  say,  then,  we  are 
not  aware  that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  now  suspended  in  any  of  the  peaceful  and  loyal  States 
of  the  Union.  An  act  of  Congress  approved  by  you  on  the  third  of  March,  1863,  authorized  the 
President  to  suspend  it  during  the  present  rebellion.  That  the  suspension  is  a  legislative  and  not  an 
executive  act,  has  been  held  in  every  judicial  decision  ever  made  in  this  country,  and  we  think  it 
cannot  be  delegated  to  any  other  branch  of  the  government.  But  passing  over  that  consideration, 
you  have  not  exercised  the  power  which  Congress  attempted  to  confer  upon  you,  and  the  writ  is  not 
suspended  in  any  part  of  the  country  where  the  civil  laws  are  in  force.  Now,  inasmuch  as  your 
doctrine  of  the  arbitrary  arrest  and  imprisonment  of  innocent  men,  in  admitted  violation  of  express 
constitutional  guarantees,  is  wholly  derived  from  a  suspension  of  the  habeas  corpus,  the  first  step  to 
be  taken  in  the  ascent  to  absolute  power,  ought  to  be  to  make  it  known  to  the  people  that  the  writ 
is  in  fact  suspended,  to  the  end  that  they  may  know  what  is  their  condition.  You  have  not  yet 
exercised  this  power,  and  therefore,  according  to  your  own  constitutional  thesis,  your  conclusion  falls 
to  the  ground.  It  is  one  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  and  of  the  very  highest  value,  that 
no  ex  post  facto  law  shall  be  passed,  the  meaning  of  which  is,  that  no  act  which  is  not  against  the 
law  when  committed  can  be  made  criminal  by  subsequent  legislation.  But  your  claim  is,  that  when 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  suspended,  you  may  lawfully  imprison  and  punish  for  the  crimes  of 
silence,  of  speech,  and  opinion.  But  as  these  are  not  offences  against  the  known  and  established 
la.w  of  the  land,  the  constitutional  principle  to  which  we  now  refer  plainly  requires  that  you  should, 
before  taking  cognizance  of  such  offences,  make  known  the  rule  of  action,  in  order  that  the  people 


DEMOCRATIC   PROTESTS.  475 

crats  against  the  war  might  be  of  some  avail.  As  it  is,  they  resemble  that 
emphatic  pronouncement  of  Mr.  Washington  Hunt :  '  Let  it  be  proclaimed 

may  be  advised  in  due  season,  so  as  not  to  become  liable  to  its  penalties.  Let  us  turn  your  at 
tention  to  the  most  glaring  and  indefensible  of  all  the  assaults  upon  constitutional  liberty,  which 
have  marked  the  history  of  your  administration.  No  one  has  ever  pretended  that  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  was  suspended  hi  the  State  of  Ohio,  where  the  arrest  of  a  citizen  at  midnight,  already  re 
ferred  to,  was  made,  and  he  placed  before  a  court-martial  for  trial  and  sentence,  upon  charges  and 
specifications  which  admitted  his  innocence  according  to  the  existing  laws  of  this  country.  Upon 
your  own  doctrine,  then,  can  you  hesitate  to  redress  that  monstrous  wrong  ? 

"  But,  sir,  we  cannot  acquiesce  in  your  dogmas  that  arrests  and  imprisonment,  without  warrant 
or  criminal  accusation,  in  their  nature  lawless  and  arbitrary,  opposed  to  the  very  letter  of  constitu 
tional  guarantees,  can  become  in  any  sense  rightful,  by  reason  of  a  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus.  We  deny  that  the  suspension  of  a  single  and  peculiar  remedy  for  such  wrongs  brings  into 
existence  new  and  unknown  classes  of  offences,  or  new  causes  for  depriving  men  of  their  liberty. 
It  is  one  of  the  most  material  purposes  of  that  writ  to  enlarge  upon  bail  persons  who,  upon  prob 
able  cause,  are  duly  and  illegally  charged  with  some  known  crime,  and  a  suspension  of  the  writ  was 
never  asked  for  in  England  or  in  this  country,  except  to  prevent  such  enlargement  when  the  sup 
posed  offence  was  against  the  safety  of  the  government.  In  the  year  1807,  at  the  time  of  Burr's 
alleged  conspiracy,  a  bill  was  passed  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  suspending  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  for  a  limited  tune  in  all  cases  where  persons  were  charged  on  oath  with  treason,  or 
other  high  crime  or  misdemeanor,  endangering  the  peace  or  safety  of  the  government.  But  your 
doctrine  undisguisedly  is,  that  a  suspension  of  this  writ  justifies  arrests  without  warrant,  without 
oath,  and  even  without  suspicion  of  treason  or  other  crime.  Your  doctrine  denies  the  freedom  of 
speech  and  of  the  press.  It  invades  the  sacred  domain  of  opinion  and  discussion.  It  denounces 
the  '  ifs '  and  the  '  buts '  of  the  English  language,  and  even  the  refuge  of  silence  is  insecure. 

"  We  repeat,  a  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  coi'pus  merely  dispenses  with  a  single  and  pecu 
liar  remedy  against  an  unlawful  imprisonment ;  but  if  that  remedy  had  never  existed,  the  right  to 
liberty  would  be  the  same,  and  every  invasion  of  that  right  would  be  condemned  not  only  by  the 
Constitution,  but  by  principles  of  far  greater  antiquity  than  the  writ  itself.  Our  common  law  is  not 
at  all  indebted  to  this  writ  for  its  action  of  false  imprisonment,  and  the  action  would  remain  to  the 
citizen,  if  the  writ  were  abolished  forever.  Again,  every  man,  when  his  life  or  liberty  is  threatened 
without  the  warrant  of  law,  may  lawfully  resist,  and  if  necessary  in  self-defence,  may  take  the  life 
of  the  aggressor.  Moreover,  the  people  of  this  country  may  demand  the  impeachment  of  the  Presi 
dent  himself  for  the  exercise  of  arbitrary  power.  And  when  all  these  remedies  shall  prove  inade 
quate  for  the  protection  of  free  institutions,  there  remains,  in  the  last  resort,  the  supreme  right  of 
revolution.  You  once  announced  this  right  with  a  latitude  of  expression  which  may  well  be  con 
sidered  dangerous  in  the  present  crisis  of  our  national  history.  You  said  :  *  Any  people,  anywhere, 
being  inclined  and  having  the  power,  have  the  right  to  rise  up  and  shake  off  the  existing  govern 
ment,  and  form  a  new  one  that  suits  them  better.  Nor  is  this  right  confined  to  cases  where  the 
people  of  an  existing  government  may  choose  to  exercise  it.  Any  portion  of  such  people  that  can 
may  revolutionize  and  make  their  own  of  so  much  of  their  territory  as  they  inhabit.  More  than 
this,  a  majority  of  any  portion  of  such  people  may  revolutionize,  putting  down  a  minority  inter 
mingled  with  or  near  about  them,  who  may  oppose  their  movements.'  (Vol.  19,  Congressional 
Globe,  p.  94.)  Such  were  your  opinions,  and  you  had  a  constitutional  right  to  declare  them.  If  a 
citizen  now  should  utter  sentiments  far  less  dangerous  in  their  tendency,  your  nearest  military  com 
mander  would  consign  him  to  a  dungeon  or  to  the  tender  mercies  of  a  court-martial,  and  you  would 
approve  the  proceeding. 

"  In  our  deliberate  judgment  the  Constitution  is  not  open  to  the  new  interpretation  suggested  by 
your  communication  now  before  us.  We  think  every  part  of  that  instrument  is  harmonious  and 
consistent.  The  possible  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  consistent  with  freedom  of 
speech  and  of  the  press.  The  suspension  of  that  remedial  process  may  prevent  the  enlargement  of 
the  accused  traitor  or  conspirator  until  he  shall  be  legally  tried  and  convicted  or  acquitted ;  but  in 


476  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

upon  the  house-tops  that  no  citizen  of  New  York  shall  be  arrested  without 
process  of  law.'  There  is  no  use  in  bawling  from  the  house-tops  what 

this  we  find  no  justification  for  arrest  and  imprisonment  without  warrant,  without  cause,  without  the 
accusation  or  suspicion  of  crime.  It  seems  to  us,  moreover,  too  plain  for  argument,  that  the  sacred 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  and  in  courts  where  the  law  of  the  land  is  the  rule  of  decision,  is  a  right 
which  is  never  dormant,  never  suspended,  in  peaceful  and  loyal  communities  and  States.  Will  you, 
Mr.  President,  maintain,  that  because  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  may  be  in  suspense,  you  can  substi 
tute  soldiers  and  bayonets  for  the  peaceful  operation  of  the  laws ;  military  commissions,  and  inquis 
itorial  modes  of  trial  for  the  courts  and  juries  prescribed  by  the  Constitution  itself  ?  And  if  you 
cannot  maintain  this,  then  let  us  ask  where  is  the  justification  for  the  monstrous  proceeding  in  the 
case  of  a  citizen  of  Ohio,  to  which  we  have  called  your  attention  ?  We  know  that  a  recreant  judge, 
whose  name  has  already  descended  to  merited  contempt,  found  the  apology  on  the  outside  of  the 
supreme  and  fundamental  law  of  the  Constitution.  But  this  is  not  the  foundation  on  which  your 
superstructure  of  power  is  built.  We  have  mentioned  the  act  of  the  last  Congress  professing  to 
authorize  a  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  This  act  now  demands  your  special  attention, 
because  if  we  are  not  greatly  in  error,  its  terms  and  plain  intention  are  directly  opposed  to  all  the 
arguments  and  conclusions  of  your  communication.  That  act,  besides  providing  that  the  habeas 
corpus  may  be  suspended,  expressly  commanded  that  the  names  of  all  persons  theretofore  or  thereafter 
arrested  by  authority  of  the  President,  or  his  cabinet  ministers,  being  citizens  of  States  in  which  the 
administration  of  the  laws  has  continued  unimpaired,  shall  be  returned  to  the  courts  of  the  United 
States  for  the  districts  in  which  such  persons  reside,  or  in  which  their  supposed  offences  were  com 
mitted  ;  and  such  return  being  made,  if  the  next  grand  jury  attending  the  courts  does  not  indict  the 
alleged  offenders,  then  the  judges  are  commanded  to  issue  an  order  for  their  immediate  discharge 
from  imprisonment.  Now,  we  cannot  help  asking  whether  you  have  overlooked  this  law,  which 
most  assuredly  you  are  bound  to  observe,  or  whether  it  be  your  intention  to  disregard  it  ?  Its 
meaning  certainly  cannot  be  mistaken.  By  it  the  national  Legislature  has  said  that  the  President 
may  suspend  the  accustomed  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  but  at  the  same  time  it  has  commanded  that  all 
arrests  under  his  authority  shall  be  promptly  made  known  to  the  courts  of  justice,  and  that  the 
accused  parties  shall  be  liberated,  unless  presented  by  a  grand  jury  according  to  the  Constitution, 
and  tried  by  a  jury  in  the  ancient  and  accustomed  mode.  The  President  may  possibly,  so  far  as 
Congress  can  give  the  right,  arrest  without  legal  cause  or  warrant.  We  certainly  deny  that  Con 
gress  can  confer  this  right,  because  it  is  forbidden  by  the  higher  law  of  the  Constitution.  But, 
waiving  that  consideration,  this  statute,  by  its  very  terms,  promptly  removes  the  proceeding  in  every 
case  into  the  courts  where  the  safeguards  of  liberty  are  observed,  and  where  the  persons  detained 
are  to  be  discharged,  unless  indicted  for  criminal  offences  against  the  established  and  ascertained 
laws  of  the  country. 

"  Upon  what  foundation,  then,  permit  us  to  ask,  do  you  rest  the  pretension  that  men  who  are 
not  accused  of  crime  may  be  seized  and  imprisoned,  or  banished  at  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the  Presi 
dent  or  any  of  his  subordinates  in  civil  and  military  positions  ?  Where  is  the  warrant  for  invading 
the  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press  ?  Where  the  justification  for  placing  the  citizen  on  trial 
without  the  presentment  of  a  grand  jury  and  before  military  commissions  ?  There  is  no  power  in 
this  country  which  can  dispense  with  its  laws.  The  President  is  as  much  bound  by  them  as  the 
humblest  individual.  We  pray  you  to  bear  in  mind,  in  order  that  you  may  duly  estimate  the  feel 
ing  of  the  people  on  this  subject,  that  for  the  crime  of  dispensing  with  the  laws  and  statutes  of 
Great  Britain,  our  ancestors  brought  one  monarch  to  the  scaffold,  and  expelled  another  from  his 
throne. 

"  This  power,  which  you  have  erected  in  theory,  is  of  vast  and  illimitable  proportions.  If  we 
may  trust  you  to  exercise  it  mercifully  and  leniently,  your  successor,  whether  immediate  or  more 
remote,  may  wield  it  with  the  energy  of  a  Caesar  or  Napoleon,  and  with  the  will  of  a  despot  and  a 
tyrant.  It  is  a  power  without  boundary  or  limit,  because  it  proceeds  upon  a  total  suspension  of  all 
the  constitutional  and  legal  safeguards  which  protect  the  rights  of  a  citizen.  It  is  a  power  not 
inaptly  described  hi  the  language  of  one  of  your  secretaries.  Said  Mr.  Seward  to  the  British  minis- 


DEMOCRATIC   PROTESTS.  477 

everybody  knows  to  be  nonsense.  *  *  *  Demand,  quotha?  The 
starling  that  Mr.  Sterne  saw  in  the  cage  said  only  '  I  can't  get  out.'  It 

ter  in  Washington  :  '  I  can  touch  a  bell  on  my  right  hand  and  order  the  arrest  of  a  citizen  of  Ohio. 
I  can  touch  the  bell  again  and  order  the  imprisonment  of  a  citizen  of  New  York,  and  no  power  on 
earth  but  that  of  the  President  can  release  them.  Can  the  Queen  of  England,  in  her  dominions,  do 
as  much  ?  '  This  is  the  very  language  of  a  perfect  despotism,  and  we  learn  from  you  with  profound 
emotion  that  this  is  no  idle  boast.  It  is  a  despotism  unlimited  in  principle,  because  the  same  arbitrary 
and  unrestrained  will  or  discretion  which  can  place  men  under  illegal  restraint,  or  banish  them,  can 
apply  the  rack  or  the  thumbscrew,  can  put  to  torture  or  to  death.  Not  thus  have  the  people  of  this 
country  hither  understood  their  Constitution.  No  argument  can  commend  to  their  judgment  such 
interpretations  of  the  great  charter  of  their  liberties.  Quick  as  the  lightning's  flash,  the  intuitive 
sense  of  freemen  perceives  the  sophistry  and  rejects  the  conclusion. 

"  Some  other  matters,  which  your  Excellency  has  presented,  demand  our  notice. 

"  In  justification  of  your  course  as  to  Mr.  Vallandigham,  you  have  referred  to  the  arrest  of 
Judge  Hall  at  New  Orleans,  by  order  of  Gen.  Jackson ;  but  that  case  differs  widely  from  the 
case  of  Mr.  Vallandigham.  New  Orleans  was  then,  as  you  truly  state,  under  '  martial  or  military 
law.'  This  was  not  so  in  Ohio,  where  Mr.  Vallandigham  was  arrested.  The  administration  of  the 
civil  law  had  not  been  disturbed  in  that  commonwealth.  The  courts  were  open,  and  justice  was 
dispensed  with  its  accustomed  promptitude.  In  the  case  of  Judge  Hall,  Gen.  Jackson  in  a  few 
days  sent  him  outside  the  line  of  his  encampments,  and  set  him  at  liberty ;  but  you  have  under 
taken  to  banish  Mr.  Vallandigham  from  his  home.  You  seem  also  to  have  forgotten  that  Gen.  Jack 
son  submitted  implicitly  to  the  judgment  of  the  court  which  imposed  the  fine  upon  him  :  that  he 
promptly  paid  it ;  that  he  enjoined  his  friends  to  assent,  '  as  he  most  freely  did,  to  the  decision 
which  had  just  been  pronounced  against  him.' 

"  More  than  this,  you  overlook  the  fact  thftt  the  then  administration  (in  the  language  of  a  well- 
known  author)  '  mildly  but  decidedly  rebuked  the  proceedings  of  General  Jackson,"  and  that  the 
President  viewed  the  subject  with  '  surprise-  and  solicitude.'  Unlike  President  Madison,  you  in  a 
case  much  more  unwarranted,  approve  the  proceedings  of  your  subordinate  officer,  and  in  addition 
justify  your  course  by  a  carefully  considered  argument  in  its  support. 

"  It  is  true  that  after  some  thirty  years,  Congress,  in  consideration  of  the  devoted  and  patriotic 
services  of  Gen.  Jackson,  refunded  the  amount  of  the  fine  he  had  paid  !  But  the  long  delay  in 
doing  this,  proved  how  reluctant  the  American  people  were  to  do  anything  which  could  be  consid 
ered  as  in  any  way  approving  the  disregard  shown  to  the  majesty  of  the  law,  even  by  one  who  so 
eminently  enjoyed  their  confidence  and  regard. 

"  One  subject  more,  and  we  shall  conclude.  You  express  your  regret  that  our  meeting  spoke 
'  as  Democrats  ; '  and  you  say  that '  in  this  time  of  national  peril  you  would  have  preferred  to  meet 
us  upon  a  level  one  step  higher  than  any  party  platform.'  You  thus  compel  us  to  allude  to  matters 
which  we  should  have  preferred  to  pass  by.  But  we  cannot  omit  to  notice  your  criticism,  as  it  casts, 
at  least,  an  implied  reproach  upon  our  motives  and  our  proceedings.  We  beg  to  remind  you  that 
when  the  hour  of  our  country's  peril  had  come,  when  it  was  evident  that  a  most  gigantic  effort  was 
to  be  made  to  subvert  our  institutions  and  to  overthrow  the  government,  when  it  was  vitally  impor 
tant  that  party  feelings  should  be  laid  aside,  and  that  all  should  be  called  upon  to  unite  most  cor 
dially  and  vigorously  to  maintain  the  Union  ;  at  the  time  you  were  sworn  into  office  as  President 
of  the  United  States,  when  you  should  have  urged  your  fellow-citizens  in  the  most  emphatic  man 
ner  to  overlook  all  past  differences  and  to  rally  in  defence  of  their  country  and  its  institutions,  when 
you  should  have  enjoined  respect  for  the  laws  and  the  Constitution,  so  clearly  disregarded  by  the 
South,  you  chose,  for  the  first  time,  under  like  circumstances,  in  the  history  of  our  country,  to  set 
up  a  party  platform,  called  the  *  Chicago  platform,'  as  your  creed  ;  to  advance  it  beyond  the  Consti 
tution,  and  to  speak  disparagingly  of  that  great  conservative  tribunal  of  our  country,  so  highly 
respected  by  all  thinking  men  who  have  inquired  into  our  institutions — THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 

"  Your  administration  has  been  true  to  the  principles  you  then  laid  down.     Notwithstanding 


4:78  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

would  have  been  more  i  manly  '  to  scream — '  I  demand  to  get  out ;  I  pro 
claim  on  the  house-tops  that  I  will  get  out.' ' 

While  thus  "  the  strong  government  "  at  Washington  had  grasped  the 
liberties  of  the  country,  it  promised  a  fresh  infusion  of  vigour  in  the  war. 
It  increased  its  army ;  it  exhibited,  as  its  strength  on  the  water,  a  navy  of 
nearly  six  hundred  vessels,  seventy-five  of  which  were  iron-clads  or 
armoured  steamers ;  and  it  made  preparations  for  the  prosecution  of  hos 
tilities  which  were  alarming  enough  by  the  side  of  the  now  rapidly 
decreasing  resources  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The  Congress  which 
assembled  at  Richmond  in  the  winter  of  1863,  was  immediately  and 
anxiously  occupied  with  the  decrease  of  our  armies,  and  the  yet  more 
alarming  diminution  of  our  subsistence.  These  two  concerns  engaged  all 
the  resources  and  ingenuity  of  its  legislation.  It  was  said  that  the  war 
had  become  a  question  of  men  and  of  food. 

The  conscription  law  had  disappointed  expectation.  When  the  first 
measure  was  passed,  limited  to  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  thirty-five,  it  was 
estimated  that  even  that  partial  call  would  yield  eight  hundred  thousand 
men.  A  very  simple  arithmetical  process  will  disclose  this  number.  The 
free  population  of  the  several  States  of  the  Confederacy  not  wholly  occu 
pied  by  the  enemy  was  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  first  act  of 


the  fact  that  several  hundred  thousand  Democrats  in  the  loyal  States  cheerfully  responded  to  the 
call  of  their  country,  filled  the  ranks  of  its  armies,  and  by  '  their  strong  hands  and  willing  arms ' 
aided  to  maintain  your  Excellency  and  the  officers  of  government  in  the  possession  of  our  national 
capital ;  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  grjeat  body  of  the  Democrats  of  the  country  have  in  the 
most  patriotic  spirit  given  their  best  efforts,  their  treasure,  their  brothers  and  their  sons,  to  sustain 
the  government  and  to  put  down  the  rebellion,  you,  choosing  to  overlook  all  this,  have  made  your 
appointments  to  civil  office,  from  your  cabinet  officers  and  foreign  ministers  down  to  the  persons  of 
lowest  official  grade  among  the  tens  of  thousands  engaged  in  collecting  the  revenues  of  the  country, 
exclusively  from  your  political  associates. 

"  Under  such  circumstances,  virtually  proscribed  by  your  administration,  and  while  most  of  the 
leading  journals  which  supported  it  approved  the  sentence  pronounced  against  Mr.  Yallandigham,  it 
was  our  true  course — our  honest  course  to  meet  as  '  Democrats,'  that  neither  your  Excellency  nor 
the  country  might  mistake  our  antecedents  or  our  position. 

"  In  closing  this  communication,  we  desire  to  reaffirm  our  determination,  and  we  doubt  not  that 
of  every  one  who  attended  the  meeting  which  adopted  the  resolutions  we  have  discussed,  expressed 
in  one  of  those  resolutions,  to  devote  '  all  our  energies  to  sustain  the  cause  of  the  Union.' 

"  Permit  us,  then,  in  this  spirit,  to  ask  your  Excellency  to  reexamine  the  grave  subjects  we  have 
considered,  to  the  end  that  on  your  retirement  from  the  high  position  you  occupy,  you  may  leave 
behind  you  no  doctrines  and  no  further  precedents  of  despotic  power  to  prevent  you  and  your  pos 
terity  from  enjoying  that  constitutional  liberty  which  is  the  inheritance  of  us  all,  and  to  the  end, 
also,  that  history  may  speak  of  your  administration  with  indulgence  if  it  cannot  with  approval. 

"  We  are,  sir,  with  great  respect,  yours  very  truly, 

"  JOHN  V.  L.  PKUYN, 

"  Chairman  of  Committee. 
«  ALBANY,  June  30, 1863." 


THE   CONFEDERATE   CONSCRIPTION.  479 

conscription  (1862)  as  follows,  giving  only  fractions  of  the  population  for 
those  States  partially  overrun  by  the  enemy  : 


Alabama, 529,164 

Arkansas, 324,323 

Florida, 78,686 

Georgia, 595,097 

Louisiana, 376,913 

Mississippi, 354,699 

North  Carolina, 661,586 

A  fourth  of  Missouri, 264,588 

South  Carolina, '. 301,271 

Two  thirds  of  Tennessee, 556,042 

Texas, 420,651 

Half  of  Virginia, 552,591 

Total, 5,015,618 


This  being  the  aggregate  population,  what  proportion  of  it  were  males 
between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  thirty-five  ?  By  the  census  of  1850,  the 
population  of  the  United  States  was  twenty-three  millions  one  hundred 
and  ninety-one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy-six.  Of  this  total, 
seven  millions  forty-seven  thousand  nine  hundred  and  forty-five  were 
given  as  between  the  ages  in  question.  Half  this  number  would  give 
three  millions  five  hundred  and  twenty-three  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
seventy-two  as  the  males  between  those  ages ;  which  number  is  fifteen 
per  cent,  of  the  aggregate  population.  This  ratio  applied  to  the  white 
population  of  the  Confederacy,  as  stated  above,  would  give  as  the  number 
that  should  have  been  produced  by  the  first  act  of  conscription  seven  hun 
dred  and  fifty-two  thousand  three  hundred  and  forty-two  men.  If  we 
should  add  to  this  number  the  volunteers  from  that  population  of  the 
States  of  Kentucky,  Maryland,  and  portions  of  Virginia  and  Missouri  not 
embraced  in  the  basis  of  estimate,  and  the  volunteers  offering  from  ages 
not  embraced  in  the  prescribed  figures,  the  aggregate  soldiery  of  the  Con 
federacy  would  reach  the  number  of  eight  hundred  thousand. 

The  conscription  law  of  the  Confederacy  had  since  been  extended  to  the 
age  of  forty-five ;  and  in  1863  it  was  further  extended,  by  the  repeal  of  the 
clause  allowing  substitutions,  which  it  was  declared  would  add  more  than 
seventy  thousand  men  to  the  army.  And  yet  about  this  time  the  rolls  of 
the  Adjutant-General's  office  in  Richmond  showed  little  more  than  four 
hundred  thousand  men  under  arms ;  and  of  these,  Mr.  Seddon,  the  Con 
federate  Secretary  of  War,  declared  that,  owing  to  desertions  and  other 
causes,  "  not  more  than  a  half,  never  two-thirds  of  the  soldiers  were  in  the 
ranks."  When  we  contemplate  the  actual  result  to  which  the  conscription 


480  THE    LOST    CAfSK. 

was  thus  reduced,  we  may  imagine  how  harsh  had  become  the  war,  and 
how  averse  the  people  of  the  South  to  the  demands  of  its  necessities.  In 
deed,  the  Confederate  Ciovernment  had  committed  a  great  oversight  in  fail 
ing  to  enlist  troops  tor  the  whole  period  of  the  war,  when  it  first  com- 
meneed  ;  for,  as  is  usual  at  the  beginning  of  all  political  revolutions,  great 
unanimity  and  patriotic  zeal  prevailed  among  the  people  throughout  the 
count rv,  which  rendered  that  measure  both  feasible  and  easy.  P>ut  lost 
opportunities  seldom  return.  This  important  measure,  so  easy  at  the  out- 
sot  of  the  war,  was  quite  impossible  in  its  advanced  stages,  as  the  ardour 
of  the  people  was  cooled  or  abated  by  the  hardships  and  vicissitudes  insep 
arable  from  a  state  of  hostility. 

The  most  striking  of  these  hardships  was  the  want  of  food,  the  actual 
panir  of  starvation  in  the  army.  Provisions  were  very  scarce  all  through 
the  country,  so  much  so  as  to  excite  fears  of  a  famine.  Poverty  and  its 
attendant  necessities  befell  those  who  had  never  dreamed  of  want.  Many 
families  who  had  been  reared  in  atUuence  and  luxury,  were  in  need  of  the 
common  necessaries  of  life.  Young,  delicate  ladies  often  had  to  perform 
menial  otlices,  such  as  cooking  and  washing  for  their  families,  having  lost 
their  servants  by  the  war,  or  having  been  driven  by  other  necessities  to 
the  last  resources  of  economy.  In  the  army  the  su tiering  was  more  vital  ; 
and  had  it,  not  been  for  the  scanty  additions  of  provisions  and  clothing, 
which  the  love  of  relatives  and  friends  occasionally  sent  them,  many  of 
the  troops  would  have  been  compelled  to  disband,  or  would  have  perished 
in  their  camps.  As  it  was,  desertions  were  rapidly  taking  place,  as  the 
rigour  of  winter  came  on.  It  required  all  the  popularity  of  den.  Lee,  and 
the  exercise  of  every  available  faculty  of  his  mind,  to  keep  even  his  veteran 
army  in  Virginia  together.  A  tithe-tax  was  instituted  by  the  Confederate 
Congress,  by  which  it  was  hoped  to  furnish  supplies  to  the  armies  ;  but 
this  and  all  kindred  measures  on  the  subject  of  subsistence  were  so  badly 
executed,  that  the  results  invariably  disappointed  the  calculation. 

Indeed,  the  subject  of  the  Confederate  commissariat  was  so  closely  con 
nected  with  the  general  fortunes  of  the  war  ;  it  did  so  much  to  determine 
its  conclusion  ;  it  exhibits  so  many  characteristic  instances  of  mal-adininis- 
tration  in  Richmond,  that  a  distinct  consideration  of  it  here,  up  to  the  time 
we  are  now  discussing,  is  not  out  of  place,  and  will  prepare  the  reader  for 
much  that  is  to  follow  in  the  general  history  of  the  war. 


11ISTOKY   OF   THE   CONFEDERATE   COMMISSARIAT. 

In  January,  1802,  a  report  was  made  to  the  Confederate  Congress  in 
Richmond,  on  the  general  administration  of  the  Bureau  of  Subsistence, 
particularly  with  reference  to  certain  contracts  for  obtaining  supplies, 


THE   CONFEDERATE   COMMISSARIAT.  481 

which  had  been  unfavourably  reported  to  the  public  and  to  Congress.  In 
that  report,  the  following  occurs  :  "  In  the  packing  season  of  1860-'61  up 
ward  of  three  million  head  of  hogs  were  packed  at  the  various  porkeries 
of  the  United  States,  besides  those  packed  by  farmers  at  home,  of  which 
less  than  twenty  thousand  were  packed  at  regular  establishments  south  of 
the  lines  of  our  armies.  Of  this  whole  number,  experts  estimate  that  the 
product  of  about  one  million  two  hundred  thousand  hogs  was  imported  in 
the  early  part  of  the  last  year  from  beyond  our  present  lines  into  what  is 
now  the  Southern  Confederacy.  This  was  accomplished,  and  to  the  extent 
of  a  bountiful  supply  by  the  action  of  the  State  authorities  in  some  cases, 
by  the  enterprise  of  private  parties,  and  by  this  department,  through  agen 
cies  of  its  own.  Of  this  number  it  is  estimated  that  about  three  hundred 
thousand  hogs,  or  their  bacon  equivalent,  have  been  consumed  by  our 
State  and  Confederate  armies  since  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  Ten 
nessee  then  became  the  main  reliance  for  the  future  use  of  the  army, 
which,  together  with  the  accessible  portions  of  Kentucky,  had  been  so  rav 
aged  by  hog  cholera  and  injured  by  short  corn  crops  for  three  years  pre 
ceding  the  year  just  closed,  that  the  number  slaughtered  at  the  porkeries 
within  her  limits  had  deviated  from  two  hundred  thousand  head  to  less 
than  twenty  thousand.  It  was  into  this  field,  just  recovering  from  these 
disasters,  and  almost  the  sole  resource  of  the  army,  and  the  planters  and 
inhabitants  of  cities,  that  this  department  had  to  enter  as  a  purchaser, 
dubious  of  a  sufficiency,  but  assured  of  a  heavy  and  active  compe 
tition." 

Shortly  after  the  date  of  this  report,  the  successive  captures  of  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  caused  the  loss  of  a  considerable  portion  of  the  sup 
plies  referred  to.  The  subsequent  campaign  lost  us  Kentucky  and  much 
of  Tennessee,  and  left  the  Confederacy  comparatively  bare  of  meat. 

In  this  early  prospect  of  distress  a  number  of  propositions  were  made  to 
the  Confederate  Government  by  responsible  and  energetic  parties,  to  ex 
change  through  the  enemy's  lines  meat  for  cotton.  But  to  this  favourable 
exchange  President  Davis  was  opposed  ;  he  was  actually  weak  enough  to 
suppose  that  if  a  little  cotton  was  kept  from  the  enemy,  the  North  would 
be  unable  to  pay  the  January  interest  of  1863  ;  and  he  was  among  those 
stupid  financiers  who  were  for  confining  cotton,  as  if  there  were  magical  sal 
vation  in  it,  and  hoarding  this  inert  wealth  of  the  South. 

In  the  fall  of  1862,  a  party  properly  vouched  for  proposed,  for  an  equiv 
alent  in  cotton,  to  deliver  thirty  thousand  hogsheads  of  bacon  through  the 
lines.  It  was  alleged  that  there  was  enough  cotton  to  feed  and  clothe  our 
army,  in  a  section  tributary  to  Memphis,  which  city  was  then,  and  had 
been  for  some  time  previous,  in  the  secure  possession  of  the  enemy ;  that 
such  cotton  must  otherwise  probably  be  destroyed  to  prevent  its  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy;  but  that  the  owners,  as  a  general  rule, 
31 


482  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

though  willing  to  let  the  government  have  their  crops,  were  averse,  if  not 
stubbornly  opposed  to  having  them  destroyed. 

This  proposition  was  submitted  to  President  Davis.  It  was  endorsed 
in  the  bureau  of  subsistence  :  "  The  alternative  is  thus  presented  of  violat 
ing  our  policy  of  withholding  cotton  from  the  enemy  or  risking  the  starva 
tion  of  our  armies  ;  "  and  it  was  suggested  that  the  Commissary  General  be 
authorized  to  contract  for  bacon  and  salt,  limiting  the  amount  of  purchase 
to  what  was  absolutely  necessary  to  feed  the  army  and  supply  it  with  blank 
ets  and  shoes,  showing  that  no  law  forbade  this  traffic  ;  that  the  precedents 
of  other  wars  justified  it ;  and  advising  that  the  Commissary  General 
should,  under  such  circumstances,  upon  his  own  statement  of  the  necessity, 
be  allowed  to  make  the  contract,  which,  this  officer  added,  nothing  less 
than  the  danger  of  sacrificing  our  armies  would  induce  "  him  to  acquiesce 
in."  Upon  that  letter  the  President  endorsed  as  follows  : 

"  SECRETARY  OF  WAR — Is  there  any  necessity  for  immediate  action  ?  Is  there  satis 
factory  evidence  that  the  present  opportunity  is  the  last  which  will  be  offered  ?  Have 
you  noted  the  scheme  of  the  enemy  for  the  payment  of  their  next  accruing  interest  on 
their  public  debt  ?  You  will  not  fail  to  perceive  the  effect  of  postponing  the  proposed 
action  until  January  1,  1863,  if  it  be  necessary  at  anytime  to  depart  from  the  well-defined 
policy  of  our  government  in  relation  to  cotton. 

"JEFF.  DAVIS. 

"OCTOBER  31,  1862." 

President  Davis  was  assured  that  the -consequences  of  the  refusal  of  this 
policy  of  exchange  would  be  most  serious.  Col.  Northrop,  the  Commis 
sary  General,  informed  him  that  present  efforts,  even  if  successful,  would 
not  produce  cured  bacon  for  the  next  year.  The  departments  of  the  east 
had  been  exhausted,  while  the  increasing  number  of  refugees,  driven  from 
their  homes  by  the  enemy's  arms,  added  to  the  consumers.  The  results 
hoped  for  from  Tennessee  were  not  probably  equal  to  the  demands  of  the 
troops  on  the  west  of  the  mountains  and  in  Tennessee.  A  statement  was 
made  in  the  bureau  of  subsistence,  that  the  supply  of  hogs  for  1862  would 
be  about  one  hundred  thousand  short  of  the  supply  for  the  preceding  year, 
and  that  the  supply  of  beef  was  well  nigh  exhausted.  This  statement  was 
communicated  to  President  Davis,  with  the  following  endorsement  by  Mr. 
Eandolph,  then  Secretary  of  War  :  "  Unless  the  deficiency  be  made  up  by 
purchases  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Confederacy,  I  apprehend  serious  conse 
quences." 

President  Davis  refused  to  see  the  necessity  so  plainly  indicated  to 
him.  He  still  lingered  in  the  conceit  of  an  early  termination  of  the  war, 
and  in  spite  of  the  plainest  figures  he  persisted  in  the  belief  that  the  requi 
site  amount  of  supplies  for  the  army  might  still  be  procured  from  sources 
within  the  Confederate  States.  How  far  he  was  mistaken  in  this,  will  be 


SUPPLIES   OF   MEAT   IN   THE   CONFEDEKACY.  483 

shown  by  the  following  reply  to  one  of  his  calls  for  information  about  the 
close  of  the  year  1862  : 

"  It  will  be  observed  that  the  President,  through  Gen.  Smith,  calls  for  information  on 
three  points,  and  to  these  exclusively  is  the  answer  addressed. 

"  First — Every  source  within  the  Confederate  lines  from  which  supplies  could  have 
been  obtained  last  year  or  this  has  been  fully  explored.  All  such  have  either  been 
exhausted  or  found  inadequate.  If  in  any  small  portion  of  the  Confederacy  supplies 
have  not  been  aimed  at,  it  was  because  it  was  known  that  such  portion  would  not  afford 
enough  for  the  current  domestic  supply  of  that  particular  area.  It  has  been  erroneously 
supposed  that  Southern  Georgia  and  Alabama,  and  certain  portions  of  Florida,  would 
afford  large  amounts  of  stock,  but  they  have  not  done  it.  They  have  not  even  fully  fed 
those  posts  which  from  geographical  position  would  naturally  draw  from  them,  and  they 
cannot  do  as  much  in  the  future  as  they  have  done  in  the  past. 

"  This  appears  abundantly  from  facts  within  my  knowledge  and  from  testimony  in 
this  office. 

"  Second — To  state  more  fully  the  reasons  for  immediate  action  it  is  necessary  to 
recapitulate : 

"The  report  states  a  clear  deficit  of  bacon  of  8,116,194  pounds,  or  twenty-five  per 
cent. ;  a  clear  deficit  in  salt  beef  of  36,000  beeves,  at  an  average  of  five  hundred  pounds 
— making  18,000,000,  or  ninety  per  cent,  per  bullock.  Whole  value  of  the  above,  in 
rations,  22,516,194.  Total  deficit  per  cent.,  43. 

"  This  calculation  is  upon  the  basis  of  the  forces  this  year  in  camp  and  field.  Fur 
ther  :  it  does  not  include  immense  supplies  purchased  from  private  hands,  which  cannot 
be  had  at  all  for  this  winter,  because  the  stock  to  create  them  is  not  in  the  Confederate 
lines,  and  the  salt  cannot  be  had  if  the  stock  could.  Besides,  large  local  supplies  have 
been  completely  exhausted,  as  in  London  and  Fauquier  and  other  districts.  And  even 
the  above  estimated  subsistence  is  not  at  all  secure.  The  hogs,  though  bargained  for, 
have  not  all  been  driven  to  places  of  safety.  The  salt  to  cure  them  has  not  all  been 
secured,  and  what  has  been  engaged  has  not  all  been  delivered,  and  must  take  its  chances 
for  transportation  over  long  distances,  upon  uncertain  roads  discordantly  connected. 
It  is  not  safe,  then,  to  rely  on  these  estimates.  Added  to  that,  the  winter  is  at  hand;  the 
rises  of  the  rivers  all  impending ;  invasion  on  a  large  scale  is  imminent ;  the  supplies 
which  had  been  hoped  for  from  the  enemy's  lines  are  not  to  be  expected. 

"  The  supplies  now  offered  are  ample,  and  are  tendered  at  lower  rates  in  cotton,  even 
at  the  extreme  bid,  than  they  can  be  bought  at  for  Confederate  currency  in  our  own  lines. 
If  not  availed  of  now  they  most  probably  never  will  be,  for  lack  of  power  and  oppor 
tunity. 

"  And,  finally,  both  Mobile  and  Charleston  are  pressing  for  large  supplies  out  of 
resources  which  must  be  held  for  the  armies  x>f  Virginia,  or  the  border  States  will  be 
lost ;  while  the  same  reserves,  and  the  accumulations  I  have  been  endeavouring  to  make 
in  Tennessee,  are  demanded  by  the  armies  of  General  Bragg. 

"  Third — As  to  the  relative  advantages  of  procuring  supplies  from  Memphis  and  from 
the  vicinity  of  New  Orleans,  the  proposition  to  make  such  purchases  is  not  a  new  idea. 
They  were  made  at  the  commencement  of  the  war  to  an  extent  which  is  little  known.  In 
an  elaborate  report  on  the  operations  of  this  Bureau,  made  by  Major  Ruffin,  under  my 
order  and  superintendence,  and  submitted  to  Congress  in  January  last,  it  is  stated  :  Ex 
perts  estimate  that  the  product  of  about  1,200,000  hogs  was  imported  in  the  early  part 
of  last  year  (1861),  from  beyond  our  present  lines  into  what  is  now  the  Southern  Con 
federacy.  This  was  accomplished  by  the  action  of  State  authorities ;  in  some  cases  by 


484  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  enterprise  of  private  parties,  and  by  this  department,  through  agencies  of  its  own. 
Of  this  number  it  is  estimated  that  about  300,000  hogs,  in  their  bacon  equivalent,  have 
been  consumed  by  our  State  and  Confederate  armies  since  the  commencement  of  hostili 
ties.  This  was  for  a  period  of  eight  months,  and  shows  a  requirement  of  450,000  hogs 
per  annum.  For  a  considerable  part  of  that  period  the  army  was  a  mere  fraction  of  the 
magnitude  which  it  has  since  reached.  Those  who  think  that  the  stimulus  of  high  prices, 
under  the  apprehension  of  a  great  scarcity,  has  so  increased  our  supply  of  meat  as  to 
enable  us  to  dispense  with  this  large  balance,  forget  that  the  counties  most  capable  of 
such  development  are  precisely  those  which  have  suffered  most  from  the  war.  Elsewhere 
it  must  have  been  a  new  enterprise,  such  as  could  not  be  expected  to  succeed  when  the 
best  men  were  in  the  army. 

"  Therefore  I  urge  that  supplies  be  engaged  both  from  Memphis  and  from  the  vicinity 
of  New  Orleans,  and  for  these  additional  reasons :  It  may  be  safely  estimated  that  the 
army  will  consume  and  waste  the  product  of  not  less  than  five  hundred  thousand  hogs, 
of  which  we  calculate  to  receive  only  about  one  third  from  our  Confederate  limits.  It 
will  not  be  prudent  to  rely  upon  obtaining  the  amount  needed  from  one  single  source  of 
supply  ;  it  will  be  well  to  divide  the  risk.  Moreover,  other  articles  are  needed  nearly  as 
much  as  meat.  The  salt  works  in  Louisiana  are  not  to  be  depended  on  ;  the  supply  to 
be  obtained  from  Saltville,  in  Virginia,  is  limited.  The  wants  of  citizens,  daily  becoming 
more  urgent  and  alarming,  will  absorb  all  of  that,  if  permitted,  and  the  drafts  of  the 
Government  upon  the  same  fund  will  cause  ruinous  prices  and  great  destitution. 

"  One  reliable  party  in  New  Orleans  oifers  to  supply  one  hundred  thousand  sacks  of 
saltj  or  more  than  is  called  for  by  the  rapidly  expiring  contract  at  Saltville.  Other  arti 
cles — such  as  coffee  and  flour — are  also  offered  from  New  Orleans.  The  supply  of  flour 
from  that  quarter  will  enable  the  soldiers  from  the  Southwest  to  use  that  in  part  as  a 
bread  ration  instead  of  corn  meal,  which  must  otherwise  be  their  sole  reliance  for  bread. 
The  reserve  of  coffee  for  the  sick  is  being  rapidly  consumed.  No  other  prospect  of  get 
ting  more  presents  itself,  but  the  necessity  of  a  sufficiency  is  important.  The  success  of 
the  enterprise  is  doubtful ;  but  the  opportunity  afforded  by  the  venality  of  the  enemy 
ought  not  to  be  lost.  If  we  thereby  obtain  the  use  of  the  Mississippi  from  Memphis  to 
New  Orleans,  until  such  time  as  the  whole  or  a  large  part  of  the  needed  supplies  shall 
have  been  obtained,  it  will  be  a  great  benefit. 

"  Its  effect  upon  the  morale  of  the  enemy,  and  the  political  results  of  such  a  policy, 
however  important  in  themselves,  are  questions  which,  as  they  have  not  entered  into  my 
calculations,  I  do  not  discuss.  My  action  proceeds  entirely  from  a  sense  of  the  absolute 
necessity  of  these  supplies  to  feed  the  army,  and  to  subdue  the  want  which  has  already 
manifested  itself  both  in  Gen.  Lee's  army  and  the  Army  of  the  West,  under  the  priva 
tions  to  which  they  have  been  subjected.  Eespectfully, 

"  L.  B.  NORTHROP." 


No  official  reply  was  ever  received  to  this  communication.  Indeed 
about  this  time  President  Davis  left  Richmond  on  a  visit  to  Mississippi, 
and  in  a  speech  before  the  Legislature  of  that  State  pronounced  the  solemn 
opinion  that  the  war  would  soon  corne  to  an  end.  For  this  reason  and 
"on  political  principles"  the  policy  of  using  cotton  to  get  supplies  through 
the  lines,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  wide-spread  venality  of  the  enemy 
was  negatived.  The  arguments  against  this  trade  were  specious  and 
trifling.  It  was  said  that  the  Federal  finances  were  in  such  a  condition 


SUPPLIES    THROUGH    THE   BLOCKADE.  485 

that  if  they  could  not  obtain  cotton,  upon  which  to  draw  bills  where 
with  to  pay  their  then  accruing  January  interest,  their  credit  would 
explode,  and  the  war  would  speedily  cease  from  the  bankrupting  of  our 
assailants.  Hence  they  wanted  cotton.  It  was  also  asserted  that  they  did 
not  want  cotton,  but  only  sought,  under  cover  of  a  contract  for  supply,  to 
find  out  the  channels  of  navigable  streams,  to  ascertain  the  location  and 
condition  of  certain  defences,  and  otherwise  to  spy  out  the  land.  A  third 
argument  was  that  the  trade  on  the  part  of  the  government  would  demoralize 
the  people  among  whom  it  might  be  conducted ;  and  the  newspapers  added 
that  to  trade  through  New  Orleans  and  let  cotton  clear  from  that  port 
"  would  make  Europe  think  we  had  caved,  who  thereupon  would  decline 
to  recognize  us  or  to  intervene."  Such  were  the  fancies  and  punctilios 
which  persuaded  the  Confederate  Government  to  persist  in  a  line  of  policy, 
the  steady  and  inevitable  tendency  of  which  was  to  bring  its  armies  to  the 
verge  of  starvation. 

The  project  of  getting  supplies  through  the  enemy's  lines  thus  discour 
aged,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Commissary  General  to  cast  about  for  a  new 
resource  ;  and  in  1863  the  experiment  was  first  attempted  of  obtaining  sup 
plies,  especially  meat  and  coffee,  from  foreign  ports  through  the  blockade. 
A  scheme  of  contract  was  prepared  on  the  basis  of  an  association  of  indi 
vidual  enterprise  with  government  capital,  which,  it  was  thought,  if  prop 
erly  arranged,  would  combine  the  power  and  money  of  the  one  with  the 
energy  and  skill  of  the  other.  Especially  in  a  business  as  hazardous  as 
blockade  running  would  such  an  association,  it  was  thought,  be  an  advan 
tage  as  securing  to  the  individuals  the  insurance  of  many  ventures,  and  to 
the  government  the  vigilance  and  intelligence  of  private  parties.  It  was 
contemplated  that  the  private  parties  should  sell  the  cotton  and  purchase 
the  return  cargo,  charging  two  and  a  half  per  cent,  commission  on  each 
transaction ;  and  that  the  government  should  purchase  the  cotton  on  this 
side  at  a  commission  of  two  and  a  half  per  cent.,  with  a  reserved  right  to 
the  government  to  all  the  private  freight  room,  when  claimed  at  an  agreed 
rate  per  ton  ;  which  was  two-thirds  less  than  had  been  previously  demand 
ed  by  other  blockade  runners,  and  paid  by  the  government.  • 

Here  again  was  the  story  of  gross  mismanagement  and  slip-shod  admin 
istration  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  authorities.  Great  quantities  of 
meat  were  left  to  rot  at  Nassau  and  Bermuda ;  payments  were  not  prompt 
ly  made  ;  and  the  new  resource  that  had  promised  such  grand  results  dwin 
dled  into  insignificant  numbers.  Contracts  for  supplies,  payable  in  cotton, 
in  our  Atlantic  ports,  were  made  with  several  parties  ;  but  in  no  instance 
with  success.  Either  the  amount  involved  was  too  small  to  tempt  the 
venality  of  those  who  could  control  or  purchase  an  evasion  of  the  blockade, 
or  the  engagement  to  deliver  meat  alone  was  found  to  be  too  small  an 
inducement  to  those  engaged  in  blockade  running. 


486  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

In  consequence  of  these  failures,  and  of  the  refusal  to  be  allowed  to  pur 
chase  on  the  Mississippi,  the  army,  especially  in  Virginia,  was  put  upon 
short  rations.  First,  they  were  reduced  to  one  half  pound  of  meat  per  day 
— which,  if  it  could  have  been  kept  up  at  that,  would  have  been  sufficient 
— then  to  one-third  of  a  pound — though  this  allowance  was  not  agreed  to 
or  adhered  to  by  several  of  the  Generals  commanding — and  then  to  one 
quarter  of  a  pound.  Upon  this  last  allowance  the  Army  of  Northern 
"Virginia  wintered. 

The  policy  of  running  the  blockade,  so  far  as  the  government  was 
interested  in  it  for  subsistence,  was  the  occasion  of  odious  monopolies, 
violations  of  contract,  misunderstandings,  &c.,  and  proved  of  little  advan 
tage  to  the  government,  and  of  questionable  profit  to  private  parties.  Wliat 
was  known  as  the  Crenshaw  or  Collie  line  of  steamers  did  not  start  until 
the  spring  of  1864,  and  then  under  unfavourable  auspices.  One  steamer 
was  lost  on  the  coast  of  Ireland,  in  coining  out ;  another  upon  her  second 
trip  ;  but  two  others,  both  very  superiour  steamers,  were  put  upon  the 
line,  one  or  both  of  which  had  been  paid  for  by  large  advances  made  by 
Crenshaw  &  Co.,  and  were  running  successfully.  Under  their  contract 
the  government  was  obliged  to  furnish  the  whole  cargo  of  cotton  for  each 
vessel,  but,  having  failed  to  do  so,  and  the  private  parties  having  been 
required,  against  the  terms  of  the  contract,  to  supply  their  own  cotton  to 
the  vessel  at  market  rates — a  demand  which  was  acceded  to  rather  than 
raise  the  issue — it  was  determined  to  take  other  parties  into  the  contract. 
This  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  inability  of  the  government  to  trans 
port  the  cotton,  and  by  the  inability  of  the  private  parties  to  supplement 
the  government  deficiencies  in  that  particular.  The  government  was  ac 
cordingly  induced  by  the  private  parties  to  sell  one-fourth  of  its  three-fourths 
interest  in  the  steamers  to  the  Supply  Importing  Company,  composed  of 
various  railroad  companies  and  others  interested  in  railroads  in  the  South. 
This — though  the  terms  of  the  contract  were  changed,  and  the  parties  be 
came,  as  was  contended  by  the  government,  mere  carriers,  whereby  the 
subsistence  department  lost  the  benefit  of  the  arrangement  it  had  proposed 
— at  once  obviated  the  difficulties  about  transporting  cotton  ;  and,  as  this 
new  contract  provided  for  twelve  steamers,  it  was  hoped  that  some  good 
results  might  be  at  last  reached.  But  just  as  this  business  had  got  well 
under  way,  the  government  decided  upon  taking  the  Atalanta,  the  best  of 
the  steamers  referred  to  above,  for  a  cruiser.  It  was  urged,  in  opposition 
to  this,  that  the  tested  speed  and  capacity  of  this  vessel  had  induced  the 
private  parties  interested  to  enter  into  large  contracts  for  vessels  in  Eng 
land,  and  to  assume  heavy  obligations  to  pay  for  the  government  interest 
in  them ;  that  there  were  large  quantities  of  subsistence  stores  at  the  Isl 
ands,  purchased  by  Crenshaw  &  Co.  for  the  commissariat,  which  were 
much  needed  by  the  army,  and  might  spoil  if  permitted  to  remain.  But 


THE   IMPRESSMENT   LAWS.  487 

the  government  insisted  upon  taking  the  ship.  Other  vessels  were  built, 
and  paid  for  by  the  credit  of  the  private  parties,  and  by  receipts  of  cotton 
from  those  successively  put  on  the  line ;  and  the  enterprise  went  on,  but 
with  results  far  below  the  necessities  of  the  country. 

During  the  whole  period  of  the  efforts  to  put  the  question  of  meat  sup 
ply  from  abroad  upon  what  the  bureau  of  subsistence  deemed  a  proper 
footing,  the  meat  in  the  limits  of  the  Confederacy  was  being  constantly 
reduced  in  amount,  though  under  constantly  increasing  efforts  to  get  it  for 
the  army. 

The  well-known  effects  of  a  depreciating  currency  in  causing  supplies 
to  be  hoarded,  rendered  it  necessary  to  impress  them.  This  mode  was 
legalized  by  acts  of  Congress,  which  failed,  however,  to  enforce  it  by  any 
penalty,  and  rendered  it  nugatory  in  many  instances  by  requiring  that  in 
all  cases  the  impressment  should  be  accompanied  by  a  proffer  of  the  money. 
In  some  States  the  feeling  against  it  had  rendered  it  almost  inoperative, 
and  the  judiciary,  gubernatorial  or  legislative  action  of  several  had  practi 
cally  nullified  the  law.  As  a  substitute,  to  last  until  the  currency  could 
have  been  amended,  it  might  have  answered  ;  but  experience  showed  that, 
as  a  permanent  system,  it  would  be  resisted  and  evaded  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  render  it  of  little  avail  in  drawing  out  a  sufficiency,  when  to  furnish 
it  even  for  the  army  was  to  produce  privation  at  home.  Under  the  rapid 
depreciation  of  our  currency,  which  was  now  thought  by  many  to  have 
reached  a  point  of  hopeless  bankruptcy,  and  when  the  prices  under  the 
schedule  fixed  by  the  Commissioners  of  Appraisement  in  the  various  States 
were  merely  nominal,  it  was  regarded  by  the  people  as  an  unjust  and  tyran 
nical  tax,  to  be  resisted  to  the  point  of  compelling  its  abandonment  as  a 
mode  of  supply. 

It  will  thus  be  seen,  on  a  general  survey  of  the  whole  subsistence  policy 
of  the  Confederate  government — its  practical  rejection  of  trade  with  the 
enemy,  its  feeble  and  mismanaged  efforts  in  running  the  blockade,  and  the 
small  yield  of  impressments — that  there  could  be  but  one  result  and  that  a 
constant  diminution  of  supplies  to  the  point  of  starvation.  It  was  a  policy 
of  blunders ;  it  lacked  some  steady  and  deliberate  system  ;  and  it  finally, 
as  we  shall  see,  in  the  close  of  the  year  1864,  got  to  that  point  where  the 
whole  system  of  Confederate  defence  was  bound  to  break  down  by  the  want 
of  subsistence,  even  without  a  catastrophe  of  arms  ! 

It  is  astonishing  what  silly  devices  were  hit  upon  in  Richmond  to  meet 
the  coming  necessity,  and  how  the  empirical  remedies  of  shallow  brains 
aggravated  the  disorder.  One  of  these  so-called  remedies  proved  one  of 
the  vilest  curses  that  was  ever  fastened  upon  the  Confederacy.  On  the 
6th  November,  1863,  an  order  was  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  that 
no  supplies  held  by  a  party  for  his  own  consumption,  or  that  of  his  em 
ployes  or  slaves,  should  be  impressed,  and  that  "  no  officer  should  at  any 


488  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

time,  unless  specially  ordered  so  to  do  by  a  general  Commanding,  in  a  case 
of  exigency,  impress  supplies  which  were  on  their  way  to  market  for  sale 
on  arrival." 

The  construction  given  to  that  order  filled  the  land  with  purchasers — 
private  individuals,  railroad  companies,  manufacturers  of  all  kinds,  corpora 
tions  of  every  class,  relief  associations  of  cities,  towns  and  counties,  were  per 
sonally  or  by  their  agents  in  the  market  buying  a  year's  supply,  unlimited 
as  to  price,  and  protected  from  impressment.  Speculators,  whose  pur 
chases  were  generally  in  transitu,  found  themselves  protected,  and  the 
government  playing  into  their  hands.  The  sudden  influx  of  purchasers  into 
the  market  stimulated  the  cupidity  of  producers  and  holders  of  the  neces 
saries  of  life,  and  induced  them  to  withhold  their  supplies,  under  the  expec 
tation  of  higher  prices,  and  actually  raised  the  prices  of  all  the  prime  arti 
cles  fully  one  hundred  per  cent,  within  a  single  month.  The  purchasing 
officers  of  the  government  could  not  buy  ;  nor  was  it  reasonable  to  expect 
parties  to  sell  to  the  government  at  schedule  price,  when  double  that  price 
was  offered  at  their  doors  by  others.  They  could  not  impress,  for  holders 
had,  with  great  promptness,  contracted  for  all  their  supplies  to  parties 
who  paid  them  higher  prices,  and  thus  it  naturally  and  surely  happened 
that  the  regular  supplies  of  the  government  were  cut  off.  The  whole 
land  was  infected  by  speculators  pampered  by  Mr.  Seddon,  the  Secretary 
of  War ;  and  the  soldier,  who  was  without  shelter  fighting  our  battles, 
found  himself  discriminated  against  in  favour  of  the  private  citizen — who, 
with  a  roof  above  him,  could  better  stand  a  short  allowance  of  food, — and 
put  at  the  mercy  of  the  most  heartless  and  hateful  speculators,  who  had  no 
conception  of  the  war  beyond  that  of  dollars  and  cents. 

It  has  been  remarked  that  the  shiftlessness  of  the  people  of  the  South, 
their  want  of  commercial  tact  or  of  business  knowledge,  so  to  speak,  how 
ever  it  might  have  been  doubted  before,  was  fully  proved  in  the  war,  and 
that  this  cause,  as  much  as  anything  else,  contributed  to  the  ruin  and  pros 
tration  of  the  Confederacy.  The  unbusin  ess-like  mind  of  the  South  was 
well  illustrated  in  its  commissariat ;  and  the  mismanagement  of  this  bureau 
confirms  the  truth  of  the  general  observation.  It  is  curious,  indeed,  how 
this  observation  extends  to  all  the  affairs  of  the  Confederacy.  There  was 
a  stock  of  childish  expedients  in  times  of  grave  distress  in  the  Confederacy, 
at  which  the  world  was  rather  disposed  to  laugh,  despite  the  necessities 
they  indicated.  When  iron  became  scarce,  an  association  of  ladies  was 
formed  to  advertise  an  appeal  all  through  the  Confederacy  for  broken  pots 
:and  pans  with  which  to  build  an  armoured  steamer.  When  the  Confed 
erate  finances  declined,  it  was  proposed  by  a  foolish  woman  of  Mobile, 
who  had  probably  never  heard  of  the  law  of  supply  and  demand,  that  all 
of  her  sex  in  the  Confederacy  should  be  shorn,  and  each  head  of  hair  bring 
ing  a  certain  price  in  the  European  markets,  to  realize  thus  many  millions 


MAKE-SHIFTS   OF   THE   CONFEDEBACY.  489 

of  dollars ;  and  the  proposition  was  seriously  entertained  in  the  newspapers. 
But  what  shall  be  said  of  the  government  that  actually  and  officially,  in  the 
course  of  a  system  of  finance  to  meet  necessities  counted  by  thousands  of 
millions  of  dollars,  made  appeals  to  the  people  to  donate  silver  plate  and 
jewelry,  and  published  monthly  lists  of  contributions  of  rings,  sugar-pots 
and  spoons  !  These  curious  lists  may  still  be  found  in  the  files  of  the  Rich 
mond  newspapers.  Such  vagaries  are  subjects  of  grave  consideration  by 
the  historian.  They  illustrate  the  general  character  of  make-shifts  in  the 
war.  He  who  seeks  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  downfall  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy,  must  take  largely  into  consideration  the  absence  of  any  intel 
ligent  and  steady  system  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs  ;  the  little  circles 
that  bounded  the  Richmond  Administration  ;  the  deplorable  want  of  the 
commercial  or  business  faculty  in  the  Southern  mind. 


CHAPTEE    XXX. 

A  TRAIN  OF  CONFEDERATE  SUCCESSES  IN  THE  BEGINNING  OF  1864. THE  BATTLE  OF  OCEAN 

POND. — GEN.  SEYMOUE'S  EXPEDITION  INTO  FLOEIDA. — ITS  DEFEAT  AND  COMPLETE  DISAS- 
TEE. — SHEEMAN'S  EXPEDITION  IN  THE  SOUTHWEST. — HIS  FIEST  EXPEEIMENT  OF  "THE 

MOVABLE  COLUMN." — HIS  DESIGNS  UPON  MOBILE  AND  THE  CONFEDEEATE  LINES  IN  NOETH 
GEOEGIA. — THE  CO-OPEEATING  COLUMN  OF  CAVALEY. — GEN.  POLK  EVACUATES  MEEIDIAN, 

AND  FALLS   BACK   TO    DEMOPOLIS. FOEEEST  DEFEATS    THE    FEDEEAL    CAVALEY. — DISAS- 

TEOUS  AND  DISGEACEFUL  CONCLUSION  OF  SHEEMAN's  ADVENTUEE. — THE  BED  EIVEE  EX 
PEDITION. — GEN.  BANKS'  DESIGNS  UPON  TEXAS. — THE  CONFEDEEATE  COMMANDS  IN  THE 

TEANS-MISSISSIPPI. — THE  FEDEEAL  ADVANCE  UP  BED  EIVEE. — THE  CONFEDERATES  FALL 
BACK  TOWAEDS  SHEEVEPOET. — BATTLE  OF  MANSFIELD. — HOW  THE  ACTION  WAS  BEOUGHT 
ON. — EOUT  OF  THE  ENEMY. — SINGULAE  SCENES  ON  THE  PUESUIT. — BATTLE  OF  PLEASANT 
HILL, — AN  UNFOETUNATE  MISTAKE  OF  OEDEES.-^-OHUECHILL's  OOEPS  PANIC-STRICKEN. — 
GBN.  WALKEE  HOLDS  THE  FIELD. — THE  ENEMY  CONTINUES  HIS  EETEEAT  TO  ALEXANDEIA. — 
HIS  MAEOH  A  CAEEEE  OF  UNPAEALLELED  COWAEDICE  AND  CEIME. — LAEGE  SPOILS  OF  THE 
CONFEDEEATES. — THE  EXTENT  OF  BANKS'  DISASTEE. — TERMINATION  OF  HIS  VISION  OF 
EMPIEE  WEST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI.— FOEEEST's  EXPEDITION  UP  THE  MISSISSIPPI. — CAPTUEE 
OF  FOET  PILLOW. — HOKE's  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  NOETH  CAEOLINA  COAST. — COMPARATIVE 
UNIMPORTANCE  OF  THESE  CONFEDEEATE  SUCCESSES. — THE  EAID  OF  ULEIC  DAHLGEEN. — 
THE  PARTS  OF  CUSTEE  AND  KILPATEICK. — FAILUEE  AND  LUDIOEOUS  COWAEDICE  OF  THE 

SEVEEAL     EXPEDITIONS. DAHLGREN's      ATROCIOUS     DESIGNS. — HE     RETREATS,     AND     IS 

CHASED  BY  POLLARD. — MANNER  OF  HIS  DEATH. DISCOVERY  OF  "  THE  DAHLGREN  PA 
PERS." — SENSATION  IN  RICHMOND.' — PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  MELODRAMA. — STATEMENT  OF 
EDWARD  W.  HALBACH  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  "  DAHLGREN  PAPERS." — THE  PAPERS  FIEST 
FOUND  BY  THE  SCHOOLBOY  LITTLEPAGE. — HOW  TEANSMITTED  TO  RICHMOND. — THE  THEORY 
OF  FORGEEY. — ITS  UTTEE  ABSURDITY. 

ALTHOUGH  the  Northern  public  was  gratified  in  contemplating  the  sum 
of  Federal  victories  in  the  year  1863,  it  had  yet  to  see  in  the  early  months 
of  1864  a  remarkable  train  of  Confederate  successes,  which,  in  the  aggre 
gate,  did  much  to  re-animate  the  Confederates,  and  to  subdue  expectation 
at  Washington.  These  successes  were  principally  a  decisive  victory  in 
Florida  ;  the  defeat  of  Sherman's  expedition  in  the  Southwest ;  and  a  tri 
umphant  issue  in  the  most  important  campaign  that  had  yet  taken  place 
west  of  the  Mississippi  River. 


• 


491 


BATTLE   OF    OCEAN   POND. 

The  operations  against  Charleston  having  been  virtually  abandoned,  it 
was  decided  at  "Washington  to  use  the  surplus  troops  in  an  attempt  upon 
Florida.  A  command  of  six  or  seven  thousand  men,  including  two  regi 
ments  of  negroes,  was  organized  under  Gen.  Seymour,  left  Charleston  har 
bour  in  eighteen  transports,  and  in  the  month  of  February  ascended  the 
St.  Mary's  River.  The  enemy  was  allowed  to  land,  as  the  small  Confed 
erate  force  under  Gen.  Finnegan  was  unequal  for  anything  like  a  battle, 
and  was  awaiting  reinforcements  despatched  by  Gen.  Beauregard,  in  whose 
military  department  the  State  of  Florida  was  included.  Colquitt's  brigade 
arrived  in  time  to  unite  with  Finnegan  and  hold  the  position  at  Oulustre 
not  far  from  Ocean  Pond,  an  inland  lake,  where  it  was  proposed  to  cover 
the  capital  of  the  State  and  defend  the  road  from  Lake  City  to  Tallahassee. 
The  joint  Confederate  force  did  not  number  more  than  five  thousand  men. 

On  the  20th  February,  this  little  force  was  advanced  several  miles  to 
meet  the  enemy.  A  severe  battle  opened  in  the  afternoon  ;  for  two  hours 
the  enemy  was  steadily  pushed  back  ;  until  at  last  about  sunset,  a  simul 
taneous  attack  of  the  Twenty-Seventh  and  Sixth  Georgia  Regiments  on 
the  enemy's  centre  and  flank  broke  his  whole  line  into  confusion.  Five 
pieces  of  artillery  were  taken,  two  thousand  small  arms,  and  five  hundred 
prisoners.  The  enemy  left  upon  the  field  three  hundred  and  fifty  dead, 
and  abandoned  all  of  his  severely  wounded.  The  action  was  decisive,  as 
it  resulted  in  the  expulsion  of  the  enemy  from  Florida,  and  the  preserva 
tion  of-  this  State  to  the  Confederacy. 


Another  notable  event  about  this  time  was  Sherman's  expedition  into 
Central  Mississippi,  in  which,  with  an  army  of  about  thirty  thousand  men, 
he  proposed  to  sever  his  communications  behind  him,  and  to  strike  off  into 
the  heart  of  the  country.  It  was  his  first  experiment  of  "  the  movable 
column,"  but  unlike  that  in  the  later  months  of  1864,  it  had  opposing 
military  forces  to  encounter,  and  came  to  the  most  wretched  grief. 

The  conceit  of  the  Federal  commander  was  to  operate  upon  what  was 
called  a  "  strategic  triangle  " — to  move  from  Yicksburg  to  Mobile,  by  the 
way  of  Selma ;  a  heavy  column  of  cavalry  to  start  from  Memphis,  move 
rapidly  across  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  come  upon  the  flank  of  Gen. 
Folk's  army,  and  harass  his  retreat  while  Sherman  rushed  upon  him  in 
front ;  and  thus  by  the  possession  of  Mobile  arid  Selma  to  obtain  two  im 
portant  water-bases — the  one  on  the  Mississippi  at  Yicksburg,  the  other  at 


4:92  THE    LOST   CA.TJ6E. 

Mobile  on  the  Gulf,  and  to  establish  his  army  firmly  in  the  triangle 
formed  by  the  Alabama  and  Tombigbee  Rivers,  and  the  railroad  leading 
from  Selma  to  Demopolis  and  Meridian.  The  immediate  objects  of  the 
movement  were  to  cut  off  Mobile  from  Johnston,  who  lay  in  front  of  Grant 
on  the  lines  in  JSTorth  Georgia,  to  break  up  Folk's  army,  and  then  to  turn 
down  on  Mobile,  and  co-operate  with  Farragut's  fleet,  which  was  at  that 
time  thundering  at  the  gates  of  this  city. 

On  the  3d  February,  Sherman  left  Vicksburg  with  about  thirty  thou 
sand  infantry,  pushed  east,  and  crossed  the  entire  State  of  Mississippi  to 
Meridian.  A  few  days  later  the  cavalry  column,  eight  thousand  strong, 
nnder  command  of  Gens.  Smith  and  Grierson,  started  from  Corinth  and 
Holly  Springs,  and  passed,  with  the  usual  incidents  of  pillage  and  destruc 
tion,  through  one  of  the  richest  districts  of  the  Confederacy.  The  junction 
of  this  cavalry  force  with  Sherman  at  Meridian  was  the  critical  point  of 
his  plan,  and  it  was  thought  would  enable  him  to  advance  upon  Demopolis 
and  Selma. 

Gen.  Folk's  little  army  having  been  reinforced  by  two  or  three 
brigades  from  the  Mobile  garrison  for  the  purpose  of  checking  the  enemy 
far  enough  to  save  his  accumulated  stores  and  supplies,  was  yet  in  no  con 
dition  to  give  battle,  being  but  half  of  Sherman's  numbers  ;  and,  therefore, 
evacuated  Meridian,  and  retired  to  Demopolis.  Meanwhile  Gen.  Forrest, 
with  not  more  than  twenty-five  hundred  cavalry,  had  been  detached  to 
watch  the  movements  of  Smith's  and  Grierson's  commands,  and  was  left 
to  confront  eight  thousand  of  the  best-equipped  cavalry  that  the  enemy 
had  ever  put  in  the  field.  But  the  great  cavalry  chief  of  the  West  showed 
no  hesitation.  He  struck  the  enemy  on  the  broad  prairies  near  West 
Foint ;  and  at  Okalona,  on  the  21st  February,  he  had  a  more  important 
action,  and  put  the  enemy  in  shameful  retreat  back  to  Memphis. 

This  action  of  Forrest  was  decisive  of  the  campaign  ;  it  broke  down 
Sherman's  means  of  subsisting  his  infantry ;  and  it  illustrated  on  what 
slight  conditions  depend  the  defeat  or  success  of  an  enterprise  which  leaves 
a  well-defined  base  to  penetrate  the  interiour  of  a  country.  Sherman  in 
his  first  experiment  of  "  the  movable  column  "  obtained  only  the  cheap 
triumphs  of  the  ruffian  and  plunderer.  He  was  compelled  to  make  a  hasty 
retreat  over  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  of  a  country  he  had  ravaged  and 
exhausted  ;  he  accomplished  not  a  single  military  result ;  he  demoralized 
a  fine  army  ;  and  of  the  cavalry  which  was  to  co-operate  with  him,  this 
master  of  billingsgate  in  the  army  declared  "  half  went  to  h — 11,  and  half 
to  Memphis." 

THE   RED   RIVER   EXPEDITION. 

Gen.  Banks,  the  Federal  commander,  had  remained  for  some  months 
idle  and  ostentatious  in  New  Orleans,  with  just  as  much  of  the  State  of 


BATTLE   OF   MANSFIELD.  493 

Louisiana  in  the  Union  as  was  covered  by  his  pickets.  But  he  hoped  to 
signalize  the  year  1864  by  a  remarkable  expedition,  which  was  to  proceed 
up  Eed  River  as  far  as  Shreveport,  thence  across  the  country  into  the  cen 
tral  region  of  Texas,  thereby  destroying  the  Confederate  lines  on  Red 
River,  and  their  supplies,  which  were  then  drawn  principally  from  that 
portion  of  Texas. 

He  proposed  to  move  on  this  expedition  with  a  land  force,  and  a  squad 
ron  of  gunboats  and  transports — the  former  numbering  about  forty  thou 
sand  men.  Maj.-Gen.  "  Dick  "  Taylor  was  at  this  time  commanding  the 
Confederate  forces  operating  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
Gen.  Kirby  Smith  was  commanding  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department, 
with  headquarters  at  Shreveport.  Gen.  Price  was  temporarily  command 
ing  the  district  of  Arkansas,  with  headquarters  in  the  field,  in  the  neigh 
bourhood  of  Camden.  The  Confederate  force  in  Arkansas  numbered 
about  eight  thousand  effective  men.  That  of  the  Federals  was  conjectured 
to  be  about  fifteen  thousand  men,  the  greater  part  of  which,  under  Gen. 
Steele,  held  Little  Rock.  Gen.  Taylor  had  about  ten  thousand  men,  Louis 
iana  and  Texas  troops. 

About  the  middle  of  March,  Gen.  Banks  commenced  his  advance  up 
Red  River  ;  and  about  two  weeks  later,  Gen.  Steele  commenced  advancing 
from  Little  Rock,  in  the  direction  of  Shreveport,  intending  to  unite  with 
Banks  at  that  point,  and  to  assist  in  capturing  the  place.  Gen.  Taylor 
made  some  desultory  attempts  to  oppose  or  check  the  advance  of  the 
enemy,  but  he  was  gradually  forced  back  by  overwhelming  numbers,  re 
treating  as  slowly  as  possible  in  order  to  give  his  reinforcements  time  to 
reach  him  before  he  fell  back  to  Shreveport.  Gen.  Smith  had  ordered  two 
brigades  of  Missouri  infantry  and  two  brigades  of  Arkansas  infantry,  which 
had  been  operating  in  Arkansas,  to  go  to  Taylor's  relief;  and  he  also  hur 
ried  up  some  cavalry  from  Texas. 


BATTLE   OF    MANSFIELD. 

Red  River  is  a  very  narrow  and  tortuous  stream,  and  at  the  time  of  the 
expedition  was  quite  low.  At  Alexandria,  one  hundred  and  sixty  miles 
below  Shreveport,  are  the  "  Falls,"  which  obstruct  the  channel  and  prevent 
navigation  in  low  water.  On  the  road  from  Shreveport  to  Alexandria, 
forty  miles  from  the  former  place,  is  Mansfield,  a  little  village  of  about 
five  hundred  inhabitants.  Twenty  miles  from  Mansfield,  on  the  same 
road,  is  the  village  of  Pleasant  Hill.  Twenty  miles  further  on  is  Blair's 
Landing  on  Red  River.  Still  further  on,  forty  miles  above  Alexandria,  on 
Old  River,  which  in  high  water  communicates  with  Red  River,  we  come 
to  Natchitoches,  the  oldest  town  on  Red  River,  the  scene  of  the  last  con- 


494:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ference  between  the  agents  of  Aaron  Burr  and  Gen.  Hamilton  in  reference 
to  the  expedition  of  the  former  to  conquer  the  Spanish  and  unfriendly 
powers  in  Louisiana  and  Mexico. 

Gen.  Smith  had  determined  to  make  a  stand  at  a  point  between  JMans- 
field  and  Shreveport,  where  he  calculated  on  having  his  army  concentrated, 
expecting  by  the  superiour  valour  of  his  men  to  defeat  the  enemy's  large 
force,  but  if  not,  to  fall  back  on  Shreveport,  and  fight  from  fortifications. 
On  the  morning  of  April  8th,  Gen.  Taylor,  with  his  command  now  aug 
mented  to  fifteen  thousand,  had  reached  within  two  miles  of  Mansfield,  and 
had  halted,  determined  to  have  an  affair  with  the  enemy.  The  Arkansas 
and  Missouri  infantry  organized  into  two  divisions,  the  Missourians  under 
Gen.  Parsons  and  the  Arkansians  under  Gen.  Tappan,  and  both  under 
Gen.  Churchill,  were  at  Keachi,  a  village  twenty  miles  from  Mansfield. 
Churchill  was  under  orders  to  march  his  command  until  he  formed  a  junc 
tion  with  Taylor.  Accordingly,  his  command,  on  the  8th  of  April,  marched 
from  Keachi  to  Mansfield,  a  distance  of  twenty  miles,  and  reached  their 
camp  after  dark. 

Gen.  Banks  was  marching  his  army  by  brigades,  with  intervals  of  from 
one  to  three  miles,  each  brigade  with  its  train — a  favourite  plan  of  march 
ing  with  the  Federal  troops.  The  place  selected  by  Gen.  Taylor  for 
engagement  was  calculated  to  give  great  advantage  to  the  party  attacked. 
He  expected  that  as  soon  as  Banks'  forces  came  up  they  would  attack  him, 
as  they  had  been  doing  for  the  past  twenty  days. 

The  ground  selected  was  a  large  plantation  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in 
width,  and  three  or  four  miles  in  length.  The  Mansfield  and  Alexandria 
road  ran  across  it.  The  ground  traversed  by  the  road  was  higher  than  on 
either  side,  forming  a  ridge.  Gen.  Taylor,  in  falling  back,  crossed  the 
clearing,  and  halted  his  command  on  the  west  side,  in  the  timber.  The 
advance-guard  of  Gen.  Banks  discovering  that  the  Confederates  had  halted, 
also  halted.  It  appeared  as  if  each  party  desired  the  other  to  attack,  and 
several  hours  were  passed  in  inactivity.  About  four  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  Gen.  Taylor,  becoming  impatient,  and  desiring  to  camp,  determined 
to  drive  back  the  advance-guard  of  the  enemy.  For  this  purpose  he  sent 
forward  a  battalion  of  skirmishers,  which  the  enemy  perceiving  when 
about  halfway  across  the  field,  sent  a  regiment  of  cavalry  to -cut  it  off. 
Gen.  Taylor,  to  save  his  skirmishers,  sent  a  regiment  to  their  relief;  the 
enemy  immediately  developed  an  entire  brigade ;  the  Louisiana  Brigade 
was  ordered  to  charge,  and  thus  in  a  few  moments  a  general  action  was 
provoked. 

The  Louisiana  troops  moved  gallantly  forward,  at  a  rapid  run,  making 
across  the  clearing  half-a-mile,  under  a  terrible  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery 
and  small  arms.  There  was  no  pause  until  they  struck  the  enemy,  broke 
the  line  of  his  first  brigade,  and  captured  nearly  the  whole  of  it.  A  sec- 


BATTLE   OF   PLEASANT    HILL.  495 

ond  line  of  the  enemy  shared  the  same  fate.  In  this  line  one  of  the  Fed 
eral  regiments  called  for  "  quarter,"  and  ceased  firing,  when  Gen.  Mouton 
rode  up  to  receive  their  surrender.  Several  shots  we're  fired  at  him,  and 
he  fell  dead,  his  body  pierced  by  four  balls.  Incensed  at  this  atrocious  act 
of  cowardice  and  treachery,  the  Louisiana  troops  poured  into  the  regiment 
that  had  called  for  quarter  volley  after  volley  of  musketry,  shattering  it, 
and  killing  or  wounding  nearly  every  man  in  it.  It  was  nearly  dark  when 
the  battle  ceased.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  ;  both  wings  of  his  army 
were  flanked  ;  he  lost  eight  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  several  thousand 
prisoners,  one  hundred  and  fifty  wagons,  eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
five  or  six  thousand  stand  of  small  arms. 

At  two  o'clock  next  morning,  Churchill's  corps,  which  had  not  been  in 
the  engagement  of  the  night  before,  was  ordered  forward,  and  put  in  the 
advance  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  who  was  soon  discovered  to  be  in  full 
retreat.  A  detachment  of  cavalry  in  advance,  acting  as  skirmishers,  were 
constantly  picking  up  stragglers.  A  thousand  men  were  captured  in  this 
way  during  the  day.  The  scene  of  the  disorderly  retreat  was  decidedly 
picturesque.  The  Zouaves,  in  their  wide  trousers,  loose  jackets,  and  skull 
caps,  all  red,  torn,  dirty,  and  with  lapdogs  frequently  in  their  arms,  which 
they  had  stolen  as  they  had  come  up,  presented  a  singular  spectacle,  as 
they  were  marched  to  the  rear  in  squads  of  fives,  tens,  or  fifties,  generally 
by  a  Texas  cavalry-man,  accoutred  in  ragged  pants,  a  wide  hat,  and  big 
spurs,  armed  with  a  long  Enfield  rifle,  and  riding  a  Spanish  mule  or  a 
mustang  pony.  On  the  road  from  the  battle-field  to  within  a  few  miles  of 
Pleasant  Hill,  the  Confederates  were  never  out  of  sight  of  a  deserted 
wagon,  some  burned  and  some  left  standing,  ambulances,  caissons,  boxes 
of  ammunition,  boxes  of  crackers,  packages  of  medicines,  dead  Federals, 
dead  horses,  and  broken  and  abandoned  guns.  Some  of  the  wagons  were 
loaded  with  cradles^  intended  for  cutting  the  wheat  crop  of  Texas,  and 
many  of  them  had  in  them  various  articles  which  had  been  stolen  from 
citizens  in  the  inarch. 


BATTLE    OF    PLEASANT    HILL. 

As  the  Confederates  advanced  within  three  miles  of  Pleasant  Hill,  it 
was  reported  that  the  enemy  had  made  a  stand  there.  The  troops  in  ad 
vance  were  halted  to  rest  them,  and  to  give  time  to  the  rear  to  close  up. 
A  council  of  war  was  called  by  Gen.  Taylor,  who  thought  that  the  enemy 
would  again  retreat  as  soon  as  our  force  developed  itself. 

Pleasant  Hill,  as  before  stated,  is  a  small  village  through  which  runs 
the  main  road  to  Alexandria.  To  the  southwest  of  the  village  was  a  large 
clearing  traversed  by  three  deep  gullies.  On  the  southeast  corner  stood 
what  was  known  as  the  College  Building. 


496  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

From  the  point  where  the  Confederates  halted  a  road  makes  a  detour 
from  the  main  road  and  comes  into  a  clearing  back  of  the  village,  at  the 
southwest  corner.  Just  before  entering  the  clearing,  a  road  branches  off 
from  this  and  makes  a  still  greater  detour  to  the  south,  and  comes  into  the 
clearing  back  of  the  college.  Gen.  Taylor,  supposing  that  the  enemy  had 
formed  across  the  main  road,  directed  "Walker's  division  of  Texas  troops, 
the  cavalry  in  reserve,  and  also  the  Louisiana  infantry  in  supporting  dis 
tance  to  advance  along  the  road,  attack,  and  drive  him.  Churchill  with 
his  corps  was  ordered  to  take  the  road  which  has  been  described  as  leading 
around  the  village,  and  thereby  strike  the  enemy  in  the  flank.  Gen.  Tay 
lor  was  not  aware  that  this  road  came  in  at  the  southwest  corner,  but 
thought  it  came  in  at  the  southeast  corner  near  the  College,  and  hence 
failed  to  caution  Churchill  against  coming  in  too  soon.  The  army  ad 
vanced  as  directed,  and  Churchill,  provided  with  a  guide,  moved  forward. 
When  he  came  to  where  the  other  road  led  off  to  the  right,  the  guide  in 
sisted  that  Gen.  Taylor  intended  the  troops  to  take  it,  and  come  in  by  the 
College.  Gen.  Churchill  replied  that  Gen.  Taylor  had  not  spoken  of  turn 
ing  off  that  road,  and  as  the  main  road  led  forward  he  determined  to  con 
tinue  on  it.  The  guide,  knowing  the  country  well,  understood  Gen. 
Taylor's  plan,  although  the  commander  had  blundered  in  describing  it. 
Churchill  advanced  until  he  reached  the  edge  of  the  clearing,  then 
marched  to  the  left,  forming  his  line  parallel  with  the  main  road,  but  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  from  it.  The  Federals  had  formed  a  line  across  the  road 
in  the  thick  timber,  and  had  thrown  up  logs  and  rails  several  feet  high  to 
protect  them.  They  had  also  formed  two  lines,  on  the  left  flank  of  this 
first  line,  and  at  right  angles  to  it,  and  parallel  to  the  road,  in  two  gullies 
running  through  the  clearing,  with  their  left  resting  on  the  edge  of  timber. 
Their  reserve  line  was  formed  beyond  the  village,  the  right  flank  resting 
on  the  main  road  and  the  left  extended  to  the  vicinity  of  the  College.  A 
battery  was  planted  at  the  west  end  of  the  village  in  the  road,  and  another 
planted  on  the  rising  ground  near  the  College.  The  enemy's  forces  were 
thus  admirably  posted  to  repel  an  attack  and  to  take  advantage  of  any  suc 
cess  they  might  obtain.  They  kept  their  positions  well  covered  by  heavy 
bodies  of  sharpshooters,  and  the  Confederates  had  to  advance  in  line  of 
battle  in  full  force  to  discover  their  position. 

Gen.  "Walker  had  advanced  along  the  road,  but  had  met  with  so  much 
resistance  from  skirmishers  as  to  induce  Gen.  Churchill  to  believe  that  he 
had  discovered  the  enemy,  and  was  really  in  his  rear.  He  therefore  or 
dered  an  advance  at  double-quick  in  the  direction  of  the  tiring.  Meanwhile 
Walker,  having  driven  in  the  skirmishers,  discovered  the  enemy  in  large 
force  concealed  in  the  underbrush,  and  ordered  a  charge.  But  the  brush 
was  almost  impenetrable,  and  the  enemy  was  in  a  cover  from  which  he 
could  not  be  easily  driven.  In  front  of  his  position  for  one  hundred  yards 


BATTLE   OF   PLEASANT   HILL.  497 

the  small  trees  were  cut  off  as  by  an  even  scythe  about  four  feet  high,  by 
the  incessant  volleys  of  the  enemy's  fire.  Churchill,  coming  up  soon,  struck 
the  first  line  of  the  enemy  posted  in  the  gully.  The  vigour  of  the  attack 
was  remarkable  ;  the  troops  ran  over  the  first  line  of  the  enemy,  never 
pausing  to  take  prisoners,  and  merely  shouting  to  the  affrighted  Federals 
to  get  to  the  rear.  In  a  few  moments  a  second  line  of  the  enemy  was 
pushed  back,  and  Churchill  was  soon  up  where  Walker  was  attacking. 
By  the  combined  assault  the  enemy  was  driven  from  his  position,  and  fell 
back  to  the  gullies  in  the  field. 

Walker's  and  Churchill's  men  were  now  intermixed  and  in  some  con 
fusion.  Col.  Burns,  commanding  the  2d  Brigade  of  Missouri  infantry, 
succeeded  in  getting  his  brigade  in  order,  and,  supported  by  the  other  com 
mands,  moved  by  the  right  flank  until  he  came  into  position  to  charge  the 
enemy  in  their  new  position.  In  a  few  moments  the  Federals  were  driven 
back  through  the  village.  The  llth  Missouri  infantry  captured  a  battery 
which  had  been  planted  in  the  road.  In  charging  the  enemy,  our  forces 
came  full  against  the  village,  and  Burns'  brigade,  being  in  advance  in  the 
flank  movement,  were  consequently  on  the  extreme  right,  and  reached 
beyond  the  main  part  of  the  village.  Just  as  they  had  driven  the  enemy 
through  the  village,  the  line  of  his  reserves,  which,  by  its  position,  was 
immediately  on  our  right  flank,  commenced  firing,  and  advancing  the 
left,  which  had  rested  near  the  College.  The  Confederates  were  thus  sud 
denly  exposed  to  a  flanking  and  rear  fire.  They  were  scattered  from  the 
last  charge,  and  fell  into  disorder. 

About  two  hundred  of  the  Missouri  brigade  were  taken  prisoners.  A 
(Confusion  and  panic  ensued,  which  it  soon  became  impossible  to  arrest. 
The  retreat  on  the  part  of  Churchill's  corps  was  converted  into  a  rout,  with 
no  enemy  pursuing.  Gen.  Parsons  passed  the  fugitive  troops  on  a  fleet 
horse,  shouting  :  "  The  enemy  are  on  you  ;  meet  me  at  Mansfield."  Some 
of  the  officers  led  the  men  in  their  flight.  One  officer  came  galloping  by 
the  Field  Infirmary,  crying  out :  "  Get  away  from  here  ;  the  enemy  have 
planted  a  battery  on  the  hill,  and  will  commence  firing  in  a  minute." 
The  enemy  had  no  battery  in  less  than  a  mile,  and  the  officer  was  so  badly 
frightened  that  he  had  mistaken  two  of  our  pieces,  which  a  panic-stricken 
lieutenant  had  deserted,  for  a  Federal  battery.  But  there  were  instances 
of  gallantry  even  in  this  retreat.  Col.  Burns  attempted  long  to  rally  his 
brigade,  and  failing,  followed  it  from  the  field  as  calmly  as  if  he  were  re 
turning  from  drill.  Col.  Moore,  commanding  the  10th  Missouri  infantry, 
was  the  last  to  leave  the  field.  On  foot  he  had  collected  about  fifty  men, 
and  was  sharpshooting  the  enemy  as  long  as  he  attempted  to  follow. 
Through  the  efforts  of  Cols.  Bums  and  Moore,  principally,  the  troops  were 
halted  and  organized  about  two  miles  from  the  village.  Part  of  Walker's 
command  remained  on  the  ground  taken  from  the  enemy,  as  also  some 
32 


498  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

cavalry  and  a  regiment  of  Arkansas  infantry.  Instead  of  showing  any  in 
clination  to  pursue  or  even  attempting  to  take  the  ground  he  had  lost,  the 
enemy  commenced  falling  back  immediately,  leaving  his  dead  and  wounded 
on  the  field.  As  night  fell,  Gen.  Smith  arrived  upon  the  field,  ordered 
Churchill's  corps  back  to  Arkansas  to  the  relief  of  Gen.  Price,  and  directed 
Gen.  Taylor  to  follow  up  the  enemy. 

The  Confederate  loss  in  the  battle  of  Pleasant  Hill  was  two  hundred 
killed,  five  hundred  wounded,  and  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  prisoners. 
The  Federal  loss  was  killed  three  hundred,  wounded  eight  hundred,  pris 
oners  two  thousand.  In  about  a  week  thereafter  our  prisoners  were  re 
turned,  in  partial  payment  of  a  deficiency  on  a  former  exchange.  The 
Federal  prisoners  were  sent  to  Tyler,  Texas. 

The  morning  following  the  battle,  Gen.  Green,  with  his  Texas  cavalry, 
was  put  in  advance  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The  gunboat  squadron  was 
retreating  down  the  river.  The  cavalry  fired  upon  it  at  Blair's  Landing, 
and  Gen.  Green  was  killed  by  the  fragment  of  a  shell.  The  enemy  was 
vigorously  annoyed  all  the  way  to  Alexandria ;  and  there  he  was  com 
pelled  to  make  a  stand,  to  gain  time  to  get  his  boats  over  the  rapids,  as  the 
river  had  fallen  so  much  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  float  them  over.  Gen. 
Taylor's  force  had  been  weakened  too  much  to  attack  and  drive  the  enemy 
from  his  fortifications ;  and  "  Yankee  ingenuity  "  triumphed  over  the 
"  Falls  "  by  the  construction  of  a  tree-dam  six  hundred  feet  across  the  river. 
The  boats  were  floated  off,  and  the  land  forces  passed  on  by  the  light  of 
the  burning  town,  which  they  fired  as  they  left.  It  was  the  last  act  of 
atrocity  in  a  career  of  unparalleled  cowardice  and  crime.  Along  the  line 
of  Banks'  march  but  few  sugar-houses,  cotton  gins,  or  even  dwelling- 
houses  were  left  standing.  It  was  said  that  his  troops  marched  on  their 
retreat  "  with  a  torch  in  their  right  hand,  plunder  in  their  left,  and  their 
arms  on  their  backs." 

Gen.  Banks,  instead  of  winning  laurels,  and  harvesting  the  wheat-fields 
of  Texas,  returned  to  New  Orleans  ruined  in  military  reputation,  with  the 
loss  of  eight  thousand  killed  and  wounded,  six  thousand  prisoners,  thirty- 
five  pieces  of  artillery,  twelve  hundred  wagons,  one  gunboat,  and  three 
transports  and  about  twenty  thousand  stand  of  small  arms.  Most  of  the 
captured  wagons  belonged  to  Steele,  who,  after  various  skirmishes  in 
Arkansas,  had  returned  to  Little  Eock  with  two  wagons  out  of  a  train 
of  near  eight  hundred,  and  after  having  lost  all  of  his  artillery.  Thus  ended 
the  expedition  to  capture  Shreveport  and  overrun  Texas ;  and  thus  dis 
solved  the  vision  of  Banks'  splendid  empire  west  of  the  Mississippi,  now 
practically  reduced  to  the  tenure  of  New  Orleans,  the  banks  of  the  river, 
and  a  strip  of  sea-coast. 

We  have  seen  that  three  notable  expeditions  of  the  enemy,  in  the  early 
part  of  1864 — that  against  Florida,  that  against  Mississippi  and  Alabama, 


EAID    OF    ULKIC    DAHLGREN.  499 

and  that  against  Texas, — had  resulted  in  extreme  disaster.  They  were  fol 
lowed  by  some  expeditions  and  episodes  on  the  Confederate  side,  which 
must  be  briefly  mentioned  here,  as  their  results,  although  successful,  threw 
but  little  weight  into  the  scales  of  the  war.  Such  was  the  expedition  by 
which  Forrest,  in  the  month  of  April,  spread  terrour  along  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi,  stormed  Fort  Pillow,*  and  cut  a  swath  across  the  State  of  Ken 
tucky.  Such,  too,  was  the  expedition  of  Hoke,  which  captured  in  North 
Carolina  the  strong  position  of  Plymouth,  that  protected  the  whole 
Roanoke  Valley,  taking  in  the  place  sixteen  hundred  prisoners  and  twenty- 
five  pieces  of  artillery.  The  latter  success  was  thought,  indeed,  to  be  of 
permanent  value,  as  it  left  the  enemy  only  two  places,  Washington  and 
Newbern,  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina ;  but  the  force  that  had  moved 
to  Plymouth  had  to  be  recalled  to  the  great  campaign  about  to  take  place 
in  Virginia,  and  the  line  of  operations  it  had  drawn  was  soon  obliterated 
from  the  general  map  of  the  war. 

In  a  general  history  there  is  but  little  space  for  detached  events.  We 
have  briefly  treated  those  which  preceded  the  large  and  active  campaigns 
of  1864.  But  we  must  make  an  exception  to  this  rule  in  case  of  an  expe 
dition  of  Federal  cavalry,  directed  against  Richmond,  in  the  month  of 
March,  which,  although  a  very  small  incident  in  military  view,  is  to  be 
taken  among  the  most  interesting  events  of  the  war,  as  containing  one  of 
the  most  distinct  and  deliberate  evidences  of  the  enemy's  atrocity  that  had 
yet  been  given  to  a  shocked  and  surprised  world. 


THE    EAID    OF    ULRIC    DAHLGREN. 

About  the  close  of  February,  an  expedition  of  Federal  cavalry  was  organ 
ized  to  move  towards  Richmond,  in  which  Col.  Ulric  Dahlgren — a  son  of 
the  Federal  admiral  who  had  operated  so  ineffectually  against  Charleston*— 

*  In  the  capture  of  Fort  Pillow  the  list  of  casualties  embraced  five  hundred  out  of  a  garrison  of 
seven  hundred  ;  and  the  enemy  entitled  the  affair  "  The  Fort  Pillow  Massacre,"  and  Northern  news 
papers  and  Congressional  committees  circulated  absurd  stories  about  negro  troops  being  buried 
alive.  The  explanation  of  the  unusual  proportion  of  carnage  is  simple.  After  the  Confederates  got 
into  the  fort,  the  Federal  flag  was  not  hauled  down  ;  there  was  nor  surrender ;  relying  upon  his  gun 
boats  in  the  river,  the  enemy  evidently  expected  to  annihilate  Forrest's  forces  after  they  had  entered 
the  works  ;  and  so  the  fighting  went  on  to  the  last  extremity.  Some  of  the  negro  troops,  in  their 
cowardice,  feigned  death,  falling  to  the  ground,  and  were  either  pricked  up  by  the  bayonet,  or  rolled 
into  the  trenches  to  excite  their  alarm — to  which  circumstance  is  reduced  the  whole  story  of  "  bury 
ing  negroes  alive."  Forrest  was  a  hard  fighter ;  he  had  an  immense  brain  ;  but  he  knew  but  little 
about  grammar  and  dictionaries.  In  describing  the  alarm  and  bewilderment  in  Fort  Pillow  to  a 
Buperiour  officer — who,  by  the  way,  has  frequently  expressed  the  opinion  that  Forrest,  notwithstand 
ing  his  defects  in  literary  education,  stood  second  only  to  Stonewall  Jackson  as  the  most  remarkable 
man  of  the  war, — Forrest  said  :  "  General,  the  d — d  Yankees  kept  firing  liorizontally  right  tip  into 
the  air." 


500  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

was  second  in  command.  One  branch  of  the  expedition  under  Gen.  Ous 
ter  was  to  create  a  diversion  and  distract  attention  in  the  direction  of 
Charlottesville;  the  other  was  to  divide  at  Beaver  Dam,  one  part  of  it 
under  Gen.  Kilpatrick  to  move  down  on  the  north  side  of  Richmond,  the 
other,  commanded  by  Dahlgren,  to  cross  the  James  River  at  some  point 
in  Goochland  County,  make  an  attack  upon  the  south  of  the  capital,  which 
was  supposed  to  be  undefended,  release  the  Federal  prisoners  there,  fire 
"  the  hateful  city,"  and  murder  in  cold  blood  the  President  and  his  prin 
cipal  officers  !  Such  was  the  fiendish  plot  of  the  enemy,  the  chief  part  of 
which  was  to  be  enacted  by  a  young  man  some  twenty-odd  years  old, 
whose  education,  social  pretensions,  and  soft  manners  would  scarcely  have 
given  one  the  idea  of  an  enterprise  which  compassed  all  the  revenge,  vil 
lainy,  and  cowardice  of  the  most  savage  warfare. 

The  parts  of  Ouster  and  Kilpatrick  were  very  weakly  carried  out.  The 
first  reached  the  vicinity  of  Charlottesville,  and  finding  Stuart's  horse  artil 
lery  there,  retreated  at  a  rapid  pace,  and  fell  back  to  his  infantry  supports  at 
Madison  Court-House.  The  second,  moving  down  on  the  Brook  turnpike, 
came,  on  the  1st  March,  near  the  outer  line  of  the  Richmond  fortifications, 
and  without  once  getting  within  range  of  the  artillery,  took  up  a  line  of 
march  down  the  Peninsula.  Meanwhile,  Dahlgren,  not  venturing  to  cross 
the  high  water  of  the  James  River,  abandoned  his  enterprise  on  the  south 
side  of  Richmond,  and,  unapprised  of  the  ludicrous  cowardice  and  retreat 
of  Kilpatrick,  proposed,  by  moving  down  the  Westham  plank-road,  which 
skirted  the  river,  to  effect  a  junction  with  him,  with  a  view  to  further 
operations  or  to  the  security  of  his  retreat. 

On  the  night  of  the  1st  March,  Dahlgren  pursued  his  way  towards 
Richmond,  with  seven  or  eight  hundred  horsemen.  The  night  was  very 
dark ;  there  was  nothing  on  the  road  but  a  force  of  local  soldiery,  com 
posed  of  a  battalion  of  artisans  in  the  Richmond  Armory  and  a  battalion 
of  department  clerks  ;  this  thin  force  of  unskilled  soldiers  was  all  that  stood 
between  Dahlgren  and  the  revenge  he  had  plotted  to  pour  in  blood  and 
fire  upon  the  devoted  capital  of  the  Confederacy.  But  it  was  sufficient. 
The  valorous  cavalry  that  came  on  with  shouts  of  "  Charge  the  d — d  mlitia," 
broke  at  the  first  fire  ;  and  a  single  fire  of  musketry,  that  killed  eleven  of 
his  men,  sufficed  to  scatter  in  shameful  flight  Dahlgren's  picked  com 
mand  of  "  braves." 

After  this  dastardly  event,  Dahlgren,  anxious  now  only  for  his  retreat, 
divided  what  of  his  force  he  could  collect,  so  as  to  increase  his  chances 
of  escape.  The  force  under  his  immediate  command  moved  down  the 
south  bank  of  the  Pamunkey,  and  in  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day  crossed 
the  Mattapony  at  Ayletts  in  King  and  Queen  County.  As  the  ferry-boat 
at  this  place  had  been  taken  up  and  hid,  Lieut.  Pollard,  who  had  posted 
from  Richmond  to  chase  the  raider^,  supposing  they  would  not  attempt  to 


EAID    OF    ULEIC    DAHLGKEN.  501 

cross  here,  and  wishing  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the  river  wherever  it 
might  be  attempted,  went,  with  a  few  men  of  "  Lee's  Rangers,"  farther  up 
the  river  to  Dunkirk,  where  it  was  thought  the  enemy  would  endeavour 
to  cross.  But  the  raiders,  having  found  an  old  flat-boat  at  Ayletts,  suc 
ceeded  in  crossing  here,  swimming  their  horses.  Lieut.  Pollard,  now  find 
ing  that  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  below  him,  imme 
diately  left  Dunkirk,  and  went  in  pursuit,  with  the  intention  of  hanging 
on  his  rear,  and  harassing  him  as  much  as  possible  with  his  handful 
of  men. 

The  rear-guard  of  the  enemy  was  overtaken  a  short  distance  above 
-Bruington  Church,  and  driven  down  the  road  on  their  main  body.  The 
party  under  Lieut.  Pollard,  numbering  now  about  twenty,  advanced,  and  a 
desultory  fire  was  kept  up  for  a  mile  or  two.  Pollard's  party  was  afterwards 
joined  by  some  "  Home-Guards,"  under  Capt.  R.  H.  Bagby,  and  the 
whole  force  now  probably  numbered  thirty  men. 

The  enemy,  having  reached  the  forks  of  the  road  near  the  point  where 
"  Butler's  Tavern  "  once  stood,  took  the  right  fork.  Here  Lieut.  Pollard 
asked  the  advice  and  information  of  persons  who  were  familiar  with  the 
roads  and  country,  and  it  was  decided  to  ambush  the  enemy  at  a  point 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  below  Stevensville.  The  enemy  numbered  about 
one  hundred  and  had  forty  negroes  with  him.  A  feint  was  made  by  send 
ing  a  few  men  in  pursuit  of  the  fugitives,  while  the  main  force  hastened 
down  the  left  fork  of  the  road  leading  to  Stevensville.  The  place  of  am 
bush  was  reached  about  dark. 

In  the  mean  time  Pollard's  force  had  been  increased  by  a  detachment 
from  the  24th  Virginia  Cavalry,  Capt.  McGruder  commanding,  and  now 
numbered  about  seventy  or  eighty  men.  These  were  also  joined  by  Capt. 
Fox,  of  the  5th  Virginia  Cavalry,  with  a  few  men,  and  he,  being  the  rank 
ing  officer,  assumed  command  of  the  whole  force,  which  was  ranged  along 
the  road  in  ambush. 

Scouts  were  sent  out  to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy,  who, 
it  was  found,  had  reached  a  point  about  a  mile  distant,  on  what  was  called 
the  "  River  Road,"  where  they  were  in  bivouac.  A  consultation  was  held 
among  the  Confederate  officers,  and  it  was  at  one  time  decided  to  attack 
the  enemy,  but  the  final  decision  was  to  await  his  approach. 

Some  of  the  officers  thought  that  the  raiders  would  remain  in  bivouac 
only  long  enough  to  feed  their  horses,  while  others  thought  that  they 
would  not  advance  before  morning,  or,  at  least,  before  the  rise  of  the 
moon  about  2  or  3  A.  M.  Those  who  held  the  latter  opinion  went  to  neigh 
bouring  houses  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  little  rest.  Among  these  was 
Lieut.  Pollard,  who  was,  consequently,  not  present  when  the  enemy 
came  up. 

The  enemy  advanced  about  11  o'clock  at  night,  Col.  Dahlgren  leading 


502  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

his  men.  He  saw  a  few  men  in  the  road,  and  ordered  them  to  surrender. 
He  was  answered  by  a  fire  from  a  few  guns.  The  fire  was  returned  by 
a  few  shots  from  the  enemy's  front.  There  was  no  "  desperate  fight ;  " 
there  was  no  "  cutting  the  way  out,"  nothing  of  the  sort.  A  few  guns 
were  fired  on  each  side,  resulting  in  the  killing  of  Col.  Dahlgren — pos 
sibly  by  his  own  men — and  the  wounding  of  two  or  three  privates. 
Thrown  into  confusion  by  the  slight  fire,  and  panic-stricken,  the  raiders 
fled  down  the  road  they  had  just  come  up,  and  endeavoured  to  escape 
through  a  field  immediately  in  front  of  the  concealed  position  of  the  Con 
federates.  They  were  baffled  in  this  by  a  creek  which  ran  from  the  place 
of  ambush  into  the  Mattapony.  Near  this  creek  they  camped,  during  the 
remainder  of  the  night,  and,  having  been  deserted  completely  by  their 
officers,  surrendered  the  next  morning,  probably  eighty  soldiers  and  thirty 
negroes — others  being  picked  up  during  the  day. 

The  great  interest  of  the  affair  remained  to  be  disclosed.  There  were 
discovered  on  the  dead  body  of  Dahlgren  a  written  address  to  his  men, 
and  other  documents,  revealing  to  the  startled  sensibilities  of  the  people 
of  Richmond  the  horrours  which  they  had  narrowly  escaped.  The  Con 
federates  had  here  documentary  evidence  of  the  atrocious  spirit  of  the 
enemy,  which  it  was  important  to  exhibit  to  the  world  ;  for  whatever  had 
been  the  constant  assertion  on  this  subject,  the  persistent  denials  of  North 
ern  prints,  their  audacious  recrimination,  and  the  stereotypes  of  Federal 
hypocrisy  about  "  Union,"  "  cause  of  humanity,"  "  hopes  of  the  world," 
etc.,  had  heretofore  imposed  upon  the  credulous,  and  put  a  certain  garb  of 
virtue  on  the  most  iniquitous  designs.  But  here  at  last  the  enemy  had, 
by  a  document  plainer  and  more  significant  than  any  published  to  the 
world  from  the  bureaux  of  Washington,  revealed  the  stark  and  deformed 
genius  of  the  war. 

On  the  person  of  Dahlgren  there  was  discovered  the  following  address 
to  the  oificers  and  men  of  the  command,  written  on  a  sheet  of  paper  hav 
ing  in  printed  letters  on  the  upper  corner,  "  Headquarters  Third  Division, 
Cavalry  Corps, ,  1864  :  " 

"  Officers  and  men : 

"  You  have  been  selected  from  brigades  and  regiments  as  a  picked  command  to  at 
tempt  a  desperate  undertaking,  which,  if  successful,  will  write  your  names  on  the  hearts 
of  your  countrymen  in  letters  that  can  never  be  erased,  and  will  cause  the  prayers  of  our 
fellow-soldiers,  now  confined  in  loathsome  prisons,  to  follow  you  and  yours  wherever 
you  may  go. 

"  We  hope  to  release  the  prisoners  from  Belle  Island  first,  and  having  seen  them  fairly 
started,  we  will  cross  the  James  Kiver  into  Richmond,  destroying  the.  bridges  after  us, 
and  exhorting  the  released  prisoners  to  destroy  and  burn  the  hateful  city,  and  do  not  allow 
the  rebel  leader  Davis,  and  his  traitorous  crew  to  escape.  The  prisoners  must  render  great 
assistance,  as  you  cannot  leave  your  ranks  too  far,  or  become  too  much  scattered,  or  you 
will  be  lost. 


THE  DAHLGEEN  PAPERS.  503 

"  Do  not  allow  any  personal  gain  to  lead  you  off,  which  would  only  bring  you  to  an 
ignominious  death  at  the  hands  of  citizens.  Keep  well  together,  and  obey  orders  strictly, 
and  all  will  be  well,  but  on  no  account  scatter  too  far ;  for  in  union  there  is  strength. 

"  With  strict  obedience  to  orders,  and  fearlessness  in  the  execution,  you  will  be  suro 
to  succeed. 

"  We  will  join  the  main  force  on  the  other  side  of  the  city,  or  perhaps  meet  them 
inside. 

"Many  of  you  may  fall;  but  if  there  is  any  man  here  not  willing  to  sacrifice  his 
life  in  such  a  great  and  glorious  undertaking,  or  who  does  not  feel  capable  of  meeting 
the  enemy  in  such  a  desperate  fight  as  will  follow,  let  him  step  out,  and  he  may  go  henco 
to  the  arms  of  his  sweetheart,  and  read  of  the  braves  who  swept  through  the  city  of 
Richmond. 

"  We  want  no  man  who  cannot  feel  sure  of  success  in  such  a  holy  cause. 

"  We  will  have  a  desperate  fight ;  but  stand  up  to  it  when  it  does  come,  and  all  will 
be  well. 

"  Ask  the  blessing  of  the  Almighty,  and  do  not  fear  the  enemy. 

"  IT.  DAHLGREN, 

"  Colonel  Commanding." 


It  might  be  supposed  that  the  Richmond  authorities  would  have  at 
tempted  some  substantial  retaliation,  in  view  of  these  murderous  and  in 
cendiary  disclosures,  and  would  have  treated  those  of  Dahlgren's  raiders 
who  had  been  captured  as  the  felons  they  really  were.  But  President 
Davis  was  w,eak  and  melodramatic  on  the  subject  of  retaliation  ;  a  distinct 
victim  had  never  yet  been  exacted  for  innumerable  murders  and  massacres 
committed  by  the  enemy  ;  a  single  act  of  substantial  retaliation  had  never 
been  done  by  the  Confederate  Administration  ;  and  now  the  utterly  absurd 
and  puerile  notice  in  Richmond  of  the  Dahlgren  raid  was  to  bury  the 
body  of  its  leader  in  a  concealed  grave,  and  to  put  several  tons  of  powder 
under  the  Libby  Prison  to  intimidate  its  inmates.  Such  stupid  melo 
drama  is  almost  incredible  in  the  head  of  a  great  government,  and  merely 
gave  occasion  to  the  enemy  to  exclaim  about  "  rebel  barbarities,"  and  to 
surround  with  romance  a  deed  of  villainy  from  which  the  public,  without 
such  appeals  to  their  interest  and  sympathy,  would  have  turned  with  aver 
sion.  Indeed  so  far  did  the  misrepresentation  and  hypocrisy  of  the  North 
go  on  this  subject,  that  the  authenticity  of  the  papers  found  on  Dahlgren 
was  denied,  and  with  that  singular  disposition  of  Northern  newspapers  to 
interpret  as  heroism,  and  entitle  as  fame,  the  worst  villainies  of  the  war, 
and  its  most  ruthless  and  comprehensive  works  of  destruction,  the  name  of 
Ulric  Dahlgren  was  written  as  "  the  young  hero  of  the  North,"  who  had 
been  "  assassinated  "  on  the  path  to  glory. 

The  authenticity  of  "  the  Dahlgren  Papers  " — the  most  important 
only  of  which  we  have  copied  above — is  probably  no  longer  a  question 
with  the  intelligent.  But  to  put  it  beyond  all  dispute,  we  annex  here  a 


504:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

detailed  statement  of  the  circumstances  of  the  discovery  of  these  papers, 
obtained  from  the  living  witness  under  whose  eye  they  first  came  : 


STATEMENT  OF   EDWARD   W.  HALBACH    IN  RELATION    TO   "THE 
DAHLGREN  PAPERS." 

"  In  the  summer  of  1863,  I,  Edward  W.  Halbach,  was  living  at  Stevensville,  in  King 
and  Queen  County,  Virginia.  I  had  already  been  exempted  from  military  service  on 
account  of  the  condition  of  my  health,  and  was  now  exempt  as  a  schoolmaster  having  the 
requisite  number  of  pupils.  But  feeling  it  my  duty  to  do  what  I  could  to  encounter  the 
raids  of  the  enemy,  I  determined  to  form  a  company  of  my  pupils  between  the  ages  of 
thirteen  and  seventeen  years.  My  commission  and  papers  p~ove  that  the  company  was 
formed,  and  accepted  by  the  President  for  "  Local  Defence."  A  member  of  this  com 
pany,  thirteen  years  of  age  at  the  time,  captured  the  notorious  "Dahlgren  Papers." 
The  name  of  this  boy  is  "William  Littlepage. 

"  Littlepage  and  myself  were  at  Stevensville  when  the  rangers  passed  that  place  on 
their  way  to  the  appointed  place  of  ambush.  Being  determined  to  participate  in  the 
affair,  we  set  off  on  foot,  having  no  horses  to  ride,  and  reached  the  rendezvous  a  little 
after  dark.  The  Yankees  came  up  in  a  few  hours,  and  were  fired  on.  Immediately  after 
this  fire,  and  while  it  was  still  doubtful  whether  the  enemy  would  summon  up  courage 
enough  to  advance  again,  in  a  word,  before  any  one  else  ventured  to  do  so,  Littlepage 
ran  out  into  the  road,  and,  finding  a  "  dead  Yankee  "  there,  proceeded  to  search  his 
pockets  to  see,  as  he  said,  if  he  might  not  be  fortunate  enough  to  find  a  watch.  The 
little  fellow  wanted  to  own  a  watch,  and,  as  the  Yankees  had  robbed  me,  his  teacher, 
of  a  gold  watch  a  short  time  before,  I  suppose  he  concluded  that  there  would  be  no  harm 
in  his  taking  a  watch  from  a  "  dead  Yankee  ;  "  but  his  teacher  always  discouraged  any 
feeeling  of  this  kind  in  his  pupils.  Littlepage  failed  to  secure  the  prize  by  not  looking  in 
the  overcoat  pockets,  and  the  watch  (for  there  was  really  one)  was  found  afterwards  by 
Lieut.  Hart.  But  in  searching  the  pockets  of  the  inner  garments,  Littlepage  did  find  a 
segar-case,  a  memorandum-box,  etc. 

"  When  the  Yankees  had  been  driven  back  and  thrown  into  a  panic  by  the  sudden 
ness  of  our  fire  and  the  darkness  of  the  night,  a  Confederate  lieutenant,  whom  the  enemy 
had  captured  at  Frederick  Hall,  embraced  the  opportunity  presented  to  make  his  escape, 
and  actually  succeeded  in  getting  over  to  our  side. 

"We  could,  by  this  time,  hear  the  enemy  galloping  rapidly  over  the  field,  and  ar 
rangements  were  soon  made  to  prevent  their  possible  escape.  Our  force  determined  to 
go  down  the  road  towards  King  and  Queen  Court-House,  and  barricade  it. 

"  But,  as  before  mentioned,  myself  and  the  only  member  of  my  company  I  had  with 
me,  were  on  foot,  and  unable  to  keep  up  with  the  horsemen.  It  was  therefore  decided 
that  the  prisoners  whom  we  had  captured  should  be  left  in  my  charge.  In  the  confu 
sion,  however,  all  the  prisoners  had  been  carried  off  by  others,  save  the  one  claiming  to 
be  a  Confederate  officer,  which  he  afterwards  proved  to  be — and  a  gallant  one  at  that. 
But,  under  the  circumstances,  I  felt  compelled  to  treat  him  as  an  enemy,  until  time  should 
prove  Mm  a  friend. 

"  Wishing  to  find  a  place  of  safety,  and  feeling  that  it  would  be  hazardous  for  so 
small  a  party  to  take  any  of  the  public  roads  (for  we  knew  not  how  many  more  Yankees 
there  were,  nor  in  what  direction  they  might  come),  I  decided  to  go  into  the  woods  a 


STATEMENT   OF   EDWAKD   W.    HALBACH.  505 

short  distance,  and  there  spend  the  night.  My  party  consisted  of  myself,  Littlepage,  the 
"  lieutenant,"  and  several  other  gentlemen  of  King  and  Queen  County.  We  walked  into 
the  woods  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  and  sat  down. 

"  Up  to  this  time,  we  had  not  even  an  intimation  of  the  name  and  rank  of  the  officer 
.commanding  the  enemy.  In  fact,  we  felt  no  curiosity  to  know.  All  we  cared  for  was  to 
punish  as  severely  as  possible  the  raiders  with  whom  we  were  contending.  We  knew 
that  one  man  was  killed,  but  knew  not  who  he  was.  We  were  just  getting  our  places 
for  the  night,  and  wrapping  up  with  blankets,  garments,  etc.,  such  as  we  had,  for  the 
ground  was  freezing,  and  we  dared  not  make  a  fire,  when  Littlepage  pulled  out  a  segar-case, 
and  said :  '  Mr.  Halbach,  will  you  have  a  segar  ? '  '  No,'  said  I ;  '  but  where  did  you  get 
segars  these  hard  times  ? '  He  replied  that  he  had  got  them  out  of  the  pocket  of  the 
Yankee  who  had  been  killed,  and  that  he  had  also  taken  from  the  same  man  a  memoran 
dum-book  and  some  papers.  '  Well,'  said  I,  '  William,  ^ou  must  give  me  the  papers, 
and  you  may  keep  the  segar-case.' 

"  Littlepage  then  remarked  that  the  dead  Yankee  had  a  wooden  leg.  Here  the  Lieu 
tenant,  greatly  agitated,  exclaimed :  '  How  do  you  know  he  has  a  wooden  leg  ? ' 

"  '  I  know  he  has,'  replied  Littlepage,  '  because  I  caught  hold  of  it,  and  tried  to  pull 
it  off.' 

"  *  There ! '  replied  the  Lieutenant,  '  you  have  killed  Col.  Dahlgren,  who  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  enemy.  His  men  were  devoted  to  him,  and  I  would  advise  you  all  to  take 
care  of  yourselves  now,  for  if  the  Yankees  catch  you  with  anything  belonging  to  him^ 
they  will  certainly  hang  us  all  to  the  nearest  tree.' 

"  Of  course  it  was  impossible  for  us  to  learn  the  contents  of  the  papers,  without  mak 
ing  a  light  to  read  them  by,  or  waiting  till  the  next  morning.  We  did  the  latteo ;  and, 
as  soon  as  day  broke,  the  papers  were  read,  and  found  to  contain  every  line  and  every 
word  as  afterwards  copied  into  the  Richmond  newspapers.  Dahlgren's  name  was  signed 
to  one  or  more  of  the  papers,  and  also  written  on  the  inside  of  the  front  cover  of  his 
memorandum-book.  Here  the  date  of  purchase,  I  suppose,  was  added.  The  book  had 
been  written  with  a  degree  of  haste  clearly  indicated  by  the  frequent  interlineations  and 
corrections,  but  the  orders  referred  to  had  also  been  re-written  on  a  separate  sheet  of 
paper ;  and,  as  thus  copied,  were  published  to  the  world.  Some  of  the  papers  were 
found  loose  in  Dahlgren's  pockets,  others  were  between  the  leaves  of  the  memorandum- 
book. 

"  The  papers  thus  brought  to  light  were  preserved  by  myself  in  the  continual  pres 
ence  of  witnesses  of  unquestionable  veracity,  until  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  day  after  their  capture ;  at  which  time  myself  and  party  met  Lieut.  Pollard,  who,  up 
to  this  time,  knew  nothing  in  the  world  of  the  existence  of  the  Dahlgren  Papers.  At 
his  request,  I  let  him  read  the  papers ;  after  doing  which  he  requested  me  to  let  him  carry 
them  to  Richmond.  At  first,  I  refused,  for  I  thought  that  I  knew  what  to  do  with  them 
quite  as  well  as  any  one  else.  But  I  was  finally  induced,  by  my  friends,  against  my  will, 
to  surrender  the  papers  to  Lieut.  Pollard,  mainly  in  consideration  of  the  fact  that  they 
would  reach  Richmond  much  sooner  through  him  than  through  a  semi-weekly  mail.  The 
papers  which  were  thus  handed  over  to  the  Confederate  Government — I  state  it  again — 
were  correctly  copied  ~by  the  Richmond  newspapers. 

A  thousand  and  one  falsehoods  have  been  told  about  this  affair — by  our  own  men  as  well 
as  by  the  Yankees.  Some  of  our  own  men  were  actuated  by  motives  of  selfishness  and 
ambition  to  claim  each  one  for  himself  the  whole  credit  of  the  affair ;  when,  in  fact, 
the  credit  belongs  to  no  particular  individual,  but,  collectively,  to  the  whole  of  our  party. 
We  were  a  strange  medley  of  regulars,  raw  troops,  old  farmers,  preachers,  schoolboys^ 
etc.  But  I  believe  that  all  present  did  their  duty,  only  to  find  that  all  the  credit  was 


506  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

afterwards  claimed,  with  a  considerable  degree  of  success  among  the  ignorant,  by  those 
who  were  not  present. 

"  The  credit  of  the  command  of  our  party  belongs  alone  to  Capt.  Fox,  than  whom 
there  was  no  more  chivalric  spirit  in  either  army.  In  making  this  statement,  I  am  actu 
ated  only  by  a  desire  to  do  justice  to  the  memory  of  one  who  was  too  unassuming  to 
sound  his  own  trumpet.  I  am  also  told,  by  soldiers,  that  Lieut.  Pollard  deserves  a  con 
siderable  degree  of  credit,  for  the  part  he  played  in  following  and  harassing  the  enemy 
up  to  the  time  they  took  the  right  fork  of  the  road  near  Butler's  Tavern. 

"  You  are,  of  course,  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  has  always  denied  the  au 
thenticity  of  the  Dahlgren  Papers,  and  declared  them  to  be  forgeries.  To  prove  the 
utter  absurdity  and  falsehood  of  such  a  charge,  I  submit  the  following : 

"  1.  The  papers  were  taken  by  Littlepage  from  the  person  of  a  man  whose  name  he 
had  never  heard.  It  was  a  dark  night,  and  the  captor,  with  the  aid  of  the  noon-day 
sun,  could  not  write  at  all.  I  afterwards  taught  him  to  write  a  little  in  my  school. 

"  The  question  occurs :  Can  a  boy  who  cannot  write  at  all,  write  such  papers,  and 
sign  to  them  an  unknown  name  ?  If  they  had  been  forged  by  any  one  else,  would  they 
have  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  child  ?  Could  any  one  else  have  forged  an  unknown 
and  unheard  of  name? 

u  2.  The  papers  were  handed  to  me  immediately  after  their  capture,  in  the  presence 
of  gentlemen  of  undoubted  integrity  and  veracity,  before  whom  I  can  prove  that  the 
papers  not  only  were  not,  but  could  not  have  been,  altered  or  interpolated  by  myself. 
These  gentlemen  were  with  me  every  moment  of  the  time  between  my  receiving  the 
papers  and  my  delivering  them  to  Lieut.  Pollard. 

"  3.*If  Lieut.  Pollard  had  made  any  alterations  in  the  papers,  these  would  have  been 
detected  by  every  one  who  read  the  papers  before  they  were  given  to  him,  and  after 
wards  read  them  in  the  newpapers.  But  all  agree  that  they  were  correctly  copied.  In 
short,  human  testimony  cannot  establish  any  fact  more  fully  than  the  fact  that  Col.  Ulric 
Dahlgren  was  the  author  of  the  "  Dahlgren  Papers." 

"  With  regard  to  the  part  taken  by  myself  in  this  affair,  I  lay  no  claim  to  any  credit. 
I  do  not  write  this  version  of  the  affair  to  gain  notoriety.  I  have  made  it  a  rule  not  to 
mention  my  own  name,  except  in  cases  where  I  found  that  false  impressions  were  being 
made  upon  the  public  mind.  You  know  very  well  that  my  being  Littlepage's  captain 
entitled  me  to  claim  the  capture  of  the  papers  for  myself.  But  this  I  have  never  done. 
And,  even  when  called  upon  by  Gen.  Fitz.  Lee  to  give  my  affidavit  to  the  authenticity  of 
the  papers,  I  wrote  him  word  that  Littlepage  was  the  captor  of  them.  In  his  letter  to 
Lieut.  Pollard,  which  was  forwarded  to  me,  he  asked  :  '  Who  is  Capt.  Halbach  ? '  I  re 
plied,  for  myself,  that  I  was  nothing  more  than  the  humble  captain  of  a  company  of 
school-boys,  and  that  if  I  deserved  any  credit,  it  was  only  so  much  as  he  might  choose 
to  give  me  for  preserving  the  papers,  when  advised  to  destroy  them,  to  avoid  being  cap 
tured  with  them  in  my  possession,  which,  I  was  told,  would  result  in  the  hanging  of  our 
little  party. 

"  I  have  never  given  the  information  herein  contained  before,  because  I  had  hoped 
that  it  would  be  given  to  the  public  by  others,  and  I  give  it  now,  because  I  regard  it  as 
a  duty  to  do  so.  My  own  course,  after  the  killing  of  Dahlgren,  was  as  follows :  I  joined 
those  who  agreed  to  bury  him  decently  in  a  coffin,  and  in  compliance  with  a  promise 
made  to  a  scout  by  the  name  of  Hogan,  I  prepared  a  neat  little  head-board  with  my  own 
hands,  to  mark  his  grave.  This  was  not  put  up,  because  the  messenger  from  Mr.  Davis 
for  the  body  of  Dahlgren  arrived  while  we  were  taking  it  out  of  the  ground  where  it 
had  been  hastily  buried." 


CHAPTER    XXXI. 

OPENING  OF  THE  GEE  AT  SPRING  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864. — EXPLANATION  OF  RENEWED  CONFIDENCE  IN 
RICHMOND. — PROSPECT  FOR  THE  CONFEDERATES  IN  THE  PRESIDENTIAL  CONTEST  OF  1864. — 

A   NEW  THEORY  OF  PEACE. VALUE  OF  ENDURANCE. — THE  MISSION  OF  MESSRS.  HOLCOMBE, 

CLAY  AND  THOMPSON. — THEY  LEAVE  WILMINGTON  WHEN  THE  CAMPAIGN  ON  THE  RAPIDAN 
OPENS. — U.  S.  GRANT  APPOINTED  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  OF  THE  FEDERAL  ARMIES. — CHAR 
ACTER  OF*GRANT. — COMPARED  WITH  BUELL. — GEN.  GRANT'S  LOW  AND  GROSS  CONCEPTION 
OF  WAR. — THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  PREPARES  AN  ARMY  ORGANIZATION  OF  ONE  MIL 
LION  OF  MEN. — DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  FEDERAL  FORCES  IN  VIRGINIA. — STRENGTH  OF  THE 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. —POSITION  AND  NUMBERS  OF  GEN.  LEE. — HIS  GREAT  ANXIETY. — 
APPEAL  OF  CONFEDERATE  WOMEN. — THE  BATTLES  OF  THE  WILDERNESS. — GRANT  CROSSES 
THE  RAPIDAN. — LEE  SPRINGS  UPON  HIS  FLANK. — ATTACK  OF  EWELL  AND  HILL. — THE  CON 
FEDERATE  LINE  BROKEN. — GORDON'S  SPLENDID  CHARGE. — GALLANT  CONDUCT  OF  PEGRAM's 

AND  HAYS'  DIVISIONS. — NIGHT  ATTACK  OF  THE  ENEMY. THE  SECOND  DAY7S  BATTLE. — 

HELL'S  CORPS  BROKEN. — LONGSTREET  COMES  UP  AND  TURNS  THE  FORTUNES  OF  THE  DAY. — 
HE  IS  SHOT  DOWN  BY  HIS  OWN  MEN. — GEN.  LEE  OFFERS  TO  LEAD  A  CHARGE. — TOUCHING 

REMONSTRANCES  OF  THE  MEN. — THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTACK  WITHDRAWN. — RESULTS  OF 
THE  DAY. — GORDON'S  NIGHT  ATTACK. — GRANT'S  WHOLE  ARMY  ON  THE  VERGE  OF  ROUT. — 
HIS  IMMENSE  LOSSES. — MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  TWO  ARMIES  TO  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT-HOUSE. 
— MASTERLY  PERFORMANCE  OF  LEE. — A  MELANCHOLY  EPISODE  TO  THE  CAMPAIGN. — 

SHERIDAN'S  EXPEDITION. — DEATH  OF  GEN.  STUART. — BATTLES  OF  SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT 
HOUSE. — COMBAT  OF  ANDERSON'S  CORPS. — THE  FIGHTING  ON  THE  IOTH  MAY. — THE  BAT 
TLE  ON  THE  12TH. — A  SALIENT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  LINE  TAKEN. — GREAT  SLAUGHTER ' 

OF  THE  ENEMY. — GRANT  CONFESSES  A  FAILURE,  AND  WAITS  SIX  DAYS  FOR  REINFORCE 
MENTS. — OPERATIONS  ON  THE  SOUTH  SIDE  OF  RICHMOND. — GRANT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  TO 
BUTLER. — SIGEL'S  COLUMN  IN  WESTERN  VIRGINIA,  ANOTHER  PART  OF  THE  COMBINATION. — 
BUTLER'S  BOASTFUL  DESPATCH. — HE  DARES  "  THE  WHOLE  OF  LEE'S  ARMY/' — HE  is  DE 
FEATED  BY  BEAUREGARD,  AND  HIS  ARMY  "  BOTTLED  UP." — OPERATIONS  IN  THE  KANAWHA 

AND  SIIENAXDOAH  VALLEYS. SIGNAL  DEFEAT  OF  6IGEL. — GRANT'S  COMBINATION  BROKEN 

DOWN. — HE  MOVES  TO  THE  NORTH  ANNA  RIVER. — IS  FOILED  AGAIN  BY  LEE. — HE  CROSSES 
THE  PAMUNKEY  RIVER. — "  THE  PENINSULA  "  MADE  THE  BATTLE-GROUND  AGAIN. — THE 

SUM    OF  GLORY  ACHIEVED  BY   LEE'S  ARMY. — STATEMENT  AS  TO  LEE'S  REINFORCEMENTS. 

THE  FEDERAL  HOST  HELD  AT  BAY  BY  AN  ARMY  OF  FIFTY  THOUSAND  MEN. GASEOUS  NON 
SENSE  IN  NEW  YORK  ABOUT  GRANT'S  GENERALSHIP. — HIS  OPERATIONS  IN  MAY  ABSURD 
AND  CONTEMPTIBLE  FAILURES. 

IT  is  remarkable  that  at  the  opening  of  the  great  spring  campaign  of 
1864,  there  should  have  simultaneously  prevailed  at  "Washington  the  opin 
ion  that  the  operations  of  the  year  would  certainly  restore  the  Union,  and 


508  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

at  Richmond  the  opinion  that  the  coming  campaign  was  more  likely  to 
accomplish  the  independence  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  than  any  pre 
ceding  .one  of  the  war.  These  opinions  were  probably  equally  sincere  and 
intelligent.  Some  special  explanation  must  be  found  for  a  conflict  of 
judgment  so  sharp  and  decided.  The  North  trusted  to  its  acumulation  of 
men  and  material  to  make  the  fourth  year  of  the  war  the  triumphant  one 
for  its  cause.  The  South,  to  a  certain  extent,  had  been  encouraged  by  the 
series  of  successes  we  have  remarked  in  the  first  months  of  this  year  ;  but 
this  animation  is  not  sufficient  to  account  for  the  large  measure  of  expec 
tation  and  confidence  with  which  she  entered  upon  the  dominant  campaign 
of  1864.  There  was  a  special  occasion  of  hope  and  reassurance. 

Despite  the  little  benefit,  beyond  verbal  assistance,  which  the  Confed 
erate  cause  had  derived  from  the  Democratic  party  in  the  North,  and  de 
spite  the  losses  of  that  party  in  the  elections  of  1863,  it  was  observed,  in 
the  spring  of  1864,  that  it  was  beginning  to  raise  a  peace  platform  for  the 
next  Presidential  election.  That  critical  election  was  the  point  of  a  new 
prospect  for  the  South.  It  was  evident  that  there  was  a  serious  impa 
tience  in  the  North  at  the  prolongation  of  the  war  ;  and  it  was  probable 
that  if  the  South  could  maintain  the  status  quo  through  another  campaign, 
and  put  before  the  North  the  prospect  of  another  and  indefinite  term  of 
hostilities,  the  present  rulers  at  Washington  would  be  discredited,  the 
Democratic  party  get  into  power,  and  the  Northern  public  be  persuaded 
to  accept  as  the  conclusion  of  the  war  some  favourable  treaty,  league,  or 
other  terms  short  of  an  actual  restoration  of  the  Union.  It  was  said,  with 
reason,  in  Richmond,  that  such  was  Northern  impatience  that  the  question 
of  the  war  had  simply  become  one  of  endurcmce  on  the  part  of  the  South  ; 
that  even  without  positive  victories  in  the  field,  and  merely  by  securing 
negative  results  in  the  ensuing  campaign,  the  Democratic  party  would  be 
able  to  overthrow  the  Administration  at  Washington,  and  to  open  negotia 
tions  with  Richmond  as  between  government  and  government. 

How  seriously  this  argument  was  entertained  in  Richmond,  may  be 
understood  from  the  fact  that,  simultaneously  with  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  in  Virginia,  President  Davis  prepared  a  mission  to  open  com 
munication  with  the  Democratic  party  in  the  North,  and  to  conduct  in 
pace  with  the  military  campaign  whatever  political  negotiation  might  be 
practicable  in  the  North.  The  commissioners  entrusted  with  this  intrigue 
were  Messrs.  Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  Holcombe,  of  Virginia,  and  Clay, 
of  Alabama  ;  and  they  were  to  proceed  to  a  convenient  place  on  the  North 
ern  frontier,  and  use  whatever  political  opportunities  the  military  events  of 
the  war  might  develop.  They  ran  the  blockade  at  Wilmington  on  the  night 
of  the  day  that  the  first  gun  on  the  Rapidan  opened  the  momentous  cam 
paign  of  1864. 

The  bloody  drama  of  the  war  was  to  recommence  on  the  banks  of  this 


GEN.    GRANT,    COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.  509 

stream,  where  Gen.  Lee's  army  had  been  stationed  during  the  winter.  On 
the  Federal  side  a  new  and  important  actor  was  to  appear  on  the  scene. 
Gen.  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  who  had  had  a  long  run  of  success  in  the  "West,  had 
been  appointed  lieutenant-general  and  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  Fed 
eral  forces,  and  was  now  to  answer  the  expectation  of  his  admirers  by  a 
campaign  in  Yirginia  and  the  repetition  of  the  enterprise  upon  the  Con 
federate  capital.  The  Richmond  journals  complimented  him  as  a  "  man 
of  far  more  energy  and  ability  than  any  that  had  yet  commanded  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,"  but  "  his  performances  would  bear  no  comparison 
whatever  to  those  of  Gen.  Lee." 

The  new  Federal  commander  in  Virginia  was  one  of  the  most  remark 
able  accidents  of  the  war.  That  a  man  without  any  marked  ability,  cer 
tainly  without  genius,  without  fortune,  without  influence,  should  attain  the 
position  of  leader  of  all  the  Federal  armies,  and  stand  the  most  conspicu 
ous  person  on  that  side  of  the  war,  is  a  phenomenon  which  would  be  inex 
plicable  among  any  other  people  than  the  sensational  and  coarse  mobs  of 
admiration  in  the  North.  Gen.  Grant's  name  was  coupled  with  success  ; 
and  this  circumstance  alone,  without  regard  to  merit  of  personal  agency, 
without  reference  to  any  display  of  mental  quality  in  the  event,  was  suffi 
cient  to  fix  him  in  the  admiration  of  the  Northern  public.  It  mattered 
not  that  Grant  had  illustrated  no  genius ;  it  mattered  not  that  he  had 
smothered  Fort  Donelson  by  numbers ;  it  mattered  not  that  he  had  suc 
ceeded  at  Yicksburg  through  the  glaring  incompetency  of  a  Confederate 
commander,  and  by  the  weight  of  eighty  thousand  men  against  twenty 
odd  thousand ;  the  North  was  prepared  to  worship  him,  without  distin 
guishing  between  accident  and  achievement,  and  to  entitle  him  the  hero 
of  the  war. 

It  is  a  curious  commentary  on  the  justice  of  popular  judgment,  that 
while  Grant  was  thus  elevated  to  power  and  fame,  the  man  who  rescued 
him  at  Perry ville  and  again  at  Shiloh,  and  whose  heroism  and  genius  had 
saved  there  the  consequences  of  his  stupidity,  should  be  languishing  in 
obscurity.  This  man  was  Gen.  Buell.  It  was  he  who  had  contributed 
most  to  Grant's  success,  and  whose  masterly  manoeuvres  had  done  more  to 
reclaim  the  Mississippi  Yalley  for  the  Federals  than  any  other  commander, 
and  who  now  had  been  sacrificed  to  the  spirit  of  political  intrigue.  At  a 
time  when  popular  passion -clamoured  for  the  desolation  of  the  South,  Gen. 
Buell  persisted,  with  a  firmness  rarer  and  more  admirable  even  than  he 
exhibited  in  the  crisis  of  battle,  in  conducting  the  war  on  the  principles  of 
humanity ;  and  by  this  noble  moderation  he  incurred  the  displeasure  of 
the  faction  that  controlled  the  Government  at  Washington.  The  Radicals 
waged  a  war  of  extermination ;  but  he  proposed,  with  the  sagacity  of  a 
statesman,  to  conciliate  the  good  will  of  the  South,  while  he  overcame  its 
resistance  by  an  exertion  of  physical  force.  His  system  was  too  refined 


510  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

for  the  comprehension,  and  too  liberal  for  the  vindictive  temper  of  the 
dominant  party,  and  he  was  forced  to  relinquish  the  command  of  the 
superb  army  he  had  organized,  and  to  resign  a  commission  which  he  might 
have  illustrated  by  splendid  achievements. 

It  is  some  consolation  to  reflect  that  the  verdict  of  history  is  neither 
the  sensation  of  a  mob  nor  the  fiat  of  a  political  faction.  Gen.  Grant  will 
have  his  proper  place  surely  and  exactly  assigned  in  the  ultimate  records 
of  merit  in  the  war.  No  one  will  deny  this  man  credit  for  many  good 
qualities  of  heart  and  great  propriety  of  behaviour.  He  had  that  coarse, 
heavy  obstinacy,  which  is  as  often  observed  in  the  Western  backwoodsman 
as  in  a  higher  range  of  character.  But  he  contained  no  spark  of  military 
genius ;  his  idea  of  war  was  to  the  last  degree  rude — no  strategy,  the 
mere  application  of  the  vis  inertice  /  he  had  none  of  that  quick  perception 
on  the  field  of  action  which  decides  it  by  sudden  strokes  ;  he  had  no  con. 
ception  of  battle  beyond  the  momentum  of  numbers.  Such  was  the  man 
who  marshalled  all  the  material  resources  of  the  North  to  conquer  the  little 
army  and  overcome  the  consummate  skill  of  Gen.  Lee.  He,  who  was  de 
clared  the  military  genius  of  the  North,  had  such  a  low  idea  of  the  contest, 
such  little  appreciation  of  the  higher  aims  and  intellectual  exercises  of  war 
that  he  proposed  to  decide  it  by  a  mere  competition  in  the  sacrifice  of 
human  life.  His  plan  of  operations,  as  he  himself  described  it,  was  "  to 
hammer  continuously  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy  and  his  re 
sources,  until  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way,  there  should  be  nothing 
left  to  him  but  an  equal  submission  with  the  loyal  section  of  our  common 
country  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  land." 

At  Washington,  the  arrangements  for  the  spring  campaign  of  1864 
were  made,  on  the  part  of  the  government,  to  put  forth  its  strength.  In 
all  the  bureaus  of  the  War  Department  supplies  were  provided  on  a  scale 
of  great  magnitude,  to  meet  any  exigency  that  could  be  foreseen.  The 
estimates  were  based  upon  an  army  organization  of  one  million  of  men. 
The  States  were  called  upon  to  strengthen  the  armies  by  volunteers  ;  new 
drafts  were  ordered  and  put  in  execution  throughout  all  the  Northern 
States ;  vast  supplies  of  arms,  ammunition,  clothing,  subsistence,  medical 
stores  and  forage  were  provided  and  distributed  in  depots  to  meet  the 
wants  of  the  troops  wherever  they  might  operate  ;  horses,  mules,  wagons, 
railroad  iron,  locomotives  and  cars,  bridge  timber,  telegraph  cable  and 
wire,  and  every  material  for  transportation  and  communication  of  great 
armies  under  all  conditions  were  supplied.  Congress,  with  unstinting 
hand,  voted  large  appropriations  for  recruiting,  paying  and  supplying  the 
troops. 

Gen.  Grant  assumed  command  as  Lieutenant-General  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  on  the  17th  day  of  March,  1864.  The  distribution  of 
the  Federal  armies  operating  in  Virginia  was  as  follows  :  The  Army  of 


THE   CONFEDERATE   ARMY   ON   THE   RAPID  AN.  511 

the  Potomac,  commanded  by  Major-General  Meade,  had  its  headquarters 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Kapidan.  The  Ninth  Corps,  under  Major-Gen 
eral  Burnside,  was,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  a  distinct  organization, 
but  on  the  24th  day  of  May,  1864,  it  was  incorporated  into  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  The  Army  of  the  James  was  commanded  by  Major-Gen. 
Butler,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Fortress  Monroe.  The  headquarters 
of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  commanded  by  Major-Gen.  Sigel,  were 
at  Winchester. 

The  available  strength  of  the  enemy's  force  on  the  line  of  the  Eapidan, 
including  the  Ninth  Corps,  was  141,166  men.  Besides  there  were  in  what 
was  known  as  the  Department  of  Washington  and  the  Middle  Department 
47,751  men,  available  as  reinforcements  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac ; 
making  therefore  a  total  of  about  180,000  men,  as  the  force  which  Gen. 
Lee  had  to  meet  with  less  than  forty  thousand  muskets  ! 

The  Confederate  army  on  the  Rapidan,  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign, 
consisted  of  two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps,  E  well's  corps,  A.  P.  Hill's 
corps,  three  divisions  of  cavalry,  and  the  artillery.  Swell's  corps  did  not 
exceed  fourteen  thousand  muskets  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  On 
the  8th  of  May,  the  effective  strength  of  Hill's  corps  was  less  than  thirteen 
thousand  muskets,  and  it  could  not  have  exceeded  eighteen  thousand  in  the 
beginning  of  the  month.  Longstreet's  corps  was  the  weakest  of  the  three 
when  all  the  divisions  were  present,  and  the  two  with  him  had  just  re 
turned  from  an  arduous  and  exhausting  winter  campaign  in  East  Tennes 
see.  His  effective  strength  could  not  have  exceeded  eight  thousand  mus 
kets.  Gen.  Lee's  whole  effective  infantry,  therefore,  did  not  exceed  forty 
thousand  muskets,  if  it  reached  that  number.  The  cavalry  divisions  were 
weak,  neither  of  them  exceeding  the  strength  of  a  good  brigade.  The 
artillery  was  in  proportion  to  the  other  arms,  and  was  far  exceeded  by 
Grant's,  not  only  in  the  number  of  men  and  guns,  but  in  weight  of  metal, 
and  especially  in  the  quality  of  the  ammunition.  Gen.  Lee's  whole  effect 
ive  strength  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  was  not  over  fifty  thousand 
men  of  all  arms.  There  were  no  means  of  recruiting  the  ranks  of  his 
army,  and  no  reinforcements  were  received  until  the  23d  of  May. 

The  Confederate  public  was  but  little  aware  of  this  terrible  disparity 
of  force  ;  but  Gen.  Lee  was  greatly  affected  by  it  as  he  contemplated  the 
thin  line  which  stood  between  the  insolent  host  of  the  enemy  and  the 
Capital  of  the  Confederacy.  In  April  he  issued  a  general  order  directing 
to  be  observed  "  a  day  of  fasting,  humiliation,  and  prayer."  All  military 
duties,  unless  absolutely  necessary,  were  to  be  suspended,  and  the  chap 
lains  were  desired  to  hold  divine  service  in  their  regiments  and  brigades. 
Officers  and  men  were  "  requested  "  to  attend.  This  passed,  the  final  prep 
arations  were  made  for  the  deadly  struggle  that,  it  was  evident,  would 
soon  commence.  "  For  your  stricken  country's  sake,  and  ours,"  said  the 


512  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

"  wives,  daughters,  sisters,  and  friends  "  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  in  a 
published  address  to  them,  "  be  true  to  yourselves  and  our  glorious  cause. 
Never  turn  your  back  on  the  flag,  nor  desert  the  ranks  of  honour,  or  the 
post  of  danger.  You  are  constantly  present  to  our  minds.  The  women  of 
the  South  bestow  all  their  respect  and  affection  on  the  heroes  who  defend 
them." 


THE   BATTLES   OF   THE   WILDERNESS. 

Gen.  Lee  was  not  idle  in  adopting  all  precautionary  measures  to  meet 
the  enemy.  He  strongly  intrenched  his  lines,  dug  rifle-pits  at  the  fords  of 
the  Rapidan,  and  kept  a  good  force  on  the  Gordonsville  road  so  as  to  hold 
the  communication  open  to  Richmond  by  that  route,  while  by  the  way  of 
Fredericksburg  he  destroyed  the  bridges  and  rails  in  order  to  prevent,  or 
make  more  difficult,  the  enemy's  advance  in  that  direction. 

The  works  occupied  by  Lee's  army  on  the  B-apidan  extended  on  the 
right  three  miles  below  Raccoon  ford.  Swell's  corps  and  Hill's  lay  behind 
those  defences,  and  stretched  out  on  each  side  of  Orange  Court-House, 
along  a  line  of  twenty  miles.  Longstreet  occupied  the  country  around 
Gordonsville,  thirteen  miles  southwest  of  the  position  on  the  Rapidan. 

Grant,  having  declined  to  assail  Lee's  front,  determined  to  turn  it  by  a 
movement  on  the  Confederate  right.  On  Tuesday  night,  May  3d,  the 
Federal  army  broke  up  its  encampment  in  the  county  of  Culpepper,  and 
at  dawn  of  next  morning  crossed  the  Rapidan  at  the  old  fords — Ely's  and 
Germania — and  in  much  the  same  line  that  Meade  attempted  in  the  pre 
vious  November,  and  where  Lee  had  caused  Hooker  to  retreat  a  year  be 
fore.  The  Second  corps,  commanded  by  Gen.  Hancock,  in  front,  crossed 
at  Ely's  ford,  the  Fifth  corps,  under  Warren,  took  the  "Germania  ford, 
while  the  Sixth,  Sedgwick's,  followed  immediately  upon  it. 

As  soon  as  Gen.  Lee  ascertained  that  Grant  had  certainly  cut  loose 
from  his  base  at  Culpepper  Court  House,  and  was  moving  rapidly  past  his 
right,  he  put  his  own  army  in  motion,  sending  Ewell's  corps  down  the 
turnpike  and  A.  P.  Hill's  down  the  plank  road,  and  ordering  Longstreet, 
who  had  arrived  at  Gordonsville,  to  move  his  corps  down  on  the  right  of 
Ewell's  line  of  march,  so  as  to  strike  the  head  of  the  enemy's  column. 

The  advance  of  Ewell's  corps — Edward  Johnson's  division — arrived 
within  three  miles  of  Wilderness  Run  in  the  evening,  and  encamped. 
Rodes  lay  in  his  rear  ;  and  Early  was  next  at  Locust  Grove,  all  ready  to 
strike  at  Grant's  advance  the  next  morning.  At  about  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  6th  May  the  enemy  was  discovered  by  the  skirmishers 
thrown  out,  and  Johnson  immediately  pressed  forward  to  gain  a  hill  where 
lie  proceeded  to  form  his  troops  in  line  of  battle. 


BATTLES   OF    THE   WILDERNESS.  513 

The  enemy  advanced  in  such  order  as  was  practicable  in  a  tangled  for 
est.  The  Fifth  corps,  accompanied,  by  two  pieces  of  artillery,  that  came 
thundering  along  the  turnpike,  assailed  the  Confederate  line  at  the  inter 
section  of  the  road.  Receiving,  as  it  advanced,  a  terrible  fusilade  without 
any  sign  of  wavering,  the  rear  rank  pressing  forward  those  of  the  front, 
the  attacking  masses  delivered  from  a  forest  of  rifles  a  fast  and  furious  fire 
upon  Johnson's  line.  Closing  in  upon  it  with  great  spirit  in  front,  and 
threatening  to  envelop  it  on  its  right,  they  succeeded,  after  a  brief  strug 
gle,  in  forcing  back  part  of  the  brigade  of  Gen.  J.  M.  Jones  that  had  been 
formed  across  the  turnpike.  Jones  strove,  in  desperation,  to  rally  his 
broken  troops,  but  with  no  avail ;  and,  as  the  brave  general  was  imploring 
his  men  to  stop  their  flight,  a  ball  struck  him,  and  he  fell  from  his  saddle 
a  bleeding  corpse. 

The  decisive  moment  of  the  battle  was  now  at  hand.  Stewart  moved 
from  his  position  in  the  line  of  battle  to  close  the  gap  left  in  it  by  the  bri 
gade  of  Jones.  As  the  Federal  masses  poured  through,  his  men  rushed 
forward  with  a  cheer ;  and,  driving  them  back  by  the  impetus  of  their 
charge,  captured  their  guns.  At  the  same  time  Ewell  ordered  Daniels'  and 
Gordon's  brigades  of  Rodes'  division  to  form  on  the  right  and  charge. 
Gordon,  holding  command  of  the  movement,  crushed  through  the  enemy's 
first  lines  and  captured  as  he  went  forward  a  whole  regiment,  men,  officers, 
and  colors.  Driving  on  furiously  he  struck  back  the  Federal  front  in  con 
fusion  upon  its  supports ;  and  scattering  both  like  leaves  before  a  storm, 
forced  them  off  the  field  in  utter  rout  for  a  mile  and  a  half. 

Soon  after  the  onslaught  upon  the  Confederate  front,  the  Sixth  corps 
of  the  Federal  army  advanced  upon  its  left  flank.  The  attack  here  was 
repulsed  by  Pegram's  and  Hay's  division.  The  furious  onslaught  of  Hay's 
men  did  not  expend  itself  until  they  had  forced  the  enemy  to  retreat  in 
confusion  for  nearly  a  mile.  In  advance  of  all  others  on  that  face  of  the 
attack,  these  splendid  troops,  having  left  nearly  one-third  of  their  number 
on  the  field,  fell  back  with  Pegram's  gallant  men  to  the  general  line  of 
battle. 

Skirmishing  continued  outside  the  lines.  Immediately  before  the  close 
of  the  evening,  the  skirmishers  of  Pegram,  on  Johnson's  left,  came  run 
ning  in,  and  soon  afterwards  his  sharpshooters  sprang  back  from  their  rifle- 
pits  in  his  immediate  front.  A  column,  three  lines  deep,  moved  upon  him 
from  the  depths  of  the  forest,  and,  firing  heavily  as  they  came  on,  pressed 
towards  his  works  furiously.  His  stanch  Virginians,  however,  met  the 
attack  resolutely,  and,  covered  partially  by  their  works,  hurled  volley  after 
volley  in  withering  blasts,  breast  high,  into  its  serried  ranks. 

But  the  work  of  carnage  was  not  yet  suificient  for  Grant.  In  five  lines 
a  column  renewed  the  attack  after  nightfall ;  but  did  so  without  other  re 
sult  than  to  increase  terribly  the  hundreds  of  men  that,  dead  or  dying  out- 
33 


514  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

side  the  Confederate  works,  lay  weltering  in  their  gore.  Pegram  fell  in 
this  last  attack  severely  wounded.  The  repulse  which  he  guided  as  he 
fell,  closed  the  work  of  war  for  the  day  on  the  left,  and  witnessed  the 
Confederates  still  in  possession  of  their  improved  position  and  advanced 
lines.  • 

The  results  of  the  day  were  that  the  enemy  had  been  beaten  back  as 
often  as  he  advanced,  with  heavy  loss,  including  two  thousand  prisoners 
and  four  guns.  Longstreet  not  having  arrived,  owing  to  the  greater  dis 
tance  he  had  to  march,  Gen.  Lee  refrained  from  pressing  his  advantage, 
and  slept  upon  the  battle-field.  His  own  loss  was  comparatively  slight, 
his  troops  understanding  how  to  take  advantage  of  the  rough  country  and 
entangled  woods  in  which  they  fought.  Longstreet  reached  a  point  ten 
miles  from  the  battle-field  by  the  middle  of  the  afternoon,  but,  owing  to 
the  peculiar  condition  of  the  atmosphere,  and  the  density  of  the  forest,  he 
was  unable  to  hear  the  report  of  Hill's  and  Swell's  guns,  and  was  ignorant 
that  the  two  armies  had  been  engaged  until  midnight,  when  he  received 
an  order  from  Gen.  Lee  to  cross  over  to  the  plank  road  to  the  aid  of  Hill. 

It  was  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  6th  when  Longstreet  aroused 
his  sleeping  men  from  their  bivouac,  and  marched  on  to  the  field  of  battle. 
Hill's  troops  were  aware  of  his  approach,  and  that  he  was  to  take  their 
place  on  the  line,  and,  having  been  marching  and  fighting  all  the  previous 
day,  and  sleeping  but  little  that  night,  they  got  ready  to  retire  as  the  head 
of  Longstreet's  corps  reached  the  ground.  Unfortunately,  Grant  renewed 
the  attack  just  at  this  time,  threw  Heth's  and  Wilcox's  divisions  of  Hill's 
corps  into  confusion,  and  pushed  them  back  upon  Longstreet's  column, 
which  had  not  yet  deployed  into  line. 

The  disordered  ranks  surged  already  within  one  hundred  and  fifty 
yards  of  the  position  of  Gen.  Lee.  But  at  this  moment  three  regiments  of 
Kershaw's  division  came  into  line,  and  this  Spartan  band  held  the  enemy 
in  check  until  the  remainder  of  the  division  and  finally  Longstreet's  entire 
corps  could  be  brought  up.  Then  ensued  a  furious  and  bloody  combat  all 
along  Longstreet's  front.  His  veteran  corps,  which  had  made  the  circuit 
of  half  the  Confederacy  within  the  last  twelve  months,  never  fought  better 
or  more  successfully.  Grant  had  taken  advantage  of  the  disorder  among 
Hill's  troops,  and  hurled  heavy  masses  upon  the  point,  hoping  to  turn  the 
Confederate  right  wing,  and  throw  himself  between  Lee  and  Richmond. 
He  would  have  succeeded  but  for  Longstreet's  timely  arrival. 

At  11  o'clock  Longstreet  was  ordered,  with  some  select  brigades,  to 
pass  to  the  right  and  attack  the  enemy  in  flank.  The  order  was  promptly 
executed.  Falling  suddenly  upon  Grant's  left,  he  drove  the  enemy  in 
confusion,  bending  his  line  back  upon  itself,  and  gaining  the  plank  road  a 
mile  in  advance  of  the  scene  of  the  recent  conflict. 

The  fortunes  of  the  day  were  evidently  turned.     Gen.  Longstreet  now 


BATTLES   OF   THE   WILDERNESS.  515 

moved  forward  with  liis  staff  to  take  his  place  at  the  head  of  the  advance ; 
and  was  received  as  he  passed  along  the  moving  mass  with  shouts  of  ap 
plause.  As  he  galloped  forward,  Gen.  Jenkins  spurred  to  his  side  to  grasp 
his  hand,  with  the  pleasure  of  an  old  friend, — for  Longstreet  had  but 
newly  arrived  from  several  months'  campaign  in  Eastern  Tennessee.  But, 
hardly  had  the  mutual  congratulations  passed  each  other's  lips,  when  a 
deadly  volley  from  Mahone's  brigade,  concealed  in  bushes  along  the  road 
— mistaking  Longstreet,  Jenkins,  and  the  rest,  for  a  party  of  the  flying  foe 
— poured  into  them,  at  short  range.  Jenkins  fell  instantly  from  his  horse 
a  lifeless  corpse,  while  Longstreet  received  a  ball  that  entered  hisf throat 
and  passed  out  through  his  right  shoulder.  Bleeding  profusely,  he  was 
helped  from  his  horse  so  prostrated  that  fears  were  entertained  of  his  im 
mediate  death.  Placed  on  a  litter,  the  wounded  General  was  removed 
from  the  field ;  but  feeble  though  he  was  from  loss  of  blood,  he  did  not 
fail  to  lift  his  hat  from  time  to  time  as  he  passed  down  the  column,  in 
acknowledgment  of  its  cheers  of  applause  and  sympathy. 

The  fall  of  Longstreet  was  an  untimely  event,  and  the  delay  it  occa 
sioned  gave  opportunity  to  the  enemy  to  reform  his  line.  The  field  was 
well  contested  on  both  sides  ;  but  at  one  time  the  aspect  of  affairs  was  so 
alarming  that  Gen.  Lee  had,  as  Fields'  division  came  under  fire,  placed 
himself  at  the  head  of  Gregg's  brigade  of  Texans.  With  that  devotion 
which  constituted  the  great  charm  of  his  character,  he  ordered  them  to  fol 
low  him  in  a  charge  upon  a  line  of  the  enemy,  sweeping  down  upon  his 
front.  The  response  was  not  shouts.  A  grim  and  ragged  soldier  of  the 
line  raised  his  voice  in  determined  remonstrance.  He  was  immediately 
followed  by  the  rank  and  file  of  the  whole  brigade  in  positive  refusal  to 
advance  until  their  beloved  commander  had  gone  to  his  proper  position 
of  safety.  Yielding  to  this  touching  solicitude,  Gen.  Lee  withdrew,  while 
the  brave  Texans  fulfilled  the  promise  by  which  they  had  urged  his  with 
drawal,  and,  breasting  a  storm  of  bullets,  drove  the  enemy  on  their  front 
back  to  his  entrenchments.  "What  was  the  exposure  of  the  devoted  com 
mander  during  the  day,  may  be  judged  from  the  circumstances  of  the 
explosion  of  a  shell  under  his  own  horse,  the  killing  of  the  horse  of  his 
Adjutant-Gen.,  Lieut.-Col.  Taylor,  and  the  wounding  of  another  officer 
attached  to  his  person,  Lieut.-Col.  Marshall, — events  which  caused  great 
and  most  affectionate  anxiety  in  the  army,  and  determined  the  troops  to 
watch  more  carefully  over  a  life  in  which  they  considered  were  bound  up 
the  fortunes  of  their  country. 

So  far  the  enemy  had  been  driven  back  on  the  Confederate  right,  and 
was  firmly  held  in  check  ;  while  on  the  left,  Ewell,  battling  severely,  and 
defeating  an  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  outflank  him,  held  his  own,  and 
joined  his  line  of  battle  with  that  which  had  been  restored  on  the  right 
wing.  Daring  the  afternoon  Brig.-Gen.  Wofford,  of  Anderson's  corps, 


516  THE    LOST    CAUSE. 

was  permitted,  at  his  own  request,  to  move  upon  the  rear  of  the  Federal 
left  wing.  He  got  possession  of  their  camps,  destroyed  and  brought  off  a 
good  deal  of  material,  and  created  great  consternation  among  the  teamsters 
and  quartermasters.  About  twilight  Brig.-Gen.  Gordon,  of  Swell's  corps, 
attacked  the  enemy's  left,  captured  Gen.  Seymour  and  a  large  portion  of 
his  brigade,  and  excited  a  panic  which  put  Grant's  whole  army  on  the 
verge  of  irretrievable  rout.  Brigade  after  brigade  fled  from  the  Federal 
works,  and,  attempting,  one  after  another,  to  wheel  around  into  line  in 
order  to  check  the  advance,  was  borne  back  under  the  rapidity  of  Gor 
don's  movement.  The  woods  in  front  were  alive  with  masses  of  men, 
struggling  to  escape  with  life.  Gordon  swept  all  before  him  for  a  distance 
of  two  miles.  But  the  forest  through  which  he  advanced  was  so  dense 
with  undergrowth,  that  by  the  nightfall  he  had  become  separated  from  his 
supports.  He  paused  before  he  had  completed  a  movement  that  came 
near  completely  routing  the  entire  Federal  right.  The  enterprise,  not 
withstanding  its  incompleteness,  was  crowned  with  brilliant  success.  The 
Confederate  loss  in  that  service  numbered,  in  killed  and  wounded,  but 
twenty-seven,  while  on  the  enemy's  side  Gens.  Shaler  and  Seymour,  with 
the  greater  part  of  their  commands,  were  taken  prisoners,  and  the  entire 
Sixth  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been  broken  up  in  panic. 

In  these  two  days  of  terrible  battle  in  the  "Wilderness  the  Confederate 
wounded,  by  the  official  reports  of  the  surgeons,  were  estimated  at  six 
thousand,  and  their  killed  at  less  than  one  thousand.  The  wounds  were 
comparatively  slight,  owing  to  the  protection  afforded  by  the  trees  and 
the  absence  of  artillery,  which  could  not  be  used  in  consequence  of  the 
dense  and  almost  unbroken  forest.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  was  out  of  all 
proportion  to  what  it  had  inflicted :  269  officers  and  3,019  men  killed ; 
1,017  officers  and  18,261  men  wounded,  and  177  officers  and  6,667  men 
missing — making  an  aggregate  of  27,310. 

On  the  7th  May,  both  armies  moved  their  position — Grant's  to  take  an 
interiour  road  towards  Richmond  by  the  Spottsylvania  Court-house,  and 
Lee's,  back,  apparently,  towards  Orange  Court-house,  but  in  reality  to 
reach  Spottsylvania  before  the  enemy.  The  advance  of  Lee  arrived  first 
and  took  up  a  good  position,  the  main  army  quickly  following.  The  situ 
ation  which  the  Northern  newspapers  interpreted  as  a  the  retreat  of  Lee  " 
bore  in  every  respect  the  evidences  of  his  generalship  and  success.  He 
had  succeeded  in  throwing  his  entire  army  right  across  the  path  by  which 
Grant  must  march  if  he  would  get  "  on  to  Eichmond." — He  had  not  only 
repulsed  all  his  assaults  at  the  Wilderness,  but  held  him  there  until  he 
could  throw  his  own  army  in  front  of  him.  It  was  a  masterly  perform 
ance,  and  made  it  necessary  for  Grant  to  deliver  battle  there  or  make 
another  effort  to  turn  the  Confederate  position. 

To  this  movement  there  was  an  episode,  which  is  chiefly  remarkable 


DEATH   OF   GEN.   J.    E.    B.    STUART.  517 

for  the  fall  in  it  of  Gen.  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  the  brilliant  commander  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry  in  Virginia.  An  expedition  of  Federal  cavalry,  com 
manded  by  Gen.  Sheridan,  was  directed  to  make  a  bold  dash  around  Lee's 
flank  towards  Richmond,  It  passed  around  the  right  flank  of  the  Con 
federates  to  the  North  Anna  Itiver ;  committed  some  damage  at  Beaver 
Dam  ;  moved  thence  to  the  South  Anna  and  Ashland  Station,  where  the 
railroad  was  destroyed ;  and  finally  found  its  way  to  the  Jaines  Kiver, 
where  it  joined  the  forces  of  Butler.  On  the  10th  May,  a  portion  of  Sher 
idan's  command,  under  Ouster  and  Merrill,  were  encountered  by  a  body 
of  Stuart's  cavalry  near  Ashland,  at  a  place  called  Yellow  Tavern,  on  the 
road  to  Richmond.  An  engagement  took  place  here.  In  a  desperate 
charge,  at  the  head  of  a  column,  Gen.  Stuart  fell,  terribly  wounded.  He 
was  immediately  taken  to  Richmond,  and  every  effort  made  to  save  his 
valuable  life  ;  but  in  vain.  He  died  the  next  day.* 

*  From  some  memoirs  of  Gen.  Stuart,  collected  from  his  staff  officers,  we  extract  some  incidents 
indicative  of  the  character  of  the  man,  designated  as  the  "  Prince  Rupert  of  the  Confederate 
Army : " 

"  One  of  the  marked  traits  of  this  preux  chevalier  was  his  indifference  to  danger,  which  im 
pressed  every  one.  It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  coolness  more  supreme.  It  was  not  that  he 
seemed  to  defy  peril — he  appeared  unconscious  of  it.  At  the  battle  of  Oxhill,  in  September,  1862, 
he  advanced  a  piece  of  artillery  down  the  road  to  Fairfax  Court-house,  and  suddenly  found  himself 
in  the  presence  of  a  buzzing  hornet's  nest  of  Federal  sharp-shooters,  who  rose  from  the  tall  weeds 
a  few  score  yards  distant,  and  poured  a  deadly  fire  into  the  cannoniers.  Stuart  was  at  the  gun 
directing  the  firing,  and  sat  on  his  horse,  full  front  to  the  fire,  with  so  perfect  an  air  of  unconscious 
ness  that  it  was  hard  to  believe  that  he  realized  his  danger.  When  a  staff  officer  said,  'This  lire- 
is  rather  peculiar,  General,'  Stuart  seemed  to  wake  up,  as  it  were,  to  whistling  bullets,  and  said, 
indifferently,  '  It  is  getting  rather  warm.'  He  met  his  death  in  this  way,  and  the  only  matter  for 
astonishment  is  that  he  was  not  killed  long  before.  He  was  constantly  on  the  most  advanced  lino 
of  skirmishers,  cheering  them  on,  the  most  conspicuous  mark  to  the  enemy.  He  used  to  laugh 
when  he  was  warned  against  such  exposure  of  himself,  and  said  that  he  was  not  afraid  of  any  ball 
'  aimed  at  him  ; '  but  I  know  that  he  never  expected  to  get  through  the  war.  He  deeply  deplored 
its  existence,  and  said,  one  day,  '  I  would  lay  down  my  right  hand  and  have  it  cut  off  at  the  wrist 
to  end  it.'  But  he  was  conscientious  in  his  espousal  of  the  Southern  cause,  and  was  ready  to  die 
for  it. 

"  The  habitual  temper  of  his  mind  toward  his  adversaries  was  cool  and  soldierly.  Federal  pris 
oners  were  treated  by  liim  with  uniform  courtesy,  and  often  left  his  headquarters  declaring  that  they 
would  never  forget  the  kindness  they  had  experienced.  I  remember  an  appeal  once  made  to  him 
by  a  prisoner,  which  amused  everybody.  One  of  his  escort  spoke  roughly  to  the  prisoner,  when  the 
latter,  seeing  the  General,  exclaimed  :  '  Gen.  Stuart,  I  did  not  come  here  to  be  blackguarded,'  at 
which  Stuart  laughed  good-humouredly,  and  reprimanded  the  person  who  had  addressed  the  pris 
oner. 

"  At  Verdiersville,  in  August,  1862,  Stuart  stopped  at  a  deserted  house  on  the  roadside,  and  lay 
down  with  his  staff  and  escort,  without  videttes,  pickets,  or  other  precaution.  The  consequence  was 
that  he  was  aroused  by  the  tramp  of  Federal  cavalry  close  on  him,  and  had  just  time  to  throw  him 
self,  hatless,  on  his  unbridled  horse,  leap  the  fence  and  fly.  He  left  his  hat,  coat,  and  gloves,  which 
his  adversaries  carried  off  in  triumph ;  but  at  Catlett's  soon  after  retorted  by  capturing  General 
Pope's  coat  and  hat,  which  was  a  fair  offset. 

"  The  gay,  humorous,  and  high  spirits  of  the  man,  did  not  wholly  desert  him  even  on  the  most 
serious  occasions.  Nothing  was  more  common  than  to  hear  him  humming  a  song  during  an  engage- 


518  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 


BATTLES   OF   SPOTTSYLVANIA   COUKT-HOUSE. 

As  Lee's  advance  —  consisting  of  Longstreet's  corps  under  Anderson  — 
reached  Spottsylvania  Court-house,  on  the  9th  May,  the  men  had  been 

ment,  and  I  was  reading  the  other  day  somewhere  a  soldier's  description  of  a  fight  in  Culpepper,  and 
what  an  electric  effect  was  produced  upon  th^infantry  by  the  appearance  of  Stuart  riding  in  front 
of  them,  singing  gaily  and  cheering  them  on.  At  Chancellorsville,  when  Jackson  fell,  he  was  called 
to  command  the  corps,  and  led  the  assault  in  person  on  the  next  morning.  An  eye  witness  says 
that  he  could  not  get  rid  of  the  idea  that  Henry  of  Navarre  had  come  back,  except  that  Stuart's 
c  plume  '  was  black  !  Everywhere,  like  Navarre,  he  was  in  front,  and  the  men  '  followed  the 
feather.'  At  the  risk,  however,  of  spoiling  this  romantic  picture,  and  passing  from  the  sublime  to 
what  some  persons  may  call  the  ridiculous,  an  additional  fact  may  be  stated,  namely:  That  Gen. 
Stuart,  attacking  with  Jackson's  veteran  corps,  and  carrying  line  after  line  of  works,  moved  at  the 
head  of  his  men,  singing  '  Old  Joe  Hooker,  will  you  come  out  of  the  wilderness.' 

"  There  was  nothing  notable  in  Stuart's  habits  except  his  abstinence  from  all  stimulants,  coffee 
excepted.  At  his  broad,  paper-covered  desk,  in  the  long  winter  evenings,  he  busied  himself  not 
with  *  official  '  work  only.  A  favourite  amusement  with  him  was  the  composition  of  parodies  in 
verse,  some  of  them  exceedingly  good.  He  was  not  a  great  reader.  He  was  fonder  of  society,  of  tell 
ing  stories,  jesting,  and  whiling  away  time  with  his  staff.  No  boy  could  be  merrier  than  Stuart,  at 
such  moments,  and  he  dearly  loved  a  practical  joke. 

"  No  analysis  of  military  movements  or  discussion  of  military  endowments  is  here  intended  ; 
but  it  is  almost  impossible  to  separate  Stuart,  the  man,  from  Stuart,  the  soldier.  He  was  ready  for 
a  *  fight  or  a  frolic,'  and  gifted  by  nature  with  an  enormous  animal  physique,  which  enabled  him  to 
defy  fatigue,  whether  produced  by  marching  night  and  day,  or  dancing  until  dawn.  Ambitious, 
fond  of  glory,  and  sensitive  to  blame  or  praise,  he  was  yet  endowed  with  a  bold  and  independent 
spirit  which  enabled  him  to  defy  all  enemies.  He  was  warm-hearted,  and  never  did  man  love  friends 
more  dearly.  Stuart  always  seemed  to  be  a  perfect  embodiment  of  the  traits  generally  attributed 
to  the  English  cavaliers.  There  was  in  him  a  rollicking  love  of  frolic,  a  gallantry  towards  ladies,  a 
fondness  for  bright  colors,  brilliant  spectacles,  and  gay  adventure,  which  made  him  resemble  strongly 
the  class  of  men  who  followed  the  fortunes  of  Charles  the  I.,  and  at  Naseby  died  rather  than  retreat 
or  surrender.  Stuart's  nerve  was  of  stern  stuff,  and  under  all  that  laughter  there  was  a  soul  that  no 
peril  could  touch.  That  bright  blue  eye  looked  into  the  very  face  of  death  without  a  quiver  of  the 
lid,  and  dared  the  worst.  A  man  more  absolutely  indifferent  to  danger,  I  believe,  never  lived  ;  and, 
like  some  chevalier  of  olden  days,  he  rode  to  battle  with  his  lady's  glove  upon  his  helm,  humming 
a  song,  and  determined  to  conquer  or  fall." 

The  following  account  of  Gen.  Stuart's  last  moments  was  published  in  the  Richmond  news 
papers  : 

"  About  noon,  President  Davis  visited  his  bedside  and  spent  some  time  with  the  dying  chief. 
In  reply  to  the  question  put  by  the  President,  '  General,  how  do  you  feel  ?  '  he  replied,  '  Easy,  but 
willing  to  die,  if  God  and  my  country  think  I  have  fulfilled  my  destiny,  and  done  my  duty.' 

"  During  the  day,  occasional  delirium  attacked  him,  and,  in  his  moments  of  mental  wandering, 
his  faculties  were  busy  with  the  past.  His  campaigns  on  the  Peninsula,  his  raid  into  Pennsylvania, 
his  doings  on  the  Rapidan,  and  his  several  engagements,  were  subjects  that  quickly  chased  them 
selves  through  his  brain.  Fresh  orders  were  given  as  if  still  on  the  battlefield  and  injunctions  to 
his  couriers  to  '  make  haste.'  Then  he  would  wander  to  his  wife  and  children,  one  of  whom,  his 
eldest  boy,  had  died  a  year  previous,  while  fighting  on  the  Rappahannock,  and  in  relation  to  whom 
he  had  said,  when  receiving  a  telegram  that  the  boy  was  dying,  1  1  must  leave  my  child  in  the  hands 
of  God  ;  my  country  needs  me  here  ;  I  cannot  cone.'  Then  his  mind  would  again  carry  him  on  to 
the  battlefield  ;  and  so  it  continued  throughout  the  day.  Occasionally  his  intellect  was  clear,  and  he 


BATTLES   OF   SPOTTSYLVANIA   COURT-HOUSE.  519 

marching  rapidly,  and  for  two  miles  had  double-quicked  it,  and  conse 
quently  were  much  jaded.  But  they  were  ready  for  work,  tired  as  they 
were.  Kershaw's  division  led  the  corps,  and  was  the  first  to  reach  the 
ground.  Two  brigades  were  sent  against  a  cavalry  force  of  the  enemy 
holding  the  Court-house,  and  two  others  were  placed  behind  a  thin  rail 
fence  and  some  frail  obstructions  which  had  been  thrown  across  the  road 


was  then  calm  and  resigned,  though  at  times  suffering  the  most  acute  agony.  He  would  even,  with 
his  own  hand,  apply  the  ice  that  was  intended  to  relieve  the  pain  of  his  wound. 

"  As  evening  wore  on,  mortification  set  in  rapidly.  In  answer  to  his  inquiry,  he  was  told  that 
death  was  fast  approaching.  He  then  said,  *  I  am  resigned,  if  it  be  God's  will,  but  I  would  like  to 
see  my  wife.  But,  God's  will  be  done.'  Several  times  he  roused  up,  and  asked  if  she  had  come. 
Unfortunately,  she  was  in  the  country  at  the  time,  and  did  not  arrive  until  too  late. 

"  As  the  last  moments  approached,  the  dying  man,  with  a  mind  perfectly  clear  and  possessed, 
then  made  a  disposition  of  his  effects.  To  Mrs.  Gen.  K.  E.  Lee,  he  directed  that  the  golden  spurs 
be  given  as  a  dying  memento  of  his  love  and  esteem  for  her  husband.  To  his  staff  officers  he  gave 
his  horses  ;  and  other  mementoes  he  disposed  of  in  a  similar  manner.  To  his  young  son  he  left  his 
sword.  He  then  turned  to  the  Rev.  Dr.  Peterkin,  of  the  Episcopal  Church,  of  which  he  was  a  strict 
member,  and  asked  him  to  sing  the  hymn  commencing : 

*  '  Rock  of  ages  cleft  for  me, 

Let  me  hide  myself  in  thee.' 

"  In  this  he  joined  with  all  the  strength  of  voice  his  failing  powers  permitted.  He  then  prayed 
with  the  minister  and  friends  around  him  ;  and,  with  the  words,  '  I  am  going  fast  now.  I  am  re 
signed  ;  God's  will  be  done,'  yielded  his  fleeting  spirit  to  Him  who  gave  it. 

"  The  funeral  of  this  much  lamented  and  brave  general  took  place  on  the  13th,  at  five  o'clock, 
from  St.  James's  Church,  corner  of  Marshall  and  Fifth  streets. 

11  At  the  appointed  hour  the  cortege  appeared  in  front  of  the  church,  and  the  metallic  coffin,  con 
taining  the  remains  of  the  noble  soldier,  whose  now  silent  voice  had  so  often  startled  the  enemy  with 
his  stirring  battle-cry,  was  carried  down  the  centre-aisle,  and  placed  before  the  altar.  Wreaths  and 
a  cross  of  evergreens,  interwoven  with  delicate  lilies  of  the  valley,  laurel,  and  other  flowers  of  purest 
white,  decked  the  coffin. 

"  The  pall-bearers  were  Gen.  Bragg,  Maj.-Gen.  McCown,  Gen.  Chilton,  Brig. -Gen.  Lawton,  Com 
modore  Forrest,  Capt.  Lee,  of  the  navy,  and  Gen.  George  W.  Randolph,  formerly  Secretary  of  War. 

"  The  scene  was  sad  and  impressive.  President  Davis  sat  near  the  front,  with  a  look  of  grief 
upon  his  careworn  face ;  his  cabinet  officers  were  gathered  around,  while  on  either  side  were  the 
Senators  and  Representatives  of  the  Confederate  Congress.  Scattered  through  the  church  were  a 
number  of  generals  and  other  officers  of  less  rank,  among  the  former  Gen.  Ransom,  commanding 
the  Department  of  Richmond.  Hundreds  of  sad  faces  witnessed  the  scene  ;  but  the  brave  Fitz  Hugh 
Lee  and  other  war-wearied  and  war-worn  men,  whom  the  dead  Stuart  had  so  often  led  where  the  red 
battle  was  fiercest,  and  who  would  have  given  their  lives  for  his,  were  away  in  the  fight,  doubtless 
striking  with  a  double  courage  as  they  thought  of  their  fallen  general. 

"  The  short  service  was  read  by  Rev.  Dr.  Peterkin,  a  funeral  anthem  sung,  and  the  remains  were 
carried  out  and  placed  in  the  hearse,  which  proceeded  to  Hollywood  Cemetery,  followed  by  a  long 
train  of  carriages. 

"  No  military  escort  accompanied  the  procession,  but  the  hero  was  laid  in  his  last  resting-place 
on  the  hillside,  while  the  earth  trembled  with  the  roar  of  artillery  and  the  noise  of  the  deadly  strife 
of  armies — the  one  bent  upon  desecrating  and  devastating  his  native  land,  and  the  other,  proudly 
and  defiantly  standing  in  the  path  and  invoking  the  blessing  of  Heaven  upon  their  cause,  to  fight  in 
better  cheer  for  the  memory  of  such  as  Stonewall  Jackson  and  J.  E.  B.  Stuart.'' 


520  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

by  which  a  force  of  Federal  infantry  was  advancing.  The  latter  fell  into 
the  errour  of  supposing  that  the  force  behind  the  fence  was  dismounted 
cavalry,  and  rushed  forward  with  the  utmost  confidence.  The  Confed 
erates  reserved  their  fire  until  their  foes  got  within  a  few  paces,  and  then, 
taking  deliberate  aim,  gave  them  a  volley  which  covered  the  ground  with 
their  slain.  The  combat  was  short  and  sharp  ;  some  of  the  Federals  got 
to  the  fence,  and  actually  used  the  bayonet ;  but  in  less  than  half  an  hour 
they  were  driven  rapidly  back,  leaving  five  hundred  dead  and  mortally 
wounded,  and  two  hundred  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  victorious  Con 
federates. 

On  the  10th  May,  the  struggle  was  renewed  at  an  early  hour,  "Warren's 
corps  being  the  one  most  hotly  engaged  against  the  Confederates,  though 
all  were  fighting  heavily.  About  half-past  5  p.  M.  two  divisions  of  Han 
cock's  Second  corps  crossed  the  Po  River,  and  advanced  against  Lee's  left, 
making  a  strong  show  of  giving  battle  there.  Lee,  supposing  the  enemy 
was  massing  forces  at  that  point,  moved  his  troops  during  the  night  and 
next  day  to  that  quarter,  but,  in  the  morning  of  the  12th,  it  was  found 
that  Hancock  was  again  in  the  centre,  and  vigorously  assaulting  Johnson's 
division. 

This  division  held  a  salient  of  the  Confederate  line  ;  and  as  the  enemy, 
taking  the  forces  within  in  flank,  rushed  over  the  angle,  they  were  quickly 
in  possession  of  the  work,  capturing  most  of  Johnson's  men  along  with 
their  commander,  and  taking  twenty  pieces  of  artillery.  Charge  after 
charge  was  made  by  the  Confederates  to  regain  what  ground  they  had  lost- 
It  was  a  conflict  of  sublime  fury  and  terrible  carnage.  The  dead  and 
wounded  lay.  piled  over  each  other,  "the  latter  often  underneath  the 
former."  What  remained  of  Swell's  corps  held  the  enemy  in  check  with 
a  courage  that  nothing  could  subdue.  Gen.  Hill  moved  down  from  the 
right,  joined  Ewell,  and  threw  his  divisions  into  .the  struggle  ;  Longstreet 
came  on  from  the  extreme  left  of  the  Confederate  line  ;  it  was  a  dead-lock 
of  slaughter,  in  which  neither  side  gained  ground,  and  the  intervening 
spaces  were  piled  with  the  slain.  At  the  close  of  the  day  the  enemy  held 
about  three  hundred  yards  of  the  Confederate  works  ;  he  had- taken  twenty- 
five  pieces  of  artillery  and  about  two  thousand  men  in  Johnson's  division  ; 
he  had  inflicted  a  loss  of  about  six  or  seven  thousand ;  but  his  own  loss 
was  stated  at  eighteen  thousand  men,  and  at  this  cost  he  had  purchased 
what  the  Northern  newspapers  called  a  "  brilliant  victory,"  but  of  which 
Gen.  Grant  had  been  candid  enough  to  state  :  "  The  advantage  gained  did 
not  prove  decisive." 

Thus,  without  decisive  results — certainly  \yithout  any  appreciable  ad 
vantage  on  the  Northern  side — had  been  fought  a  series  of  battles  such  as 
had  never  been  compressed  into  so  many  days  in  the  history  of  man,  and 
such  as  had  never  before  been  exhibited  by  a  single  army,  contending 


521 

against  an  adversary  more  than  three  times  its  numbers.  In  those  days 
Lee's  army  made  its  surpassing  record  of  heroism.  Grant  was  not  shamed. 
The  Moloch  of  the  North  had  not  yet  been  sated.  The  great  military 
genius  that  was  to  resolve  generalship  into  the  fierce  and  brutal  consump 
tion  of  human  life,  who  had  taken  the  field  with  triple  Lee's  numbers, 
found  it  necessary,  after  the  first  series  of  conflicts  to  call  for  reinforce 
ments,  and  that  before  his  adversary  had  received  one  additional  musket 
for  his  own  thinned  ranks.  From  the  13th  to  the  18th  May,  Grant  con 
sumed  the  time  in  manoeuvring  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of  reinforcements 
from  Washington.  He  attempted  to  compose  the  anxiety  of  the  authori 
ties  there  by  a  display  of  resolution.  He  telegraphed  to  President  Lin 
coln  :  "  I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  takes  all  summer." 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE   SOUTH    SIDE   OF   RICHMOND. 

While  Grant  was  engaged  on  the  Rapidan,  there  were  other  move- 
mens  in  progress  which  were  parts  of  his  combination,  and  which  belong 
to  the  great  military  drama  in  Virginia. 

The  column  of  Butler — what  was  known  as  the  Army  of  the  Jaiues — 
was  the  most  important  correspondent  of  his  movement,  intended  to  oper 
ate  against  Richmond  on  the  south  side.  In  advance  of  the  movements  on 
the  Rapid  an,  the  following  letter  of  instructions  was  addressed  to  Gen. 
Butler,  explaining  the  part  of  the  campaign  against  Richmond  as 
signed  to  him  : 

"  FORT  MONROE,  VA.,  April  2,  1864. 

-  "  General :  In  the  spring  campaign,  which  it  is  desirable  shall  commence  at  as  early 
a  day  as  practicable,  it  is  proposed  to  have  co-operative  action  of  all  the  armies  in  the 
field,  as  far  as  this  object  can  be  accomplished. 

"  It  will  not  be  possible  to  unite  our  armies  into  two  or  three  large  ones  to  act  as  so 
many  units,  owing  to  the  absolute  necessity  of  holding  on  to  the  territory  already  taken 
from  the  enemy.  But,  generally  speaking,  concentration  can  be  practically  effected  by 
armies  moving  to  the  interiour  of  the  enemy's  country  from  the  territory  they  have  to 
guard.  By  such  movements  they  interpose  themselves  between  the  enemy  and  the  coun 
try  to  be  guarded,  thereby  reducing  the  number  necessary  to  guard  important  points,  or 
at  least  occupy  the  attention  of  a  part  of  the  enemy's  force,  if  no  greater  object  is  gained. 
Lee's  army  and  Richmond  being  the  greater  objects  towards  which  our  attention  must 
be  directed  in  the  next  campaign,  it  is  desirable  to  unite  all  the  force  we  can  against 
them.  The  necessity  of  covering  Washington  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  of 
covering  your  Department  with  your  army  makes  it  impossible  to  unite  these  forces  at  the 
beginning  of  any  move.  I  propose,  therefore,  what  comes  nearest  this  of  anything  that 
seems  practicable.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  will  act  from  its  present  base,  Lee's  army 
being  the  objective  point.  You  will  collect  all  the  forces  from  your  command  that  can  be 
spared  from  garrison  duty,  I  should  say  not  less  than  twenty  thousand  effective  men — to 
operate  on  the  south  side  of  James  River,  Richmond  being  your  objective  point.  To  the 


522  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

force  you  already  have  will  be  added  about  ten  thousand  men  from  South  Carolina,  un 
der  Maj.-Gen.  Gillmore,  who  will  command  them  in  person.  Maj.-Gen.  W.  F.  Smith  is 
ordered  to  report  to  you,  to  command  the  troops  sent  into  the  field  from  your  own  De 
partment. 

"  Gen.  Gillmore  will  be  ordered  to  report  to  you  at  Fortress  Monroe,  with  all  the 
troops  on  transports,  by  the  18th  instant,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable.  Should 
you  not  receive  notice  by  that  time  to  move,  you  will  make  such  disposition  of  them  and 
your  other  forces  as  you  may  deem  best  calculated  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  real 
move  to  be  made. 

"  When  you  are  notified  to  move,  take  City  Point  with  as  much  force  as  possible. 
Fortify,  or  rather  entrench,  at  once,  and  concentrate  all  your  troops  for  the  field  there  as 
rapidly  as  you  can.  From  City  Point  directions  cannot  be  given  at  this  time  for  your 
further  movements. 

"The  fact  that  has  already  been  stated — that  is,  that  Richmond  is  to  be  your  objective 
point,  and  that  there  is  to  be  co-operation  between  your  force  and  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac — must  be  your  guide.  This  indicates  the  necessity  of  your  holding  close  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  James  River  as  you  advance.  Then,  should  the  enemy  be  forced  into 
his  entrenchments  in  Richmond,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  follow,  and  by  means 
of  transports  the  two  armies  would  become  a  unit. 

**  All  the  minor  details  of  your  advance  are  left  entirely  to  your  direction.  If,  how 
ever,  you  think  it  practicable  to  use  your  cavalry  south  of  you  so  as  to  cut  the  railroad 
about  Hicks'  Ford,  about  the  time  of  the  general  advance,  it  would  be  of  immense  ad 
vantage. 

"  You  will  please  forward  for  my  information  at  the  earliest  practicable  day,  all  or 
ders,  details,  and  instructions  you  may  give  for  the  execution  of  this  order. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

"  Maj.-Gen.  B.  F.  Butler." 

From  this  exposition  of  Grant's  designs  upon  the  Confederate  capital, 
it  appears  that  he  calculated  to  fight  Lee  between  Culpepper  and  Rich 
mond,  and  failing  to  defeat  him  away  from  his  base,  to  make  a  junction 
with  Butler's  army  on  the  James  River,  with  the  prospect  that  the  latter 
would  be  able  to  invest  Richmond  on  the.  south  side,  with  its  left  resting 
on  the  James  above  the  city. 

But  there  was  yet  another  part  of  Grant's  ambitious  and  sweeping  plan 
of  operations  in  Virginia.  He  might  take  Richmond,  without  capturing 
the  Government  machinery,  and  without  overthrowing  Lee's  army.  In 
that  view,  further  operations  were  necessary  to  isolate  Richmond,  and  de 
stroy  its  railroad  communications.  Gen.  Sigel  was  therefore  directed  to 
organize  all  his  available  force  into  two  expeditions,  to  move  from  Beverly 
to  Charleston,  under  command  of  Gens.  Ord  and  Crook,  against  the  East 
Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad.  Subsequently,  Gen.  Ord,  having  been 
relieved  at  his  own  request,  Gen.  Sigel  was  instructed  at  his  own  sugges 
tion,  to  give  up  the  expedition  by  Beverly,  and  to  form  two  columns,  one 
under  Gen.  Crook,  on  the  Kanawha,  numbering  about  ten  thousand  men, 
and  one  on  the  Shenandoah,  numbering  about  seven  thousand  men  ;  the 
one  on  the  Shenandoah  to  assemble  between  Cumberland  and  the  Shenan- 


OPERATIONS    IN   WESTERN   VIRGINIA.  523 

doah,  and  the  infantry  and  artillery  moved  to  Cedar  Creek  with  such 
cavalry  as  could  be  made  available  at  the  moment,  to  threaten  the  enemy 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  advance  as  far  as  possible ;  while  Gen. 
Crook  would  take  possession  of  Lewisburg  with  part  of  his  force,  and  move 
down  the  Tennessee  Railroad,  doing  as  much  damage  as  he  could. 

Gen.  Butler  moved  his  main  force  up  the  James  River,  in  pursuance 
of  instructions,  on  the  4th  May,  Gillrnore  having  joined  him  with  the  Tenth 
Corps.  On  the  5th  he  occupied,  without  opposition,  both  City  Point  and 
Bermuda  Hundred.  On  the  6th  he  was  in  position  with  his  main  army, 
and  commenced  entrenching.  On  the  7th  he  made  a  reconnoissance 
against  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  Railroad,  destroying  a  bridge  seven 
miles  from  the  former  place,  from  which  he  took  the  conceit  that  he  had 
now  got  well  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  capital,  and  held  "  the  key  to 
the  back-door  of  Richmond."  He  telegraphed  to  Washington  :  "  We  have 
landed  here,  entrenched  ourselves,  destroyed  many  miles  of  railroad,  and 
got  a  position  which,  with  proper  supplies,  we  can  hold  out  against  the 
whole  of  Lee's  army  !  "  This  boast  was  to  come  to  a  singular  conclusion. 

In  the  month  of  April,  the  services  and  command  of  Gen.  Beauregard 
had  been  called  into  requisition  from  Charleston  to  strengthen  the  defences 
around  Richmond.  On  the  21st  April,  he  passed  through  Wilmington 
with  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  assumed  command  of  the  district  on  the 
south  and  east  of  Richmond.  On  the  16th  May  he  attacked  Butler  in  his 
advanced  position  in  front  of  Drewry's  Bluff.  The  action  was  sharp  and 
decisive.  Butler  was  forced  back  into  his  entrenchments  between  the  forks 
of  the  James  and  Appomattox  Rivers ;  and  Beauregard,  entrenching 
strongly  in  his  front,  covered  the  railroads,  the  city,  and  all  that  was  val 
uable  to  him.  Butler's  army  was  thus  effectually  cut  off  from  all  further 
operations  against  Richmond,  as  much  so,  wrote  Gen.  Grant,  "  as  if  his 
army  had  been  in  a  bottle  strongly  corked." 


OPERATIONS   IN   THE   KANAWHA   AND   SHENANDOAH   VALLEYS. 

While  Butler  was  thus  neutralized,  the  movement  in  the  Kanawha  and 
Shenandoah  Valleys,  under  Sigel,  was  to  end  in  disaster.  Gen.  Crook, 
who  had  the  immediate  command  of  the  Kanawha  expedition,  divided  his 
forces  into  two  columns,  giving  one,  composed  of  cavalry,  to  Gen.  Averill. 
They  crossed  the  mountains  by  separate  routes.  Averill  struck  the  Ten 
nessee  and  Virginia  Railroad,  near  Wytheville,  on  the  19th  May,  and, 
proceeding  to  New  River  and  Christiansburg,  destroyed  the  road,  several 
important  bridges  and  depots,  including  New  River  Bridge,  forming  a 
junction  with  Crook  at  Union.  Gen.  Sigel  moved  up  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  and  on  the  15th  was  encountered  near  Newmarket  by  Gen.  Breck- 


524  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

inridge,  who  drove  the  enemy  across  the  Shenandoah,  captured  six  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  nearly  one  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  and  inflicted 
upon  him  a  heavy  loss  ;  Sigel  abandoning  his  hospitals  and  destroying  the 
larger  portion  of  his  train.  This  signal  defeat  of  Sigel  was  the  occasion 
of  his  removal,  and  the  appointment  of  Hnnter  to  take  command  of  the 
forces  with  a  larger  design,  reaching  to  Lynchburg  and  Charlottesville, 
the  operations  of  which,  however,  were  reserved  for  another  month. 

The  secondary  parts  of  the  operations  of  the  month  of  May  against 
Richmond  having  thus  failed,  Gen.  Grant,  despite  his  expressed  determi 
nation  to  fight  all  summer  on  the  line  he  held  at  Spottsylvania,  proposed 
a  movement  to  the  North  Anna  River,  by  which  he  hoped  to  flank  the 
little  army  of  Lee,  that  he  no  longer  could  hope,  even  by  the  "  hammer 
ing  "  process,  to  beat  in  the  open  field.  Previous,  however,  to  the  com 
mencement  of  this  movement,  he  made  an  assault,  on  the  19th  May,  on 
Ewell's  line,  with  the  view  of  turning  Lee's  left ;  but  this  failed,  and  the 
Federals  returned  to  their  camps  after  a  heavy  loss.  On  the  night  of  the 
21st  the  movement  to  the  North  Anna  was  commenced.  Gen.  Lee  was 
thus  necessarily  obliged  to  evacuate  his  position  on  the  Po,  and,  by  an 
admirable  movement,  took  up  a  new  position  between  the  North  and 
South  Anna  Rivers  before  Grant's  army  had  reached  its  new  destination. 

Foiled  again,  and  finding  his  agile  adversary  again  in  his  path,  Grant 
found  it  necessary,  on  the  24tli  May,  to  make  another  flank  movement,  by 
recrossing  the  North  Anna,  and  marching  easterly  towards  the  Pamunkey. 
To  cover  his  plans,  an  attack  was  made  on  Lee's  left,  while  a  portion  of 
Sheridan's  cavalry  tore  up  the  Central  Railroad.  But  the  great  Confed 
erate  was  fully  master  of  the  situation,  and  could  not  be  easily  blinded. 
He  comprehended  Grant's  tactics ;  he  was  as  prompt  in  his  movements ; 
and  he  was  far  more  skilful  in  his  strategy  than  the  Federal  commander. 
Accordingly,  no  sooner  did  Grant's  army,  on  the  28th,  arrive  at  Hanover- 
town,  on  the  Pamunkey,  fifteen  miles  northeast  of  Richmond,  than  it  was 
found  the  Confederates  were  in  line  of  battle,  from  Atlee's  Station,  on  the 
railroad,  ten  or  eleven  miles  north  of  Richmond  to  Shady  Grove,  eight  or 
nine  miles  north-northeast  of  the  capital.  The  next  day,  Grant's  forces 
were  across  the  Pamunkey,  marching  towards  Richmond ;  and  reinforce 
ments  from  Butler's  army,  on  the  James  River,  were  arriving  at  White 
House,  which  once  formed  the  Federal  base  of  supplies. 

The  singular  fortune  of  war  had  again  made  the  Peninsula  a  deadly 
battle-ground.  One  month  had  hardly  elapsed  since  the  campaign  had 
begun  ;  and  its  record  of  carnage  in  this  brief  time  was  unsurpassed,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  never,  in  such  a  space,  had  such  a  sum  of  glory  been 
achieved  as  that  which  now  illuminated  the  arms  of  Lee.  When  he  stood 
in  array  against  Grant  at  the  Rapidan,  his  force  was  not  more  than  fifty 
thousand  men.  It  was  this  force  which  had  compelled  Grant,  after  the 


SPLENDID   GENERALSHIP    OF    LEE.  525 

fighting  at  the  Wilderness  and  around  Spottsylvania  Court-house,  to 
wait  six  days  for  reinforcements  from  Washington  before  he  could  move, 
and  had  baffled  his  favourite  plan  of  reaching  Richmond.  Lee  never  re 
ceived  a  single  item  of  reinforcement  until  the  23d  of  May.  At  Hanover 
Junction,  he  was  joined  by  Pickett's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps,  one 
small  brigade  of  Early's  division  of  Swell's  corps,  which  had  been  in  North 
Carolina  with  Hoke,  and  two  small  brigades,  with  a  battalion  of  artillery 
under  Breckinridge.  The  force  under  Breckinridge,  which  Grant  esti 
mated  at  fifteen  thousand,  did  not  exceed  two  thousand  muskets.  When 
he  fell  back  to  the  lines  immediately  about  Richmond,  Gen.  Lee  was  joined 
there  by  Hoke's  division  from  Petersburg  ;  but  at  the  same  time  Breckin- 
ridge's  force  had  to  be  sent  back  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  Swell's 
corps,  with  two  battalions  of  artillery,  had  to  be  detached  under  Gen. 
Early's  command  to  meet  the  demonstrations  of  Hunter  upon  Lynchburg. 
This  counterbalanced  all  reinforcements.  The  foregoing  statement  shows, 
indeed,  that  the  disparity  of  forces  between  the  two  armies  in  the  begin 
ning  of  the  campaign  was  never  lessened  after  they  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  but,  on  the  contrary,  was  largely  increased. 
It  has  well  been  asked,  by  a  commentator  on  these  remarkable  facts : 
"  What  would  have  been  the  result,  if  the  resources  in  men  and  munitions 
of  war  of  the  two  commanders  had  been  reversed  ?  " 

The  fact  was  that  Grant,  notwithstanding  his  immense  preponderance 
of  men  and  material,  had,  after  losses  almost  equalling  Lee's  numbers, 
utterly  failed  in  his  design  of  defeating  the  heroic  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  away  from  its  base,  and  pushing  the  fragments  before  him  clown  to 
Richmond,  and  had  been  forced  to  cover  up  his  failure  by  adopting  the 
derided  Peninsular  scheme  of  McClellan.  The  Northern  public,  however, 
professed  to  find  occasion  of  exultation  in  the  reflection  that  he  was 
within  a  few  miles  from  Richmond,  without  considering  that  Lee's  army 
was  as  much  a  protection  there  as  a  hundred  miles'  away,  and  that  Grant 
had  only  by  a  monstrous  circuit,  reached  a  point,  where,  ascending  the 
waters  of  Virginia,  he  might  have  landed  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
campaign  without  loss  or  opposition.  It  was  a  remarkable  exhibition  of 
the  gaseous  nonsense  of  New  York  that  a  mob  of  twenty-five  thousand 
persons  should  have  assembled  in  that  city  "  to  render  the  thanks  of  the 
nation  to  Gen  Grant "  for  a  feat  which  was,  simply  and  at  once,  absurd, 
disastrous,  shocking,  and  contemptible. 


CHAPTER   XXXII. 

POSITION  OF  THE  ARMIES  AROUND  RICHMOND,  JUNE  1,  1864. — MANOEUVRES  FOR  POSITION. — 
BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOUR. — EASY  REPULSE  OF  THE  ENEMY. — GRANT  DECIDES  TO  CROSS 
THE  RIVER,  AND  ATTEMPT  THE  SOUTH  SIDE  OF  RICHMOND. — WHY  GEN.  LEE  DID  NOT  AT 
TEMPT  TO  ATTACK  HIM  IN  THE  MOVEMENT. — BATTLES  OF  PETERSBURG. — TWO  ATTACKS  OF 
THE  ENEMY  REPULSED. — BUTLER  ADVANCES  HIS  POSITION,  AND  IS  DRIVEN  BACK. — GRANT 
TURNS  HIS  ATTENTION  FROM  THE  FORTIFICATIONS  TO  THE  RAILROADS. — DEMONSTRATIONS 
ON  THE  WELDON  AND  DANVILLE  ROADS. — DEFEAT  OF  SHERIDAN'S  EXPEDITION  ON  THE 
RAILROADS  NORTH  OF  RICHMOND. — OPERATIONS  WEST  OF  THE  BLUE  RIDGE. — HUNTER'S 
MOVEMENT.— HE  CAPTURES  STAUNTON. — HE  ADVANCES  UPON  LYNCHBURG. — HE  IS  DE 
FEATED,  AND  DRIVEN  INTO  WESTERN  VIRGINIA. — GEN.  JOHN  MORGANA  EXPEDITION  INTO 
KENTUCKY. — ITS  DISASTROUS  CONCLUSION. — PARTICULARS  OF  THE  MURDER  OF  GEN.  MOR 
GAN  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE. — EARLY'S  INVASION  OF  MARYLAND. — DARING  OF  GEN.  LEE. — 
WHAT  HE  PROPOSED  BY  SENDING  EARLY's  COLUMN  INTO  THE  NORTH. — GRANT'S  PREPARA 
TIONS  AGAINST  THIS  MOVEMENT. — BATTLE  OF  MONOCACY  BRIDGE. — DEFEAT  OF  "  LEW  " 
WALLACE'S  COMMAND. — EARLY  ADVANCES  UPON  WASHINGTON. — SKIRMISH  IN  FRONT  OF 
FORT  STEVENS. — EARLY  DECLINES  TO  ATTACK  THE  FEDERAL  CAPITAL  AND  RETREATS. — 
QUESTIONS  AS  TO  THE  STRENGTH  OF  WASHINGTON. — RESULTS  OF  EARLY's  EXPEDITION. — ITS 
EFFECT  ON  THE  ARMIES  OPERATING  AROUND  RICHMOND. — THE  MINE  FIASCO  AT  PETERS 
BURG. — THREE  ELEMENTS  IN  THE  PLAN  OF  ATTACK. — DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  MINE. — THE 
EXPLOSION  AND  A  "  FEU  D'ENFER." — THE  ASSAULTING  COLUMN  PAUSES  IN  THE  CRATER. — 

TERRIBLE  SCENES  OF  CARNAGE. — THE  MISERABLE  FAILURE. COMMENTARY  OF  THE  NEW 

YORK  "  TIMES." 

THE  first  of  June,  1864,  found  the  position  of  the  two  armies  around 
Richmond  as  follows  :  Grant  was  between  the  Chickahominy  and  the  Pa- 
munkey,  with  his  left  thrown  forward  to  Mechanicsville,  his  right  with 
drawn  to  White  House,  and  his  reserve  massed  in  rear  of  his  left,  and  Rich 
mond  somewhat  behind  his  left  flank.  Lee  was  posted  from  Atlee's  Station, 
extending  on  his  left  to  Games'  Mill,  with  outposts  as  far  as  Coal  Harbour. 
His  position  conformed  to  that  of  1862  ;  and,  indeed,  the  whole  Confederate 
line  of  battle  was  on  ground  occupied  by  both  the  armies  at  that  time. 

On  falling  back  to  Richmond  it  had  been  the  first  concern  of  Gen.  Lee 
to  secure  positions  he  knew,  from  the  battles  of  1862,  to  be  good  ones. 


BATTLE    OF   COLD    HARBOUK.  527 

He,  accordingly,  sent  forward  to  the  right  Kershaw's  and  Hoke's  divisions 
of  Anderson's  corps,  with  orders  to  occupy  the  eminences  around  Games' 
Mill  and  Cold  Harbour.  This  position  had  been  previously  carried  by  some 
Federal  cavalry.  But  on  arrival  of  Hoke's  division,  shortly  afterwards 
reinforced  by  McLaws',  the  Confederates  obtained  possession  of  the  desired 
posts.  At  the  same  time  Breckinridge  and  Mahone,  of  Hill's  corps,  were 
equally  successful  in  gaining  certain  advanced  positions. 

On  the  2d  June,  as  Grant  continued  to  develop  his  left  flank,  the  Con 
federates  were  put  in  motion  on  a  parallel  line,  while  Early,  commanding 
Ewell's  corps,  swung  round,  late  in  the  afternoon,  and  took  the  enemy  in 
flank,  drove  him  from  two  lines  of  entrenchments,  and  inflicted  great  loss. 
Meanwhile  Breckinridge,  supported  by  Wilcox,  proceeded,  under  orders 
from  Lee,  to  attack  the  advanced  Federals,  now  on  the  extreme  right  at 
Turkey  Hill,  and  there  succeeded  in  driving  them  away.  Thus  another 
important  position  wTas  obtained  by  Lee ;  this  hill  commanding  the  ap 
proaches  from  the  north  and  east  to  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy.  Mean 
while  Grant  was  getting  his  troops  into  position  for  a  decisive  action. 
Early  in  the  morning  of  June  the  3d,  his  army,  now  extending  from  Tolo- 
patomy  Creek,  across  the  road  from  Cold  Harbour  to  the  Chickahominy, 
advanced  in  full  line  of  battle,  upon  the  Confederates. 


BATTLE   OF    COLD    HARBOUR. 

The  Federal  line  of  battle  ran  in  the  following  order,  from  right  to  left : 
Burnside,  "Warren,  Smith,  Wright,  and  Hancock.  The  latter  was  opposed 
by  Breckinridge's  command  on  Lee's  extreme  right ;  Ewell's  corps  held 
the  extreme  left  opposite  Burnside  ;  and  Hill's  corps  was  in  reserve.  The 
attack  was  led  by  Hancock,  who  momentarily  carried  the  position  held  by 
Breckinridge's  troops,  but  was  severely  repulsed,  as  this  part  of  the  line 
was  reinforced  by  Milligan's  Florida  brigade,  and  the  Maryland  battalion. 
This  was  the  only  corps  of  the  enemy  that  came  in  contact  with  the  Con 
federate  works.  The  two  corps  on  the  right  of  Hancock  were  repulsed ; 
and  Warren  and  Burnside  staggered  on  the  line  of  the  rifle-pits.  The  fact 
was  that  Grant,  in  testing  the  question,  whether  Lee's  army  had  or  had 
not  been  demoralized  by  its  experience  from  the  Rapidan  to  the  James, 
found  his  own  army  so  incapable,  that  he  was  compelled  to  withdraw  it  in 
sheer  despair.  He  "  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  along  the  lines  to  ascer 
tain  from  the  different  commanders  the  actual  state  of  things  in  their  im 
mediate  front.  He  returned  leisurely,  absorbed  in  thought,  and  it  was 
evident  that  the  attempt  would  not  be  Tenewed."  Of  the  results  of  the 
day,  he  wrote  :  "  Our  loss  was  heavy,  while  that  of  the  enemy,  I  have  rea 
son  to  believe,  was  comparatively  light."  The  fact  was  that  the  report  of 


528  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  adjutant-general  at  Washington  showed  a  loss  of  seven  thousand  five 
hundred  men  in  three  days'  operations  on  the  Chickahominy,  the  greater 
portion  of  which  occurred,  of  course,  in  the  general  action  of  the  3d  of 
June. 

For  several  days  after  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbour  there  was  compara 
tive  quiet,,  and  some  unimportant  skirmishes.  During  the  night  of  the  5th 
Grant  withdrew  his  right  wing  about  two  miles,  and  placed  it  behind  a 
swamp,  which  protected  both  the  flank  and  front  of  that  portion  of  his 
army.  The  severe  experience  of  the  3d  satisfied  him  that  Richmond  could 
not  be  carried  by  a  coup  de  main,  and  could  no  longer  be  approached  with 
advantage  from  the  north.  On  this  side  lay  a  difficult  river  and  five  miles 
of  earthworks,  stretched  to  the  Confederate  capital.  Here,  too,  the  enemy 
had  to  hold  the  Fredericksburg  railroad,  a  long,  vulnerable  line,  which 
would  exhaust  much  of  his  strength  to  guard,  and  which  would  have  to  be 
protected  to  supply  his  army— a  situation  which  would  have  left  open  to 
the  Confederates  all  their  lines  of  communication  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James.  A  full  survey  of  all  the  ground  satisfied  Grant  that  he  could  not 
operate  with  advantage  north  and  east  of  Richmond ;  he  determined  to 
make  another  movement  by  Lee's  left  flank,  throw  his  army  over  James 
River,  and  seize  Petersburg,  hoping  thus  to  cut  off  all  the  Confederate  sup 
plies,  except  by  the  canal ;  while  his  cavalry  could  be  sent  to  Charlottes- 
ville  and  Gordonsville,  to  break  up  the  railroad  connection  between  Rich 
mond  and  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  Lynchburg. 

On  the  12th  June,  Grant  completed  his  preparations  to  abandon  the 
late  field  of  operations  about  the  Chickahominy,  cross  the  James  River, 
and  occupy  the  south  side  towards  Petersburg.  To  do  this  he  had  to  make 
another  movement  round  Lee's  right,  extending  as  far  as  Bottom's  Bridge, 
and  march  down  the  Chickahominy  as  far  as  the  next  crossings  at  Long's 
and  Jones'  bridges.  The  movement  was  effected  with  skill.  On  June  13, 
the  advance  had  reached  Wilcox's  landing  on  the  James,  near  Charles' 
City  Court-house,  and  the  next  day  Grant's  whole  army  was  safely  trans 
ferred  to  the  opposite  shore. 

Gen.  Lee  did  not  attack  Grant  on  his  movement  to  the  James.  He 
was  probably  unable  to  do  so.  Richmond  and  Petersburg  had  both  to  be 
guarded,  not  only  against  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  also  that  of  But 
ler,  who  had  come  up  the  river  in  heavy  force  to  co-operate  with  Grant ; 
while  an  important  detachment  of  Confederate  force,  as  we  shall  see,  had 
to  be  ready  to  move  towards  Lynchburg  to  meet  the  advance  of  a  third 
army  in  that  direction.  It  had  been  the  expectation  of  Grant  to  make  an 
easy  capture  of  Petersburg,  which  Butler  had  previously  failed  to  take, 
laying  the  blame  of  defeat  on  his  subordinate,  Gillmore.  But  he  found 
that  Lee  had  anticipated  him  in  this  new  plan  of  operations  ;  that  Peters 
burg  was  well  able  to  withstand  a  siege  ;  that  additional  fortifications  had 


BATTLES    OF   PETERSBURG.  529 

been  promptly  erected  around  it  and  on  the  banks,  of  the  Appomattox, 
while  Drewry's  Bluff,  also,  afforded  a  good  and  strong  point  of  defence. 


BATTLES   OF    PETERSBURG. 

Grant  found  it  now  necessary  to  "  hammer  "  at  Petersburg,  which, 
properly  regarded,  was  then  a  mere  outpost  of  the  Confederate  capital,  for 
even  if  he  took  the  first,  or  rather  the  line  of  works  that  commanded  it, 
similar  works,  around  Richmond,  twenty  miles  off,  confronted  him. 
Smith's  corps,  of  Butler's  command,  having  disembarked  at  Bermuda 
Hundred  on  the  14th  June,  moved  rapidly  upon  Petersburg,  and  made  an 
assault  on  the  batteries  covering  the  approaches  to  the  town  on  the  north 
east.  He  got  possession  of  this  line  of  works,  but  was  too  timid  to  push 
his  advantage,  and  waited  the  coming  up  of  the  Second  Corps,  under  Han 
cock,  two  divisions  of  which  arrived  during  the  night,  and  relieved  a  part 
of  Smith's  line  in  the  captured  works.  An  attack  was  ordered  in  the  'even 
ing  of  the  next  day,  Burnside's  corps  having  also  come  up  and  gone  into 
position  on  the  left.  Three  assaults  were  made  with  disastrous  result ;  the 
Confederates  assuming  the  aggressive,  driving  the  enemy  from  his  breast 
works  at  Hewlett's  House,  and  opening  upon  him  an  enfilading  fire,  in 
which  a  large  portion  of  a  brigade  that  had  sought  shelter  in  a  ravine  was 
captured  by  a  Georgia  regiment. 

The  next  day  the  Fifth  Corps  was  got  up,  and  a  third  attack  was  made 
by  the  enemy  four  corps  strong.  It  was  repulsed  at  all  parts  of  the  line  ; 
and,  again  assuming  the  offensive,  the  Confederates  made  an  attack  on 
Burnside's  line  of  advanced  rifle-pits,  drove  the  enemy  back  upon  his  sup 
ports,  and  remained  in  possession  until  day-light,  when  they  retired  to 
their  own  works. 

Meanwhile  Butler,  taking  advantage  of  the  Confederates  in  his  front 
having  been  withdrawn  to  Petersburg,  sallied  from  behind  his  entrench 
ments  and  advanced  towards  the  railroad,  intending  to  tear  it  up.  Lee 
promptly  prepared  for  him.  The  lines  necessarily  vacated  by  Beaure- 
gard,  when  he  had  to  fall  back  and  defend  Petersburg,  had  already  been 
taken  possession  of  by  the  Federals  ;  but  directly  Butler  made  his  attempt, 
Anderson  was  despatched  with  his  corps  from  Richmond  to  repulse  him. 
This  was  done  most  effectively — Pickett's  division,  the  heroes  of  Gettys 
burg,  again  making  here  an  impetuous  charge,  capturing  the  breastworks  of 
the  enemy.  "We  may  imagine  how  unfortunate  Butler  was  in  his  official 
announcement  of  great  victories,  for  on  the  very  day  that  he  despatched 
that  he  had  destroyed  the  communication  with  Richmond,  Gen.  Lee  was 
sending,  by  the  railroad,  troops  from  the  capital  for  the  defence  of  Peters- 
burg. 

34 


530  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  result  of  all  these  engagements,  which  had  cost  Grant,  by  an 
official  calculation,  9,665  men,  was  that  the  Confederates  were  still  in  firm 
possession  of  their  works  covering  Petersburg,  and  that  Grant  was  left  no 
other  resource  than  to  proceed  to  envelop  the  town  as  far  as  possible  with 
out  attacking  fortifications. 

The  immediate  operations  of  his  army  appear  now  to  have  degenerated 
to  an  attempt  upon  the  railroads.  On  the  22d  an  attempt  was  made  by 
two  divisions  of  cavalry  to  get  possession  of  the  Weldon  railroad  ;  but  when 
a  portion  of  the  command  had  reached  the  Jerusalem  plank-road,  A. 
P.  Hill's  corps  and  Anderson's  successfully  encountered  them,  and 
drove  them  back  with  severe  loss.  Gen.  Wilson,  however,  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  railroad  at  Ream's  station,  below  where  the  combatants  were 
engaged,  and  tore  up  some  of  the  track.  Wilson,  joined  by  Kautz,  then 
struck  across  to  the  Southside  railroad,  doing  some  damage,  and  finally 
came  upon  the  Danville  track,  having  had  a  sharp  engagement  with  a 
small  Confederate  force  near  Nottoway  Court-house.  Continuing  along 
the  Danville  railroad  to  the  southwest,  they  arrived  at  the  covered  bridge 
over  the  Staunton  river,  in  the  evening  of  the  24th.  Here  a  body  of  Yir- 
ginia  and  North  Carolina  militia  met  them,  and  after  a  brisk  encounter 
Wilson  and  Kautz  had  to  retire.  This  was  the  limit  of  their  raid.  They 
returned  as  rapidly  as  they  could,  but  at  Ream's  station  one  thousand  pris 
oners  and  all  the  enemy's  artillery  and  trains  were  captured  by  a  Confed 
erate  force  under  Hampton  and  Fitzhugh  Lee.  Kautz's  knowledge  of  the 
country  enabled  him  to  escape.  He,  with  his  shattered  command,  reached 
camp  on  the  30th  June,  while  Wilson,  with  his  men  in  wretched  condition, 
did  not  arrive  till  next  day. 

North  of  Richmond,  Grant's  designs  on  the  railroads  were  no  more  suc 
cessful,  and  the  expedition  of  Sheridan  already  noticed  as  sent  out  to  de 
stroy  the  railroads  between  Richmond  and  the  Shenandoah  Y  alley  and 
Lynchburg,  had  met  with  disaster,  without  accomplishing  a  single  impor 
tant  result.  He  had  been  intercepted  at  Trevillian  station  while  moving 
on  the  Gordonsville  road  ;  and  reaching  the  latter  place  by  a  circuit,  was 
twice  repulsed  by  the  infantry  in  the  rifle-pits  there,  and  pleading  the 
"  want  of  ammunition  "  was  compelled  to  withdraw  his  command  across 
the  North  Anna  and  retreat  to  the  White  House. 

The  month  of  June  thus  closed  with  Lee  master  of  the  situation  around 
Richmond  and  Petersburg.  In  the  same  month  there  were  other  notable 
successes  to  strengthen  the  capital,  and  public  attention  was-  turned  to 
events  occurring  in  other  parts  of  Virginia,  the  result  of  which  was  to  open 
the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  that  famous  avenue  into  the  territory  of  the 
North,  and  to  afford  Gen.  Lee  the  opportunity  of  an  important  diversion. 
We  shall  see,  indeed,  that  this  ready  and  resourceful  commander,  with 
Grant  fully  occupied  in  the  south  of  Virginia,  was  yet  enabled  quietly 


OPEEATIONS   WEST   OF  THE   BLUE  KIDGE.  531 

and   skilfully  to   send    another   army   of   invasion    into    the    Northern 
States. 


OPEEATIONS  WEST  OF   THE   BLUE   KIDGE. 

At  the  last  reference  to  operations  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  Gen.  Hun 
ter — the  same  who  had  made  himself  famous  by  his  negrophilism  in  the 
department  of  Beaufort,  South  Carolina — had  taken  command  of  the  Fed 
eral  forces  there,  and  was  about  to  enter  upon  an  enlarged  campaign. 
That  campaign  was  dictated  by  Grant.  It  indicated  the  extension  of  the 
auxiliary  movement  against  Richmond  to  as  many  points  as  Staunton, 
Lynchburg,  Chaiiottesville  and  Gordonsville — the  general  design  being  to 
cut  the  communications  of  Richmond,  in  view  of  which  Hunter  was  to 
move  on  the  point  that  best  invited  attack. 

"West  of  the  Blue  Ridge  the  Confederate  force  was  small,  disarranged } 
and  altogether  unequal  to  meet  these  formidable  enterprises  of  the  enemy. 
It  consisted  of  a  few  small  brigades  of  inferiour  cavalry,  about  two  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  and  a  small  brigade  (Vaughan's)  of  dismounted  troops 
acting  as  infantry.  To  supply  the  place  of  Breckinridge,  who  had  gone  to 
the  Richmond  and  Petersburg  lines,  McCausland's  little  force,  from  Dub 
lin,  was  sent  to  the  front  of  Staunton,  and  Gen.  "William  E.  Jones  warf 
ordered  to  take  all  the  troops  he  could  move  from  Southwestern  Virginia 
to  the  same  position  in  the  lower  valley.  Accordingly,  Gen.  Jones  not 
only  got  together  all  the  infantry  west  of  the  New  River,  but  having  dis 
mounted  Vaughan's  brigade  of  cavalry  also,  took  all  to  Staunton,  leaving 
nothing  in  the  extreme  southwest  but  a  few  disjointed  bodies  of  cavalry 
and  Morgan's  command  to  meet  Burbridge,  coining  in  from  Kentucky. 

Gen.  Hunter,  having  received  his  instructions  from  Grant,  immediately 
took  up  the  offensive,  and  moving  up  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  met  Jones' 
little  command,  on  the  5th  June,  at  Piedmont.  Here  the  Confederates 
were  overpowered  with  the  loss  of  more  than  one  thousand  prisoners,  and 
of  their  commander,  'who,  with  hat  in  hand,  was  cheering  his  men  when 
he  fell,  pierced  through  his  head  by  a  minie  ball.  On  the  8th,  Hunter 
formed  a  junction  with  Crook  and  Averill  at  Staunton,  from  which  place 
he  moved,  by  way  of  Lexington,  direct  on  Lynchburg.  He  reached  this 
place  on  the  16th  June. 

It  now  became  necessary  for  Gen.  Lee  to  detach  a  considerable  portion 
of  his  force  to  meet  this  distant  demonstration  of  the  enemy,  and  to  select 
a  commander,  the  decision,  energy  and  rapidity  of  whose  movements  might 
overthrow  Hunter,  and  possibly  make  an  opportunity  to  pass  a  column, 
however  small,  through  the  Yalley  of  Virginia  to  threaten  the  Federal 
capital.  For  this  work  Gen.  Early  was  selected.  He  had  latterly  com- 


532  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

manded  Swell's  corps,  and  with  the  great  portion  of  this,  he  moved  rapidly 
by  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad  to  Lynchburg. 

On  the  18th  June  Hunter  made  an  attack  on  the  south  side  of  Lynch 
burg,  which  was  easily  repulsed.  The  next  day  the  Confederates  attacked, 
drove  him  in  confusion,  took  thirteen  of  his  guns,  pursued  him  to  Salem, 
and  forced  him  to  a  line  of  retreat  into  the  mountains  of  Western  Vir- 
ginia.  Gen.  Grant  wrote :  "Had  Gen.  Hunter  moved  by  way  of  Char- 
lottesville,  instead  of  Lexington,  as  his  instructions  contemplated,  he  would 
have  been  in  a  position  to  have  covered  the  Shenandoah  Y  alley  against  the 
enemy,  should  the  force  he  met  have  seemed  to  endanger  it.  If  it  did  not, 
he  would  have  been  within  easy  distance  of  the  James  River  canal,  on  the 
main  line  of  communication  between  Lynchburg  and  the  forces  sent  for  its 
defence."  As  it  was,  no  sooner  did  Gen.  Early  ascertain  that  Hunter  was 
retreating  by  the  way  of  the  Kanawha  River,  thus  laying  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  open  for  an  expedition  into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  than  he 
returned  northward  and  moved  down  that  valley. 

While  the  Shenandoah  Yalley  was  thus  opened,  Gen.  John  Morgan  had 
done  his  part  in  breaking  up  the  enemy's  combination  in  Western  Yirginia. 
This  adventurous  cavalier — who  had  escaped  from  the  Ohio  Penitentiary, 
and  returned  to  active  service — was  operating  in  Southwestern  Yirginia, 
when  Gen.  Jones,  commanding  there,  was  ordered,  with  all  the  troops  he 
could  transport,  to  Staunton,  at  the  very  time  that  Southwestern  Yirginia 
was  about  to  be  invaded  by  Burbriclge.  Having  no  force  to  meet  Bur- 
bridge  in  front,  it  was  resolved  by  Morgan  to  dash  boldly  into  the  heart  of 
Kentucky,  and  thus  draw  the  Federal  commander  away.  This  plan  suc 
ceeded,  but  at  the  cost  of  the  defeat  of  Morgan's  command. 

With  a  force  of  little  more  than  two  thousand  cavalry,  Gen.  Morgan 
entered  the  State  of  Kentucky  through  Pound  Gap.  On  the  llth  June  he 
attacked  and  captured  Cynthiana,  with  its  entire  garrison.  On  the  12th 
he  was  overtaken  by^Burbridge,  with  a  largely  superiour  force,  and  his 
command  effectually  dispersed,  and  finally  driven  from  the  State. 

This  was  the  last  important  expedition  ever  commanded  by  John  Mor 
gan  ;  and  we  may  add  here  some  account  of  the  tragical  circumstances 
which  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  brought  to  a  close  the  career  of  this 
extraordinary  man,  and  which  constitute  a  case  of  atrocious  murder,  un 
paralleled  in  the  records  of  any  events  which  assume  the  title  of  civilized 
war.  Driven  from  Kentucky,  Gen.  Morgan  attempted  a  smaller  scale  of 
operations  in  East  Tennessee,  and  was  next  heard  of  near  Greenville.  He 
was  here  on  the  3d  September  ;  the  place  lying  on  the  great  line  of  rail 
road  from  Yirginia  to  Georgia  by  the  way  of  Knoxville,  and  nineteen 
miles  distant  from  Bull's  Gap,  where  Gen.  Gillem  was  encamped  with  a 
brigade  of  Federal  cavalry.  What  now  occurred,  it  is  necessary  to  state 
with  more  particularity  of  detail  than  we  have  usually  bestowed  on  the 


DEATH   OF   GEN.    MORGAN.  533 

relation  of  single  events,  as  the  manner  of  Gen.  Morgan's  death  has  been 
variously  questioned,  the  enemy  claiming  that  he  was  killed  in  honourable 
combat. 

The  General  established  his  headquarters  at  the  house  of  a  Mrs.  Wil 
liams,  in  the  town  of  Greenville.  His  own  brigade  wras  sent  on  the  road 
leading  to  Rodgersville,  for  the  purpose  of  getting  forage,  and  a  detach 
ment  of  Tennessee  cavalry,  six  hundred  strong,  was  ordered  under  Col.  Brad 
ford,  to  encamp  on  the  road  leading  to  Bull's  Gap,  and  to  picket  the  road 
leading  towards  the  enemy.  The  country  between  Greenville  and  the  Gap 
is  hilly,  and  wild,  and  very  poor.  Gen.  Morgan's  betrayal  was  at  hand 
from  a  quarter  he  had  least  expected.  He  had  no  sooner  retired  to  rest 
than  a  woman,  the  daughter-in-law  of  Mrs.  Williams,  mounted  a  horse, 
and,  unnoticed,  rode  to  the  Federal  commander,  and  informed  him  of  the 
prize  within  his  reach.  Gillem  immediately  moved  his  command  in  the 
direction  of  Greenville  ;  when  about  five  miles  from  town  he  halted  and 
sent  a  detachment  through  the  woods,  and  succeeded  in  getting  on  the 
flank  of  Bradford's  command,  and  driving  him  back  from  the  road,  leav 
ing  it  open  to  Greenville.  A  detachment  of  four  companies  of  the  13th 
Tennessee  Cavalry  was  then  sent  forward  to  charge  the  town.  '  They  met 
with  no  resistance.  The  square  on  which  Mrs.  W.'s  house  wras  situated 
was  surrounded  immediately.  The  officers  of  Morgan's  staff  being  aroused 
by  the  couriers,  of  whom  there  were  three  or  four  at  the  front  gate,  rushed 
out  and  were  captured  one  by  one.  Gen.  Morgan  attempted  to  escape 
through  the  garden  ;  finding  exit  in  that  direction  cut  off,  he  concealed 
himself  among  some  grape  vines.  He  had  no  weapon  at  all,  Captain 
Rogers  having  one  of  his  pistols,  and  one  of  his  clerks  the  other.  While 
the  officers  of  his  staff'  and  couriers  were  together  under  guard  within 
twenty  yards  of  his  concealment,  he  necessarily  heard  the  questions  asked 
them  and  the  threats  made  against  them. 

Seeing  that  there  was  no  hope  of  successful  concealment,  he  came  out 
and  surrendered  to  Capt.  Wilcox,  of  the  13th  Tennessee  Cavalry,  who  had 
already  both  of  Morgan's  pistols  in  his  possession.  This  captain  sat  on  his 
horse  and  conversed  with  the  General  for  some  time,  and  then  rode  off. 
A  few  minutes  after  he  left,  a  man  named  Andrew  Campbell,  belonging 
to  the  Federal  cavalry  referred  to,  rode  up  and  presented  his  gun  at  Gen. 
Morgan.  The  General  said  :  u  For  God's  sake  don't  shoot  me — I  am  a 
prisoner."  The  gun  was  tired  and  the  General  fell.  The  muzzle  of  the 
gun,  a  Colt's  army  rifle,  was  within  two  feet  of  Gen.  Morgan's  breast  when 
it  was  discharged  ;  his  clothing  and  his  body  were  blackened  with  powder. 
His  murderer  then  dismounted  and  threw  the  General's  body  across  his 
horse,  in  front  of  the  saddle,  and  rode  about  town  shouting,  "  Here's  your 
horse  thief."  When  permission  was  given  to  some  of  Gen.  Morgan's 
officers  to  take  possession  of  the  body,  they  found  it  lying  in  the  road, 


534:  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

about  one  mile  from  the  place  where  he  had  been  shot.  It  was  so  covered 
with  mud  that  they  could  scarcely  recognize  it.  The  ball  struck  the  centre 
of  the  breast,  about  three  or^four  inches  below  its  junction  with  the  neck, 
and  came  out  behind  the  hip  bone.  The  brave  commander  met  his  death 
as  he  met  his  foes  a  thousand  times  before  ;  there  was  no  shrinking — not  a 
quiver  of  a  nerve — though  he  saw  murder  in  the  brawny  felon's  eye.  He 
fell,  leaving  to  his  countrymen  a  testimony  of  Kentucky  chivalry — the 
record  of  a  gallant,  dashing  life  and  a  fearless  death. 


EAELY'S  INVASION  OF  MARYLAND. 

We  left  the  situation  in  Virginia  with  Lee  covering  Richmond  and 
Petersburg,  and  meditating  a  menace  upon  the  Federal  capital.  No 
sooner  was  the  defeat  of  Hunter  known,  than  the  rapidity  of  a  new  move 
ment  became  imperative,  and  not  a  moment  was  lost  in  pushing  Early's 
column  towards  Maryland.  In  spite  of  the  prostrating  heat,  the  troops 
made  twenty  miles  a  day,  and  the  rumour  of  this  determined  advance 
came  to  the  Federal  authorities,  at  the  time  when  Grant  was  supposed  to 
be  carrying  everything  before  him.  It  was  another  illustration  of  Gen. 
Lee's  wonderful  enterprise,  and  showed  this  commander  to  be  one  of  the 
most  daring  as  well  as  the  most  skilful  Generals  of  the  age.  That  popular 
opinion  which  regarded  Lee  as  a  good  slow,  prudent  commander  without 
dash  is  one  of  the  lowest  and  most  imperfect  estimates  of  his  character. 
We  see  now  that  when  Grant  was  hoping  to  suffocate  him  with  numbers, 
he  dared  to  detach  a  considerable  portion  of  his  army  to  threaten  the  capi 
tal  of  the  enemy.  He  was  left  at  Petersburg  with  only  the  corps  of  A.  P. 
Hill,  two  divisions  of  Swell's  corps,  and  one  division  of  Longstreet's.  But 
Lee  had  rightly  calculated  that  the  diversion  towards  Washington,  coupled 
with  the  panic  it  would  occasion,  would  weaken  Grant  to  a  greater  extent 
than  himself,  besides  impressing  him  and  the  Northern  public  with  the 
extent  and  activity  of  his  resources,  and  obtaining  an  important  moral 
effect. 

It  became  necessary  for  Grant  at  once  to  find  troops  to  meet  the  new 
movement.  For  this  purpose  the  Sixth  Corps  was  taken  from  the  armies 
operating  against  Eichmond  and  sent  up  the  Chesapeake  Bay  to  man  the 
fortifications  around  Washington,  while  orders  were  sent  to  hurry  forward 
the  forces  of  Gen.  Hunter  from  the  Ohio.  To  the  Sixth  Corps  was  added 
the  Nineteenth,  which  was  under  orders  to  proceed  from  the  Gulf  Depart 
ment  to  the  lines  of  Virginia,  and  which  was  already  debarking  in  Hamp 
ton  Roads.  The  garrisons  of  Baltimore  and  Washington  were  at  this  time 
made  up  of  heavy  artillery  regiments,  hundred-days'  men,  and  detachments 


BATTLE   OF  MONOCACY  BEIDGE.  535 

from  the  invalid  corps ;  and  the  rapidity  of  reinforcements  was  the  im 
portant  and  critical  concern. 

On  the  3d  July,  Gen.  Early  approached  Martinsburg,  accompanied  by 
a  cavalry  force  under  Hansom.  Gen.  Sigel,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Federal  forces  there,  retreated  across  the  Potomac  at  Shephardstown  ;  and 
Gen.  "Weber,  commanding  at  Harper's  Ferry,  crossed  the  river,  and  occu 
pied  Hagerstown,  moving  a  strong  column  towards  Frederick  City.  Mean 
while  Gen.  "  Lew."  "Wallace,  a  commander  much  akin  in  character  to 
"  Beast "  Butler,  and  who  -had  distinguished  himself  in  Baltimore  by  a 
cowardly  ferocity  and  an  easy  prowess  in  the  arrest  and  persecution 
of  citizens,  pushed  out  from  that  city  with  Kicketts'  division  and  his  own 
command,  and  took  a  position  at  Monocacy  Bridge. 


BATTLE   OF  MONOCACY  BEIDGE. 

Gen.  Early  had  pressed  on,  crossed  the  Potomac, 'and,  advancing  to 
Frederick  City,  found  it  evacuated  by  the  Federal  troops,  and  that  the 
enemy  had  concentrated  his  forces  at  Monocacy  Bridge,  four  miles  dis 
tant.  The  Federals  held  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  which  runs  due  north 
and  south,  and  were  drawn  up  along  the  railroad.  Early,  having  crossed 
the  river  south  of  the  bridge,  sent  forward  Evans'  brigade  across  an  open 
field  to  develop  the  strength  of  the  enemy.  It  moved  steadily  under  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry  until  within  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy's  position, 
when  another  body  of  Federals  emerged  from  the  woods  on  its  right,  and 
took  it  in  flank.  The  other  forces  of  Early  were  rapidly  moved  to  the 
critical  point ;  a  simultaneous  charge  was  made  ;  and  the  enemy  broke  in 
shameful  confusion,  leaving  the  railroad  and  national  pike,  and  retreating 
in  the  direction  of  Gettysburg.  His  losses  were  more  than  a  thousand 
killed  and  wounded,  and  seven  hundred  prisoners. 

From  Monocacy  Gen.  Early  moved  on  "Washington,  his  cavalry  ad 
vance  reaching  Bockville  on  the  evening  of  the  10th  July.  He  was  now 
within  sight  of  Washington,  and  the  fire  of  the  skirmishers  was  heard  at 
the  "  White  House,"  and  in  the  department  buildings  of  the  capital.  The 
enormous  march,  however,  had  diminished  his  army.  The  five  hundred 
miles  of  incessant  advance,  at  twenty  miles  a  day,  left  him  only  eight 
thousand  infantry,  about  forty  field  pieces  and  two  thousand  cavalry  with 
which  to  assault  the  works  around  Washington. 

The  most  important  of  these  works  was  Fort  Stevens.  On  the  12th  a 
severe  skirmish,  resulting  from  a  reconnoissance,  occurred  in  front  of  this 
fort ;  but  Gen.  Early  declined  to  follow  it  up,  and,  by  a  decisive  blow, 
attempt  the  capture  of  Washington.  Reflecting  that  he  was  in  the  heart 
of  the  enemy's  country,  arid  not  knowing  what  force  defended  the  capital, 


536  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

he  abandoned  his  design  upon  it,  and  in  the  night  of  the  12th  commenced 
his  retreat. 

There  has  been  much  question  as  to  the  extent  of  the  danger  to  which 
Washington  was  at  this  time  exposed,  and  as  to  the  merit  of  Early's  decli 
nation  of  attack.  Northern  writers  declare  that  if  Early  had  made  a  vigor 
ous  attack  when  he  first  came  up,  and  not  lost  a  day  in  a  fruitless  recon- 
noissance,  it  would  have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  city,  so  feebly  was 
it  then  defended.  Fortunately  we  have  some  distinct  evidence  on  this 
point.  Gen.  Grant  has  testified  that  two  divisions  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  and 
the  advance  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps  had  reached  "Washington  before  Early 
got  there.  Whether  it  would  have  been  prudent  for  Early  to  match  this 
force,  while  Hunter  was  hastening  from  the  West  to  strike  his  rear,  and 
cut  him  off  from  his  only  avenue  of  retreat  across  the  Potomac,  is  a  ques 
tion  for  the  military  critic  to  decide. 

Gen.  Early,  having  broke  up  his  camp  before  Washington,  retreated, 
and  with  little  molestation  recrossed  the  Potomac,  and  finally  stood  at  bay 
on  the  Opequon  to  protect  the  Shenandoah  Yalley.  The  results  of  the  ex 
pedition  fell  below  public  expectation  at  the  South,  where  again  had  been  in 
dulged  the  fond  imagination  of  the  capture  of  Washington.  But  the  move 
ment  was,  on  the  whole,  a  success  ;  Early  brought  off  five  thousand  horses 
and  twenty-five  hundred  beef  cattle  ;  and  the  primary  object  of  the  march 
had  been  accomplished  when  he  retreated  and  posted  himself  in  the  Shenan 
doah  Yalley — a  standing  threat  to  repeat  the  enterprise  upon  Washington 
— for  we  shall  see  that  it  was  no  longer  a  mere  detached  column  that  op 
posed  him,  but  an  army  of  forty  or  fifty  thousand  men.  To  that  extent 
Gen.  Grant  had  been  weakened,  and  the  heavy  weight  upon  Gen.  Lee's 
shoulders  lightened. 


THE   MINE   FIASCO  AT   PETERSBURG. 

While  Early  was  detached  from  Lee's  lines,  Gen.  Grant  made  what  may 
be  described  as  his  last  attempt  to  take  Petersburg  by  a  coup  de  main. 
There  were  three  parts  of  the  enterprise  :  an  assault  on  the  Federal  posi 
tion  on  Burnside's  front ;  the  explosion  of  a  mine  under  an  angle  of  the 
'Confederate  works,  to  open  the  way  to  the  attack ;  and  a  feint  of  opera 
tions  on  the  north  side  of  the  James,  to  deceive  Lee  into  sending  away  a 
portion  of  his  troops. 

In  June  a  plan  had  been  suggested  by  one  of  Burnside's  officers  to  ex 
cavate  a  tunnel  under  an  angle  of  the  Confederate  works  that  was  covered 
by  a  six-gun  battery.  On  the  25th  July  the  work  was  completed.  Its 
length  was  about  five  hundred  feet,  and  at  the  end  of  the  tunnel  the  mine 
was  formed,  running  parallel  with  and  directly  under  the  fort  that  was  to 


THE  MINE  EXPLOSION  OF  PETERSBURG.  537 

be  destined.  On  the  27th,  the  enormous  quantity  of  12,000  Ibs.  of  pow 
der  was  placed  in  the  mine,  fuses  were  constructed  and  connected  with 
the  magazine,  and  everything  was  in  readiness  for  the  grand  explosion. 

The  mine  was  exploded  between  four  and  five  o'clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  30th  July.  An  immense  mass  of  dull,  red  earth  was  thrown  two 
hundred  feet  in  the  air ;  human  forms,  gun-carriages,  and  small  arms  were 
mingled  in  what  appeared  to  be  a  bank  of  clouds  blazing  with  lightning  ; 
a  great  shock  smote  the  ear,  and  the  ground  trembled  as  if  by  an  appalling 
convulsion  of  nature.  Instantly,  before  the  rumble  of  the  explosion  had 
died  away,  every  piece  of  siege  artillery  on  the  enemy's  line,  and  all  the 
field  artillery  that  could  be  brought  into  position  opened  as  with  the  grand 
chorus  of  death.  With  such  an  infernal  display  to  strike  terrour  into  the 
Confederates  and  to  demoralize  men  suddenly  awakened  from  sleep,  the 
Ninth  Corps,  fifteen  thousand  strong,  marched  out  to  attack,  and  complete 
what  was  thought  to  be  an  easy  and  certain  victory. 

But  Lee's  soldiers  were  not  men  who  could  be  fought  after  the  Chinese 
fashion  of  assailing  the  ears  with  terrible  sounds.  They  were  quickly  pre 
pared  to  meet  the  enemy.  The  assaulting  column,  on  reaching  the  scene 
of  explosion,  found  that  there  had  been  opened  here  a  huge  crater,  one 
hundred  and  fifty  feet  long,  sixty  feet  wide,  and  from  twenty-five  to  thirty 
deep.  It  did  not  advance  beyond  it ;  instead  of  rushing  forward  and 
crowning  the  crest,  the  assailants  made  the  most  shameful  exhibition  of 
timidity;  they  huddled  into  the  crater,  they  sought  shelter  there,  and  no 
commands  or  persuasions  could  move  them  further.  A  division  of  negro 
troops  was  thrown  into  the  crater — this  maw  of  death  ;  and  for  two  hours 
the  mingled  mass  of  white  and  black  troops,  utterly  demoralized,  unable  to 
pluck  up  courage  to  make  a  determined  charge  upon  the  crest,  swayed  to 
and  fro  in  the  hollow  of  the  exploded  earthworks,  while  the  Confederates 
were  rapidly  bringing  up  their  artillery  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  crater 
to  destroy  the  enemy  before  he  could  extricate  himself  from  the  disgraceful 
coil.  Once  a  feeble  charge,  in  which  the  black  troops  were  put  in  advance^ 
was  made  towards  the  crest.  It  was  encountered  by  Mahone's  brigade. 
His  men  were  ordered  not  to  fire  until  they  could  see  the  whites  of  the 
negroes'  eyes.  At  the  first  volley  delivered  at  this  distance,  the  blacks 
broke ;  they  were  panic-stricken  and  past  control ;  they  rushed  through 
the  troops  in  the  crater  back  to  the  original  lines,  while  into  this  slaughter- 
pen  the  Confederates  now  poured  an  incessant  storm  of  bombs  and  shells. 
Retreat  across  the  open  space  in  rear  of  it  was  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  death. 
The  ground  all  around  was  dotted  with  the  fallen  ;  while  the  sides  and  bot 
tom  of  the  crater  were  literally  lined  with  dead,  the  bodies  lying  in  every 
conceivable  position.  Some  had  evidently  been  killed  with  the  butts  of 
muskets,  as  their  crushed  skulls  and  badly  smashed  faces  too  plainly  indi 
cated  ;  while  the  greater  portion  were  shot,  great  pools  of  blood  having 


538  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

flowed  from  their  wounds  and  stained  the  ground.  In  a  few  short  hours 
of  morning  the  enemy  had  lost  between  four  and  five  thousand  men,  and 
had  accomplished  nothing. 

"  This  miserable  affair,"  as  Gen.  Grant  himself  was  forced  to  entitle  it, 
appears  to  have  been  sufficient  to  satisfy  him  that  he  could  not  hope  for 
the  capture  of  Petersburg  from  expedients,  partial  efforts  and  coups  de 
main,  and  that  the  task  was  one  of  magnitude  far  beyond  his  original  com 
prehension.  His  last  spasmodic  effort  went  far  to  persuade  the  Northern 
public  that  his  whole  campaign  was  a  failure,  and  that  they  had  miscalcu 
lated  the  importance  of  his  mere  vicinity  to  the  Confederate  capital,  when 
Gen.  Lee  had  been  able  to  hold  Petersburg  against  an  attack  combining  so 
many  elements  of  success,  and  that  too  after  he  had  detached  an  important 
column  into  the  valley  of  Virginia,  and  sent  five  of  his  divisions  to  the 
north  side  of  the  James.  The  commentary  of  the  New  York  Times  was 
logical  and  significant.  It  said :  "  Under  the  most  favourable  circum 
stances,  with  the  rebel  force  reduced  by  two  great  detachments,  we  failed 
to  carry  their  lines.  Will  they  not  conclude  that  the  twenty-five  thousand 
men  that  held  Grant  in  check  are  sufficient  to  garrison  the  works  of  Peters 
burg  ?  Will  they  -not  conclude  that,  if  they  were  able  thus  to  hold  their 
own  with  the  force  of  from  eighteen  to  twenty  thousand  men  sent  to  the 
north  side  of  the  James  River  neutralized,  this  force  is  available  for  active 
operations  elsewhere  ? " 


CHAPTEE    XXXIII. 

SHERMAN'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  GEORGIA  THE  IMPORTANT  CORRESPONDENT  OF  GRANT'S  IN  VIBGINIA. 
THE  "  ON-TO-RICHMOND,"  AND  THE  "  ON-TO-ATLANTA,"  THE  TWO  IMPORTANT  MOVE 
MENTS  OF  1864. — SHERMAN'S  DEMAND  OF  NUMBERS. — GEN.  JOSEPH  E.  JOHNSTON'S  COM 
MAND. — HE  PROPOSES  AN  OFFENSIVE  MOVEMENT. — IS  BALKED  BY  BRAGG  AT  RICHMOND. 
— STATEMENT  OF  JOHNSTON'S  FORCES  ON  1ST  MAY. — JOHNSTON'S  POLICY  OF  RETREAT. — 

HE  PROPOSES  TO  FIGHT  AT  CASSVILLE  ;    BUT   IS    OVERRULED   BY   HOOD  AND  HARDEE. HE 

CROSSES   THE   ETOWAH — ENGAGEMENT    AT    NEW   HOPE    CHURCH. — BATTLE    OF    KENESAW 

MOUNTAIN. — SHERMAN'S  GHASTLY  EXPERIMENT. — HE  RESORTS  TO  MANOEUVRING. — JOHN 
STON  RETIRES  TO  ATLANTA. — THE  SITUATION  AROUND  ATLANTA. DEFEAT  OF  STURGIS5 

COLUMN  IN  NORTH  MISSISSIPPI. — JOHNSTON  MASTER  OF  THE  SITUATION. — WONDERFUL 
SUCCESS  OF  HIS  RETREAT. — HE  HOLDS  SHERMAN  SUSPENDED  FOR  DESTRUCTION. — NAVAL 
FIGHT  IN  MOBILE  BAY. — A  MATCH  OF  212  GUNS  AGAINST  22. — HOW  THE  GUN-BOATS  SELMA 
AND  MORGAN  FOUGHT  THE  ENEMY. — GALLANT  FIGHT  OF  THE  IRON-CLAD  TENNESSEE.— 
— SURRENDER  OF  THE  FORTS  IN  THE  HARBOUR. — LITTLE  VALUE  OF  FARRAGUT's  CONQUEST. 
— EXCESSIVE  LAUDATION  OF  HIM  IN  THE  NORTH. — SINKING  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  PRI 
VATEER  ALABAMA. — REVIEW  OF  THE  RESULT  OF  THE  PRIVATEERING  SERVICE  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATES. A  GLANCE  AT  BRITISH  "  NEUTRALITY." — HOW  EARL  RUSSELL  WAS  BULLIED 

BY  THE  WASHINGTON  GOVERNMENT. — THE  STORY  OF  THE    LAIRDS5  RAMS. — CRUISE  OF  THE 

ALABAMA. — WHY  SHE  FOUGHT  THE  KEARSARGE  OFF  THE  FRENCH  COAST. CAPT.  SEMMES' 

MOTIVES    FOR    A    NAVAL    DUEL. THE    ALABAMA    SINKING. — THE   FEDERAL  VESSEL  SENDS 

NO  RELIEF. — MR.  SEWARD'S  LITTLE  REMARK  ABOUT  "  PIRATES." — DISCOVERY  OF  CON 
CEALED  ARMOUR  ON  THE  KEARSARGE. — HOW  THE  RICHMOND  EDITORS  WOULD  HAVE 
TREATED  CAPT.  WINSLOW. — A  CURIOUS  ANECDOTE  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. — CAPTURE  OF 
THE  PRIVATEER  FLORIDA. — THE  EXPLOIT  OF  NAPOLEON  COLLINS  IN  A  NEUTRAL  PORT. — 
HE  ATTEMPTS  TO  SINK  AND  THEN  STEALS  THE  CONFEDERATE  VESSEL. — THE  NEW  YORK 
HERALD  AND 
AND  WHY  IT  FAILED. THE  TRANS-MISSISSIPPI  SUNK  OUT  OF  SIGHT  IN  THE  WAR. 

THE  important  correspondent  of  Grant's  campaign  in  Yirginia  was 
that  of  Sherman  in  Georgia  ;  the  great  military  effort  of  1864  being  re 
solved  into  two  important  movements  :  the  "  On-to-Riclimoud,"  and  the 
u  On-to- Atlanta."  These  grand  movements  were  on  different  sides  of  the 
Allegheny  mountains ;  a  thousand  miles  of  distance  intervened  between 
them ;  but  both  concurred  in  the  design  of  attempting  deep  operations  in 
the  South,  and  reaching  what  were  deemed  vital  points  of  the  Confederacy. 


540  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

Gen.  Sherman  demanded  what  Federal  commanders  invariably  named 
as  the  condition  of  their  success  against  the  brave  Confederate  armies — 
vastly  superiour  numbers.  Questions  of  generalship,  skill  and  courage 
were  concerns  for  the  Confederates.  Sherman  did  not  discuss  these  ;  he 
wanted  physical  momentum  ;  he  demanded  a  hundred  thousand  men  and 
two  hundred  and  fifty  pieces  of  artillery.  The  lavish  government  at 
Washington  supplied  the  demand,  minus  twelve  hundred  men.  Three 
armies  were  united  under  Sherman,  viz. :  the  army  of  the  Cumberland, 
Maj.-Gen.  Thomas  commanding;  the  army  of  the  Tennessee,  Maj.-Gen. 
McPherson  commanding  ;  and  the  army  of  the  Ohio,  Maj.-Gen.  Schofield 
commanding.  The  effective  strength  of  these  three  armies  was  98,797 
men,  and  two  hundred  and  fifty -four  guns. 

Fortunately  for  the  Confederacy  the  military  genius  of  Gen.  Joseph  E, 
Johnston  had  been  called  again,  although  unwillingly,  into  service  by 
President  Davis,  who  had  displaced  Bragg  from  the  Army  of  Tennessee 
only  after  he  had  accomplished  a  complete  sum  of  disaster,  and  capped  his 
career  of  misfortune  on  Missionary  Ridge.  On  the  27th  December,  1863, 
Gen.  Johnston  had  assumed  command  of  the  army  at  Dalton,  Georgia. 
In  January  he  had  fallen  back  from  Dalton,  and  his  advanced  posts  ;  on 
the  7th  February  he  was  encamped  at  Rome,  Georgia  ;  but  he  again  ad 
vanced  to  Dalton  shortly  afterwards,  and  proposed  then  an  offensive  move 
ment  against  the  enemy, whose  strength  he  knew  would  be  greatly  increased 
in  the  spring,  and  who,  therefore,  could  be  attacked  with  better  advantage 
before  such  increase  of  the  disproportion  of  numbers.  Gen.  Johnston 
knew  very  well  that  he  could  not  expect  reinforcements  at  pace  with  the 
enemy,  and  was,  therefore,  wisely  determined  to  make  at  once  a  forward 
movement  and  try  issues  with  him  as  soon  as  possible.  But  a  most  un 
timely  controversy  in  Richmond  defeated  Johnston's  just  and  promising 
plan  of  operations.  Gen.  Bragg  had  been  removed  from  command  of  the 
army  he  had  so  disastrously  led,  to  take  the  post,  by  the  persistent  par 
tiality  of  President  Davis,  of  "  consulting  or  advising  officer  "  to  the  Exec 
utive.  The  favourite  in  Richmond  had  his  own  plan  of  offensive  opera 
tions  differing  from  that  of  Johnston  ;  President  Davis  agreed  with  him. 
Gen.  Johnston,  in  vain,  telegraphed  to  Richmond  :  "  I  expressly  accept 
taking  the  offensive — I  only  differ  with  you  as  to  details  "  ;  but  the  dis 
cussion  of  "  details  "  lingered  in  Riphmond,  until,  when  in  the  month  of 
April  the  President  sent  a  messenger  to  Georgia  to  explain  his  plans,  the 
opportunity  of  the  offensive  was  past,  the  enemy  was  being  reinforced  to 
more  than  twice  Johnston's  number,  and  was  only  waiting  for  the  signal 
from  over  the  Alleghanies  to  commence  the  "  On-to- Atlanta  "  movement 

On  the  1st  May,  the  effective  artillery  and  infantry  of  the  Army  of 
Tennessee  amounted  to  40,900  ;  the  effective  cavalry  to  about  four  thou 
sand.  Gen.  Johnston  was  thus  greatly  overmatched  in  numbers  ;  and  he 


541 

had  no  prospect  of  compensation,  but  in  superiour  skill  and  strategy.  But 
the  condition  of  his  army  was  excellent  in  every  respect,  and  had  been 
made  so  by  the  admirable  skill  and  inspiration  he  had  brought  to  the 
work  of  its  regeneration.  It  was  well-fed,  well-clad,  in  high  and  hopeful 
spirits  ;  and  for  the  first  time  in  its  history  there  was  no  barefoot  soldier 
in  its  ranks.  Ninety  days  before,  the  army  left  by  Bragg  was  dishearten 
ed,  despairing,  and  on  the  verge  of  dissolution.  By  judicious  measures 
Gen.  Johnston  had  restored  confidence,  re-established  discipline,  and 
exalted  the  hearts  of  his  army.  There  was  reason  now  to  hope  that  the 
Army  of  Tennessee,  the  most  ill-starred  and  successless  of  all  our  armies, 
had  seen  its  worst  days. 

In  the  first  days  of  May,  simultaneous  with  the  onward  movement  of 
Grant  in  Virginia,  Sherman  began  his  grand  march  into  Georgia.  The 
Federal  advance  was  in  three  columns — Thomas  moving  in  front,  direct 
upon  Johnston's  centre  at  Dalton,  with  his  advance  at  Ringgold  and  Tun 
nel  Hill ;  Schofield  from  Cleveland  thirty  miles  northeast  of  Chattanooga, 
via  Red  Clay,  on  the  Georgia  line,  to  unite  with  Thomas  ;  and  McPher- 
son,  by  a  flank  movement  of  some  forty  or  fifty  miles  upon  Johnston's 
lines  of  communications  at  Resaca,  a  station  on  the  Western  and  Atlantic 
railroad,  at  the  crossing  of  the  Oostanaula  river,  eighty-four  miles  from 
Atlanta,  and  fifteen  miles  south  of  Dalton. 

The  flank  movement  on  Resaca  forced  Johnston  to  evacuate  Dalton. 
On  the  14th  May,  having  moved  to  Resaca,  he  sustained,  with  perfect  suc 
cess,  two  attacks  of  the  enemy  on  his  breastworks,  and  drove  him  with  a 
loss  of  two  thousand  men.  But  Johnston  did  not  design  to  fight  here ; 
he  determined  to  fall  back  slowly  until  circumstances  should  put  the 
chances  of  battle  in  his  favour,  and  he  hoped  by  taking  advantage  of  posi 
tions  and  opportunities  to  reduce  the  odds  against  him  by  partial  engage 
ments.  In  pursuance  of  this  characteristic  policy,  he  took  up  at  leisure 
his  line  of  retrograde  movement  in  the  direction  of  the  Etowah  River,  pass 
ing  through  Kingston  and  Cassville. 

In  rear  of  Cassville  Gen.  Johnston  had  proposed  to  deliver  a  decisive 
battle,  taking  position  on  a  bold  ridge  with  an  open  valley  before  it. 
Two  of  his  corps  commanders,  however — Polk  and  Hood — questioned  the 
value  of  the  position  against  the  enemy's  artillery,  flatly  declared  their 
distrust,  and  were  for  abandoning  the  ground  immediately.  "  So  unwill 
ing  were  they,"  writes  Gen.  Johnston,  "  to  depend  on  the  ability  of  their 
corps  to  defend  the  ground,  that  I  yielded,  and  the  army  crossed  the  Eto 
wah  on  the  20th  of  May — a  step  which  I  have  regretted  ever  since"  He 
had  reason  to  regret  it.  While  he  retreated  towards  Allatoona  Pass,  a 
division  of  Thomas'  army  was  sent  to  Rome,  capturing  it  with  its  forts  and 
artillery,  and  its  valuable  mills  and  foundries.  Meanwhile  Sherman  pressed 
steadily  on  for  Dallas  with  a  view  of  turning  the  difficult  pass  at  Allatoona. 


542  THE  -LOST   CAUSE. 

On  the  25th  the  Federal  advance  under  Hooker  struck  Stewart's  divi 
sion  at  the  New  Hope  Church,  and  a  hot  engagement  of  two  hours  ensued. 
The  next  two  days  there  was  constant  skirmishing  and  fighting.  Late  in 
afternoon  of  the  27th,  Cleburne's  division  assaulted  MePherson  at  Dallas 
and  left  six  hundred  of  the  enemy's  dead  on  the  field.  But  these  sharp 
encounters  were  of  little  significance  ;  for  it  was  evidently  not  Sherman's 
intention  to  make  a  great  battle,  and  risk  dashing  his  army  to  pieces  in 
trying  to  force  the  pass  at  Allatoona.  He  was  merely  developing  his  lines 
for  a  movement  on  Johnston's  flank  ;  and  when,  on  the  30th  of  May,  his 
left  had  reached  the  railroad  near  Marietta,  Johnston  had  no  other  choice 
than  to  abandon  his  position  at  New  Hope  Church,  and  retreat  to  the 
strong  positions  of  Kenesaw,  Pine  and  Lost  Mountains. 

BATTLE   OF   KENESAW  MOUNTAIN. 

These  natural  battlements  covered  the  railroad  back  to  the  Chatta- 
hoochie  river.  On  the  19th  June  the  disposition  of  Johnston's  forces  was  : 
Hood's  corps  with  its  right  on  the  Marietta  and  Canton  road,  Loring's 
on  the  Kenesaw  Mountain,  and  Hardee's,  with  its  left  extending  across  the 
Lost  Mountain,  and  the  Marietta  road.  Subsequently  Cheatham's  and 
Cleburne's  divisions  of  Hardee's  corps  were  moved  up  to  Kenesaw  Moun 
tain,  which  was  properly  the  apex  of  Johnston's  lines. 

On  the  27th  June  Sherman  attempted  an  assault  by  McPherson  and 
Thomas  on  Johnston's  left  centre  on  Kenesaw  Mountain.  The  battle  was 
but  the  slaughter  of  thousands  of  his  men.  They  never  came  in  contact 
with  the  Confederate  works  ;  they  were  swept  by  a  fiery  torrent  of  shot 
and  shell ;  and  when  the  attack  was  withdrawn  more  than  three  thousand 
of  the  enemy  were  scattered  over  the  rugged  ground,  dead  or  bleeding. 
On  the  Confederate  side,  Cheatham's  division  lost  one  hundred  and  ninety - 
five  men,  while  two  thousand  of  the  enemy  were  killed  and  wounded  in 
his  front.  In  Cleburne's  division  the  loss  was  eleven  ;  that  in  Loring's 
whole  corps  two  hundred  and  thirty-six  ;  while  on  this  part  of  the  line  the 
loss  of  the  enemy  was  more  than  a  thousand.  Of  this  ghastly  experiment 
Gen.  Sherman  was  satisfied  to  write  :  "  Failure  as  it  was,  and  for  which  I 
assume  the  entire  responsibility,  I  yet  claim  it  produced  great  fruits,  as  it 
demonstrated  to  Gen.  Johnston  that  I  would  assault,  and  that  boldly." 

After  his  repulse  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  Sherman  again  resorted  to 
manoeuvring.  On  the  night  of  the  2d  July,  he  commenced  moving  his 
army  by  the  left  flank,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  found  that  Johnston, 
in  consequence  of  this  movement,  had  abandoned  Kenesaw,  and  retreated 
across  the  Chattahoochie.  He  remained  on  the  Chattahoochie  to  give  his 
men  rest  and  get  up  stores,  until  the  17th  July,  when  he  resumed  opera 
tions,  crossed  the  river,  and  established  his  lines  witliin  eight  miles  of  At 
lanta.  Peach-Tree  Creek  and  the  river  below  its  mouth  was  now  taken 


543 

by  Johnston  for  his  line  of  defence  ;  the  immediate  fortifications  of  Atlanta 
were  strengthened ;  and  the  two  armies  now  confronted  each  other  in 
what  was  unmistakably  the  crisis  of  the  Georgia  campaign. 

To  this  point  the  incidents  of  the  compaign  had  all  been  in  favour  of 
the  Confederates.  The  engagements  at  Resaca,  New  Hope  Church,  and 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  had  been  all  Confederate  victories.  In  connection, 
too,  with  the  campaign,  Gen.  Forrest  had  achieved  a  brilliant  success  in 
Northern  Mississippi,  and  intercepting  at  Guntown,  on  the  10th  June,  an 
expedition  under  Sturgis  on  its  way  from  Memphis  to  protect  and  operate 
in  Sherman's  rear,  had  driven  it  back  in  utter  rout  and  confusion,  and 
hotly  pursued  it  a  distance  of  a  hundred  miles,  taking  two  thousand 
prisoners,  and  killing  and  wounding  an  equal  number.  This  stroke  uncov 
ered  Sherman's  rear,  and  left  him  a  hundred  and  thirty-five  miles  in  the 
interiour  of  Georgia,  in  constant  dread  that  cavalry  might  get  upon  his 
line,  and  destroy  it  beyond  the  possibility  of  further  use.  The  situation 
was  all  that  Gen.  Johnston  had  anticipated  ;  all  that  he  wished  for.  He 
had  performed  all  the  conditions  of  the  campaign  he  had  proposed  to  him 
self ;  he  had  now  u  got  the  chances  of  battle  in  his  favour  ;"  he  had  "  re 
duced  the  odds  against  him  by  partial  engagements  ;"  he  had  brought  his 
army  to  Atlanta,  after  inflicting  a  loss  upon  the  enemy  five  times  as  great 
as  his  own  ;  and  he  had  performed  the  almost  marvellous  feat  of  conduct 
ing  a  retreat  through  a  difficult  and  mountainous  country  more  than  a 
hundred  miles  in  extent,  without  the  loss  of  materiel  or  of  a  single  gun. 
Gen.  Johnston  held  Atlanta  more  firmly  than  Lee  held  Richmond.  Sher 
man  was  unable  to  invest  the  city,  and  to  withdraw  he  would  have  to  pass 
over  a  single  road,  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  miles  long,  traversing  a 
wild  and  broken  country.  Johnston  held  him  as  it  were  suspended  for 
destruction.  The  situation  was  brilliant  for  the  Confederates.  A  pause 
had  now  been  given  to  the  parallel  operations  of  the  enemy  in  Virginia 
and  Georgia — the  one  aimed  at  Richmond,  the  other  at  Atlanta  ; — both 
movements  were  now  unmistakably  in  check  ;  and  intelligent  men  among 
the  ranks  of  the  enemy  did  not  hesitate  to  declare  that  it  was  only  necessary 
for  the  Confederates  to  maintain  the  situation  at  each  point  to  put  Northern 
patience  to  the  last  proof,  and  compel  a  peace. 

In  this  interesting  condition  we  must  leave  the  great  campaign  of  1864 
on  the  dominant  lines  in  Virginia  and  Georgia,  to  make  a  rapid  narrative 
of  other  events  of  the  war,  including  certain  successes  of  the  enemy  on  the 
water,  and  some  detached  operations  important  enough  to  draw  attention 
after  them. 

The  naval  events  of  1864  may  be  briefly  summed  up  as  a  battle  in  Mo 
bile  Bay  ;  the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  privateer  Alabama,  and  the 
capture  of  her  most  efficient  ally,  the  Florida.  We  shall  discuss  these  in 
the  order  of  their  importance. 


544  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 


NAVAL   FIGHT   IN    MOBILE   BAT. 

The  enemy  had  long  contemplated  the  possession  of  Mobile  Bay, 
guarded  at  its  entrance  by  two  imposing  fortifications.  Here  was  a  diffi 
cult  point  to  blockade ;  here  was  a  nursery  of  the  Confederate  navy  ;  and 
here  vessels  were  already  being  constructed  for  raising  the  blockade. 

In  the  latter  part  of  July,  Gen.  Canby  sent  Maj.-Gen.  Gordon  Granger, 
with  such  forces  as  he  could  collect,  to  co-operate  with  Admiral  Farragut 
against  the  defences  of  Mobile  Bay.  On  the  5th  August  the  Federal  fleet, 
numbering  fourteen  steamers  and  four  monitors,  carrying  in  all  more  than 
two  hundred  guns,  and  manned  by  twenty-eight  hundred  men,  moved 
steadily  up  the  main  ship-channel  into  Mobile  Bay.  Having  once  passed 
Fort  Morgan,  this  huge  armada  had  to  encounter  a  Confederate  naval 
force  composed  of  one  iron-clad — the  ram  Tennessee — and  three  wooden 
vessels. 

The  Brooklyn  took  the  lead  of  the  enemy's  fleet  in  passing  Fort  Morgan, 
keeping  up  such  a  broadside  fire  on  its  batteries  that  the  guns  of  the  fort 
were  almost  silenced.  But  another  danger  had  to  be  run  ;  and  as  the  fleet 
moved  grandly  on,  a  torpedo  exploded  beneath  the  iron-clad  Tecumseh, 
and  in  a  moment  she  had  disappeared  beneath  the  waves,  carrying  down 
with  her  her  commander  and  nearly  all  her  crew.  As  the  fleet  got  past 
the  fort,  the  ram  Tennessee  dashed  out  at  the  Hartford,  Farragut's  flag 
ship,  but  finding  her  starboard  side  completely  protected  by  the  Monitors, 
was  unable  to  reach  her,  and  was  content  with  an  exchange  of  harmless 
fire. 

The  three  Confederate  gunboats,  the  Morgan,  Gaines  and  Selma  were 
ahead,  the  latter  pouring  a  raking  fire  into  the  enemy's  fleet.  The  ene 
my  passed  up  to  a  pocket  of  deep  water,  where  he  bore  off  somewhat  to 
the  westward,  and  appeared  to  be  collecting  his  fleet.  About  this  time 
the  Gaines  was  disabled,  and  forced  to  retire  in  a  sinking  condition.  The 
Morgan  and  Selma  continued  to  fire  into  the  Hartford  and  Brooklyn,  the 
leading  vessels  of  the  enemy.  The  Metacomet,  which  had  up  to  this  time 
been  lashed  to  the  port-side  of  the  Hartford,  was  now  cast  off,  and  steamed 
forward  in  the  direction  of  the  Selma  and  Morgan,  the  fire  from  the  ene 
my's  fleet  having  ceased. 

The  Metacomet  was  a  wooden  gunboat,  mounting  ten  heavy  guns ; 
and  the  Morgan  and  Selma  were  also  wooden  gunboats,  the  former  carry 
ing  six  and  the  latter  four  heavy  guns.  At  this  time  the  Confederate  flag 
ship  Tennessee,  with  Admiral  Buchanan  on  board,  was  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Fort  Gaines,  beyond  signal  distance  of  the  Morgan  and  Selma.  Shortly 
after  the  time  when  the  Metacomet  cast  off,  two  other  vessels  of  the  ene- 


NAVAL   FIGHT   IN   MOBILE   BAY.  545 

my  were  also  seen  to  be  cast  off  and  heading  in  the  same  general  direction 
with  the  Metacomet,  though  distant  from  her  about  two  and  a  half  miles. 
Immediately  on  seeing  the  Metacomet  cast  off,  the  Selma,  previously  head 
ing  southwestwardly,  changed  her  course  and  bore  off  up  the  Bay  north 
wardly  and  eastwardly  with  as  much  steam  as  she  could  make,  and  con 
tinued  on  that  general  direction,  using  her  after  guns.  Upon  the  Selma's 
turning  off,  the  Metacomet  bore  down  on  the  Morgan,  which  vessel  engaged 
her  as  she  came  on  for  some  minutes,  when  she  also  changed  her  course 
and  steamed  southeastwardly  in  the  direction  of  shoal  water,  or  Fort  Mor 
gan.  The  Metacomet  now  pursued  the  Morgan  for  some  minutes,  the  latter 
still  fighting  her  as  she  came,  when  a  rain  squall  suddenly  arose  which 
temporarily  obscured  the  vessels. 

The  obscurity  of  the  squall  lasted  some  fifteen  minutes,  and  when  it 
cleared  off,  the  Metacomet  was  found  to  have  abandoned  the  pursuit  of 
the  Morgan,  and  had  gone  in  quest  of  the  Selma,  which  was  still  pursuing 
her  course  up  the  Bay.  The  Metacomet  was  now  distant  from  the  Mor 
gan  some  two  miles,  and  was  closely  overhauling  the  Selma.  The  Morgan 
headed  as  if  to  go  in  the  direction  of  the  Metacomet  and  Selma,  when  the 
latter  surrendered. 

It  appears  from  this  statement  that  there  was  no  combination  of  action 
or  concert  made  or  attempted  between  the  Morgan  and  Selma  at  any  time 
after  the  Metacomet  cast  loose  from  the  Hartford.  It  is  proper  to  explain 
that  this  statement  is  reduced  from  the  findings  of  a  naval  court  of  inquiry 
called  in  the  Confederacy  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  naval  battle  in 
Mobile  Bay  ;  and  that,  while  its  authenticity  is  thus  put  beyond  question, 
it  is  directly  opposed  to,  and  in  utter  variance  with  the  official  report  of 
Admiral  Buchanan,  to  the  effect  that  the  Morgan  and  Selma  were  engaged 
in  fight,  and  at  one  and  the  same  time,  with  the  Metacomet,  and  that  in 
the  midst  of  that  fight  the  Morgan  withdrew  and  left  the  Selma  to  her 
fate.  Indeed  it  was  fortunate  that  the  two  vessels  never  at  any  time  com 
bined  ;  for  had  such  combination  taken  place  it  would  have  led  to  the 
concentration  of  the  Federal  gunboats  and  resulted  in  the  loss  of  the  Mor 
gan  as  well  as  the  Selma.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Commander  Harrison 
of  the  first  managed  his  vessel  skilfully  ;  and  he  ultimately  saved  her  by  a 
gallant  run  to  Mobile.  To  estimate  this  feat  it  must  be  remembered  that 
it  took  place  after  the  severe  action  of  the  day  ;  that  it  was  undertaken  in 
opposition  to  the  unanimous  opinion  of  a  council  of  officers  ;  that  the  ene 
my  was  between  the  Morgan  and  Mobile,  his  gunboats  and  iron-clads 
cruising  about  the  Bay ;  that  the  night  was  calm  and  starlight,  and  the 
Confederate  vessel  high-pressure,  and  making  black  smoke  which  could 
be  seen  a  long  distance.  Notwithstanding  these  adverse  circumstances  the 
Morgan  succeeded  in  reaching  the  obstructions  near  the  city,  although  pursued 
and  shelled  for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  by  three  of  the  Federal  vessels. 
05 


54:6  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

While  the  affair  of  the  Metacomet  and  wooden  gunboats  was  taking 
place  the  Confederate  flag-ship  Tennessee  was  three  or  four  miles  distant, 
slowly  following  up  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  column  of  ships,  which,  being 
of  too  great  draught,  were  confined  to  a  "  pocket  "  of  deep  water  of  about 
five  or  six  miles  length  and  running  in  about  a  north-northwest  direction. 
It  was  only  the  enemy's  gunboats,  being  of  light  draught,  that  could  go 
beyond  these  limits  and  pursue  ours. 

As  the  enemy's  fleet,  having  passed  the  forts  and  dispersed  the  gun 
boats,  was  proceeding  to  cast  anchor,  the  Tennessee  at  last  gave  sign  of 
battle  and  made  directly  for  the  Hartford.  It  was  a  desperate  enterprise, 
for  although  the  vessel  was  protected  by  five  and  six  inches  of  iron-plating, 
she  was  about  to  engage  in  a  conflict  in  which  she  would  be  beset  by  a 
whole  fleet.  Farragut's  orders  to  the  Monitors  were  to  attack  the  Tennes 
see,  not  only  with  their  guns,  but  bows  on  at  full  speed.  The  doomed 
vessel  was  soon  surrounded.  The  Monongahela,  the  Lacka wanna  and  the 
Hartford,  each  struck  her  in  turn ;  and  the  latter  in  rasping  along  her 
side  poured  a  whole  port  broadside  of  nine-inch  solid  shot  within  ten  feet 
of  her  casemate.  The  vessel  still  floated,  but  was  unmanageable,  as  her 
steering  chains  were  gone.  A  second  and  more  terrible  onset  was  pre 
pared  ;  the  three  vessels  already  mentioned  again  bore  down  upon  her ;  a 
fourth,  the  Ossipee,  was  approaching  her  at  full  speed  ;  and  the  Chickasaw 
was  pounding  away  at  her  stern.  As  she  was  about  being  struck  by  the 
vessels  converging  upon  her,  a  white  flag  was  hoisted,  and  Admiral 
Buchanan  surrendered  his  vessel  only  after  she  had  been  disabled,  himself 
wounded,  and  his  crew  almost  in  a  smothering  condition.  He  might 
have  anticipated  the  result  of  the  unequal  contest,  and  have  declined  it 
with  honour. 

The  Federal  success,  however,  was  yet  incomplete,  as  the  forts  still 
held  out,  although  with  little  prospect  of  resisting  a  bombardment  from 
the  shore  batteries  of  the  enemy,  and  the  Monitors  and  ships  inside  the 
Bay.  On  the  8th  August  Fort  Gaines  surrendered  to  the  combined  naval 
and  land  forces.  Fort  Powell  was  blown  up  and  abandoned. 

•  On  the  9th  Fort  Morgan  was  invested,  and  after  a  severe  bombardment 
surrendered  on  the  23d.  The  total  captures  amounted  to  1,464  prisoners, 
and  104  pieces  of  artillery. 

The  enemy  was  thus  in  possession  of  Mobile  Bay,  and  enabled  to  close 
the  port  to  all  ingress  or  egress  of  blockade  runners.  But.  this  was  the 
limit  of  his  success  ;  the  city  was  still  held  by  the  Confederates,  and  months 
were  to  elapse  before  the  enemy  was  to  make  any  new  demonstration  upon 
it.  The  capture  of  the  forts  did  not  give  the  city  of  Mobile  to  the  enemy, 
or  even  give  him  a  practicable  water  basis  for  operations  against  it. 

Yet  Farragut's  victory,  so  easily  achieved  and  so  little  fruitful,  was  ex 
claimed  over  the  North  as  one  of  the  greatest  naval  achievements  of  the 


PRIVATEERING    SERVICE    OF   THE   CONFEDERATES.  547 

war,  and  was  by  Yankee  hyperbole  exalted  above  the  deeds  of  Nelson  at 
Trafalgar  and  the  Nile.  He  who  had  by  the  most  indifferent  prowess — 
for  the  enemy's  superiority  on  the  water  had  always  been  a  foregone  con 
clusion — come  to  be  the  naval  hero  of  the  war,  was  immortalized  after  the 
modern  New  York  fashion  of  big  dinners  and  newspaper  lyrics.  A 
"  poet  "  was  employed  to  recite  to  him  in  public  what  the  New  York 
journals  called  "  a  masterly  ballad,"  each  stanza  of  which  closed  with 
the  word  "  Farragut."  A  feast  was  prepared  for  him,  where  a  plaster  of 
ice-cream  represented  the  American  Eagle,  and  miniature  ships,  built  of 
sticks  of  candy,  loaded  the  table.  The  sober  mind  will  turn  from  these 
coarse  displays  of  New  York  enthusiasm,  ridiculous  to  childishness, 
to  look  at  facts.  The  naval  f  ght  in  Mobile  Bay  was  a  match  between 
eighteen  Federal  vessels,  having  two  hundred  and  twelve  guns,  and  four 
Confederate  vessels,  having  twenty-two  guns.  The  commentary  of  history 
will  be  taken  from  the  words  written  at  the  time  in  the  columns  of  the 
Richmond  Examiner  :  "  It  was  a  most  unequal  contest  in  which  our  gal 
lant  little  navy  was  engaged,  and  we  lost  the  battle ;  but  our  ensign  went 
down  in  a  blaze  of  glory." 

We  pass  to  other  events  of  the  naval  service  of  1864,  to  find  a  record 
of  Federal  success,  coupled  with  peculiar  circumstances  of  dishonour. 

SINKING    OF   THE   CONFEDERATE    PRIVATEER    ALABAMA. 

The  privateering  service  of  the  Confederate  States  had  not  accomplished 
all  that  the  public  had  expected  from  it ;  and  yet  the  sum  of  its  results 
was  formidable,  and  amounted  to  a  considerable  weight  in  the  war.  From 
the  time  the  pilot-boat  Savannah  and  the  little  schooner  Jeff.  Davis  sallied 
out  in  the  first  year  of  the  war,  terrour  had  been  struck  into  the  entire 
commercial  marine  of  the  enemy.  The  Siunter,  carrying  nine  gnus,  under 
command  of  Capt.  Raphael  Semmes,  was  the  first  really  formidable  ex 
periment  of  a  Confederate  privateer.  After  capturing  a  number  of  prizes, 
she  was  abandoned  at  Gibraltar,  in  January,  1862,  as  unseaworthy.  Since 
then  the  two  most  famous  Confederate  privateers  were  the  Alabama  and 
the  Florida,  which  scoured  the  seas  from  the  East  Indies  to  the  Atlantic 
coast,  inflicting  on  the  Federal  commerce  and  tonnage  the  most  disastrous 
results. 

A  report  was  made  to  the  Federal  Congress  of  captures  by  Confederate 
cruisers  up  to  the  30th  of  January,  1864.  The  list,  which  was  not  com 
plete,  footed  up  193,  with  a  tonnage  of  89,704.  At  fifty  dollars  a  ton,  the 
vessels  were  valued  at  $4,485,200  ;  the  cargoes,  at  one  hundred  dollars  a 
ton,  were  estimated  at  $8,970,400;  total  value,  $13,455.500.  Sixty-two 
were  captured  by  the  Alabama ;  twenty-six  by  the  Sumter,  and  twenty 
two  by  the  Florida. 


548  THE    LOST   CA.TJSE. 

But  the  effect  of  the  Confederate  privateering  on  Federal  tonnage  was 
even  more  marked.  The  perils  of  capture  were  standing  temptations  to 
Northern  ship-owners  to  transfer  their  vessels,  and  put  them  under  the 
protection  of  foreign  flags  ;  and  in  the  summer  of  1864  it  was  officially 
reported  at  Washington  that  478,665  tons  of  American  shippage  were 
flying  other  flags.  This  loss  to  the  North,  as  a  matter  of  course,  involved 
a  consequent  increase  of  the  tonnage  and  power  of  its  commercial  rivals, 
and  was  a  bitter  and  humiliating  infliction  upon  its  pride. 

The  Alabama,  the  most  formidable  of  the  Confederate  privateers  or 
cruisers,  had  been  built  at  Birkenhead,  England,  and  left  the  Mersey, 
July  29,  1862.  The  construction  of  this  vessel  within  the  British  domin 
ions  was  long  a  theme  of  diplomatic  accusations  at  Washington,  in  which 
it  was  charged  that  Great  Britain  had,  in  this  circumstance,  overstepped 
the  limits  and  obligations  of  her  neutrality  in  the  war.  To  this  foolish 
and  insolent  assertion  the  latter  Government  made  a  reply  which  should 
have  been  conclusive  of  the  matter.  On  the  llth  September,  1863,  Earl 
Russell  had  written  :  u  With  regard  to  the  general  duties  of  a  neutral, 
according  to  international  law,  the  true  doctrine  has  been  laid  down  re 
peatedly  by  Presidents  and  judges  of  eminence  of  the  United  States  and 
that  doctrine  is,  that  a  neutral  may  sell  to  either  or  both  of  two  belligerent 
parties  any  implements  or  munitions  of  war  which  such  belligerents  may 
wish  to  purchase  from  the  subjects  of  the  neutral,  and  it  is  difficult  to  find 
a  reason  why  a  ship  that  is  to  be  used  for  warlike  purposes  is  more  an  in 
strument  or  implement  of  war  than  cannon,  muskets,  swords,  bayonets, 
gunpowder,  and  projectiles  to  be  fired  from  cannon  and  muskets.  A  ship 
or  musket  may  be  sold  to  one  belligerent  or  the  other,  and  only  ceases  to 
be  neutral  when  the  ship  is  owned,  manned,  and  employed  in  war,  and  the 
musket  is  held  by  a  soldier,  and  used  for  the  purpose  of  killing  his  enemy. 
In  fact,  the  ship  can  never  be  expected  to  decide  a  war  or  a  campaign, 
whereas  the  other  things  above  mentioned  may,  by  equipping  a  larger 
army,  enable  the  belligerent  which  requires  them  to  obtain  decisive  advan 
tages  in  the  war." 

Here  was  a  plain,  comprehensive  definition  of  neutrality,  which  the 
good  sense  of  the  world  evidently  accepted.  It  is  a  sad  reflection  upon 
the  British  Government  that  it  should  have  been  driven  from  a  position  so 
well  fortified  by  reason  and  justice,  and  should  have  subsequently  allowed 
itself  to  be  bullied  by  the  Washington  Government  into  the  seizure  of  two 
iron-clads  (combining  the  ram  and  monitor  principles),  which  were  being 
built  by  the  Messrs.  Laird,  at  Birkenhead,  as  alleged,  for  the  service  of  the 
Confederates.  That  seizure  was  made  in  1863.  The  terms  in  which  that 
outrage  was  demanded,  and  the  mean  and  cowardly  circuit  by  which  the 
British  Government  ultimately  conceded  it,  may  be  placed  here  as  an  ex 
ample  of  the  timidity  of  that  Government,  and  a  striking  evidence  that 


BAMS.  549 

nothing  had  been  further  from  its  intentions  during  the  war  than  the  "  rec 
ognition  "  of  the  Confederate  States.     The  demand  was  made  as  follows  : 

"  LEGATION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  LONDON,  Sept.  3,  1863. 

"  MY  LOED  :  I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  copies  of  further  depositions  relating  to 
the  launching  and  other  preparation  of  the  second  of  the  two  vessels-of-war  from  the 
yard  of  Messrs.  Laird,  at  Birkenhead,  concerning  which  it  has  already  been  my  disagree 
able  duty  to  make  most  serious  representations  to  Her  Majesty's  Government. 

"  I  believe  there  is  not  any  reasonable  ground  for  doubt  that  these  vessels,  if  permit 
ted  to  leave  the  port  of  Liverpool,  will  be  at  once  devoted  to  the  object  of  carrying  on 
war  against  the  United  States  of  America.  I  have  taken  the  necessary  measures  in  the 
proper  quarters  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  the  respective  statements  current  here,  that  they 
are  intended  for  the  use  of  the  Government  of  France  or  for  the  Pacha  of  Egypt,  and 
have  found  both  without  foundation.  At  this  moment,  neither  of  those  Powers  appears 
to  have  occasion  to  use  concealment  or  equivocation  in  regard  to  its  intentions,  had  it 
any  in  obtaining  such  ships.  In  the  notes  which  I  had  the  honour  to  address  to  your 
Lordship  on  the  llth  of  July  and  the  14th  of  August,  I  believe  I  stated  the  importance 
attached  by  my  Government  to  the  decision  involved  in  this  case  with  sufficient  distinct 
ness.  Since  that  date  I  have  had  the  opportunity  to  receive  from  the  United  States  a 
full  approbation  of  its  contents.  At  the  same  time,  I  feel  it  my  painful  duty  to  make 
known  to  your  Lordship  that,  in  some  respects,  it  has  fallen  short  in  expressing  the 
earnestness  with  which  I  have  been  in  the  interval  directed  to  describe  the  grave  nature 
of  the  situation  in  which  both  countries  must  be  placed  in  the  event  of  an  act  of  aggres 
sion  committed  against  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United  States  by  either  of  these 
formidable  vessels. 

"  I  pray  your  Lordship  to  accept  the  assurances  of  the  highest  consideration  with 
which  I  have  the  honour  to  be,  my  Lord,  your  most  obedient  servant, 

"  CHARLES  FRANCIS  ADAMS. 
"Right  Honourable  Earl  Russell,  &c.,  <&c" 

The  consequence  of  this  menace  was  that  the  Messrs.  Laird  were  for 
bidden  to  allow  these  vessels  to  leave  their  yard  "  without  an  ample  ex 
planation  of  their  destination  and  a  sustainable  reference  to  the  owner  or 
owners  for  whom  they  are  constructed."  It  was  outrageously  held  by 
Lord  Russell  that  "  Messrs.  Laird  were  bound  to  declare — and  sustain  on 
unimpeachable  testimony  such  declaration — the  Governments  for  whom 
the  steam  rams  have  been  built."  In  other  words,  without  an  affidavit  or 
other  legal  foundation  for  proceedings  against  them,  these  gentlemen  were 
required  to  come  forward  and  prove  their  innocence,  a  thing  opposed  to 
all  the  law  of  Coke  and  Blackstone,  and  practised  for  the  first  time  in 
British  dominions  at  the  dictation  of  powers  in  "Washington. 

We  return  to  a  brief  chronicle  of  the  cruise  of  the  Alabama.  She 
arrived  at  Porto  Praya  on  the  19th  August.  Shortly  thereafter  Capt. 
Raphael  Semmes  assumed  command.  Hoisting  the  Confederate  flag,  she 
cruised  and  captured  several  vessels  in  the  vicinity  of  Flores.  Cruising  to 
the  westward,  and  making  several  captures,  she  approached  within  two 
hundred  miles  of  New  York ;  thence  going  southward,  arrived,  on  the 


550  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

18th  November  at  Port  Royal,  Martinique.  On  the  night  of  the  19th  she 
escaped  from  the  harbour  and  the  Federal  steamer  San  Jacinto,  and  on 
the  20th  November  was  at  Blanquilla.  On  the  7th  December  she  cap 
tured  the  steamer  Ariel  in  the  passage  between  Cuba  and  St.  Domingo. 
On  January  llth,  1863,  she  sunk  the  Federal  gunboat  Hatteras  off  Gal- 
veston,  and  on  the  30th  arrived  at  Jamaica.  Cruising  to  the  eastward, 
and  making  many  captures,  she  arrived,  on  the  10th  April,  at  Fernando 
de  Noronha,  and  on  the  llth  May  at  Bahia,  where,  on  the  13th,  she  was 
joined  by  the  Confederate  steamer  Georgia.  Cruising  near  the  line, 
thence  southward  towards  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  numerous  captures 
were  made.  On  the  29th  July  she  anchored  in  Saldanha  Bay,  South 
Africa,  and  near  there,  on  the  5th  August,  was  joined  by  the  Confederate 
bark  Tuscaloosa,  Commander  Low.  In  September,  1863,  she  was  at  St. 
Simon's  Bay,  and  in  October  was  in  the  Straits  of  Sunda,  and  up  to  Jan 
uary  20,  1864,  cruised  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  and  vicinity,  visiting  Singa 
pore,  and  making  a  number  of  very  valuable  captures,  including  the  High 
lander,  Sonora,  etc.  From  this  point  she  cruised  on  her  homeward  track 
via  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  capturing  the  bark  Tycoon  and  ship  Rockingham, 
and  arrived  at  Cherbourg,  France,  in  June,  1864,  where  she  repaired. 

A  Federal  steamer,  the  Kearsarge,  was  lying  off  the  harbour.  Capt. 
Semmes  might  easily  have  evaded  this  enemy  ;  the  business  of  his  vessel 
was  that  of  a  privateer  ;  and  her  value  to  the  Confederacy  was  out  of  all 
comparison  with  a  single  vessel  of  the  enemy,  the  loss  of  which  would,  of 
course,  be  but  an  unimportant  subtraction  from  the  immense  superiority 
of  the  Federals  on  the  water.  But  Capt.  Semmes  had  been  twitted  with 
the  name  of  "  pirate  ;  "  and  he  was  easily  persuaded  to  attempt  an  eclat 
for  the  Southern  Confederacy  by  a  naval  fight  within  sight  of  the  French 
coast,  which  contest,  it  was  calculated,  would  prove  the  Alabama  a  legiti 
mate  war  vessel,  and  give  such  an  exhibition  of  Confederate  belligerency 
as  possibly  to  revive  the  question  of  "  recognition  "  in  Paris  and  London. 
These  were  the  secret  motives  of  the  gratuitous  fight  with  which  Capt 
Semmes  obliged  the  enemy  off  the  port  of  Cherbourg. 

The  Alabama  carried  one  7-inch  Blakely  rifled  gun,  one  8-inch  smooth 
bore  pivot  gun,  and  six  32-pounders,  smooth-bore,  in  broadside  ;  the  Kear- 
sarge  carried  four  broadside  32-pounders,  two  11-inch  and  one  28-pound 
rifle.  The  two  vessels  were  thus  about  equal  in  match  and  armament ; 
and  their  tonnage  was  about  the  same.  On  the  morning  of  the  19th  of 
June,  the  Alabama  steamed  out  of  the  harbour  of  Cherbourg,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  engaging  the  Kearsarge,  which  had  been  lying  off-and-on  the  port 
for  several  days  previously.  She  came  up  with  the  latter  at  a  distance  of 
about  seven  miles  from  the  shore.  The  vessels  were  about  one  mile  from 
each  other,  when  the  Alabama  opened  with  solid  shot  upon  the  enemy,  to 
which  he  replied  in  a  few  minutes. 


SINKING  OF  "THE  ALABAMA."  551 

The  two  vessels,  instead  of  coming  to  close  quarters,  resorted  to  a  curi 
ous  manoeuvre — fighting  in  a  circle,  and  steaming  around  a.  common 
centre.  The  distance  between  them  varied  from  a  quarter  to  half  a  mile. 
The  Alabama  fired  alternately  with  shot  and  shell ;  her  guns  were  ad 
mirably  worked ;  but  strange  to  say,  the  Kearsarge  showed  no  sign  of 
material  damage,  when,  after  more  than  an  hour's  fire,  Capt.  Semmes 
ascertained  that  his  own  vessel  was  in  a  sinking  condition,  large  apertures 
having  been  made  in  her  sides  and  between  decks.  He  now  turned  his 
vessel  towards  the  French  coast,  hoping  to  reach  it  under  a  full  head  of 
steam  and  a  crowd  of  sail.  It  was  too  late ;  the  ship  was  evidently 
doomed  ;  the  fires  were  extinguished  in  the  furnaces  ;  and  when  the  Kear 
sarge,  which  pursued  her,  was  four  hundred  yards  distant,  Capt.  Semmes 
hauled  down  his  colours,  and  prepared  to  surrender.  His  vessel  was  evi 
dently  settling  under  him,  and  he  looked  with  anxiety  to  the  Kearsarge 
for  her  boats  to  put  out  to  receive  the  surrender  and  rescue  her  prisoners 
from  the  fate  of  drowning.  No  boat  came.  Instead  of  despatching  relief, 
the  Kearsarge  fired  five  times  upon  the  Alabama  after  her  colours  had  been 
struck.  "  It  is  charitable  to  suppose,"  says  Capt.  Semmes,  "  that  a  ship 
of  war  of  a  Christian  nation  could  not  have  done  this  intentionally."  But 
there  is  another  explanation  of  this  act.  It  has  since  become  known  to 
the  world  that  in  a  certain  diplomatic  letter  from  Secretary  Seward  on 
questions  growing  out  of  this  battle,  he  has  taken  the  position  that  the 
Federal  vessel  had  choice  of  a  capture  of  prisoners,  or  "of  sinking  the 
crew  of  the  pirate  !  " 

It  appeared  that  nothing  but  a  watery  grave  awaited  the  officers  and 
crew  of  the  Alabama.  As  the  vessel  was  on  the  point  of  sinking,  the  un 
happy  arid  desperate  men  leaped  overboard,  and  the  waves  were  soon  filled 
with  drowning  men.  Happily  an  English  yacht,  the  Deerhound,  was 
upon  the  scene,  and  having  been  allowed  by  the  Kearsarge  to  go  to  the 
rescue,  steamed  up  in  the  midst  of  the  drowning  men,  and  rescued  most 
of  them  from  the  water.  Capt.  Semmes  was  taken  by  the  Deerhound's 
boat  from  the  water,  as  he  was  sinking  for  the  last  time.  He  turned  his 
face  to  the  rescuing  party,  and  said  :  "  I  am  Capt.  Semmes — save  me." 
He  was  eagerly  taken  aboard  when  his  rank  was  thus  known,  and,  being 
covered  with  a  tarpaulin,  he  was  carried  to  the  English  yacht,  directly 
under  the  guns  of  the  Kearsarge,  without  attracting  any  attention  from  the 
vessel. 

The  loss  of  the  Alabama,  in  killed  and  wounded,  was  thirty ;  and  on 
the  Kearsarge  not  a  single  life  had  been  lost.  But  there  was  another  in 
equality  of  results  of  much  more  curious  interest.  The  hull  of  the  Ala 
bama  had  been  fearfully  opened  by  the  enemy's  shot  and  shell,  and  yet  the 
Kearsarge,  after  the  contest,  showed  such  little  evidence  of  serious  damage, 
that  it  did  not  appear  even  necessary  for  her  to  come  into  port  to  repair.. 


552  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

The  secret  came  out  after  the  engagement.  The  Kearsarge  had  a  concealed 
armour,  that  completely  protected  her  from  the  thirteen  or  fourteen  shots 
received  in  or  about  her  hull.  Her  midship  section,  on  both  sides,  was 
thoroughly  iron-coated.  This  had  been  done  with  chain  constructed  for  the 
purpose,  placed  perpendicularly  from  the  rail  to  the  water's  edge,  the 
whole  covered  over  by  a  thin  outer  planking,  which  gave  no  indication  of 
the  armour  beneath.  This  planking  had  been  ripped  oft'  in  every  direc 
tion  by  the  shot  and  shell  of  the  Alabama,  the  chain  broken  and  indented 
in  many  places,  and  forced  partly  into  the  ship's  side.  She  was  most 
effectually  guarded,  however,  in  this  section  from  penetration  ;  and  in  the 
hour's  contest  the  Alabama  little  knew  that  she  was  fighting  a  mailed 
enemy,  with  scarcely  'a  single  chance  in  her  favour. 

In  commenting  on  this  discovery,  the  Richmond  Dispatch  referred  to 
a  certain  custom  of  chivalry,  that  when  a  knight  was  discovered  in  con 
cealed  armour  his  spurs  were  hacked  off  by  the  public  hangman.  The 
Northern  public,  however,  could  scarcely  be  expected  to  take  so  fine  a 
notion  ;  and  Capt.  Winslow,  the  North  Carolinian,  who  commanded  the 
Kearsarge,  easily  entitled  his  exploit  among  the  sensations  of  the  day, 
reached  the  American  coast  to  find  himself  famous,  was  overwhelmed  with 
receptions  and  dinners  in  Boston,  and  had  his  physiognomy  recorded  on 
the  first  pages  of  the  New  York  pictorials. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  PRIVATEER  FLORIDA. 

A  few  weeks  later  another  naval  exploit  of  the  enemy  was  practically 
to  terminate  the  privateering  service  of  the  Confederates,  and  to  give  one 
of  the  most  extraordinary  illustrations  of  the  enemy's  utter  disregard  of 
means  in  obtaining  any  desirable  result  in  the  war.  An  account  of  this 
event  is  properly  preceded  by  an  anecdote  told  in  the  New  York  news 
papers,  of  Admiral  Farragut,  the  naval  hero  of  the  North.  When  the 
Russian  Admiral,  in  1863,  wintered  in  New  York  with  his  fleet,  it  was  an 
occasion  of  receptions  and  banquets,  at  one  of  which  occurred  the  follow 
ing  conversation  with  Admiral  Farragut.  The  latter  was  complaining 
of  the  American  officer  who  did  not  capture  a  Confederate  steamer  in  a 
neutral  port.  "  Why,  would  you  have  done  it  ?  "  asked  the  Russian. 
"  Yes,  sir,"  was  the  prompt  reply.  "  But,"  said  the  Russian,  "  your  Gov 
ernment  would  have  broken  you."  "  Of  course  it  would,"  replied  Ad 
miral  F. ;  "  l)ut  wouldn't  I  have  had  her  !  "  The  New  York  journals  re 
ported  this  among  the  heroic  anecdotes  of  their  heroic  men  ;  when  it  was 
simply  the  brutal  expression  of  advantage,  the  disowning  of  all  interna 
tional  conscience,  the  characteristic  Yankee  bluster  of  might  against  right. 

This  curious  exposition  of  international  law  by  the  Federal  Admiral 


CAPTURE   OF   "  THE  FLORIDA."  553 

did  not  have  to  wait  long  for  a  practical  illustration.  After  the  capture  of 
the  Alabama,  the  enemy  appears  to  have  had  an  increased  desire  for  the 
other  important  Confederate  cruiser,  the  Florida,  carrying  eight  guns.  She 
had  eluded  the  Kearsarge  at  Brest,  and  since  then  had  ventured  within 
sixty  miles  of  New  York,  chasing  the  war  steamer  Ericsson,  and  capturing 
the  steamer  Electric  Spark  on  the  route  to  New  Orleans.  She  was  next 
heard  from  at  Tenerifle,  and  subsequently  entered  the  Bay  of  San  Salvador, 
Brazil. 

The  "Waclmsett,  a  Federal  steamer,  was  also  in  this  neutral  port ;  and 
her  commander,  Napoleon  Collins,  conceived  the  utterly  outrageous  and  das 
tardly  design  of  sinking  the  Confederate  vessel  at  her  anchorage,  or  captur 
ing  her  by  stealing  upon  her  in  an  unguarded  moment,  and  towing  her  out  to 
sea.  The  circumstances  of  the  outrage  were  of  peculiar  atrocity.  A  little 
past  midnight  of  6th  October,  the  Wachusett  slipped  her  cables,  and  bore 
down  upon  the  Florida,  when  about  one  half  the  crew  of  the  unsuspecting 
vessel  were  ashore.  The  Florida's  officer  on  deck,  when  he  saw  the  ap 
proach  of  the  Wachusett,  actually  hailed  her  to  avoid  an  accidental  col 
lision  as  he  feared ;  little  supposing  that  the  Federal  vessel  was  coming 
down  under  a  full  head  of  steam  with  the  diabolical  design  of  sinking 
a  defenceless  vessel  with  her  crew  asleep  beneath  her  decks.  The  blow, 
however,  was  not  well  delivered,  striking  the  Florida  in  the  stern  and  not 
amidships  as  intended.  As  the  Wachusett  drew  off,  she  demanded  the 
surrender  of  the  vessel,  incapable  of  resistance,  and  having  in  a  few  mo 
ments  boarded  her,  attached  a  hawser,  and  moving  at  the  top  of  her  speed, 
towed  the  Florida  rapidly  out  to  sea.  The  outrage  was  not  discovered  by 
the  Brazilian  fleet  until  the  Wachusett  with  her  prize  had  got  out  to  sea, 
and  then  some  harmless  shots  were  fired,  which  passed  over  her 
pennant. 

Of  course  Mr.  Seward  had  to  apologize  to  the  Brazilian  Government, 
and  Capt.  Collins  had  to  go  through  certain  forms  of  censure.  But  this 
was  of  no  importance.  The  diplomatic  apology  did  not  prevent  the  Florida 
from  being  held  as  a  prize,  and  afterwards  being  "  accidentally  "  sunk  in 
Hampton  Roads.  And  the  official  affectation  with  Capt.  Collins  did 
not  prevent  the  press  from  lauding  him,  and  the  New  York  Herald  from 
saying  :  "  Certainly,  no  page  of  history  can  show  a  more  daring  achieve 
ment  " — another  illustration,  by  the  way,  of  how  the  North  has  measured 
glory  in  the  war  by  the  very  degrees  of  wantonness  and  outrage. 


INVASION    OF    MISSOURI   BY    GEN.  PRICE. 

In  the  close  of  this  chapter  and  in  the  group  of  events  of  the  war,  in 
1864:,  outside  of  the  grand  campaigns  of  Virginia  and  Georgia,  we  may 


554  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

properly  place  here  a  brief  record  of  what  was  the  most  important  of  the 
detached  military  operations  of  1864.  This  was  a  movement  in  the  Trans- 
Mississippi,  the  invasion  of  Missouri  by  Gen.  Price.  It  appears  to  have 
been  altogether  a  detached  operation,  having  no  relation  to  the  campaigns 
east  of  the  Mississippi,  and  with  but  little  effect  on  the  general  issues  of 
the  war.  It  is  therefore  narrated  in  a  small  space. 

About  the  middle  of  September,  Gen.  Price  entered  Missouri,  crossing 
the  State  line  from  Arkansas,  by  the  way  of  Pocahontas  and  Poplar  Bluff. 
He  had  about  ten  thousand  men  under  the  command  of  Gens.  Shelby, 
Marmaduke,  and  Fagan.  From  Poplar  Bluff,  Price  advanced,  by  the 
way  of  Bloomfield,  to  Pilot  Knob,  driving  before  him  the  various  outpost 
garrisons,  and  threatening  Cape  Girardeau.  Pilot  Knob  was  evacuated, 
and  Price  thus  obtained  a  strongly  fortified  position,  eighty-six  miles  south 
of  St.  Louis,  the  terminus  of  the  railroad,  and  the  depot  for  supply  of  the 
lower  outposts. 

Gen.  Rosecrans,  the  Federal  commander  in  the  Department  of  Mis 
souri,  was  largely  superiour  in  force  to  Price ;  bnt  he  appears  to  have 
been  unable  to  concentrate  or  handle  his  troops,  and  the  country  was  sur 
prised  to  find  Gen.  Price  moving  almost  without  molestation  through  the 
large  State  of  Missouri,  doing  incalculable  mischief,  and  kindling  the  hopes 
of  the  Confederates  with  another  campaign  of  wonders  in  this  remote  re 
gion  of  the  war.  From  Pilot  Knob  Gen.  Price  moved  north  to  the  Mis- 
sonri  Biver,  and  continued  up  that  river  towards  Kansas.  Gen.  Custis, 
commanding  the  Department  of  Kansas,  immediately  collected  such  forces 
as  he  could  to  repel  the  invasion  ;  while  four  brigades  of  Federal  cavalry, 
numbering  about  eight  thousand  men  and  eight  rifled  guns,  were  operat 
ing  in  Price's  rear.  On  the  23d  October,  Gen.  Price  was  brought  to  bat 
tle  on  the  Big  Blue,  and  defeated,  Gens.  Marmaduke  and  Cabell  being 
taken  prisoners,  and  the  Confederates  losing  nearly  all  of  their  artil 
lery.  On  the  following  day,  Price  was  again  attacked,  near  Fort 
Scott,  and  obliged  hurriedly  to  retreat  into  Kansas.  He  then  turned 
down  to  the  south,  and  crossed  the  Arkansas  Biver,  above  Fort  Smith, 
into  the  Indian  Territory.  He  subsequently  went  into  winter  quar 
ters  in  the  south  of  Arkansas,  his  men  in  worse  plight  than  when  they 
started  from  that  State,  and  the  conclusion  of  his  campaign  an  undoubted 
failure. 

The  fact  is  that  Gen.  Price  had  retreated  from  Missouri,  not  so  much 
under  the  stress  of  the  enemy's  arms  as  from  inherent  faults  in  his  own 
enterprise.  He  had  declared  that  his  invasion  was  not  a  raid,  that  he  came 
to  possess  Missouri ;  but  the  breadth  of  the  excursion,  its  indefiniteness, 
and  the  failure  to  concentrate  on  important  points,  ruined  him.  While 
his  command  roamed  through  the  State,  his  men,  brought  to  the  vicinity 
of  their  old  homes,  which  they  had  not  seen  for  several  years,  were  ex- 


555 

posed  to  unusual  temptations  to  desert ;  and  instead  of  being  reinforced 
by  recruits,  his  command  was  diminished  by  desertions  at  every  step  of 
the  march,  and  almost  ran  through  his  fingers  before  he  left  the  State. 
With  this  sad  conclusion  of  Gen.  Price's  expedition,  the  last  hope  was 
banished  from  the  Southern  mind  of  possessing  Missouri ;  and  the  opera 
tions  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  may  be  said  now  to  have  made  their  last 
figure  of  importance  in  the  war. 


CHAPTEE   XXXIY. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  CANVASS  OF  1864  IN  THE  NOETH. — ITS  EELATIONS  TO  THE  MILITARY  CAM 
PAIGN. REVIEW  OF  PAETIES  IN  THE  NOETH. — A  GENEEAL  DISTINCTION  FOUNDED  ON  TWO 

QUESTIONS. — COMPOSITION  OF  THE  PAETT  OPPOSING  ME.  LINCOLN'S  ADMINISTRATION. 

THE  DOCTRINES  OF  THE  BLACK  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  IMPOSSIBLE  TO  BE  DEFINED. — HOW 
THE  PAETY  CHANGED  AND  SHIFTED  THEOUGH  THE  WAR. — OPINIONS  OF  MR.  WEBSTER  AND 

MR.  CLAY. MODEEN  VERIFICATION  OF  MR.  CLAY'S  CHARGE  OF  "AMALGAMATION." 

POLICY  OF  THE  BLACK  REPUBLICAN  PARTY  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR. — MR.  LIN 
COLN'S  INSTINCTS  OF  UNWORTHINESS. HOW  THE  PEACE  PARTY  IX  THE  NORTH  MADE  THE 

FIRST  FALSE  STEP. — GROWTH  OF  THE  POWER  OF  LINCOLN'S  ADMINISTRATION. — ITS  MEAS 
URES  OF  TERROUE. — MODEEATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY  TOWARDS  "  UNION  MEN5'  AND 
DISSENTIENTS. — SOME  ACCOUNT  OF  ARRESTS  IN  THE  NORTH. — LINCOLN'S  DETECTIVE  SYS 
TEM. — COMPARATIVE  IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  MAINTAINING  AN  OPPOSITION  PARTY  IN  THE 

NOETH. — INFAMOUS  CONDUCT  OF  "  WAR  DEMOCRATS." THE  CONSERVATIVE  PHALANX  IN 

THE  CONGRESS  AT  WASHINGTON. — A  RECORD  OF  ITS  VOTES. — REASSURANCE  OF  THE  CON 
SERVATIVE  PARTY  IN  1864.— THE  PAETY  ISSUES  OF  1864,  WITH  REFERENCE  TO  "  RECON 
STRUCTION." CONVENTION  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  PARTY  AT  BALTIMORE. — ITS  "  PLAT 
FORM." — PRETERMISSION  OF  THE  CONDITION  OF  STATE  ABOLITION  OF  SLAVERY. — HOW 

THIS  CONDITION  WAS  AFTERWARDS  INSERTED. MR.  LINCOLN'S  RESCRIPT,  "  TO  WHOM  IT 

MAY  CONCERN." — HISTORY  OF  THE  NIAGARA  FALLS  COMMISSION. HOW  MR.  LINCOLN'S 

PASSPORT  WAS  MADE  A  POLITICAL  CARD. — DEMOCRATIC  CONVENTION  AT  CHICAGO. — ITS 

DECLAEATION    OF    PEINCIPLES. — M'CLELLAN's    LETTER  OF  ACCEPTANCE. SLAVERY   NO 

LONGER  AN  ISSUE  IN  THE  WAR. — THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  POINT  AT  ISSUE  BETWEEN  M'CLEL- 

LAN  AND  LINCOLN. THE  RADICAL  WING  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY. THE  CLEVELAND 

CONVENTION. THE  ISSUES  OF  THE  CANVASS  AS  BETWEEN  THE  DEMOCRATIC  PARTY,  THE 

GOVERNMENT  PARTY*,  AND  THE  RADICAL  PARTY. — HOW  THE  TWO  LAST  INSTEAD  OF  THE 
TWO  FIRST  COALESCED. — "RECONSTRUCTION"  ANTE-DATED. — A  FAINT  HINT  OF  NEGRO 
SUFFRAGE. — THE  WRITTEN  ISSUES  OF  THE  CANVASS  BUT  LITTLE  CONSIDERED. THE  CON 
TEST  MAINLY  ON  THE  FOURTH  RESOLUTION  OF  THE  CHICAGO  "  PLATFORM." ELOQUENCE 

OF  THE  M'CLELLAN  CAMPAIGN  PAPERS. — THE  ELECTION  OF  M'CLELLAN  IMPOSSIBLE  IN 

VIEW  OF  THE  FEDEBAL  VICTORIES  OF  1864. — TRIUMPH  OF  ME.  LINCOLN  AND  HIS  PAETY. 

ANALYSIS  OF  THE  POPULAE  VOTE  IN  HIS  ELECTION. — A  LARGE  ELEMENT  OF  ENCOURAGE 
MENT  IN  IT. — THE  VICTORY  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  POSTPONED.  * 

WE  have  already  referred  to  the  great  consideration  which  attached  to 
the  Presidential  contest  in  the  North  which  was  now  to  take  place  ;  we 
have  stated  that  it  gave  a  new  hope  for  the  South  in  1864 ;  and  we  have 


POLITICAL   PARTIES   IN   THE   NORTH.  557 

indicated,  that  the  political  campaign  of  this  year  was,  in  the  minds  of  the 
Confederate  leaders,  scarcely  less  important  than  the  military.  Indeed,  the 
two  were  indissolubly  connected ;  and  the  calculation  in  Richmond  was 
that  if  military  matters  could  even  be  held  in  a  negative  condition,  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  North  would  have  the  opportunity  of  appealing 
to  the  popular  impatience  of  the  war,  and  bringing  it  to  a  close  on  terms 
acceptable  to  the  great  mass  of  the  Southern  people. 

For  a  thorough  discussion  of  this  political  campaign  it  will  be  well  to 
make  a  rapid  review  and  analysis  of  parties  in  the  North,  even  at  the  risk 
of  some  repetition  to  the  reader. 

Parties  in  the  North  were  divided  by  very  distinct  lines.  There 
were  two  questions  upon  which  the  division  took  place.  One  of  these 
referred  to  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution  as  opposed  to  military  neces 
sity — real  or  pretended.  The  other  had  reference  to  the  relative  powers 
of  the  Union  and  the  States.  On  both  these  questions  the  party  in  power 
held  loose  and  careless  opinions,  employing  force  wherever  it  would  avail 
for  military  or  partisan  advantage.  The  opposition  contended  for  a  strict 
observance  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  rights  of  the 
States.  This  was  the  general  distinction. 

But  widely  as  the  theories  of  these  two  parties  separated  them  on 
questions  touching  the  sanctity  and  scope  of  the  Constitution,  there  was 
still  a  margin  of  difference  left  between  the  views  of  the  Northern  Demo 
cratic  party  and  the  Southern  doctrines  upon  which  the  right  of  Secession 
was  founded.  The  difference,  however,  concerned  only  the  last  alternative 
of  Secession.  According  to  the  Northern  view,  the  "Union  was  inviolable 
and  perpetual,  and  all  grievances  must  be  redressed  within  the  Union  by 
remedies  which  respected  its  integrity.  According  to  the  Southern  view, 
Secession  was  a  rightful  remedy  for  evils  otherwise  incurable,  sanctioned 
by  the  precedent  and  precepts  of  the  men  of  1YY6. 

This  latter  doctrine  had  so  limited  a  support  at  the  North,  however, 
that  it  was  totally  unknown  in  the  controversies  of  parties.  There,  all,  or 
nearly  all,  assumed  that  the  Union  was  permanent  and  inviolable — differ 
ences  of  opinion  turning  upon  the  powers  of  the  Union  ;  the  powers  of  the 
Federal  Government ;  the  rightfulness  of  extra-constitutional  measures  in 
time  of  war ;  and  the  expediency,  and  most  judicious  means  of  coercion. 

The  party  in  opposition  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  Administration — most  properly 
designated  as  the  Constitutional  party — was  composed  chiefly  of  Demo 
crats,  but  largely  interspersed  with  Whigs  of  the  stamp  of  Wm.  B.  Eeed 
of  Philadelphia,  Eobert  C.  Winthrop  of  Massachusetts,  Eeverdy  Johnson 
of  Maryland,  Wm.  B.  Crittenden,  and  the  like.  In  partisan  parlance  they 
were  called  "  Copperheads,"  and  they  were  reinforced  in  the  debates, 
though  generally  opposed  in  the  votes,  by  a  class  of  men  who  had  split 
away  from  the  Democratic  party,  called  "  War  Democrats." 


558  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  state  in  precise  terms  the  political  .doctrines 
confessedly  held  by  the  Black  Republican  party.  After  a  patient  effort 
we  have  desisted  from,  the  attempt.  The  more  responsible  avowals  and 
professions  of  its  leaders  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  fanatical  utter 
ances  of  its  less  conspicuous  and  more  active  representatives.  Its  policy  as 
well  as  its  professions  were  shaped  to  suit  the  hour ;  and  changed  with 
evey  varying  phase  of  the  war.  The  party  was  conservative  and  apolo 
getic  in  moments  of  distrust  and  apprehension  ;  but  always  ready  to  over 
step  the  limitations  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  burst  through  the  restraints 
of  law,  in  seasons  of  confidence  and  success.  It  was  as  unfaithful  to  its 
own  promulgated  schedules  of  faith,  and  programmes  of  policy,  as  to  the 
laws  of  the  land.  It  alike  disregarded  its  oaths  of  fidelity  to  the  Constitu 
tion  and  pledges  of  adherence  to  specific  lines  of  policy.  It  would,  there 
fore,  be  quite  useless  to  quote  from  its  several  creeds  and  platforms,  to 
ascertain  its  principles  as  a  party ;  for  it  would  be  folly  to  judge  of  its 
character  by  its  professions. 

In  sketching  the  career  of  one  of  the  parties  of  the  North,  we  neces 
sarily  present  a  history  of  that  which  constantly  opposed  it.  The  imme 
diate  subject  of  our  review  will,  therefore,  be  the  Black  Republican  party  ; 
which  had  absolute  control  of  the  war  throughout,  and  which,  in  claim 
ing  the  credit  of  its  results,  assumes  the  responsibility  of  its  transactions. 

As  composed  at  the  time  of  the  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  this  party  was 
not  precisely  the  same  as  it  had  been  during  the  first  years  of  its  career. 
It  was  a  party  built  up,  as  we  have  seen,  through  many  years  of  effort, 
upon  the  agitation  against  slavery.  In  the  beginning  it  was  despised  alike 
for  its  weakness  in  numbers  and  for  its  fanaticism.  It  received  its  ideas 
from  the  Anti-Slavery  Society  of  England,  and  there  is  no  doubt  it  was 
fostered  during  its  early  career  by  pecuniary  subsidies  from  that  same 
organization.  After  a  few  years,  it  began  to  acquire  importance  in  the 
political  contests  of  the  country,  as  holding  a  balance  of  votes  capable  of 
turning  the  scales  in  several  of  the  Northern  States,  where  the  great  par 
ties  were  nearly  equipoised.  Although  it  finally  absorbed  the  great  mass 
of  the  Northern  Whig  party,  it  was  characterized  in  terms  of  severe  repro 
bation  by  both  Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  "Webster.  The  latter  said,  with 
prophetic  truth  :  "  If  these  fanatics  and  Abolitionists  get  power  into  their 
hands,  they  will  override  the  Constitution,  set  the  Supreme  Court  at  de 
fiance,  change  and  make  laws  to  suit  themselves.  Finally,  they  will  bank 
rupt  the  country,  and  deluge  it  with  blood." 

Mr.  Clay,  in  describing  its  purposes,  said  of  it,  in  words  well  nigh  veri 
fied  already :  "  The  ultras  go  for  abolition  and  amalgamation,  and  their 
object  is  to  unite  in  marriage  the  laboring  white  man  and  the  black 
woman,  and  to  reduce  the  white  laboring  man  to  the  despised  and  de 
graded  condition  of  the  black  man." 


NORTHERN   DOCTRINE   OF    "  AMALGAMATION."  559 

The  proclaimed  purpose  of  the  war  of  the  Black  Republican  party 
upon  the  Constitution,  and  of  the  organization  which  they  proposed  of  the 
Union,  was  the  abolition  of  slavery,  and  the  securing  of  equal  rights  be 
fore  the  law  to  the  African  race.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  how  a  party 
should  meditate  and  plan  a  revolution  of  the  Government  and  a  radical 
revisal  of  the  Constitution  for  such  a  purpose,  without  desiring  to  elevate 
the  negro  to  a  platform  of  social  as  well  as  political  equality  with  the 
white  man.  Nor  is  proof  wanting  of  the  truth  of  Mr.  Clay's  grave  impu 
tation  in  this  regard.  The  organs  of  the  party  have  not  been  very  reticent 
or  secretive  on.  this  subject.  From  a  vast  multitude  of  similar  utterances 
we  quote  a  few.  The  New  York  Tribune  often  iterates  the  assertion  that 
"  if  a  white  man  pleases  to  marry  a  black  woman,  the  mere  fact  that  she  is 
black  gives  no  one  a  right  to  prevent  or  set  aside  such  a  marriage."  The 
New  York  Independent  is  fond  of  a  theory,  that  the  German,  Irish,  negro, 
and  other  races  have  come  to  America,  not  for  the  purpose,  each,  of  propa 
gating  its  distinct  species,  u  but  each  to  join  itself  to  each,  till  all  together 
shall  be  built  up  into  the  monumental  nation  of  the  earth  ;  "  "  the  negro 
of  the  South  growing  paler  with  every  generation,  till  at  last  he  com 
pletely  hides  his  face  under  the  snow."  Enamoured  with  the  character  of 
Toussaint  L'Ouverture,  it  says  to  those  who  cherish  the  prejudice  of  colour 
and  caste,  that  "  they  must  cease  to  call  unclean  those  whom  God  has 
cleansed,  that  they  must  acknowledge  genius  whatever  be  the  colour  of 
the  skin  that  enwraps  it ;  and  that  they  must  prepare  themselves  to  wel 
come  to  the  leadership  of  our  armies  and  our  senate,  as  Southern  substi 
tutes  for  Jeff  Davis  and  his  drunken  Comus-like  crew,  that  have  so  long 
bewitched  and  despoiled  us,  black  Toussaints,  who,  by  their  superiour 
talents  and  principles,  shall  receive  the  grateful  homage  of  an  appreciative 
and  admiring  nation."  Gen.  Banks  said,  when  in  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  that  "  in  regard  to  whether  the  white  or  black  race  was  su 
periour,  he  proposed  to  wait  till  time  should  develop  whether  the  white 
race  should  absorb  the  black,  or  the  black  the  white."  Wendell  Phillips, 
the  ablest  and  the  boldest  of  them  all,  said,  in  1863  :  "  Remember  this, 
the  youngest  of  you,  that  on  the  4th  day  of  July,  1863,  you  heard  a  man 
say,  that  in  the  light  of  all  history,  in  virtue  of  every  page  he  ever  read,  he 
was  an  amalgamationist  to  the  utmost  extent.  I  have  no  hope  for  the 
future,  as  this  country  has  no  past,  but  in  that  sublime  mingling  of  races, 
which  is  God's  own  method  of  civilizing  and  elevating  the  world.  God, 
by  the  events  of  His  providence,  is  crushing  out  the  hatred  of  race  that 
has  crippled  this  country  until  to-day."  Theodore  Tilton  also  said,  that, 
"  the  history  of  the  world's  civilization  is  written  in  one  word — which 
many  are  afraid  to  speak,  and  many  more  afraid  to  hear — and  that  is, 
amalgamation." 

These  citations  are  abundant  to  show  the  animus  and  purposes  of  the 


560  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

men  in  the  front  rank  of  the  Republican  party,  who  have  always  brought 
their  colleagues,  when  necessary,  up  to  their  own  standard  and  position. 
It  is  not  pretended,  however,  to  deny  that  there  were  milder  phases  of 
opinion  in  the  Republican  party.  There  were  those  who  aimed  only  at 
the  abolition  of  slavery  ;  on  the  idea  expressed  years  before  by  Mr.  Sew- 
ard,  and  reiterated  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  that  an  irrepressible  conflict  existed  in 
the  Union  between  slave  society  and  free  society,  which  could  only  be 
allayed  by  making  the  Union  all  slave  or  all  free.  There  were  very  few, 
if  any,  who  were  not  determined  to  use  the  war  as  an  instrument  of  aboli 
tion,  and  to  prosecute  it,  not  merely  for  restoring  the  authority  of  the 
Union,  but  also  for  securing  the  extinction  of  slavery  in  the  South.  No 
such  purpose  was  responsibly  avowed  in  the  beginning ;  but  it  was  fully 
developed  by  the  summer  of  1864,  when  it  became,  as  we  shall  see,  very 
soon  a  leading  issue  between  the  Lincoln  and  M'Clellan  parties. 

Such  wei;e  the  antecedents,  character,  and  composition  of  the  party 
which  had  succeeded  in  the  Presidential  election  of  1860.  The  shock 
which  the  announcement  of  the  result  gave  to  the  country  was  very  great ; 
but  it  was  not  greater  than  that  which  was  felt  by  the  successful  party  itself. 
Composed  of  extreme  fanatical  elements,  and  brought  for  the  first  time 
face  to  face  with  the  serious  and  grave  responsibilities  of  office,  under  that 
Union  to  which  so  many  of  them  had  avowed  a  bitter  hostility,  and  under 
that  Constitution  to  which  they  were  obliged  to  swear  support,  and  which 
they  designed  to  subvert,  they  at  once  began  to  realize  the  serious  diffi 
culty  of  their  position.  That  which  most  added  to  their  embarrassment, 
however,  was  the  fact  that  they  had  carried  the  election  by  only  a  plural 
ity  vote.  They  had  received  no  support  in  one  half  of  the  Union ;  and 
in  the  other  half,  they  had  triumphed  by  only  a  majority  of  suffrages. 
They  could  not  command  a  majority  in  either  House  of  Congress ;  and 
they  felt  that  if  the  election  could  be  held  over  again,  the  classes  which 
were  esteemed  to  embrace  the  intelligence,  worth,  and  patriotism  of  the 
country,  would  rally  together,  make  common  cause  against  them,  and  de 
feat  their  accession  to  power. 

Thus  circumstanced,  it  was  the  interest  of  the  Republican  party,  as  a 
party,  that  the  secession  movement  should  go  on,  and  that  the  threatened 
dissolution  of  the  Union  should  be  consummated.  We  have  already  seen 
signs  of  their  policy  secretly  to  exasperate  the  feelings  and  confirm  the 
purposes  of  the  South  ;  and,  with  professions  of  conservatism  and  devotion 
to  the  Union,  to  secure  to  themselves  in  administering  the  Government 
the  support  of  the  classes  who  had  opposed  them  at  the  North. 

We  might  make  here  a  large  accumulation  of  proofs  of  the  fact  that 
the  Black  Republican  party,  on  its  accession  to  power,  wanted  dissolution 
and  wanted  war  ;  but  we  are  not  aware  that  it  is  now  denied.  It  is  a  his 
torical  truth.  It  is  a  historical  conviction,  confirmed  alike  by  the  action, 


HYPOCRISY   OF   THE   REPUBLICAN   PARTY.  561 

the  interests,  and  the  avowals  of  the  party.  It  is  indeed  a  fact  which  they 
have  taken  no  pains  to  conceal. 

Although  this  party,  after  securing  unrestrained  command  of  the  power 
and  patronage  of  Government,  shaped  its  policy  at  will  throughout  the 
war,  and  prosecuted  their  measures  with  haughty  and  arrogant  indiffer 
ence  to  the  protests  and  resistance  of  the  opposition,  yet  they  had  come 
into  posesssion  of  office  with  alarm  and  humility.  Not  only  were  they  in 
a  minority  of  numbers,  but  they  felt  that  they  were  hostile  to  the  Constitu 
tion  to  which  they  were  about  to  swear  fidelity,  and  to  the  principles  on 
which  it  had  been  administered  from  its  foundation.  They  felt  conscious 
that  their  success  in  the  election  had  given  a  shock  to  the  institutions  of 
the  country,  and  that  both  their  capacity  for  administering  the  Govern 
ment  in  the  spirit  of  its  institutions,  and  their  fidelity  to  the  Union  and  to 
the  organic  law  were  greatly,  and  with  reason,  distrusted.  Mr.  Lincoln's 
personal  conduct  in  the  emergency  betrayed  these  instincts  of  unworthi- 
ness.  His  speeches  during  the  progress  from  Springfield  to  Washington 
were  a  continual  apology  for  his  party  and  for  his  election  ;  and  his  well- 
remembered  inaugural  address  was  an  appeal  to  the  country  against  being 
judged  by  the  avowals  and  proclaimed  tenets  of  the  party  which  had 
elected  him.  It  may  be  said  that  by  the  moderate  declarations  of  the 
Republican  party  at  the  outset  of  the  war,  the  suspicions  of  the  conserva 
tive  classes  of  the  North  were  allayed,  and  the  opposition  party  completely 
disarmed.  Care  had  been  taken  to  withhold  these  pacific  utterances  until 
too  late  for  them  to  reclaim  the  South.  The  North  placed  entire  faith  in 
them  ;  the  South  placed  none  at  all.  They  failed  to  save  Virginia,  North 
Carolina,  and  Tennessee  ;  and  it  required  the  most  energetic  employment 
of  force,  threat,  and  cajolery,  even  to  retain  Maryland  and  Kentucky.  To 
reclaim  the  South,  however,  was  not  the  object.  The  aim  was  to  yoke 
the  whole  North  into  support  of  the  measures  which  were  meditated,  and 
which  it  was  intended  gradually  to  develop.  The  scheme  completely  suc 
ceeded.  The  Constitutional  peace  party  were  silenced  everywhere.  The 
war  feeling  grew  with  astonishing  rapidity.  It  carried  away  many  of  the 
more  prominent  men  of  the  opposition.  But  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  from 
the  reduction  of  Sumter  down  to  the  close  of  the  war  there  was  a  Con 
stitutional  party  in  the  North,  which,  although  unable  to  do  more  than  to 
make  continual  protest  against  the  conduct  of  the  ruling  party,  yet  did 
make  this  protest  with  ability,  manliness,  consistency,  and  dignity.  The 
difficulty  was,  it  had  not  power  during  the  war  to  put  any  check  upon  its 
career. 

Those  who  have  studied  the  characteristics  and  idiosyncracies  of  the 
Northern  people,  and  have  observed  their  fondness  for  an  affected  enthu 
siasm,  and  their  proneness  to  give  way  to  gregarious  impulses,  however 
absurd  and  reprehensible,  were  not  surprised  at  the  alacrity  with  which 
36 


562  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  masses  of  even  moderate  men  rushed  into  the  war  movement,  at  the 
piping  of  the  war  party,  and  at  the  appeal  of  the  drum  and  fife.  So  soon 
as  individuals  found  the  throng  tending  that  way,  they  rushed  enthusiasti 
cally  into  what  seemed  the  popular  current ;  and  the  very  men  who  but 
yesterday  were  loud  in  condemnation  of  the  aggressive  and  incendiary 
purposes  of  the  Republicans,  to-day  made  amends  for  their  tardy  Unionism, 
by  a  precipitate  enlistment  in  the  ranks  of  the  Administration. 

It  is  the  first  step  which  costs.  The  peace  party  was  a  peace  party  no 
longer.  A  few  consistent  men  remained,  but  the  party  disappeared  for  a 
period.  Conservatism  underwent  almost  a  total  eclipse.  Opposed  to  war  ; 
averse  to  the  principle  of  coercion  ;  believing  in  the  superiour  efficacy  of 
pacific  over  belligerent  measures  for  restoring  the  Union  ;  regretting  every 
blow  that  was  struck  and  every  drop  of  blood  that  was  shed  in  the  contest, 
the  party  of  the  Constitution,  of  fraternal  Union,  of  law,  of  order,  and  of 
peace,  found  itself  compelled,  first  in  one  step,  then  in  another,  then  in  all, 
to  support  the  war,  to  vote  men  and  means  for  its  vigorous  prosecution,  for 
sixty  days,  for  ninety  days,  for  the  first  campaign,  and  then,  on  and  on,  to 
a  successful  conclusion.  They  thought  to  bide  their  time,  and  to  employ 
every  opportunity  that  should  offer  in  the  interests  of  peace  ;  but  the  op 
portunity  never  came  ;  the  fury  of  the  war-storm,  increasing  as  it  pro 
gressed,  and  engulfing  and  carrying  away  everything  in  its  course,  swept 
down  all  who  talked  of  peace.  The  vast  patronage  brought  to  the  Admin 
istration  made  it  omnipotent,  and  enabled  it  to  appeal  with  effect  to  the 
passions  alike  of  the  avaricious,  the  ambitious,  the  adventurous  of  all  sorts 
and  conditions  of  men.  As  the  costliness  of  the  war  increased,  and  the 
number  of  offices  and  the  profitableness  of  contracts  augmented,  so  its 
power  in  the  country  grew  and  waxed  more  and  more  irresistible. 

We  are  not  inclined  to  judge  the  peace  party  of  the  North  too  harshly. 
The  arguments  which  led  them  to  sanction  and  sustain  the  first  measures 
of  the  Administration  were  such  as  could  not  well  be  resisted  by  a  party 
believing  in  the  inviolability  of  the  Union,  and  the  duty  of  suppressing 
all  attempt  at  disruption.  They  were  beguiled  into  the  first  belligerent 
measures  by  the  conservative  tone  and  pledges  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr. 
Seward ;  and  they  were,  moreover,  deceived  into  the  belief  that  prompt 
and  vigorous  steps  were  the  surest  means  of  preventing  a  protracted,  ex 
pensive,  and  bloody  war.  It  was  these  first  steps,  taken  under  a  sense  of 
duty  to  the  Union,  taken,  as  they  thought,  really  in  the  interests  of  peace, 
that  involved  them  inextricably  in  the  war.  They  ought  to  have  remem 
bered  that  all  negotiation  ends  with  the  first  blow  and  the  flow  of  blood  ; 
that,  then,  it  is  a  question  of  force,  and  no  longer  one  of  right  and  reason ; 
tha.t  war  is  like  that  cave  of  bones  and  carcases  in  mythology  into  which 
led  many  tracks,  but  out  of  it,  none. 

Much  of  the  apparent  unanimity  which  prevailed  in  favour  of  the  war, 


MODERATION   OF  THE   CONFEDERATE   AUTHORITIES.  563 

was  the  result  of  terrour.  The  people  of  the  North  seem  to  have  a  pecu 
liar  dread  of  public  opinion.  The  great  majority  will  not  only  surrender 
their  own  convictions  to  what  happens  to  be  the  popular  caprice,  but  they 
will  join  the  populace  in  persecuting  those  who  entertain  their  own  pre 
vious  convictions.  It  was  so  in  the  crisis  under  consideration.  But  very 
effective  measures  were  taken  by  the  Government  in  aid  of  this  spontane 
ous  instinct  of  terrour.  They  revived  the  system  of  espionage  and  arrests 
which  had  been  employed  in  France  by  Robespierre  and  Fouche.  At 
first,  it  was  pretended  that  the  arrested  persons  held  secret  correspondence 
with  the  Southern  authorities  ;  but  soon  all  disguise  and  hypocrisy  were 
thrown  off,  and  arrests  were  made  on  charges,  even  suspicion,  of  mere  dis 
loyalty.  It  was  held  that  the  safeguards  which  the  Constitution  threw 
around  citizens,  protecting  them  "  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and 
effects  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures ;  "  guarantying  them  a 
speedy  trial  in  open  court  of  law,  and  giving  them  by  the  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  the  right  to  know  at  once  the  charge  against  them,  and  to  have  the 
validity  of  that  charge  examined  by  a  judge  having  power  to  discharge  ; — 
it  was  held  that  these  provisions  were  put  in  abeyance  by  the  state  of  war, 
and  that  the  liberty  of  the  citizen  was  not  to  be  considered  when  the  na 
tion's  life  was  at  stake. 

At  the  South,  where  great  armies  were  penetrating  and  beleaguering 
the  country,  where  public  and  domestic  danger  were  everywhere  and  at 
all  hours  present,  and  where  disaffection  could  at  any  moment  bring  fear 
ful  calamity  upon  the  community,  these  arrests  by  order  of  Government 
were  rare.  It  was  a  constant  complaint  of  Generals  in  the  field,  and  of 
civil  officers  in  the  municipal  service,  that  when  dangerous  persons  guilty 
of  overt  acts  of  treason  to  the  Confederacy,  were  arrested  and  sent  to  Rich 
mond,  they  were,  as  a  general  rule,  released  on  the  most  unsatisfactory 
explanations,  and  let  loose  again  upon  the  country.  Much  has  been  said 
of  the  sufferings,  humiliations,  and  spoliations  inflicted  upon  "  Union  "  men 
in  the  South  ;  and  infinite,  ingenious,  and  unblushing  falsehoods  have  been 
published  on  the  subject ;  but  when  the  period  arrives  for  a  dispassionate 
examination  of  real  facts,  the  reader  of  the  history  will  be  amazed  at  the 
moderation  which  was  observed  by  the  Southern  people,  more  especially 
by  the  Confederate  Government,  towards  a  class  of  persons  capable  of  so 
much  mischief  in  a  society  threatened  by  imminent  and  fearful  peril  from 
within  and  without. 

But  at  the  North,  there  was  no  necessity  for  arbitrary  arrests.  The 
country  was  not  invaded.  The  war  was  at  a  distance  ;  and  was  offensive, 
not  defensive.  Except  in  portions  of  the  Border  States,  the  public  sentiment 
was  unanimous  as  against  the  South ;  opinions  only  differing  as  to  the 
best  means  of  reducing  the  distant  "  rebellion."  Yet  a  system  of  terrour 
was  established,  which  could  only  have  been  warrantable  at  the  South, 


564  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

and  was  held  to  be  unnecessary  even  there.  JSTo  shadow  of  excuse  existed 
for  considering  the  North  or  any  State  of  the  North  as  disloyal ;  on  the 
contrary,  Democrats  and  Republicans  poured  out  their  money  by  millions, 
and  sent  their  young  men  by  hundreds  of  thousands  to  the  support  of  the 
flag.  Yet  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  war,  a  system  of  arbitrary  and  despotic 
seizure  and  imprisonment  was  inaugurated,  which  continued  even  after  the 
surrenders  of  Lee  and  Johnston.  The  number  of  arbitrary  arrests  that 
were  made  in  the  whole  period  of  the  war  is  variously  estimated  at  from 
ten  to  thirty  thousand.  The  great  mass  of  arrested  persons  never  had  a 
trial,  and  knew  nothing  of  the  charges,  if  any  at  all,  on  which  they  were 
imprisoned.  In  the  great  majority  of  cases,  not  only  was  the  writ  of  habe 
as  corpus  refused,  but  applications  to  be  examined  by  officers  selected  by 
the  Government  itself  were  refused.  Prisoners,  suddenly  arrested  and 
dragged  to  prison,  without  an  opportunity  of  seeing  their  families  or 
arranging  for  the  continuance  of  their  business,  after  long  incarcerations, 
were  not  only  denied  an  examination  of  their  cases,  but  they  were  offi 
cially  informed  that  the  employment  of  counsel  was  distasteful  to  the 
Government,  and  would  prejudice  their  applications  for  trial  and  release. 
Though  arrests  were  made  at  the  suggestion  of  anonymous  letters,  yet 
letters  from  the  persons  imprisoned  applying  for  release  or  for  trial  were 
left  unopened,  and  often  returned  in  that  condition  to  their  authors. 
Finally,  it  was  determined,  that  not  only  should  the  ground  of  arrest  be 
withheld  from  the  imprisoned,  but  the  fact  of  arrest  be  withheld  from  the 
public ;  detective  officers  being  prohibited  from  reporting  the  cases  of 
arrest  to  the  press,  or  permitting  an  inspection  of  their  books.  Of  course 
under  this  system,  the  number  of  denunciations  against  suspected  persons 
became  burdensome  to  the  Central  Government ;  and  such  paragraphs  as 
the  following  began  to  appear  in  the  official  newspapers  : 

"  Eight  hundred  names  are  now  entered  on  the  books  of  the  secret  police  in  New- 
York  city,  of  persons  suspected  of  treason,  and  many  arrests  will  be  made." — N.  T. 
Tribune,  Sept.  6,  1861. 

"  A  large  number  of  arrests  are  daily  made  at  the  North,  the  number  averaging  ten  or 
twelve  a  day.  These  are  made  generally  on  complaints  lodged  with  the  departments  at 
Washington.  The  Government  is  somewhat  annoyed  and  astonished  that  petty  cases  of 
treason  should  be  sent  there  for  consideration.  Any  military  commander  can  commit  for 
treasonable  acts,  and  the  local  officers  should  promptly  act  themselves." — Hartford 
Courant,  Sept.  6,  1864. 

The  arrests  soon  became  very  flagrant  in  their  manner  and  character. 
Clergymen  were  seized  while  at  prayer  at  the  altar  on  the  sabbath-day. 
Judges  were  seized  for  judicial  opinions  rendered  on  the  bench.  Ladies 
were  seized  and  imprisoned,  subjected  to  nameless  insults,  forbidden  the 
visits  of  friends,  hurried  from  prison  to  prison,  and  indecently  treated  by 


REIGN   OF   TERROUR   IN   THE   NORTH.  565 

officers.  Mourners  were  seized  at  funerals,  while  burying  their  dead. 
Young  children  were  arrested  and  imprisoned  for  months,  in  some  cases 
for  years.  The  victims  of  these  proceedings  were  in  many  instances 
driven  to  lunacy  and  to  suicide,  some  of  them  dying  under  their  severe 
usage.  The  detective  system  took  the  feature  of  eaves-dropping,  and 
domestic  servants  were  enlisted  in  the  pay  of  Government.  Arrests  were 
often  made  on  the  most  frivolous  and  contemptible  pretences.  A  father, 
hearing  that  his  son  was  shot  instantly  dead  in  battle,  exclaimed,  "  That  is 
good,"  meaning  to  express  his  relief  at  the  thought  that  he  had  escaped 
the  agonies  of  a  lingering,  painful  death  ;  he  was  arrested  for  the  "  dis 
loyal  "  expression,  hurried  precipitately  to  Camp  Chase,  and  imprisoned 
for  two  months  before  the  privilege  of  explanation  was  accorded  him. 
Two  ladies  of  undoubted  loyalty  were  arrested  in  a  carriage  in  the  streets, 
for  raising  their  handkerchiefs,  and  passing  them  several  times  over  their 
mouths.  They  were  suspected  of  making  signs  to  prisoners  ;  whereas  they 
had  been  eating  an  orange.  The  system  of  terrour  was  employed  not  only 
in  the  Border  States,  but  was  put  in  practice  everywhere.  In  far  in- 
teriour  towns,  where  the  idea  of  danger  from  the  rebels  was  supremely 
ridiculous,  it  was  as  active  as  in  Washington  city  or  New  Orleans.  A 
single  clergyman  in  Central  New  York,  wrote  thirty  letters  in  two  months, 
sending  lists  of  his  neighbours  whose  arrest  he  demanded.  An  order  was 
issued  by  the  President  to  all  policemen  in  the  country,  commanding  their 
services  in  these  seizures.  State  machinery  was  thus  brought  to  the  help 
of  this  nefarious  business.  The  system  was  vigorously  employed  for  parti 
san  purposes.  "  Democrat "  was  held  to  be  synonymous  with  "  traitor," 
and  being  a  "  Democrat "  was  often  the  only  ground  for  arrest. 

We  make  this  recital  to  show  how  impossible  it  was,  for  a  while,  to 
maintain  an  opposition  party  at  the  North.  The  power  of  a  Government, 
wielding  a  patronage  of  many  hundred  millions  of  dollars  per  annum,  and 
supported  by  an  army  of  more  than  a  million  of  soldiers,  half  of  them  kept 
habitually  in  the  North,  and  allowed  to  resolve  themselves  into  a  mob  on 
the  slightest  pretence,  was  too  great  to  be  opposed  by  reason  and  argu 
ment,  when  brought  to  bear  without  scruple  and  with  despotic  ferocity 
upon  a  helpless  and  paralyzed  opposition.  Passive  submission  to  despotic 
rule,  being  a  necessity,  became  a  temporary  duty.  We  have  no  heart  nor 
right  to  censure  those  who  remained  consistent  though  often  silent  oppo 
nents  of  the  Administration,  during  such  a  period  of  force  and  terrourism. 
But  there  was  a  class  of  original  conservatives,  who  did  not  remain  pas 
sive  ;  who  went  over  heart  and  hand  and  soul  to  the  Republican  party ; 
and  who  vied  with  the  minions  of  power  in  intemperance  of  speech  and 
violence  of  action.  The  principal  authors  of  the  enormities  that  were 
perpetrated  will  receive  the  due  sentence  of  history  ;  but  what  will  be  the 
ignominy  that  will  attach  to  the  names  of  men,  who,  in  the  character  of 


566  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

"  War  Democrats,"  deserted  their  political  associations,  apostatized  from 
the  principles  which  they  had  all  their  lives  upheld ;  espoused  the  arbi 
trary  doctrines,  seconded  the  despotic  practices,  imbibed  the  truculent  ani 
mosities  of  the  ascendant  party  ;  and  prosecuted  the  war  in  the  vindictive 
spirit  and  for  the  revolutionary  purposes  avowed  by  the  worst  enemies  of 
the  Union  and  the  Constitution  ! 

In  spite,  however,  of  the  ferocity  of  the  Government  and  its  minions, 
there  was  never  a  day  during  the  war  in  which  the  conservative  party 
failed  to  present  a  small  phalanx  in  Congress  to  make  opposition  to  the  poli 
cy  of  the  Government,  and  to  raise  a  continual  protest  against  its  uncon 
stitutional  proceedings.  Did  space  suffice,  it  would  be  interesting  to  re 
capitulate  here  the  several  votes  which  this  small  party  gave  upon  succes 
sive  measures  considered  by  Congress.  A  very  few  instances  must  serve 
to  illustrate  their  courage  and  fidelity  to  the  Constitution. 

Against  the  Confiscation  Bill,  the  vote  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
was  42 ;  in  the  Senate,  13.  Against  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  of 
persons  engaging  in  the  rebellion,  the  vote  in  the  House  was  66  ;  in  the 
Senate,  11.  Against  striking  out  from  the  Confiscation  Act  the  clause 
limiting  the  forfeiture  to  the  offender's  natural  life,  the  vote  in  the  House 
was  76  ;  in  the  Senate,  13.  The  vote  in  the  House  against  the  resolution 
declaring  that  the  United  States  ought  to  'co-operate  with  any  States  in 
gradually  abolishing  slavery,  was  36  ;  in  the  Senate  it  was  10.  Against 
the  scheme  of  compensated  emancipation  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  the 
vote  in  the  Senate  was  19,  in  the  House  39.  Against  the  proposition  of 
enquiry  into  the  practicability  of  inaugurating  a  scheme  of  compensated 
emancipation  in  the  Border  States,  the  vote  in  the  House  was  52.  Against 
the  bill  repealing  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act,  the  vote  in  the  House  was  62  ; 
in  the  Senate,  12.  Against  the  bil]  authorizing  a  suspension  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  the  vote  (March  3,  1863)  was  45,  in  the  House ;  in  the 
Senate  it  would  have  been  13,  but  failed  by  accident  to  be  taken  by  roll- 
call.  This  bill  also  indemnified  the  President  and  other  officers  of  Govern 
ment  for  arrests  and  seizures,  not  only  in  respect  to  subsequent  but  pre 
vious  acts.  An  eloquent  protest  against  the  bill  was  signed  by  thirty-six 
members,  who  moved  ineffectually  to  have  it  placed  on  the  journal.  The 
Government  frequently  suppressed  newspapers ;  and  the  Postmaster- 
General  forbade  the  transmission  of  journals  characterized  as  disloyal 
through  the  mails.  An  effort  to  bring  this  subject  before  Congress  was 
resisted  by  a  majority  of  the  House ;  the  vote  in  favour  of  considering 
some  action  in  favour  of  the  liberty  of  the  press,  was  54.  Against  the 
resolution  in  favour  of  submitting  the  Amendments  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  United  States,  the  final  vote  in  the  House  (January  3, 1865), 
was  56  ;  in  the  Senate,  6.  Against  the  bill  by  which  it  was  proposed  to 
limit  the  action  of  the  President  in  the  readmission  of  insurgent  States, 


PAKTY   ISSUES    OF    1864:   IN   THE   NOETH.  567 

overrun  and  subdued  by  the  Federal  power,  and  to  subject  these  States  to 
extra  Constitutional  conditions  before  readmission  into  the  Union,  the  vote 
in  the  House  was  66  ;  in  the  Senate,  14. 

These  examples  are  sufficient  to  show  how  a  small  Constitutional  party 
in  the  North  held  to  their  principles  throughout  the  dark  period  of  usur 
pation  and  despotism.  As  the  conservative  party  became  less  awed  by 
terrourism,  they  became  less  restrained  in  speech  and  action.  In  the 
progress  of  time,  divisions  began  to  arise  in  the  Black  Republican  party, 
and  protests  to  proceed  from  Black  Republican  politicians.  Democrats, 
who,  absorbed  in  military  operations  in  the  distant  fields  of  campaign,  had 
for  some  time  given  no  attention  to  internal  and  domestic  concerns,  having 
the  indisputable  right  of  soldiers  to  speak  their  sentiments,  began  to  give 
expression  to  the  disgust  and  alarm  which  the  arbitrary  proceedings  of  the 
Administration  had  naturally  excited.  Thus  the  opposition  grew  formi 
dable  as  the  term  of  Mr.  Lincoln  drew  towards  a  close  ;  and  parties  for  and 
against  the  Administration  began  to  be  organized,  and  issues  of  principle  to 
be  evolved  and  defined,  for  the  approaching  Presidential  canvass. 

The  party  issues  for  1864  turned  in  a  measure  upon  the  conditions  of 
reconstruction ;  and  three  sets  of  opinion  on  this  subject  were  developed 
in  the  course  of  the  canvass.  The  Constitutional  party  held  to  the  ground 
that  the  sole  rightful  object  of  the  war  had  been  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion  ;  and  that,  so  soon  as  the  power  of  the  rebel  authorities  in  any 
State  was  crushed,  the  State  was  by  that  fact  already  restored  to  the 
Union,  from  which  it  had  never  been  legally  separated  ;  and  nothing  re 
mained  to  be  done  but  the  restoration  of  the  lawful  State  Government. 
This  position  was  afterwards  compendiously  expressed  by  their  candidate, 
Gen.  McClellan,  in  the  declaration  :  "  The  Union  is  the  sole  condition  of 
peace — we  ask  no  more." 

As  will  be  seen  in  the  sequel,  the  Administration  or  Government  party 
went  into  the  canvass  on  the  issue  of  simple  coercion  ;  proposing  indeed  to 
bring  the  insurgent  States  into  the  Union  divested  of  slavery  ;  but  divested 
by  the  expedient  of  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution.  But  the  pressure 
of  the  contest  forced  them  into  the  necessity  of  adding  to  their  platform  a 
requirement,  upon  States  returning  to  the  Union,  that  they  should  them 
selves  abolish  slavery  as  a  condition  precedent  to  readmission.  They  were, 
in  other  words,  forced  to  abandon  a  Constitutional  measure,  and  to  sub 
stitute  an  extra-constitutional  one  in  its  stead. 

The  programme  of  the  radical  branch  of  the  Black  Republican  party 
had  been  developed,  some  short  time  before,  in  the  bill  which  passed  Con 
gress  on  the  3d  of  July,  1864,  but  which  the  President  failed  to  sign, 
prescribing  these  three  conditions  as  necessary  preliminaries  to  the  restora 
tion  of  a  seceded  State  to  the  Union  :  to  wit,  the  disfranchisement  by  the 
States  of  the  guilty  leaders  of  the  rebellion  as  to  State  officers  ;  the  aboli- 


568  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

tion  of  slavery  by  the  act  of  the  returning  States  themselves ;  and  the 
repudiation  of  the  rebel  debt,  also  by  the  act  of  these  States. 

Another  feature  of  this  radical  programme,  but  which  had  failed  to  be 
incorporated  into  the  bill  just  mentioned,  was,  that  no  seceded  State  should 
vote  in  the  Electoral  College,  nor  be  admitted  to  representation  in  Con 
gress,  until  after  proclamation  by  the  President  of  its  obedience  to  the  laws 
of  the  United  States,  especially  authorized  by  act  of  Congress  passed  ex 
pressly  for  the  purpose.  The  project  of  requiring  the  admission  of  negroes 
to  full  citizenship  and  suffrage,  had  not  then  taken  the  form  of  a  distinct, 
express  additional  exaction. 

The  National  Convention  of  the  Government  party  was  held  at  Balti 
more  on  the  7th  of  June,  1864.  The  votes  were  all  given  for  Mr.  Lincoln, 
except  that  of  Missouri,  which  was  cast  for  Gen.  Grant.  The  ballot  on  the 
Vice-Presidency  was  nearly  unanimous  in  favour  of  Mr.  Andrew  Johnson. 
A  platform  was  unanimously  adopted  declaring  in  favour  of  maintaining 
the  Union  in  its  integrity  and  supreme  authority  against  all  enemies ;  of 
quelling  the  rebellion  by  force  of  arms  and  duly  punishing  traitors  for 
their  crimes  ;  approving  the  determination  of  the  Government  not  to  com 
promise  with  rebels,  and  to  refuse  all  terms  except  an  unconditional  sub 
mission  to  the  Federal  authority  ;  promising  bounties  to  maimed  soldiers  ; 
upholding  the  acts  and  proclamations  of  the  Executive  in  regard  to  slavery ; 
calling  for  an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  abolishing  slavery ;  thank 
ing  the  army  and  navy  for  gallant  services ;  approving  and  applauding 
the  acts  of  the  President,  especially  his  measures  taken  against  open  and 
secret  foes  ;  declaring  none  worthy  of  confidence  but  such  as  endorsed  this 
platform ;  demanding  the  full  protection  of  the  laws  of  war  for  all  men 
employed  in  the  armies  of  the  Union,  without  distinction  of  colour  ;  wel 
coming  foreign  immigration;  approving -the  National  Pacific  Railroad; 
pledging  the  national  faith  for  the  public  debt ;  and  denouncing  all  at 
tempts  of  foreign  powers  to  supplant  republican  institutions  in  the  Repub 
lics  of  this  continent. 

The  project  of  making  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  each  revolted  State 
a  condition  precedent  to  the  readmission  of  the  State  into  the  Union  was 
not  incorporated  into  this  platform.  On  the  contrary,  the  language  of  the 
second  resolution  implied  an  intentional  pretermission  of  that  condition,  in 
prohibiting,  as  it  did,  the  offer  of  any  terms  to  the  rebels  "  except  such  as 
may  be  based  upon  an  unconditional  surrender  of  their  hostility,  and  re 
turn  to  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  ;  "  the  Convention 
seeming  to  rely  upon  the  proposed  amendment  of  the  Constitution  for 
effecting  that  object.  Mr.  Lincoln,  also,  in  the  language  which  he  em 
ployed  in  accepting  the  nomination  of  the  Convention,  took  pains  to 
exclude  the  idea  of  intending  to  require  the  abolition  of  slavery,  as  a  con 
dition  of  peace,  by  any  other  process  than  by  means  of  an  amendment  to 


THE   NIAGABA   FALLS   COMMISSION.  569 

the  Constitution.  He  said :  "  I  approve  the  declaration  in  favour  of  so 
amending  the  Constitution  as  to  prohibit  slavery  throughout  the  nation. 
When  the  people  in  revolt,  with  a  hundred  days  of  explicit  notice  that  they 
could,  within  those  days,  resume  their  allegiance,  without  the  overthrow 
of  their  institutions,  and  that  they  could  not  resume  it  afterwards,  elected 
to  stand  out,  such  amendment  to  the  Constitution  as  is  now  proposed, 
became  a  fitting  and  necessary  conclusion  to  the  final  success  of  the  Union 
cause.  Such  alone  can  meet  and  cover  all  cavils.  Now,  the  uncondi 
tional  Union  men,  North  and  South,  perceive  its  importance,  and  embrace 
it.  In  the  joint  names  of  Liberty  and  Union,  let  us  labour  to  give  it  legal 
form  and  practical  effect."  He  thus  clearly  declared  that  abolition  by  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution  was  the  "  legal  form  "  of  procedure,  which 
"  alone  can  meet  and  cover  all  cavils."  But  the  pressure  of  the  canvass 
soon  drove  him  away  from  this  position  ;  and  forced  him  to  propound  a 
project  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  unconstitutional  proceeding.  This 
project  was  interpolated  by  Mr.  Lincoln  into  the  platform  of  his  party  in  his 
notable  rescript  of  the  18th  of  July,  dated  from  the  Executive  chamber,  and 
addressed  "  To  whom  it  may  concern"  That  extraordinary  and  unique 
partisan  document  was  promulgated  under  the  following  circumstances  : 

Early  in  the  summer  of  1864,  the  Confederate  Government  had  sent,  as 
we  have  seen,  a  commission  of  intelligent  persons  to  Canada,  as  a  con 
venient  and  important  theatre  for  the  presence  of  a  judicious  agency.  The 
commission  held  no  specific  authority  themselves  to  participate  directly  in 
any  conference  with  the  Government  at  Washington  looking  to  peace.  In 
the  action  which  they  took,  they  went  no  further  than  to  propose  to  confer 
on  the  expediency  and  preliminary  conditions  of  such  a  meeting.  The 
commissioners  were  Messrs.  Clement  C.  Clay,  James  P.  Holcombe,  and 
Jacob  Thompson.  It  is  proper  to  observe  that  these  persons  were  agents 
of  the  Confederate  Executive  ;  that  their  nominations  to  any  mission  were 
never  communicated  to  the  Congress  at  Richmond ;  and  that  they  were 
paid  out  of  the  secret  service  fund.  Using  George  N.  Sanders  and  W.  C. 
Jewett  as  intermediaries,  they  exchanged  notes  with  Mr.  Horace  Greeley, 
with  a  view  to  obtain  from  President  Lincoln,  through  the  influence  of 
that  well-known  politician,  a  safe-conduct  to  the  city  of  Washington. 
This  correspondence  with  Mr.  Greeley  commenced  on  the  12th  July,  1864. 
By  the  17th  of  the  month,  the  President  seemed  to  have  consented  to  grant 
the  safe-conduct ;  and  Mr.  Greeley  had  repaired  to  Niagara,  apparently  to 
deliver  it  to  the  commissioners.  But  it  was  soon  developed  in  correspond 
ence  that  the  commissioners  had  no  particular  authority  from  their  Gov 
ernment  themselves  to  enter  upon  the  subject  of  peace  ;  and  that  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  passport,  in  terms,  implied  that  its  bearers  should  be  expressly  ac 
credited  to  his  Government  on  that  subject.  The  commissioners  could  not 
therefore  accept  or  make  use  of  the  paper.  After  various  explanations, 


570  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

another  paper  finally  came  from  Washington,  addressed  "  To  whom  it 
might  concern,"  and  declaring,  that  any  person  or  persons,  having  au 
thority  to  control  the  armies  then  at  war  with  the  United  States,  bear 
ing  a  proposition  to  treat,  which  should  "  embrace  the  restoration  of  peace, 
the  integrity  of  the  whole  Union,  and  the  abandonment  of  slavery  •  " 
should  have  safe-conduct  both  ways ;  and  their  proposition  would  be  re 
ceived  and  considered  by  the  Executive  Government  of  the  United  States. 
This  paper,  alike  with  the  others,  was  useless  to  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners,  who  neither  had  authority  to  control  the  armies  of  the  Confed 
erate  States,  nor  commission  to  treat  directly  on  terms  of  peace,  nor  dispo 
sition  to  enter  into  conference  with  a  power  indecently  and  arrogantly 
assuming  to  dictate  in  advance  the  conditions  of  negotiation.  This,  Mr. 
Lincoln  of  course  knew ;  and  it  could  not  be  pretended  that  his  "  pass 
port  "  was  offered  in  good  faith.  It  was  proposed  in  no  expectation  that 
it  would  be  accepted.  It  bore  the  ear-marks  of  a  mere  partisan  docu 
ment.  Those  who  concocted  it  felt  that  so  rude  a  rejection  as  it  gave  to 
the  overtures  for  a  conference,  would  prejudice  Mr.  Lincoln  with  the 
country,  which  was  earnestly  desirous  of  peace  ;  and  that  it  was  necessary 
to  interpose  the  popularity  of  abolition  as  an  offset  to  the  disfavour  which 
the  rejection  of  a  peace  conference  must  excite.  In  fact,  it  was  not  pre 
tended  that  the  paper  was  designed  for  any  other  than  a  campaign  pur 
pose  ;  and  the  frivolity  of  the  President's  proceeding  was  excused  on  the 
plea  that  the  object  of  the  commissioners  in  Canada,  in  opening  the  corre 
spondence,  was  to  make  capital  for  the  opposition  party  of  the  North. 
The  personal  surroundings  of  the  commissioners  in  Canada  were  referred 
to  by  the  Government  press  in  confirmation  of  the  truth  of  this  imputa 
tion.  Such  is  the  history  of  this  after-thought,  of  making  abolition  by  the 
States  in  revolt  a  condition  of  their  readmission  into  the  Union  ;  such  was 
the  manner  and  occasion  of  interpolating  this  additional  plank  in  the  plat 
form  of  the  Government  party.  The  party  itself  had  pretermitted  it  at 
Baltimore  in  June.  The  radical  spirits  had  supplied  the  omission  in  the 
bill  for  reconstructing  the  revolted  States,  which  they  had  succeeded  in 
carrying  through  Congress  on  the  3d  of  July.  The  President  had  virtually 
vetoed  this  bill,  on  the  ground,  taken  in  his  speech  accepting  the  nomina 
tion,  that  the  only  "  legal  form  "  of  abolishing  slavery  was  by  means  of 
the  Constitutional  amendment,  called  for  by  the  Baltimore  resolutions. 
What,  therefore,  the  radical  spirits  of  the  party  had  failed  to  accomplish, 
the  action  of  the  Confederate  commissioners  and  the  reputation  of  George 
Sanders  for  political  intrigue,  had  succeeded  in  achieving. 

The  National  Convention  of  the  Democratic  party  did  not  meet  until 
after  the  appearance  of  this  paper.  It  convened  at  Chicago  on  the  29th 
of  August.  Outside  of  the  Convention  there  was  a  warm  contest  between 
the  friends  of  Gen.  McClellan  and  those  who  desired  the  nomination  of  a 


THE   CHICAGO   CONVENTION.  571 

candidate  less  committed  to  the  coercive  policy,  and  less  implicated  in  the 
war.  This  struggle  did  not  turn  upon  a  sufficiently  tangible  issue  to  give 
it  importance.  As  a  Union  party,  the  great  body  of  the  opposition  party 
was  committed  to  the  war  as  the  only  practicable  means  of  preserving  and 
restoring  the  Union.  Gen.  McClellan  was  known  to  be  earnestly  desirous 
of  peace,  and  of  peace  on  the  single  and  simple  basis  of  a  restoration  of  the 
Union  under  the  Constitution  as  it  stood.  This  was  the  only  ground  on 
which  the  conservative  party  could  go  before  the  people  in  the  canvass, 
and  hope  to  succeed  in  the  election.  It  would  have  been  vain  to  expect 
success  upon  the  principles  of  the  very  few  Democrats  and  conservatives 
who  believed,  and  believed  correctly,  that  the  war  had  been  unrighteous 
and  iniquitous  in  its  leading  object,  no  less  than  in  the  manner  in  which  it 
had  been  conducted.  The  great  body  of  the  opposition  concurred  with 
Gen.  McClellan  in  the  opinion  that  secession  was  unwarrantable  and  in 
iquitous,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  resisted  by  all  the  power  of  the  Union. 
They  considered,  therefore,  that  the  war  was  righteous  in  its  object,  arid 
only  iniquitous  in  the  manner  in  which  it  had  been  prosecuted.  Reflect 
ing  these  views  held  by  the  mass  of  his  party,  and  having  no  competitor 
for  the  nomination  favoured  by  them,  he  was  nominated  with  little  if  any 
opposition  when  the  vote  came  on  in  the  body  of  the  Convention.  Mr. 
George  H.  Pendleton  was  selected  as  the  second  candidate  on  the  ticket, 
in  a  manner  altogether  nattering  and  creditable  to  that  staunch  and  con 
sistent  defender  of  the  Constitution. 

The  Convention  unanimously  adopted  a  platform  declaring  their  un 
swerving  fidelity  to  the  Union  ;  calling  for  a  convention  of  all  the  States 
looking  to  the  restoration  of  peace  on  the  basis  of  a  Federal  Union  of  all 
the  States  ;  denouncing  the  military  interference  which  had  been  practised 
in  recent  elections  in  the  Border  States  ;  declaring  that  the  aim  and  object 
of  the  Democratic  party  were  to  preserve  the  Federal  Union  and  rights 
of  the  States  unimpaired  ;  reprobating  the  system  of  usurpation,  tyranny, 
and  despotism  which  the  Administration  had  wantonly  and  systematically 
pursued  throughout  the  war ;  reprehending  the  Government's  cruel  neg 
lect  of  the  Union  prisoners  of  war ;  and  tendering  their  sympathy  and 
pledging  their  future  protection  to  the  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  army  and 
navy  of  the  United  States. 

Gen.  McClellan's  letter  of  acceptance  soon  after  appeared,  and  by  its 
pacific  tone  and  conciliatory  terms,  removed  much  of  the  objection  which 
the  extreme  peace  men  of  his  party  had  felt  to  his  nomination.  Affirming 
the  necessity  of  preserving  the  Union  entire  in  the  most  cogent  terms ;  he 
declared,  that  its  preservation  "  was  the  sole  avowed  object  for  which  the 
war  was  commenced ; "  that  "  it  should  have  been  conducted  for  that 
object  only  ; "  that  it  should  have  been  conducted  on  the  principles  of  con 
ciliation  and  compromise  ;  that  the  re-establishment  of  the  Union  must  be 


572  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

the  indispensable  condition  in  any  settlement ;  and  that  "  they  should  ex 
haust  all  the  resources  of  statesmanship  to  secure  such  a  peace,  to  re-estab 
lish  the  Union,  and  to  secure  for  the  future  the  constitutional  rights  of 
every  State.' 

Except  in  the  important  particular  that  the  Government  party  pro 
posed,  in  its  amended  platform,  to  abolish  slavery  by  an  extra-constitu 
tional  means,  there  was  no  great  difference  between  the  positions  of  these 
two  parties  in  regard  to  slavery  itself.  The  war  had,  by  the  summer  of 
1864,  rendered  the  continuance  of  the  institution  impracticable ;  though 
Gen.  Grant's  declaration,  made  as  early  as  August,  1862,  that  it  was  then 
dead  and  could  not  be  resurrected,  was  certainly  premature.  By  the 
summer  of  1864,  however,  the  fate  of  slavery  had,  in  fact,  been  sealed. 
It  probably  could  not  have  existed  if  the  Confederacy  had  been  estab 
lished.  It  could  not  have  survived  a  return  to  the  Union,  even  if  no  ob 
jection  had  been  made  to  its  new  incorporation  there.  Mr.  Davis  had 
acknowledged  that  it  was  no  longer  an  issue  between  the  North  and  South, 
several  months  before  the  rescript  of  Mr.  Lincoln  had  transpired  at  Nia 
gara.  All  thoughtful  minds  at  the  South  were  convinced  that  the  institu 
tion  had  been  too  completely  demoralized  by  the  protracted  duration  of  the 
war,  and  the  long  presence  of  liberating  armies  and  negro  brigades  in  the 
South,  to  be  any  longer  a  stable,  a  profitable,  or  a  safe  feature  in  the 
Southern  economy. 

There  was,  however,  a  grave  constitutional  point  at  issue  on  this  sub 
ject  between  the  conservative  and  the  Government  party,  notwithstanding 
that  practically  the  continuance  of  slavery  was  no  longer  in  controversy. 
The  conservatives  denied  the  right  to  impose  extra-constitutional  condi 
tions  on  the  returning  States ;  the  Government  party  asserted  this  right, 
and  asserted  it  wantonly.  In  that  point  of  view  the  issue  was  vital. 
"Why  abolish  what  was  already  doomed  to  dissolution  ?  Slavery  had 
received  its  death-blow ;  why  overleap  the  Constitution  to  cut  its 
throat  ? 

The  Radical  party  did  not  insist  upon  thrusting  its  extreme  demands  as 
issues  into  the  canvass.  They  held  a  convention  at  Cleveland,  as  early  as 
May  31,  and  proposed  a  platform  by  way  of  preserving  for  its  leading 
spirits  a  consistent  record.  They  nominated  John  C.  Fremont  for  the 
Presidency,  and  a  very  weak  and  rather  obscure  apostate  from  the  Demo 
cratic  party,  John  Cochrane,  for  the  Vice-Presidency.  All  this,  however, 
was  for  little  more  than  mere  form's  sake.  No  effort  was  made  to  draw 
off  voters  from  the  body  of  the  party,  which  supported  the  Government 
candidates  ;  and  none  were  drawn  off.  In  his  letter  of  acceptance,  Gen. 
Fremont  expressed  his  preference  for  supporting  the  candidate  who  should 
be  nominated  at  Baltimore,  if  it  could  be  done  without  violence  to  his  sense 
of  duty  and  consistency.  The  platform  differed  in  no  material  particulars 


PLATFORM   OF   THE   NORTHERN   RADICALS.  573 

from  that  of  Baltimore,  excepting  in  the  addition  of  a  passage  in  the  fifth 
resolution,  hereafter  to  be  noticed,  and  of  the  two  following  clauses,  viz. : 

"  12.  That  the  question  of  the  reconstruction  of  the  rebellious  States  belongs  to  the 
people  through  their  representatives  in  Congress,  and  not  to  the  Executive. 

"  13.  That  the  confiscation  of  the  lands  of  the  rebels,  and  their  distribution  among 
the  soldiers  and  actual  settlers,  is  a  measure  of  justice." 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  even  this  radical  platform  omits  the  imposi 
tion  of  extra-constitutional  conditions  precedent  upon  the  revolted  States 
as  requisite  to  their  readmission  into  the  Union  even  in  respect  to  the 
institution  of  slavery  ;  and  that  its  fifth  clause  relies  upon  an  amendment 
to  the  Constitution  alone,  as  a  means  of  accomplishing  the  object ;  that 
clause  being  in  these  words  : 

"5.  That  the  rebellion  has  destroyed  slavery,  and  the  Constitution  should  be 
amended  to  prohibit  its  re-establishment,  and  to  secure  to  all  men  absolute  equality 
"before  the  law.'1'1 

The  reader  will  not  fail  to  note  how  subordinate  and  obscure  a  position 
in  this  platform  was  assigned  to  the  demand  for  negro  suffrage  and  citizen 
ship,  which  afterwards  was  made  so  prominent  a  feature  in  the  policy  of 
the  Radicals. 

Thus,  if  we  look  to  the  written  terms  in  which  the  issues  of  parties 
were  made  up,  they  were  as  follows  :  The  Conservatives  demanded  recon 
struction  on  the  sole,  simple  basis  of  the  Constitution  as  it  was.  The  Gov 
ernment  party  demanded  a  formal  abolition  of  slavery  by  the  revolted 
States  as  a  condition  precedent  to  restoration.  The  Radicals  demanded — 
if  we  look  to  their  legislation  in  Congress — the  three  conditions  of  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery  by  the  States,  the  disfranchisement  of  the  leading  rebels, 
and  the  repudiation  of  the  rebel  debt ;  and  if  we  look  to  their  Cleveland 
platform,  they  demanded  that  the  whole  question  of  reconstruction  should 
be  left  to  the  people  of  the  North,  through  their  representatives  in  the 
sectional  Congress,  that  the  lands  of  the  rebels  should  be  confiscated,  and 
that  "  equality  before  the  law  "  should  be  secured  to  all  men. 

On  paper,  the  more  ready  and  natural  affiliation  of  parties  would  seem 
to  have  been  between  the  Conservative  and  the  Government  parties  ;  and 
the  real  antagonism  to  have  been  between  the  Radical  party  on  one  side, 
and  the  Government  party  and  Conservatives,  combined,  on  the  other ; 
and  this  might  possibly  have  been  the  division,  if  the  war  had  been  already 
terminated.  For  it  was  apparent,  even  as  early  as  the  summer  of  1864, 
that  such  would  really  become  the  dividing  line  of  parties,  when  the  ques 
tions  of  reconstruction  should  come  immediately  up  for  practical  decision. 
But  the  election  ante-dated  reconstruction  by  more  than  a  year ;  and  the 


574  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

contest  of  parties  turned,  of  course,  upon  the  transactions  of  the  war,  rather 
than  upon  the  conditions  and  results  of  a  peace  still  unconquered. 

The  written  issues  of  the  canvass  were  therefore  little  considered. 
The  debates  hung  and  dwelt  upon  the  usurpations  of  the  Executive,  and 
the  revolutionary  spirit,  policy,  and  purposes  of  the  party  in  power.  These 
being  the  subject  of  respective  assault  and  defence,  the  array  of  parties 
remained  as  during  the  war ;  the  Conservatives  and  Democrats  on  one 
side ;  the  Kadical  and  Administration  Republicans,  on  the  other.  The 
prosecution  and  defence  proceeded  upon  the  indictment  embodied  in  the 
fourth  resolution  of  the  Democratic  platform,  "  that  the  administrative 
usurpation  of  extraordinary  and  dangerous  powers  not  granted  by  the 
Constitution  ;  the  subversion  of  the  civil  by  military  law  in  States  not  in 
insurrection ;  the  arbitrary  military  arrests,  imprisonment,  trial  and  sen 
tence  of  American  citizens  in  States  where  civil  law  exists  in  full  force ; 
the  suppression  of  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press ;  the  denial  of  the 
right  of  asylum ;  the  open  and  avowed  disregard  of  State  Rights ;  the 
employment  of  unusual  test-oaths,  and  the  interference  with  and  denial 
of  the  right  of  the  people  to  bear  arms  in  their  defence,  are  calculated  to 
prevent  a  restoration  of  the  Union,  and  the  perpetuation  of  a  government 
deriving  its  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed." 

The  eloquence  of  the  orators  who  made  appeal  against  these  high 
crimes,  was  worthy  of  the  cause  for  which  they  stood.  Some  of  the  ora 
tions  delivered  on  the  -inspiring  theme  equal,  if  they  do  not  surpass,  in 
power  and  pathos,  any  that  were  ever  before  delivered  in  vindication  of 
human  rights  and  in  defence  of  constitutional  liberty.  No  papers,  in  the 
political  history  of  this  country,  exceed,  in  dignity  of  style,  in  power  and 
cogency  of  argument,  in  thrilling  interest  of  narration,  in  sternness  of 
arraignment,  in  intensity  of  patriotic  appeal  and  indignation,  some  of  the 
papers  that  were  put  forth  by  the  supporters  of  Gen.  McClellan.  But  the 
weight  of  power  and  patronage  proved  sufficient  to  overbalance  that  of 
patriotism  and  reason. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  go  further  into  the  details  of  the  canvass ;  and 
the  reader  will  already  anticipate  its  conclusion.  The  election  of  McClel 
lan,  of  which  there  had  been  some  probability  in  the  midsummer  of  1864, 
became  impossible,  in  view  of  the  rapid  military  successes  of  the  North, 
which  never  failed  to  draw  new  adherents  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  Administra 
tion  ;  illustrating  how  little  there  was  of  steadfast  principle  in  party 
organizations  in  the  North,  and  how  much  of  political  opposition  gave 
way  to  the  views  of  expediency  and  the  persuasions  of  time-service.  The 
•'  electoral  necessity  "  at  "Washington  for  victories  in  the  field  was  amply 
fulfilled.  The  canvass  of  1864  concluded  in  the  election  of  Abraham  Lin 
coln  by  the  vote  of  every  Northern  State,  except  Delaware,  Kentucky,  and 
New  Jersey. 


ANALYSIS   OF   THE   PRESIDENTIAL   VOTE   OF   1864.  575 

But  in  the  analysis  of  the  popular  vote  there  was  yet  some  encourage 
ment.  It  stood  twenty-two  hundred  thousand  for  Mr.  Lincoln,  eighteen 
hundred  thousand  for  Gen.  McClellan.  Although  too  small  for  victory, 
the  conservative  vote  was  much  larger  than  had  been  expected  by  reflect 
ing  men,  after  the  fall  of  Atlantaj  the  reverses  of  Hood,  and  the  success 
of  Sherman.  Under  all  the  adverse  circumstances  under  which  the  vote 
was  given,  it  was  creditable  to  the  party  which  made  the  contest,  and  en 
couraging  for  the  cause  of  constitutional  liberty.  It  was  given  just  after 
decisive  reverses  had  befallen  the  Confederate  cause,  in  the  moments  of 
victory  and  exultation,  at  a  time  the  most  propitious  that  could  have  been 
chosen  by  the  war  party,  and  the  most  unpropitious  conceivable  for  the 
peace  party.  The  election  had  occurred  just  at  the  time  when  the  idea 
prevailed  that  a  popular  vote  in  favour  of  the  war  party  would  fall  as  a 
finishing  blow  upon  the  already  exhausted  and  prostrate  Confederacy  ;  and 
that  a  vote  in  favour  of  the  peace  party  would  cheer  the  South  to  put  forth 
renewed  effort  in  the  hope  of  securing  the  most  favorable  terms  of  peace. 
The  adverse  vote  was  not,  therefore,  a  deliberate  judgment  of  a  majority 
of  the  Northern  people  against  the  principles  of  constitutional  liberty.  A 
large  number  of  the  men  who  helped  to  cast  that  majority  vote  were  actu 
ated  by  motives  of  expediency,  thinking  to  save  the  Union  first,  and  leav 
ing  it  for  a  more  eligible  occasion  to  vindicate  their  attachment  to  consti 
tutional  principles.  Thus,  the  victory  of  the  Constitution  was  postponed  ; 
and  its  triumph  reserved  for  another  and  uncertain  time. 


CHAPTEE    XXXV. 

AN  INTRIGUE  IN  EIOHMOND  AGAINST  GEN.  JOHNSTON. — EVIDENCE  OF  IT. — GEN.  BRAGG's  VISIT 
TO  ATLANTA. — REMOVAL  OF  GEN.  JOHNSTON  FROM  COMMAND. — THE  BATTLES  OF  ATLANTA. 
— ENGAGEMENTS  OF  THE  20TH,  22D,  AND  28TH  JULY. — SHERMAN'S  DESIGNS  ON  THE 
MACON  ROAD. — UNSUCCESSFUL  RAIDS  OF  STONEMAN  AND  MCCOOK. — HOOD'S  GREAT 

MISTAKE. — HE  SENDS  OFF   HIS    CAVALRY   TOWARDS    CHATTANOOGA. SHERMAN  MOVES  ON 

THE  MACON  ROAD. — DEFEAT  OF  HARDEE  AT  JONESBORO'. — HOOD  EVACUATES  ATLANTA, 
AND  RETREATS  TO  LOVEJOY's  STATION. — SHERMAN'S  OCCUPATION  OF  ATLANTA. — HIS  ORDER 

FOR    ITS    DEPOPULATION. ATROCIOUS    CHARACTER    OF    THIS     MEASURE. — THE    FALL    OF 

ATLANTA  A  SERIOUS  DISASTER   FOR  THE   CONFEDERATES. VISIT   OF   PRESIDENT  DAVIS  TO 

THE  MILITARY  LINES  IN  GEORGIA. — HIS  SPEECH   AT  MACON. — HE  BETRAYS  TO  THE  ENEMY 

THE  NEW  MILITARY  DESIGN. HOOD'S  NEW  MOVEMENT  TO  TENNESSEE. — SHERMAN  FOLLOWS 

TO  GAYLESVILLE. — HE  TURNS  BACK  AND  DETERMINES  TO  TRAVERSE  THE  STATE  OF 
GEORGIA  TO  THE  SEA. — HIS  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GRANT. — HOW  THE  ENTERPRISE  WAS 
A  PLAIN  ONE. — NO  PERIL  OR  GENIUS  IN  IT. — ERRORS  OF  THE  HOOD-DAVIS  STRATEGY. — 

HOOD'S  TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN. HE  LOSES    THE    GREAT    OPPORTUNITY    OF  THE  CAMPAIGN 

AT  SPRING  HILL. — SCHOFIELD  EFFECTS  A  RETREAT  TO  FRANKLIN. — BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN. 
— HEROIC  CONDUCT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  TROOPS. — REMARKABLE  LOSS  AMONG  THEIR 
GENERAL  OFFICERS. — BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE. — GEN.  GRANT'S  FEARS  THAT  HOOD  WOULD 
INVADE  KENTUCKY. — PROBABLE  EFFECT  OF  SUCH  A  MOVEMENT. — THE  ENEMY'S  PLAN  OF 
BATTLE. — THE  SECOND  DAY'S  FIGHT. — HOOD'S  ASSURANCE  OF  VICTORY. — A  CONFEDERATE 
BRIGADE  GIVES  WAY  BEFORE  A  SKIRMISH  LINE  OF  THE  ENEMY. — A  DISGRACEFUL  PANIC 
AND  ROUT. — HOOD  ESCAPES  ACROSS  THE  TENNESSEE  RIVER. — HIS  LOSSES. — THE  WHOLE 
SCHEME  OF  CONFEDERATE  DEFENCE  TERMINATED  WEST  OF  THE  ALLEGHANIES. 

GEN.  LEE  had  moved  from  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond,  with  an  increase 
of  reputation  at  each  stage  of  the  retreat.  It  is  curious  that  when  Gen. 
Johnston  moved  from  the  Northern  frontier  of  Georgia  to  Atlanta,  even 
with  greater  success,  he  should  not  have  experienced  similar  tokens  of  ap 
probation.  The  fact  was  that  he  was  the  subject  of  a  deep  intrigue  in 
Richmond,  to  displace  him  from  the  command  of  an  army,  whose  affec 
tions  and  confidence  he  had  never  ceased  to  enjoy  ;  and  even  while  he  was 
moving  in  the  march  from  Dalton,  his  removal  from  command  was  secretly 
entertained  in  Richmond.  There  is  a  certain  delicate  evidence  of  this, 
which  the  historian  should  not  spare.  While  the  march  referred  to  was  in 


THE  BATTLES  OF  ATLANTA.  ,  577 

progress,  a  letter  written  by  Gen.  J.  B.  Hood  to  one  who  was  supposed  to 
have  more  than  an  ordinary  concern,  an  affectionate  interest  in  his  career, 
declared  then  his  confident  anticipation  of  being  soon  elevated  from  the 
position  of  corps  commander  to  the  head  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee.  There 
was  other  evidence  of  the  intrigue  in  Richmond.  Gen.  Bragg,  the  "  mili 
tary  adviser "  of  President  Davis,  visited  Johnston  in  his  lines  around 
Atlanta  ;  never  apprised  him  that  his  visit  was  of  an  official  nature  ;  put 
together  everything  he  could  to  make  a  case  against  Johnston,  and  re 
turned  to  Richmond  with  the  alarming  report  that  he  was  about  to  give 
up  Atlanta  to  the  enemy  !  Of  this  nonsense  Gen.  Johnston  has  written  : 
"  The  proofs  that  I  intended  to  hold  Atlanta  are,  the  fact  that  under  my 
orders  the  work  of  strengthening  its  defences  was  going  on  vigorously, 
the  communication  on  the  subject  made  by  me  to  Gen.  Hood,  and  the  fact 
that  my  family  was  in  the  town.  That  the  public  workshops  were  re 
moved,  and  no  large  supplies  deposited  in  the  town,  as  alleged  by  Gen. 
Bragg,  were  measures  of  common  prudence,  and  no  more  indicated  the 
intention  to  abandon  the  place  than  the  sending  the  wagons  of  an  army  to 
the  rear,  on  a  day  of  battle,  proves  a  foregone  determination  to  abandon 
the  field." 

But  the  Presidential  fiat  was  to  go  forth  in  the  face  of  all  facts.  On 
the  night  of  the  17th  July  it  was  known  in  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  that  a 
despatch  had  been  received  from  Richmond,  removing  Johnston  from  com 
mand,  and  appointing  in  his  place  Gen.  J.  B.  Hood.  The  news  struck  a 
chill  in  the  army,  such  as  no  act  or  menace  of  the  enemy  had  ever  done. 
To  Sherman  it  was  the  occasion  of  new  spirit.  When  he  heard  that  Hood 
was  to  be  his  future  antagonist,  he  jumped  to  his  feet,  made  a  significant 
motion  around  his  forefinger,  and  exclaimed  :  "  I  know  that  fellow." 

Gen.  J.  B.  Hood  had  been  appointed  by  President  Davis  as  "  a  fighting 
General,"  and  was  prompt  to  vindicate  the  cheap  reputation  that  had  pro 
cured  for  him  such  a  command.  With  some  reinforcements  from  the 
Southwest  and  levies  of  Georgia  militia,  Gen.  Hood  had  now  under  his 
command  an  effective  force  of  forty-one  thousand  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  ten  thousand  cavalry.  With  reference  to  other  Confederate  forces  in 
the  field,  his  army  was  a  large  one,  although  it  gave  him  but  little  margin 
for  fanciful  attacks  and  useless  sacrifice  of  life. 


THE   BATTLES    OF    ATLANTA. 

As  Sherman  approached  Atlanta,  two  of  his  corps  had  swung  around 

upon   the  Augusta  road,  destroying  this  line  of  communication,  while 

Thomas  took  his  command  across  Peach  Tree  Creek,  directly  in  front  of 

the  Confederate  entrenchments.     While  the  enemy's  right  on  the  creek 

37 


578  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

was  in  marching  column.  Hood,  in  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  July,  directed 
an  attack  upon  it,  designing  to  take  advantage  of  a  gap  between  two  of 
its  divisions.  The  attack  was  led  by  Walker's  and  Bates'  divisions  of 
Hardee's  corps  ;  and  the  massed  troops,  in  admirable  order,  burst  through 
the  gap  in  the  enemy's  lines,  and  for  a  time  appeared  about  to  destroy  his 
forces  on  the  right.  But  a  double  fire  was  brought  to  bear  upon  their  lines 
alono-  the  deep  hollow  they  had  penetrated  ;  and  the  attack  was  drawn  oft' 
in  good  order,  but  after  a  half  hour  of  deadly  work,  in  which  the  killed 
and  wounded  were  counted  by  thousands.  The  loss  of^  the  enemy  was 
about  two  thousand  ;  that  of  the  Confederates  probably  twice  as  large,  as 
they  were  the  assaulting  party,  and  terribly  exposed  on  the  line  of  attack. 

Next  day,  McPherson  moved  forward,  and  established  a  line  east  and 
south  of  Atlanta,  and  within  three  miles  of  the  town.  His  command 
stretched  beyond  the  Atlanta  and  Augusta  Railroad,  which  he  had  torn 
up.  Hood  now  hastily  swung  around  Hardee's  corps,  followed  by  the 
others,  and  brought  the  bulk  of  his  army  against  McPherson.  Hardee 
moved  against  the  enemy's  extreme  left,  drove  him  from  his  works,  and 
captured  sixteen  pieces  of  artillery.  Gen.  McPherson  was  shot  dead  as  he 
rode  along  the  line.  Meanwhile,  Cheatham  attacked  the  enemy's  centre 
with  a  portion  of  his  command,  and  took  six  pieces  of  artillery.  Affairs 
looked  gloomy  for  the  enemy  ;  he  had  been  repulsed  at  several  points,  he 
had  lost  much  artillery,  and  the  stream  of  bleeding  men  going  to  the  rear 
told  how  severely  he  suffered  in  the  conflict.  But  about  this  time  the 
enemy  succeeded  in  concentrating  his  artillery,  and  Gen.  Sherman  sent 
word  to  Logan,  who  had  succeeded  McPherson,  to  mass  his  troops  in  the 
centre  and  charge.  Exhausted,  Yaste(^j  an(*  bleeding,  the  Confederate 
columns  gave  way,  abandoning  most  of  the  artillery  they  had  captured  in 
the  early  part  of  the  day.  The  attack  of  the  22d  was  like  that  of  the 
20th — one  of  the  most  reckless,  massive,  and  headlong  charges  of  the  war, 
where  immense  prices  were  paid  for  momentary  successes,  and  the  terrible 
recoil  of  numbers  gave  a  lesson  to  the  temerity  of  the  Confederate  com 
mander. 

Hood's  attempt  on  the  Federal  left  being  frustrated,  he  fell  back  to  his 
inner  line  of  works.  The  intentions  of  Sherman  appear  now  to  have  been 
to  swing  his  army  to  Hood's  extreme  right,  threatening  the  Macon  road, 
and  having  in  co-operation  a  great  cavalry  raid  upon  his  rear.  Stoneman 
was  sent  with  five  thousand  cavalry,  and  McCook  with  four  thousand  men, 
to  meet  on  the  Macon  road  near  Lovejoy's  Station,  where  they  were  to  de 
stroy  the  rail,  and  also  to  attack  and  drive  Wheeler's  command.  Stone 
man  requested  permission  to  be  allowed  to  proceed  to  Macon  to  release  the 
Federal  prisoners  confined  there.  Sherman  left  this  at  his  own  discretion, 
in  case  he  felt  he  was  able  to  do  so  after  the  defeat  of  Wheeler's  cavalry. 
But  Stoneman  did  not  fulfil  the  conditions.  He  got  down  in  front  of 


OPERATIONS   ABOUND    ATLANTA.  579 

Macon,  without  going  to  Lovejoy's,  and,  in  attempting  to  retreat,  was 
hemmed  in  by  Iverson,  and  was  himself  captured,  together  with  one  thou 
sand  of  his  men  and  two  guns.  McCook  returned  after  losing  five  hundred 
men  as  prisoners.  The  cavalry  raid  was  a  decided  failure,  or  as  Sherman 
mildly  expressed  it,  "  not  deemed  a  success." 

On  the  28th  July  Hood  made  a  partial  attack  along  the  Lickskillet 
road,  which  he  had  occcupied  with  Stewart's  and  Lee's  corps.  The  con 
flict  was  desultory  and  without  result  on  either  side.  After  five  hours  of 
action,  Hood  retired  with  a  loss  of  about  fifteen  hundred  killed  and 
wounded. 

We  have  already  noticed  that  Sherman  did  not  have  force  enough  to 
invest  Atlanta  completely.  This  was  the  great  point  in  Johnston's  calcu 
lations,  when  they  were  upset  at  Richmond  ;  for  Sherman,  reduced  to 
strategy,  would  have  found  his  master  in  the  cool  and  dexterous  Johnston, 
whereas  in  Hood  he  had  plainly  his  inferiour  to  deal  with — a  commander 
who  had  indeed  abundant  courage,  but  a  scant  brain  with  whicli  to  bal 
ance  it.  Sherman's  army  was  not  large  enough  to  encircle  Atlanta  com 
pletely,  without  making  his  lines  too  thin  and  assailable.  He  never  con 
templated  an  assault  upon  its  strong  works.  It  was  his  great  object  to  get 
possession  of  the  Macon  road,  and  thus  sever  Atlanta  entirely  from  its  sup 
plies.  It  was  not  sufficient  to  cut  the  road  by  raids ;  it  must  be  kept 
broken,  and  to  accomplish  this  it  was  clearly  necessary  to  plant  a  sufficient 
force  south  of  Atlanta. 

While  Sherman  meditated  such  a  movement,  Hood  made  the  very  mis 
take  that  would  secure  and  facilitate  it,  and  thrust  into  the  hands  of  his 
adversary  the  opportunity  he  had  waited  for.  He  sent  off  his  entire  cav 
alry  towards  Chattanooga  to  raid  on  the  enemy's  line  of  communication- — 
a  most  absurd  excursion,  since  Sherman  had  enough  provisions  accumu 
lated  this  side  of  that  place  to  last  him  until  he  could  restore  his  communi 
cations,  and  had  also  formed  a  second  base  at  Allatoona. 

Instantly,  the  Federal  cavalry  was  on  the  Macon  road.  With  his 
flanks  easily  protected,  Sherman  followed  quickly  with  his  main  army. 
On  the  31st  August,  Howard,  on  the  right,  had  reached  Jonesboro',  on  the 
Macon  road,  twenty  miles  southeast  of  Atlanta ;  Thomas,  in  the  centre, 
was  at  Couch's ;  and  Schofield,  on  the  left,  was  near  Rough-and-Ready, 
still  closer  to  Atlanta. 

Hood  had  no  alternative  now  but  to  make  a  battle  on  or  near  the  line 
of  the  Macon  road,  and  there  settle  the  fate  of  Atlanta.  He  might  have 
moved  out  of  the  city  on  the  north,  and  have  overwhelmed  what  of  Sher 
man's  army — the  Twentieth  corps — was  left  there  ;  but  he  would  then 
have  been  in  a  country  destitute  of  supplies.  He  determined  to  make  the 
battle  near  Jonesboro',  and  the  corps  of  Lee  and  Hardee  were  moved  out 
to  attempt  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  entrenched  position  he  held 


580  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

across  Flint  River.  The  attack  failed  with  the  loss  of  more  than  two  thou 
sand  men.  On  the  evening  of  the  1st  September,  the  enemy's  columns 
converged  iipon  Jonesboro',  and  Hardee's  corps,  finding  itself  about  to  be 
flanked  and  overwhelmed,  withdrew  during  the  night,  after  having  been 
cut  up  by  two  severe  engagements,  and  with  the  loss  of  eight  guns. 

That  night,  finding  his  line  of  supply  cut  off,  and  the  sum  of  his  disas 
ters  complete,  Hood  determined  to  abandon  Altanta.  He  blew  up  his 
magazines,  destroyed  all  his  supplies  that  he  could  not  remove,  consisting 
of  seven  locomotives  and  eighty-one  cars  loaded  with  ammunition,  and  left 
the  place  by  the  turnpike  roads.  He  moved  swiftly  across  the  country 
towards  Macon.  The  next  morning  Sherman  moved  south  to  catch  the 
retreating  army,  but  at  Lovejoy's,  two  miles  beyond  Jonesboro',  he  found 
Hood  strongly  entrenched,  arid,  abandoning  the  pursuit,  returned  to 
Atlanta. 

Sherman  announced :  "  Atlanta  is  ours,  and  fairly  won."  His  army 
entered  the  city  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  September,  and  the  successful 
commander  rode  through  the  streets  to  his  headquarters  without  parade  or 
ostentation.  He  declared  that  his  army,  wearied  by  an  arduous  campaign, 
needed  rest,  and  that  he  proposed  to  give  it  an  interval  of  repose  within 
the  defences  of  Atlanta.  But  the  period  of  military  inaction  was  to  be 
employed  in  launching  measures  of  the  most  extraordinary  cruelty  against 
the  non-combatant  people  of  Atlanta.  Gen.  Sherman  was  the  author  of 
the  sentiment,  "  War  is  cruelty,  and  you  cannot  refine  it,"  which  was 
caught  up  in  the  Northern  newspapers  as  a  bit  of  very  sententious  and  ele 
gant  philosophy,  when,  in  fact,  denying,  as  it  did,  that  war  had  any  law 
of  order  or  amelioration,  it  was  a  mere  plagiarism  from  the  bloody  and 
detestable  code  of  the  savage.  This  extraordinary  doctrine  Sherman  at 
once  proceeded  to  put  in  practice  by  depopulating  Atlanta,  and  driving 
from  their  homes  thousands  of  helpless  women  and  children.  It  was  the 
most  cruel  and  savage  act  of  the  war.  Butler,  the  tyrant  of  New  Orleans, 
had  only  banished  registered  enemies.  Sherman  issued  a  sweeping  edict, 
covering  all  the  inhabitants  of  a  city,  and  driving  them  from  their  homes 
to  wander  as  strangers,  outcasts  and  exiles,  and  to  subsist  on  charity. 
Gen.  Hood,  while  he  received  the  exiles  within  his  lines,  took  occasion  to 
protest,  writing  to  Gen.  Sherman  himself  of  the  measure  his  sinister  mind 
had  devised  :  "  It  transcends  in  studied  and  ingenious  cruelty  all  acts  ever 
before  brought  to  my  attention  in  the  dark  history  of  war."  But  all  pro 
tests  were  unavailing.  In  vain  the  Mayor  of  Atlanta  had  pointed  out  to 
Gen.  Sherman  that  the  country  south  of  the  city  was  crowded  already  with 
refugees,  and  without  houses  to  accommodate  the  people,  and  that  many  had 
no  other  shelter  but  what  they  might  find  in  churches,  and  out-buildings  ; 
that  among  the  exiles  were  many  poor  women  in  an  advanced  state  of 
pregnancy ;  that  the  consequences  would  be  woe,  horrour,  and  suffering, 


581 

which  could  not  be  described  by  words.  Sherman  was  inexorable.  He 
affected  the  belief  that  Atlanta  might  again  be  rendered  formidable  in  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates,  and  resolved,  in  his  own  words,  "  to  wipe  it 
out."  The  old  and  decrepit  were  hunted  from  their  homes ;  they  were 
packed  into  railroad  cars ;  tottering  old  age  and  helpless  youth  were 
crowded  together ;  wagons  were  tilled  with  wrecks  of  household  goods ; 
and  the  trains  having  deposited  their  medley  freight  at  Rough-and-Ready, 
the  exiles  were  then  left  to  shift  for  themselves. 

Tlie  fall  of  Atlanta  was  a  terrible  blow  to  the  Southern  Confederacy  ; 
a  reanimation  of  the  North  ;  the  death  of  "  the  peace  party  "  there  ;  the 
date  of  a  new  hope  of  the  enemy  and  of  a  new  prospect  of  subjugation. 
"  On  that  day,"  said  the  Richmond  Examiner,  "  McClellan's  nomination 
fell  still-born,  and  an  heir  was  born  to  the  Abolition  dynasty.  On  that 
day,  peace  waved  those  '  white  wings,'  and  fled  to  the  ends  of  the  morn 
ing.  On  that  day,  calculations  of  the  war's  duration  ceased  to  be  the 
amusements  even  of  the  idle."  President  Davis  had  declared,  when  he 
removed  Johnston,  that  "  Atlanta  must  be  held  at  all  hazards."  It  was 
the  most  important  manufacturing  centre  in  the  Confederacy  ;  it  was  the 
key  to  the  network  of  railroads  extending  to  all  portions  of  the  Gulf 
States  ;  it  was  "  the  Gate  City  "  from  the  north  and  west  to  the  southeast ; 
it  was  an  important  depot  of  supplies,  and  commanded  the  richest  granaries 
of  the  South.  Such  was  the  prize  of  the  enemy. 

The  catastrophe  moved  President  Davis  in  Richmond,  and  mortified 
the  vanity  that  had  so  recently  proclaimed  the  security  of  Atlanta  under 
the  command  of  Hood.  He  determined  to  visit  Hood's  new  lines,  to  plan 
with  him  a  new  campaign,  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  Atlanta,  and  to 
take  every  possible  occasion  to  raise  the  hopes  and  confidence  of  the  peo 
ple.  It  is  remarkable  that  the  visits  of  the  Confederate  President  to  the 
armies  were  always  the  occasions  of  some  far-fetched  and  empirical  plan 
of  operations,  and  were  always  accompanied  with  vapours  and  boasts  that 
unduly  exalted  the  public  mind.  Mr.  Davis  never  spoke  of  military  mat 
ters  without  a  certain  ludicrous  boastfulness,  which  he  maintained  to  the 
last  event  of  the  war.  It  was  not  swagger  or  affectation  ;  it  was  the  sin 
cere  vagary  of  a  mind  intoxicated  with  conceit  when  occupied  with  a  sub 
ject  where  it  imagined  it  found  its  forte,  but  where  in  fact  it  had  least 
aptitude.  Mr.  Davis,  as  a  military  commander  or  adviser,  was  weak,  fan 
ciful,  to  excess,  and  much  too  vain  to  keep  his  own  counsels.  As  he 
travelled  towards  Hood's  lines,  he  made  excited  speeches  in  South  Caro 
lina  and  Georgia.  At  Macon  he  declared  that  Atlanta  would  be  recov 
ered  ;  that  Sherman  would  be  brought  to  grief ;  and  that  this  Federal 
comminander  "  would  meet  the  fate  that  befell  Napoleon  in  the  retreat 
from  Moscow."  These  swollen  assertions,  so  out  of  character,  were  open 
advertisements  to  the  enemy  of  a  new  plan  of  operations.  It  appears 


582  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

that  the  unfortunate  vanity  of  President  Davis  completely  betrayed  him. 
Keferring  to  this  period,  Gen.  Grant  writes  :  "  During  this  time  Jefferson 
Davis  made  a  speech  in  Macon,  Georgia,  which  was  reported  in  the  papers 
of  the  South,  and  soon  became  known  to  the  whole  country,  disclosing  the 
plans  of  the  enemy,  thus  enabling  Gen.  Sherman  to  fully  meet  them.  He 
exhibited  the  weakness  of  supposing  that  an  army  that  had  been  beaten 
and  fearfully  decimated  in  a  vain  attempt  at  the  defensive  could  success 
fully  undertake  the  offensive  against  the  army  that  had  so  often  de 
feated  it." 

The  new  offensive  movement  of  Hood,  advised  by  President  Davis, 
was  soon  known  to  the  country.  Not  satisfied  with  the  revelation  at 
Macon,  President  Davis  addressed  the  army,  and  more  plainly  announced 
the  direction  of  the  new  campaign.  Turning  to  Cheatharn's  division  of 
Tennesseeans,  he  said  :  "  Be  of  good  cheer,  for  within  a  short  while  your 
faces  will  be  turned  homeward,  and  your  feet  pressing  Tennessee  soil." 

On  the  24th  September,  Hood  commenced  the  new  movement  to  pass 
to  Sherman's  rear  and  to  get  on  his  line  of  communications  as  far  as  Ten 
nessee.  The  first  step  was  to  transfer  his  army,  by  a  flank  movement, 
from  Lovejoy's  Station  on  the  Macon  Railroad,  to  near  Newman  on  the 
West  Point  road.  The  significance  of  this  might  have  escaped  the  enemy, 
but  for  the  incautious  language  of  President  Davis  at  Macon,  which  at 
once  gave  rise  to  the  supposition  that  this  movement  was  preliminary  to 
one  more  extensive.  Sherman  was  instantly  on  the  alert,  sending  his 
spare  forces,  wagons,  and  guns,  to  the  rear,  under  Gen.  Thomas,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  sending  Schofield,  Newton,  and  Corse  to  take  up  different 
points  in  the  rear  of  Atlanta. 

On  the  27th,  Hood  moved  towards  the  Chattahoochee.  On  the  1st 
October,  the  enemy  made  a  reconnoissance  towards  Newman,  and  discov 
ered  that  Hood  had  crossed  the  Chattahoochee  River  on  the  29th  and  30th 
of  September.  Sherman  immediately  followed. 

On  the  5th  October, 'when  Hood's  advance  assaulted  Allatoona,  Sher 
man  was  on  Kenesaw  Mountain,  signalling  to  the  garrison  at  Allatoona, 
over  the  heads  of  the  Confederates,  to  hold  out  until  he  relieved  them. 
Hood  moved  westward,  and,  crossing  the  Etowah  and  Oostanaula  Rivers 
by  forced  marches,  attacked  Dalton  on  the  12th,  which  was  surrendered. 
Passing  through  the  gap  of  Pigeon  Mountain,  he  entered  Lafayette  on  the 
15th.  From  this  place  he  suddenly  moved  south  to  Gadsden,  Alabama, 
where  he  rejoined  his  trains,  to  make  his  fatal  march  towards  Nashville. 

Sherman  waited  some  time  at  Gaylesville,  until  he  became  fully  as 
sured  of  the  direction  taken  by  Hood ;  and  then  abruptly  prepared  to 
abandon  the  pursuit,  return  to  Atlanta,  and  mobilize  his  army  for  a  inarch 
across  the  broad  State  of  Georgia  to  the  sea.  His  calculation  was  a  plain 
and  precise  one.  Gen.  Thomas,  at  Nashville,  could  collect  troops  from  the 


FOLLY   OF   THE   DAVIS-HOOD   CAMPAIGN.  583 

whole  Department  of  the  Mississippi ;  Rosecrans  was  able  to  send  him 
reinforcements  from  Missouri  ;  Sherman  detached  two  corps — the  Fourth 
and  Twenty-third — to  move,  by  the  way  of  Chattanooga,  to  the  relief  of 
Thomas  ;  and  there  was  little  doubt  that  with  this  force  Thomas  could  hold 
the  line  of  the  Tennessee,  or  if  Hood  forced  it,  would  be  able  to  concen 
trate  and  give  a  good  battle.  Sherman  was  left  in  command  of  four  army 
corps,  and  two  divisions  of  superb  cavalry — a  force  of  about  sixty-thou 
sand  men.  When  Hood  wandered  off  in  the  direction  of  Florence,  Sherman 
was  left  free  to  complete  his  arrangements,  and  there  was  nothing  to  inter 
fere  with  his  grand  projected  march  to  the  sea.  In  October,  Gen.  Grant,  who 
was  watching  closely  the  development  of  the  wretched  Davis-Hood  device 
to  find  some  compensation  for  the  loss  of  Atlanta,  telegraphed  Sherman  : 
"  If  you  were  to  cut  loose,  I  do  not  believe  you  would  meet  Hood's  army, 
but  would  be  bushwhacked  by  all  the  old  men,  little  boys,  and  such  rail 
road  guards  as  are  still  left  at  home."  "With  nothing,  of  course,  to  fear 
from  such  an  opposition,  Sherman  telegraphed  his  determination  "  to 
make  a  wreck  of  the  road,  and  of  the  country  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta, 
including  the  latter  city  ;  send  back  all  his  wounded  and  worthless,  and  with 
his  effective  army,  move  through  Georgia,  smashing  things,  to  the  sea." 

The  inarch  would,  indeed,  have  been  a  perilous  enterprise,  if  there  had 
been  any  considerable  force  in  Sherman's  front,  or  on  his  flanks.  As  it 
was,  nothing  opposed  his  march  to  the  sea,  and  he  had  simply  to  pass 
through  the  gate- ways  which  the  stupidity  of  the  Davis-Hood  campaign 
had  left  open.  It  is  amusing  to  the  student  of  history  to  have  such  a 
plain  march  entitled  a  grand  exploit,  when  it  was  only  a  question  of  so 
many  miles  motion  a  day.  Sherman  knew  very  well  that  there  was  noth 
ing  to  oppose  him  ;  he  knew  that  the  Confederacy  had  been  compelled  to 
throw  all  its  fighting  power  on  its  frontiers,  for  Grant  had  told  him  "  it 
was  but  an  egg-shell ;  "  he  knew  that  the  conscription  had  exhausted  the 
mteriour ;  he  knew  that  the  country  he  wrould  traverse  was  peopled 
with  non-combatants,  women,  and  children  ;  he  knew  that  this  country 
abounded  with  supplies,  which  the  difficulties  of  transportation  had  with 
held  from  Richmond.  He  simply  proposed  to  take  plain  advantage  of 
these  circumstances,  and  march  to  the  sea-board.  There  was  no  genius  in 
this  ;  no  daring  ;  it  was  merely  looking  the  situation  in  the  face.  It  is 
said  that  had  Sherman  failed  he  would  have  been  put  down  as  one  of  the 
greatest  charlatans  of  the  age.  But  there  was  no  chance  of  failure  when 
there  was  nothing  to  dispute  the  march.  If,  indeed,  he  had  attempted  the 
movement  with  a  Confederate  army  in  his  front  or  on  his  flank,  it  is  highly 
probable  that  the  adventure  would  have  taken  rank  with  his  movement 
in  1862  on  Yicksburg,  the  greatest  fiasco  of  the  war,  and  his  experiment 
with  "  the  strategic  triangle  "  in  1863,  a  piece  of  charlatanism  and  of  dis 
ordered  execution  that  should  have  decided  his  reputation. 


584:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

It  liad  been  the  original  design  of  the  enemy  to  hold  Atlanta,  and  by 
getting  through  to  the  west,  with  a  garrison  left  on  the  southern  railroads 
leading  east  and  west  through  Georgia,  to  effectually  sever  the  east  from 
the  west.  In  other  words  it  was  proposed  in  the  great  campaign  of  1864 
to  repeat  the  experiment  of  bisection  of  the  Confederacy,  first  accomplished 
when  the  enemy  gained  possession  of  the  Mississippi  River.  It  was  calcu 
lated  of  course  to  tight  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea,  and  that  the  second  stroke 
of  bisection  would  be  accomplished  by  cutting  through  a  hostile  array.  In 
originating  with  Hood  the  movement  north  of  Atlanta,  President  Davis 
simply  saved  the  enemy  all  the  trouble  he  had  contemplated,  cleared  the 
way  of  opposition  and  opened  a  plain  and  unencumbered  way  to  his  ori 
ginal  design,  with  an  invitation  to  execute  it  without  fear  and  at  leisure. 

We  must  leave  here  the  story  of  Sherman's  march  to  follow  the  erratic 
campaign  of  Hood.  When  the  latter  was  ready  to  leave  Florence,  Sher 
man  was  far  on  his  way  on  his  march  towards  Savannah  ;  and  the  country 
beheld  with  amazement  the  singular  spectacle  of  two  antagonistic  armies, 
both  at  once  acting  on  the  offensive,  day  after  day  marching  away  from 
each  other,  and  moving  diametrically  apart.  To  appreciate  what  insanity 
must  have  inspired  such  a  campaign  on  the  Confederate  side,  we  may 
remark  the  utter  want  of  compensation  in  the  two  movements.  Even 
throwing  out  of  consideration  the  great  fact  that  Hood's  movement  to  the 
north  uncovered  Georgia  and  left  her  undefended  to  the  sea,  while  itself 
encountered  a  second  army  of  the  enemy,  yet  even  if  Hood  was  successful, 
an  invasion  of  Northern  territory  would  be  no  possible  equivalent  for  that 
of  the  South,  where  the  ravage  and  loss  of  material  resources  might  be 
vital ;  and  even  in  the  least  circumstance,  the  season  of  the  year,  the  Con 
federate  troops,  badly  clothed  and  shod,  were  put  at  the  disadvantage  of 
marching  northward,  while  the  enemy  sought  the  genial  clime  of  a  South 
ern  latitude. 


On  the  20th  November,  Gen.  Hood  commenced  to  move  his  army  from 
Northern  Alabama  to  Tennessee.  He  pushed  forward  as  if  to  cut  off 
Schofield's  retreat  from  Pulaski ;  this  Federal  commander  having  taken 
position  there,  with  the  greater  part  of  two  army  corps,  and  an  aggregation 
of  fort-garrisons  from  the  surrounding  country,  while  Thomas  remained  at 
Nashville.  Schofield  fearing  that  his  position  was  about  to  be  flanked, 
abandoned  Pulaski,  and  attempted  by  a  forced  march  to  reach  Columbia. 

The  want  of  a  good  map  of  the  country,  and  the  deep  mud  through 
which  the  army  marched,  prevented  Hood  overtaking  the  enemy  before 
he  reached  Columbia ;  but  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  of  November  the 


585 

Confederate  army  was  placed  in  position  in  front  of  his  works  at  that  place. 
During  the  night,  however,  the  enemy  evacuated  the  town,  taking  position 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  town, 
which  was  considered  quite  strong  in  front.  Late  in  the  evening  of  the 
28th  November,  Gen.  Forrest,  with  most  of  his  command,  crossed  Duck 
River,  a  few  miles  above  Columbia,  and  Hood  followed  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  20th,  with  Stewart's  and  Cheatham's  corps,  and  Johnson's 
division  of  Lee's  corps,  leaving  the  other  divisions  of  Lee's  corps  in  the 
enemy's  front  at  Columbia.  The  troops  moved  in  light  marching  order,  the 
object  being  to  turn  the  enemy's  flank  by  marching  rapidly  on  roads 
parallel  to  the  Columbia  and  Franklin  pike,  at  or  near  Spring  Hill,  and  to 
cut  off  that  portion  of  the  enemy  at  or  near  Columbia. 

The  enemy,  discovering  the  intentions  of  the  Confederates,  began  to  re 
treat  on  the  pike  towards  Spring  Hill.  About  4  p.  M.,  Hood's  infantry 
forces,  Cheatham  in  the  advance,  commenced  to  come  in  contact  with  the 
enemy,  about  two  miles  from  Spring  Hill,  through  which  place  the  Colum 
bia  and  Franklin  pike  runs.  The  enemy  was  at  this  time  moving  rapidly 
along  the  pike,  with  some  of  his  troops  on  the  flank  of  his  column  to  pro 
tect  it.  Cheatliam  was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once,  vigorously, 
and  get  possession  of  this  pike.  He  made  only  a  feeble  and  partial  attack, 
failing  to  reach  the  point  indicated.  The  great  object  of  Gen.  Hood  was 
to  possess  himself  of  the  road  to  Franklin,  and  thus  cut  off  the  enemy's 
retreat.  Though  owing  to  delays  the  signal  opportunity  to  do  this  had 
passed  at  daylight,  there  was  yet  a  chance  of  dealing  the  enemy  a  heavy 
blow.  Stewart's  corps  and  Johnson's  division  were  arriving  upon  the  field 
to  support  the  attack.  Stewart  was  ordered  to  move  his  corps  beyond 
Cheatham's,  and  place  it  across  the  road  beyond  Spring  Hill.  He  did  not 
succeed  in  getting  the  position  he  desired,  owing  to  some  misunderstand 
ing  of  orders,  and,  night  falling,  he  went  into  bivouac.  About  midnight, 
ascertaining  that  the  enemy  was  moving  in  great  confusion — artillery 
wagons  and  troops  intermixed — Gen.  Hood  sent  instructions  to  Cheatham 
to  advance  a  heavy  line  of  skirmishers  against  him,  and  still  further  im 
pede  and  confuse  his  march.  This  was  not  accomplished.  The  enemy 
continued  to  move  along  the  road  in  hurry  and  confusion,  within  hearing, 
nearly  all  the  night.  Thus  was  lost  a  great  opportunity  of  striking  the 
enemy,  and  his  line  of  retreat  secured  in  the  face  of  the  Confederates 
without  a  battle. 

Much  of  the  disaster  that  was  now  to  ensue  in  his  campaign  Gen. 
Hood  attributed  to  the  fact  that  "  some  of  his  Generals  had  failed  him  at 
Spring  Hill."  There  was  nothing  left  now  but  to  pursue  the  enemy.  At 
daylight  Hood's  army  followed  as  fast  as  possible  towards  Franklin, 
Stewart  in  the  advance,  Cheatham  following,  and  Lee  with  the  trains, 
moving  from  Columbia  on  the  same  road.  The  Confederates  pursued  the 


586  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

enemy  rapidly,  and  compelled  him  to  burn  a  number  of  his  wagons.  He 
made  a  feint  as  if  to  give  battle  on  the  hills  about  four  miles  south  of 
Franklin,  but  as  soon  as  Hood's  forces  began  to  deploy  for  the  attack,  and 
to  flank  him  on  his  left,  he  retired  slowly  to  Franklin.  Gen.  Hood  had 
learned  from  despatches  captured  at  Spring  Hill,  from  Thomas  to 
Schofield,  that  the  latter  was  instructed  to  hold  that  place  till  the  position 
at  Franklin  could  be  made  secure,  indicating  the  intention  of  Thomas  to 
hold  Franklin  and  his  strong  works  at  Murfreesboro'.  Thus  Hood  knew 
that  it  was  all-important  to  attack  Schofield  before  he  could  make  himself 
strong,  and  that  if  he  should  escape  at  Franklin,  he  would  gain  his  works 
about  Nashville.  The  nature  of  the  position  was  such  as  to  render  it  inex 
pedient  to  attempt  any  farther  flank  movement,  and  he  therefore  deter 
mined  toattack  the  enemy  in  front,  and  without  delay. 


BATTLE    OF   FRANKLIN. 

On  the  30th  November  Stewart's  corps  was  placed  in  position  on  the 
right,  Cheatham's  on  the  left,  and  the  cavalry  on  either  flank,  the  main 
body  on  the  right  under  Forrest.  Johnson's  division  of  Lee's  corps  also 
became  engaged  on  the  left  during  the  action.  The  line  advanced  at 
4  P.  M.,  with  orders  to  drive  the  enemy,  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet, 
into  or  across  the  Big  Harpeth  Kiver,  while  Gen.  Forrest,  if  successful, 
was  to  cross  the  river  and  attack  and  destroy  his  trains  and  broken  col 
umns.  The  troops  moved  forward  most  gallantly  to  the  attack.  They 
carried  the  enemy's  line  of  hastily-constructed  works  handsomely.  They 
then  advanced  against  his  interiour  line,  and  succeeded  in  carrying  it  also, 
in  some  places.  Here  the  engagement  was  of  the  fiercest  possible  charac 
ter.  The  Confederates  came  on  with  a  desperation  and  disregard  of  death, 
such  as  had  been  shown  on  few  battle-fields  of  the  war.  A  Northern 
writer  says  :  "  More  heroic  valour  was  never  exhibited  by  any  troops  than 
was  shown  here  by  the  rebels."  The  devoted  troops  were  mowed  down  by 
grape  and  canister.  Many  of  them  were  killed  entirely  inside  of  the  works. 
The  brave  men  captured  were  taken  inside  the  enemy's  works  on  the  edge 
of  the  town.  The  struggle  lasted  till  near  midnight,  when  the  enemy 
abandoned  his  works  and  crossed  the  river,  leaving  his  dead  and  wounded. 

It  is  remarkable  that  in  this  hard-fought  battle  the  Confederates  used 
no  artillery  whatever ;  Gen.  Hood's  explanation  being  that  he  was  re 
strained  from  using  that  terrible  arm  "  on  account  of  the  women  and  chil 
dren  remaining  in  the  town."  Victory  had  been  purchased  at  the  price 
of  a  terrible  slaughter.  Hood's  total  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prison 
ers  was  4,500.  Among  the  killed  was  Maj.-Gen.  P.  B.  Cleburne,  Brig.- 
Gens.  John  Adams,  Strahl  and  Granbury ;  while  Maj.-Gen.  Brown,  Brig.- 


BATTLE   OF  NASHVILLE.  587 

Gens.  Carter,  Manigault,  Quarles,  Cockrell,  and  Scott  were  wounded,  and 
Brig.-Gen.  Gordon  captured. 


BATTLE   OF   NASHVILLE. 

The  next  morning  Gen.  Hood  advanced  upon  Nashville,  where  Scho- 
field  had  retreated,  and  where  Thomas  lay  with  his  main  force.  He  laid 
siege  to  the  town  on  the  2d  December,  closely  investing  it  for  a  fortnight. 
The  opinion  long  prevailed  in  the  Confederacy  that  in  this  pause  and  the 
operations  of  siege,  Hood  made  the  cardinal  mistake  of  his  campaign  ;  and 
that  if  he  had  taken  another  course,  and  struck  boldly  across  the  Cumber 
land,  and  settled  himself  in  the  enemy's  communications,  he  would  have 
forced  Thomas  to  evacuate  Nashville,  and  fall  back  towards  Kentucky. 
This  was  the  great  fear  of  Gen.  Grant.  That  high  Federal  officer,  in  his 
report  of  the  operations  of  1864,  has  written  :  "  Before  the  battle  of  Nash 
ville  I  grew  very  impatient  over,  as  it  appeared  to  me,  the  unnecessary 
delay.  This  impatience  was  increased  upon  learning  that  the  enemy  had 
sent  a  force  of  cavalry  across  the  Cumberland  into  Kentucky.  I  feared 
Hood  would  cross  his  whole  army  and  give  us  great  trouble  here.  After 
urging  upon  Gen.  Thomas  the  necessity  of  immediately  assuming  the  offen 
sive,  I  started  west  to  superintend  matters  there  in  person.  Reaching 
Washington  city,  I  received  Gen.  Thomas's  despatch  announcing  his  attack 
upon  the  enemy,  and  the  result  as  far  as  the  battle  had  progressed.  I  was 
delighted.  All  fears  and  apprehensions  were  dispelled." 

On  the  night  of  the  14th  December,  Thomas  decided  upon  a  plan  of 
battle,  which  was  to  make  a  feint  on  Hood's  right  flank,  while  he  massed 
his  main  force  to  crush  in  Hood's  left,  which  rested  on  the  Cumberland, 
and  where  the  cover  of  the  Federal  gunboats  might  be  made  available. 
The  brunt  of  the  action  did  not  fall  until  evening,  when  the  enemy  drove 
in  the  Confederate  infantry  outposts  on  the  left  flank.  Hood,  however, 
quickly  ordered  up  troops  from  his  right  to  stay  the  reversed  tide  of  bat 
tle  ;  and  the  remainder  of  the  day  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  sweeping 
the  Confederate  entrenchments  with  artillery  fire,  while  here  and  there  his 
infantry  attempted,  in  vain,  to  find  a  weak  spot  in  their  lines. 

Under  cover  of  the  night  Hood  re-formed  his  line,  and  in  the  morning 
was  found  in  position  along  the  Overton  Hills,  some  two  miles  or  so  to  the 
rear  of  his  original  line.  The  new  position  was  a  strong  one,  running  along 
the  wooded  crests  of  closely-connecting  hills  ;  while  the  two  keys  to  it  were 
the  Granny  White  and  Franklin  pikes,  leading  to  Franklin,  Columbia,  Pu- 
laski,  and  so  down  the  country  to  the  Tennessee  River.  Thomas'  over 
whelming  numbers  enabled  him  to  throw  heavy  columns  against  Hood's 
left  and  centre.  But  every  attack  of  the  enemy  was  repulsed.  It  was 


588  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

four  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  the  day  was  thought  to  be  decided  for  the 
Confederates,  when  there  occurred  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  incidents 
of  the  war.  It  is  said  that  Gen.  Hood  was  about  to  publish  a  victory 
along  his  line,  when  Finney's  Florida  brigade  in  Bates'  division,  which 
was  to  the  left  of  the  Confederate  centre,  gave  way  before  the  skirmish 
line  of  the  enemy  !  Instantly  Bates'  whole  division  took  the  panic,  and 
broke  in  disorder.  The  moment  a  small  breach  was  thus  made  in  the 
Confederate  lines,  the  whole  of  two  corps  unaccountably  and  instantly  fled 
from  their  ditches,  almost  without  firing  a  gun.  It  was  a  disgraceful 
panic  ;  muskets  were  abandoned  where  they  rested  between  the  logs  of  the 
breastworks  ;  and  everything  that  could  impede  flight  was  thrown  away  as 
the  fugitives  passed  down  the  Granny  White  and  Franklin  pikes,  or  fled 
wildly  from  the  battle-field.  Such  an  instance  of  sudden,  unlooked-for, 
wild  retreat,  the  abandonment  of  a  victory  almost  won,  could  only  have 
happened  in  an  army  where  thorough  demoralization,  the  consequence  of 
long,  heavy,  weary  work,  and  of  tremendous  efforts  without  result — in 
short,  the  reaction  of  great  endeavours  where  success  is  not  decided,  al 
ready  lurked  in  the  minds  of  troops,  and  was  likely  to  be  developed  at  any 
time  by  the  slightest  and  most  unimportant  circumstance. 

Fifty  pieces  of  artillery  and  nearly  all  of  Hood's  ordnance  wagons  were 
left  to  the  enemy.  His  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  disgracefully  small ; 
and  it  was  only  through  want  of  vigour  in  Thomas'  pursuit  that  Hood's 
shattered  and  demoralized  army  effected  its  retreat.  Forrest's  command, 
and  Walthal,  with  seven  picked  brigades,  covered  the  retreat.  The  situa 
tion  on  the  Tennessee  River  was  desperate ;  Hood  had  no  pontoon  train, 
and  if  he  had  been  pressed,  would  have  been  compelled  to  surrender ; 
but  as  it  was,  Thomas'  great  error  in  resting  upon  his  victory  at  Nash 
ville  enabled  a  defeated  Confederate  army  to  construct  bridges  of  timber 
over  the  Tennessee  River,  while  the  Federal  gunboats  in  the  stream  were 
actually  kept  at  bay  by  batteries  of  32-pounders. 

Hood  succeeded  in  escaping  across  the  Tennessee,  but  only  with  a  rem 
nant  of  the  brilliant  force  he  had  conducted  across  the  river  a  few  weeks 
before,  having  lost  from  various  causes  more  than  ten  thousand  men,  half 
of  his  Generals,  and  nearly  all  of  his  artillery.  Such  was  the  disastrous 
issue  of  the  Tennessee  campaign,  which  put  out  of  existence,  as  it  were, 
the  splendid  army  that  Johnston  had  given  up  at  Atlanta,  and  terminated 
forever  the  whole  scheme  of  Confederate  defence  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 


CHAPTER    XXXVI. 

CAMPAIGN"  OF  1864    IN    THE    VALLEY    OF    VIRGINIA. —  ITS    GENERAL   DESIGN    AS    A    STRATEGIC 
AUXILIARY  TO  RICHMOND. — THE  NEW  COMMAND    OF    THE    ENEMY   IN  THE  VALLEY. — GEN. 

SHERIDAN  AND  HIS  FORCES. VIEWS  OF  GEN.  LEE    ABOUT    THE  RELIEF  OF   RICHMOND. — HE 

DETACHES  A  FORCE  UNDER  GEN.  ANDERSON  TO  CO-OPERATE  WITH  EARLY,  AND  "  STIR  UP  " 
THE  ENEMY  ACROSS  THE  POTOMAC. ANDERSON  AND  FITZHUGH  LEE  FIND  EARLY  FALL 
ING  BACK  AND  ASKING  FOR  REINFORCEMENTS. THE  ENEMY  DECLINES  A  BATTLE  AND 

RETREATS  TO  HARPER'S  FERRY. —STRENGTH  AND  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE 
FORCES  ABOUT  WINCHESTER. — NEARLY  A  MONTH  CONSUMED  IN  MARCHING  AND  COUNTER 
MARCHING. — GEN.  LEE  ORDERS  THE  RETURN  OF  GEN.  ANDERSON  WITH  KERSHAW's  DIVI 
SION. — BATTLE  OF  WINCHESTER. GEN.  GRANT  ADVISES  SHERIDAN  TO  "  GO  IN." EARLY's 

SMALL  FORCE.— HOW  IT  CAME  TO  BE  SCATTERED    OVER  TWENTY-TWO   MILES. — RAMSEUR's 

DIVISION  SUSTAINS  THE    ATTACK   UNTIL   THE    OTHER    CONFEDERATE    FORCES    COME   UP. 

GORDON  DRIVES  THE  ENEMY. — HAPPY    STROKE    OF  A    CONFEDERATE  BATTERY. — THE  ENE- 

MY'S  INFANTRY  ROUTED. HIS  CAVALRY    GET    ON  THE  CONFEDERATE  LEFT  AND  REAR  AND 

CHANGE  THE  DAY. — RETREAT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. BATTLE    OF  FISHER?S  HILL. HOW 

GEN.  EARLY'S  POSITION  WAS  DEFECTIVE  HERE. — HE  is  FLANKED  ON  THE  LEFT,  AND  RE 
TREATS  UP  THE  VALLEY. THE  ENEMY  PURSUES  TO  8TAUNTON. SHERIDAN'S  BARBAROUS 

ORDER  TO  DEVASTATE  THE  VALLEY. HE  BURNS  "  TWO  THOUSAND  BARNS." — REFLECTIONS 

UPON  THIS  OUTRAGE. — BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CREEK. EARLY,  REINFORCED,  RESUMES  THE 

CAMPAIGN,  AND  DETERMINES  TO  MAKE  A  SURPRISE. — A  FLANKING  COLUMN  OF  CONFED 
ERATES  CROSSES  THE  NORTH  FORK  OF  THE  SHENANDOAH. TWO  CORPS  OF  THE  ENEMY 

BROKEN  AND  PUT  TO  ROUT. — THE  ENEMY  PURSUED  THROUGH  MIDDLETOWN. — HOW  THE 
VIGOUR  OF  PURSUIT  WAS  LOST. — THE  FOOLISH  NEWSPAPER  STORY  ABOUT  GEN.  SHERIDAN'S 
SUDDEN  APPEARANCE  ON  THE  FIELD. — THE  CONFEDERATES  DEMORALIZED  BY  PILLAGE. — 
THE  ENEMY  MAKES  A  COUNTER- CHARGE,  AND  SWEEPS  EVERYTHING  BEFORE  HIM. — GEN. 
EARLY'S  ATTEMPT  TO  PUT  THE  CENSURE  OF  THE  DISASTER  UPON  HIS  MEN. — HOW  FAR  HE 
WAS  RESPONSIBLE  FOR  IT. — TRUE  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  PAUSE  IN  HIS  VICTORY. — REMOVAL 

OF  GEN.  EARLY  FROM  COMMAND. — GEN.  LEE'S  GENEROUS  LETTER  TO  HIM. HOW  THE 

NEWSPAPERS  BERATED  HIM.  — THE  CHARGE  OF  HABITUAL  INTOXICATION. REVIEW  OF  THE 

VALLEY  CAMPAIGN. — ITS  EFFECT  DECISIVE  UPON  RICHMOND. — REMARK  OF  A  CONFEDERATE 
GENERAL. — SOME  VIEWS  OF  THE  MANAGEMENT  AND  DISPOSITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE 
CAVALRY  FORCES  IN  VIRGINIA. 

To  Hood's  unbroken  series  of  disasters  there  was  a  companion-piece  in 
another  part  of  the  Confederacy  :  a  small  theatre  of  the  war,  but  an  im 
portant  and  a  conspicuous  one,  associated  with  many  heroic  memories  of 


590  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

the  Confederacy.  This  other  chapter  of  misfortune  was  Early's  campaign 
in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  In  this  campaign  a  Confederate  General  never 
won  a  victory ;  lost  all  of  his  artillery,  and  brought  an  army  to  practical 
annihilation.  But,  although  like  Hood's  misadventure  in  these  particu 
lars,  the  campaign  in  the  Valley  is  to  be  judged  by  another  standard; 
while  marked  by  some  undoubted  misconduct,  it  had  much  to  excuse  its 
impotent  conclusion,  and  it  was,  in  some  respects,  what  its  commander 
designated  it — "  a  forlorn  hope." 

"We  have  already  pointed  out  the  first  object  of  Early's  operations  in 
the  Valley  as  substantially  the  same  which  took  Stonewall  Jackson  there 
in  1862 — the  diversion  of  a  portion  of  the  Federal  forces  from  the  great 
arena  of  combat  in  the  lowlands.  It  was  also  important  to  save,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  harvests  of  the  Shenandoah  and  to  protect  the  Gordonsville 
road  ;  but  the  campaign  was  mainly  a  strategic  auxiliary  to  the  operations 
around  Petersburg  and  Richmond. 

In  consequence  of  the  threatening  attitude  of  Early,  who  since  he  had 
moved  across  the  Potomac,  had  been  able  to  send  a  raiding  party  into 
Pennsylvania,  which  on  the  30th  July  burned  Chambersburg,  Gen.  Grant 
had  been  unable  to  return  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  corps  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  On  the  contrary,  he  saw  the  necessity  of  an  enlarged  cam 
paign  to  protect  the  frontiers  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  "What  was 
called  the  Middle  Department,  and  the  Departments  of  West  Virginia, 
Washington,  and  Susquehanna,  were  constituted  into  one  under  the  com 
mand  of  Gen.  Sheridan.  The  new  commander  was  a  man  of  a  coarse, 
active  nature,  excessive  animal  spirits,  and  an  intensely  combative  temper 
ament — an  antagonist  not  to  be  despised,  although  he  had  shown  no  dis 
tinct  military  genius,  and  was  only  remarkable  in  the  war  for  the  execu 
tion  of  single  tasks  indicated  to  him  by  his  superiours.  He  had  an  amount 
of  force  which  was  all  he  could  have  asked  for  as  a  condition  of  success. 
In  addition  to  the  column  of  active  operation  under  his  command,  consist 
ing  of  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  corps,  and  the  infantry  and  cavalry  of 
West  Virginia  under  Crook  and  Averill,  there  were  assigned  to  him  two 
divisions  of  cavalry  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  Torbert  and 
Wilson.  His  effective  infantry  strength  was  about  thirty-five  thousand 
muskets  ;  and  his  great  superiority  in  cavalry  was  very  advantageous  to 
him,  as  the  country  was  very  open  and  admirably  adapted  to  the  opera 
tions  of  this  arm. 

Gen.  Lee  had  long  been  persuaded  that  he  was  too  weak  to  attack  the 
enemy's  works  in  his  front  at  Petersburg.  Information  derived  from 
trusty  scouts  and  from  reconnoissances  pushed  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy's 
flanks,  proved  the  impracticability  of  turning  them.  The  only  resource 
was  strategy,  and  that  obviously  the  renewal  of  the  Valley  campaign,  to 
develop,  if  possible,  a  crisis  in  the  situation  about  Petersburg  and  Richmond. 


591 

On  the  4th  August,  1864,  an  order  was  issued  from  the  headquarters 
of  Lee's  army,  dircting  the  march  of  Kershaw's  division  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  and  Fitzhugli  Lee's  division  of  cavalry  to  Culpepper  Court-house. 
Lieut.-Gen.  R.  H.  Anderson  was  then  commanding  the  troops  of  Gen. 
Longstreet  (the  latter  being  still  incapacitated  from  duty  by  the  wound 
received  in  the  battles  of  the  Wilderness),  and  was  assigned  to  command 
the  expedition.  The  force  ordered  for  it  was  withdrawn  from  Grant's 
front  on  the  south  side  of  the  James ;  Fitzhugh  Lee's  division  being  on  the 
Confederate  right  in  the  vicinity  of  Ream's  Station  on  the  Weldon 
Railroad. 

Gen.  Lee's  intentions,  as  explained  to  his  officers,  were  to  send  the 
troops  of  Kershaw  and  Fitzhugh  Lee  to  co-operate  with  Early  in  move 
ments  on  the  Maryland  border,  or  even  in  the  State  itself.  He  wanted  the 
enemy  in  Washington  and  vicinity  "  stirred  up,"  as  much  as  possible,  and 
the  impression  produced  that  our  force  was  a  large  one.  Upon  reaching 
Culpepper  Court-House,  Fitzhugh  Lee  was  to  go  down  towards  Alexan 
dria  and  make  a  demonstration  in  that  vicinity,  and  if  his  information  as 
to  the  disposition  of  the  enemy's  forces  and  strength  warranted,  Anderson 
and  he  were  to  cross  the  Potomac  about  Leesburg,  Early  crossing  higher 
up,  and  all  to  act  in  concert  against  Washington  or  produce  that  impres 
sion.  Gen.  Anderson  was  sent  on  the  expedition,  though  only  one  divi 
sion  of  his  corps  was  detached,  because  the  enemy  knew  he  commanded  in 
Longstreet's  place,  and  the  idea  might  be  taken  that  the  whole  corps  was 
en  route.  It  was  possible,  then,  that  Grant  might  send  a  corresponding 
force  to  counteract  the  movement,  in  which  case  the  remainder  of  the  corps 
could  be  sent,  and  the  demonstration  continued  on  a  larger  scale.  In  brief, 
Gen.  Lee  explained  that  he  was  going  to  try  to  manoeuvre  Grant  from  the 
front  of  Richmond.  The  other  alternative  which  presented  itself  was  that 
under  the  supposition  that  Lee  had  weakened  himself  by  a  whole  corps, 
Grant  might  be  induced  to  attack,  which  Gen.  Lee  conceived  to  be  at  that 
time  a  very  desirable  object. 

No  sooner  had  Anderson's  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  troops  reached  Culpep 
per  Court-House,  than  a  despatch  was  received  from  Early,  stating  that,  in 
consequence  of  the  concentration  of  a  large  force  in  his  front,  whilst  in  the 
lower  part  of  the  Yalley,  he  had  been  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  strong 
position  at  Fisher's  Hill,  and  asking  for  reinforcements.  This  necessitated 
the  movement  of  Anderson  and  Lee  at  once  to  his  support ;  and  their 
march  was  at  once  directed  to  Front  Royal,  by  the  way  of  Chester  Gap  in 
the  Blue  Ridge.  They  arrived  at  Front  Royal  on  the  15th  August.  Early 
was  ascertained  to  be  at  Strasburg,  some  ten  miles  distant.  The  road  con 
necting  the  two  places  and  running  to  the  base  of  the  Massanutton  or  Fort 
Mountain,  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  who  was  also  in  large  force  in 
Early's  front. 


592  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Under  orders  from  Gen.  Anderson,  Fitzhugh  Lee  started  at  daybreak 
on  the  morning  of  tlie  16th  to  communicate  with  Gen.  Early  and  arrange 
a  combined  attack  upon  the  enemy.  The  direct  road  being  in  possession 
of  the  enemy,  he  was  obliged  to  cross  the  Massanutton  Mountain,  consist 
ing  at  that  point  of  three  separate  ranges  in  close  proximity  to  each  other, 
very  precipitous  and  rough.  He  was  accompanied  by  only  one  staff 
officer,  and  they  were  obliged  to  ride  mules,  so  steep  was  the  ascent.  He 
arrived  at  Gen.  Early's  head-quarters  that  afternoon,  arranged  many  de 
tails,  and  riding  all  night,  was  back  with  Gen.  Anderson  by  daylight  on 
the  17th.  But  the  enemy  had  already  commenced  to  retreat,  and  the  op 
portunity  for  striking  a  blow  was  lost.  He  had  discovered  Gen.  Ander 
son's  position  at  Front  Royal  during  the  morning  of  the  16th,  and  had 
taken  possession  with  a  cavalry  force  of  "  Guard  Hill,"  a  commanding 
position  on  the  north  bank  of  the  north  fork  of  the  Shenandoah  River,  op 
posite  the  town.  Gen.  Anderson,  fearing  that  the  force  occupying  it  would 
be  increased,  and  the  position  fortified,  attacked  the  enemy  during  the 
afternoon  of  the  16th  with  Wickham's  brigade  of. Lee's  division,  supported 
by  Wofford's  infantry  brigade.  After  quite  a  spirited  contest,  the  posses 
sion  of  the  hill  was  secured  by  the  Confederates.  Early  in  the  morning 
of  the  17th,  Anderson  and  Lee  commenced  their  advance,  and  followed  up 
the  enemy's  retreat.  At  Winchester  they  united  with  Gen.  Early's  col 
umn,  driving  the  Federal  troops  through  the  town,  capturing  one  piece  of 
artillery  and  some  prisoners.  The  pursuit  was  continued  the  next  day, 
and  the  enemy  driven  to  his  stronghold  at  Harper's  Ferry. 

The  Confederate  force  now  consisted  of  the  infantry  divisions  of  Rodes, 
Ramseur,  Gordon  and  Warton,  and  Lomax's  division  of  Valley  cavalry 
under  Early  and  Breckinridge,  and,  under  Anderson.  Kershaw's  division  of 
infantry,  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  division  of  cavalry.  It  happened  that  An 
derson  and  Early  had  been  both  made  lieutenant-generals  the  same  day, . 
though  the  former  was  the  ranking  officer  in  consequence  of  being  the 
senior  major-general.  Their  last  commissions  being  of  same  date,  and 
Anderson  being  in  Early's  department,  he  did  not  like  to  assume  command 
of  the  whole  force.  Early  being  his  junior,  could  not  command  it,  and  a 
very  anomalous  state  of  things  resulted,  producing  much  confusion  and 
want  of  co-operation. 

Instead  of  a  campaign  being  inaugurated,  which,  from  its  offensive 
character  and  operations  would  compel  more  troops  to  be  drawn  from 
Grant's  army  to  counteract  it,  and  which  was  contemplated  by  Gen.  Lee. 
nothing  was  done.  Nearly  a  month  elapsed  in  marching  and  counter 
marching  in  the  vicinity  of  Charlestown,  productive  of  no  results.  Gen. 
Lee,  perceiving  at  last  that  nothing  was  likely  to  be  accomplished,  directed 
Anderson,  unless  something  of  importance  was  in  contemplation,  to  move 
back  with  Kershaw's  division  to  Culpepper  Court-House,  where  he  would 


BATTLE    OF    WINCHESTER.  593 

be  in  a  position  to  be  transported  to  him  in  case  he  decided  to  carry  out  a 
movement  against  the  enemy  in  front  of  Petersburg,  then  under  consider 
ation. 

Accordingly,  on  the  15th  September  Anderson  moved  off  with  Ker 
shaw's  division  en  route  to  Culpepper.  Early  was  then  in  the  vicinity  of 
"Winchester,  having  moved  back  for  convenience  of  supplies,  after  the  ene 
my  had  been  driven  to  the  river.  Sheridan  was  between  Charlestown  and 
Berryville,  with  his  advance  covering  the  latter  place.  The  cavalry  pickets 
of  the  two  armies  were  only  a  few  miles  apart. 


BATTLE   OF   WINCHESTER. 

The  month  of  August  and  the  fore  part  of  September  had  been  con 
sumed  in  desultory  and  apparently  uncertain  operations.  Notwithstanding 
his  great  superiority  in  force,  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  unwilling  to  risk 
a  general  engagement,  the  result  of  which  might  be  to  lay  open  to  the  Con 
federates  the  States  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  before  another  army 
could  be  interposed  to  check  them.  But  this  excessive  caution  gradually 
wore  off ;  the  aggressive  temper  of  Sheridan  asserted  itself  against  Grant's 
timidity  ;  and  the  latter  commander  has  since  declared  in  an  official  paper, 
rather  ineleganly,  and  with  that  taste  for  slang  which  seems  to  charactert- 
ize  the  military  literature  of  the  North  :  "  Gen.  Sheridan  expressed  sucli 
confidence  of  success,  that  I  saw  there  were  but  two  words  of  instruction 
necessary — '  Go  in.' ' 

But  there  appear  to  have  been  especial  reasons  for  Sheridan's  confi 
dence.  The  effective  strength  of  Gen.  Early,  reduced  by  the  return  of 
Kershaw's  division  to  the  Petersburg  lines,  was  about  eighty-five  hundred 
muskets,  three  battalions  of  artillery  and  less  than  three  thousand  cavalry. 
The  latter  were  mostly  armed  with  Enfield  rifles,  without  pistols  or  sabres, 
and  were  but  a  poor  match  for  the  brilliant  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  whose 
arms  and  equipments  were  complete. 

The  day  after  Kershaw's  departure,  Early  disposed  his  army  as  fol 
lows  :  Kamseur's  division  of  infantry  (a  very  small  one,  some  fifteen  hun 
dred  muskets),  Lee's  division  of  cavalry,  under  Wickham  (Gen.  Fitzhugh 
Lee  having  been  placed  in  command  of  all  the  cavalry),  were  at  Winches 
ter.  Wharton's  division  of  infantry  (a  small  one)  and  Lomax's  cavalry 
were  about  Stephenson's  Depot,  some  five  miles  from  Winchester  on  the 
railroad.  Rodes'  and  Gordon's  divisions,  in  charge  of  Gen.  Early  himself,, 
were  marched  to  JVIartinsburg,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  up  again  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  reported  to  have  been  repaired  since  the 
Confederates  had  last  visited  it.  Martinsburg  is  about  twenty-two  miles 
from  Winchester.  From  the  situation  of  the  two  armies  it  will  be  seen. 
38 


594  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

that  Sheridan,  besides  being  in  position  almost  on  Early's  flank,  was,  by 
the  way  of  White  Post,  nearer  the  Yalley  turnpike,  Early 's  line  of  com 
munication,  than  a  greater  portion  of  the  Confederate  troops,  with  the  ad 
vantage  of  coming  out  in  rear  of  Early's  right  at  Winchester.  Sheridan 
saw  the  opportunity  offered :  Kershaw,  with  his  large  division  gone,  and 
the  remaining  troops  stretched  out  for  twenty-two  miles.  He  decided,  of 
course,  to  attack,  and  commenced  moving  up  with  the  intention  of  seizing 
and  occupying  Winchester  before  Early  could  retrace  his  steps.  On  the 
afternoon  and  night  of  the  18th  he  began  his  movement  from  Berryville, 
eleven  miles  from  Winchester. 

Gen.  Early  left  Martinsburg,  though  in  ignorance  of  the  enemy's  move 
ment,  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  and  encamped  Gordon  and  Rodes'  divi 
sions  that  night  in  the  vicinity  of  Bunker's  Hill,  some  twelve  miles  from 
Winchester. 

By  daylight  on  the  19th  the  Confederate  pickets  had  been  driven  in, 
and  the  enemy's  cannon  were  thundering  at  Ramseur's  little  band,  drawn 
up  beyond  the  town  of  Winchester.  Lee's  cavalry  division  was  soon  in 
position  on  Ramseur's  left,  and  the  battle  began.  Never  did  men  fight 
better,  for  they  sustained  the  repeated  and  furious  assaults  of  an  enemy 
immensely  their  superiour,  and  alone  maintained  the  contest  until  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  when  the  advance  of  Rodes'  division  made  its  ap 
pearance.  Rodes'  troops  were  hastily  thrown  into  action,  and  their  com 
mander  soon  after  killed.  Gordon  arrived  next,  and  went  in  on  our  ex 
treme  left.  Wharton,  in  command  of  Breckinridge's  old  division,  arrived 
last,  though  nearer  to  Winchester  than  the  other  two.  It  had  been  holding 
in  check  two  divisions  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  under  Torbert  at  Stephenson's 
depot,  which  had  been  sent  around  towards  that  place  for  the  purpose  of  re 
tarding  the  march  of  the  troops  hastening  to  the  relief  of  Winchester. 

A  portion  of  Lomax's  division  arrived  with  Breckenridge,  the  remainder 
having  previously  come  up  ;  and  with  the  greater  part  of  Lee's  division  of 
cavalry  were  transferred  to  the  extreme  right  and  placed  opposite  Wilson's 
cavalry  to  prevent  it  from  swinging  around  and  getting  possession  of  the 
turnpike  in  rear  of  Winchester. 

Gordon,  previous  to  Breckenridge's  arrival,  had  driven  the  enemy  by  a 
most  gallant  charge  in  line  of  battle,  but  going  too  far,  had  been  driven 
back  in  turn.  A  battery  of  six  guns,  supported  by  a  brigade  of  cavalry, 
had  been  placed  on  Gordon's  extreme  left.  It  allowed  the  enemy's  ad 
vancing  lines  to  pass  it,  their  right  almost  brushing  it,  so  close  did  it  march 
to  its  position.  The  battery  was  concealed  under  the  edge  of  a  hill. 
Hardly  had  the  Federal  lines  got  beyond  it  than  its  intrepid,  adventurous 
commander,  Major  Breathed,*  ordered  the  guns  to  be  placed  in  battery 

*  Of  this  officer,  whose  reputation  for  daring  was  known  throughout  the  armies  of  Virginia,  and 
of  whom  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee  says,  "  he  was  the  most  recklessly  brave  man  I  ever  knew,"  there  is 


BATTLE   OF   WINCHESTER.  595 

upon  the  crest  of  the  hill.  In  a  few  minutes,  a  most  destructive  and  un 
expected  tire  was  poured  into  the  enemy's  ranks.  It  was  something  more 
than  an  enfilading  fire.  The  Federal  line  of  battle  was  soon  broken  by  it. 
Gordon  seized  the  opportunity,  turned,  and  charged ;  and  the  retreat  of 
the  enemy  soon  degenerated  into  a  rout.  There  appeared  now  but  little 
doubt  that  the  day  was  for  the  Confederates. 

But  at  this  time  the  enemy's  reserve  infantry,  the  greater  part  of 
Crook's  Corps  (the  Eighth),  made  its  appearance,  prolonging  their  extreme 
right.  Gordon's  successful  advance  was  stopped,  for  fear  his  flank  was 
endangered.  Breckinridge's  troops,  coining  up  at  this  time,  were  placed 
in  opposition  to  Crook,  and  on  Gordon's  left ;  but  his  flank  was  very  much 
overlapped  by  the  superiour  numbers  of  Crook. 

The  movement  which  placed  Breckinridge  in  line  of  battle  to  confront 
Crook,  freed  the  enemy's  two  cavalry  divisions,  Merritt's  and  Averill's, 
under  Torbert.  Their  line  was  formed  on  Crook's  right,  in  the  shape  of  a 
semi-circle,  and  completely  environed  the  Confederate  left  and  rear.  Every 
man  on  the  Confederate  side  was  closely  engaged.  A  few  hundred  cav 
alry,  and  a  small  regiment  of  infantry,  under  Col.  Patton,  withdrawn  from 
fighting  in  Crook's  front,  stayed  for  a  little  time  the  heavy  movement  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry.  But  it  was  impossible  to  hold  it  in  check.  The 
country  was  open  ;  every  movement  of  the  enemy  was  discernible  on  the 
Confederate  left ;  and  yet  there  were  no  troops  available  to  counteract  what 

an  authentic  incident,  related  by  his  commander,  connected  with  Lee's  early  battles  on  the  Rapi- 
dan. 

Of  this  incident  Fitzhugh  Lee  writes:  ",Maj.  Jas.  Breathed,  commanding  my  horse  artillery,  by 
my  order  placed  a  single  gun  in  position  on  a  little  knoll,  as  we  were  falling  back,  disputing  the 
enemy's  advance  towards  Spottsylvania  Court-house.  We  knew  the  enemy's  infantry  were  march 
ing  in  column  through  a  piece  of  woods,  and  the  object  was  to  fire  upon  the  head  of  the  column,  as 
it  debouched,  to  give  the  idea  that  their  further  advance  would  again  be  contested,  and  to  compel 
them  to  develop  a  line  of  battle  with  skirmishers  thrown  out,  &c.  The  delay  which  it  was  hoped 
to  occasion  by  such  demonstration  was  desirable  in  order  to  increase  the  chances  of  our  infantry, 
then  marching  by  another  and  parallel  route  to  the  Court-house.  Under  Maj.  B's  personal  super 
intendence,  shells  were  thrown,  and  burst  exactly  in  the  head  of  the  column  as  it  debouched.  The 
desired  effect  was  obtained  ;  the  head  of  the  enemy's  advance  was  scattered,  and  it  was  only  with 
some  difficulty  a  line  of  battle  with  skirmishers  in  its  front  was  formed  to  continue  the  advance. 
I  was  sitting  on  my  horse  near  Breathed,  and  directed  him  to  withdraw  his  gun,  but  he  was  so 
much  elated  with  his  success  that  he  begged  to  be  allowed  to  give  the  enemy  some  more  rounds. 
He  fired  until  their  line  got  so  close  that  you  could  hear  them  calling  out,  "  Surrender  that  gun,  you 
rebel  son  of  a  b — h."  Breathed's  own  horse  had  just  been  shot.  The  cannoneers  jumped  on  their 
horses,  expecting  of  course  the  gun  to  be  captured,  and  retreated  rapidly  down  the  hill.  B.  was 
left  alone.  He  Umbered  the  gun  up,  and  jumped  on  the  lead  horse.  It  was  shot  from  under  him. 
Quick  as  lightning  he  drew  his  knife,  cut  the  leaders  out  of  the  harness,  and  sprang  upon  a  swing 
horse.  It  was  also  shot  from  under  him  just  as  he  was  turning  to  get  into  the  road.  He  then 
severed  the  harness  of  the  swing  horse,  jumped  upon  one  of  the  wheel  horses,  and  again  made  the 
desperate  trial  for  life.  The  ground  was  open  between  the  piece  and  woods  ;  the  enemy  had  a 
full  view  of  the  exploit ;  and  Breathed  at  last  dashed  off  unharmed,  almost  miraculously  escaping 
through  a  shower  of  bullets." 


596  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

was  now  the  decisive  movement  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  The  Confederate 
left  was  completely  turned  ;  the  enemy  was  let  in  on  the  rear  of  the  re 
mainder  of  the  line ;  and  the  Confederate  infantry,  which  had  so  long 
withstood  fourfold  odds,  now  pressed  heavily  in  front  by  the  enemy's  in 
fantry,  and  on  the  right  by  his  cavalry,  was  compelled  to  give  way  under 
the  combined  assault,  and  at  last  broke  in  confusion,  retiring  from  the  field 
and  through  Winchester,  with  the  enemy  in  pursuit. 

In  this  battle  Gen.  Early  lost  twenty-five  hundred  prisoners  and  five 
pieces  of  artillery.  But  in  this  battle  there  had  been  a  surpassing  display 
of  courage  in  the  men  who  had  held  their  ground  so  long  against  the 
swarming  forces  of  the  enemy.  It  is  quite  certain  that  up  to  the  moment 
when  he  put  his  cavalry  in  motion  against  the  Confederate  left,  Sheridan 
had  been  virtually  defeated.  Not  until  the  enemy's  cavalry  advanced  on 
the  Martinsburg  road,  attained  the  Confederate  rear,  and  charged  them  in 
flank  and  rear,  was  there  the  least  wavering.  It  is  true  that  from  that 
moment  the  action  was  lost.  Early's  line  gave  way  in  confusion  ;  his  ar 
tillery  was  fought  to  the  muzzle  of  the  guns,  but  could  do  nothing,  and 
that  night  the  Confederate  forces  were  in  full  retreat  up  the  Yalley. 


Gen.  Early  retired  to  Fisher's  Hill,  near  Strasburg,  a  position  overlook 
ing  the  north  branch  of  the  Shenandoah  River,  and  protected  on  the  west 
by  the  North  Mountain.  This  position  has  been  described  as  a  very  de 
fensible  one,  indeed  the  strongest  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia.  But  a  Con 
federate  officer,  who  has  ably  reviewed  the  campaign,  remarks  :  "  When 
Early  took  up  a  position  on  the  great  range  of  hills  above  Strasburg,  and 
waited  to  be  attacked,  he  committed  an  error  under  the  circumstances, 
which  the  General  himself,  at  this  day,  would  probably  acknowledge.  The 
ground  there  is  unsuitable  to  receive  an  attack  upon,  unless  the  force  stand 
ing  on  the  defensive  is  strong  enough  to  reach  from  mountain  to  moun 
tain.  Gen.  Jackson  is  said  to  have  expressed  this  opinion,  and  it  is  certain 
that  he  never  made  a  stand  there.  Gen.  Early  did  so,  and  was  flanked  on 
the  left." 

On  the  22d  October,  Sheridan  formed  his  force  for  a  direct  attack  on 
Early's  position,  while  Torbert's  cavalry  moved  by  the  Luray  Valley  to 
gain  Newmarket,  twenty  miles  in  Early's  rear,  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 
While  making  a  feint  of  an  attack  in  front,  a  corps  of  infantry  was  sent 
around  to  Early's  left,  resting  on  the  North  Mountain,  flanked  it,  attacked 
it  in  rear,  and  drove  it  from  its  entrenchments.  The  whole  Confederate 
line  was  easily  disrupted,  and  Early  retired  in  great  disorder,  losing  eleven 
pieces  of  artillery.  Happily  his  line  of  retreat  was  secured,  as  Torbert  had 


GEN.  SHERIDAN'S  DEVASTATIONS.  597" 

been  held  in  check  at  Milford  by  a  small  division  of  Confederate  cavalry, 
under  Gen.  "Wickham. 

The  retreat  was  continued  to  the  lower  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  Gen. 
Early  had  lost  half  his  army,  and  it  was  supposed  that  his  career  was  now 
at  an  end.  Sheridan  pushed  the  pursuit  to  Staunton  and  the  gaps  of  the 
Blue  Eidge  ;  but,  before  returning  to  Strasburg,  and  taking  position  on  the 
north  side  of  Cedar  Creek,  this  Federal  commander  resolved  upon  an  act 
of  barbarism,  competing  with  the  worst  reputations  of  the  war.  He  de 
termined  to  devastate  the  upper  portion  of  the  Valley  as  he  abandoned  it. 
This  ruthless  measure  was  not  confined  to  the  destruction  of  the  crops,  pro 
visions,  and  forage ;  mills  were  burned,  farming  implements  were  de 
stroyed,  and  a  wanton  vengeance  was  inflicted  upon  the  country  for  many 
years  to  come.  Gen.  Sheridan  wrote  from  Strasburg,  as  if  he  were  com 
memorating  a  great  deed,  instead  of  writing  down  a  record  of  imperish 
able  infamy  :  "  In  moving  back  to  this  point,  the  whole  country,  from  the 
Blue  Eidge  to  the  North  Mountain,  has  been  made  entirely  untenable  for 
a  rebel  army.  I  have  destroyed  over  two  thousand  barns  filled  with  wheat 
and  hay  and  farming  implements  ;  over  seventy  mills  filled  with  flour  and 
wheat ;  have  driven  in  front  of  the  army  over  four  thousand  head  of  stock, 
and  have  killed  and  issued  to  the  troops  not  less  than  three  thousand  sheep. 
This  destruction  embraces  the  Luray  Yalley  and  the  Little  Fort  Yalley,  as 
well  as  the  main  valley." 

Of  this  and  other  like  atrocities  of  the  enemy,  there  has  been  attempted 
a  very  weak  excuse,  to  the  effect  that  if  the  private  property  of  the  inhabit 
ants  of  the  Confederacy  had  not  been  destroyed,  it  might  have  been  con 
verted  to  the  uses  of  the  belligerent  Government,  and  have  helped  to  sus 
tain  it.  Once  for  all,  it  may  be  said  that  this  excuse  excludes  every  senti 
ment  of  humanity  in  war,  and  may  be  logically  carried  to  the  last  extremi 
ties  of  savage  warfare.  Some  time  ago  a  great  indignation  was  awakened 
in  Northern  newspapers,  when  a  Northern  officer  justified  his  putting  to 
death  some  children  belonging  to  a  hostile  Indian  tribe  on  the  ground 
that,  if  they  had  not  been  killed,  they  would  have  grown  up  to  be  men  and 
chiefs,  to  fight  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  But  the  logic  of  this  was 
unimpeachable,  quite  as  sound  as  that  which  justified  the  outrages  of  pri 
vate  property  and  deeds  of  devastation  and  horrour,  committed  by  such 
men  as  Sheridan  and  Sherman.  There  are  some  things,  even  in  war, 
which  are  to  be  done,  or  to  be  left  undone,  without  regard  to  consequences. 
Modern  war  is  not  based  upon  logic ;  it  is  not  merely  a  question  of  how 
much  ruin  may  be  done  ;  it  is  not  simple  "  cruelty,"  as  Sherman  defined 
it  to  the  mayor  of  Atlanta  ;  it  recognizes  certain  claims  of  humanity  and 
indicates  a  class  of  outrages  for  which  no  selfish  reason  is  commensurate. 
A  writer  of  authority,  treating  of  the  law  of  nations,  says  :  "  When  the 
French  armies  desolated,  with  fire  and  sword,  the  Palatinate  in  1674,  and 


598  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

again  in  1689,  there  was  a  general  outcry  throughout  Europe  against  such 
a  mode  of  carrying  on  war ;  and  when  the  French  minister  Louvois  alleged 
that  the  object  in  view  was  to  cover  the  French  frontier  against  the  inva 
sion  of  the  enemy,  the  advantage  which  France  derived  from  the  act  was 
universally  held  to  be  inadequate  to  the  suffering  inflicted,  and  the  act 
itself  to  be  therefore  unjustifiable." 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAE  CREEK. 

Having  received  reinforcements,  Gen.  Early  returned  to  the  Valley  in 
October.  These  reinforcements  consisted  of  one  division  of  infantry  (Ker- 
shaw's),  numbering  twenty-seven  hundred  muskets,  one  small  battalion  of 
artillery,  and  about  six  hundred  cavalry,  which  about  made  up  the  Con 
federate  losses  at  Winchester  and  Fisher's  Hill.  On  the  9th  October, 
Rosser's  cavalry,  which  had  hung  on  Sheridan's  rear,  was  attacked  on  the 
Strasburg  pike,  while  a  division  of  cavalry,  moving  by  a  back  road,  took 
him  in  flank.  In  this  affair  the  enemy  took  eleven  pieces  of  artillery  and 
several  hundred  prisoners.  On  the  18th  October,  Early  was  again  at 
Cedar  Creek,  between  Strasburg  and  "Winchester.  He  had  less  than  ten 
thousand  men,  and  about  forty  pieces  of  artillery.  His  force  was  inade 
quate  for  open  attack,  and  his  only  opportunity  was  to  make  a  surprise. 
The  enemy  was  posted  on  a  line  of  low  hills,  the  Eighth  corps  on  the  left, 
the  Nineteenth  corps  in  the  centre,  and  the  Sixth  corps  on  the  right,  some 
what  in  rear  and  in  reserve.  Early's  dispositions  for  attack  were  to  make 
a  feint  with  light  artillery  and  cavalry  against  the  enemy's  right,  while  the 
bulk  of  his  forces  marched  towards  the  left  where  the  Sixth  corps  was 
posted. 

The  movement  commenced  a  little  past  midnight.  Whilst  demonstra 
tions  were  made  against  the  Federal  right,  whence  the  sounds  of  musketry 
already  announced  a  fight  on  the  picket  line,  the  flanking  columns  of  the 
Confederates  toiled  along  seven  miles  of  rugged  country,  crossing  the  north 
fork  of  the  Shenandoah  by  a  ford  about  a  mile  to  the  east  of  the  junction 
of  Cedar  Creek  with  that  stream.  The  march  was  performed  in  profound 
silence.  Many  places  had  to  be  traversed  by  the  men  in  single  file,  who 
occasionally  had  to  cling  to  bushes  on  the  precipitous  sides  of  the  moun 
tain  to  assist  their  foothold.  At  dawn  the  flanking  column  was  across  the 
ford  :  Gordon's  division  in  front,  next  Ramseur's,  and  Pegram's  in  reserve. 
A  heavy  fog  yet  favoured  them.  The  enemy's  pickets  had  not  yet  taken 
the  alarm  ;  some  of  them  had  reported  that  they  heard  a  heavy,  muffled 
tramp  and  rustling  through  the  underbrush,  but  no  attention  was  paid 
to  a  supposed  fancy,  and  no  reconnoissance  was  sent  out.  Early  had 
brought  his  column,  unperceived.  to  the  rear  of  the  left  flank  of  the  Fed- 


BATTLE  OF  CEDAR  CKEEK.  599 

eral  force  ;  and  it  remained  now  but  to  close  in  upon  the  enemy,  and  fight 
rapidly. 

The  surprise  was  complete.  The  Eighth  corps  was  unable  to  form  a 
line  of  battle,  and  in  five  minutes  was  a  herd  of  fugitives.  Many  of  the 
men  awoke  only  to  find  themselves  prisoners.  The  Nineteenth  corps  was 
soon  involved  in  the  rout.  The  valorous  Confederates  pressed  on,  driving 
the  whole  Federal  left  and  centre,  slaying  many  of  the  enemy  in  their 
camps,  capturing  eighteen  pieces  of  artillery,  fifteen  hundred  prisoners, 
small  arms  without  number,  wagons,  camps,  everything  on  the  ground. 

The  retreat  of  the  enemy  was  now  a  general  one,  the  Sixth  corps  doing 
what  it  could  to  cover  it.  At  Middletown  an  attempt  was  made  to  form 
a  line  of  battle ;  but  the  Confederates  threatened  a  flank  movement,  got 
possession  of  the  town,  and  put  the  enemy  on  what  was  supposed  to  be  his 
final  retreat  to  "Winchester. 

The  vigour  of  the  pursuit  was  lost  here.  The  fire  and  flush  of  the 
valorous  charge  was  quenched,  as  the  men  now  betook  themselves  to 
plundering  the  Federal  camps,  taking  no  notice  of  the  enemy  in  the  dis 
tance  beyond  some  skirmishing  and  desultory  artillery  fire.  But  the  ene 
my  had  no  idea  of  continuing  his  retreat  to  Winchester.  At  the  first  good 
ground  between  Middletown  and  Newtown  the  troops  were  rallied,  a  com 
pact  line  formed,  and  the  enemy  soon  put  in  a  condition  to  resist  further 
attack  or  take  the  offensive. 

The  Northern  newspapers,  with  their  relish  for  dramatic  circumstance, 
had  a  singular  story  of  how  the  sudden  apparition  of  Gen.  Sheridan  on  a 
black  horse  flecked  with  foam,  which  he  had  galloped  from  Winchester, 
where  he  had  slept  the  previous  night,  reassured  his  fugitive  army,  and 
restored  the  battle.  But  the  fact  is  that  Sheridan  did  not  appear  on  the 
field  until  the  army  had  reorganized  a  new  line  of  battle  and  made  its 
dispositions  for  attack,  which  he  did  not  change  in  any  respect.  The 
counter-charge  was  made  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  Con 
federates  were  not  prepared  for  it ;  they  had  been  demoralized  by  pillage  ; 
when  urged  forward  they  had  moved  without  enthusiasm  ;  and  when  in 
the  afternoon  Gen.  Early  decided  to  attempt  an  advance,  he  was  compelled 
to  move  cautiously,  feeling  his  way  with  artillery. 

At  the  first  contact  with  the  enemy,  Gordon's  division  broke ;  Ker- 
shaw's  and  Ramseur's  followed  in  retreat,  and  the  field  became  covered 
with  flying  men.  The  artillery  retired,  firing  slowly,  and  sustained  only 
by  Pegram's  old  brigade  and  Evan's  brigade.  Across  Cedar  Creek  the 
enemy's  cavalry  charged  in  rear  of  the  Confederate  train  without  provok 
ing  a  shot ;  and  a  bridge  on  a  narrow  part  of  the  road  between  the  creek 
and  Fisher's  Hill  having  broken  down,  guns  and  wagons  were  abandoned. 
Many  ordnance  and  medical  stores,  and  twenty-three  pieces  of  artillery, 
besides  those  taken  in  the  morning  by  Early,  were  captured.  About  fif- 


600  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

teen  hundred  prisoners  were  taken,  which  fully  made  up  for  those 
lost  by  the  enemy  in  the  morning.  The  day  was  completely  turned 
against  the  Confederates  and  night  closed  with  the  enemy's  infantry 
occupying  their  old  camps,  and  his  cavalry  pursuing  the  wreck  of  Early's 
army. 

With  reference  to  the  disaster  of  Cedar  Creek,  Gen.  Early  published  an 
address  to  his  troops,  ascribing  to  their  misconduct  the  loss  of  the  field, 
and  attemping  to  break  the  censure  levelled  at  the  commander.  He 
wrote  :  "  I  had  hoped  to  have  congratulated  you. on  the  splendid  victory 
won  by  you  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  at  Belle  Grove,  on  Cedar  Creek, 
when  you  surprised  and  routed  two  corps  of  Sheridan's  army,  and  drove 
back  several  miles  the  remaining  corps,  capturing  eighteen  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  one  thousand  five  hundred  prisoners,  a  number  of  colours,  a  large 
quantity  of  small  arms  and  many  wagons  and  ambulances,  with  the  entire 
camps  of  the  two  routed  corps  ;  but  I  have  the  mortification  of  announc 
ing  to  you  that,  by  your  subsequent  misconduct,  all  the  benefits  of  that 
victory  were  lost,  and  a  serious  disaster  incurred.  Had  you  remained 
steadfast  to  your  duty  and  your  colours,  the  victory  would  have  been  one 
of  the  most  brilliant  and  decisive  of  the  war  ;  you  would  have  gloriously 
retrieved  the  reverses  at  Winchester  and  Fisher's  Hill,  and  entitled  your 
selves  to  the  admiration  and  gratitude  of  your  country.  But  many  of  you, 
including  some  commissioned  officers,  yielding  to  a  disgraceful  propensity 
for  plunder,  deserted  your  colours  to  appropriate  to  yourselves  the  aban 
doned  property  of  the  enemy ;  and,  subsequently,  those  who  had  pre 
viously  remained  at  their  posts,  seeing  their  ranks  thinned  by  the  absence 
of  the  plunderers,  when  the  enemy,  late  in  the  afternoon,  with  his-  shat 
tered  columns  made  but  a  feeble  effort  to  retrieve  the  fortunes  of  the  day, 
yielded  to  a  needless  panic,  and  fled  the  field  in  confusion,  thereby  con 
verting  a  splendid  victory  into  a  disaster." 

But  this  explanation  of  the  conversion  of  a  victory  into  a  disaster,  as  a 
personal  defence  of  Gen.  Early,  is  scarcely  fair.  If  soldiers  resort  to  pillag 
ing  on  a  field  of  victory  the  commander  is  the  responsible  party,  unless 
where  it  is  shown  that  he  resorted  to  the  most  extreme  measures  to  restrain 
a  disorder  so  shameful  and  plainly  deserving  death  on  the  spot,  and  that, 
despite  all  efforts,  the  men  had  passed  completely  beyond  his  control. 
The  broad  fact  cannot  be  concealed  that  for  four  or  five  hours  Gen.  Early 
was  in  the  condition  of  a  commander  who  had  lost  the  vigour  of  pursuit 
and  was  satisfied  to  put  up  with  a  half-way  success.  This  disposition  to 
pause  in  battle  and  be  satisfied  with  a  half  victory  was  not  the  peculiar 
story  of  Cedar  Creek.  It  was  the  curse  of  more  than  one  Confederate 
commander.  As  Gen.  Early  counted  his  victory  and  paused  in  his  career, 
the  refluent  wave  of  the  enemy  overtook  him,  swept  away  his  laurels,  and 
overwhelmed  him  with  an  unexpected  disaster.  The  story  is  not  different 


CLOSE   OF   THE  VALLEY   CAMPAIGN.  601 

from  that  of  other  Confederate  battle-fields  where  a  mediocre  commander 
has  trifled  with  success. 

Gen.  Early  had  received  a  stunning  defeat  from  which  his  army  never 
recovered.  The  battle  of  Cedar  Creek  practically  closed  the  campaign  in 
the  Valley,  and  most  of  Early's  infantry  were  returned  to  Gen.  Lee's 
lines.  Breckinridge  was  detached  and  sent  to  command  in  the  South 
western  Department.  The  three  divisions  (composing  what  was  known 
as  the  Second  Army  Corps)  formerly  commanded  by  Rodes,  Gordon,  and 
Ramseur,  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Gordon,  the  sole  survivor  of 
the  three,  and  sent  back  to  Gen.  Lee.  Nearly  the  whole  of  the  cavalry 
were  temporarily  furloughed,  the  Government  being  unable  to  supply  them 
with  forage.  Early  was  left  with  his  headquarters  at  Staunton,  and  what 
remained  of  Wharton's  division  constituted  the  Army  of  the  Valley. 

The  unfortunate  commander  continued  for  some  time  to  move  uneasily 
up  and  down  the  Valley,  with  his  small  force ;  but  all  operations  of 
moment  had  plainly  ceased  there  ;  there  was  not  forage  enough  for  any 
considerable  body  of  cavalry  ;  and  some  weeks  later  we  shall  see  the  last 
appearance  of  Gen.  Early  on  the  military  stage,  at  Waynesboro'  ,where  his 
command,  consisting  of  about  a  thousand  infantry,  was  captured,  and  the 
General  with  two  staff,  officers  escaped  to  Charlottesville,  the  melancholy 
remnant  of  an  enterprise  that  had  been  planned  to  relieve  Richmond  and 
turn  the  scales  of  the  war. 

In  consequence  of  the  disastrous  campaign  we  have  narrated,  but  not 
until  a  very  late  period  of  the  war,  Gen.  Early  was  removed  from  com 
mand.  Gen  Lee  wrote  to  his  subordinate  with  characteristic  generosity  : 

HEAD-QUARTERS  C.  S.  ARMIES,  March  30,  1865. 

Lieut.- Gen.  J.  A.  Early,  Franklin  C.  H.,  Va, : 

DEAR  SIB  :  My  telegram  will  have  informed  you  that  I  deem  a  change  of  commanders 
in  your  department  necessary,  but  it  is  due  to  your  zealous  and  patriotic  services  that  I 
should  explain  the  reasons  that  prompted  my  action.  The  situation  of  affairs  is  such 
that  we  can  neglect  no  means  calculated  to  develop  the  resources  we  possess  to  the 
greatest  extent,  and  make  them  as  efficient  as  possible.  To  this  end  it  is  essential  that 
we  should  have  the  cheerful  and  hearty  support  of  the  people  and  the  full  confidence  of 
the  soldiers,  without  which  our  efforts  would  be  embarrassed,  and  our  means  of  resis 
tance  weakened.  I  have  reluctantly  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  you  cannot  command 
the  united  and  willing  co-operation  which  is  so  essential  to  success.  Your  reverses  in 
the  Valley,  of  which  the  public  and  the  army  judge  chiefly  by  the  results,  have,  I  fear, 
impaired  your  influence  both  with  the  people  and  the  soldiers,  and  would  add  greatly 
to  the  difficulties  which  will,  under  any  circumstances,  attend  our  military  operations  in 
Southwestern  Virginia.  "While  my  own  confidence  in  your  ability,  zeal,  and  devotion 
to  the  cause  is  unimpaired,  I  have  nevertheless  felt  that  I  could  not  oppose  what  seems  to 
be  the  current  of  opinion  without  injustice  to  your  reputation  and  injury  to  the  service. 
I  therefore  felt  constrained  to  endeavour  to  find  a  commander  who  would  be  more  likely 
to  develop  the  strength  and  resources  of  the  country,  and  inspire  the  soldiers  with  confi 
dence,  and,  to  accomplish  this  purpose,  thought  it  proper  to  yield  my  own  opinion,  and 


602  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

defer  to  that  of  those  to  whom  alone  we  can  look  for  support.  I  am  sure  that  you  will 
understand  and  appreciate  my  motives,  and  that  no  one  will  be  more  ready  than  your 
self  to  acquiesce  in  any  measures  which  the  interests  of  the  country  may  seem  to  require, 
regardless  of  all  personal  considerations.  Thanking  you  for  the  fidelity  and  energy  with 
which  you  have  always  supported  my  efforts,  and  for  the  courage  and  devotion  you 
have  ever  manifested  in  the  service  of  the  country,  I  am,  very  respectfully  and  truly, 
your  obedient  servant, 

K.  E.  LEE,  General. 

Censure  in  the  newspapers  ran  high  against  Gen.  Early ;  but  it  must 
be  remembered  that  this  was  at  a  time  when  the  temper  of  the  Southern 
people  was  irritable  and  exacting,  impatient  to  be  refreshed  with  what  was 
now  the  rare  experience  of  a  victory.  Gen.  Early  was  not  a  popular  man  ; 
but  he  had  had  the  reputation  throughout  the  war  of  a  hard,  resolute 
fighter  ;  and  Gen.  Lee's  familiar  designation  of  him  as  "  his  bad  old  man  " 
suited  the  picture  of  a  commander  who  garnished  his  speech  with  oaths, 
dressed  in  the  careless,  burly  fashion  of  a  stage-driver,  and  was  famous  for 
his  hard,  direct  knocks  in  battle.*  It  was  hinted  in  the  newspapers  that 


*  The  following  sketch  of  Gen.  Early  is  from  a  graphic  pen,  and  its  fund  of  anecdote  is  amus 
ing  and  characteristic : — 

"  He  was  a  man  past  middle  age,  and  of  vigorous  and  athletic  appearance.  His  stature  ap 
proached  if  it  did  not  reach  six  feet,  and  he  seemed  to  be  capable  of  undergoing  great  fatigue.  His 
hair  was  black  and  curling,  and  just  touched  with  gray ;  his  eyes,  dark  and  sparkling ;  his  smile, 
ready  and  expressive,  but  somewhat  sarcastic,  as  was  the  bent  of  his  character.  His  dress  was 
plain  gray,  with  slight  decoration.  Long  exposure  had  made  the  old  coat  which  he  wore  quite 
dingy.  A  wide-brim  hat  overshadowed  his  sparkling  eyes,  his  swarthy  features,  and  grizzled  hair. 
His  face,  set  upon  a  short  neck,  joined  to  stooping  shoulders,  attracted  attention  from  every  one. 
In  the  dark  eye  you  could  read  the  resolute  character  of  the  man,  as  in  his  satirical  smile  you  saw 
the  evidence  of  that  dry,  trenchant,  often  mordant  humour,  for  which  he  was  famous.  The  keen 
glance  drove  home  the  sarcastic  speech,  and  almost  every  one  who  ventured  upon  word  combats 
with  Lieut.-General  Early  sustained  a  *  palpable  hit.'  The  soldiers  of  his  army  had  a  hundred  jests 
and  witticisms  about  him.  They  called  him  '  Old  Jube,'  sometimes  '  Old  Jubilee.'  They  delighted 
to  relate  how,  after  the  defeat  of  Fisher's  Hill,  when  the  troops  were  in  full  retreat,  their  commander 
had  checked  his  horse,  raised  his  arms  aloft,  and  exclaimed,  '  My  God  !  won't  any  of  my  men  make 
a  rally  around  Old  Jubal  ?  '  To  which  a  philosophic  foot-soldier,  calmly  seeking  the  rear,  replied  : 
'  Nary  rally,  General.'  A  similar  anecdote,  which  may  or  may  not  be  true,  is  even  yet  immensely 
relished  by  Early's'old  soldiers.  He  is  said  to  have  exclaimed,  when  he  heard  of  Lee's  retreat, 
'  Now  let  Gabriel  blow  his  horn.  It  is  tune  to  die.'  Everything  about  the  soldier  was  characteris 
tic  and  marked.  Speaking  slowly  and  with  a  species  of  drawl  in  his  voice,  all  that  he  said  was 
pointed,  direct  and  full  of  sarcastic  force.  These  '  hits '  he  evidently  enjoyed,  and  he  delivered 
them  with  the  coolness  of  a  swordsman  making  a  mortal  lunge.  All  the  army  had  laughed  at  one 
of  them.  While  marching  at  the  head  of  his  column,  dusty  in  his  dingy,  gray  uniform,  and  with 
his  faded  old  hat  over  his  eyes,  he  had  seen  leaning  over  a  fence  and  looking  at  the  column  as  it 
passed,  a  former  associate  in  the  Virginia  Convention,  who  had  violently  advocated  secession. 
This  gentleman  was  clad  in  citizens'  clothes — black  coat  and  irreproachable  shirt  bosom — and  greet 
ed  Early  as  he  passed.  The  reply  of  the  General  was  given  with  his  habitual  smile  and  sarcastic 
drawl :  '  How  are  you  ? '  he  said.  '  I  think  you  said  the  Whigs  wouldn't  fight ! '  The  blow  was 
rude,  and  made  the  whole  army  laugh.  Of  this  peculiar  humour  a  better  instance  still  is  given. 
After  Fisher's  Hill,  when  his  whole  army  was  in  complete  retreat,  and  the  Federal  forces  were  press- 


GEN.   EARLY   CRITICIZED.  603 

» 

much  of  Early's  disaster  in  the  Valley  was  due  to  his  alleged  intemper 
ance,  and  that  .there  had  been  too  much  ".  apple-jack  "  in  the  campaign. 
But  the  charge  of  habitual  intemperance  was  examined  by  a  committee  of 
the  Confederate  Congress,  and  disproved.  It  was  not  established  indeed 
that  Gen.  Early  was  a  believer  in  total  abstinence— or  as  one  of  his  Irish 
friends  remarks,  that  the  man  was  always  "  beastly  sober  " — but  it  was 
conclusively  shown  that  in  the  line  of  his  duty  he  was  never  under  the 
influence  of  drink,  and  to  no  such  imprudence  could  be  attributed  any 
misfortune  of  his  military  life. 

The  real  character  of  Gen.  Early's  campaign  appears  in  the  narrative. 
Much  of  his  disaster  is  to  be  fairly  attributed  to  lack  of  numbers,  his  great 
disproportion  to  the  enemy  in  this  respect ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  not 
to  be  denied  that  his  loss  of  artillery  was  excessive  and  peculiar,  and  that 
in  the  field  at  Cedar  Creek  he  had  not  shown  the  nerve  and  grasp  of  a 
great  commander.  His  loss  of  artillery  was  so  notorious,  that  wags  in 
Richmond  ticketed  guns  sent  him  u  to  Gen.  Sheridan,  care  of  Jubal  Early." 
In  a  month  he  lost  more  than  fifty  guns.  Briefly,  it  may  be  said  that  in 
the  operations  in  the  Yalley  Gen.  Early  committed  no  flagrant  error, 
and  did  nothing  to  draw  upon  him  a  distinct  and  severe  censure  ;  yet,  at 
the  same  time,  he  certainly  did  not  display  in  this  campaign  the  qualities 
of  a  great  commander,  never  rose  above  mediocrity,  and,  with  a  superiour 
army  upon  him,  went  headlong  to  destruction. 

The  effect  of  the  Valley  campaign  on  the  situation  around  Richmond 
may  be  almost  said  to  have  been  decisive.  The  result  of  it,  in  this  respect, 
was  this  :  that  it  released  a  powerful  force  and  made  it  available  for  Grant, 
while  Gen.  Lee  could  only  make  use  of,  as  a  corresponding  force,  the  small 
remnant  of  a  dispirited  army..  One  of  the  highest  and  most  intelligent 
Confederate  Generals  has  not  hesitated  to  express  the  opinion  that  "  the 
battle  of  Winchester  was  the  turning-point  of  the  fortunes  of  the  war  in 
Virginia."  The  view  is  not  unreasonable  when  we  consider  what  was  the 
object  of  Early's  campaign.  A  battle  fought  in  the  Valley  with  decisive 
results  might  have  relieved  Richmond.  Such  was  the  idea  of  Gen.  Lee. 
Battles  were  fought,  but  with  decisive  results  for  the  enemy  ;  and  Rich 
mond  fell. 

ing  him  close,  he  was  riding  with  Gen.  Breckinridge.  It  might  have  been  supposed  that  their  con 
versation  would  relate  to  the  disastrous  events  of  the  day,  but  Gen.  Early  did  not  seem  to  trouble 
himself  upon  that  subject.  In  full  retreat  as  they  were,  and  followed  by  an  enraged  enemy,  his 
companion  was  astounded  to  hear  from  Early  the  cool  and  nonchalant  question  :  '  Well,  Breckin 
ridge,  what  do  you  think  of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,  in  its  bearings 
upon  the  rights  of  the  South  in  the  Territories  ?  '  The  man  who  coald  amuse  himself  with  politi 
cal  discussions  between  Fisher's  Hill  and  Woodstock  on  the  22d  of  September,  1864,  must  have 
been  of  hard  stuff  or  peculiar  humour.  There  were  many  persons  in  and  out  of  the  army  who  doubt 
ed  the  soundness  of  his  judgment — there  were  none  who  ever  called  in  question  the  tough  fibre  of 
his  courage." 


604  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

A  general  opinion  prevalent  at  Richmond,  and  apparently  strengthened 
by  the  experiences  of  the  Valley  campaign,  was  that  the  Confederate' cav 
alry  in  Virginia  had  become  very  inefficient  and  unequal  to  its  early  repu 
tation.  The  report  is  one  of  singular  injustice,  in  view  of  the  brilliant 
record  of  the  cavalry  for  1864,  especially  that  part  of  it  under  the  com 
mand  of  Gen.  Fitzhugh  Lee,  the  compeer  and  successor  of  Stuart,  a  model 
of  chivalry  and  a  leader  whose  star  ascended  to  the 'highest  realms  of  glory 
in  the  war.  We  have  elsewhere  referred  generally  to  the  operations  of 
the  cavalry  in  Grant's  early  combination  against  Richmond.  It  is  a  fact 
based  upon  official  testimony,  that  Fitzhugh  Lee's  command  fought  nine 
consecutive  days,  commencing  the  day  Grant  crossed  the  Rapidan,  and  in 
that  time  lost  one-half  of  its  numbers  in  killed  and  wounded,  its  loss  in 
prisoners  in  the  same  time  being  not  more  than  thirty !  '  His  command 
was  composed  of  Virginians,  save  one  gallant  company  from  Maryland. 
The  simple  inscription  of  the  fact  we  have  related  is  an  undying  title  of 
glory  for  the  cavalry  of  Virginia,  testifying  as  it  does  to  a  courage  and 
devotion,  the  parallels  of  which  are  scarcely  to  be  found  out  of  the  pages 
of  fabulous  history. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  the  disasters  of  the  Valley  campaign  were  in 
a  great  measure  due  to  the  extreme  numerical  inferiority  of  the  Con 
federate  cavalry  to  that  of  the  enemy.  The  distribution  of  our  cavalry  at 
this  time  in  Virginia  is  a  curious  study  and  excites  criticism.  Only  two 
brigades  of  cavalry  were  sent  to  the  Valley  by  Gen.  Lee.  Gen.  Grant  sent 
two  large  divisions  of  three  brigades  each.  At  Petersburg  and  Richmond, 
the  numbers  of  our  cavalry  exceeded  those  of  the  enemy.  But  unfortu 
nately,  the  country  in  this  vicinity  (especially  in  Dinwiddie  county)  was  but 
little  adapted  for  this  superiority  to  be  .displayed,  it  being  very  wooded 
and  traversed  only  by  narrow  roads. 

Grant  had  Gregg's  division  of  two  brigades  on  his  left  flank  on  the 
south  side  of  the  James — and  four  regiments  under  Kautz  on  the  north 
side,  guarding  his  right  flank.  Confronting  Kautz,  the  Confederates  had 
Gary's  brigade,  and  opposite  to  Gregg,  Bulter's  division  (Hampton's  old 
command)  of  three  brigades,  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  division,  of  two  brigades, 
and  a  detached  brigade  under  Bearing.  Rosser's  brigade  was  after 
wards  sent  to  the  Valley,  but  not  until  the  battle  of  Winchester  had  been 
fought. 

The  Valley  was  especially  adapted  for  the  operations  of  cavalry.  It  is 
universally  admitted  that  a  preponderating  force  of  cavalry  gives  immense 
advantages  in  a  country  suitable  for  its  employment ;  for  cavalry  can  live 
on  the  lines  of  communication  of  the  army  opposed  to  it,  easily  avoiding 
any  infantry  sent  after  it.  In  the  Valley,  where  cavalry  could  be  used  to 
advantage,  the  Federal  superiority  was  some  six  or  seven  thousand.  Around 
Petersburg,  where  cavalry  could  only  fight  dismounted,  our  numbers  were 


THE   CONFEDERATE   CAVALRY   IN   VIRGINIA.  605 

in  excess  of  those  of  the  enemy,  but  not,  it  is  true,  to  the  degree  of  the 
enemy's  superiority  in  the  other  field  of  operations.  If,  however,  the  pro 
portion  had  been  to  some  extent  reversed,  and  something  like  an  equal 
match  been  made  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  the  Valley,  the  result  might 
have  been  different,  or  at  least  there  have  been  one  error  and  its  con 
sequences  less  in  that  campaign. 


CHAPTEE    XXXVII. 


SHIP. — THE  FEDERALS  GET  POSSESSION  OF  THE  WELDON  RAILROAD. — ACTION  AT  REAMS5 
STATION. OPERATIONS  NORTH  OF  JAMES  RIVER. — SURPRISE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  HAR 
RISON. — ATTEMPT  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES  TO  RETAKE  IT  DISCONCERTED  AND  DEFEATED. 

GRANT  PLANS  A  GENERAL  ADVANCE  IN  OCTOBER. — THREE  CORPS  OF  THE  ENEMY  IN  MO 
TION. ATTEMPT  TO  TURN  THE  CONFEDERATE  POSITION  ON  HATCHER'S  RUN,  AND  SEIZE 

THE  SOUTHSIDE  RAILROAD. — DEFEAT  OF  THE   ENEMY   AND   FRUSTRATION  OF  HIS  PLANS. 

PUBLIC  ATTENTION  DRAWN  TO  GEORGIA. — SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. — HE  RETURNS 
FROM  GAYLESVILLE  TO  ATLANTA. — THE  WORK  OF  DESTRUCTION  COMMENCED  AT  ROME. — 
BURNING  OF  ATLANTA. — MORE  THAN  FOUR  THOUSAND  HOUSES  CONSUMED. — OUTLINE  OF 

SHERMAN'S  MARCH  FROM  ATLANTA. — THE  COUNTRY  IT  TRAVERSES  FULL  OF  SUPPLIES. — 
PILLAGE  OF  MADISON. — CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  FORCES  AT  MILLEDGEVILLE. — 
AN  AFFAIR  OF  MILITIA  AT  GRISWOLDSVILLE. — KILPATRICK5S  DEMONSTRATION  ON  AUGUS 
TA. — STATEMENT  OF  CONFEDERATE  FORCES  THERE. — SHERMAN'S  MARCH  TO  MILLEN. — HE 
MEETS  WITH  NO  RESISTANCE. — HIS  DEVASTATION  OF  THE  COUNTRY. — PROWESS  OF  HIS 
TROOPS  IN  PILLAGE  AND  VILLANY. — NOTHING  BUT  MILITIA  AND  HASTY  LEVIES  TO  OPPOSE 

HIM. — SHERMAN'S  APPROACH  TO  SAVANNAH. — FORT  M'ALLISTER  TAKEN  BY  ASSAULT. — 

GALLANTRY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  GARRISON. — GEN.    HARDEE   EVACUATES   SAVANNAH. 

EXTENT  OF  SHERMAN'S  CAPTURES. — HOW  MUCH  OF  HIS  ACHIEVEMENTS  WAS  "  SIMPLE 
WASTE  AND  DESTRUCTION." — REVIEW  OF  "  THE  GREAT  MARCH." — ABSURD  HISTORICAL 
COMPARISONS  IN  THE  NORTH. — CHARACTER  OF  GEN.  SHERMAN. — HIS  CHARLATANISM. — HIS 
PROPER  PLACE  IN  HISTORY. 


IT  is  said  that  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  on  the  Eapidan,  Gen. 
Meade,  in  conversation  with  Gen.  Grant,  was  telling  him  that  he  proposed 
to  manoeuvre  thus  and  so ;  whereupon  Gen.  Grant  stopped  him  at  the 
word  "  manoeuvre,"  and  said,  "  Oh  !  1  never  manoeuvre."  "We  have  seen 
that  the  famous  Federal  commander,  who  thus  despised  manoeuvring,  had 
failed  to  destroy  Lee's  army  by  "  hammering  continuously  "  at  it ;  had 
failed  to  take  either  Eichmond  or  Petersburg  by  a  coup  de  main.  We  shall 
now  see  that  he  was  no  longer  unwilling  to  avail  himself  of  the  resource 
of  manoeuvring  ;  and  we  shall  observe  that  in  this  resource  also,  he  was 
overmatched  by  Lee,  who  showed  himself  his  master  in  every  art  of  war, 


CAPTUEE   OF  FOET  HARRISON.  607 

and  indeed  left  Grant  not  a  single  branch  of  generalship  in  which  he 
might  assert  his  reputation. 

For  some  time  after  the  mine  explosion,  but  little  was  done  by  the 
Federals  in  front  of  Petersburg.  In  the  remaining  months  of  summer  and 
autumn,  some  manoeuvres  were  executed  with  more  or  less  breadth  of 
design,  which  may  be  briefly  stated  here  in  the  order  of  their  occurrence. 

On  the  18th  and  19th  August,  Grant's  left  under  Warren,  after  a 
defeat  on  the  first  day,  succeeded  in  holding  the  Weldon  Railroad.  This 
line  of  communication  with  the  South  was  not  of  any  great  importance  to 
Gen.  Lee,  as  long  as  he  held  the  road  to  Danville,  the  main  avenue  to  the 
fertile  grain  districts  of  the  South.  A  series  of  severe  actions,  however, 
ensued  to  break  Warren's  hold  upon  the  road ;  and  he  maintained  his 
position  only  after  a  loss  which  he  himself  officially  reports  as  4,455  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.  Meanwhile  Hancock's  corps  was  brought  in  rear 
of  the  position  held  by  Warren,  and  ordered  to  destroy  a  southward  section 
of  the  road.  On  the  25th  August,  this  force  was  encountered  at  Reams' 
station  by  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  under  Wilcox,  Heth,  and  Mahone.  A  vig 
orous  attack  of  Heth  broke  the  enemy's  line,  and  drove  a  division  which 
was  in  reserve,  while  one  line  of  breastworks  was  carried  by  the  Con 
federate  cavalry  under  Gen.  Hampton.  The  results  of  the  day  were, 
twelve  stands  of  colours  captured,  and  nine  pieces  of  artillery,  ten  caissons, 
2,150  prisoners,  and  3,100  stand  of  small-arms.  The  Confederate  loss  was, 
in  cavalry,  artillery,  and  infantry,  720  men,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 
Warren,  however,  still  continued  to  hold  the  Weldon  railroad ;  but  after  a 
sum  of  disaster,  as  we  have  seen,  that  was  a  very  extravagant  price,  com 
pared  with  the  little  real  importance  of  the  acquisition.  The  road  was 
permanently  retained  by  the  enemy ;  and  he  now  proceeded  to  form  a  line 
of  redoubts  connecting  the  new  position  with  the  old  left  of  the  army  on 
the  Jerusalem  plank  road. 

About  the  close  of  September,  attention  was  again  drawn  to  operations 
north  of  James  River,  and  a  movement  on  Gen.  Butler's  front  resulted  in 
a  serious  disaster  to  the  Confederates,  and,  it  must  be  confessed,  accom 
plished  one  real  success  for  this  ill-stared  General  in  the  operations 
against  Richmond.  On  the  night  of  the  28th  September,  Butler  crossed 
to  the  north  side  of  the  James,  with  the  corps  of  Birney  and  Ord,  and 
moved  up  the  river  with  the  design  of  attacking  the  very  strong  fortifica 
tions  and  entrenchments  below  Chapin's  farm,  known  as  Fort  Harrison. 
A  portion  of  Butler's  force  was  moved  on  the  Newmarket  road,  and  while 
a  severe  engagement  was  occurring  there,  a  column  of  the  enemy  made  a 
flank  movment  on  Fort  Harrison,  and  practically  succeeded  in  surprising 
this  important  work,  which  surrendered  after  a  very  feeble  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  artillery,  and  while  a  force  of  Confederates  was  on  the 
double-quick  to  reinforce  it. 


608  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Tliis  fort  occupied  a  commanding  position  below  Drewry's  Bluff,  and 
constituted  the  main  defence  of  that  part  of  our  lines.  Its  loss,  with  fifteen 
pieces  of  artillery,  was  a  severe  blow  to  the  Confederates,  attended  with 
circumstances  of  mortification,  and  the  resolution  was  quickly  taken  to 
attempt  its  recapture.  Gen.  Field  was  for  attacking  at  once  before  the 
enemy  could  strengthen  the  position ;  but  he  was  overruled,  and  the  attack 
deferred  until  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day.  It  was  arranged  that  Ander 
son's,  Bratton's,  and  Law's  brigades  of  Field's  division  should  make  the 
assault  in  front,  while  floke  was  to  attack  on  the  other  side,  taking  advan 
tage  of  a  ravine  by  which  he  was  enabled  to  form  his  men  within  two  or 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  fort.  The  plan  of  attack  miscarried  by  a  sin 
gular  circumstance.  Anderson's  men  being  put  in  motion  merely  to  adjust 
the  line,  misunderstood  the  orders  of  their  commander,  leaped  the  breast 
works  of  the  enemy,  rushed  forward  with  a  yell,  and  were  soon  past  con 
trol.  This  necessitated  rapid  movement  on  the  part  of  the  other  brigades. 
Gen.  Hoke,  awaiting  the  signal  that  had  been  agreed  upon  for  action,  did 
not  move  ;  and  the  enemy  was  thus  enabled  to  concentrate  his  fire  on  the 
scattered  assault  of  the  brigades  of  Field's  division.  Law's  brigade  accom 
plished  its  object  in  retaking  a  redan  to  the  left  of  the  fort,  thus  protecting 
our  left  flank  ;  but  the  main  attack  failed  ;  and  the  general  result  was  that 
the  lodgment  of  Butler's  army  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  was  secured, 
and  a  position  thus  obtained  very  menacing  to  Richmond. 

Before  settling  down  to  winter-quarters,  Gen.  Grant  determined  to 
make  a  last  vigorous  attempt  to  retrieve  the  campaign  and  to  strike  one 
more  blow  for  the  capture  of  Petersburg.  The  sequel  of  this  enterprise 
was  the  occasion  of  the  usual  attempt  to  misrepresent  it  as  a  mere  recon- 
noissance  in  force  ;  but  there  can  no  longer  be  any  doubt  that  Gen.  Grant, 
in  the  movement  of  October,  1864,  designed  a  real  advance,  and  hoped  to 
achieve  a  success  which  would  influence  the  approaching  Pesidential  elec 
tion,  only  a  few  days  distant,  and  electrify  the  North  with  the  news  of  a 
great  victory. 

He  made  every  preparation  to  conduct  the  movement  on  the  largest 
scale.  Three  days  were  occupied  in  the  preparations.  The  hospitals  were 
emptied  of  their  sick  and  wounded,  all  of  whom  were  sent  to  the  rear. 
Five  days  rations  were  issued  to  the  troops.  All  superfluous  or  unneces 
sary  baggage  was  sent  to  the  rear  with  the  trains.  The  army  was  put  in 
what  is  called  light  marching  order.  In  fact,  nothing  was  left  undone  to 
insure  the  success  of  the  undertaking.  During  the  night  preceding  the 
movement  nearly  all  the  Federal  troops  were  withdrawn  from  the  breast 
works  on  both  sides  of  the  James  and  massed  some  distance  in  the  rear, 
ready  to  march  forward  at  daylight.  Guns  were  mounted  to  cover  Grant's 
communications  with  his  base  at  City  Point,  in  case  the  Confederates 
should  take  possession  of  the  trenches  he  had  evacuated,  and  every  indica- 


609 

tion  pointed  to  a  design  to  abandon  the  line  before  Petersburg,  and  take 
possession  of  the  Southside  railroad. 

The  movement  occupied  three  corps  of  the  enemy,  and  commenced  at 
daylight  of  the  27th  October.  The  right  of  the  Confederate  entrenched  line 
rested  on  the  east  bank  of  Hatcher's  Run  ;  and  it  was  hoped  to  turn  this, 
and  then  march  upon  and  lay  hold  of  the  Southside  railroad,  which  was 
Lee's  principal  communication.  As  the  advance  of  the  enemy  moved  for 
ward  to  the  Boydton  plank  road,  the  Confederate  pickets  and  skirmishers 
were  encountered,  and  a  lively  fire  of  musketry  was  kept  up  all  the  morn 
ing.  When  the  Boydton  road  was  reached  the  Confederates  were  found 
strongly  entrenched  at  every  point.  It  was  thought  that  by  making  a 
wide  detour  these  intrenchments  co.uld  be  taken  in  flank  and  the  Con 
federates  forced  back  to  Petersburg  ;  but  when  Hancock's  corps  reached  a 
point  below  where  the  Confederate  works  were  supposed  to  terminate,  they 
were  found  to  extend  a  considerable  distance  in  the  direction  of  Stony 
Creek,  and  their  appearance  was  so  formidable  that  it  was  deemed  im 
prudent  to  attempt  to  carry  them. 

During  Hancock's  march  towards  what  was  supposed  to  be  the  ex 
treme  right  of  the  Confederate  line,  a  gap  occurred  between  his  right  and 
the  left  of  the  Fifth  corps.  The  Confederates  were  not  slow  to  perceive 
the  advantage.  Gen.  Heth  had  crossed  Hatcher's  Run  to  attack  the 
enemy,  and  Mahone's  division  quickly  assailed  Hancock's  right  in  its  ex 
posed  situation,  driving  back  Gibbon's  division  more  than  a  mile,  and  in 
flicting  upon  it  considerable  loss.  Meanwhile  Hampton's  cavalry  fell  upon 
the  rear  of  Hancock,  and  increased  the  disorder.  Mahone  captured  four 
hundred  prisoners,  three  stand  of  colours,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery.  A 
subsequent  effort.pf  the  enemy  to  recover  his  position  was  bravely  resisted ; 
Gen.  Mahone  broke  three  lines  of  battle ;  and  night  found  him  standing 
firmly  on  the  Boydton  road,  and  successfully  resisting  all  efforts  to  drive 
him  from  it. 

Finding  the  Confederates  strongly  fortified  along  the  Boydton  road, 
and  also  on  both  sides  of  Hatcher's  Run,  and  seeing  the  hopelessness  of  at 
tempting  to  break  through  works  fully  as  formidable  as  those  before  Peters 
burg,  Grant  issued  orders  for  the  troops  to  withdraw  to  their  original  posi 
tion, — that  is,  the  entrenchments  in  front  of  Petersburg — and  during  the 
night  they  retraced  their  steps,  and  were  settled  back  in  their  old  camps. 
The  design  to  turn  the  Confederate  position  and  take  possession  of  the 
Southside  railroad,  had  been  completely  frustrated  ;  and  thus  failed,  almost 
shamefully,  Grant's  ambitious  movement  of  October,  1864. 

"While  thus  the  Confederate  lines  around  Richmond  and  Petersburg 

stood  successful  and  defiant,  the  shadow  of  a  great  misfortune  fell  on 

another  part  of  the  country.     In  the  last  months  of  1864,  public  attention 

was  drawn  unanimously  and  almost  exclusively  after  the  march  of  Sher- 

39 


610  THE   LOST    CAUSE. 

man  through  the  State  of  Georgia  ;  and  to  this  event,  fraught  with  conse 
quences  and  recriminations  eventually  fatal  to  the  Confederacy,  we  must 
now  direct  the  course  of  our  narrative. 


At  last  accounts  of  operations  in  Georgia,  Gen.  Sherman  was  meditat 
ing  a  march  to  the  sea-board.  Preparations  were  made  to  abandon  all  the 
posts  south  of  Dalton,  and  from  Gaylesville  and  Rome  orders  were  issued 
concerning  the  new  movement.  In  the  latter  place  commenced  the  work 
of  destruction  :  a  thousand  bales  of  cotton,  two  flour  mills,  two  tanneries, 
foundries,  machine-shops,  depots,  store-houses,  and  bridges  were  set  on 
lire ;  the  torch  was  applied  to  private  dwellings,  and  the  whole  town 
wrapped  in  a  fearful  and  indiscriminate  conflagration.  The  march  back 
to  Atlanta  left  a  track  of  smoke  and  flame. 

Having  concentrated  his  troops  at  Atlanta  by  the  14th  of  November, 
Sherman  was  ready  to  commence  his  march,  threatening  both  Augusta  and 
Macon.  On  the  night  of  the  15th  the  torch  was  applied  to  Atlanta  ;  and 
where  the  merciless  commander  had  already  created  a  solitude,  he  deter 
mined  to  make  a  second  conflagration,  by  the  light  of  which  his  marching 
columns  might  commence  their  journey  to  the  sea.  The  work  was  done 
with  terrible  completeness  ;  buildings  covering  two  hundred  acres  were  in 
flames  at  one  time  ;  the  heavens  were  an  expanse  of  lurid  fire  ;  and  amid 
the  wild  and  terrific  scene  the  Federal  bands  played  "  John  Brown's  soul 
goes  marching  on."  The  next  morning  Sherman's  army  moved  from  a 
scene  of  desolation  such  as  had  occurred  in  no  modern  picture  of  civilized 
war.  From  four  to  five  thousand  houses  were  reduced  to  ruins  ;  and  four 
hundred  left  standing  was  the  melancholy  remnant  of  Atlanta.  Nearly 
all  the  shade  trees  in  the  park  and  city  had  been  destroyed,  and  the  sub 
urbs,  stripped  of  timber,  presented  to  the  eye  one  vast,  naked,  ruined,  de 
serted  camp. 

The  main  outline  of  Sherman's  march  was,  that  Howard,  with  the 
right  wing,- should  follow  the  Georgia  Central  road,  running  southeast 
through  Macon  and  Milledgeville  to  Savannah  ;  while  Slocum,  command 
ing  the  left  wing,  was  to  march  directly  east,  on  the  railroad  leading  from 
Atlanta  to  Augusta,  destroying  it  as  he  went.  Two  columns  of  cavalry — 
one  to  the  north  of  Slocum,  and  the  other  to  the  south  of  Howard — were 
to  protect  their  flanks,  and  conceal  entirely  from  view  the  routes  of  the  in 
fantry.  An  order  directed  the  army  "  to  forage  liberally  on  the  march." 

The  country  immediately  around  Atlanta  had  been  foraged  by  Slocum's 
corps  when  it  held  the  city  ;  but  two  days'  march  brought  Sherman's 
troops  into  regions  of  such  abundance  as  were  scarcely  supposed  to  exist 


611 

within  the  limits  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  There  were,  indeed,  many 
parts  of  the  Confederacy  which  the  difficulties  of  transportation  had  gorged 
with  supplies,  and  none  more  so,  perhaps,  than  that  part  of  Georgia  now 
traversed  by  Sherman's  troops.  There  were  pits  of  sweet  potatoes,  yards 
of  poultry  and  hogs,  and  cellars  of  bacon  and  flour,  offering  abundance  on 
every  hand,  and  gratifying  the  soldiers  with  a  change  of  diet.  It  is  said 
"  hard  tack "  was  scarcely  heard  of  in  Sherman's  army  on  its  march 
through  Georgia.  The  cattle  trains  soon  became  so  large  that  it  was  diffi 
cult  to  drive  them  along ;  and  they  were  turned  nightly  into  the  immense 
fields  of  ungathered  corn  to  eat  their  fill,  while  the  granaries  were  crowded 
to  overflowing  with  both  oats  and  corn. 

Slocum  continued  to  move  out  on  the  Augusta  line,  destroying  the  rail 
road  as  he  advanced,  until  he  reached  Madison.  This,  a  pretty  town  of 
two  thousand  inhabitants,  was  pillaged,  the  stores  gutted,  and  the  streets 
filled  with  furniture  and  household  goods,  broken  and  wrecked  in  mere 
wantonness.  From  Madison  Slocum  turned  suddenly  south  towards  Mil- 
ledgeville,  and  on  the  21st  November  entered  the  capital  of  Georgia. 
Meanwhile  Howard,  covered  by  a  cloud  of  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  had  de 
monstrated  on  Macon,  and  crossing  the  Ocmulgee,  had  pressed  on  towards 
Milledgeville ;  Sherman's  forces  being  thus  rapidly  concentrated  at  the 
capital  of  Georgia,  after  having  threatened  both  Augusta  and  Macon,  thus 
confounding  the  Confederates  as  to  his  intentions. 

A  part  of  Howard's  command  had  been  left  at  Griswoldsville,  ten  miles 
east  of  Macon,  for  demonstrative  purposes  merely.  It  was  attacked  by  a 
force  of  Confederate  militia,  which  marched  out  from  Macon,  and  were 
severely  repulsed  by  the  enemy's  artillery.  This  affair,  small  as  it  was, 
was  the  most  serious  fight  of  Sherman's  campaign  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea. 

Having  sufficiently  rested  at  Milledgeville,  Sherman  resumed  his  march 
eastward ;  while  Kilpatrick's  cavalry  continued  to  operate  towards  Au 
gusta,  advancing  as  far  as  Waynesboro',  to  create  the  impression  of  a  heavy 
movement  upon  Augusta.  There  had  been  concentrated  at  this  city  some 
Confederate  militia,  two  or  three  South  Carolina  regiments,  and  a  portion 
of  Hampton's  command,  sent  there  to  remount.  Even  if  the  real  move 
ment  of  Sherman's  army  had  been  known,  this  force  could  not  have  inter 
posed  any  serious  obstacle  to  the  advance  of  his  main  body,  as  long  as  his 
left  wing  was  used  as  a  strong  arm  thrust  out  in  advance,  ready  to  encoun 
ter  any  force  which  might  attempt  to  bar  the  way.  While  Kilpatrick 
demonstrated  savagely  upon  Augusta,  Sherman  marched  rapidly  on  Mil- 
len,  reaching  it  on  the  2d  December. 

He  had  already  penetrated  and  devastated  the  richest  portion  of  Geor 
gia,  and  was  now  on  the  line  of  the  pine  forests  that  sloped  to  the  sea. 
For  a  hundred  miles  he  had  left  behind  him  a  wreck  of  railroads  and  a 
desolated  country ;  he  had  consumed  the  fat  of  the  land,  and  he  had  strewn 


612  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

every  mile  of  his  march  with  the  evidences  of  savage  warfare.  His  army 
had  been  permitted  to  do  whatever  crime  could  compass  and  cruelty  in 
vent.  A  Northern  correspondent,  who  travelled  with  the  army,  thus  re 
lates  its  prowess  in  pillage  and  all  provinces  of  cowardly  violence  :  "  Such 
little  freaks  as  taking  the  last  chicken,  the  last  pound  of  meal,  the  last  bit 
of  bacon,  and  the  only  remaining  scraggy  cow,  from  a  poor  woman  and 
her  flock  of  children,  black  or  white  not  considered,  came  under  the  order 
of  legitimate  business.  Even  crockery,  bed-covering,  or  cloths,  were  fair 
spoils.  As  for  plate,  or  jewelry,  or  watches,  these  were  things  rebels  had 
no  use  for.  Men  with  pockets  plethoric  with  silver  and  gold  coin  ;  soldiers 
sinking  under  the  weight  of  plate  and  fine  bedding  materials  ;  lean  mules 
and  horses,  with  the  richest  trappings  of  Brussels  carpets,  and  hangings  of 
fine  chenille ;  negro  wenches,  particularly  good-looking  ones,  decked  in 
f  satin  and  silks,  and  sporting  diamond  ornaments ;  officers  with  sparkling 
rings,  that  would  set  Tiffany  in  raptures — gave  colour  to  the  stories  of 
hanging  up  or  fleshing  an  i  old  cuss,'  to  make  him  shell  out.  A  planter's 
house  was  overrun  in  a  jiffy ;  boxes,  drawers,  and  escritoires  were  ran 
sacked  with  a  laudable  zeal,  and  emptied  of  their  contents.  If  the  spoils 
were  ample,  the  depredators  were  satisfied,  and  went  off  in  peace  ;  if  not, 
everything  was  torn  and  destroyed,  and  most  likely  the  owner  was  tickled 
with  sharp  bayonets  into  a  confession  where  he  had  his  treasures  hid.  If 
he  escaped,  and  was  hiding  in  a  thicket,  this  was  prima  facie  evidence 
that  he  was  a  skulking  rebel ;  and  most  likely  some  ruffian,  in  his  zeal  to 
get  rid  of  such  vipers,  gave  him  a  dose  of  lead,  which  cured  him  of  his 
Secesh  tendencies.  Sorghum  barrels  were  knocked  open,  bee-hives  rifled, 
while  their  angry  swarms  rushed  frantically  about.  Indeed,  I  have  seen  a 
soldier  knock  a  planter  down  because  a  bee  stung  him.  Should  the  house 
be  deserted,  the  furniture  is  smashed  in  pieces,  music  is  pounded  out  of 
four  hundred  dollar  pianos  with  the  ends  of  muskets.  Mirrors  were  won 
derfully  multiplied,  and  rich  cushions  and  carpets  carried  off  to  adorn 
teams  and  war-steeds.  After  all  was  cleared  out,  most  likely  some  set  of 
stragglers  wanted  to  enjoy  a  good  fire,  and  set  the  house,  debris  of  furni 
ture,  and  all  the  surroundings,  in  a  blaze.  This  is  the  way  Sherman's 
army  lived  on  the  country." 

The  sum  of  these  villanies  has  passed  into  Northern  history  as  a  weight 
of  martial  glory.  But  the  day  will  yet  come  when  the  hero  of  such  a 
story,  instead  of  enjoying  as  now  the  plaudits  of  ferocious  and  cowardly 
mobs,  will  obtain  the  execrations  of  civilized  mankind.  The  facility  of  his 
progress  was  no  achievement  of  genius  to  illuminate  a  record  of  villany 
It  is  clear  enough,  when  it  is  known  that  there  was  nothing  to  oppose  his 
march  but  some  hasty  levies  of  regular  troops,  and  clans  of  scattered  mili 
tia.  It  is  melancholy  to  look  over  the  map  of  this  march,  a  region  of 
swamp  and  thicket,  and  observe  that  in  no  portion  of  it  could  a  field  be 


613 

found  adequate  to  the  display  of  ten  thousand  men,  and  reflect  how  small 
a  Confederate  force,  put  between  Sherman  and  the  sea,  might  have  dis 
puted  his  march,  exacted  a  bloody  toll  at  every  defile,  and  brought  him  to 
grief  and  disaster.  But  there  was  no  such  force.  The  general  story  of 
the  march  is  that  the  Confederates  had  no  partisan  fighting  as  in  days 
past ;  that  their  levies  of  regular  troops  did  not  make  their  appearance  in 
season  for  a  concentration  of  strength  at  any  one  point ;  that  Hardce,  hav 
ing  a  command  of  not  more  than  ten  thousand  men,  remained  to  cover 
Savannah ;  that  the  clans  of  militia  and  small  detachments  of  Wheeler's 
cavalry  were  utterly  unable  to  cope  with  the  enemy,  and  were  rather  cal 
culated  to  provoke  his  enterprise  than  to  impede  his  march  ;  and  that  the 
consequence  was  that  the  sum  of  opposition  to  Sherman's  march  was  little 
more  than  a  series  of  small  skirmishes,  without  result  on  either  side. 

On  the  2d  December  Sherman's  army  pivoted  upon  Millen,  swung 
slowly  round  from  its  eastern  course,  and  swept  down  in  six  parallel  col 
umns,  by  as  many  different  roads,  towards  Savannah.  About  ten  miles 
from  the  city  his  left  wing  struck  the  Charleston  Railroad,  and  encoun 
tered  some  Confederate  skirmishers,  which  indicated  for  the  first  time  the 
presence  of  Hardee's  army.  Sherman's  right  wing  was  now  thrown  for 
ward  ;  his  army  closed  gradually  and  steadily  in  upon  Savannah  ;  and  on 
the  10th  December  it  lay  in  line  of  battle,  confronting  the  outer  works 
about  five  miles  distant  from  the  city.  His  first  task  was  to  open  com 
munication  with  Dahlgren's  fleet,  which  lay  in  Ossabaw  Sound,  and  he 
therefore  determined  to  capture  Fort  McAllister,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Ogeechee,  which  enters  the  ocean  but  a  few  miles  south  of  the  Savannah. 

Fort  McAllister  was  a  large  enclosure,  with  wide  parapets,  a  deep 
ditch  and  thickly-planted  palisades.  There  were  twenty- one  guns,  large 
and  small,  in  the  fort,  all  mounted  en  barbette.  It  had  resisted  two  or 
three  bombardments  of  the  enemy's  iron-clads  ;  and  it  appears  that  Gen. 
Hardee  had  overlooked  the  possibility  of  a  land  attack,  and  had  neglected 
to  strengthen  the  garrison.  Anyhow  the  Confederate  commander  was  not 
up  to  the  quick  decision  of  Sherman,  who,  instead  of  building  entrench 
ments  and  rifle-pits,  resolved  to  take  the  fort  by  assault.  A  whole  divi 
sion  was  ordered  for  the  work,  on  the  evening  of  the  30th  December.  The 
fort  was  commanded  by  Major  Anderson ;  and  its  garrison,  at  the  time  of 
attack,  was  less  than  two  hundred  men.  The  fact  that  its  guns  were 
mounted  en  barbette  exposed  the  gunners  to  the  deadly  aim  of  sharp 
shooters  ;  and  as  the  division  of  the  enemy's  troops  commanded  by  Gen. 
Hazen  advanced  to  the  assault,  it  was  found  that  the  artillery  of  the  fort 
did  but  little  execution  upon  them.  The  Federals  went  easily  over  the 
parapet ;  but  the  little  Confederate  garrison,  although  desperately  out 
numbered,  fought  to  the  last.  Many  of  these  devoted  men  disdained  quar 
ter,  and  were  bayoneted  at  their  posts.  Capt.  Clinch,  who  commanded 


614  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  artillery,  refused  to  surrender  until  he  was  disabled  by  three  sabre  and 
two  gun-shot  wounds,  and  faint  from  loss  of  blood. 

When  Sherman  saw  the  Federal  flag  raised  upon  Fort  McAllister,  he 
seized  a  slip  of  paper,  and  telegraphed  to  Washington  :  u  I  regard  Savan 
nah  as  already  gained."  The  possession  of  the  fort  opened  'Ossabaw 
Sound,  effected  communication  with  Dahlgren's  fleet,  and  indeed  made 
the  capture  of  Savannah,  where  Hardee  appeared  to  be  shut  up  with  ten 
or  twelve  thousand  men,  but  a  question  of  time.  But  it  was  Sherman's 
hope  to  capture  Hardee's  army  with  the  city  ;  and  movements  were  made 
to  close  up  all  avenues  of  escape,  Sherman's  army  stretching  from  the 
Savannah  to  the  Ogeechee  River,  while  Foster's  troops  covered  the  rail 
road  to  Charleston.  It  was  intended  to  place  a  division  to  operate  with 
Foster  by  way  of  Broad  River ;  but  while  Sherman's  flank  movement  was 
in  process  of  operation,  Hardee  outwitted  him,  and  on  the  night  following 
the  enemy's  demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  city,  the  Confederates  had 
evacuated  it,  and  were  on  the  Carolina  shore. 

The  evacuation  was  a  complete  surprise  to  Sherman.  On  the  night  of 
the  28th  December,  Hardee  opened  a  fierce  bombardment,  expending  his 
ammunition  without  stint.  After  dark,  he  threw  his  men  on  rafts  and 
steamboats  across  the  river  to  the  South -Carolina  shore.  The  night  was 
dark,  with  a  fierce  gust  of  wind  deadening  the  sounds  of  the  wagons  and 
the  tramp  of  the  troops.  As  morning  broke,  the  attention  of  the  enemy 
was  excited  at  last  by  unusual  sounds,  and  his  pickets  were  advanced  on 
the  extreme  left  of  the  line.  Meeting  no  opposition,  they  pushed  still  fur 
ther,  crawled  through  the  abatis,  floundered  through  dikes  and  ditches, 
scaled  the  first  line  of  works,  and  found  it  deserted.  All  the  ordnance 
stores  and  supplies  which  Hardee  could  not  transport,  had  been  destroyed 
before  the  evacuation ;  he  had  burned  the  ship-yard  and  sunk  two  iron 
clads  ;  but  all  the  rest  of  the  uninjured  city  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy. 

Sherman  announced  "his  success  in  a  characteristic  despatch.  He  wrote 
to  President  Lincoln  :  "  I  beg  to  present  you,  as  a  Christmas  gift,  the  city 
of  Savannah,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  heavy  guns  and  plenty  of  ammuni 
tion,  and  also  about  twenty-five  thousand  bales  of  cotton."  And  thus  ended 
the  story  of  the  march  to  the  sea.  In  his  official  report  of  his  achieve 
ments,  Gen.  Sherman  wrote  :  "  We  have  consumed  the  corn  and  fodder  in 
the  region  of  country  thirty  miles  on  either  side  of  a  line  from  Atlanta  to 
Savannah,  as  also  the  sweet  potatoes,  cattle,  hogs,  sheep,  and  poultry,  and 
have  carried  away  more  than  ten  thousand  horses  and  mules,  as  well  as  a 
countless  number  of  their  slaves.  I  estimate  the  damage  done  to  the  State 
of  Georgia  and  its  military  resources  at  one  hundred  millions  of  dollars  ;  at 
least  twenty  millions  of  which  has  inured  to  our  advantage,  and  the  re 
mainder  is  simple  waste  and  destruction" 


CHARACTER   OF   GEN.    SHERMAN.  615 

The  North  exhibited  its  characteristic  measure  of  greatness  by  taking 
Sherman's  "  march  from  the  mountains  to  the  seas  "  as  the  greatest  mili 
tary  exploit  of  modern  times.  It  fitted  the  Northern  idea  of  magnitude. 
It  was,  of  course,  "  the  Great  March,"  as  everything  the  North  admired, 
from  a  patent-machine  to  an  army,  was  "  the  great."  But  it  -is  difficult 
for  a  sober  historian  to  find  in  the  easy  marches  of  Sherman  through 
Georgia,  any  great  military  merit,  or  to  discover  in  the  excessively  vulgar 
character  of  this  commander  any  of  the  elements  of  the  hero/  Where  there 
is  nothing  to  oppose  an  army,  the  mere  accomplishment  of  distances  is  no 
great  wonder  or  glory.  From  the  time  Sherman  left  Gaylesville  to  the 
day  he  encountered  the  lines  around  Savannah,  he  never  had  a  thousand 
men  on  his  front  to  dispute  his  advance  ;  he  had  nothing  to  threaten  his 
rear  beyond  a  few  bodies  of  Confederate  horse  ;  he  moved  through  a  coun 
try  so  full  of  supplies  that  his  own  commissariat  was  scarcely  taxed  to  sub 
sist  his  army  ;  he  himself  telegraphed  to  Washington  :  "  Our  march  was 
most  agreeable,"  and  compared  it  to  "  a  pleasure-trip."  And  yet  this 
pleasant  excursion  the  North  insisted  upon  amplifying  as  a  great  military 
exploit,  to  be  compared  with  Napoleon's  march  to  Moscow,  and  other 
splendid  adventures  of  invasion,  while  the  chief  excursionist  was  raised  to 
the  dignity  of  a  hero. 

Sherman  is  an  example  of  the  reputation  achieved  in  the  North  by 
intrepid  charlatanism  and  self-assertion.  He  had  elements  of  Northern 
popularity  outside  of  the  severe  circle  of  military  accomplishments.  His 
swagger  was  almost  irresistible ;  he  wrote  slang  phrases  in  his  official  de 
spatches  ;  his  style  was  a  flash  Fourth-of-July  tangled  oratory,  that  never 
fails  to  bring  down  the  applause  of  a  Northern  mob.  It  is  the  office  of 
history  to  reduce  the  reputations  of  the  gazette.  The  man  who  is  now 
known  in  Northern  newspapers  as  a  hero  of  the  war  and  luminary  of  the 
military  age  will  scarcely  be  known  in  future  and  just  history,  further  than 
as  the  man  who  depopulated  and  destroyed  Atlanta,  essayed  a  new  code 
of  cruelty  in  war,  marched  so  many  miles,  achieved  much  bad  notoriety, 
and  ended  with  a  professional  fame  mediocre  and  insignificant,  holding  a 
place  no  longer  conspicuous  in  the  permanent  records  of  the  times. 


CHAPTER    XXXVIII. 

THE  EXCHANGE  OF  PEISONEES,  AND  THEIR  TBEATMENT  IN  CAPTIVITY. — EXCEEDING  INTEREST 
OF  THE  SUBJECT. — SLIGHT  ACCOUNT  OF  PRISONEES  IN  THE  EAELY  PEEIOD3  OF  THE  WAR, 
— ME.  BOYCE'S  PEOPOSITION. — THE  WOOL-COBB  NEGOTIATION. — THE  FOET  DONELSON  CAP- 

TUEES. — BAD  FAITH  OF  THE  FEDEEAL  GOVEENMENT. — THE  CARTEL  OF  1862. — CHARACTER 
OF  COMMISSIONER  OULD. — HIS  HUMANE  AND  ZEALOUS  SEEVICES. — SHAMEFUL  VIOLATION 
OF  THE  CAETEL  BY  THE  FEDEEAL  AUTHOEITIES. — SOLEMN  PEOTEST  OF  COMMISSIONER 
OULD. — COUNTEE-CHAEGE  OF  THE  FEDEEALS. — IT  IS  DISPEOVED  BY  COMMISSIONEE  OULD. 
— CASE  OF  STEEIGHT. — THE  FEDEEAL  GOVEENMENT  DECLARES  PAROLES  VOID. — COMMIS- 
BIONEE  OULD  DENOUNCES  THE  CHEAT. — HIS  RETALIATION  WITH  EESPECT  TO  THE  VICKS- 
BUEG  PRISONERS. — HE  WAIVES  THE  CARTEL,  AND  MAKES  A  NEW  PROPOSITION. — HE  SENDS 
TO  WASHINGTON  LISTS  OF  MORTALITY  IN  THE  ANDEESONVILLE  PEISON. — THE  FEDEEAL 
GOVEENMENT  DOES  NOT  REPLY. — ITS  PERSISTENT  AND  INHUMAN  SILENCE. — EXPLANATION 
OF  IT. — THE  WASHINGTON  GOVERNMENT  RESOLVED  TO  MAKE  A  CASE  OF  "  REBEL  BARBAR 
ITY." — THE  SITE,  ARRANGEMENTS  AND  DISCIPLINE  OF  THE  ANDERSONVILLE  PRISON. — 
EXPLANATION  OF  THE  SUFFERING  AND  MORTALITY  THEEE. — EXTRAORDINARY  PEOPOSI 
TION  OF  THE  CONFEDEEATE  GOVEENMENT  TO  EELEASE  WITHOUT  EQUIVALENTS  AND  WITH 
OUT  FORMALITY  ALL  SICK  AND  WOUNDED  FEDERAL  PRISONERS. — SECRETARY  STANTON 
DEAF  TO  THE  CRY  OF  THE  SUFFERERS. — HIS  GREAT  GUILT. — EXCHANGES  RESUMED  UNDER 
GEN.  GRANT'S  AUTHORITY. — REPORT  OF  THE  JOINT  SELECT  COMMITTEE  OF  THE  CONFED 
ERATE  CONGRESS,  APPOINTED  TO  INVESTIGATE  THE  CONDITION  AND  TREATMENT  OF  PRIS 
ONERS  OF  WAR. — NORTHERN  PUBLICATIONS  ON  THIS  SUBJECT. — REFUTATION"  OF  "  RAW- 
HEAD-AND-BLOODY-BONES  "  STORIES.— HUMANITY  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES. — 
A  TERRIBLE  RECORD  OF  FEDERAL  CRUELTIES. — BARBAROUS  PUNISHMENT  IN  NORTHERN 
PRISONS. — LAST  HUMANE  PROPOSITION  OF  COMMISSIONER  OULD. — HIS  LETTER  TO  GEN. 
GRANT. — A  COMPLETE  RECORD  OF  JUSTICE  AND  HUMANITY  ON  THE  PART  OF  THE  CONFED 
ERATES. 

THE  exchange  of  prisoners  taken  during  the  war  ;  their  treatment  in 
their  places  of  confinement  North  and  South  ;  the  incidents  of  the  cartel, 
altogether,  constitute  so  large  and  interesting  a  subject  that  we  have  re 
served  its  treatment  for  a  separate  chapter.  On  the  exposition  of  this  in 
tricate  matter  depends  much  of  the  good  name  of  the  Confederates  and  the 
contrary  title  of  the  enemy ;  and  it  may  be  remarked  that  no  subject  which 
tended  to  keep  alive  a  feeling  of  bitterness  aiicl  animosity  between  the 


THE   WOOL-COBB   NEGOTIATION.  617 

Northern  and  Southern  people  was  more  effective  than  recrimination  about 
the  cartel,  and  the  alleged  cruelty  to  prisoners  of  war  on  both  sides.  The 
exposition  we  propose  to  make  is  mainly  by  a  chain  of  records,  extending 
through  the  war,  thus  best  securing  authenticity  of  statement,  and  com 
bining  these  documents  in  a  unity  of  narrative,  so  as  to  place  before  the 
reader  a  complete  view  and  a  severe  analysis  of  the  whole  subject. 

In  the  first  periods  of  the  war,  and  with  the  prospect  of  its  early  termi 
nation,  but  little  account  was  taken  of  prisoners  captured  on  either  sida 
Indeed,  some  time  elapsed  at  Washington  before  any  lists  were  kept  of 
these  captures ;  and  after  the  first  remarkable  battle  of  the  war,  that  of 
Manassas,  in  1861,  it  was  actually  proposed  (by  Mr.  Boyce  of  South  Caro 
lina),  in  the  Provisional  Congress  at  Richmond,  to  send  back  the  Federal 
prisoners  taken  on  that  field  without  any  formality  whatever.  The  Fort 
Donelson  capture,  however,  appeared  to  have  developed  for  the  first  time 
the  value  and  interest  of  the  exchange  question,  and  was  the  occasion  of 
remarkable  perfidy  on  the  part  of  the  Washington  authorities. 

Just  previous  to  these  important  captures,  Gen.  Wool,  on  the  Federal 
side,  had  declared,  in  a  letter  dated  the  13th  February,  1862  :  "  I  am  alone 
clothed  with  full  power,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  for  the  exchange  of 
prisoners,"  and  had  invited  a  conference  on  the  subject.  Gen.  Howell 
Cobb,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederacy,  was  appointed  to  negotiate  with 
him  ;  and  the  two  officers  decided  upon  a  cartel  by  which  prisoners  taken 
on  either  side  should  be  paroled  within  ten  days  after  their  capture,  and 
delivered  on  the  frontier  of  their  own  country.  The  only  point  of  tenacious 
difference  between  them  was  as  to  a  provision  requiring  each  party  to  pay 
the  expense  of  transporting  their  prisoners  to  the  frontier  ;  and  this  point 
Gen.  AVool  promised  to  refer  to  the  decision  of  his  Government.  At  a 
second  interview  on  the  1st  March,  Gen.  Wool  declared  that  his  Govern 
ment  would  not  consent  to  pay  these  expenses  ;  when  Gen.  Cobb  promptly 
gave  up  the  point,  leaving  the  cartel  free  from  all  of  Gen.  Wool's  objec 
tions,  and  just  what  he  had  proposed  in  his  letter  of  the  13th  February. 
Upon  this,  Gen.  Wool  informed  Gen.  Cobb  that  "  his  Government  had 
changed  his  instructions,"  and  abruptly  broke  off  the  negotiation.  The 
occasion  of  this  bad  faith  and  dishonour  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  was, 
that  in  the  interval  they  had  taken  several  thousand  prisoners  at  Fort 
Donelson,  which  reversed  the  former  state  of  things,  and  gave  them  a  sur 
plus  of  prisoners,  who,  instead  of  being  returned  on  parole,  were  carried 
into  the  interiour,  and  incarcerated  with  every  circumstance  of  indignity. 

In  the  second  year  of  the  war  a  distinct  understanding  was  obtained  on 
the  subject  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners  of  war,  and  the  following  cartel 
was  respectively  signed  and  duly  executed  on  the  part  of  the  two  Govern 
ments.  This  important  instrument  of  war  invites  a  close  examination  of 
the  reader,  and  is  copied  in  full : 


618  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 


HAXALL'S  LANDING,  ON  JAMES  BIVEB,  July  22,  1862. 

The  undersigned,  haying  been  commissioned  by  the  authorities  they  respectively 
represent,  to  make  arrangements  for  a  general  exchange  of  prisoners  of  war,  have  agreed 
to  the  following  articles  : 

ARTICLE  I.  It  is  hereby  agreed  and  stipulated,  that  all  prisoners  of  war  held  by 
either  party,  including  those  taken  on  private  armed  vessels,  known  as  privateers,  shall 
be  exchanged  upon  the  conditions  and  terms  following  : 

Prisoners  to  be  exchanged,  man  for  man  and  officer  for  officer ;  privateers  to  be  placed 
upon  the  footing  of  officers  and  men  of  the  navy. 

Men  and  officers  of  lower  grades,  may  be  exchanged  for  officers  of  a  higher  grade, 
and  men  and  officers  of  different  services  may  be  exchanged  according  to  the  following 
scale  of  equivalents. 

A  general-commanding-in-chief,  or  an  admiral,  shall  be  exchanged  for  officers  of 
equal  rank  or  for  sixty  privates  or  common  seamen. 

A  flag  officer  or  major-general  shall  be  exchanged  for  officers  of  equal  rank  or  for 
forty  privates  or  common  seamen. 

A  commodore,  carrying  a  broad  pennant,  or  a  brigadier-general  shall  be  exchanged 
for  officers  of  equal  rank  or  twenty  privates  or  common  seamen. 

A  captain  in  the  navy  or  a  colonel  shall  be  exchanged  for  officers  of  equal  rank  or 
for  fifteen  privates  or  common  seamen. 

A  lieutenant-colonel,  or  commander  in  the  navy,  shall  be  exchanged  for  officers  of 
equal  rank  or  for  ten  privates  or  common  seamen. 

A  lieutenant-commander  or  a  major  shall  be  exchanged  for  officers  of  equal  rank 
or  eight  privates  or  common  seamen. 

A  lieutenant  or  a  master  in  the  navy  or  a  captain  in  the  army  or  marines  shall  be 
exchanged  for  officers  of  equal  rank  or  six  privates  or  common  seamen. 

Master's  mates  in  the  navy,  or  lieutenants  or  ensigns  in  the  army,  shall  be  exchanged 
for  officers  of  equal  rank  or  four  privates  or  common  seamen. 

Midshipmen,  warrant  officers  in  the  navy,  masters  of  merchant  vessels  and  command 
ers  of  privateers,  shall  be  exchanged  for  officers  of  equal  rank  or  three  privates  or  com 
mon  seamen ;  second  captains,  lieutenants,  or  mates  of  merchant  vessels  or  privateers, 
and  all  petty  officers  in  the  navy,  and  all  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  army  or 
marines,  shall  be  severally  exchanged  for  persons  of  equal  rank  or  for  two  privates  or 
common  seamen ;  and  private  soldiers  or  common  seamen,  shall  be  exchanged  for  each 
other,  man  for  man. 

ARTICLE  II.  Local,  State,  civil,  and  militia  rank  held  by  persons  not  in  actual  mili 
tary  service,  will  not  be  recognized  ;  the  basis  of  exchange  being  the  grade  actually  held 
in  the  naval  and  military  service  of  the  respective  parties. 

ARTICLE  ILL  If  citizens  held  by  either  party  on  charges  of  disloyalty  for  any  alleged 
civil  offence  are  exchanged,  it  shall  only  be  for  citizens.  Captured  sutlers,  teamsters^ 
and  all  civilians  in  the  actual  service  of  either  party  to  be  exchanged  for  persons  in 
similar  position. 

ARTICLE  IV.  All  prisoners  of  war  to  be  discharged  on  parole  in  ten  days  after  their 
capture,  and  the  prisoners  now  held  and  those  hereafter  taken  to  be  transported  to  the 
points  mutually  agreed  upon,  at  the  expense  of  the  capturing  party.  The  surplus  pris 
oners,  not  exchanged,  shall  not  be  permitted  to  take  up  arms  again,  nor  to  serve  as 
military  police,  or  constabulary  force  in  any  fort,  garrison,  or  field  work,  held  by  either 
of  the  respective  parties,  nor  as  guards  of  prisoners,  deposit,  or  stores,  nor  to  discharge 
any  duty  usually  performed  by  soldiers,  until  exchanged  under  the  provisions  of  this 


THE   CARTEL.  619 

cartel.    The  exchange  is  not  to  be  considered  complete  until  the  officer  or  soldier  ex 
changed  for  has  been  actually  restored  to  the  lines  to  which  he  belongs. 

ARTICLE  V.  Each  party,  upon  the  discharge  of  prisoners  of  the  other  party,  is  au 
thorized  to  discharge  an  equal  number  of  their  own  officers  or  men  from  parole,  furnish 
ing  at  the  same  time  to  the  other  party  a  list  of  their  prisoners  discharged,  and  of  their 
own  officers  and  men  relieved  from  parole ;  thus  enabling  each  party  to  relieve  from 
parole  such  of  their  own  officers  and  men  as  the  party  may  choose.  The  lists  thus  mu 
tually  furnished  will  keep  both  parties  advised  of  the  true  condition  of  the  exchange  of 
prisoners. 

ARTICLE  VI.  The  stipulations  and  provisions  above  mentioned  to  be  of  binding 
obligation  during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  it  matters  not  which  party  may  have  the 
surplus  of  prisoners,  the  great  principles  involved  being  :  1st.  An  equitable  exchange  of 
prisoners,  man  for  man,  officer  for  officer,  or  officers  of  higher  grade,  exchanged  for  offi 
cers  of  lower  grade,  or  for  privates,  according  to  the  scale  of  equivalents.  3d.  That 
privates  and  officers  and  men  of  different  services  may  be  exchanged  according  to  the 
same  scale  of  equivalents.  3d.  That  all  prisoners,  of  whatever  arm  of  service,  are  to  be 
exchanged  or  paroled  in  ten  days  from  the  time  of  their  capture,  if  it  be  practicable  to 
transfer  them  to  their  own  lines  in  that  time ;  if  not,  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable. 
4th.  That  no  officer,  soldier,  employee  in  service  of  either  party  is  to  be  considered  as 
exchanged  and  absolved  from  his  parole  until  his  equivalent  has  actually  reached  the 
lines  of  his  friends.  5th.  That  the  parole  forbids  the  performance  of  field,  garrison, 
police,  or  guard,  or  constabulary  duty. 

JOHN  A.  DIX,  Major- General. 

D.  H.  HILL,  Major- General,  C.  8.  A. 


SUPPLEMENTARY    ARTICLES. 

ARTICLE  VII.  All  prisoners  of  war  now  held  on  either  side,  and  all  prisoners  hereafter 
taken,  shall  be  sent,  with  all  reasonable  despatch,  to  A.  M.  Aiken's,  below  Dutch  Gap, 
on  the  James  River,  in  Virginia,  or  to  Vicksburg,  on  the  Mississippi  River,  in  the  State 
of  Mississippi,  and  there  exchanged  or  paroled  until  such  exchange  can  be  effected,  no 
tice  being  previously  given  by  each  party  of  the  number  of  prisoners  it  will  send,  and 
the  time  when  they  will  be  delivered  at  those  points  respectively  ;  and  in  case  the  vicis 
situdes  of  war  shall  change  the  military  relations  of  the  places  designated  in  this  article 
to  the  contending  parties,  so  as  to  render  the  same  inconvenient  for  the  delivery  and  ex 
change  of  prisoners,  other  places,  bearing  as  nearly  as  may  be  the  present  local  relations 
of  said  places  to  the  lines  of  said  parties,  shall  be,  by  mutual  agreement,  substituted. 
But  nothing  in  this  article  contained  shall  prevent  the  commanders  of  two  opposing 
armies  from  exchanging  prisoners,  or  releasing  them  on  parole,  at  other  points  mutually 
agreed  on  by  said  commanders. 

ARTICLE  VIII.  For  the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect  the  foregoing  articles  of 
agreement,  each  party  will  appoint  two  agents,  to  be  called  agents  for  the  exchange  of 
prisoners  of  war,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  communicate  with  each  other,  by  correspond 
ence  and  otherwise ;  to  prepare  the  lists  of  prisoners ;  to  attend  to  the  delivery  of  the 
prisoners  at  the  places  agreed  on,  and  to  carry  out  promptly,  effectually,  and  in  good 
faith,  all  the  details  and  provisions  of  the  said  articles  of  agreement. 

ARTICLE  IX.  And  in  case  any  misunderstanding  shall  arise  in  regard  to  any  clause 
or  stipulation  in  the  foregoing  articles,  it  is  mutually  agreed  that  such  misunderstand- 


620  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

ing  shall  not  interrupt  the  release  of  prisoners  on  parole,  as  herein  provided,  but  shall  be 
made  the  subject  of  friendly  explanation,  in  order  that  the  object  of  this  agreement  may 
neither  be  defeated  nor  posptoned. 

JOHN  A.  DIX, .Major- General 

D.  H.  HILL,  Major- General,  C.  S.  A. 

Mr.  Robert  Ould  was  appointed  agent  of  the  Confederacy  under  this 
important  text  of  the  war.  He  was  eminently  qualified  for  the  office.  He 
was  among  the  most  accomplished  jurists  of  the  country  ;  he  had  one  of 
the  most  vigorous  intellects  in  the  Confederacy  ;  he  was  a  man  of  large 
huinamty,  dignified,  and  even  lofty  manners,  and  spotless  personal  honour. 
The  record  of  his  services  in  the  cause  of  humanity  and  truth  was  one  of 
the  purest  in  either  the  public  bureau  or  secret  chamber  of  the  Confederacy. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  chief,  if  not  the  only  purpose,  of  the  instrument 
copied  above  was  to  secure  the  release  of  all  prisoners  of  war.  To  that 
end  the  fourth  article  provided  that  all  prisoners  of  war  should  be  dis 
charged  on  parole  in  ten  days  after  their  capture,  and  that  the  prisoners 
then  held  and  those  thereafter  taken  should  be  transported  to  the  points 
mutually  agreed  upon,  at  the  expense  of  the  capturing  party.  The  sixth 
article  also  stipulated  that  "  all  prisoners  of  whatever  arm  of  service  are 
to  be  exchanged  or  paroled  in  ten  days  from  the  time  of  their  capture,  if 
it  be  practicable  to  transfer  them  to  their  own  lines  in  that  time  ;  if  not, 
as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable." 

From  the  date  of  the  cartel  until  July,  1863,  the  Confederate  authori 
ties  held  the  excess  of  prisoners.  During  that  interval  deliveries  were 
made  as  fast  as  the  Federal  Government  furnished  transportation.  Indeed, 
upon  more  than  one  occasion,  Commissioner  Ould  urged  the  Federal  au 
thorities  to  send  increased  means  of  transportation.  As  ready  as  the  ene 
my  always  has  been  to  bring  false  accusations  against  the  Confederates,  it 
has  never  been  alleged  that  they  failed  or  neglected  to  make  prompt  de 
liveries  of  prisoners  who  were  not  under  charges  when  they  held  the  ex 
cess.  On  the  other  hand,  during  the  same  time  the  cartel  was  openly  and 
notoriously  violated  by  the  Federal  authorities.  Officers  and  men  were 
kept  in  cruel  confinement,  sometimes  in  irons  or  doomed  to  cells,  without 
charge  or  trial. 

These  facts  were  distinctly  charged  in  the  correspondence  of  Commis 
sioner  Ould.  On  the  26th  July,  1863,  he  addressed  a  letter  to  Lieut-Col . 
Ludlow,  then  acting  as  agent  of  exchange  on  the  Federal  side,  in  which  he 
used  the  following  impressive  and  vigorous  language  in  vindication  of 
himself  and  his  Government :  "  Now  that  our  official  connection  is  being 
terminated,  I  say  to  you  in  the  fear  of  God — and  I  appeal  to  Him  for  the 
truth  of  the  declaration — that  there  has  been  no  single  moment,  from  the 
time  we  were  first  brought  together  in  connection  with  the  matter  of  ex 
change  to  the  present  hour,  during  which  there  has  not  been  an  open  and 


VIOLATION  OF  THE  CARTEL  BY  THE  NORTH.  C21 

notorious  violation  of  the  cartel,  by  your  authorities.  Officers  and  men, 
numbering  over  hundreds,  have  been,  during  your  whole  connection  with 
the  cartel,  kept  in  cruel  confinement,  sometimes  in  irons,  or  doomed  to  cells, 
without  charges  or  trial.  They  are  in  prison  now,  unless  God,  in  His 
mercy,  has  released  them.  In  our  parting  moments,  let  me  do  you  the 
justice  to  say  that  I  do  not  believe  it  is  so  much  your  fault  as  that  of  your 
authorities.  Nay,  more,  I  believe  your  removal  from  your  position  has 
been  owing  to  the  personal  efforts  you  have  made  for  a  faithful  observ 
ance,  not  only  of  the  cartel,  but  of  humanity,  in  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

"  Again  and  again  have  I  importuned  you  to  tell  me  of  one  officer  or 
man  now  held  in  confinement  by  us,  who  was  declared  exchanged.  You 
have,  to  those  appeals,  furnished  one,  Spencer  Kellog.  For  him  I  have 
searched  in  vain.  On  the  other  hand,  I  appeal  to  your  own  records  for 
the  cases  where  your  reports  have  shown  that  our  officers  and  men  have 
been  held  for  long  months  and  even  years  in  violation  of  the  cartel  and 
our  agreements.  The  last  phase  of  the  enormity,  however,  exceeds  all 
others.  Although  you  have  many  thousands  of  our  soldiers  now  in  con 
finement  in  your  prisons,  and  especially  in  that  horrible  hold  of  death, 
Fort  Delaware,  you  have  not,  for  several  weeks,  sent  us  any  prisoners. 
During  those  weeks  you  have  despatched  Capt.  Mulford  with  the  steamer 
New  York  to  City  Point,  three  or  four  times,  withoiit  any  prisoners.  For 
the  first  two  or  three  times  some  sort  of  an  excuse  was  attempted.  None 
is  given  at  this  present  arrival.  I  do  not  mean  to  be  offensive  when  I  say 
that  effrontery  could  not  give  one.  I  ask  you  with  no  purpose  of  disre 
spect,  what  can  you  think  of  this  covert  attempt  to  secure  the  delivery  of 
all  your  prisoners  in  our  hands,  without  the  release  of  those  of  ours  who 
are  languishing  in  hopeless  misery  in  your  prisons  and  dungeons  ?  " 

It  is  a  fact  beyond  all  controversy  that  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Con 
federacy  entitled  to  delivery  and  exchange,  were  kept  in  confinement,  in 
defiance  of  the  cartel,  some  under  charges,  and  some  without.  Many  of 
these  officers  and  soldiers  were  in  confinement  at  the  time  of  the  adoption 
of  the  cartel,  and  continued  to  be  so  kept  for  months  and  years  afterwards. 
In  a  few  instances  Commissioner  Ould  succeeded  by  persistent  pressure  in 
securing  their  release.  In  other  cases,  when  from  returned  prisoners  he 
would  learn  their  place  of  confinement,  and  state  it  to  the  Federal  agent, 
there  would  either  be  a  denial  of  the  fact  that  the  party  was  confined 
there,  or  he  would  be  removed  to  some  other  prison.  Many  of  these  pris 
oners  were  actually  declared  exchanged  by  the  Federal  Agent  of  Ex 
change,  but  yet  still  kept  in  prison,  and  all  the  others  were  entitled  to  de 
livery  for  exchange  under  the  terms  of  the  cartel. 

To  the  serious  allegation  of  a  retention  of  prisoners  in  spite  of  the  cartel 
and  all  the  obligations  of  good  faith,  the  Federal  Government  never  at 
tempted  anything  but  a  paltry  counter-charge  of  the  weakest  and  most 


622  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

disingenuous  kind.  During  the  period  before  mentioned  the  only  com 
plaints  made  by  the  Federal  authorities  of  any  breach  of  the  cartel,  were 
in  the  cases  of  such  officers  as  were  retained  in  consequence  of  President 
Davis'  several  proclamations,  and  in  the  case  of  Gen.  Streight  and  his 
officers.  In  looking  back  over  the  prison  records  of  the  Confederacy,  the 
author  can  find  no  instance  of  any  officers  or  men  who  were  kept  in  pris 
on  after  the  date  of  the  cartel  under  the  proclamations  of  Mr.  Davis.  In 
point  of  fact,  nothing  was  ever  done  under  them.  ~No  inquiry  was  ever 
made  whether  the  prisoners  led  negro  troops  or  not.  Streight's  men  were 
detained  for  several  months.  The  reasons  for  their  detention  were  fully 
given.  In  a  letter  written  by  Commissioner  Ould,  August  1st,  1863,  to 
Brig.-Gen.  Meredith,  he  said :  "  In  retaining  Col.  Streight  and  his  com 
mand,  the  Confederate  authorities  have  not  gone  as  far  as  those  of  the 
United  States  have  claimed  for  themselves  the  right  to  go  ever  since  the 
establishment  of  the  cartel.  You  have  claimed  and  exercised  the  right  to 
retain  officers  and  men  indefinitely,  not  only  upon  charges  actually  pre 
ferred,  but  upon  mere  suspicion.  You  have  now  in  custody  officers  who 
were  in  confinement  when  the  cartel  was  framed,  and  who  have  since  been 
declared  exchanged.  Some  of  them  have  been  tried,  but  most  of  them 
have  languished  in  prison  all  the  weary  time  without  trial  or  charges. 
I  stand  prepared  to  prove  these  assertions.  This  course  was  pursued,  too, 
in  the  face  not  only  of  notice,  but  of  protest.  Do  you  deny  to  us  the  right 
to  detain  officers  and  men  for  trial  upon  grave  charges,  while  you  claim 
the  right  to  keep  in  confinement  any  who  may  be  the  object  of  your  sus 
picion  or  special  enmity  ?  " 

Commissioner  Ould  also  informed  the  Federal  authorities,  in  1863,  that 
the  charges  against  Streight  and  his  command  were  not  sustained,  and  that 
they  were  held  as  other  prisoners.  At  the  time,  however,  of  this  latter 
notification,  other  difficulties  had  supervened,  which  had  almost  entirely 
stopped  exchanges. 

Up  to  July,  1863,  the  Confederates  had  a  large  excess  of  prisoners. 
The  larger  number  had  been  released  upon  parole  after  capture.  Such 
paroles  had  been  without  question  respected  by  both  parties,  until  about 
the  middle  of  1863,  when  they  were  to  be  declared  to  be  void  (except 
under  very  special  circumstances)  by  General  Orders  at  Washington.  The 
true  reason  of  those  General  Orders  was  that  the  Federals  had  no  lists  of 
paroled  prisoners  (released  on  capture)  to  be  charged  against  the  Confed 
erates.  The  latter  had  paid  off  all  debts  of  that  kind  from  their  abundant 
stores.  They,  on  the  other  hand,  had  many  such  lists  which  were  unsatis 
fied,  being  principally  captures  in  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  etc.  Such  being 
the  state  of  affairs,  on  the  8th  of  April,  1863,  Commisssioner  Ould  was  in 
formed  that  "  exchanges  will  be  confined  to  such  equivalents  as  are  held  in 
confinement  on  either  side."  In  other  words,  as  all  the  paroles  held  by 


THE   EXCHANGE   QUESTION.  623 

the  Federals  had  been  satisfied  and  paid  for  in  equivalents,  and  as  they 
then  held  none  of  such  to  be  charged  against  the  Confederates,  they  would 
no  longer  respect  such  as  they  held,  and  the  latter  must  deliver  men  actu 
ally  in  captivity  for  such  as  they  would  send.  The  Confederates  then  had 
the  outstanding  paroles,  but  the  Federals  had  the  majority  of  prisoners  in 
hand.  The  effect  of  all  this  would  have  been,  after  the  Confederates  had 
delivered  all  their  prisoners,  to  leave  a  large  balance  of  their  people  in 
prison,  while  they  at  the  same  time  had  in  their  possession  the  paroles  of 
ten  times  as  many  prisoners  as  the  enemy  held  in  captivity.  This  arrange 
ment  Commissioner  Ould  refused  with  indignation.  The  officers  and  men, 
who  gave  the  paroles  referred  to,  were  subsequently,  in  violation  of  their 
parole,  and  without  being  declared  exchanged,  ordered  to  duty,  and 
served  against  the  South.  Thereupon,  Commissioner  Ould  off-setted  such 
paroles  against  similar  paroles  taken  by  our  officers  and  men  at  Vicksburg, 
and  declared  a  like  number  of  the  latter  exchanged.  That  was  the  only 
way  he  had  of  "  getting  even  "  with  the  enemy  ;  and  no  one  can  say  that 
the  way  was  not  fair  and  honourable. 

From  this  time  the  provision  of  the  cartel,  that  all  prisoners,  where 
practicable,  were  to  be  delivered  within  ten  days  was  practically  nullified, 
and  was  not  respected  during  the  remainder  of  the  war.  Such  deliveries 
as  were  made  afterwards,  were  in  consequence  of  special  agreements.  The 
most  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  Commissioner  Ould  to  remedy  this 
distressing  state  of  things.  The  Confederate  authorities  only  claimed  that 
the  provisions  of  the  cartel  should  be  fulfilled.  They  only  asked  the  ene 
my  to  do  what,  without  any  hesitation,  they  had  done  during  the  first  year 
of  the  operation  of  the  cartel.  Seeing  a  persistent  purpose  on  the  part  of 
the  Federal  Government  to  violate  its  own  agreement,  the  Confederate  au 
thorities,  moved  ly  the  sufferings  of  the  men  in  the  prisons  of  each  belligerent, 
determined  to  abate  their  fair  demands,  and  accordingly,  on  the  10th  of 
August,  1864,  Commissioner  Ould  addressed  the  following  communication 
to  Major  John  E.  Mulford,  Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange  : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  August  10th,  1864. 

Mcy.  John  E.  Mulford,  Asst.  Agent  of  Exchange : 

SIR :  You  have  several  times  proposed  to  me  to  exchange  the  prisoners  respectively 
held  by  the  two  belligerents,  officer  for  officer,  and  man  for  man.  The  same  offer  has 
also  been  made  by  other  officials  having  charge  of  matters  connected  with  the  exchange 
of  prisoners.  This  proposal  has  heretofore  been  declined  by  the  Confederate  authorities, 
they  insisting  upon  the  terms  of  the  cartel,  which  required  the  delivery  of  the  excess  on 
either  side  upon  parole.  In  view,  however,  of  the  very  large  number  of  prisoners  now 
held  by  each  party,  and  the  suffering  consequent  upon  their  continued  confinement, 
I  now  consent  to  the  above  proposal  and  agree  to  deliver  to  you  the  prisoners  held  in 
captivity  by  the  Confederate  authorities,  provided  you  agree  to  deliver  an  equal  number 
of  Confederate  officers  and  men.  As  equal  numbers  are  delivered  from  time  to  time, 
they  will  be  declared  exchanged.  This  proposal  is  made  with  the  understanding  that  the 


624:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

officers  and  men  on  both  sides,  who  have  been  longest  in  captivity,  will  be  first  delivered, 
where  it  is  practicable.  I  shall  be  happy  to  hear  from  you  as  speedily  as  possible, 
whether  this  arrangement  can  be  carried  out. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  OULD,  Agent  of  Exchange. 

The  delivery  of  this  letter  was  accompanied  with  a  statement  of  the 
mortality  which  was  hurrying  so  many  Federal  prisoners,  at  Andersonville, 
to  the  grave. 

On  the  20th  of  the  same  month  Major  Mulford  returned  with  the  flag 
of  truce  steamer,  but  brought  no  answer  to  the  letter  of  the  10th  of  August. 
In  conversation  with  him,  Commissioner  Ould  asked  if  he  had  any  reply  to 
make  to  the  communication,  and  his  answer  was  that  he  was  not  author 
ized  to  make  any.  So  deep  was  the  solicitude  which  Commissioner  Ould 
felt  in  the  fate  of  the  captives  in  Northern  prisons,  that  he  determined  to 
make  another  effort.  In  order  to  obviate  any  objection  which  technicality 
might  raise  as  to  the  person  to  whom  his  communication  was  addressed, 
he  wrote  to  Maj.-Gen.  E.  A.  Hitchcock,  the  Federal  Commissioner  of 
Exchange,  residing  in  Washington  city,  the  following  letter,  and  delivered 
the  same  to  Major  Mulford  on  the  day  of  its  date.  Accompanying  that 
letter  was  a  copy  of  the  communication  which  he  had  addressed  to  Major 
Mulford  on  the  10th  of  August : 

RICHMOND,  August  22,  1864. 

Maj.-Gen.  E.  A.  Hitchcock,  II.  8.  Commissioner  of  Exchange: 

SIR  :  Enclosed  is  a  copy  of  a  communication  which,  on  the  10th  inst.,  I  addressed 
and  delivered  to  Major  Jno.  E.  Mulford,  Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange.  Under  the  cir 
cumstances  of  the  case,  I  deem  it  proper  to  forward  this  paper  to  you,  in  order  that  you 
may  fully  understand  the  position  which  is  taken  by  the  Confederate  authorities.  I  shall 
be  glad  if  the  proposition  therein  made  is  accepted  by  your  Government. 

Respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

Ro.  OULD,  Agent  of  Exchange. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  30th  August,  Commissioner  Ould  was  notified 
that  the  flag  of  truce  steamer  had  again  appeared  at  Yarina.  On  the  fol 
lowing  day  he  sent  to  Maj.  Mulford  the  following  note : 

RICHMOND,  August  31,  1864. 

Maj.  John  E.  Mulford,  Assistant  Agent  of  Exchange  : 

SIR  :  On  the  10th  of  this  month  I  addressed  you  a  communication,  to  which  I  have 
received  no  answer.  On  the  22d  inst.  I  also  addressed  a  communication  to  Maj.-Gen. 
E.  A.  Hitchcock,  TJ.  S.  Commissioner  of  Exchange,  enclosing  a  copy  of  my  letter  to  you 
of  the  10th  inst.  I  now  respectfully  ask  you  to  state  in  writing  whether  you  have  any 
reply  to  either  of  said  communications ;  and  if  not,  whether  you  have  any  reason  to 
give  why  no  reply  has  been  made  ? 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Ro.  OULD,  Agent  of  Exchange* 


STOKIE8   OF    "  REBEL   BAKBAKITIES."  625 

In  a  short  time  Commissioner  Quid  received  the  following  re 
sponse  : 

FLAG  OF  TRUCE  STEAMER,  "NEW  YORK.'»  ) 
VAHINA,  VA.,  August  31,  1864.  } 

Hon.  R.  Otdd,  Agent  of  Exchange  : 

SIK  :  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  favour  of  to-day,  request 
ing  answer,  etc.,  to  your  communication  of  the  10th  inst.,  on  the  question  of  the  ex 
change  of  prisoners.  To  which,  in  reply,  I  would  say,  I  have  no  communication  on  the 
subject  from  our  authorities,  nor  am  I  yet  authorized  to  make  answer. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 
JOHN  E.  MULFORD,  Ass>t  Agent  of  Exchange. 

This  was  the  whole  Federal  reply  to  the  humane  proposition  of  the 
Confederacy — this  the  brief  indication  of  their  cruel  purpose  to  let  their 
prisoners  rot  and  die  in  insufficient  prisons,  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
pointing  a  libel  and  colouring  a  story  against  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
The  offer  of  Commissioner  Ould  was  on  the  extreme  of  generosity.  He 
proposed,  when  the  enemy  had  a  large  excess  of  prisoners,  to  exchange 
officer  for  officer  and  man  for  man.  This  arrangement  would  have  left  the 
surplus  in  the  enemy's  hands.  But  the  liberal  offer,  which  would  have 
instantly  restored  to  life  and  freedom  thousands  of  suffering  captives, 
was  never  even  heeded  at  Washington ;  it  was  brutally  calculated  there 
that  such  a  delivery  from  the  prison  pens  of  Andersonville  and  elsewhere 
would  put  so  many  thousand  Confederate  muskets  in  the  field,  and  cut  off 
a  chapter  of  horrours,  from  which  it  had  been  convenient  to  draw  texts  on 
the  subject  of  "  rebel  barbarities."  To  keep  that  text  before  the  world  was 
the  determined  purpose  at  Washington.  It  had  again  and  again  been  an 
nounced  that  the  subsistence  of  the  Confederacy  had  fallen  so  low — chiefly 
through  the  warfare  of  the  enemy  making  it  a  point  to  destroy  in  all  parts 
of  the  country  supplies  of  every  kind — that  its  own  soldiers  were  compelled 
to  subsist  upon  a  third  of  a  pound  of  meat  and  a  pound  of  coarse  corn  meal 
or  flour  every  day.  With  such  reduced  rations,  Confederate  soldiers  them 
selves  were  often  exposed  with  thin  and  tattered  clothes  to  the  freezing 
winter  storms,  without  tents,  overcoats,  blankets  or  shoes.  In  these  cir 
cumstances  it  was  impossible  to  provide  properly  for  many  tens  of  thou 
sands  of  prisoners  at  Andersonville,  Salisbury,  and  other  places  south  of 
Richmond,  where  crowded  quarters,  prepared  only  for  smaller  numbers, 
and  frequent  removals  to  prevent  recapture,  added  to  the  discomfort  of  the 
prisoners,  and  swelled  the  list  of  mortality.  The  authorities  at  Washing 
ton  refused  to  do  their  own  part  to  relieve  the  sufferings  of  these  unhappy 
men,  and  deliberately  decreed  the  extension  of  their  sufferings  that  they 
might  put  before  the  world  false  and  plausible  proofs  of  "  rebel  barbarity." 

It  is  simply  in  opposition  to  all  that  is  known  of  Southern  generosity 
in  the  war  to  believe  that  the  sufferings  of  Andersonville  were  the  result 
40 


626  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

of  neglect,  still  less  of  design  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  Government. 
A  single  train  of  acts  is  not  likely  to  be  so  opposed  to  the  whole  career  and 
consistent  character  of  a  people  in  a  four  years'  war.  The  site  of  the  prison 
at  Andersonville — a  point  on  the  Southwestern  railway  in  Georgia  had 
been  selected  under  an  official  order  having  reference  to  the  following 
points  :  "  A  healthy  locality,  plenty  of  pure  good  water,  a  running  stream, 
and,  if  possible,  shade  trees,  and  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  grist 
and  saw  mills."  The  pressure  was  so  great  at  Richmond,  and  the  supplies 
so  scant,  that  prisoners  were  sent  forward  while  the  stockade  was  only 
about  half  finished.  When  the  first  instalment  of  prisoners  arrived,  there 
was  no  guard  at  Andersonville,  and  the  little  squad  which  had  charge  of 
them  in  the  cars  had  to  remain ;  and  at  no  time  did  the  guard,  efficient  and 
on  duty,  exceed  fifteen  hundred,  to  man  the  stockade,  to  guard,  and  do 
general  duty,  and  afford  relief  and  enforce  discipline  over  thirty-four  thou 
sand  prisoners. 

In  regard  to  the  sufferings  and  mortality  among  the  prisoners  at  An 
dersonville,  none  of  it  arose  from  the  unhealthiness  of  the  locality.  The 
food,  though  the  same  as  that  used  by  the  Confederate  soldiers,  the  bread, 
too,  being  corn,  was  different  from  that  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed, 
did  not  agree  with  them,  and  scurvy  and  diarrhosa  prevailed  to  a  consider 
able  extent ;  neither  disease,  however,  was  the  result  of  starvation.  That 
some  prisoners  did  not  get  their  allowance,  although  a  full  supply  was  sent 
in,  is  true.  But  there  not  being  a  guard  sufficient  to  attend  to  distribution, 
Federal  prisoners  were  appointed,  each  having  a  certain  number  allotted 
to  his  charge,  among  whom  it  was  his  duty  to  see  that  every  man  got  his 
portion,  and,  as  an  inducement,  this  prisoner  had  especial  favours  and  ad 
vantages  ;  upon  complaint  by  those  under  him,  he  was  broke  and  another 
selected ;  so  that  it  only  required  good  faith  on  -the  part  of  these  head  men, 
thus  appointed,  to  insure  to  each  man  his  share.  But  prisoners  would  often 
sell  their  rations  for  whiskey  and  tobacco,  and  would  sell  the  clothes 
from  their  backs  for  either  of  them. 

In  regard  to  sanitary  regulations,  there  were  certain  prescribed  places 
and  modes  for  the  reception  of  all  filth,  and  a  sluice  was  made  to  carry  it 
off;  but  the  most  abominable  disregard  was  manifested  of  all  sanitary 
regulations,  and  to  such  a  degree  that  if  a  conspiracy  had  been  entered  into 
by  a  large  number  of  the  prisoners  to  cause  the  utmost  filth  and  stench, 
it  could  not  have  accomplished  a  more  disgusting  result.  Besides  which 
there  was  a  large  number  of  atrocious  villains,  whose  outrages  in  robbing, 
beating  and  murdering  their  fellow-prisoners  must  have  been  the  cause, 
directly  or  remotely,  of  very  many  deaths  and  of  an  inconceivable  amount 
of  suffering.  We  must  recollect  that  among  thirty-four  thousand  prison 
ers,  who  had  encountered  the  hardships  of  the  fields  of  many  battles,  and 
had  had  wounds,  there  were  many  of  delicate  physique — many  of  respect- 


THE   ANDERSONVILLE  PRISON.  627 

ability,  to  whom  such  fellowship,  such  self-created  filth,  and  such  atrocious 
ruffianism,  would  of  itself  cause  despondency,  disease,  and  death ;  and 
when,  in  addition  to  this,  was  the  conviction  that  the  Federal  War  De 
partment,  perfectly  cognizant  of  all  this,  had  deliberately  consigned 
them  indefinitely  to  this  condition,  a  consuming  despair  was  superadded 
to  all  their  other  sufferings. 

The  merits  of  Andersonville  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that  it  was 
of  unquestioned  healthfulness  ;  it  was  large  enough  and  had  water  enough, 
and  could  have  been  made  tolerable  for  the  number  originally  intended 
for  it.  It  appears  that  the  increase  of  that  number  was  apparently  a  mat 
ter  of  necessity  for  the  time  ;  that  other  sites  were  selected  and  prepared 
with  all  possible  despatch  ;  that  the  provisions  were  similar  in  amount  and 
quality  to  those  used  by  Confederate  soldiers ;  that  deficient  means  ren 
dered  a  supply  of  clothing,  tents,  and  medicines  scanty  ;  that  the  rules  of 
discipline  and  sanitary  regulations  of  the  prison,  if  complied  with  by  the 
prisoners,  would  have  secured  to  each  a  supply  of  food,  and  have  averted 
almost,  if  not  altogether,  the  filth  and  the  ruffianism,  which  two  causes 
outside  of  unavoidable  sickness,  caused  the  great  mass  of  suffering  and 
mortality. 

But  the  history  of  the  extraordinary  efforts  of  the  Confederate  authori 
ties  to  relieve  the  sufferings  of  Andersonville,  through  some  resumption  of 
exchanges,  does  not  end  with  the  proposition  referred  to  as  made  by  Com 
missioner  Ould  to  exchange  man  for  man,  and  leave  the  surplus  at  the 
disposition  of  the  enemy.  It  was  followed  by  another  more  liberal  and 
more  extraordinary  proposition.  Acting  under  the  direct  instructions  of 
the  Secretary  of  "War,  and  seeing  plainly  that  there  was  no  hope  of  any 
general  or  extended  partial  system  of  exchange,  Commissioner  Ould,  in 
August,  1864,  offered  to  the  Federal  agent  of  exchange,  Gen.  Mulford,  to 
deliver  to  him  all  the  sick  and  wounded  Federal  prisoners  we  had,  without 
insisting  upon  the  delivery  of  an  equivalent  number  of  our  prisoners  in 
return.  He  also  informed  Gen.  Mulford  of  the  terrible  mortality  among 
the  Federal  prisoners,  urging  him  to  be  swift  in  sending  transportation  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Savannah  Kiver  for  the  purpose  of  taking  them  away. 
The  offer  of  Commissioner  Ould  included  all  the  sick  and  wounded  at 
Andersonville  and  other  Confederate  prisons.  lie  further  informed  Gen. 
Mulford,  in  order  to  make  his  Government  safe  in  sending  transportation, 
that  if  the  sick  and  wounded  did  not  amount  to  ten  or  fifteen  thousand 
men,  the  Confederate  authorities  would  make  up  that  number  in  well  men. 
This  offer,  it  will  be  recollected,  was  made  early  in  August,  1864.  Gen. 
Mulford  informed  Commissioner  Ould  it  was  directly  communicated  to  his 
Government,  yet  no  timely  advantage  was  ever  taken  of  it. 

This  interesting  and  important  fact  is  for  the  first  time  authoritatively 
published  in  these  pages.  It  contains  volumes  of  significance.  The  ques- 


628  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

tion  occurs,  who  was  responsible  for  the  sufferings  of  the  sick  and  wounded 
and  prisoners  at  Andersonville,  from  August  to  December,  1864  ?  The 
world  will  ask  with  amazement,  if  it  was  possible  that  thousands  of  pris 
oners  were  left  to  die  in  inadequate  places  of  confinement,  merely  to  make 
a  case  against  the  South — merely  for  romance  !  The  single  fact  gives  the 
clue  to  the  whole  story  of  the  deception  and  inhuman  cruelty  of  the  au 
thorities  at  Washington  with  reference  to  their  prisoners  of  war — the  key 
to  a  chapter  of  horrours  that  even  the  hardy  hand  of  History  shakes  to 
unlock.  To  blacken  the  reputation  of  an  honourable  enemy  ;  to  make  a 
false  appeal  to  the  sensibilities  of  the  world  ;  to  gratify  an  inhuman  re 
venge,  Mr.  Stanton,  the  saturnine  and  malignant  Secretary  of  War  at  Wash 
ington,  did  not  hesitate  to  doom  to  death  thousands  of  his  countrymen,  and 
then  to  smear  their  sentinels  with  accusing  blood. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  Commissioner  Ould  to  keep  open  the  offer  he 
had  made,  and  deliver  to  the  Federal  authorities  all  their  sick  and  wounded, 
from  time  to  time,  especially  if  the  straits  of  war  should  deny  the  Confed 
erates  the  means  of  providing  for  their  comfort.  To  show  how  honest  and 
earnest  he  was  in  his  offer  to  Mulford,  when  the  transportation  did  arrive, 
he  did  deliver  to  him  at  Savannah  and  Charleston  thirteen  thousand  men, 
large  numbers  of  whom  were  well,  and  was  ready  to  deliver  as  many  as 
his  transportation  could  accommodate,  and  that  too  under  the  difficulties 
and  pressure  of  Sherman's  invasion  of  Georgia,  when  nothing  but  tempo 
rary  shiftings  were  our  expedients. 

The  transfer  of  the  entire  matter  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners  from  the 
control  of  Secretary  Stanton,  who  had  been  averse  to  all  arguments  of 
justice,  and  to  all  appeals  on  this  subject,  to  that  of  Gen.  Grant,  offered 
to  Commissioner  Ould  another  oportunity  to  essay  an  effort  of  humanity. 
On  the  llth  February,  1865,  he  proposed  to  Gen.  Grant,  to  deliver  with 
out  delay  all  the  prisoners  on  hand,  upon  receiving  an  assurance  from  him 
that  he  would  deliver  an  equal  number  of  Confederate  prisoners,  within  a 
reasonable  time.  This  was  accepted,  and  every  energy  was  used  to  send 
immediately  through  Wilmington,  James  .River,  and  other  practicable 
ways,  all  the  prisoners  we  had.  This  was  very  speedily  consummated,  so 
far  as  all  in  prisons  in  Virginia,  and  North,  and  South  Carolina,  were  con 
cerned.  The  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  the  cutting  of  our  communica 
tions,  only  prevented  the  immediate  execution  elsewhere.  Orders  to  that 
effect,  and  messengers  to  secure  it,  were  sent  to  Georgia,  Alabama,  and 
the  Trans-Mississippi.  A  return  number  of  prisoners,  to  the  amount  of 
about  five  thousand  per  week,  were  sent  to  Eichmond,  until  the  fortunes 
of  war  closed  all  operations,  even  down  to  the  matter  of  an  adjustment  of 
accounts.  The  adjustment  has  never  been  made. 

The  general  subject  of  the  condition  and  treatment  of  prisoners,  on  both 
sides,  in  the  war,  is  involved  in  much  we  have  already  written  of  the 


CONFEDERATE   REPORT   ON    PRISONS.  629 

history  of  tlie  exchange  question.  But  in  order  to  make  a  proper  case  for 
posterity  on  a  special  and  deeply  interesting  topic,  Commissioner  Ould 
urged  and  succeeded  in  raising  a  joint  Congressional  Committee  at  Rich 
mond,  to  take  the  testimony  of  returned  prisoners  as  to  their  treatment  by 
the  enemy.  That  Committee  was  raised,  and  a  large  mass  of  testimony 
was  taken,  which  was  unfortunately  lost  by  fire.  This  Committee,  how 
ever,  made  a  report  in  February,  1865,  a  copy  of  which  was  preserved. 
It  is  a  document  which  should  be  read  with  care ;  the  space  it  occupies 
could  scarcely  be  filled  with  a  narrative  more  just  and  condensed  ;  and 
we  therefore  annex  it,  in  full : 


REPORT   OF  THE  JOINT  SELECT  COMMITTEE   OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS,  APPOINTED 
TO  INVESTIGATE  THE  CONDITION  AND  TREATMENT  OF  PRISONERS  OF  WAR. 


The  duties  assigned  to  the  committee  under  the  several  resolutions  of  Congress  des 
ignating  them,  are  "  to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  condition  and  treatment  of  the 
prisoners  of  war  respectively  held  by  the  Confederate  and  United  States  Governments^ 
upon  the  causes  of  their  detention,  and  the  refusal  to  exchange ;  and  also  upon  the  vio 
lations  by  the  enemy  of  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  in  the  conduct  of  the  war. "  These 
subjects  are  broad  in  extent  and  importance  ;  and  in  order  fully  to  investigate  and  pre 
sent  them,  the  committee  propose  to  continue  their  labours  in  obtaining  evidence,  and 
deducing  from  it  a  truthful  report  of  facts  illustrative  of  the  spirit  in  which  the  war  has 
been  conducted. 

But  we  deem  it  proper  at  this  time  to  make  a  preliminary  report,  founded  upon  evi 
dence  recently  taken,  relating  to  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war  by  both  belligerents. 
This  report  is  rendered  especially  important,  by  reason  of  persistent  efforts  lately  made 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  by  associations  and  individuals  connected 
or  co-operating  with  it,  to  asperse  the  honour  of  the  Confederate  authorities,  and  to 
charge  them  with  deliberate  and  wilful  cruelty  to  prisoners  of  war.  Two  publications 
have  been  issued  at  the  North  within  the  past  year,  and  have  been  circulated  not  only 
in  the  United  States,  but  in  some  parts  of  the  South,  and  in  Europe.  One  of  these  is 
the  report  of  the  joint  select  committee  of  the  Northern  Congress  on  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  known  as  "  Keport  No.  67."  The  other  purports  to  be  a  "  Narrative  of  the  priva 
tions  and  sufferings  of  United  States  officers  and  soldiers  while  prisoners  of  war,"  and  is 
issued  as  a  report  of  a  commission  of  enquiry  appointed  by  "  The  United  States  Sani 
tary  Commission." 

This  body  is  alleged  to  consist  of  Valentine  Mott,  M.  D.,  Edward  Delafield,  M.  D., 
Gouverneur  Morris  Wilkins,  Esq.,  Ellerslie  Wallace,  M.  D.,  Hon.  J.  J.  Clarke  Hare,  and 
Rev.  Treadwell  Walden.  Although  these  persons  are  not  of  sufficient  public  importance 
and  weight  to  give  authority  to  their  publication,  yet  your  committee  have  deemed  it 
proper  to  notice  it  in  connection  Tvith  the  "  Report  No.  67,"  before  mentioned,  because 
the  Sanitary  Commission  has  been  understood  to  have  acted  to  a  greater  extent  under 
the  control  and  by  the  authority  of  the  United  States  Government,  and  because  their 
report  claims  to  be  founded  on  evidence  taken  in  solemn  form. 

A  candid  reader  of  these  publications  will  not  fail  to  discover  that,  whether  the 
statements  they  make  be  true  or  not,  their  spirit  is  not  adapted  to  promote  a  better  feel 
ing  between  the  hostile  powers.  They  are  not  intended  for  the  humane  purpose  of 


630  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ameliorating  the  condition  of  the  unhappy  prisoners  held  in  captivity.  They  are  de 
signed  to  inflame  the  evil  passions  of  the  North  ;  to  keep  up  the  war  spirit  among  their 
own  people  ;  to  represent  the  South  as  acting  under  the  dominion  of  a  spirit  of  cruelty, 
inhumanity,  and  interested  malice,  and  thus  to  vilify  her  people  in  the  eyes  of  all  on 
whom  these  publications  can  work.  They  are  justly  characterized  by  the  Hon.  James 
M.  Mason  as  belonging  to  that  class  of  literature  called  the  "  sensational " — a  style  of 
writing  prevalent  for  many  years  at  the  North,  and  which,  beginning  with  the  writers 
of  newspaper  narratives  and  cheap  fiction,  has  gradually  extended  itself,  until  it  is  now 
the  favoured  mode  adopted  by  medical  professors,  judges  of  courts,  and  reverend  clergy 
men,  and  is  even  chosen  as  the  proper  style  for  a  report  by  a  committee  of  their  Congress. 

Nothing  can  better  illustrate  the  truth  of  this  view  than  the  "  Report  No.  67,"  and 
its  appendages.  It  is  accompanied  by  eight  pictures,  or  photographs,  alleged  to 
represent  United  States  prisoners  of  war,  returned  from  Richmond,  in  a  sad  state  of 
emaciation  and  suffering.  Concerning  these  cases,  your  committee  will  have  other  re 
marks,  to  be  presently  submitted.  They  are  only  alluded  to  now  to  show  that  this  re 
port  does  really  belong  to  the  "  sensational "  class  of  literature,  and  that,  prima  facie, 
it  is  open  to  the  same  criticism  to  which  the  yellow-covered  novels,  the  "  narratives  of 
noted  highwaymen,"  and  the  "  awful  beacons  "  of  the  Northern  book-stalls  should  be 
subjected. 

The  intent  and  spirit  of  this  report  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  extract : 
"  The  evidence  proves,  beyond  all  manner  of  doubt,  a  determination  on  the  part  of  the 
rebel  authorities,  deliberately  and  persistently  practised,  for  a  long  time  past,  to  subject 
those  of  our  soldiers  who  have  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  fall  into  their  hands,  to  a  sys 
tem  of  treatment  which  has  resulted  in  reducing  many  of  those  who  have  survived  and 
been  permitted  to  return  to  us,  to  a  condition,  both  physically  and  mentally,  which  no 
language  we  can  use,  can  adequately  describe." — Report,  p.  1.  And  they  give  also  a 
letter  from  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  the  Northern  Secretary  of  "War,  from  which  the  following 
is  an  extract :  "  The  enormity  of  the  crime  committed  by  the  rebels  towards  our  prison 
ers  for  the  last  several  months  is  not  known  or  realized  by  our  people,  and  cannot  but 
fill  with  horrour  the  civilized  world,  when  the  facts  are  fully  revealed.  There  appears 
to  have  been  a  deliberate  system  of  savage  and  barbarous  treatment  and  starvation,  the 
result  of  which  will  be  that  few  (if  any)  of  the  prisoners  that  have  been  in  their  hands 
during  the  past  winter,  will  ever  again  be  in  a  condition  to  render  any  service  or  even 
to  enjoy  life." — Report,  p.  4.  And  the  Sanitary  Commission,  in  their  pamphlet,  after 
picturing  many  scenes  of  privations  and  suffering,  and  bringing  many  charges  of  cruelty 
against  the  Confederate  authorities,  declare  as  follows : — "  The  conclusion  is  unavoid 
able,  therefore,  that  these  privations  and  sufferings  have  been  designedly  inflicted  by  the 
military  and  other  authorities  of  the  rebel  Government,  and  could  not  have  been  due  to 
causes  which  such  authorities  could  not  control." — p.  95. 

After  examining  these  publications,  your  committee  approached  the  subject  with  an 
earnest  desire  to  ascertain  the  truth.  If  their  investigation  should  result  in  ascertaining 
that  these  charges  (or  any  of  them)  were  true,  the  committee  desired,  as  far  as  might  be 
in  their  power,  and  as  far  as  they  could  influence  the  Congress,  to  remove  the  evils  com 
plained  of,  and  to  conform  to  the  most  humane  spirit  of  civilization :  and  if  these  charges 
were  unfounded  and  false,  they  deemed  it  as  a  sacred  duty,  without  delay,  to  present  to 
the  Confederate  Congress  and  people,  and  to  the  public  eye  of  the  enlightened  world,  a 
vindication  of  their  country,  and  to  relieve  her  authorities  from  the  injurious  slanders 
brought  against  her  by  her  enemies.  With  these  views,  we  have  taken  a  considerable 
amount  of  testimony  bearing  on  the  subject.  "We  have  sought  to  obtain  witnesses  whose 
position  or  duties  made  them  familiar  with  the  facts  testified  to,  and  whose  characters 


CONFEDERATE    REPORT   ON    PRISONS.  631 

entitled  them  to  full  credit.  "We  have  not  hesitated  to  examine  Northern  prisoners  of 
war  upon  points  and  experience  specially  within  their  knowledge.  We  now  present  the 
testimony  taken  by  us,  and  submit  a  report  of  facts  and  inferences  fairly  deducible  from 
the  evidence,  from  the  admissions  of  our  enemies,  and  from  public  records  of  undoubted 
authority. 

First  in  order,  your  committee  will  notice  the  charge  contained  both  in  "  Report 
No.  67,"  and  in  the  "  sanitary  "  publication,  founded  on  the  appearance  and  condition 
of  the  sick  prisoners  sent  from  Richmond  to  Annapolis  and  Baltimore  about  the  last  of 
April,  1864.  These  are  the  men,  some  of  whom  form  the  subjects  of  the  photographs 
with  which  the  United  States  Congressional  Committee  have  adorned  their  report.  The 
disingenuous  attempt  is  made  in  both  these  publications  to  produce  the  impression  that 
these  sick  and  emaciated  men  were  fair  representatives  of  the  general  state  of  the  pris 
oners  held  by  the  South,  and  that  all  their  prisoners  were  being  rapidly  reduced  to  the 
same  state  by  starvation  and  cruelty,  and  by  neglect,  ill  treatment,  and  denial  of  proper 
food,  stimulants,  and  medicines  in  the  Confederate  hospitals.  Your  committee  take 
pleasure  in  saying  that  not  only  is  this  charge  proved  to  be  wholly  false,  but  the  evi 
dence  ascertains  facts  as  to  the  Confederate  hospitals  in  which  Northern  prisoners  of  war 
are  treated,  highly  creditable  to  the  authorities  which  established  them,  and  to  the  sur 
geons  and  their  aids  who  have  so  humanely  conducted  them.  The  facts  are  simply 
these : 

The  Federal  authorities,  in  violation  of  the  cartel,  having  for  a  long  time  refused 
exchange  of  prisoners,  finally  consented  to  a  partial  exchange  of  the  sick  and  wounded 
on  both  sides.  Accordingly,  a  number  of  such  prisoners  were  sent  from  the  hospitals  in 
Richmond.  General  directions  had  been  given  that  none  should  be  sent  except  those 
who  might  be  expected  to  endure  the  removal  and  passage  with  safety  to  their  lives ; 
but  in  some  cases  the  surgeons  were  induced  to  depart  from  this  rule,  by  the  entreaties 
of  some  officers  and  men  in  the  last  stages  of  emaciation,  suffering  not  only  with  exces 
sive  debility,  but  with  "  nostalgia,"  or  home-sickness,  whose  cases  were  regarded  as 
desperate,  and  who  could  not  live  if  they  remained,  and  might  possibly  improve  if  car 
ried  home.  Thus  it  happened  that  some  very  sick  and  emaciated  men  were  carried  to 
Annapolis,  but  their  illness  was  not  the  result  of  ill  treatment  or  neglect.  Such  cases 
might  be  found  in  any  large  hospital,  North  or  South.  They  might  even  be  found  in 
private  families,  where  the  sufferer  would  be  surrounded  by  every  comfort  that  love 
could  bestow.  Yet  these  are  the  cases  which,  with  hideous  violation  of  decency,  the 
Northern  committee  have  paraded  in  pictures  and  photographs.  They  have  taken  their 
own  sick  and  enfeebled  soldiers,  have  stripped  them  naked  ;  have  exposed  them  before 
a  daguerreian  apparatus  ;  have  pictured  every  shrunken  limb  and  muscle — and  all  for  the 
purpose,  not  of  relieving  their  sufferings,  but  of  bringing  a  false  and  slanderous  charge 
against  the  South. 

The  evidence  is  overwhelming  that  the  illness  of  these  [Federal]  prisoners  was  not 
the  result  of  ill  treatment  or  neglect.  The  testimony  of  Surgeons  Semple  and  Spence, 
of  Assistant  Surgeons  Tinsley,  Marriott,  and  Miller,  and  of  the  Federal  prisoners,  E.  P. 
Dalrymple,  George  Henry  Brown,  and  Freeman  B.  Teague,  ascertains  this  to  the  satisfac 
tion  of  every  candid  mind.  But  in  refuting  this  charge,  your  committee  are  compelled, 
by  the  evidence,  to  bring  a  counter-charge  against  the  Northern  authorities,  which  they 
fear  will  not  be  so  easily  refuted.  In  exchange,  a  number  of  Confederate  sick  and 
wounded  prisoners  have  been  at  various  times  delivered  at  Richmond  and  at  Savannah. 
The  mortality  among  these  on  the  passage  and  their  condition  when  delivered,  were  so 
deplorable  as  to  justify  the  charge  that  they  had  been  treated  with  inhuman  neglect  by 
the  Northern  authorities. 


632  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Assistant  Surgeon  Tinsley  testifies :  "  I  have  seen  many  of  our  prisoners  returned 
from  the  North,  who  were  nothing  but  skin  and  bones.  They  were  as  emaciated  as  a 
man  could  be  to  retain  life,  and  the  photographs  (appended  to  '  Report  No.  67,')  would 
not  be  exaggerated  representations  of  our  returned  prisoners  to  whom  I  thus  allude. 
I  saw  two  hundred  and  fifty  of  our  sick  brought  in  on  litters  from  the  steamer  at 
Rockett's.  Thirteen  dead  bodies  were  brought  off  the  steamer  the  same  night.  At  least 
thirty  died  in  one  night  after  they  were  received." 

Surgeon  Spence  testifies  :  "  I  was  at  Savannah,  and  saw  rather  over  three  thousand 
prisoners  received.  The  list  showed  that  a  large  number  had  died  on  the  passage  from 
Baltimore  to  Savannah.  The  number  sent  from  the  Federal  prisons  was  three  thousand 
five  hundred,  and  out  of  that  number  they  delivered  only  three  thousand  and  twenty- 
eight,  to  the  best  of  my  recollection.  Capt.  Hatch  can  give  you  the  exact  number. 
Thus,  about  four  hundred  and  seventy-two  died  on  the  passage.  I  was  told  that  sixty- 
seven  dead  bodies  had  been  taken  from  one  irain  of  cars  between  Elmira  and  Baltimore. 
After  being  received  at  Savannah,  they  had  the  best  attention  possible,  yet  many  died 
in  a  few  days."  "  In  carrrying  out  the  exchange  of  disabled,  sick,  and  wounded  men, 
we  delivered  at  Savannah  and  Charleston  about  eleven  thousand  Federal  prisoners,  and 
their  physical  condition  compared  most  favourably  with  those  we  received  in  exchange, 
although  of  course  the  worst  cases  among  the  Confederates  had  been  removed  by  death 
during  the  passage." 

Richard  H.  Dibrell,  a  merchant  of  Richmond,  and  a  member  of  the  "  ambulance  com 
mittee,"  whose  labors  in  mitigating  the  sufferings  of  the  wounded  have  been  acknowl 
edged  both  by  Confederate  and  Northern  men,  thus  testifies  concerning  our  sick  and 
wounded  soldiers  at  Savannah,  returned  from  Northern  prisons  and  hospitals  :  "  I  have 
never  seen  a  set  of  men  in  worse  condition.  They  were  so  enfeebled  and  emaciated  that 
we  lifted  them  like  little  children.  Many  of  them  were  like  living  skeletons.  Indeed, 
there  was  one  poor  boy,  about  seventeen  years  old,  who  presented  the  most  distressing 
and  deplorable  appearance  I  ever  saw.  He  was  nothing  but  skin  and  bone,  and  besides 
this,  he  was  literally  eaten  up  with  vermin.  He  died  in  the  hospital  in  a  few  days  after 
being  removed  thither,  notwithstanding  the  kindest  treatment  and  the  use  of  the  most 
judicious  nourishment.  Our  men  were  in  so  reduced  a  condition,  that  on  more  than 
one  trip  up  on  the  short  passage  of  ten  miles  from  the  transports  to  the  city,  as  many  as 
five  died.  The  clothing  of  the  privates  was  in  a  wretched  state  of  tatters  and  filth." 
"  The  mortality  on  the  passage  from  Maryland  was  very  great,  as  well  as  that  on  the 
passage  from  the  prisons  to  the  port  from  which  they  started.  I  cannot  state  the  exact 
number,  but  I  think  I  heard  that  three  thousand  five  hundred  were  started,  and  we  only 
received  about  three  thousand  and  twenty-seven."  I  have  looked  at  the  photographs 
appended  to  '  Report  No.  67 '  of  the  committee  of  the  Federal  Congress,  and  do  not  hesi 
tate  to  declare  that  several  of  our  men  were  worse  cases  of  emaciation  and  sickness  than 
any  represented  in  these  photographs." 

The  testimony  of  Mr.  Dibrell  is  confirmed  by  that  of  Andrew  Johnston,  also  a  mer 
chant  of  Richmond,  and  a  member  of  the  "  ambulance  committee." 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  sick  and  wounded  Federal  prisoners  at  Annapolis  whose 
condition  has  been  made  a  subject  of  outcry  and  of  widespread  complaint  by  the  North 
ern  Congress,  were  not  in  a  worse  state  than  were  the  Confederate  prisoners  returned 
from  Northern  hospitals  and  prisons  of  which  the  humanity  and  superiour  management 
are  made  subjects  of  special  boasting  by  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commission  ! 

In  connection  with  this  subject,  your  committee  take  pleasure  in  reporting  the  facts 
ascertained  by  their  investigations  .concerning  the  Confederate  hospitals  for  sick  and 
wounded  Federal  prisoners.  They  have  made  personal  examination,  and  have  taken  evi- 


CONFEDERATE   KEPOKT    ON   PEISON8.  633 

dence  specially  in  relation  to  "  Hospital  No.  21,"  in  Richmond,  because  this  has  been  made 
subject  of  distinct  charge  in  the  publication  last  mentioned.  It  has  been  shown,  not  only 
by  the  evidence  of  the  surgeons  and  their  assistants,  but  by  that  of  Federal  prisoners, 
that  the  treatment  of  the  Northern  prisoners  in  these  hospitals  has  been  everything  that 
humanity  could  dictate ;  that  their  wards  have  been  well  ventilated  and  clean ;  their 
food  the  best  that  could  be  procured  for  them — and  in  fact,  that  no  distinction  had  been 
made  between  their  treatment  and  that  of  our  own  sick  and  wounded  men.  Moreover, 
it  is  proved  that  it  has  been  the  constant  practice  to  supply  to  the  patients,  out  of  the 
hospital  funds,  such  articles  as  milk,  butter,  eggs,  tea,  and  other  delicacies,  when  they 
were  required  by  the  condition  of  the  patients.  This  is  proved  by  the  testimony  of 
E.  P.  Dalrymple,  of  New  York,  George  Henry  Brown,  of  Pennsylvania,  and  Freeman  B. 
Teague,  of  New  Hampshire,  whose  depositions  accompany  this  report. 

This  humane  and  considerate  usage  was  not  adopted  in  the  United  States  hospital  on 
Johnson's  Island,  where  Confederate  sick  and  wounded  officers  were  treated.  Col.  J.  H. 
Holinan  thus  testifies :  "  The  Federal  authorities  did  not  furnish  to  the  sick  prisoners 
the  nutriment  and  other  articles  which  were  prescribed  by  their  own  surgeons.  All 
they  would  do  was  to  permit  the  prisoners  to  buy  the  nutriment  or  stimulants  needed ; 
and  if  they  had  no  money,  they  could  not  get  them.  I  know  this,  for  I  was  in  the  hos 
pital  sick  myself,  and  I  had  to  buy,  myself,  such  articles  as  eggs,  milk,  flour,  chickens, 
and  butter,  after  their  doctors  had  prescribed  them.  And  I  know  this  was  generally 
the  case,  for  we  had  to  get  up  a  fund  among  ourselves  for  this  purpose,  to  aid  those  who 
were  not  well  supplied  with  money."  This  statement  is  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of 
Acting- Assistant  Surgeon  John  J.  Miller,  who  was  at  Johnson's  Island  for  more  than 
eight  months.  When  it  is  remembered  that  such  articles  as  eggs,  milk,  and  butter  were 
very  scarce  and  high-priced  in  Richmond,  and  plentiful  and  cheap  at  the  North,  the 
contrast  thus  presented  may  well  put  to  shame  the  "  Sanitary  Commission,"  and  dissipate 
the  self-complacency  with  which  they  have  boasted  of  the  superiour  humanity  in  the 
Northern  prisons  and  hospitals. 

Your  committee  now  proceed  to  notice  other  charges  in  these  publications.  It  is  said 
that  their  prisoners  were  habitually  stripped  of  blankets  and  other  property,  on  being 
captured.  What  pillage  may  have  been  committed  on  the  battle-field,  after  the  excite 
ment  of  combat,  your  committee  cannot  know.  But  they  feel  well  assured  that  such 
pillage  was  never  encouraged  by  the  Confederate  generals,  and  bore  no  comparison  to 
the  wholesale  robbery  and  destruction  to  which  the  Federal  armies  have  abandoned 
themselves,  in  possessing  parts  of  our  territory.  It  is  certain  that  after  the  prisoners 
were  brought  to  the  Libby  and  other  prisons  in  Richmond  no  such  pillage  was  permit 
ted.  Only  articles  which  came  properly  under  the  head  of  munitions  of  war,  were  taken 
from  them.  4 

The  next  charge  noticed  is,  that  the  guards  around  the  Libby  prison  were  in  the 
habit  of  recklessly  and  inhumanly  shooting  at  the  prisoners,  upon  the  most  frivolous 
pretexts,  and  that  the  Confederate  officers,  so  far  from  forbidding  this,  rather  encouraged 
it,  and  made  it  a  subject  of  sportive  remark.  This  charge  is  wholly  false  and  baseless. 
The  "  Rules  and  Regulations,"  appended  to  the  deposition  of  Major  Thomas  P.  Turner, 
expressly  provide,  "  Nor  shall  any  prisoner  be  fired  upon  by  a  sentinel  or  other  person, 
except  in  case  of  revolt  or  attempted  escape."  Five  or  six  cases  have  occurred  in  which 
prisoners  have  been  fired  on  and  killed  or  hurt ;  but  every  case  has  been  made  the  sub 
ject  of  careful  investigation  and  report,  as  will  appear  by  the  evidence.  As  a  proper 
comment  on  this  charge,  your  committee  report  that  the  practice  of  firing  on  our  prison 
ers  by  the  guards  in  the  Northern  prisons  appears  to  have  been  indulged  in  to  a  most 
brutal  and  atrocious  extent.  See  the  depositions  of  C.  C.  Herrington,  Win.  F.  Gordon, 


634:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Jr.,  J.  B.  McCreary,  Dr.  Thomas  P.  Holloway  and  John  P.  Fennell.  At  Fort  Delaware, 
a  cruel  regulation  as  to  the  use  of  the  "  sinks,"  was  made  the  pretext  for  firing  on  and 
murdering  several  of  our  men  and  officers — among,  them,  Lieut.-Col.  Jones,  who  was 
lame,  and  was  shot  down  by  the  sentinel  while  helpless  and  feeble,  and  while  seeking  to 
explain  his  condition.  Yet  this  sentinel  was  not  only  not  punished,  but  was  promoted 
for  his  act.  At  Camp  Douglas,  as  many  as  eighteen  of  our  men  are  reported  to  have 
been  shot  in  a  single  month.  These  facts  may  well  produce  a  conviction  in  the  candid 
observer,  that  it  is  the  North  and  not  the  South  that  is  open  to  the  charge  of  deliberate 
ly  and  wilfully  destroying  the  lives  of  the  prisoners  held  by  her. 

The  next  charge  is,  that  the  Libby  and  Belle  Isle  prisoners  were  habitually  kept  in  a 
filthy  condition,  and  that  the  ofiicers  and  men  confined  there  were  prevented  from  keep 
ing  themselves  sufficiently  clean  to  avoid  vermin  and  similar  discomforts.  The  evidence 
clearly  contradicts  this  charge.  It  is  proved  by  the  depositions  of  Maj.  Turner,  Lieut. 
Bossieux,  Kev.  Dr.  McCabe,  and  others,  that  the  prisons  were  kept  constantly  and  syste 
matically  policed  and  cleansed ;  that  in  the  Libby  there  was  an  ample  supply  of  water 
conducted  to  each  floor  by  the  city  pipes,  and  that  the  prisoners  were  not  only  not  re 
stricted  in  its  use,  but  urged  to  keep  themselves  clean.  At  Belle  Isle,  for  a  brief  season 
(about  three  weeks),  in  consequence  of  a  sudden  increase  in  the  number  of  prisoners,  the 
police  was  interrupted,  but  it  was  soon  restored,  and  ample  means  for  washing,  both 
themselves  and  their  clothes,  were  at  all  times  furnished  to  the  prisoners.  It  is  doubtless 
true,  that  notwithstanding  these  facilities,  many  of  the  prisoners  were  lousy  and  filthy  ; 
but  it  was  the  result  of  their  own  habits,  and  not  of  neglect  in  the  discipline  or  arrange 
ments  of  the  prison.  Many  of  the  prisoners  were  captured  and  brought  in  while  in  this 
condition.  The  Federal  general,  Neal  Dow  well  expressed  their  character  and  habits. 
When  he  came  to  distribute  clothing  among  them,  he  was  met  by  profane  abuse,  and 
he  said  to  the  Confederate  officer  in  charge,  "  You  have  here  the  scrapings  and  rakings 
of  Europe."  That  such  men  should  be  filthy  in  their  habits  might  be  expected. 

"We  next  notice  the  charge  that  the  boxes  of  provisions  and  clothing  sent  to  the 
prisoners  from  the  North,  were  not  delivered  to  them,  and  were  habitually  robbed  and 
plundered,  by  permission  of  the  Confederate  authorities.  The  evidence  satisfies  your 
committee  that  this  charge  is,  in  all  substantial  points,  untrue.  For  a  period  of  about 
one  month  there  was  a  stoppage  in  the  delivery  of  boxes,  caused  by  a  report  that  the 
Federal  authorities  were  forbidding  the  delivery  of  similar  supplies  to  our  prisoners. 
But  the  boxes  were  put  in  a  warehouse,  and  afterwards  delivered.  For  some  time  no 
search  was  made  of  boxes  from  the  "  Sanitary  Committee,"  intended  for  the  prisoners' 
hospital.  But  a  letter  was  intercepted,  advising  that  money  should  be  sent  in  these 
boxes,  as  they  were  never  searched ;  which  money  was  to  be  used  in  bribing  the  guard, 
and  thus  releasing  the  prisoners.  After  this,  it  wa$  deemed  necessary  to  search  every 
box,  which  necessarily  produced  some  delay.  Your  committee  are  satisfied  that  if  these 
boxes  or  their  contents  were  robbed,  the  prison  officials  are  not  responsible  therefor. 
Beyond  doubt,  robberies  were  often  committed  by  prisoners  themselves,  to  whom  the 
contents  were  delivered  for  distribution  to  their  owners.  Notwithstanding  all  this  alleged 
pillage,  the  supplies  seem  to  have  been  sufficient  to  keep  the  quarters  of  the  prisons  so 
well  furnished  that  they  frequently  presented,  in  the  language  of  a  witness,  "  the  ap 
pearance  of  a  large  grocery  store. 

In  connection  with  this  point,  your  committee  refer  to  the  testimony  of  a  Federal 
officer,  Col.  James  M.  Sanderson,  whose  letter  is  annexed  to  the  deposition  of  Major 
Turner.  He  testifies  to  the  full  delivery  of  the  clothing  and  supplies  from  the  North, 
and  to  the  humanity  and  kindness  of  the  Confederate  ofiicers — specially  mentioning 
Lieut.  Bossieux,  commanding  on  Belle  Isle.  His  letter  was  addressed  to  the  President 


CONFEDERATE  REPORT   ON   PRISONS.  635 

of  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commission,  and  was  beyond  doubt  received  by  them, 
having  been  forwarded  by  the  regular  flag  of  truce.  Yet  the  scrupulous  and  honest  gen 
tlemen  composing  that  commission,  have  not  found  it  convenient  for  their  purposes  to 
insert  this  letter  in  their  publication  !  Had  they  been  really  searching  for  the  truth,  this 
letter  would  have  aided  them  in  finding  it. 

Your  committee  proceed  next  to  notice  the  allegation  that  the  Confederate  authori 
ties  had  prepared  a  mine  under  the  Libby  prison,  and  placed  in  it  a  quantity  of  gunpow 
der  for  the  purpose  of  blowing  up  the  buildings  with  their  inmates,  in  case  of  an  attempt 
to  rescue  them.  After  ascertaining  all  the  facts  bearing  on  this  subject,  your  committee 
believe  that  what  was  done  under  the  circumstances,  will  meet  a  verdict  of  approval 
from  all  whose  prejudices  do  not  blind  them  to  the  truth.  The  state  of  things  was  un 
precedented  in  history,  and  must  be  judged  of  according  to  the  motives  at  work,  and 
the  result  accomplished.  A  large  body  of  Northern  raiders,  under  one  Col.  Dahlgren, 
was  approaching  Richmond.  It  was  ascertained,  by  the  reports  of  prisoners  captured 
from  them,  and  other  evidence,  that  their  design  was  to  enter  the  city,  to  set  fire  to  the 
buildings,  public  and  private,  for  which  purpose  turpentine  balls  in  great  number  had 
been  prepared ;  to  murder  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  other  prominent 
men ;  to  release  the  prisoners  of  war,  then  numbering  five  or  six  thousand ;  to  put  arms 
into  their  hands,  and  to  turn  over  the  city  to  indiscriminate  pillage,  rape,  and  slaughter. 
At  the  same  time  a  plot  was  discovered  among  the  prisoners  to  co-operate  in  this  scheme, 
and  a  large  number  of  knives  and  slung-shot  (made  by  putting  stones  into  woollen 
stockings)  were  detected  in  places  of  concealment  about  their  quarters.  To  defeat  a 
plan  so  diabolical,  assuredly  the  sternest  means  were  justified.  If  it  would  have  been 
right  to  put  to  death  any  one  prisoner  attempting  to  escape  under  such  circumstances 
it  seems  logically  certain  that  it  would  have  been  equally  right  to  put  to  death  any  num 
ber  making  such  attempt.  But  in  truth  the  means  adopted  were  those  of  humanity  and 
prevention,  rather  than  of  execution.  The  Confederate  authorities  felt  able  to  meet  and 
repulse  Dahlgren  and  his  raiders,  if  they  could  prevent  the  escape  of  the  prisoners. 

The  real  object  was  to  save  their  lives,  as  well  as  those  of  our  citizens.  The  guard 
force  at  the  prisons  was  small,  and  all  the  local  troops  in  and  around  Eichmond  were 
needed  to  meet  the  threatened  attack.  Had  the  prisoners  escaped,  the  women  and  chil 
dren  of  the  city,  as  well  as  their  homes,  would  have  been  at  the  mercy  of  five  thousand 
outlaws.  Humanity  required  that  the  most  summary  measures  should  be  used  to  deter 
them  from  any  attempt  at  escape. 

A  mine  was  prepared  under  the  Libby  prison ;  a  sufficient  quantity  of  gunpowder 
was  put  into  it,  and  pains  were  taken  to  inform  the  prisoners  that  any  attempt  at  escape 
made  by  them  would  be  effectually  defeated.  The  plan  succeeded  perfectly.  The  pris 
oners  were  awed  and  kept  quiet.  Dahlgren  and  his  party  were  defeated  and  scattered. 
The  danger  passed  away,  and  in  a  few  weeks  the  gunpowder  was  removed.  Such  are 
the  facts.  Your  committee  do  not  hesitate  to  make  them  known,  feeling  assured  that 
the  conscience  of  the  enlightened  world  and  the  great  law  of  self-preservation  will  justify 
all  that  was  done  by  our  country  and  her  officers. 

We  now  proceed  to  notice,  under  one  head,  the  last  and  gravest  charge  made  in  these 
publications.  They  assert  that  the  Northern  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederate 
authorities  have  been  starved,  frozen,  inhumanly  punished,  often  confined  in  foul  and 
loathsome  quarters,  deprived  of  fresh  air  and  exercise,  and  neglected  and  maltreated  in 
sickness — and  that  all  this  was  done  upon  a  deliberate,  wilful,  and  long-conceived  plan 
of  the  Confederate  Government  and  officers,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  the  lives  of 
these  prisoners,  or  of  rendering  them  forever  incapable  of  military  service.  This  charge 
accuses  the  Southern  Government  of  a  crime  so  horrible  and  unnatural  that  it  could 


636  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

never  have  been  made  except  by  those  ready  to  blacken  with  slander  men  whom  they 
have  long  injured  and  hated.  Your  committee  feel  bound  to  reply  to  it  calmly  but  em 
phatically.  They  pronounce  it  false  in  fact,  and  in  design ;  false  in  the  basis  on  which 
it  assumes  to  rest,  and  false  in  its  estimate  of  the  motives  which  have  controlled  the 
Southern  authorities. 

At  an  early  period  in  the  present  contest  the  Confederate  Government  recognized 
their  obligation  to  treat  prisoners  of  war  with  humanity  and  consideration.  Before  any 
laws  were  passed  on  the  subject,  the  Executive  Department  provided  such  prisoners  as 
fell  into  their  hands,  with  proper  quarters  and  barracks  to  shelter  them,  and  with  ra 
tions  the  same  in  quantity  and  quality  as  those  furnished  to  the  Confederate  soldiers 
who  guarded  these  prisoners.  They  also  showed  an  earnest  wish  to  mitigate  the  sad  con 
dition  of  prisoners  of  war,  by  a  system  of  fair  and  prompt  exchange — and  the  Confed 
erate  Congress  co-operated  in  these  humane  views.  By  their  act,  approved  on  the  21st 
day  of  May,  1861,  they  provided  that  "  all  prisoners  of  war  taken,  whether  on  land  or  at 
sea,  during  the  pending  hostilities  with  the  United  States,  shall  be  transferred  by  the 
captors  from  time  to  time,  and  as  often  as  convenient,  to  the  Department  of  War ;  and 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  "War,  with  the  approval  of  the  President,  to  issue 
such  instructions  to  the  Quartermaster-General  and  his  subordinates,  as  shall  provide  for 
the  safe  custody  and  sustenance  of  prisoners  of  war ;  and  the  rations  furnished  prisoners 
of  war  shall  be  the  same  in  quantity  and  quality  as  those  furnished  to  enlisted  men  in 
the  Army  of  the  Confederacy."  Such  were  the  declared  purpose  and  policy  of  the  Con 
federate  Government  towards  prisoners  of  war — amid  all  the  privations  and  losses  to 
which  their  enemies  have  subjected  them,  they  have  sought  to  carry  them  into  effect. 

Our  investigations  for  this  preliminary  report  have  been  confined  chiefly  to  the  ra 
tions  and  treatment  of  the  prisoners  of  war  at  the  Libby  and  other  prisons  in  Richmond 
and  on  Belle  Isle.  This  we  have  done,  because  the  publications  to  which  we  have  al 
luded  chiefly  refer  to  them,  and  because  the  "  Report  No.  67  "  of  the  Northern  Congress 
plainly  intimates  the  belief  that  the  treatment  in  and  around  Richmond  was  worse  than 
it  was  farther  South.  That  report  says  :  "  It  will  be  observed  from  the  testimony  that 
all  the  witnesses  who  testify  upon  that  point  state  that  the  treatment  they  received  while 
confined  at  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  Dalton,  Georgia,  and  other  places,  was  far  more 
humane  than  that  they  received  at  Richmond,  where  the  authorities  of  the  so-called  Con 
federacy  were  congregated,"  Report,  p.  3. 

The  evidence  proves  that  the  rations  furnished  to  prisoners  of  war  in  Richmond  and 
on  Belle  Isle,  have  been  never  less  than  those  furnished  to  the  Confederate  soldiers  who 
guarded  them,  and  have  at  some  seasons  been  larger  in  quantity  and  better  in  quality 
than  those  furnished  to  Confederate  troops  in  the  field.  This  has  been  because,  until 
February,  1864,  the  Quartermaster's  Department  furnished  the  prisoners,  and  often  had 
provsions  or  funds,  when  the  Commissary  Department  was  not  so  well  provided.  Once 
and  only  once,  for  a  few  weeks,  the  prisoners  were  without  meat,  but  a  larger  quantity 
of  bread  and  vegetable  food  was  in  consequence  supplied  to  them.  How  often  the  gal 
lant  men  composing  the  Confederate  Army,  have  been  without  meat,  for  even  longer 
intervals,  your  committee  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  say.  Not  less  than  sixteen  ounces 
of  bread  and  four  ounces  of  bacon,  or  six  ounces  of  beef,  together  with  beans  and  soup, 
have  been  furnished  per  day  to  the  prisoners.  During  most  of  the  time  the  quantity  of 
meat  furnished  to  them  has  been  greater  than  these  amounts  ;  and  even  in  times  of  the 
greatest  scarcity,  they  have  received  as  much  as  the  Southern  soldiers  who  guarded 
them.  The  scarcity  of  meat  and  of  breadstuff's  in  the  South,  in  certain  places,  has  been 
the  result  of  the  savage  policy  of  our  enemies  ir  burning  barns  filled  with  wheat  or  corn, 
destroying  agricultural  implements,  and  driving  off  or  wantonly  butchering  hogs  and 


CONFEDERATE   EEPOKT   ON   PEISONS.  637 

cattle.  Yet  amid  all  these  privations,  we  have  given  to  their  prisoners  the  rations  above 
mentioned.  It  is  well  known  that  this  quantity  of  food  is  sufficient  to  keep  in  health  a 
man  who  does  not  labour  hard.  All  the  learned  disquisitions  of  Dr.  Ellerslie  Wallace 
on  the  subject  of  starvation,  might  have  been  spared,  for  they  are  all  founded  on  a  false 
basis.  It  will  be  observed  that  few  (if  any)  of  the  witnesses  examined  by  the  "  Sanitary 
Commission  "  speak  with  any  accuracy  of  the  quantity  (in  weight)  of  the  food  actually 
furnished  to  them.  Their  statements  are  merely  conjectural  and  comparative,  and  can 
not  weigh  against  the  positive  testimony  of  those  who  superintended  the  delivery  of 
large  quantities  of  food,  cooked  and  distributed  according  to  a  fixed  ratio,  for  the  num 
ber  of  men  to  be  fed. 

The  statements  of  the  "  Sanitary  Commission  "  as  to  prisoners  freezing  to  death  on 
Belle  Isle,  are  absurdly  false.  According  to  that  statement,  it  was  common,  during  a 
cold  spell  in  winter,  to  see  several  prisoners  frozen  to  death  every  morning  in  the  places 
in  which  they  had  slept.  This  picture,  if  correct,  might  well  excite  our  horrour ;  but 
unhappily  for  its  sensational  power,  it  is  but  a  clumsy  daub,  founded  on  the  fancy  of  the 
painter.  The  facts  are,  that  tents  were  furnished  sufficient  to  shelter  all  the  prisoners ; 
that  the  Confederate  commandant  and  soldiers  on  the  Island  were  lodged  in  similar 
tents ;  that  a  fire  was  furnished  in  each  of  them ;  that  the  prisoners  fared  as  well  as  their 
guards ;  and  that  only  one  of  them  was  ever  frozen  to  death,  and  he  was  frozen  by  the 
cruelty  of  his  own  fellow-prisoners,  who  thrust  him  out  of  the  tent  in  a  freezing  night, 
because  he  was  infested  with  vermin.  The  proof  as  to  the  healthiness  of  the  prisoners  on 
Belle  Isle,  and  the  small  amount  of  mortality,  is  remarkable,  and  presents  a  fit  comment 
on  the  lugubrious  pictures  drawn  by  the  "  Sanitary  Commission,"  either  from  their  own 
fancies,  or  from  the  fictions  put  forth  by  their  false  witnesses.  Lieut.  Bossieux  proves 
that  from  the  establishment  of  the  prison  camp  on  Belle  Isle  in  June,  1862,  to  the  10th 
of  February,  1865,  more  than  twenty  thousand  prisoners  had  been  at  various  times  there 
received,  and  yet  that  the  whole  number  of  deaths  during  this  time,  was  only  one  hun 
dred  and  sixty-four.  And  this  is  confirmed  by  the  Federal  colonel,  Sanderson,  who 
states  that  the  average  number  of  deaths  per  month  on  Belle  Isle,  was  "  from  two  to 
five ;  more  frequently  the  lesser  number."  The  sick  were  promptly  removed  from  the 
Island  to  the  hospitals  in  the  city. 

Doubtless  the  "  Sanitary  Commission  "  have  been  to  some  extent  led  astray  by  their 
own  witnesses,  whose  character  has  been  portrayed  by  Gen.  Neal  Dow,  and  also  by  the 
editor  of  the  New  York  Times,  who,  in  his  issue  of  January  6th,  1865,  describes  the 
material  for  recruiting  the  Federal  army  as  "  wretched  vagabonds,  of  depraved  morals, 
decrepit  in  body,  without  courage,  self-respect,  or  conscience.  They  are  dirty,  disor 
derly,  thievish,  and  incapable." 

In  reviewing  the  charges  of  cruelty,  harshness,  and  starvation  to  prisoners  made  by 
the  North,  your  committee  have  taken  testimony  as  to  the  treatment  of  our  own  officers 
and  soldiers,  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  It  gives  us  no  pleasure  to  be  compelled  to 
speak  of  the  suffering  inflicted  upon  our  gallant  men ;  but  the  self-laudatory  style  in 
which  the  "  Sanitary  Commission  "  have  spoken  of  their  prisons,  makes  it  proper  that 
the  truth  should  be  presented.  Your  committee  gladly  acknowledge  that  in  many 
cases  our  prisoners  experienced  kind  and  considerate  treatment ;  but  we  are  equally  as 
sured  that  in  nearly  all  the  prison  stations  of  the  North — at  Point  Lookout,  Fort 
McHenry,  Fort  Delaware,  Johnson's  Island,  Elmira,  Camp  Chase,  Camp  Douglas,  Alton, 
Camp  Morton,  the  Ohio  Penitentiary  and  the  prisons  of  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  our  men 
have  suffered  from  insufficient  food,  and  have  been  subjected  to  ignominious,  cruel,  and 
barbarous  practices,  of  which  there  is  no  parallel  in  anything  that  has  occurred  in  the 
South.  The  witnesses  who  were  at  Point  Lookout,  Fort  Delaware,  Camp  Morton  and 


638  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Camp  Douglas,  testify  that  they  have  often  seen  our  men  picking  up  the  scraps  and 
refuse  thrown  out  from  the  kitchens,  with  which  to  appease  their  hunger.  Dr.  Herrin  g- 
ton  proves  that  at  Fort  Delaware  unwholesome  bread  and  water  produced  diarrhosa  in 
numberless  cases  among  our  prisoners,  and  that  "  their  sufferings  were  greatly  aggra 
vated  by  the  regulation  of  the  camp,  which  forbade  more  than  twenty  men  at  a  time  at 
night  to  go  to  the  sinks.  I  have  seen  as  many  as  five  hundred  men  in  a  row  waiting 
their  time.  The  consequence  was  that  they  were  obliged  to  use  the  places  where  they 
were.  This  produced  great  want  of  cleanliness,  and  aggravated  the  disease."  Our  men 
were  compelled  to  labour  in  unloading  Federal  vessels  and  in  putting  up  buildings  for 
Federal  officers,  and,  if  they  refused,  were  driven  to  the  work  with  clubs. 

The  treatment  of  Brig.-Gen.  J.  H.  Morgan  and  his  officers  was  brutal  and  ignomini 
ous  in  the  extreme.  It  will  be  found  stated  in  the  depositions  of  Capt.  M.  D.  Logan, 
Lieut.  W.  P.  Crow,  Lieut.-Col.  James  B.  McCreary,  and  Capt.  B.  A.  Tracey,  that  they 
were  put  in  the  Ohio  Penitentiary,  and  compelled  to  submit  to  the  treatment  of  felons. 
Their  beards  were  shaved,  and  their  hair  was  cut  close  to  the  head.  They  were  con 
fined  in  convicts'  cells,  and  forbidden  to  speak  to  each  other.  For  attempts  to  escape,  and 
for  other  offences  of  a  very  light  character,  they  were  subjected  to  the  horrible  punish 
ment  of  the  dungeon.  In  midwinter,  with  the  atmosphere  many  degrees  below  zero, 
without  blanket  or  overcoat,  they  were  confined  in  a  cell,  without  fire  or  light,  with  a 
fetid  and  poisonous  air  to  breathe — and  here  they  were  kept  until  life  was  nearly  ex 
tinct.  Their  condition  on  coming  out,  was  so  deplorable  as  to  draw  tears  from  their 
comrades.  The  blood  was  oozing  from  their  hands  and  faces.  The  treatment  in  the 
St.  Louis  prison  was  equally  barbarous.  Capt.  William  H.  Sebring  testifies  :  "  Two  of 
us,  A.  C.  Grimes  and  myself,  were  carried  out  into  the  open  air  in  the  prison  yard,  on  the 
25th  of  December,  1863,  and  handcuffed  to  a  post.  Here  we  were  kept  all  night  in 
sleet,  snow,  and  cold.  We  were  relieved  in  the  day-time,  but  again  brought  to  the  post 
and  handcuffed  to  it  in  the  evening — and  thus  we  were  kept  all  night  until  the  2d  of 
January,  1864.  I  was  badly  frost-bitten  and  my  health  was  much  impaired.  This  cruel 
infliction  was  done  by  order  of  Capt.  Byrnes,  Commandant  of  Prisons  in  St.  Louis.  He 
was  barbarous  and  insulting  to  the  last  degree." 

But  even  a  greater  inhumanity  than  any  we  have  mentioned  was  perpetrated  upon 
our  prisoners  at  Camp  Douglas  and  Camp  Chase.  It  is  proved  by  the  testimony  of 
Thomas  P.  Holloway,  John  P.  Fennell,  H.  H.  Barlow,  H.  C.  Barton,  C.  D.  Bracken,  and 
J.  S.  Barlow,  that  our  prisoners  in  large  numbers  were  put  into  "  condemned  camps," 
where  small-pox  was  prevailing,  and  speedily  contracted  this  loathsome  disease,  and  that 
as  many  as  forty  new  cases  often  appeared  daily  among  them.  Even  the  Federal  officers 
who  guarded  them  to  the  camp  protested  against  this  unnatural  atrocity  :  yet  it  was  done. 
The  men  who  contracted  the  disease  were  removed  to  a  hospital  about  a  mile  off,  but  the 
plague  was  already  introduced,  and  continued  to  prevail.  For  a  period  of  more  than 
twelve  months  the  disease  was  constantly  in  the  camp,  yet  our  prisoners  during  all  this 
time  were  continually  brought  to  it,  and  subjected  to  certain  infection.  Neither  do  we 
find  evidences  of  amendment  on  the  part  of  our  enemies,  notwithstanding  the  boasts  of 
the  "sanitary  commission."  At  Nashville,  prisoners  recently  captured  from  General 
Hood's  army,  even  when  sick  and  wounded,  have  been  cruelly  deprived  of  all  nourish 
ment  suited  to  their  condition;  and  other  prisoners  from  the  same  army  have  been 
carried  into  the  infected  Camps  Douglas  and  Chase. 

Many  of  the  soldiers  of  General  Hood's  army  were  frost-bitten  by  being  kept  day  and 
night  in  an  exposed  condition  before  they  were  put  into  Camp  Douglas.  Their  suffer 
ings  are  truthfully  depicted  in  the  evidence.  At  Alton  and  Camp  Morton  the  same 
inhuman  practice  of  putting  our  prisoners  into  camps  infected  by  small-pox,  prevailed. 


CONFEDERATE   REPORT   ON   PRISONS.  639 

It  was  equivalent  to  murdering  many  of  them  by  the  torture  of  a  contagious  disease.  The 
insufficient  rations  at  Oamp  Morton  forced  our  men  to  appease  their  hunger  by  pounding 
up  and  boiling  bones,  picking  up  scraps  of  meat  and  cabbage  from  the  hospital  slop  tubs, 
and  even  eating  rats  and  dogs.  The  depositions  of  Wm.  Ayres  and  J.  Chambers  Brent 
prove  these  privations. 

The  punishments  often  inflicted  on  our  men  for  slight  offences,  have  been  shameful 
and  barbarous.  They  have  been  compelled  to  ride  a  plank  only  four  inches  wide,  called 
"  Morgan's  horse ;"  to  sit  down  with  their  naked  bodies  in  the  snow  for  ten  or  fifteen 
minutes,  and  have  been  subjected  to  the  ignominy  of  stripes  from  the  belts  of  their 
guards.  The  pretext  has  been  used,  that  many  of  their  acts  of  cruelty  have  been  by  way 
of  retaliation.  But  no  evidence  has  been  found  to  prove  such  acts  on  the  part  of  the 
Confederate  authorities.  It  is  remarkable  that  in  the  case  of  Colonel  Streight  and  his 
officers,  they  were  subjected  only  to  the  ordinary  confinement  of  prisoners  of  war.  No 
special  punishment  was  used  except  for  specific  offences  ;  and  then  the  greatest  infliction 
was  to  confine  Colonel  Streight  for  a  few  weeks  in  abasement  room  of  the  Libby  prison, 
with  a  window,  a  plank  floor,  a  stove,  a  fire,  and  plenty  of  fuel. 

"We  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  dwell  further  on  these  subjects.  Enough  has  been 
proved  to  show  that  great  privations  and  sufferings  have  been  borne  by  the  prisoners  on 
both  sides. 


WHY   HAVE  NOT  PKISONEKS   OF   WAR  BEEN  EXCHANGED? 

But  the  question  forces  itself  upon  us,  why  have  these  sufferings  been  so  long  con 
tinued  ?  Why  have  not  the  prisoners  of  war  been  exchanged,  and  thus  some  of  the 
darkest  pages  of  history  spared  to  the  world  ?  In  the  answer  to  this  question  must  be 
found  the  test  of  responsibility  for  all  the  sufferings,  sickness  and  heart-broken  sorrow 
that  have  visited  more  than  eighty  thousand  prisoners  within  the  past  two  years.  On 
this  question,  your  committee  can  only  say  that  the  Confederate  authorities  have  always 
desired  a  prompt  and  fair  exchange  of  prisoners.  Even  before  the  establishment  of  a 
cartel  they  urged  such  exchange,  but  could  never  effect  it  by  agreement  until  the  large 
preponderance  of  prisoners  in  our  hands  made  it  the  interest  of  the  Federal  authorities 
to  consent  to  the  cartel  of  July  22d,  1862.  The  9th  article  of  that  agreement  expressly 
provided,  that  in  case  any  misunderstanding  should  arise,  it  should  not  interrupt  the 
release  of  prisoners  on  parole,  "but  should  be  made  the  subject  of  friendly  explanation. 
Soon  after  this  cartel  was  established,  the  policy  of  the  enemy  iu  seducing  negro  slaves 
from  their  masters,  arming  them  and  putting  white  officers  over  them  to  lead  them 
against  us,  gave  rise  to  a  few  cases  in  which  questions  of  crime  under  the  internal  laws  of 
the  Southern  States  appeared.  "Whether  men  who  encouraged  insurrection  and  murder 
could  be  held  entitled  to  the  privileges  of  prisoners  of  war  under  the  cartel,  was  a  grave 
question.  But  these  cases  were  few  in  number,  and  ought  never  to  have  interrupted  the 
general  exchange.  "We  were  always  ready  and  anxious  to  carry  out  the  cartel  in  its  true 
meaning,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  9th  article  required  that  the  prisoners  on  both  sides 
should  be  released,  and  that  the  few  cases  as  to  which  misunderstanding  occurred  should 
be  left  for  final  decision.  Doubtless  if  the  preponderance  of  prisoners  had  continued  with 
us,  exchanges  would  have  continued.  But  the  fortunes  of  war  threw  the  larger  number 
into  the  hands  of  our  enemies.  Then  they  refused  farther  exchanges,  and  for  twenty- 
two  months  this  policy  has  continued.  Our  Commissioner  of  Exchange  has  made  con 
stant  efforts  to  renew  them.  In  August,  1864,  he  consented  to  a  proposition  which  had 
been  repeatedly  made,  to  exchange  officer  for  officer  and  man  for  man,  leaving 


640  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

the  surplus  in  captivity.  Though  this  was  a  departure  from  the  cartel,  our  anxiety  for  the 
exchange  induced  us  to  consent.  Yet,  the  Federal  authorities  repudiated  their  previous 
offer,  and  refused  even  this  partial  compliance  with  the  cartel.  Secretary  Stanton,  who 
has  unjustly  charged  the  Confederate  authorities  with  inhumanity,  is  open  to  the  charge 
of  having  done  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  a  fair  exchange,  and  thus  to  prolong  the  suf 
ferings  of  which  he  speaks ;  and  very  recently,  in  a  letter  over  his  signature,  Benjamin  F. 
Butler  has  declared  that  in  April,  1864,  the  Federal  Lieut.-Gen.  Grant  forbade  him  "to 
deliver  to  ttye  rebels  a  single  able-bodied  man ;"  and  moreover,  Gen.  Butler  acknowledges 
that  in  answer  to  Col.  Quid's  letter  consenting  to  the  exchange,  officer  for  officer  and 
man  for  man,  he  wrote  a  reply,  "not  diplomatically  but  obtrusively  and  demonstratively, 
not  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  exchange  of  prisoners,  but  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
and  stopping  the  exchange,  and  furnishing  a  ground  on  which  we  could  fairly  stand." 

These  facts  abundantly  show  that  the  responsibility  of  refusing  to  exchange  prisoners 
of  war  rests  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  the  people  who  have  sus 
tained  that  Government,  and  every  sigh  of  captivity,  every  groan  of  suffering,  every 
heart  broken  by  hope  deferred  among  these  eighty  thousand  prisoners,  will  accuse  them 
in  the  judgment  of  the  just. 

With  regard  to  the  prison  stations  at  Andersonville,  Salisbury,  and  other  places  south 
of  Richmond,  your  committee  have  not  made  extended  examination,  for  reasons  which 
have  already  been  stated.  We  are  satisfied  that  privation,  suffering  and  mortality,  to  an 
extent  much  to  be  regretted,  did  prevail  among  the  prisoners  there,  but  they  were  not 
the  result  of  neglect,  still  less  of  design,  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  Government. 
Haste  in  preparation  ;  crowded  quarters,  prepared  only  for  a  smaller  number ;  frequent 
removals  to  prevent  recapture  ;  want  of  transportation  and  scarcity  of  food,  have  all  re 
sulted  from  the  pressure  of  the  war,  and  the  barbarous  manner  in  which  it  has  been 
conducted  by  our  enemies.  Upon  these  subjects  your  committee  propose  to  take  further 
evidence,  and  to  report  more  fully  hereafter. 

But  even  now  enough  is  known  to  vindicate  the  South,  and  to  furnish  an  overwhelm 
ing  answer  to  all  complaints  on  the  part  of  the  U.  S.  Government  or  people,  that  their 
prisoners  were  stinted  in  food  or  supplies.  Their  own  savage  warfare  has  wrought  all 
the  evil.  They  have  blockaded  our  ports ;  have  excluded  from  us  food,  clothing  and 
medicines ;  have  even  declared  medicines  contraband  of  war.  and  have  repeatedly  de 
stroyed  the  contents  of  drug  stores,  and  the  supplies  of  private  physicians  in  the  country ; 
have  ravaged  our  country  ;  burned  our  houses,  and  destroyed  growing  crops  and  farming 
implements.  One  of  their  officers  (General  Sheridan)  has  boasted  in  his  official  report, 
that,  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  alone,  he  burned  two  thousand  barns  filled  with  wheat 
and  corn ;  that  he  burned  all  the  mills  in  the  whole  tract  of  country  ;  destroyed  all  the 
factories  of  cloth,  and  killed  or  drove  off  every  animal,  even  to  the  poultry,  that  could 
contribute  to  human  sustenance.  These  desolations  have  been  repeated  again  and  again 
in  different  parts  of  the  South.  Thousands  of  our  families  have  been  driven  from  their 
homes,  as  helpless  and  destitute  refugees.  Our  enemies  have  destroyed  the  railroads 
and  other  means  of  transportation,  by  which  food  could  be  supplied  from  abundant 
districts  to  those  without  it.  While  thus  desolating  our  country,  in  violation  of  the 
usages  of  civilized  warfare,  they  have  refused  to  exchange  prisoners ;  have  forced  us 
to  keep  fifty  thousand  of  their  men  in  captivity — and  yet  have  attempted  to  attribute  to 
us  the  sufferings  and  privations  caused  by  their  own  acts.  We  cannot  doubt  that  in  the 
view  of  civilization  we  shall  stand  acquitted,  while  they  must  be  condemned. 

In  concluding  this  preliminary  report,  we  will  notice  the  strange  perversity  of  in 
terpretation  which  has  induced  the  "  Sanitary  Commission  '»'  to  affix  as  a  motto  to  their 
pamphlet,  the  words  of  the  compassionate  Redeemer  of  mankind : 

"  For  I  was  anhungered  and  ye  gave  me  no  meat :  I  was  thirsty  and  ye  gave  me  no 


STARVATION    IN    NORTHERN    PRISONS.  64:1 

drink  :  I  was  a  stranger  and  ye  took  me  not  in :  naked,  and  ye  clothed  me  not :  sick  and 
in  prison  and  ye  visited  me  not." 

We  have  yet  to  learn  on  what  principle  the  Federal  soldiers  sent  with  arms  in  their 
hands  to  destroy  the  lives  of  our  people  ;  to  waste  our  land,  burn  our  houses  and  barns? 
and  drive  us  from  our  homes,  can  be  regarded  by  us  as  the  followers  of  the  meek 
and  lowly  Redeemer,  so  as  to  claim  the  benefit  of  his  words.  Yet  even  these  soldiers, 
when  taken  captive  by  us,  have  been  treated  with  proper  humanity.  The  cruelties  in 
flicted  on  our  prisoners  at  the  North  may  well  justify  us  in  applying  to  the  "  Sanitary 
Commission  "  the  stern  words  of  the  Divine  Teacher  :  "  Thou  hypocrite,  first  cast  out 
the  beam  out  of  thine  own  eye,  and  then  shalt  thou  see  clearly  to  cast  out  the  mote  out 
of  thy  brother's  eye." 

We  believe  that  there  are  many  thousands  of  just,  honourable,  and  humane  people  in 
the  United  States,  upon  whom  this  subject,  thus  presented,  will  not  be  lost ;  that  they 
will  do  all  they  can  to  mitigate  the  horrours  of  war ;  to  complete  the  exchange  of  pris 
oners,  now  happily  in  progress,  and  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such  sufferings  as  have 
been  narrated.  And  we  repeat  the  words  of  the  Confederate  Congress,  in  their  Mani 
festo  ot  the  14th  of  June,  1864  :  "  We  commit  our  cause  to  the  enlightened  judgment  of 
the  world  ;  to  the  sober  reflections  of  our  adversaries  themselves,  and  to  the  solemn  and 
righteous  arbitrament  of  Heaven." 

The  general  important  fact  of  this  report  is,  the  declaration  of  the 
result  of  sworn  investigations  to  the  effect  that  from  the  necessity  of  the 
case,  Federal  prisoners  suffered  considerably  in  the  South,  but  were  not, 
unless  exceptionally,  treated  with  indignity,  oppression  or  cruelty ;  and 
that  the  general  rule  was  the  other  way  as  to  our  prisoners  at  the  North— 
that  the  rule  there  was  indignity,  oppression  and  cruelty,  and  threatened, 
if  not  attempted,  starvation  in  the  midst  of  plenty.  Where  this  fearful 
penalty  was  held  over  the  victim  was  not  in  a  land  where  the  invader  had 
proclaimed  and  carried  out  the  policy  of  destroying  every  grain  of  wheat, 
and  every  ounce  of  meat,  and  everything  that  tended  to  its  production  ; 
not  in  a  land  whose  women  and  children  were  already  perishing  for  bread, 
but  starvation  in  a  land  that  flowed  with  milk  and  honey,  starvation  in  a 
land  that  had  not  only  an  abundance,  but  a  superabundance  even  of  the 
luxuries  of  life  !  * 

*  The  author  might  make,  from  various  memoranda  he  has  personally  collected  of  the  experiences 
of  Confederate  prisoners,  a  very  vast  addition  to  the  instances  of  suffering  collected  by  the  committee 
at  Richmond.  The  following  will  suffice  for  examples.  A  Confederate  officer,  whose  experience  was 
at  Johnson's  Island,  writes : 

"  No  sugar,  no  coffee,  no  tea ;  only  bread  and  salt  beef,  or  salt  pork,  or  salt  fish,  the  latter  as 
poor  as  poverty,  and  as  unnutritious  as  pine  shavings,  varied  occasionally  with  fresh  beef,  but  never 
more  than  two-thirds  enough  of  either.  Occasionally,  we  would  get  one  onion,  or  one  potato  each, 
and  an  ounce  or  so  of  hominy.  Many  would  consume  the  whole  at  one  meal ;  others  thought  it 
more  wise  to  divide  it  into  two  or  three  meals ;  but  all  were  hungry  continually.  Sir,  it  is  a  terri 
ble  thing  to  be  hungry  from  day  to  day,  from  week  to  week,  from  month  to  month — to  be  always 
hungry  !  It  is  fearful  to  see  three  thousand  men  cooped  up  and  undergoing  such  an  ordeal ! 
Should  it  be  a  matter  of  surprise  that  men  dwindled  from  200  to  140  and  100  pounds;  that  their 
eyes  had  a  strange  and  eager  expression  ;  that  they  grew  pale,  cadaverous  ;  that  they  walked  with  an 
41 


64:2  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

To  the  exposition  made  by  the  Richmond  Congress  of  the  humane  en 
deavours  of  the  Confederacy,  with  respect  to  prisoners  of  the  war,  there  is 
yet  an  addition  to  be  made.  Impressed  with  the  exaggerations  of  the 
newspapers  on  this  subject,  arid  desiring  to  secure  the  publication  of  the 
truth  from  time  to  time,  Commissioner  Ould,  in  January,  1864,  wrote  to 
Gen.  Hitchcock  the  following  letter  : 

CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  j 

WAR  DEPARTMENT.  > 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  Jan.  24th,  1864-  J 

MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  A.  HITCHCOCK, 
Agent  of  Exchange  ; 

SIR  :  In  view  of  the  present  difficulties  attending  the  exchange  and  release 
of  prisoners,  I  propose  that  all  such  on  each  side  shall  be  attended  by  a  proper  number 
of  their  own  surgeons,  who  under  rules  to  be  established,  shall  be  permitted  to  take 
charge  of  their  health  and  comfort.  I  also  propose  that  these  surgeons  shall  act  as 
commissaries,  with  power  to  receive  and  distribute  such  contributions  of  money,  food, 
clothing  and  medicines  as  may  be  forwarded  for  the  relief  of  the  prisoners.  I  further 
propose  that  these  surgeons  shall  be  selected  by  tbeir  own  Government,  and  that  they 
shall  have  full  liberty  at  any  and  all  times  through  the  Agents  of  Exchange,  to  make 
reports  not  only  of  their  own  acts,  but  of  any  matters  relating  to  the  welfare  of  the 
prisoners. 

Respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

RO.  OULD,  Agent  of  Exchange. 

To  this  letter  Commissioner  Ould  received  no  reply.  In  January,  1865, 
the  proposition  was  renewed  to  Gen.  Grant,  with  the  following  remarks  : 
"  It  is  true  your  prisoners  are  suffering.  It  is  one  of  the  calamities  and 

unsteady  gait ;  that  all  talked  continually  of '  something  to  eat ' — of  the  good  dinner,  or  breakfast, 
or  supper  they  had  had  at  times  and  places  that  seemed  very  long  ago,  and  very,  far  off;  that  they 
slept  but  to  dream  of  sitting  down  to  tables  groaning  with  rich  viands,  where  they  ate,  and  ate,  and 
still  could  not  be  satisfied ;  that  with  miserly  care  they  picked  up  every  crumb  ;  that  they  pounded 
up  old  bones,  and  boiled  them  over  and  over,  until  they  were  as  white  as  the  driven  snow ;  that 
they  fished  in  the  swill-barrel  at  the  prison  hospital ;  that  they  greedily  devoured  rats  and  cats ; 
that  they  resorted  to  all  manner  of  devices  and  tricks  to  cheat  the  surgeon  out  of  a  certificate  ;  that 
they  became  melancholy  and  dejected ;  that  they  fell  an  easy  prey  to  disease  and  death !  Ah  ! 
there  is  many  a  poor  fellow  in  his  grave  on  Johnson's  Island  to-day,  who  would  not  be  there  had  he 
been  allowed  wholesome  food  and  enough  of  it." 

A  personal  friend  of  the  author  gives  a  long  and  painfully  interesting  account  of  his  experience 
1  in  a  trans-shipment  of  prisoners  from  Hilton  Head  to  Fort  Delaware,  the  terrible  facts  of  which  rival 
all  that  is  known  of  the  horrours  of  the  "  middle  passage."  Of  420  prisoners  shipped  by  sea,  only 
sixty-two  could  walk  when  the  vessel  arrived  at  Fort  Delaware ;  the  others  were  all  down  with 
sickness  and  exhaustion,  and  had  to  be  taken  to  their  cells  on  stretchers  and  ambulances.  Many 
of  them  had  lost  their  teeth  by  scurvy,  and  many  were  blind  from  disease.  For  months  they  had 
been  subsisted  on  eight  ounces  of  corn  meal  (ground  in  1860)  and  one  ounce  of  pickle  (vitriol  and 
salt),  as  a  substitute  for  sorghum.  Their  rations  were  improved  for  a  little  while  at  Fort  Delaware. 
But  the  regulations  for  cooking  there  allotted  for  such  purpose  to  a  company  of  100  men  every 
twenty-four  hours,  a  log,  10  feet  long  and  eight  inches  in  diameter.  There  were  no  cooking  uten 
sils.  Old  pieces  of  tin  were  used  over  the  fire.  The  men  were  locked  up  eighteen  out  of  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  only  twenty  at  a  time  were  allowed  to  pass  out  for  the  offices  ofnature. 


HUMANITY   OF  THE   CONFEDEBATES.  643 

necessities  of  the  war,  made  so  not  by  our  choice.  "We  have  done  every 
thing  we  can  consistently  with  the  duty  we  owe  to  ourselves.  We  intend 
to  do  the  same  in  the  future.  But  that  great  suffering  must  ensue  if  your 
prisoners  remain  in  our  hands,  is  very  certain.  For  that  reason,  I  propose 
that  all  of  them  be  delivered  to  you  in  exchange,  man  for  man,  and  officer 
for  officer,  according  to  grade,  for  those  of  ours  whom  you  hold.  Will  not 
the  cause  of  humanity  be  far  more  promoted  by  such  a  course,  even 
if,  as  you  s'uggest,  the  friends  of  prisoners,  both  North  and  South,  are  satis 
fied  of  the  exaggeration  of  the  reports  of  suffering  so  rife  in  both  sections  ? 
If,  however,  prisoners  are  to  remain  in  confinement,  at  least,  let  us  mutu 
ally  send  to  their  relief  and  comfort  stationary  agents,  whose  official  duty 
requires  them  to  devote  all  their  time  and  labour  to  their  sacred  mission." 
Gen.  Grant  did  not  reply.  Perhaps  he  thought  matters  were  too  near 
the  end  to  entertain  any  new  negotiations  on  the  subject  referred  to. 
However  this  may  be,  whatever  was  to  be  the  catastrophe,  the  conclusion 
is  simply  stated  :  it  was  to  leave  the  Confederacy  with  a  complete  record 
of  justice,  a  testimony  of  humanity,  on  the  whole  subject  of  the  exchange 
and  treatment  of  prisoners,  which  must  ever  remain  among  the  noblest 
honours  and  purest  souvenirs  of  a  lost  cause. 


CHAPTER    XXXIX. 

HOW  SHEBMAN'S  MAECH  THBOUGH  GEOEGIA  DEVELOPED  A  CEISIS  IN  THE  CONFEDEEACY. — GEO- 
GEAPHIOAL  IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  THE  CONQUEST  OF  THE  SOUTH. — A.DDEESS  OF  THE  CONFED- 

EEATE  CONGEESS. — A  VULGAE  AND  FALSE  ESTIMATE  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  SUCCESS. — MAPS  OF 
CONQUEST  AND  COBWEB  LINES  OF  OCCUPATION. — GENEEAL  DECAY  OF  PUBLIC  SPIEIT  IN 
THE  CONFEDEEACY. — POPULAE  IMPATIENCE  OF  THE  WAE. — WANT  OF  CONFIDENCE  IN 
PEESIDENT  DAVIS'  ADMINISTEATION. — BEWILDEEED  ATTEMPTS  AT  OOUNTEE-EEVOLUTION. 
— EXECUTIVE  MISMANAGEMENT  IN  EICHMOND. — HOW  THE  CONSCEIPTION  LAW  WAS  CHEAT 
ED. — DESEETEES  IN  THE  CONFEDEEATE  AEMIES. — PECULIAE  CAUSES  FOE  IT. — ITS  FBIGHT- 
FUL  EXTENT. — HOW  IT  WAS  NOT  A  SIGN  OF  INFIDELITY  TO  THE  CONFEDEEATE  CAUSE. — 
CONDITION  OF  THE  OOMMISSAEIAT. — BEEAD  TAKEN  FEOM  GEN.  LEE?S  AEMY  TO  FEED 
PEISONEES. — ALAEMING  EEDUCTION  OF  SUPPLIES. — MAJOE  FEENCH's  LETTEE. — LEE's 
TEOOPS  BOEDEEING  ON  STAEVATION. — EIGHT  POINTS  PEESENTED  TO  CONGEESS. — WHAT  IT 
DID. — THE  CONDITION  OF  THE  CUEEENCY. — CONGEESS  CUETAILS  THE  CUEEENCY  ONE- 
THIED. — ACT  OF  17TH  FEBEUAEY,  1864. — SECEETAEY  SEDDON  GIVES  THE  COltp  de  grace 
TO  THE  CUEEENOY. — HIS  NEW  STANDAED  OF  VALUE  IN  WHEAT  AT  FOETY  DOLLAES  A 
BUSHEL. — DISOEDEES  OF  THE  CUEEENOY  AND  COMMISSAEIAT  AS  CONTEIBUTING  TO  DESEE- 
TIONS. — IMPEACTICABILITY  OF  ALL  EEMEDIES  FOE  DESEETIONS. — NO  DISAFFECTION  IN  THE 
CONFEDEEACY,  EXCEPT  WITH  EEFEEENCE  TO  FAULTS  OF  THE  EIOHMOND  ADMINISTEATION. 
— PEESIDENT  DAVIS  AND  THE  OONFEDEEATE  CONGEESS,  &0. — THEEE  PEINCIPAL  MEASUEES 
IN  CONGEESS  DIEECTED  AGAINST  THE  PEESIDENT. — EEMONSTEANCE  OF  THE  VIEGINIA 
DELEGATION  WITH  EEFEEENCE  TO  THE  CABINET. — EESIGNATION  OF  ME.  SEDDON. — PEE- 
SONAL  EELATIONS  BETWEEN  PEESIDENT  DAVIS  AND  GEN.  LEE.  —  WHY  THE  LATTEE  DE 
CLINED  TO  TAKE  COMMAND  OF  ALL  THE  AEMIES  OF  THE  CONFEDEEACY. — WANT  OF  SELF- 
ASSEETION  IN  GEN.  LEE's  CHAEACTEE. — WHY  HIS  INFLUENCE  IN  THE  GENEEAL  AFFAIES 
OF  THE  CONFEDEEACY  WAS  NEGATIVE. — EECEIMINATION  BETWEEN  PEESIDENT  DAVIS  AND 

CONGEESS. A  SINGULAE  ITEM  IN    THE '  CONSCEIPTION    BUEEAU. — EEMAEK  OF  MES.  DAVIS 

TO  A  CONFEDEEATE  SENATOE. — THE  OPPOSITION  LED  BY  SENATOE  WIGFALL. — HIS  TEEEIBLE 
AND  ELOQUENT  INVECTIVES. — A  CHAPTEE  OF  GEEAT  OEATOEY  LOST  TO  THE  WOELD. — AN 
APPAEENT  CONTEADICTIONINTHE  PEESIDENT's  CHAEACTEE. — THE  INFLUENCE  OF  "  SMALL 
FAVOUEITES." — JOHN  M.  DANIEL'S  OPINION  OF  PEESIDENT  DAVIS'  TEAES. — INFLUENCE  OF 
THE  PEESIDENT  ALMOST  ENTIEELY  GONE  IN  THE  LAST  PEEIODS  OF  THE  WAE. — THE  VISIBLE 
WEECK8  OF  HIS  ADMINISTEATION. — HISTOEY  OF  "  PEACE  PEOPOSITIONS  "  IN  CONGEESS. — 
THEY  WEEE  GENEEALITIES. — ANALYSIS  OF  THE  "  UNION  PAETY  "  IN  THE  SOUTH. — HOW 
GOV.  BEOWN,  OF  GEOEGIA,  WAS  USED  BY  IT. — ITS  PEESISTENT  DESIGN  UPON  THE  VIEGINIA 
LEGISLATUEE. — HOW  IT  WAS  EEBUFFED. — HEEOIO  CHOICE  OF  VIEGINIA. — PEESIDENT 


GEOGRAPHICAL    IMPOSSIBILITY    OF    SUBJUGATION.  645 

DAVIS'  TRIBUTE  TO  THIS  STATE. — WANT  OF  RESOLUTION  IN  OTHER  PARTS  OF  THE  CONFED 
ERACY. — SUMMARY  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  DECLINE  AND  FALL  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY. — 
PROPOSITION  TO  ARM  THE  SLAVES  OF  THE  SOUTH  INDICATIVE  OF  A  DESPERATE  CONDITION. 
— HOW  IT  WAS  IMPRACTICABLE  AND  ABSURD. — NOT  FIVE  THOUSAND  SPARE  MUSKETS  IN 
THE  CONFEDERACY. — PALTRY  LEGISLATION  OF  CONGRESS. — GRASPING  AT  SHADOWS. 

THERE  was  nothing  fatal  in  a  military  point  of  view  in  Sherman's  mem 
orable  march  ;  and  vet  it  dated  the  first  chapter  of  the  subjugation  of  the 
Confederacy.  It  brought  the  demoralization  of  the  country  to  the  surface  ; 
it  had  plainly  originated  in  the  pragmatic  and  excessive  folly  of  President 
Davis  ;  it  furnished  a  striking  occasion  for  recrimination,  and  was  accom 
panied  with  a  loss  of  confidence  in  his  admini'stration,  that  nothing  but  a 
miracle  could  repair. 

We  have  already  referred  in  another  part  of  this  work  to  the  physical 
impossibility  of  the  subjugation  of  the  South  at  the  hands  of  the  North,  as 
long  as  the  integrity  of  the  public  resolution  was  maintained.  This  im 
possibility  was  clearly  and  distinctly  stated,  in  an  address  of  the  Congress 
to  the  people  of  the  Confederate  States  as  late  as  the  winter  of  1864-5. 
That  body  then  declared,  with  an  intelligence  that  no  just  student  of  history 
will  fail  to  appreciate  :  "  The  passage  of  hostile  armies  through  our  country, 
though  productive  of  cruel  suffering  to  our  people,  and  great  pecuniary 
loss,  gives  the  enemy  no  permanent  advantage  or  foothold.  To  subjugate 
a  country,  its  civil  government  must  be  suppressed  by  a  continuing  mili 
tary  force,  or  supplanted  by  another,  to  which  the  inhabitants  yield  a  vol 
untary  or  forced  obedience.  The  passage  of  hostile  armies  through  our 
territory  cannot  produce  this  result.  Permanent  garrisons  would  have  to 
be  stationed  at  a  sufficient  number  of  points  to  strangle  all  civil  govern 
ment  before  it  could  be  pretended,  even  by  the  United  States  Government 
itself,  that  its  authority  was  extended  over  these  States.  How  many  gar 
risons  would  it  require  ?  How  many  hundred  thousand  soldiers  would 
suffice  to  suppress  the  civil  government  of  all  the  States  of  the  Confed 
eracy,  and  to  establish  over  them,  even  in  name  and  form,  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  ?  In  a  geographical  point  of  view,  therefore,  it  may 
be  asserted  that  the  conquest  of  these  Confederate  States  is  impracticable.'' 

The  "  geographical  point  of  view  "  was  decisive.  The  Confederacy 
was  yet  far  from  the  extremity  of  subjugation,  even  after  Sherman  had 
marched  from  Northern  Georgia  to  the  sea-coast.  He  had  left  a  long  scar 
on  the  State  ;  but  he  had  not  conquered  the  country  ;  he  had  been  unable 
to  leave  a  garrison  on  his  route  since  he  left  Dal  ton ;  and  even  if  he  passed 
into  the  Carolinas,  to  defeat  him  at  any  stage  short  of  Richmond  would  be 
to  re-open  and  recover  all  the  country  he  had  overrun.  It  was  the  fashion 
in  the  North  to  get  up  painted  maps,  in  which  all  the  territory  of  the  South 
traversed  by  a  Federal  army,  or  over  which  there  was  a  cob- web  line  of 
military  occupation,  was  marked  as  conquest,  and  the  other  parts  desig- 


64:6  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

nated  as  the  remnant  of  the  Confederacy.  This  appeal  to  the  vulgar  eye 
was  not  without  effect,  but  it  was  very  absurd.  Lines  drawn  upon  paper 
alarmed  the  multitude  ;  it  was  sufficient  for  them  to  know  that  the  enemy 
was  at  such  and  such  points  ;  they  never  reflected  that  a  title  of  occupa 
tion  was  worthless,  without  garrisons  or  footholds,  that  it  often  depended 
upon  the  issue  of  a  single  field,  and  that  one  or  two  defeats  might  put  the 
whole  of  the  enemy's  forces  back  upon  the  frontiers  of  the  Confederacy. 

But  the  military  condition  of  the  Confederacy  must  be  studied  in  con 
nection  with  the  general  decay"  of  public  spirit  that  had  taken  place  in  the 
country,  and  the  impatience  of  the  hardships  of  the  war,  when  the  people 
had  no  longer  confidence  in  its  ultimate  results.  This  impatience  was  man 
ifested  everywhere  ;  it  amounted  to  the  feeling,  that  taking  the  war  to  be 
hopeless,  the  sooner  it  reached  an  adverse  conclusion  the  better ;  that  vic 
tories  which  merely  amused  the  imagination  and  insured  prolongation  of 
the  war,  were  rather  to  be  deprecated  than  otherwise,  and  that  to  hurry 
the  catastrophe  would  be  mercy  in  the  end.  Unpopular  as  the  adminis 
tration  of  President  Davis  was,  evident  as  was  its  failure,  there  were  not 
nerve  and  elasticity  enough  in  the  country  for  a  new  experiment.  The 
history  of  the  last  Confederate  Congress  is  that  of  vacillating  and  bewild 
ered  attempts  to  reform  and  check  the  existing  disorder  and  the  evident 
tendency  to  ruin — weak,  spasmodic  action,  showing  the  sense  of  necessity 
for  effort,  but  the  want  of  a  certain  plan  and  a  sustained  resolution. 

In  the  last  periods  of  the  war,  the  demoralization  of  the  Confederacy 
was  painfully  apparent.  The  popular  resolution  that  had  been  equal  to  so 
long  a  contest,  that  had  made  so  many  proffers  of  devotion,  that  had  given 
so  many  testimonies  of  sacrifice  and  endurance,  had  not  perhaps  inherent 
ly  failed.  But  it  had  greatly  declined  in  view  of  Executive  mismanage 
ment,  in  the  utter  loss  of  confidence  in  the  Richmond  Administration,  and 
under  the  oppressive  conviction  that  its  sacrifices  were  wasted,  its  pur 
poses  thwarted,  and  its  efforts  brought  to  nought,  by  an  incompetent  gov 
ernment.  This  official  mismanagement  not  only  impaired  the  popular 
effort,  but  by  the  unequal  distribution  of  burdens  incident  to  weak  and  ir 
regular  governments,  even  where  such  is  not  designed,  incurred  the  charge 
of  corrupt  favour,  and  exasperated  large  portions  of  the  community.  Rich 
and  powerful  citizens  managed  to  escape  the  conscription — it  was  said  in 
Richmond  that  it  was  "  easier  for  a  camel  to  go  through  the  eye  of  a 
needle  than  for  a  rich  man  to  enter  Camp  Lee ; "  but  the  rigour  of  the 
law  did  not  spare  the  poor  and  helpless,  and  the  complaint  was  made  in 
the  Confederate  Congress  that  even  destitute  cripples  had  been  taken  from 
their  homes,  and  confined  in  the  conscription  camps,  without  reference  to 
physical  disability  so  conspicuous  and  pitiful.  It  was  not  unusual  to  see 
at  the  railroad  stations  long  lines  of  squalid  men,  with  scraps  of  blankets 
in  their  hands,  or  small  pine  boxes  of  provisions,  or  whatever  else  they 


DIMINUTION    OF   CONFEDERATE   SUPPLIES.  647 

might  snatch  in  their  hurried  departure  from  their  homes,  whence  they 
had  been  taken  almost  without  a  moment's  notice,  and  ticketed  for  the 
various  camps  of  instruction  in  the  Confederacy. 

In  armies  thus  recruited,  desertions  were  the  events  of  every  day. 
There  were  other  causes  of  desertion.  Owing  to  the  gross  mismanagement 
of  the  commissariat,  and  a  proper  effort  to  mobilize  the  subsistence  of  the 
Confederacy,  the  armies  were  almost  constantly  on  short  rations,  some 
times  without  a  scrap  of  meat,  and  frequently  in  a  condition  bordering  on 
absolute  starvation.  The  Confederate  soldier,  almost  starving  himself, 
heard  constantly  of  destitution  at  home,  and  was  distressed  with  the  suffer 
ing  of  his  family,  and  was  constantly  plied  with  temptation  to  go  to  their 
protection  and  relief.  A  depreciated  currency,  which  had  been  long 
abused  by  ignorant  remedies  and  empirical  treatment  reduced  nearly  every 
home  in  the  Confederacy  to  the  straits  of  poverty.  A  loaf  of  bread  was 
worth  three  dollars  in  Richmond.  A  soldier's  monthly  pay  would  scarcely 
buy  a  pair  of  socks  ;  and  paltry  as  this  pay  was,  it  was  constantly  in 
arrears,  and  there  were  thousands  of  soldiers  who  had  not  received  a  cent 
in  the  last  two  years  of  the  war.  In  such  a  condition  of  affairs  it  was  no 
wonder  that  desertions  were  numerous,  where  there  was  really  no  infidelity 
to  the  Confederate  cause,  and  where  the  circumstances  appealed  so  strongly 
to  the  senses  of  humanity,  that  it  was  impossible  to  deal  harshly  with  the 
offence,  and  adopt  for  example  the  penalty  of  death.  For  every  Confed 
erate  soldier  who  went  over  to  the  Federal  lines,  there  were  hundreds  who 
dropped  out  from  the  rear  and  deserted  to  their  homes.  It  was  estimated 
in  1864,  that  the  conscription  would  put  more  than  four  hundred  thousand 
men  in  the  field.  Scarcely  more  than  one-fourth  of  this  number  were 
found  under  arms  when  the  close  of  the  war  tore  the  veil  from  the  thin 
lines  of  Confederate  defence. 


CONDITION   OF   THE   COMMISSAEIAT. 

"We  have  elsewhere  noticed  the  mismanagement  of  the  Confederate 
commissariat,  and  the  rapid  diminution  of  supplies  in  the  country.  The 
close  of  the  year  1864,  was  to  find  a  general  distress  for  food,  and  an 
actual  prospect,  even  without  victories  of  the  enemy's  arms,  of  starving 
the  Confederacy  into  submission. 

On  the  2d  May,  two  days  before  the  battles  of  the  last  spring  commenced, 
there  were  but  two  days'  rations  for  Lee's  army  in  Richmond.  On  the  23d 
June,  when  Wilson  and  Kautz  cut  the  Danville  Railroad,  which  was  not 
repaired  for  twenty-three  days,  there  were  only  thirteen  days'  rations  on 
hand  for  Gen.  Lee's  army,  and  to  feed  it  the  Commissary  General  had  to 
offer  market  rates  for  wheat,  then  uncut  or  shocked  in  the  field — thereby 


648  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

incurring  an  excess  of  expenditure,  which,  if  invested  in  corn  and  trans 
portation,  would  have  moved  ten  millions  of  bread  rations  from  Augusta  to 
Richmond. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  Gen.  Lee  had  urged  the  importance 
of  having  at  least  thirty  days'  reserves  of  provisions  at  Richmond  and  at 
Lynchburg.  We  have  just  seen  how  impossible  it  was  to  meet  his  views. 
It  is  a  curious  commentary  on  the  alleged  cruelty  of  Confederates  to  their 
prisoners,  that  in  the  winter  of  1863-4,  our  entire  reserve  in  Richmond 
of  thirty  thousand  barrels  of  flour  was  consumed  by  Federal  prisoners  of 
war,  and  the  bread  taken  from  the  mouths  of  our  soldiers  to  feed  them  ! 

In  the  course  of  the  campaign  there  had  been  the  most  serious  reduc 
tions  of  supplies.  The  exhaustion  of  Virginia,  the  prevalence  of  drought 
and  the  desolation  of  the  lower  Valley  and  the  contiguous  Piedmont  coun 
ties  by  the  enemy,  reduced  her  yield  very  considerably.  The  march  of  a 
Federal  army  through  the  heart  of  Georgia,  and  the  possession  of  Savan 
nah  as  a  secure  base  for  raids  and  other  military  operations,  was,  of  course, 
calculated  to  reduce  her  yield.  The  amount  of  tithe  had  proved  a  very 
imperfect  guide  to  the  quantity  of  meat  that  might  be  obtained  under  its 
indications.  Thus,  in  South  Carolina,  only  two  and  one-half  per  cent,  of 
the  sum  of  the  tithe  was  reported  as  purchased. 

In  Virginia  the  supply  even  of  bread  was  practically  exhausted,  and 
but  little  more  could  be  expected,  even  after  the  next  wheat  crop  came  in. 
The  present  corn  crop  was  no  better,  probably  worse,  than  the  last.  Add 
to  this  the  destruction  of  whole  districts  by  Federal  armies,  the  effect  of 
calling  put  the  whole  reserve  force,  and  subsequently  of  revoking  and  put 
ting  into  the  field  or  in  camp  all  detailed  farmers  at  the  period  of  seeding 
wheat,  the  absconding  of  numerous  negroes  under  the  fear  of  being  placed 
in  our  armies,  and  it  was  apparent  that  no  bread  could  be  expected  from 
Virginia. 

In  November,  1864,  President  Davis  applied  to  the  Commissary  Gen 
eral  to  know  if  his  magazines  were  increasing  or  diminishing.  He  sent 
back  word  that  they  were  diminishing,  and  to  give  him  more  accurate  in 
formation  forwarded  the  following  statement,  made  in  the  previous 
month,  disclosing  the  alarming  fact,  that  thirty  million  requisitions  were 
unfilled. 

BUEEAU  OF  SUBSISTENCE.  | 
RICHMOND,  October  18, 1864.  j 

Col.  L.  B.  Norihrop,  Commissary- General  of  Subsistence  : 

COLONEL  :  I  have  the  honour  to  submit  for  your  consideration  the  inclosed  memor 
andum  of  meats  on  hand  at  the  various  depots  and  posts  in  the  Confederate  States,  from 
which  you  will  see  at  a  glance  the  alarming  condition  of  the  commissariat.  Georgia, 
Alabama,  and  Mississippi  are  the  only  States  where  we  have  an  accumulation,  and  from 
these  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  are  no-<v  subsisting,  to  say  nothing  of  the  pris- 


DISTRESS    FOR   FOOD   IN   THE    SOUTH.  649 

oners.  The  Chief  Commissary  of  Georgia  telegraphs  that  he  cannot  send  forward  an 
other  pound.  Alabama,  under  the  most  urgent  call,  has  recently  shipped  125,000 
pounds,  but  cannot  ship  more.  Mississippi  is  rendering  all  the  aid  possible  to  the  com 
mand  of  Gen.  Beauregard,  in  supplying  beef.  She  is  without  bacon.  Florida  is  ex 
hausted,  and  can  only  respond  to  the  local  demand.  South  Carolina  is  scarcely  able  to 
subsist  the  troops  at  Charleston  and  the  prisoners  in  the  interiour  of  the  State.  During 
my  late  trip  to  North  Carolina  I  visited  every  section  of  the  State,  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  true  condition  of  affairs,  and,  under  your  orders,  to  send  forward  every 
pound  of  meat  possible  to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  to  supply  the  forts  at 
Wilmington.  After  a  thorough  and  careful  examination  I  was  unable  (taking  into  con 
sideration  the  local  daily  issues)  to  ship  one  pound  to  either  Virgina  or  Wilmington  ; 
and  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of  the  steamer  Banshee  at  Wilmington,  Gen.  Lee's  order 
for  thirty  days'  reserve  at  the  forts  could  not  have  been  furnished.  From  the  enclosed 
memorandum  you  will  notice  that  we  have  only  on  hand  in  the  Confederate  States 
4,105,048  rations  of  fresh  meat,  and  3,426,519  rations  of  bacon  and  pork,  which  will  sub 
sist  three  hundred  thousand  men  twenty-five  days.  We  are  now  compelled  to  subsist, 
independent  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  the  prisoners  of  war,  the  Navy  Depart 
ment,  and  the  different  bureaus  of  the  War  Department. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  B.  FRENCH,  Major  and  C.  8. 

On  the  5tli  December,  the  Commissary  General  brought  the  condition 
of  things  to  the  attention  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  coupling  it  with  a  state 
ment  of  subsistence  on  hand,  which  showed  nine  days'  rations  on  hand  for 
Gen.  Lee's  army  ;  and,  quoting  a  letter  from  the  commander,  that  day 
received,  stating  that  his  men  were  deserting  on  account  of  short  rations, 
lie  urged  prompt  action.  But  none  was  taken.  On  the  14th  December, 
nine  days  afterwards,  Gen.  Lee  telegraphed  President  Davis  that  his  army 
was  without  meat.  This  disaster  was  averted  for  the  time  by  the  timely 
arrival  of  several  vessel  loads  of  supplies  at  Wilmington. 

In  a  secret  session  of  the  Confederate  Congress  in  Bichmond,  the  condi 
tion  of  the  Confederacy,  with  respect  to  subsistence  was  thus  enumerated  : 

First. — That  there  was  not  meat  enough  in  the  Southern  Confederacy, 
for  the  armies  it  had  in  the  field. 

Second. — That  there  was  not  in  Virginia  either  meat  or  bread  enough 
for  the  armies  within  her  limits. 

Third. — That  the  bread  supply  from  other  places  depended  absolutely 
upon  the  keeping  open  the  railroad  connections  of  the  South. 

Fourth. — That  the  meat  must  be  obtained  from  abroad  through  a  sea 
port,  and  by  a  different  system  from  that  which  prevailed. 

Fifth. — That  the  bread  could  not  be  had  by  impressment,  but  must  be 
paid  for  in  market  rates. 

Sixth. — That  the  payment  must  be  made  in  cash,  which,  so  far,  had  not 
been  furnished,  and  from  present  indications  could  not  be,  and,  if  possible, 
in  a  better  medium  than  at  present  circulating. 


650  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Seventh. — That  the  transportation  was  not  now  adequate,  from  what 
ever  cause,  to  meet  the  necessary  demands  of  the  service. 

Eighth. — That  the  supply  of  fresh  meat  to  Gen.  Lee's  army  was  pre 
carious,  and  if  the  army  fell  back  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  there 
was  every  probability  that  it  would  cease  altogether. 

To  meet  these  great  necessities,  nothing  was  done  by  the  Government 
beyond  a  visionary  scheme  enacted  in  the  last  days  of  Congress,  to  raise 
three  millions  in  specie  to  purchase  supplies  from  those  producers  of  the 
Confederacy,  who  were  no  longer  willing  to  take  scrip  for  their  commodi 
ties.  Probably  a  tithe  of  the  sum  was  raised,  and  the  paltry  scheme  actu 
ally  executed  in  a  few  of  the  Western  counties  of  Virginia. 


THE    CONDITION    OF   THE    CURRENCY. 

In  1864,  the  Confederate  Government  had  given  the  finishing  blow  to 
the  currency. 

By  the  end  of  1863,  the  policy  of  paying  oif  all  debts  and  making  all 
purchases  with  money  manufactured  for  the  purpose  as  needed,  had 
swollen  the  volume  of  the  currency  to  more  than  six  hundred  millions  of 
dollars.  If  we  recollect  that,  before  the  war,  fifty  millions  of  bank  notes, 
and  twenty  millions  of  specie,  had  sufficed  for  the  currency  of  eleven 
States  ;  and  observe  that  about  one-third  of  the  area  of  these  States  was,  in 
the  beginning  of  1864,  under  the  control  of  the  invader,  we  can  appre 
hend  how  excessively  redundant  a  circulation  exceeding  six  hundred  mil 
lions  of  dollars  must  have  proved  to  be  in  the  restricted  territory  remain 
ing  under  the  Confederate  sway.  Legislation  was  deemed  to  be  absolutely 
necessary  to  bring  down  the  bulk  of  this  circulation,  and  to  give  greater 
value  to  the  paper  dollar.  Accordingly,  on  the  17th  February,  1864,  an 
act  of  Congress  was  passed  of  a  very  sweeping  character.  The  design  of 
the  law  was,  to  call  in  from  circulation,  the  whole  outstanding  six  hundred 
millions  of  paper  money ;  and  to  substitute  for  the  old  a  new  issue  of 
greatly  enhanced  value.  Its  provisions  were  well  calculated  to  effect  this 
object.  It  provided  that  until  the  1st  day  of  April  next  succeeding  the 
passage  of  the  law,  east  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the  1st  day  of  July  west  of 
this  river,  the  holders  of  the  outstanding  currency  above  the  denomination 
of  five  dollars,  should  be  at  liberty  to  exchange  the  same  at  par  for  four 
per  cent,  bonds  of  the  government ;  which  bonds  should  be  receivable  in 
the  payment  of  all  Confederate  taxes.  The  law,  however,  did  not  exempt 
these  bonds  from  taxation.  It  further  provided  that  after  the  period  first 
specified,  this  liberty  of  funding  at  par  should  cease,  and  that  the  entire 
body  of  the  currency,  except  notes  under  the  denomination  of  five  dollars, 
should  cease  to  be  current,  and  should  be  exchangeable  for  the  notes  of  a 


REDUCTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  CURRENCY.  651 

new  issue  at  the  rate  of  three  dollars  of  the  old  issue  for  two  dollars  of 
the  new  ;  and  that  non-interest-bearing  notes  of  the  denomination  of  one 
hundred  dollars  should  be  subject  in  addition  to  a  further  tax  of  ten  per 
cent,  per  month,  for  the  time  they  should  remain  outstanding  after  the  1st 
of  April.  All  the  notes  of  the  old  issue  were  to  be  receivable  in  payment 
of  taxes  after  the  1st  of  April,  1864,  at  the  reduced  rate  at  which  they 
were  exchangeable  for  the  new  issue.  But  it  was  provided  that  notes  of 
the  denomination  of  one  hundred  dollars  should  not  be  exchangeable  for 
notes  of  the  new  issue.  The  privilege  of  exchanging  should  continue  until 
the  1st  day  of  January,  1865,  and  should  then  cease.  After  that  date,  all 
treasury  notes  of  the  old  issue  remaining  outstanding  were  to  be  subject 
to  a  tax  of  one  hundred  per  cent.  Notes  of  the  new  issue,  and  notes  of 
the  old  scaled  to  two-thirds  of  their  full  value,  might  be  exchanged  at  the 
treasury  for  call  certificates,  bearing  four  per  cent,  interest  and  payable  two 
years  after  the  notification  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  the  United  States  ; 
but  notes  of  the  old  issue  of  the  denomination  of  one  hundred  dollars  were 
not  to  be  thus  exchangeable. 

The  effect  of  this  measure  was,  to  compel  the  conversion  of  all  notes  of 
the  denomination  of  one  hundred  dollars  into  the  four  per  cent,  bonds.  It 
also  presented  to  the  holders  of  notes  of  the  other  denominations,  the  alter 
native  of  exchanging  them  at  par  for  the  four  per  cent,  bonds,  or  of  sub 
mitting  to  the  tax  of  one-third,  and  converting  them  into  notes  of  the  new 
issue.  This  latter  course  was  preferred  by  a  large  majority  of  the  note 
holders,  under  the  conviction,  that  the  reduction  effected  by  the  Act  in 
this  volume  of  the  circulation,  would  so  strengthen  the  value  of  the  new 
issues,  as  to  render  the  two  new  dollars  which  they  received  for  the  three 
old  ones  more  valuable  than  the  three. 

The  effect  of  the  measure  was,  to  produce  a  reduction  in  the  mass  of 
currency  to  the  extent  of  rather  less  than  three  hundred  millions  of  dollars  ; 
and  to  leave,  during  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1864,  and  the  beginning  of 
1865,  the  amount  of  treasury  notes  in  circulation  in  the  Confederacy,  at 
three  hundred  and  twenty-five  millions  of  dollars,  an  amount  which  was 
found  to  be  perfectly  manageable  ;  and  which,  indeed,  under  the  deprecia 
tion  of  the  new  issue,  which  took  place  towards  the  close,  was  found  to  be 
inadequate  to  the  wants  of  the  country.  For,  at  the  rate  of  sixty  for  one, 
at  which  the  Confederate  Government  itself  sold  specie  for  several  months 
in  Richmond,  this  three  hundred  and  twenty-five  millions  of  currency 
represented  only  the  value  of  five  millions  in  specie  and  general  property  ; 
and  the  natural  result  was  a  very  great  stringency  in  the  money  market. 

But  the  currency  act  of  February  signally  failed  in  its  object.  The  new 
currency  was  not  issued  promptly.  The  old  currency  remained  in  circula 
tion,  depreciated  in  value  by  the  operation  of  causes  which  preceded  the 
currency  act,  aided  by  the  trenchant  provisions  of  the  Act  itself.  The  ex- 


652  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

change  of  the  new  for  the  old  money,  was  not  effected  in  the  country  at 
large  for  many  months  ;  during  which  the  worthlessness  of  the  currency 
became  an  idea  too  firmly  fixed  in  the  public  mind  to  be  removed.  One 
sad  blunder,  committed  in  the  month  of  August,  1864,  gave  the  money 
the  coup-de-grace.  The  commissioners  of  the  State  of  Virginia,  charged 
with  the  duty  of  assessing  the  vUlue  of  property  taken  by  government, 
were  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Seddon,  to  raise  the  price  of 
wheat  to  forty  dollars  per  bushel.  At  this  rate  the  Secretary  of  War  him 
self  sold  a  large  crop  of  wheat  to  the  government,  as  did  also  a  considera 
ble  number  of  his  neighbours,  who  were  large  farmers  on  the  James  River. 
This  action  gave  great  dissatisfaction,  and  cheapened  Confederate  money 
to  a  degree  from  which  it  never  recovered.  Previously  to  this  action,  the 
people  at  large  had  for  a  long  time  received  and  paid  the  money  at  the 
rate  of  twenty  for  one.  But  when  a  prominent  member  of  the  Cabinet 
put  down  the  value  to  forty  for  one,  and  authorized  the  commissioners  of 
the  government  to  shift  the  prices  of  commodities  on  this  basis,  the  twenty 
dollar  scale  was  discarded  everywhere  ;  and  the  public  mind  conceived  a 
distrust  of  the  money  of  which  it  never  divested  itself.  The  commissioners 
soon  discovered  their  blunder,  and  re-established  the  old  scale  ;  but  it  was 
too  late.  From  forty  to  one  the  price  of  the  money  went  gradually  down 
until,  in  February,  it  reached  the  low  figure  of  sixty  for  one.  For  several 
months  about  this  time,  and  until  the  evacuation  of  Eichmond,  the  gov 
ernment  steadily  sold  specie  in  Eichmond  at  prices  approximating  that 
rate  ;  and  but  for  the  value  thus  given,  the  money  would  have  completely 
lost  its  purchasing  power. 

The  statements  of  insufficiency  of  food  in  the  army  ;  the  distress  from 
the  currency,  the  peculiar  temptations  which  Confederate  soldiers  had  to 
desert,  not  to  the  enemy,  but  to  their  own  poverty-stricken  homes ;  and 
the  impracticability  of  executing  the  death  penalty  upon  an  offence  which 
had  so  many  circumstances  to  palliate  it,  sufficiently  indicate  how  difficult 
to  deal  with  was  the  question  of  desertions  in  the  armies  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy.  The  strong  mind  of  Gen.  Lee  was  long  and  painfully  em 
ployed  in  devising  a  remedy  for  an  evil  which  was  eating  into  the  vital 
parts  of  our  resources,  and  which  was  indeed  "  the  army-worm  "  of  the 
Confederacy.  But  the  evil  was  but  little  within  the  reach  of  any  remedy 
arid  was  logically  uncontrollable.  Appeals  to  patriotism  were  of  but  little 
avail,  for  in  nine  cases  out  often  Confederate  desertions  had  not  happened 
from  political  disaffection,  but  from  causes  which  had  over-ridden  and  borne 
down  public  spirit.  Attempts  to  reclaim  deserters  by  force  were  equally 
unavailing,  for  whole  regiments  would  have  to  be  detached  for  the  pur 
pose,  and  there  were  unpleasant  stories  of  the  murder  of  enrolling  officers 
in  some  parts  of  the  Confederacy. 

The  fact  is,  the  prime  evil  was  behind  desertions.     In  contemplating 


PRESIDENT   DAVIS   AND   CONGRESS.  653 

the  decline  of  the  Confederate  armies,  we  must  not  rest  on  secondary  causes, 
such  as  desertions ;  for  these  we  have  shown  were  almost  entirely  the 
consequence  of  a  mismanaged  commissariat,  and  a  currency  wrecked  by 
mal-administration  at  Richmond.  All  the  stones  of  Confederate  decay  are 
traced  at  last  to  one  source :"  the  misgovernment  that  had  made  make 
shifts  in  every  stage  of  the  war,  at  last  to  the  point  of  utter  deprivation, 
and  had  finally  broken  down  the  spirit  of  its  armies  and  the  patience  of  its 
people.  The  disaffection  in  the  Confederacy  that  was  original,  that  was 
purely  political,  that  did  not  proceed  from  some  particular  grievance  of 
the  administration  in  Richmond,  was  utterly  inconsiderable,  and  was  per 
haps  less  than  was  ever  known  in  any  great  popular  commotion  in  the 
history  of  the  world. 


PRESIDENT  DAVIS   AND   THE   CONFEDERATE   CONGRESS,    &C. 

There  was  a  series  of  measures  in  the  Confederate  Congress  directed 
against  the  administration  of  President  Davis  ;  it  was  the  faint  shadow  of 
a  counter-revolution ;  but  as  we  have  said,  the  disposition  was  not  firm 
enough  for  a  decisive  experiment,  and  perhaps  the  public  affairs  of  the 
Confederacy  had  lapsed  too  far  to  be  reclaimed  by  legislative  remedies. 
This  series  of  measures  was  the  appointment  of  Lee  to  a  military  dictator 
ship  ;  the  restoration  of  Johnston  to  active  command  ;  and  the  reform  of 
the  Cabinet,  so  far  at  least  as  to  secure  a  purer  and  better  administration 
of  the  "War  office,  then  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Seddon,  the  wreck  of  a  man,  a 
walking  skeleton,  industrious,  but  facile,  and  at  a  period  of  life  when  the 
professional  politician  readily  falls  to  the  office  of  a  tool  in  the  hands  of 
an  arbitrary  master.  The  two  first  measures  were  accomplished  but  im 
perfectly.  The  command  of  all  the  Confederate  armies  was  given  to  Gen. 
Lee,  but  this  conscientious  chieftain  never  practically  asserted  it.  The 
restoration  of  Johnston  was  ungraciously  conceded  by  President  Davis ; 
but  he  was  not  put  in  command  of  the  forces  south  of  Richmond  until 
they  had  been  swept  by  Sherman  through  two  States  into  the  forests  of 
North  Carolina,  and  were  so  broken  and  disorganized  that  the  campaign 
may  be  said  to  have  been  already  lost. 

A  delegation  of  the  Virginia  members  of  Congress,  headed  by  Mr.  Bo- 
cock,  the  speaker  of  the  House,  addressed  to  President  Davis  an  earnest 
but  most  respectful  paper,  expressing  their  want  of  confidence  in  the  ca 
pacity  and  services  of  his  Cabinet.  The  President  resented  the  address  as 
impertinent ;  and  when  Mr.  Seddon,  Secretary  of  War,  recognizing  the 
censure  as  particularly  directed  against  himself,  a  Yirginian,  insisted  upon 
resigning,  President  Davis  took  occasion  to  declare  that  the  event  of  this 
resignation  would  in  no  manner  change  the  policy  or  course  of  his  admin- 


654:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

istration,  and  made  it  very  plain  that  the  course  of  Mr.  Seddon  was  to  be 
ascribed  to  his  punctilio,  and  to  be  taken  in  no  manner  as  a  triumph  of  the 
Opposition  in  Congress. 

No  man  within  the  limits  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  had  such  in 
fluence  over  its  President  as  Gen.  Lee.  It  was  the  only  happy  instance 
of  well-bestowed  confidence  and  merited  deference  on  the  part  of  Presi 
dent  Davis  ;  and  to  the  last  period  of  the  war  entire  accord,  and  a  warm 
personal  friendship  existed  between  himself  and  the  commander  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  It  will  naturally  be  asked  why,  in  such  re 
lations,  Gen.  Lee  did  not  impose  his  views  upon  the  President,  varying  as 
they  did  from  the  actual  conduct  of  his  administration,  and  inclined,  as  all 
the  Confederacy  knew,  to  a  policy  very  different  from  that  which  Presi 
dent  Davis  actually  pursued.  Gen.  Lee  was  in  favour  of  enlisting  negro 
troops,  and  he  was  anxious  for  the  reorganization  of  the  forces  south  of 
Richmond,  and  the  restoration  of  Johnston  to  command.  But  for  a  long 
time  Davis  carried  both  points  against  him.  Gen.  Lee  was  offered  the 
entire  and  exclusive  conduct  of  the  military  affairs  of  the  Confederacy ; 
Congress  made  him  commander-in-chief ;  the  Legislature  of  Virginia  passed 
a  resolution  declaring  that  "  the  appointment  of  Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee  to 
the  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States  would  promote 
their  efficiency  and  operate  powerfully  to  reanimate  the  spirits  of  the 
armies,  as  well  as  of  the  people  of  the  several  States,  and  to  inspire  in 
creased  confidence  in  the  final  success  of  our  cause."  Yet  Gen.  Lee  did 
not  accept  the  trust ;  he  remained  with  his  limited  command  in  Virginia  ; 
he  made  no  effort  to  carry  out  his  views  against  the  administration  at 
Richmond.  And  what  is  most  remarkable  in  all  these  differences  between 
President  Davis  and  Gen.  Lee,  there  never  was  even  a  momentary  dis 
turbance  of  kindly  relations,  as  between  themselves,  and  of  mutual  compli 
ments.  Indeed,  President  Davis  replied  to  the  Legislature  of  Virginia,  that 
he  had  desired  to  surrender  all  military  affairs  to  Gen.  Lee,  but  that  the 
latter  persisted  in  his  refusal  to  accept  a  trust  of  such  magnitude.  He 
said  :  "  The  opinion  expressed  by  the  General  Assembly  in  regard  to 
Gen.  R.  E.  Lee  has  my  full  concurrence.  Virginia  cannot  have  a  higher 
regard  for  him,  or  greater  confidence  in  his  character  and  ability,  than  is 
entertained  by  me.  When  Gen.  Lee  took  command  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  he  was  in  command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confede 
rate  States  by  my  order  of  assignment.  He  continued  in  this  general  com 
mand,  as  well  as  in  the  immediate  command  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  as  long  as  I  would  resist  his  opinion  that  it  was  necessary  for 
him  to  be  relieved  from  one  of  these  two  duties.  Ready  as  he  has  ever 
shown  himself  to  be  to  perform  any  service  that  I  desired  him  to  render 
to  his  country,  he  left  it  for  me  to  choose  between  his  withdrawal  from  the 
command  of  the  army  in  the  field,  and  relieving  him  of  the  general  com- 


GEN.  LEE'S  INFLUENCE.  655 

mand  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States.  It  was  only  when  sat- 
isiied  of  this  necessity  that  I  came  to  the  conclusion  to  relieve  him  from 
the  general  command,  believing  that  the  safety  of  the  capital  and  the  suc 
cess  of  oiir  cause  depended,  in  a  great  measure,  on  then  retaining  him  in 
the  command  in  the  field  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia.  On  several 
subsequent  occasions,  the  desire  on  my  part  to  enlarge  the  sphere  of  Gen. 
Lee's  usefulness,  has  led  to  renewed  consideration  of  the  subject,  and  he 
has  always  expressed  his  inability  to  assume  command  of  other  armies 
than  those  now  confided  to  him,  unless  relieved  of  the  immediate  com 
mand  in  the  field  of  that  now  opposed  to  Gen.  Grant." 

The  explanation  of  these  differences  between  President  Davis  and  Gen. 
Lee,  without  any  issue  ever  being  declared  between  them,  is  easy  when 
the  character  of  the  latter  is  understood.  No  great  actor  in  history  had 
ever  less  self-assertion  than  Gen.  Lee  ;  outside  of  the  limits  of  his  particu 
lar  command,  he  was  one  of  those  who  never  gave  an  opinion,  except  in 
the  shape  of  a  suggestion  ;  his  warm  personal  friendship  resisted  any  atti 
tude  of  hostility  to  the  President ;  and  although  he  differed  from  much  of 
his  policy,  he  went  so  far  as  to  declare  to  several  members  of  the  Rich 
mond  Congress,  that  whatever  might  be  Davis'  errours  he  was  yet  consti 
tutionally  the  President,  and  that  nothing  could  tempt  himself  to  en 
croach  upon  prerogatives  which  the  Constitution  had  bestowed  upon  its 
designated  head.  The  world  will  see  in  such  conduct  some  pleasing  traces 
of  modesty  and  conscientiousness  ;  although  it  is  much  to  be  regretted,  in 
view  of  the  circumstances  and  sequel  of  the  Confederacy,  that  Gen.  Lee 
was  not  an  ambitious  man,  or  did  not  possess  more  of  that  vigorous  self 
ishness  that  puts  the  impressions  of  individuality  on  the  pages  of  history. 
The  fact  was  that,  although  many  of  Gen.  Lee's  views  were  sound,  yet, 
outside  of  the  limits  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Yirginia,  and  with  reference 
to  the  general  affairs  of  the  Confederacy,  his  influence  was  negative  and 
accomplished  absolutely  nothing. 

The  last  occupation  of  the  Confederate  Congress  appears  to  have  been 
a  sharp  recrimination  between  it  and  President  Davis,  as  to  the  responsi 
bility  for  the  low  condition  of  the  public  defences.  A  raging  debate  took 
place  in  secret  session  of  the  Senate.  It  was  charged  that  the  President 
had  resisted  all  measures  looking  to  the  restoration  of  public  confidence 
and  the  energetic  administration  of  military  affairs ;  that  he  had  robbed 
the  conscription  of  its  legitimate  fruits,  by  a  weak  and  corrupt  system  of 
details  ;  and  the  statistics  of  the  conscription  bureau  were  brought  up  to 
show  that  east  of  the  Mississippi  River,  twenty-two  thousand  and  thirty- 
five  men  had  been  detailed  by  executive  authority,  and  so  much  subtracted 
from  the  strength  of  the  Confederate  armies  by  a  single  measure  of  the 
President's  favour. 

When  in  secret  session,  confidence  in  the  President's  military  adminis- 


656  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

tration  was  put  to  the  test,  on  the  proposition  to  take  the  control  and 
conduct  of  the  armies  from  his  hands,  it  was  found  that  his  party  had 
dwindled  down  to  an  insignificant  number,  and  that  many  who  had  pre 
viously  supported  him  in  much  of  evil  report,  now  joined  in  recording  the 
verdict  of  incompetency  against  him.  When  the  vote  came  to  be  taken 
upon  the  proposition  to  put  Lee  in  command  of  all  the  Confederate  armies, 
Senator  Henry  of  Kentucky,  long  the  constant  and  intelligent  friend  of 
President  Davis — indeed  the  leader  of  his  party  in  the  Confederate  Sen 
ate — felt  constrained  to  vote  for  this  important  change  in  the  Administra 
tion  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  On  the  occasion  of  a  social  visit  to  the 
family  of  the  President,  he  was  called  to  task  by  Mrs.  Davis,  who  bitterly 
inveighed  against  the  purpose  of  Congress  to  diminish  the  power  of  her 
husband.  She  spoke  with  a  spirit  so  extraordinary,  that  her  words  were 
well  remembered.  "  If  I  were  Mr.  Davis,"  she  said,  "  I  would  die  or  be 
hung  before  I  would  submit  to  the  humiliation." 

The  man  who  was  by  general  assent  leader  of  the  Congressional  party 
against  the  President,  was  Senator  Wigfall,  of  Texas.  He  had  one  of  the 
largest  brains  in  the  Confederacy.  He  was  a  man  of  scarred  face  and 
fierce  aspect,  but  with  rare  gifts  of  oratory  ;  in  argument  he  dealt  blows 
like  those  of  the  sledge-hammer  ;  he  was  bitter  in  his  words,  his  delivery 
was  careless  and  slovenly  to  affectation,  but  some  of  his  sentences  were 
models  of  classic  force,  and  as  clear-cut  as  the  diamond.  The  terrible  de 
nunciations  of  this  extraordinary  man  will  be  remembered  by  those  who 
visited  the  halls  of  legislation  in  Richmond  ;  but  the  newspapers  were  afraid 
to  publish  his  speeches,  beyond  some  softened  and  shallow  sketches  of  the 
reporters.  It  is  a  pity  that  all  of  this  splendid,  fiery  oratory,  which  might 
have  matched  whatever  we  know  of  historical  invective,  has  been  lost  to 
the  world.  It  is  only  now  in  the  faint  reflection  of  these  censures  of 
President  Davis,  we  may  study  the  character  of  the  man  who,  while  he  did 
much  to  ornament  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy,  yet  persisted  to  the  last 
in  a  long  course  of  practical  errours,  and  was  dead  alike  to  censure  and 
expostulation. 

President  Davis  had  a  great  reputation  in  the  Confederacy  for  a  certain 
sort  of  firmness.  He  was  almost  inaccessible  to  the  advice  and  argument 
of  those  who  might  aspire  to  intellectual  equality,  and  possibly  dispute 
with  him  the  cr-edit  of  public  measures.  "No  man  could  receive  a  delega 
tion  of  Congressmen,  or  any  company  of  persons  who  had  advice  to  give,  or 
suggestions  to  make,  with  such  a  well-bred  grace,  with  a  politeness  so  stud 
ied  as  to  be  almost  sarcastic,  with  a  manner  that  so  plainly  gave  the  idea 
that  his  company  talked  to  a  post.  But  history  furnishes  numerous  ex 
amples  of  men  who,  firm  as  flint  in  public  estimation,  and  superiour  to 
the  common  addresses  of  humanity,  have  yet  been  as  wax  in  the  hands  of 
small  and  unworthy  favourites.  Severest  tyrants  have  been  governed  by 


MALADMINISTRATION   OF   PRESIDENT   DAVIS.  C>57 

women  and  court-jesters.  President  Davis,  firm,  cold,  severe  to  those  who 
from  position  or  merit  should  have  been  admitted  into  his  counsels,  was 
notoriously  governed  by  his  wife  ;  had  dismissed  the  Quarter-Master  Gen 
eral  of  the  Confederacy,  on  account  of  a  woman's  quarrel  and  a  criticism 
of  Mrs.  Davis'  figure  ;  surrounded  himself  with  and  took  into  his  household 
and  intimate  confidence  men  who  had  been  "  Jenkinses  "  and  court-cor 
respondents  in  Washington ;  was  imposed  upon  by  "  travelled  gentlemen  " 
and  obsequious  adventurers  ;  and  frequently  placed  in  the  most  important 
commands  and  positions  in  the  Confederacy,  men  who  had  no  other  claim 
on  his  favour,  than  an  acquaintance  at  West  Point,  or  some  social  pleas 
antry  in  Washington.  Those  who  knew  Mr.  Davis  best  testified  that  he 
was  the  weakest  of  men,  on  certain  sides  of  his  character,  and  that  he  had 
a  romantic  sentimentalism,  which  made  him  the  prey  of  preachers  and 
women.  John  M.  Daniel,  the  editor  of  the  Richmond  Exarrt/mer — a  single 
press  so  powerful  in  the  Confederacy,  that  it  was  named  "  the  fourth 
estate  " — once  remarked  to  Senator  Wigfall,  that  the  President  was  con 
temptibly  weak  ;  that  his  eyes  often  filled  with  tears  on  public  occasions  ; 
and  that  a  man  who  cried  easily  was  unfit  for  a  ruler.  "  I  do  not  know 
about  that,"  said  the  rugged  Texas  Senator ;  "  there  are  times  in  every 
man's  life,  when  it  is  better  to  take  counsel  of  the  heart  than  the  head." 
"  Well,"  replied  Daniel,  "  I  have  only  to  say  that  any  man  whose  tears  lie 
shallow,  is  assuredly  weak  and  unreliable.  For  myself,  I  admire  the 
manner  of  the  austere  Romans :  when  they  wept,  the  face  was  turned 
away  and  the  head  covered  with  the  mantle." 

It  must  be  admitted  that  in  the  last  periods  of  the  war,  the  influence 
of  President  Davis  was  almost  entirely  gone,  and  that  the  party  which 
supported  him  was  scarcely  anything  more  than  that  train  of  followers 
which  always  fawns  on  power  and  lives  on  patronage.  There  was  a  large 
party  in  the  Confederacy,  that  now  accepted  its  downfall  as  an  inevitable 
result,  in  view  of  what  stared  them  in  the  face,  that  all  the  public  meas 
ures  of  Mr.  Davis'  administration  had  come  to  be  wrecks.  The  foreign 
relations  of  the  Confederacy  were  absurdities ;  its  currency  was  almost 
worthless  rags ;  its  commissariat  was  almost  empty ;  its  system  of  con 
scription  was  almost  like  a  sieve  for  water.  Surely  when  all  these  wrecks 
of  a  great  system  of  government  lay  before  the  eyes,  it  was  no  longer  pos 
sible  to  dispute  the  question  of  maladminstration,  debate  the  competency 
of  President  Davis,  and  give  him  a  new  lease  of  public  confidence. 

Much  had  been  imagined  in  Richmond  of  propositions  for  peace  nego 
tiations,  vaguely  reported  as  pending  in  secret  •  session  of  Congress.  But 
this  part  of  the  secret  history  of  the  Confederacy  is  easily  told ;  covers  no 
very  important  facts ;  and  will  disappoint  the  reader,  who  may  have  ex 
pected  from  these  chambers  of  mystery  some  startling  revelations. 

The  propositions  for  pacification  in  the  last  Confederate  Congress, 
42 


658  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

never  came  to  a  practical  point,  and  were  loose  efforts  indicative  of  its 
weak  and  bewildered  mind.  None  of  these  propositions  ever  originated  in 
the  Confederate  Senate  ;  no  vote  was  ever  taken  there ;  they  came  from 
the  House  and  were  generalities. 

Almost  during  the  entire  period  of  the  war,  there  had  been  a  certain 
Union  party  in  some  of  the  States  of  the  Confederacy.  Its  sentiment  was 
uniform  during  the  term  of  its  existence  ;  but  its  designs  varied  at  dif 
ferent  stages  of  the  war.  Early  in  1863,  a  party  organization  was  secretly 
proposed  in  Georgia,  to  introduce  negotiations  with  the  enemy  on  the  part 
of  the  States  separately,  without  regard  to  their  Confederate  faith.  It  was 
supposed  that  the  excessive  vanity  of  Gov.  Brown  could  be  easily  used  in 
this  matter ;  and  he  was  weak  enough  to  give  his  ear  to  the  coarsest  flat 
tery  and  to  believe  what  a  charlatan  told  him,  that  "  he  (Gov.  Brown) 
held  the  war  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand."  The  party  of  State  negotiation 
obtained  a  certain  hold  in  Georgia,  in  Northern  Alabama,  and  in  parts  of 
North  Carolina ;  but  the  great  object  was  to  secure  the  Legislature  of 
Virginia,  and  for  a  long  period  an  active  and  persistent  influence  was  used 
to  get  the  prestige  of  Virginia's  name  for  this  new  project.  But  it  failed. 
The  intrigue  caught  such  third-rate  politicians  as  TVickham,  and  such  chaff 
as  James  Lyons,  and  men  who  had  balanced  all  their  lives  between  North 
and  South.  But  this  was  a  low  order  of  Virginians.  In  the  last  stages  of 
the  war,  the  Legislature  of  Virginia  was  besieged  with  every  influence  in 
favour  of  separate  State  negotiation  with  the  Federal  Government ;  pro 
positions  were  made  for  embassies  to  "Washington  ;  but  the  representative 
body  of  the  proudest  State  in  the  Confederacy  was  true  to  its  great  histor 
ical  trust,  and  preferred  that  Virginia  should  go  down  to  posterity  proudly, 
starkly,  with  the  title  of  a  subjugated  people,  rather  than  a  community 
which  bartered  its  Confederate  faith,  its  honour,  and  its  true  glory  for  the 
small  measure  of  an  enemy's  mercy,  and  the  pittance  of  his  concessions. 
The  deliberate  choice  of  Virginia,  in  the  very  last  period  of  the  war,  was 
to  stand  or  fall  by  the  fortune  of  the  Confederate  arms,  holding  her  un 
tarnished  honour  in  her  hands,  and  committing  to  history  along  with  the 
record  of  success  or  of  disaster  the  greatest  and  most  spotless  name  of 
modern  times. 

In  the  month  of  January,  1865,  Virginia  raised  her  voice  for  the  last 
time  in  the  war,  and  gave  official  expression  to  her  heroic  choice.  In  a 
public  letter  of  the  two  Houses  of  her  Legislature  to  President  Davis,  it 
was  then  declared :  "  The  General  Assembly  of  Virginia  desire  in  this  crit 
ical  period  of  our  affairs,  by  such  suggestions  as  occur  to  them,  and  by  the 
dedication,  if  need  be,  of  the  entire  resources  of  the  Commonwealth  to  the 
common  cause,  to  strengthen  our  hands,  and  to  give  success  to  our  strug 
gle  for  liberty  and  independence."  The  reply  of  President  Davis  was 
noble.  Almost  his  last  official  writing  was  a  tribute  to  the  grand  State  of 


PROPOSITION  TO   AEM   THE   SLAVES.  659 

Virginia.  To  the  presiding  officer  of  her  Legislature,  he  wrote  :  "  Your  as 
surance  is  to  me  a  source  of  the  highest  gratification ;  and  while  conveying 
to  you  my  thanks  for  the  expression  of  the  confidence  of  the  General  As 
sembly  in  my  sincere  devotion  to  my  country  and  sacred  cause,  I  must 
beg  permission,  in  return,  to  bear  witness  to  the  uncalculating,  unhesitating 
spirit  with  which  Virginia  has,  from  the  moment  when  she  first  drew  the 
sword,  consecrated  the  blood  of  her  children  and  all  her  material  resources 
to  the  achievement  of  the  object  of  our  struggle." 

If  the  spirit  of  Virginia  had  animated  the  entire  Confederacy,  a  cause 
now  prostrate  might  have  been  still  erect  and  in  arms,  and  perhaps  trium 
phant.  For  after  all,  the  main  condition  of  the  success  of  the  Confederacy 
was  simply  resolution,  the  quality  that  endures  ;  and  as  long  as  the  people 
were  resolved  to  be  free,  there  was  no  military  power  that  could  have  been 
summoned  by  the  enemy,  to  bring  under  subjection  a  country  occupying 
so  many  square  miles,  and  so  wild  and  difficult  as  that  of  the  South.  The 
mind  may  easily  discover  many  causes  that  concurred  in  the  decline  and 
downfall  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  and  contributed  something  to  the 
catastrophe ;  but  one  rises  uppermost,  and,  for  the  purposes  of  the  expla 
nation,  is  sufficient  and  conclusive — the  general  demoralization  of  the  peo 
ple,  and  that  demoralization  consequent  upon  such  a  want  of  confidence  in 
the,  administration  of  President  Davis,  as  was  never  before  exhibited  be 
tween  a  people  and  its  rulers  in  a  time  of  revolution.  He  who  takes  broad 
and  enlightened  views  of  great  historical  results,  and  is  not  satisfied  to  let 
his  mind  rest  on  secondary  causes  and  partial  explanations,  will  ascribe 
the  downfall  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  to  a  general  breakng  down  of 
the  public  virtue,  and  the  debasement  of  a  people  who,  having  utterly  lost 
hope  in  their  rulers,  and  having  no  heart  for  a  new  experiment,  descend 
to  tame  and  infamous  submission  to  what  they  consider  fortune. 

We  may  properly  add  here  some  considerations  of  an  extraordinary 
measure  to  restore  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy,  indicative,  indeed,  of 
the  desperate  condition  of  the  country,  and  of  the  disposition  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  catch  at  straws.  Throughout  the  entire  session  of  the  last 
Congress  in  Richmond  there  was  an  ill-natured  debate  of  a  proposition  to 
arm  the  slaves,  and  thus  repair  the  strength  and  organization  of  the 
armies.  The  circumstances  in  which  this  proposition  was  discussed 
showed  plainly  enough  that  the  yield  of  the  conscription  law  had  been 
practically  exhausted,  and  were  the  occasion  of  prejudicial  dissensions, 
which  contributed  to  the  overthrow  of  the  Confederacy.  It  may  easily  be 
calculated  that  out  of  three  million  slaves,  two  hundred  thousand  might 
have  been  spared,  and  brought  into  the  field.  This  addition,  if  made 
some  time  ago,  might  have  turned  the  scale  in  favour  of  the  South,  con 
sidering  how  evenly  the  balance  hung  in  the  early  campaigns  of  the  war. 
But  the  time  for  this  measure  was  past ;  soldiers  could  not  be  impro- 


660  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

vised ;  there  was  no  time  to  drill  and  perfect  negro  recruits  before  the  re 
sumption  of  the  active  and  decisive  campaign ;  and  it  is  a  striking  evi 
dence  of  the  shiftlessness  of  the  Confederate  Government  and  the  imprac 
ticability  of  the  Congress,  that  there  should  have  been  debated  a  bill  to 
put  two  hundred  thousand  negroes  in  the  Confederate  armies  at  a  time 
when  there  were  not  five  thousand  spare  arms  in  the  Confederacy  and  our 
returned  prisoners  could  not  actually  find  muskets  with  which  to  resume 
their  places  in  the  field. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  general  merits  of  the  question  of  enlist 
ing  the  negro  and  competing  with  the  enemy  in  this  branch  of  the  recruit 
ing  service,  the  time  and  circumstances  in  which  the  measure  was  actual 
ly  discussed  in  Richmond  rendered  it  impracticable  and  absurd,  and  gave 
occasion  to  a  controversy  which,  however  barren  of  proper  results,  created 
parties  and  drew  lines  of  exasperated  prejudice  through  different  classes 
of  the  people.  The  country,  in  its  exhausted  state,  could  not  half  feed 
and  clothe  the  few  soldiers  left  in  the  ranks.  Hence,  under  all  possible 
circumstances,  the  negroes  could  but  add  to  the  painful  embarrassments 
already  existing.  The  policy  of  the  government  in  this,  as  well  as  nearly 
all  its  measures,  was  lamentably  weak  and  short-sighted.  To  suppose  that 
it  could  accomplish  with  negro  soldiers  what  it. had  totally  failed  to  do 
with  the  white,  who  had  a  much  greater  interest  in  the  issue,  was  -su 
premely  absurd.  The  actual  results  of  the  legislation  of  Congress  on  the 
subject  were  ridiculously  small,  and  after  the  pattern  of  all  its  other  pro 
ductions  in  its  last  session — a  pretence  of  doing  something,  yet  so  far  be 
low  the  necessities  of  the  case,  as  to  be  to  the  last  degree  puerile,  absurd, 
and  contemptible.  The  proposition  to  arm  negroes  was  made  in  Novem 
ber,  1864 ;  it  was  debated  until  March,  1865  ;  and  the  result  was  a  weak 
compromise  on  the  heel  of  the  session  by  which  the  question  of  emancipa 
tion  as  a  reward  for  the  negroes'  services  was  studiously  excluded,  and  the 
President  simply  authorized  to  accept  from  their  masters  such  slaves  as 
they  might  choose  to  dedicate  to  the  military  service  of  the  Confederacy. 

Such  paltry  legislation  indeed,  may  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  that 
vague  desperation  in  the  Confederacy  which  grasped  at  shadows ;  which 
conceived  great  measures,  the  actual  results  of  which  were  yet  insignifi 
cant  ;  which  showed  its  sense  of  insecurity — and  yet,  after  all,  had  not 
nerve  enough  to  make  a  practical  and  persistent  effort  at  safety. 


CHAPTER    XL. 

GEN.  SHERMAN'S  NEW  BASE  AT  SAVANNAH. — HE  PEEPAEES  TO  MARCH  THROUGH  THE  CARO- 
LINAS. — GEN.  GEANT'S  FIRST  IDEA  TO  BEING  SHERMAN'S  ARMY  TO  VIRGINIA  BY  WATER. — 
OPENING  OF  THE  CAROLINA  CAMPAIGN. — HOWARD'S  MOVEMENT  TOWARDS  CHARLESTON. — 
THE  LINE  OF  THE  SALKAHATCHIE  TAKEN. — SLOCUM  THREATENS  AUGUSTA. — JUNCTION  OF 
THE  TWO  COLUMNS  IN  THE  VICINITY  OF  THE  AUGUSTA  AND  CHARLESTON  BAILEOAD.— 
SCENES  OF  LICENSE  AND  PLUNDER  ON  SHERMAN'S  MARCH. — SAVAGE  ATROCITIES. — THE 
TRACK  OF  FIRE. — SHERMAN'S  "  BUMMERS." — WHAT  WAS  THOUGHT  OF  THEM  IN  WASHING 
TON. — SHERMAN  TURNS  HIS  COLUMNS  ON  COLUMBIA. — DISPOSITION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE 

FORCES  BETWEEN  AUGUSTA  AND  CHARLESTON. — WHY  COLUMBIA  WAS  NOT  DEFENDED. — 
GALLANTRY  OF  GEN.  WADE  HAMPTON. — SACK  AND  DESTRUCTION  OF  COLUMBIA. — SHER- 
MAN'S  SOLEMN  PROMISE  TO  THE  MAYOR. — ROBBERY  AND  OUTRAGE  IN  THE  STREETS. — THE 
CATHOLIC  CONVENT. — SOME  OF  THE  FEDERAL  SOLDIERS  TELL  OF  THE  PROPOSED  DESTRUC 
TION  OF  THE  TOWN. — IT  IS  FIRED  IN  TWENTY  PLACES. — HORROURS  OF  THE  CONFLAGRA 
TION. — SCENES  OF  MISERY  AND  RUIN. — PROOFS  THAT  SHERMAN  WAS  RESPONSIBLE  FOR 
THE  FIRE. — ARRAY  OF  EVIDENCE  ON  THIS  SUBJECT. — FALL  OF  CHARLESTON. — THE  CITY 
EVACUATED  BY  HARDEE. — OCCASION  OF  DELAY  BY  PRESIDENT  DAVIS. — AN  EXPLOSION 
AND  CONFLAGRATION. — APPEARANCE  OF  THE  CITY  AFTER  FOUR  YEARS  OF  CONFLICT. — 
CAPTURE  OF  FORT  FISHER. FALL  OF  WILMINGTON. — THE  ENEMY'S  VIEWS  OF  THE  IMPOR 
TANCE  OF  WILMINGTON. — HOW  IT  WAS  TO  BE  USED  AS  ANOTHER  BASE  OF  OPERATIONS 
TOWARDS  RICHMOND. — ITS  CAPTURE  AUXILIARY  TO  SHERMAN'S  MOVEMENT. — THE  FIRST 
EXPEDITION  AGAINST  IT. — BUTLER'S  POWDER-SHIP. — FAILURE  OF  THE  EXPEDITION. — THE 
BUTLER-GRANT  CONTROVERSY. — SECOND  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  WILMINGTON. — GEN.  BRAGG 
AGAIN  ON  THE  MILITARY  STAGE. — HOW  THE  ENEMY  EFFECTED  A  LANDING  ABOVE  FORT 
FISHER. — WANT  OF  VIGILANCE  ON  THE  PART  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — GEN.  HOKE  FLANKED 

AND  RETREATS. — THE  FORT  TAKEN  BY  ASSAULT. CO-OPERATION  OF  THE  ENEMY'S  FLEET. 

ITS  TERRIBLE  FIRE. — GEN.    BRAGG   EVACUATES    WILMINGTON. — GRANT'S   INSTRUCTIONS 

TOSCHOFIELD  TO  CO-OPERATE  WITH  SHERMAN. — THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA.— 
SHERMAN  MOVES  APPARENTLY  TOWARDS  CHARLOTTE,  AND  DEFLECTS  TO  FAYETTEVILLE. 
— MOVEMENT  OF  THE  CO-OPERATING  COLUMNS  FROM  WILMINGTON  AND  NEWBEEN. — GEN. 
BRAGG  ENGAGES  THE  ENEMY  NEAR  KINSTON. — SUCCESS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATES. — AR 
RIVAL  OF  SCHOFIELD  AND  TERRY  AT  GOLDSBORO'. — SHERMAN  PUSHES  ON  THERE. — GEN. 
JOHNSTON'S  COMMAND,  AND  DISTRIBUTION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES. — IIARDEE 

LOSES  TWO-THIRDS  OF  HIS  ARMY  BY  DESERTIONS. — HE  ENGAGES  THE  ENEMY  NEAR 
AVERYSROEO',  AND  IS  COMPELLED  TO  FALL  BACK. — THE  ENGAGEMENT  AT  BEXTONVILLE. 


662  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

TEEN"  THOUSAND  MEN. — SUCCESS  ON  THE  CONFEDERATE  EIGHT. — JOHNSTON  HOLDS  HIS 
GEOUND  AGAINST  THE  WHOLE  OF  SHERMAN'S  AEMY,  AND  EETEEATS  DELIBEEATELY  TO 
SMITHFIELD. — SHEEMAN's  AEEIVAL  AT  GOLDSBOEO'. — CONFEEENCE  AT  CITY  POINT  OF 
SHEEMAN,  GEANT  AND  PEESIDENT  LINCOLN. 

IN  capturing  Savannah,  Sherman  not  only  obtained  a  great  prize  in 
ordnance  and  cotton,  which,  after  a  fashion  somewhat  Oriental,  he  desig 
nated  as  a  "  Christmas  gift "  to  his  master  in  Washington.  He  also  ob 
tained  a  position  of  great  military  value.  From  the  banks  of  the  Savannah 
Kiver,  he  beheld  opened  before  him  all  the  avenues  into  and  through 
South  Carolina,  and  discovered  a  new  route,  reaching  to  what  had  now 
become  the  last  and  contracted  theatre  of  war  in  the  Confederacy.  The 
Northern  newspapers  declared  that  when  Sherman's  legions  looked  across 
the  Savannah  to  the  shores  of  Carolina,  they  sent  up  a  "  howl  of  delight." 
There  was  a  terrible  gladness  in  the  realization  of  so  many  hopes  and 
wishes — in  seeing  the  most  hated  £tate  of  the  South  almost  prostrate,  and 
offering  the  prospect  of  outrage  with  impunity. 

It  had  been  the  first  idea  of  Gen.  Grant,  anticipating  the  arrival  of 
Sherman  at  Savannah,  that,  after  establishing  a  base  on  the  sea-coast,  with 
necessary  garrison  to  include  all  his  artillery  and  cavalry,  he  should  come 
by  water  to  City  Point  with  the  remainder  of  his  command,  to  ensure  the 
capture  of  Lee's  army  or  to  smother  it  with  numbers.  But  this  plan  of 
operations  was  changed.  "  On  the  18th  of  December,"  writes  Gen.  Grant, 
"  having  received  information  of  the  defeat  and  utter  rout  of  Hood's  army 
by  Gen.  Thomas,  and  that,  owing  to  the  great  difficulty  of  procuring  ocean 
transportation,  it  would  take  over  two  months  to  transport  Sherman's 
army,  and  doubting  whether  he  might  not  contribute  as  much  towards  the 
desired  result  by  operating  from  where  he  was,  I  wrote  to  him  to  that 
effect,  and  asked  him  for  his  views  as  to  what  would  be  best  to  do.  A  few 
days  after  this  I  received  a  communication  from  Gen.  Sherman',  of  date  of 
16th  of  December,  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  my  order  of  the  6th,  and 
informing  me  of  his  preparations  to  carry  it  into  effect  as  soon  as  he  could 
get  transportation.  Also,  that  he  had  expected  upon  reducing  Savannah, 
instantly  to  march  to  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  thence  to  Raleigh,  and 
thence  to  report  to  me ;  but  that  this  would  consume  about  six  weeks' 
time  after  the  fall  of  Savannah,  whereas  by  sea  he  could  probably  reach 
me  by  the  middle  of  January.  The  confidence  he  manifested  in  this  letter 
of  being  able  to  march  up  and  join  me,  pleased  me  ;  and,  without  waiting 
for  a  reply  to  my  letter  of  the  18th,  I  directed  him,  on  the  28th  of  Decem 
ber,  to  make  preparations  to  start,  as  he  proposed,  without  delay,  to  break 
up  the  railroads  in  North  and  South  Carolina,  and  join  the  armies  operat 
ing  against  Richmond,  as  soon  as  he  could." 

The  middle  of  January  saw  Sherman's  troops  actually  in  motion  for 
the  Carolina  campaign.  His  right  wing,  under  Howard,  was  taken  by 


663 

water  to  Beaufort,  where  it  began  to  move  up  the  Charleston  Railroad ; 
while  the  left  wing,  under  Slocum,  with  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  was  to  cross 
the  Savannah  at  Sister's  Ferry,  and  move  up  towards  Augusta.  The  de 
sign  of  this  disposition  of  forces  was  to  confuse  the  Confederates  as  to 
Sherman's  real  objective  point,  and  divide  their  forces  at  Augusta  from 
those  at  Charleston  and  its  vicinity,  under  the  impression  that  each  place 
was  threatened  ;  thus  preventing  their  concentration,  which  might  readily 
make  the  rivers  successive  lines  of  defence,  and  eluding  any  opposition  until 
he  had  passed  Columbia,  which  was  really  his  first  objective  point. 

Howard's  movement  on  the  right  threatened  Charleston  and  Branch- 
ville ;  and  while  one  division  remained  at  Pocotaligo  to  keep  up  the  ap 
pearance  of  marching  on  Charleston  by  the  railroad  bridge  near  that  point, 
the  remainder  of  the  command  moved  up  the  Salkahatchie  River,  crossed, 
almost  without  opposition,  wrhat  might  have  been  made  a  line  of  strong 
defence,  and  pushed  on  for  the  Augusta  and  Charleston  Railroad.  On  the 
6th  February,  Howard  occupied  two  points  on  this  railroad,  at  Hamburg 
and  at  Midway,  and  commenced  destroying  the  track.  Sherman's  left 
wing  had  struck  the  road  further  up,  towards  Augusta,  and  had  also  com 
menced  the  work  of  destruction. 

In  reaching  this  important  line  of  communication,  Sherman's  march 
had  been  tracked  by  fire.  The  well-known  sight  of  columns  of  black 
smoke  attested  its  progress.  In  Georgia  not  many  dwelling-houses  were 
burned ;  in  South  Carolina  the  rule  was  the  other  way,  and  positively 
everything  was  given  to  destruction  and  pillage.  The  country  was  convert 
ed  into  one  vast  bonfire.  The  pine  forests  were  fired,  the  resin  factories  were 
fired,  the  public  buildings  and  private  dwellings  were  fired.  The  middle 
of  the  finest  day  looked  black  and  gloomy,  for  a  dense  smoke  arose  on  all 
sides,  clouding  the  very  heavens.  At  night  the  tall  pine  trees  seemed  so 
many  pillars  of  fire. 

The  scenes  of  license  and  plunder  which  attended  these  conflagrations 
were  even  more  terrible.  Long  trains  of  fugitives  lined  the  roads,  with 
women  and  children,  and  horses  and  stock  and  cattle,  seeking  refuge  from 
the  pursuers.  Long  lines  of  wagons  covered  the  highways.  Half-naked 
people  cowered  from  the  winter  under  bush-tents  in  the  thickets,  under  the 
eaves  of  houses,  under  the  railroad  sheds,  and  in  old  cars  left  them  along 
the  route.  Habitation  after  habitation,  village  after  village,  sent  up  its 
signal  flames  to  the  others,  and  lighted  the  sky  with  crimson  horrours. 
Granaries  were  emptied,  and  where  the  grain  was  not  carried  off,  it  was 
strewn  to  waste  under  the  feet  of  the  cavalry,  or  consigned  to  -the  fire  which 
consumed  the  dwelling.  The  roads  were  covered  with  butchered  cattle, 
hogs,  mules,  and  the  costliest  furniture.  Valuable  cabinets,  rich  pianos, 
were  not  only  hewn  to  pieces,  but  bottles  of  ink,  turpentine,  oil,  whatever 
could  efface  or  destroy,  was  employed  to  defile  and  ruin.  Horses  were 


664:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

ridden  into  the  houses.  Beautiful  homesteads  of  the  parish  gentry,  with 
their  wonderful  tropical  gardens,  were  ruined.  Ancient  dwellings  of  black 
cypress,  one  hundred  years  old,  were  given  to  the  torch  as  recklessly  as 
were  the  rude  hovels.  Choice  pictures  and  works  of  art,  from  Europe, 
select  and  numerous  libraries,  objects  of  peace  wholly,  were  all  destroyed. 
The  inhabitants  were  left  to  starve,  compelled  to  feed  only  upon  the  garb 
age  to  be  found  in  the  abandoned  camps  of  the  soldiers.  The  corn  scraped 
up  from  the  spots  where  the  horses  fed,  was  the  only  means  of  life  left  to 
thousands  lately  in  affluence. 

Sherman  had  in  his  army  a  service  which  he  seems  proud  to  have  ex 
hibited  as  a  novel  and  unique  feature — that  of  so-called  "  bummers."  The 
wretches  thus  curiously  designated,  were  allowed  as  irregular  foragers  to 
eat  up  and  plunder  the  country,  often  going  twenty  miles  from  the  main 
columns  to  burn,  to  steal,  to  commit  nameless  crimes,  always  assured  of 
welcome  to  the  main  body  if  they  returned  with  horses  embellished  with 
strings  of  poultry  or  stolen  vehicles  laden  with  supplies.  How  far  this 
worse  than  brigandish  service  was  recognized  by  Gen.  Sherman  may  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that,  when  at  the  close  of  the  war,  his  army  had  a 
triumphal  procession  in  Washington,  the  department  of  "  bummers  "  was 
represented  in  the  line ;  and  the  crowd  of  admirers  that  pressed  upon  it 
was  excessively  entertained  by  men  on  scraggy  mules,  laden  with  broken 
furniture  and  household  goods,  representing  the  prowess  of  cut-throats 
and  thieves.* 


*  A  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald,  who  accompanied  Sherman's  march  through  the 
Carolinas,  gives  the  following  definition  of  "  the  bummer :" 

"  Any  man  who  has  seen  the  object  that  the  name  applies  to,  will  acknowledge  that  it  was  ad 
mirably  selected.  Fancy  a  ragged  man,  blackened  by  the  smoke  of  many  a  pine-knot  fire,  mount 
ed  on  a  scraggy  mule,  without  a  saddle,  with  a  gun,  a  knapsack,  a  butcher-knife,  and  a  plug  hat, 
stealing  his  way  through  the  pine  forests  far  out  on  the  flanks  of  a  column,  keen  on  the  scent  of 
rebels,  or  bacon,  or  silver  spoons,  or  corn,  or  anything  valuable,  and  you  have  him  in  your  mind. 
Think  how  you  would  admire  him  if  you  were  a  lone  woman,  with  a  family  of  small  children,  far 
from  help,  when  he  blandly  inquired  where  you  kept  your  valuables.  Think  how  you  would  smile 
when  he  pried  open  your  chests  with  his  bayonet,  or  knocked  to  pieces  your  tables,  pianos,  and 
chairs,  tore  your  bed-clothing  in  three-inch  strips,  and  scattered  them  about  the  yard.  The  "  bum 
mers  "  say  it  takes  too  much  time  to  use  keys.  Colour  is  no  protection  from  these  roughriders. 
They  go  through  a  negro  cabin,  in  search  of  diamonds  and  gold  watches,  with  just  as  much  free 
dom  and  vivacity  as  they  "  loot"  the  dwelling  of  a  wealthy  planter.  They  appear  to  be  possessed 
of  a  spirit  of  "  pure  cussedness."  One  incident  of  many  will  illustrate  :  A  bummer  stepped  into  a 
house  and  inquired  for  sorghum.  The  lady  of  the  house  presented  a  jug,  which  he  said  was  too 
heavy  ;  so  he  merely  filled  his  canteen.  Then  taking  a  huge  wad  of  tobacco  from  his  mouth,  he 
thrust  it  into  the  jug.  The  lady  inquired,  in  wonder,  why  he  spoiled  that  which  he  did  not  want. 
*  Oh,  some  feller'll  come  along  and  taste  that  sorghum,  and  think  you've  poisoned  him  ;  then  he'll 
burn  your  d — d  old  house."  There  are  hundreds  of  these  mounted  men  with  the  column,  and  they 
go  everywhere.  Some  of  them  are  loaded  down  with  silver-ware,  gold  coin,  and  other  valuables. 
I  hazard  nothing  in  saying  three-fifths  (in  value)  of  the  personal  property  of  the  counties  we  have 
passed  through  were  taken  by  Sherman's  army." 


SACK   AND   DESTRUCTION   OF  COLUMBIA.  665 

At  our  last  account  of  the  stages  of  Sherman's  march  he  had  gained  the 
peninsula  formed  by  the  Salkahatehie  and  Edisto  Rivers,  and  had  now  the 
choice  of  going  to  Augusta  or  Charleston.  lie  declined  both  places.  In 
his  official  report,  he  says  :  "  Without  wasting  time  or  labour  on  Branch- 
ville  or  Charleston,  which  I  knew  the  enemy  could  no  longer  hold,  I  turned 
all  the  columns  straight  on  Columbia."  On  the  16th  February,  his  ad 
vance  was  drawn  up  on  the  banks  of  the  Saluda  in  front  of  Columbia. 

It  had  been  hoped  to  the  last  by  the  people  of  Columbia  that  the 
town  would  be  vigorously  defended,  and  made  a  point  of  decisive  contest 
in  Sherman's  pathway.  But  the  old,  wretched  excuse  of  want  of  concen 
tration  of  the  Confederate  forces  was  to  apply  here.  Gen.  Hardee  was  not 
the  man  to  grasp  the  business  of  a  large  army,  and  he  had  never  had  his 
forces  well  in  hand.  The  remnants  of  Hood's  army,  the  corps  of  Cheatham 
and  Stewart,  had  been  brought  to  Augusta,  to  find  that  Sherman  had 
given  the  cold  shoulder  to  it,  and  moved  down  the  railroad.  On  the  lower 
part  of  the  road,  Hardee  could  not  be  persuaded  that  Charleston  was  not 
the  chief  object  of  Sherman's  desires,  and  so  lay  behind  his  fortifications,  at 
Branchville,  to  protect  it.  In  this  uncertainty  of  purpose  there  was  no 
force  afield  sufficient  to  check  Sherman's  course.  The  only  Confederate 
troops  which  contested  his  advance  upon  Columbia  consisted  of  the  mount 
ed  men  of  Hampton,  Wheeler,  Butler,  etc.,  and,  although  they  made  stub 
born  head  against  the  enemy,  their  opposition  could  not,  of  course,  be 
more  than  that  of  severe  skirmishing. 

Yet,  to  the  last  moment,  it  was  hoped  Columbia  might  be  saved.  It 
was  asserted  that  the  corps  of  Cheatham  and  Stewart  were  making  forced 
marches,  with  a  view  to  a  junction  with  the  troops  under  Beauregard,  and 
such  was  the  spirit  of  the  Confederate  troops,  and  one  of  the  Generals  at 
least,  that  almost  at  the  moment  when  Sherman's  advance  was  entering 
the  town,  Hampton's  cavalry  was  in  order  of  battle,  and  only  waiting  the 
command  to  charge  it.  But  the  honours  of  a  street  fight  in  a  defenceless 
city,  filled  with  women  and  children,  were  prudently  avoided ;  and  the 
Confederate  troops  were  drawn  off  from  the  scene  at  the  very  hour  when 
the  Federals  were  entering  it.  The  gallant  and  chivalrous  Hampton  was 
eager  to  do  battle  to  the  last ;  when  it  was  proposed  to  display  a  white 
flag  from  the  tower  of  the  City  Hall,  he  threatened  to  tear  it  down  ;  he 
reluctantly  left  the  city,  and  so  slowly  that  a  portion  of  his  command 
passed  on  the  road  to  Winnsboro'  in  sight  of  the  advance  column  of  the 
enemy,  giving  it  the  idea  of  a  flank  movement  of  cavalry. 


SACK   AND   DESTRUCTION   OF   COLUMBIA. 

Columbia  was  surrendered  to  the  enemy  in  the  morning  of  the  17th 


666  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

February,  by  the  mayor,  Mr.  Goodwyn,  who  asked  for  the  citizens  "  the 
treatment  accorded  by  the  usages  of  civilized  warfare."  Sherman 
promised  this.  As  night  approached,  perceiving  that  the  mayor  was  ex 
hausted  by  his  labours  of  the  day,  he  counselled  him  to  retire  to  rest,  say 
ing  :  "  Not  a  finger's  breadth,  Mr.  Mayor,  of  your  city  shall  be  harmed. 
You  may  lie  down  to  sleep,  satisfied  that  your  town  shall  be  as  safe  in  my 
hands  as  if  wholly  in  your  own."  Such  was  very  nearly  the  language  in 
which  he  spoke  ;  such  was  the  substance  of  it.  He  added  :  "  It  will  be 
come  my  duty  to  destroy  some  of  the  public  or  Government  buildings  ;  but 
I  will  reserve  this  performance  to  another  day.  It  shall  be  done  to-mor 
row,  provided  the  day  be  calm."  With  this  assurance  the  mayor  retired. 

But  the  work  of  pillage  had  begun  when  the  Federal  troops  had  first 
reached  the  head  of  Main  street.  Stores  were  broken  open,  and  the  con 
tents  strewn  on  the  side-walk  ;  citizens  were  robbed  in  the  street ;  no  one 
felt  safe  in  his  own  dwelling.*  Robbery  was  going  on  at  every  corner — 

*  We  are  indebted  for  many  incidents  of  the  sack  and  destruction  of  Columbia  to  a  publication 
in  the  Daily  Phcenix.  We  group  some  of  these  incidents  to  make  a  partial  picture  of  outrages  in 
numerable  and  almost  indescribable: 

"  At  an  early  hour  in  the  day,  almost  every  house  was  visited  by  groups,  averaging  in  number 
from  two  to  six  persons.  Some  of  these  entered  civilly  enough,  but  pertinaciously  entered,  in  some 
cases,  begging  for  milk,  eggs,  bread  and  meat — in  most  cases,  demanding  them.  In  the  house, 
parties  less  meek  of  temper  than  these  pushed  their  way,  and  the  first  intimation  of  their  presence, 
as  they  were  confronted  at  the  entrance,  was  a  pistol  clapped  at  the  head  or  bosom  of  the  owner, 
whether  male  or  female. 

" '  Your  watch ! '  '  Your  money  ! '  was  the  demand.  Frequently,  no  demand  was  made.  Rare 
ly,  indeed,  was  a  word  spoken,  where  the  watch  or  chain,  or  ring  or  bracelet,  presented  itself  con 
spicuously  to  the  eye.  It  was  incontinently  plucked  away  from  the  neck,  breast  or  bosom.  Hun 
dreds  of  women,  still  greater  numbers  of  old  men,  were  thus  despoiled.  The  slightest  show  of  re 
sistance  provoked  violence  to  the  person. 

"  The  venerable  Mr.  Alfred  Huger  was  thus  robbed  in  the  chamber  and  presence  of  his  family, 
and  in  the  eyes  of  an  almost  dying  wife.  He  offered  resistance,  and  was  collared  and  dispossessed 
by  violence. 

"  In  the  open  streets  the  pickpockets  were  mostly  active.  A  frequent  mode  of  operating  was 
by  first  asking  you  the  hour.  If  thoughtless  enough  to  reply,  producing  the  watch  or  indicating 
its  possession,  it  was  quietly  taken  from  hand  or  pocket,  and  transferred  to  the  pocket  of  the  *  other 
gentleman,' with  some  such  remark  as  this:  'A  pretty  little  watch  that.  I'll  take  it  myself ;  it 
just  suits  me.'  And  the  appropriation  followed ;  and  if  you  hinted  any  dislike  to  the  proceeding, 
a  grasp  was  taken  of  your  collar,  and  the  muzzle  of  a  revolver  put  to  your  ear. 

*********** 

"  The  venerable  Mr.  H — stood  ready,  with  his  couteau  de  chasse  made  bare  in  his  bosom, 

hovering  around  the  persons  of  his  innocent  daughters.     Mr.  0 ,  on  beholding  some  too  familiar 

approach  to  one  of  his  daughters,  bade  the  man  stand  off  at  the  peril  of  his  life  ;  saying  that  while 
he  submitted  to  be  robbed  of  property,  he  would  sacrifice  life  without  reserve — his  own  and  that  of 
the  assailant — before  his  child's  honour  should  be  abused. 

"  Mr.  James  G.  Gibbes  with  difficulty,  pistol  in  hand,  and  only  with  the  assistance  of  a  Yankee 
officer,  rescued  two  young  women  from  the  clutches  of  as  many  ruffians." 

*********** 

"  A  Mrs.  J was  but  recently  confined.    Her  condition  was  very  helpless.     Her  life  hung 


FEDERAL   OUTRAGES.  667 

in  nearly  every  house.     It  was  useless  to  complain.     Crowds  of  escaped 
prisoners,  soldiers,  and  negroes,  intoxicated  with  their  new-born  liberty, 


upon  a  hair.  The  men  were  apprised  of  all  the  facts  in  the  case.  They  burst  into  the  chamber — 
took  the  rings  from  the  lady's  fingers — plucked  the  watch  from  beneath  her  pillow,  and  so  over 
whelmed  her  with  terrour,  that  she  sunk  under  the  treatment,  surviving  their  departure  but  a  day 
or  two. 

"  In  several  instances  parlours,  articles  of  crockery,  and  even  beds,  were  used  by  the  soldiers 
as  if  they  were  water-closets.  In  one  case,  a  party  used  vessels  in  this  way,  then  put  them  on  the 
bed,  fired  at  and  smashed  them  to  pieces,  emptying  the  filthy  contents  over  the  bedding. 

"  In  several  cases,  newly  made  graves  were  opened,  the  coffins  taken  out,  broken  open,  in  search 
of  buried  treasure,  and  the  corpses  left  exposed.  Every  spot  in  grave-yard  or  garden,  which 
seemed  to  have  been  recently  disturbed,  was  sounded  with  sword,  or  bayonet,  or  ramrod,  in  the 
desperate  search  after  spoil" 

**#*****#*# 

A  lady  spoke  indignantly  to  General  Atkins,  of  Sherman's  army,  and  said  of  that  General,  "  He 
wars  upon  women  !  " 

"Yes,"  said  Atkins,  "and  justly.  It  is  the  women  of  the  South  who  keep  up  this  cursed  rebel 
lion.  It  gave  us  the  greatest  satisfaction  to  see  those  proud  Georgia  women  begging  crumbs  from 
Yankee  leavings ;  and  this  will  soon  be  the  fate  of  all  you  Carolina  women." 

Escorting  a  sad  procession  of  fugitives  from  the  burning  dwellings,  one  of  the  soldiers  said : 

"  What  a  glorious  sight !  " 

"  Terribly  so,"  said  one  of  the  ladies. 

"  Grand ! "  said  he. 

"  Very  pitiful,"  was  the  reply. 

The  lady  added : 

"  How,  as  men,  you  can  behold  the  horrours  of  this  scene,  and  behold  the  sufferings  of  these 
innocents,  without  terrible  pangs  of  self-condemnation  and  self-loathing,  it  is  difficult  to  con 
ceive." 

"  We  glory  in  it !  "  was  the  answer.  "  I  tell  you,  madam,  that  when  the  people  of  the  North 
hear  of  the  vengeance  we  have  meted  out  to  your  city,  there  will  be  one  universal  shout  of  rejoic 
ing  from  man,  woman  and  child,  from  Maine  to  Maryland." 

"  You  are,  then,  sir,  only  a  fitting  representative  of  your  people." 

Another,  who  had  forced  himself  as  an  escort  upon  a  party,  on  the  morning  of  Saturday,  said, 
pointing  to  the  thousand  stacks  of  chimneys,  "  You  are  a  curious  people  here  in  house-building. 
You  run  up  your  chimneys  before  you  build  the  house." 

One  who  had  been  similarly  impudent,  said  to  a  mother,  who  was  bearing  a  child  in  her  arms  : 

"  Let  me  carry  the  baby,  madam." 

"  Do  not  touch  him  for  your  life,"  was  the  reply.  "  I  would  sooner  hurl  him  into  the  flames, 
•and  plunge  in  after  him  than  that  he  should  be  polluted  by  your  touch.  Nor  shall  a  child  of  mine 
ever  have  even  the  show  of  obligation  to  a  Yankee  ! " 

"  Well,  that's  going  it  strong,  by ;  but  I  like  your  pluck.     We  like  it  d — e ;  and  you'll 

see  us  coming  back  after  the  war — every  man  of  us — to  get  a  Carolina  wife.  We  hate  your  men 
like  h — 1,  but  we  love  your  women  !  " 

"  We  much  prefer  your  hate,  even  though  it  comes  in  fire.    Will  you  leave  us,  sir  ?  " 

It  was  not  always,  however,  that  our  women  were  able  to  preserve  their  coolness  and  firmness 
under  the  assaults.  We  have  quite  an  amusing  story  of  a  luckless  wife,  who  was  confronted  by  a 
stalwart  soldier,  with  a  horrid  oath  and  a  cocked  revolver  at  her  head. 

"  Your  watch  !  your  money !  you  d — d  rebel  b — h ! " 

The  horrid  oaths,  the  sudden  demand,  fierce  look  and  rapid  action,  so  terrified  her  that  she 
cried  out,  "  Oh !  my  G — d  !  I  have  no  watch,  no  money,  except  what's  tied  round  my  waist ! " 

We  need  not  say  how  deftly  the  Bowie-knife  was  applied  to  loose  the  stays  of  the  lady. 


668  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

which  they  looked  upon  as  a  license  to  do  as  they  pleased,  were  parading 
the  streets  in  groups.  The  reign  of  terronr  did  not  fairly  begin  till  night. 
In  some  instances,  where  parties  complained  of  the  misrule  and  robbery, 
Federal  soldiers  said  to  them,  with  a  chuckle  :  "  This  is  nothing.  Wait 
till  to-night,  and  you'll  see  h — 11." 

In  the  town  of  Columbia  was  a  Catholic  convent,  the  Lady  Superiour 
of  which  had  educated  Gen.  Sherman's  daughter,  and  now  laid  claim  to 
his  protection  for  the  young  women  in  her  charge.  A  guard  of  eight  or 
ten  men  were  detailed  for  the  institution.  But  a  Catholic  officer  in  Sher 
man's  army  visited  the  convent,  warned  the  Lady  Superiour  of  danger, 
and  whispered  to  her,  "  I  must  tell  you,  my  sister,  Columbia  is  a  doomed 
city." 

A  few  moments  later,  while  Mayor  Goodwyn  was  conversing  with  a 
Federal  soldier,  three  rockets  were  shot  up  by  the  enemy  from  the  capitol 
square.  As  the  soldier  beheld  these  rockets,  he  cried  out :  "  Alas  !  alas  ! 
for  your  poor  city !  It  is  doomed.  Those  rockets  are  the  signal.  The 
town  is  to  be  fired."  In  less  than  twenty  minutes  after,  the  flames  broke 
out  in  twenty  distinct  quarters. 

Engines  and  hose  were  brought  out  by  the  firemen,  but  these  were 
soon  driven  from  their  labours — which  were  indeed  idle  against  such  a 
storm  of  fire — by  the  pertinacious  hostility  of  the  soldiers ;  the  hose  was 
hewn  to  pieces,  and  the  firemen,  dreading  worse  usage  to  themselves,  left 
the  field  in  despair.  Meanwhile,  the  flames  spread  from  side  to  side,  from 
front  to  rear,  from  street  to  street.  All  the  thoroughfares  were  quickly 
crowded  with  helpless  women  and  children,  some  in  their  night-clothes. 
Agonized  mothers,  seeking  their  children,  all  affrighted  and  terrified,  were 
rushing  on  all  sides  from  the  raging  flames  and  falling  houses.  Invalids 
had  to  be  dragged  from  their  beds,  and  lay  exposed  to  the  flames  and 
smoke  that  swept  the  streets,  or  to  the  cold  of  the  open  air  in  back  yards. 

The  scene  at  the  convent  was  a  sad  one.  The  flames  were  fast  encom 
passing  the  convent,  and  the  sisters,  and  about  sixty  terrified  young  ladies, 
huddled  together  on  the  streets.  Some  Christian  people  formed  a  guard 
around  this  agonized  group  of  ladies,  and  conducted  them  to  Sidney  Park. 
Here  they  fancied  to  find  security,  as  but  few  houses  occupied  the  neigh 
bourhood,  and  these  not  sufficiently  high  to  lead  to  apprehension  from  the 
flames.  But  fire-balls  were  thrown  from  the  heights  into  the  deepest  hol 
lows  of  the  park,  and  the  wretched  fugitives  were  forced  to  scatter,  finding 
their  way  to  other  places  of  retreat,  and  finding  none  of  them  secure. 
Group  after  group,  stream  after  stream  of  fugitives  thus  pursued  their  way- 
through  the  paths  of  flaming  and  howling  horrour,  only  too  glad  to  fling 
themselves  on  the  open  ground,  whither,  in  some  cases,  they  had  suc 
ceeded  in  conveying  a  feather-bed  or  mattress.  The  malls,  or  open 
squares,  the  centres  of  the  wide  streets,  were  thus  strewn  with  piles  of  bed- 


COLUMBIA   IN   BUINS.  669 

ding,  on  which  lay  exhausted  figures,  or  crouched  women  and  children 
wild  with  terrour.  Every  hour  of  the  night  was  fraught  with  scenes  of 
horrour  such  as  we  have  described.  By  midnight,  every  large  block  in 
the  business  portion  of  the  town  was  consumed.  A  lady  said  to  an  officer 
at  her  house,  somewhere  about  four  o'clock  in  the  morning :  "  In  the  name 
of  God,  sir,  when  is  this  work  of  hell  to  be  ended  ?  "  He  replied  :  "  You 
will  hear  the  bugles  at  sunrise,  when  a  guard  will  enter  the  town  and 
withdraw  these  troops.  It  will  then  cease,  and  not  before." 

The  sun  rose  with  a  wan  countenance,  peering  dimly  through  the  dense 
vapours  whch  seemed  wholly  to  overspread  the  firmament.  The  best  and 
most  beautiful  portion  of  Columbia  lay  in  ruins.  Eighty-four  squares  of 
buildings  had  been  destroyed,  with  scarcely  the  exception  of  a  single 
house.  The  capitol  building,  six  churches,  eleven  banking  establishments, 
the  schools  of  learning,  the  shops  of  art  and  trade,  of  invention  and  manu 
facture,  shrines-  equally  of  religion,  benevolence,  and  industry  were  all 
buried  together  in  one  congregated  ruin.  Nothing  remained  but  the  tall, 
spectre-looking  chimneys.  The  noble -looking  trees  that  shaded  the  streets, 
the  flower-gardens  that  graced  them,  were  blasted  and  withered  by  fire. 
On  every  side  there  were  rums  and  smoking  masses  of  blackened  walls, 
and  between,  in  desolate  groups,  reclining  on  mattress,  or  bed,  or  earth, 
were  wretched  women  and  children  gazing  vacantly  on  the  site  of  what 
had  been  their  homes.  Roving  detachments  of  the  soldiers  passed  around 
and  among  them.  There  were  those  who  looked  and  lingered  nigh,  with 
taunt  and  sarcasm.  Others  there  were,  in  whom  humanity  did  not  seem 
wholly  extinguished ;  and  others  again,  to  their  credit  be  it  said,  who 
were  truly  sorrowful  and  sympathizing,  who  had  labored  for  the  safety 
of  family  and  property,  and  who  openly  deplored  the  dreadful  crime. 

An  attempt  has  been  made  to  relieve  Gen.  Sherman  of  the  terrible 
censure  of  having  deliberately  fired  and  destroyed  Columbia,  and  to 
ascribe  the  calamity  to  accident  or  to  carelessness  resulting  from  an 
alleged  order  of  Gen.  Hampton  to  burn  the  cotton  in  the  city.  This 
explanation  is  a  tardy  one,  and  has  come  only  after  Gen.  Sherman  has 
observed  the  horrour  which  this  crime  has  excited  in  the  world,  and 
realized  some  of  its  terrible  consequences.  To  the  imputation  against 
Gen.  Hampton,  that  chivalrous  officer,  whose  word  friend  nor  foe  ever 
had  reason  to  dispute,  has  replied  in  a  public  letter :  "  I  deny  emphati 
cally  that  any  cotton  was  fired  in  Columbia  by  my  order.  I  deny  that 
the  citizens  '  set  fire  to  thousands  of  bales  rolled  out  into  the  streets.' 
I  deny  that  any  cotton  was  on  fire  when  the  Federal  troops  entered  the 
city.  *  *  *  I  pledge  myself  to  prove  that  I  gave  a  positive  order, 
by  direction  of  Gen.  Beauregard,  that  no  cotton  should  be  fired  ;  that  not 
one  bale  was  on  fire  when  Gen.  Sherman's  troops  took  possession  of  the 
city ;  that  he  promised  protection  to  the  city,  and  that,  in  spite  of  his 


670  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

solemn  promise,  he  burned  the  city  to  the  ground,  deliberately,  system 
atically  and  atrociously." 

The  facts  are,  as  we  have  seen,  that  Columbia  was  fired  in  twenty 
different  places  at  one  time  ;  that  several  hours  before  the  commencement 
of  the  fire,  a  Federal  officer  had  given  warning  at  the  Ursuline  Convent 
that  Columbia  was  doomed ;  and  that  just  before  the  conflagration  a 
Federal  soldier,  pointing  to  a  signal  of  rockets,  declared  to  the  Mayor 
that  the  city  was  to  be  fired.  There  are  living  witnesses  to  attest  these 
facts.  But  it  has  also  been  pertinently  asked:  Why  did  Sherman's 
soldiers  prevent  the  firemen  from  extinguishing  the  fire  as  they  strove 
to  do  ?  Why  did  they  cut  the  hose  as  soon  as  it  was  brought  into  the 
streets?  Why  did  they  not  assist  in  extinguishing  the  flames?  Why, 
with  twenty  thousand  men  encamped  in  the  streets,  did  they  suffer  mere 
stragglers,  as  the  incendiaries  were  represented,  to  succeed  in  a  work  of 
such  extent?  Every  circumstance  shows  that  the  conflagration  was 
deliberately  planned ;  that  it  was  fed  and  protected  by  the  soldiers ; 
while  the  universal  plundering  simultaneous  with  it  went  unchecked, 
and  was  plainly  part  of  the  object  attained  through  the  means  of  fire. 

The  burning  of  Columbia  was  but  of  a  piece  with  Sherman's  record, 
and  the  attempt  to  exculpate  him  in  this  particular  is  but  little  consistent 
and  plausible  in  view  of  his  general  conduct  from  the  moment  when  he 
entered  South  Carolina.  He  had  burned  six  out  of  every  seven  farm 
houses  on  the  route  of  his  march.  Before  he  reached  Columbia,  he  had 
burned  Blackville,  Graham,  Ramberg,  Buford's  Bridge,  Lexington,  and 
had  not  spared  the  humblest  hamlet.  After  he  left  Columbia,  he  gave 
to  the  flames  the  villages  of  Allston,  Pomaria,  Winnsboro',  Blackstock, 
Society  Hill,  and  the  towns  of  Camden  and  Cheraw.  Surely  when  such 
was  the  fate  of  these  places,  the  effort  is  ill-made  to  show  that  an  excep 
tion  was  to  be  made  in  favour  of  the  State  capital  of  South  Carolina,  the 
especial  and  notorious  object  of  the  enemy's  hate  and  revenge,  and  which, 
for  days  before  the  catastrophe,  had  been  designated  as  "  the  promised 
boon  of  Sherman's  army." 


FALL   OF   CHARLESTON. 

The  march  of  Sherman,  which  traversed  South  Carolina,  was  decisive 
of  the  fate  of  Charleston.  At  Savannah,  the  Federal  commander  had 
been  asked  if  he  intended  taking  Charleston.  He  answered,  "  Yes  ;  but 
I  shall  not  sacrifice  life  in  its  capture.  If  I  am  able  to  reach  certain 
vital  points,  Charleston  will  fall  of  itself.  If  the  people  remain  there, 
they  must  starve,  that's  all." 

The  loss  of  Charleston  was  a  severe  trial  to  President  Davis,  who  had 


CAPTURE   OF   FORT   FISHEE.  671 

a  peculiar  affection  for  the  city.  Even  when  Gen.  Beauregard  directed 
the  evacuation  of  the  city,  so  as  to  provide  a  force  with  which  to  fall 
upon  Sherman,  the  President  wrote  such  a  despatch  to  Gen.  Hardee, 
commanding  in  Charleston,  as  led  him  to  suspend  the  evacuation,  and 
obliged  Beauregard  to  assume  command,  and  to  direct  imperatively  the 
measure  to  be  completed. 

Gen.  Hardee  completed  the  evacuation  of  the  city  on  the  17th  Feb 
ruary.  He  destroyed  the  cotton  warehouses,  arsenals,  two  iron-clads, 
and  some  vessels  in  the  ship-yard  ;  but  he  was  compelled  to  leave  to  the 
enemy  all  the  heavy  ordnance  that  could  not  be  brought  off,  including 
two  hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  which  could  only  be  spiked  and  tempo 
rarily  disabled.  A  terrible  incident  of  the  evacuation,  was  an  accidental 
explosion  of  powder  in  the  large  building  at  the  depot  of  the  North 
western  railroad,  destroying  several  hundred  lives.  The  building  was 
blown  into  the  air  a  whirling  mass  of  ruins.  From  the  depot  the  fire 
spread  rapidly,  and,  communicating  with  the  adjoining  buildings,  threat 
ened  destruction  to  that  part  of  the  city.  Four  squares,  embracing  the 
area  bounded  by  Chapel,  Alexander,  Charlotte  and  "Washington  streets, 
were  consumed  before  the  conflagration  was  subdued. 

Charleston  came  into  the  enemy's  possession  a  scarred  and  mutilated 
city.  It  had  made  a  heroic  defence  for  nearly  four  years ;  for  blocks 
not  a  building  could  be  found  that  was  exempt  from  the  marks  of  shot 
and  shell ;  what  were  once  fine  houses,  presented  great  gaping  holes  in 
the  sides  and  roof,  or  were  blackened  by  fire  ;  at  almost  every  step  were 
to  be  found  evidences  of  destruction  and  ruin  wrought  by  the  enemy. 
After  a  display  of  heroism  and  sacrifice  unexcelled  in  the  war,  this  most 
famous  city  of  the  South  fell,  not  by  assault,  or  dramatic  catastrophe,  but 
in  consequence  of  the  stratagem  of  a  march  many  miles  away  from  it. 

The  evacuation  of  Charleston  having  been  successfully  accomplished, 
Hardee  and  Beauregard  retired  to  Charlotte,  whither  Cheatharn  was  mak 
ing  his  way  from  Augusta  to  join  them. 


CAPTURE   OF   FORT   FISHER — FALL   OF   WILMINGTON. 

An  important  branch  of  Sherman's  expedition  through  the  Carolinas 
led  from  "Wilmington.  It  was  proposed  by  Gen.  Grant  to  open  still 
another  base  of  operations  towards  Richmond,  and  with  the  capture  of 
"Wilmington,  to  effect  an  early  communication  with  Sherman,  and  to  sus 
tain  his  march  north  by  a  co-operating  column.  Besides,  it  was  important 
to  get  possession  of  "Wilmington,  as  the  most  important  sea-coast  port  left 
to  the  Confederates,  through  which  to  get  supplies  from  abroad,  and  send 
cotton  and  other  products  out  by  blockade-runners.  The  Federal  navy 


672  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

had  been  unable  to  seal  the  harbour,  and  Secretary  Welles  had  been  forced 
to  confess,  that  fifty  fast  Federal  steamers  had  been  quite  unable  to  main 
tain  the  blockade  here.  The  theory  of  the  enemy  was  that  the  nature  of 
the  outlet  of  Cape  Fear  River  was  such  that  it  required  watching  for  so 
great  a  distance,  that  without  possession  of  the  land  north  of  ISTew  Inlet, 
or  Fort  Fisher,  it  was  impossible  for  the  navy  to  entirely  close  the  harbour 
against  the  entrance  of  blockade  runners. 

An  expedition  directed  by  Gen.  Grant,  in  the  close  of  December,  1864, 
to  capture  Fort  Fisher,  had  failed  of  success.  For  this  expedition  there  had 
been  assembled  in  Hampton  Roads,  under  command  of  Admiral  Porter, 
what  Gen.  Grant  designated  as  "  the  most  formidable  armada  ever  col 
lected  for  concentration  upon  one  given  point."  The  co-operating  land 
force  consisted  of  sixty-five  hundred  men,  detached  from  Gen.  Butler's 
command  before  Richmond.  The  expedition  got  off  on  the  13th  Decem 
ber.  Accompanying  it  was  a  vessel  loaded  with  a  large  quantity  of 
powder,  to  be  exploded  as  near  the  fort  as  possible ;  Gen.  Butler  having 
obtained  the  singular  idea  of  levelling  the  fort,  or  demoralizing  the  gar 
rison  by  the  shock  of  the  explosion.  The  boat  was  blown  up  in  the  night 
of  the  24:th  December,  and  attracted  such  little  attention  that  the  Con 
federates  supposed  it  to  be  nothing  more  than  the  bursting  of  one  of  the 
enemy's  guns,  and  were  never  enlightened  as  to  the  object  of  the  explosion 
until  informed  of  it  by  Northern  newspapers. 

Porter's  fleet  had  already  commenced  a  bombardment  of  the  fort ;  and 
on  the  25th  December,  under  cover  of  this  fire,  a  landing  was  effected  by 
the  enemy  without  opposition,  and  a  reconnoissance  pushed  up  towards 
the  fort.  The  result  of  the  reconnoissance  was  that  Gen.  Butler  declined 
to  attack,  and  very  suddenly  ordered  the  re-embarkation  of  the  troops 
and  the  return  of  the  expedition.  This  conduct  of  Butler  was  the  occa 
sion  of  his  removal  from  command,  and  of  a  sharp  recrimination  which 
ran  through  official  documents,  newspapers,  and  even  the  lowest  forms 
of  personal  controversy  between  himself  and  Gen.  Grant.  In  a  letter 
published  in  a  Northern  journal,  Gen.  Butler  congratulated  himelf  that 
he  had  retired  from  command,  without  having  on  his  skirts  the  blood  of 
his  soldiers  needlessly  sacrificed— referring  to  Grant's  list  of  butcheries 
and  utter  disregard  of  life  in  the  Virginia  campaign ;  and  it  could  be 
said,  if  his  powder  ship  had  proved  a  ridiculous  toy,  it  was  at  least  not 
so  expensive  as  Grant's  experiment  with  the  mine  at  Petersburg. 

The  fleet  did  not  follow  Butler's  transports,  and  the  persistence  of 
Porter  encouraged  Grant  to  make  another  attempt  to  take  Fort  Fisher 
and  secure  "Wilmington.  He  selected  Gen.  Terry  to  command  the  second 
expedition.  The  troops  composing  it  consisted  of  the  same  that  composed 
the  former,  with  the  addition  of  a  small  brigade  numbering  about  fifteen 
hundred  men,  and  a  small  siege  train.  The  expedition  sailed  from  Fortress 


673 

Monroe  on  the  6tli  January,  1865,  but,  owing  to  the  difficulties  of  the 
weather,  did  not  reach  its  destination  until  the  12th. 

Gen.  Braxtoii  S.  Bragg  appeared  again  on  the  military  stage,  thrust 
there  by  President  Davis,  in  the  second  defence  of  Wilmington.  A 
Virginia  newspaper  announced  the  event  irreverently,  as  follows : 
"  Gen.  Bragg  has  been  appointed  to  command  at  Wilmington :  Good 
bye  Wilmington  !  "  There  was  no  confidence  in  this  Confederate  com 
mander ;  and  although  Fort  Fisher  had  held  out  against  a  naval  bom 
bardment,  and  its  garrison  was  largely  increased  when  Bragg  took 
command,  it  was  very  much  feared  that  the  enemy  would  obtain  with 
him  some  new  advantage,  would  effect  some  surprise,  or  succeed  by  some 
untoward  event. 

These  fears  were  to  be  exactly  realized.  Fort  Fisher  consisted  of  two 
fronts — the  first,  or  land  front,  running  across  the  peninsula,  at  this  point 
seven  hundred  yards  wide,  was  four  hundred  and  eighty  yards  in  length, 
while  the  second,  or  sea  front,  ran  from  the  right  of  the  first  parallel  to 
the  beach,  to  the  Mound  Battery — a  distance  of  thirteen  hundred  yards. 
The  land  front  was  intended  to  resist  any  attack  from  the  north  ;  the  sea 
front  to  prevent  any  of  the  enemy's  vessels  from  running  through  New 
Inlet,  or  landing  troops  on  Federal  Point. 

It  was  evidently  the  important  concern  to  prevent  a  landing  of  the 
enemy's  troops,  or  to  dislodge  them  as  soon  as  they  got  ashore ;  and 
Bragg's  forces  were  disposed  with  that  view,  Gen.  Hoke  holding  a  line 
north  of  Fort  Fisher.  On  the  13th  January,  Terry  succeeded,  under  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  fleet,  in  landing  several  thousand  troops  on  the  sea- 
beach,  some  five  or  six  miles  above  Fort  Fisher.  The  place  of  landing 
was  admirably  selected ;  the  troops  being  disembarked  just  above  the 
neck  of  the  sound,  interposing  a  small  surface  of  water  between  them 
and  an  attacking  force,  or  compelling  such  force  to  work  around  the 
lower  extreme  of  the  sound — either  of  which  movements  would  have  to 
be  executed  under  the  fire  of  the  whole  fleet. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  Hoke  to  attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as  he  advanced, 
and  his  cavalry  was  thrown  out  on  his  right  flank,  to  observe  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy,  and  report  his  first  step  towards  establishing  a  line 
across  the  neck  of  land  to  the  river.  But  it  was  found  the  next  morning, 
that  through  the  imperfect  vigilance  of  the  Confederates,  the  enemy  had 
laid  out  a  second  line.  During  the  night  his  troops,  passing  between 
Hoke's  cavalry,  and  threading  their  way  through  the  thick  marshy  under 
growth,  made  their  way  to  the  river,  and  next  morning  held  an  intrenched 
line  on  Hoke's  right  flank,  extending  nearly  across  the  peninsula.  Gen. 
Bragg  at  first  gave  the  order  to  charge  the  enemy  in  his  works,  bat  after  a 
close  reconnoissance  which  discovered  his  force  and  position,  determined 
to  withdraw  after  reinforcing  the  fort,  which  was  held  by  Gen.  Whiting, 
43 


674  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

with  a  garrison  increased  to  about  twenty-five  hundred  men.  In  the 
afternoon  the  enemy  pushed  a  reconnoissance  within  five  hundred  yards 
of  the  fort.  It  seemed  probable  that  troops  could  be  got  within  two 
hundred  yards  of  the  work  without  serious  loss ;  and  it  was  a  matter 
of  doubt  with  the  enemy,  whether  the  necessary  ammunition  could  be  sup 
plied  by  the  open  beach,  if  regular  approaches  were  determined  on.  It 
was  decided  to  assault  the  next  day. 

While  these  movements  on  land  were  taking  place,  the  enemy's  fleet 
had  held  Fort  Fisher  enveloped  in  a  terrific  fire  for  three  days.  More  than 
four  hundred  guns  poured  torrents  of  shells  and  missiles  on  every  spot. 
There  were  three  divisions  of  the  fleet — the  first,  led  by  the  "  Brooklyn," 
numbered  one  hundred  and  sixteen  guns ;  the  second,  by  the  "  Minne 
sota,"  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  guns  ;  and  the  third,  composed  of  gun 
boats,  with  one  hundred  and  twenty- three  guns.  During  the  afternoon  of 
the  15th  January — the  day  appointed  for  the  assault — this  immense  arm 
ament  poured  in  a  concentric  fire  upon  the  fort ;  and  while  the  tossing 
clouds  of  smoke  incessantly  rolled  up  from  the  water,  Terry  organized  his 
force  for  the  assault — three  deployed  brigades  following  one  another,  at 
intervals  of  about  three  hundred  yards,  and  each  making  its  final  rush  for 
the  west  end  of  the  land  face  of  the  fort. 

The  rapid  fire  from  the  water  prevented  the  Confederates  from  using 
either  artillery  or  musketry,  on  the  advancing  lines  of  the  enemy,  until 
they  had  got  within  sixty  yards  of  the  fort,  when  the  fire  of  the  fleet  lifted 
so  as  not  to  involve  the  assaulting  column.  The  Confederates  were 
brought  to  the  charge  after  having  been  packed  in  the  bomb-proofs  for  fif 
ty-six  hours,  many  of  them  benumbed  and  exhausted.  Capt.  Braddy's 
company  guarding  the  sally-port  gave  way.  From  seven  to  about  ten 
o'clock  at  night,  the  fighting  went  on  from  traverse  to  traverse  ;  it  was  a 
hand-to-hand  fight,  a  heroic  defence,  in  which  bravery,  endurance  and  de 
votion  failed  to  overcome  numbers.  The  enemy  had  not  lost  a  man  until 
he  entered  the  fort,  and  the  loss  that  he  confessed  to  in  the  entire  affair  of 
seven  or  eight  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  must  have  taken  place  within 
its  enclosures.  The  garrison  at  last  driven  from  the  fort,  retreated  down 
the  peninsula  to  the  cover  of  some  works  near  the  inlet.  But  further  re 
sistance  was  useless  ;  and  about  midnight,  Gen.  "Whiting  surrendered  him 
self  and  men  as  prisoners  of  war,  numbering  over  eighteen  hundred,  the 
remainder  of  his  force  being  killed  or  wounded. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Fisher  ultimately  decided  the  fate  of  Wilmington.  It 
was  followed  by  the  blowing  up  of  Fort  Caswell,  and  the  abandonment  of 
the  works  on  Smith's  Island,  which  gave  the  enemy  entire  control  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear  River.  Fort  Anderson,  the  main  defence  on  the 
west  bank  of  the  river,  was  evacuated  on  the  19th  February,  on  the  ap 
pearance  of  Porter's  fleet  before  it,  in  conjunction  with  a  land  force  under 


MOVEMENTS   IN   NORTH    CAROLINA.  675 

Scliofield  moving  up  both  sides  of  the  river.  "Wilmington  was  occupied 
without  resistance ;  and  the  command  of  Gen.  Bragg,  which  had  remained 
idle  there  for  more  than  a  month  (despite  the  earnest  protest  of  Gen. 
Beauregard,  who  in  vain  had  represented  to  President  Davis  that  with 
the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher  Wilmington  became  useless,  and  that  the  command 
there  should  be  used  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  the  field  against 
Sherman),  was  at  last  moved  to  what  had  now  become  the  dominant  thea 
tre  of  hostilities  in  the  Carolinas. 

The  new  base  which  the  enemy  had  now  opened,  was  well  defined  by 
Gen.  Grant  as  auxiliary  to  Sherman.  The  State  of  North  Carolina,  was 
constituted  into  a  new  military  department,  and  Gen.  Schofield,  whose 
corps  had  been  transferred  here  from  the  Tennessee  lines,  was  assigned  to 
command.  The  following  instructions  were  given  him  by  Gen.  Grant : 

"  CITY  POINT,  VA.,  January  31,  1865. 

General :  Your  movements  are  intended  as  co-operative  with  Sherman's  through  the 
States  of  South  and  North  Carolina.  The  first  point  to  be  attained  is  to  secure  Wil 
mington.  Goldsboro  will  then  be  your  objective  point,  moving  either  from  Wilmington 
or  Newbern,  or  both,  as  you  deem  best.  Should  you  not  be  able  to  reach  Goldsboro,  you 
will  advance  on  the  line  or  lines  of  railway  connecting  that  place  with  the  sea-coast — as 
near  to  it  as  you  can,  building  the  road  behind  you.  The  enterprise  under  you  has  two 
objects :  the  first  is  to  give  Gen.  Sherman  material  aid,  if  needed,  in  his  march  north  : 
the  second,  to  open  a  base  of  supplies  for  him  on  his  line  of  march.  As  soon,  therefore, 
as  you  can  determine  which  of  the  two  points,  Wilmington  or  Newbern,  you  can  best  use 
for  throwing  supplies  to  the  interiour,  you  will  commence  the  accumulation  of  twenty 
days'  rations  and  forage  for  sixty  thousand  men  and  twenty  thousand  animals.  You 
will  get  of  these  as  many  as  you  can  house  and  protect  to  such  point  in  the  interiour  as 
you  may  be  able  to  occupy.  ****** 


THE    CAMPAIGN    IN   NORTH   CAROLINA. 

"When  Sherman  left  behind  him  the  smoking  ruins  of  Columbia,  it  was1 
thought  by  the  Confederates  that  lie  would  move  towards  Charlotte,  where 
all  the  rolling  stock  of  the  railroads  destroyed  had  been  run,  and  from 
which  it  could  not  be  removed,  on  account  of  the  railroad  beyond  that 
being  of  a  different  gauge.  On  the  21st  February,  Sherman  passed  through 
Winnsboro  on  the  road  to  Charlotte  ;  but  on  the  23d,  his  army  suddenly 
swung  on  a  grand  right  wheel,  and  moved  rapidly  off  towards  Fayetteville. 
On  the  12th  March,  it  reached  Fayetteville.  Meanwhile  preparations  had 
been  made  by  the  enemy  on  the  coast,  for  a  movement  on  Goldsboro  in 
two  columns — one  from  Wilmington,  and  the  other  from  Isfewbern — and 
to  repair  the  railroad  leading  there  from  each  place,  as  well  as  to  supply 
Sherman  by  Cape  Fear  River  toward  Fayetteville,  if  it  became  necessary. 
The  column  from  Newborn  wras  attacked  on  the  8th  March,  near  Kinston, 


6T6  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

by  Gen.  Bragg,  with  his  own  troops  and  Hill's  division  of  the  Army  of 
Tennessee.  The  enemy  was  completely  routed,  and  fifteen  hundred  pris 
oners  taken.  On  the  9th  March,  Gen.  Bragg  found  the  enemy  several 
miles  in  rear  strongly  entrenched,  and,  after  a  faint  attack,  drew  off. 

On  the  14th,  this  body  of  the  enemy,  under  Schofield,  crossed  the 
Neuse  River,  occupied  Kinston,  and  entered  Goldsboro  on  the  21st.  The 
column  from  Wilmington  reached  Cox's  Bridge  on  the  Neuse  River,  ten 
miles  above  Goldsboro,  on  the  22d. 

It  remained  now  for  Sherman  to  keep  the  rendezvous  and  complete  the 
combination.  But  to  do  so  and  make  the  last  stage  of  his  march,  it  was 
clear  that  he  would  have  to  do  some  more  important  and  severe  fighting 
than  he  had  experienced  since  he  and  Johnston  parted  at  Atlanta— the  lat 
ter  General  having  been  put  in  command  of  the  Confederate  forces  in  the 
Carolinas.  It  appeared  indeed  that  a  formidable  army  was  at  last  collect 
ing  in  his  pathway.  Beauregard  at  Charlotte,  had  been  reinforced  by 
Cheatham  and  the  garrison  at  Augusta,  and  had  had  ample  time  to  move 
in  the  direction  of  Raleigh.  Hardee  had  evacuated  Charleston,  in  time  to 
keep  ahead,  of  Sherman,  and  was  moving  to  the  same  point.  It  was  easy 
for  Bragg  and  Hoke  in  North  Carolina  also  to  effect  a  junction  with  these 
forces,  swelling  them,  it  would  be  supposed,  to  a  formidable  army.  But 
this  army,  which  appeared  so  imposing  in  the  enumeration  of  its  parts,  was 
no  match  for  Sherman.  When  the  enemy's  campaign  in  South  Carolina 
commenced,  Hardee  had  eighteen  thousand  men.  He  reached  Cheraw 
with  eleven  thousand,  and  Averysboro  with  about  six  thousand.  Eleven 
hundred  State  troops  left  him  between  those  places  by  order  of  Gov.  Mag- 
rath  of  South  Carolina  ;  but  the  balance  of  his  great  loss  was  due,  almost 
entirely,  to  desertions.  These  figures  are  from  an  official  source,  and  show 
without  the  aid  of  commentary  how  low  had  fallen  the  military  organiza 
tion  and  spirit  of  the  Confederacy. 

On  the  15th  March  Sherman  put  his  army  in  motion  from  Fayetteville. 
In  the  narrow  ground  between  Cape  Fear  River  and  Black  Creek,  which 
becomes  Black  River,  and  empties  into  the  Cape  Fear  below  Fayetteville, 
Gen.  Hardee  was  posted,  his  force  consisting  of  two  small  divisions  under 
Maj.-Gens.  McLaws  and  Taliaferro.  He  held  his  ground,  without  difficulty, 
on  the  16th.  But  at  night,  finding  that  the  Federal  right  had  crossed 
Black  River  and  moved  towards  Goldsboro,  and  that  the  left  was  crossing 
the  creek  as  if  to  turn  his  position,  he  abandoned  it  before  daybreak,  and 
reached  Elevation,  on  the  road  to  Smithfield,  at  noon  of  the  17th. 

On  the  17th  Gen.  Bragg  was  encamped  near  Smithfield  with  Hoke's 
North  Carolina  division,  four  thousand  seven  hundred  and  seventy  men. 
Lieut.-Gen.  Stewart  was  in  the  same  neighbourhood  with  nearly  four  thou 
sand  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  under  Maj.-Gens.  Loring,  D.  H.  Hill,  and 
Stevenson. 


BATTLE   OF   BENTONVILLE.  677 

At  daybreak  of  the  18th  a  report  was  received  from  Gen.  Hampton, 
to  the  effect  that  the  Federal  army  was  moving  on  Goldsboro  in  two 
columns  :  the  15th  and  17th  corps,  on  the  direct  road  from  Fayetteville  to 
that  place,  and  the  14th  and  20th  on  that  from  Averysboro.  By  previous 
reports  the  former  was  nearly  a  day's  march  in  advance  of  the  latter,  which 
would  probably  reach  the  point  opposite  Bentonsville  early  on  the  19th. 
That  place  is  about  two  miles  north  of  the  road,  and  sixteen  miles  from 
Smithfield.  By  the  State  map  the  roads  followed  by  the  Federal  troops 
are  twelve  miles  apart  here,  and  Elevation  twelve  miles  from  BentonsvilLe. 
Orders  were  immediately  given  for  concentration  there  that  evening. 
Bragg's  and  Stewart's  troops  reached  the  ground  easily.  But  Hardee's 
were  unable  to  do  so.  Bentonsville  is  incorrectly  placed  on  the  map,  and 
its  distance  from  Elevation  much  greater  than  is  indicated,  and  no  direct 
road  could  be  found.  Consequently  Hardee  arrived  not  until  the  morning  of 
the  19th.  In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  came  up,  and  attacked  Hoke's  divi 
sion,  which  had  been  formed  across  the  road,  Stewart's  corps  on  its  right, 
its  own  much  thrown  forward.  This  attack  was  so  vigorous  that  Gen. 
Bragg  called  for  aid,  and  McLaw's  division  then  arriving,  was  sent  to 
him  ;  the  other,  Taliaferro's,  was  placed  on  Stewart's  right.  Before  these 
troops  got  into  position,  the  attack  on  our  left  had  been  repulsed,  as  well  as 
a  subsequent  one  upon  Loring's  division.  Hardee  was  then  directed  to 
charge  with  Stewart's  troops  and  Taliaferro's  division,  the  latter  being 
thrown  on  the  enemy's  left  flank.  Bragg's  troops  were  ordered  to  join  in 
the  movement  successively,  from  right  to  left. 

On  the  right,  where  the  ground  was  open,  the  attack  was  perfectly 
successful,  driving  the  14th  corps  back  at  least  a  mile  and  a  half  into  dense 
thickets  ;  but  the  progress  of  the  left  was  soon  stopped  in  very  thick  woods 
by  entrenchments.  The  fight  began  at  three  o'clock,  and  continued  until 
dark.  Wheeler's  cavalry  was  to  have  fallen  upon  the  rear  of  the  Federal 
left ;  but  a  swollen  creek  which  intervened  kept  it  out  of  action.  After 
burying  the  dead  as  far  as  practicable  at  night,  and  removing  his  wounded 
and  many  of  those  of  the  enemy,  Gen.  Johnston  resumed  his  first  position. 

The  battle — known  as  that  of  Bentonsville — although  it  had  failed  to 
fulfil  what  was  probably  Johnston's  purpose,  to  cripple  Sherman  before  he 
could  effect  a  junction  with  Schofield,  had  been  a  most  creditable  affair  for 
the  Confederates.  With  fourteen  thousand  men  they  had  encountered  the 
]  4th  and  20th  corps  of  the  enemy  and  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  an  aggregate 
probably  of  forty  thousand  men. 

On  the  20th  the  whole  Federal  army  was  in  Johnston's  front,  which 
was  changed  parallel  to  the  road.  The  Confederates  were  compelled  to 
hold  their  ground  that  clay  and  the  next,  to  cover  the  operation  of  carrying 
off  their  wounded.  Sherman's  whole  army  was  before  them,  and  made 
many  partial  attacks,  all  of  which  were  repulsed.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 


678  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

21st,  the  17th  corps  penetrated  the  thin  line  of  cavalry  which  formed  the 
Confederate  left,  and  almost  reached  a  bridge  in  rear  of  the  centre,  over 
which  lay  the  only  road  left  to  Johnston.  It  was  easily  driven  back  by 
the  reserve. 

Before  daybreak  on  the  22d  Gen.  Johnston  moved  towards  Smithfield, 
leaving  a  few  wounded  who  were  too  much  injured  to  bear  removal.  His 
loss  in  the  three  days  was  two  hundred  and  twenty-four  killed,  one  thou 
sand  four  hundred  and  ninety-nine  wounded,  and  more  than  three  hundred 
prisoners.  That  of  the  enemy  must  have  been  much  greater,  as  the  Con 
federates  had  the  advantage  in  the  fighting,  and  generally  fought  under 
cover.  More  than  eight  hundred  prisoners'  were  reported. 

The  junction  of  Sherman's  and  Schofield's  forces  was  effected  at 
Goldsboro'  the  next  day.  It  made  an  army  of  more  than  one  hundred  thou 
sand  men  within  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  of  the  lines  in  Virginia.  No 
sooner  had  Sherman  disposed  his  army  in  camp  about  Goldsboro'  than  he 
hastened  to  City  Point,  where  he  had  a  conference  with  Gen.  Grant,  at 
which  President  Lincoln  was  present,  and  where  was  settled  the  final  plan 
of  combination  against  Richmond  ;  it  being  intended  that  Sherman  should 
move  to  the  line  of  the  Roanoke  and  thence  on  the  Richmond  and  Danville 
road,  or  directly  to  the  front  of  Petersburg.  But  this  plan  was  never  car 
ried  into  operation ;  Grant  saw  reason  to  anticipate  it ;  and  the  fate 
of  Richmond  was  decided  without  any  participation  of  Sherman  in  the 
catastrophe. 


CHAPTER   XLI. 

GEN.  LEE'S  LINES  ABOUND  RICHMOND  AND  PETERSBURG. — COMPARISON  OF  HIS  FORCE  WITH 
THAT  OF  THE  ENEMY. — GEN.  LEE'S  SENTIMENT  ABOUT  SURRENDER. — DULL  CONDITION  OV 
THE  POPULACE  IN  RICHMOND. — EXTRAVAGANT  RUMOURS. — STORY  OF  THE  FRENCH  MESSB1*- 
GER. — THE  FORTRESS  MONROE  CONFERENCE. — MR.  BLAIR'S  VISIT  TO  RICHMOND. — NOTES 
OF  PRESIDENTS  DAVIS  AND  LINCOLN. — CONVERSATION  OF  THE  FORMER  WITH  ALEXANDER 

H.  STEPHENS. — OFFICIAL  NARRATIVE  OF  THE  CONFERENCE  IN  HAMPTON  ROADS. — A  RHE 
TORICAL  APPEAL  TO  THE  PEOPLE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY. — A  DAY  OF  SPEECHES  IN  RICH 
MOND. — PRESIDENT  DAVIS'  SPEECH  AT  THE  AFRICAN  CHURCH. — ITS  EXTRAVAGANT  AND 
SWOLLEN  TONE. — A  REMARK  ON  THE  TEMPER  AND  VANITY  OF  THE  PRESIDENT. — BATTLE 
OF  HARE'S  HILL. — DESIGN  OF  THE  ACTION  ON  THE  PART  OF  GEN.  LEE. — THE  GENERAL  DIS 
POSITION  OF  HIS  FORCES. — CAPTURE  OF  FORT  8TEADMAN. — THE  CONFEDERATES  FALTER. — 
WHAT  THE  DAY  PROVED. — THE  LAST  BATTLES  AROUND  PETERSBURG. WHY  GRANT  HUR 
RIED  THE  FINAL  OPERATIONS. — THE  PRELIMINARY  EXPEDITION  OF  SHERIDAN'S  CAVALRY. 

WHAT  IT  ACCOMPLISHED. — THE  ATTEMPT  UPON  LEE'S  RIGHT. — DESPERATE  RESOURCE  OF 
THE  CONFEDERATE  COMMANDER. — BATTLE  OF  FIVE  FORKS. — MISBEHAVIOUR  OF  THE  CON 
FEDERATES. —  GEN.  LEE'S  REPROACH. — BOMBARDMENT  OF  THE  PETERSBURG  LINES. — THE 
ASSAULT. — THE  CONFEDERATES'  LINES  BROKEN. — DEFENCE  OF  FORT  GREGG. — A  THRILLING 
SCENE  OF  SELF-DEVOTION. — THE  CONFEDERATES  FORCED  BACK  UPON  PETERSBURG. — 
DEATH  OF  GEN.  A.  P.  HILL. — EVACUATION  OF  RICHMOND. — THE  CITY  UNPREPARED  FOE 
THE  NEWS. — FRIGHT  AND  DISORDER  IN  THE  STREETS. — A  CURIOUS  SCENE  IN  THE  CAPITOL. 
— GEN.  EWELL'S  WITHDRAWAL  FROM  THE  CITY. — HE  FIRES  A  NUMBER  OF  WAREHOUSES. — 
A  FRIGHTFUL  CONFLAGRATION. — SCENES  OF  SUBLIME  HORROUR. — GRAND  ENTREE  OF  THE 

FEDERALS. — RAVAGES   OF   THE   FIRE. — EXULTATION  IN  NORTHERN  CITIES. STUFF  OF 

YANKEE  NEWSPAPERS. — DUE  ESTIMATE  OF  GRANT'S  ACHIEVEMENT  IN  THE  FALL  OF  RIOD- 
MOND. — DEFINITION  OF  GENERALSHIP. — THE  QUALITIES  OF  MIND  EXHIBITED  BY  THE 
NORTH  IN  THE  WAR. 

IN  the  first  months  of  1865  Gen.  Lee  held  both  Eichmond  and  Peters 
burg  with  not  more  than  thirty-three  thousand  men.  At  this  time  Grant's 
strength,  as  rated  at  the  War  Department  in  Washington,  exceeded  one 
hundred  and  sixty-thousand  men.  Such  was  the  disparity  of  force  in  the 
final  array  of  the  contest  for  Richmond.  Gen.  Lee's  lines  stretched  from 
below  Richmond  on  the  north  side  of  the  James  to  Hatchers  Run  away 
beyond  Petersburg  on  the  south  side.  He  had  forty  miles  of  defence  ;  and 
it  may  well  be  imagined  that  with  his  little  force  posted  over  such  a  di&- 


680  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

tance,  his  line  of  battle  was  almost  as  thin  as  a  skirmish  line.  Duty  was 
incessant ;  it  was  fatiguing  in  the  greatest  degree ;  the  Confederates  had 
no  reserves,  and  when  a  brigade  was  taken  to  asssist  at  some  threatened 
point,  the  position  it  left  was  endangered.  But  even  in  this  extreme  situ 
ation,  Gen.  Lee  had  not  yet  despaired  of  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy. 
He  was  gravely  sensible  of  the  danger ;  in  frequent  conference  with  com 
mittees  of  the  Congress  at  Richmond,  he  stated  frankly  his  anxiety,  but 
urged  levies  of  negro  troops,  held  out  what  hope  he  could,  and  expressly 
and  firmly  discountenanced  any  surrender  of  the  Confederate  cause  by 
premature  negotiations  with  "Washington.  On  one  of  these  occasions  lie 
made  the  personal  declaration  for  himself  that  he  had  rather  die  on  the 
battle-field  than  surrender — a  sentiment  which  provoked  the  sneer  of  a 
well-known  "  Union  "  man  in  Richmond,  and  the  remark  that  "  Gen.  Lee 
talked  like  a  school-girl." 

The  populace  of  Richmond  was  but  little  aware  of  the  terrible  decrease 
of  Gen.  Lee's  army ;  and  indeed  the  people  of  the  Confederacy  were  studi 
ously  kept  in  the  dark  as  to  all  details  of  the  military  situation.  So  reti 
cent  had  the  Government  become,  that  the  newspapers  were  forbid  pub 
lishing  anything  of  military  affairs  beyond  the  scanty  doles  of  information 
and  the  skeleton  telegrams  furnished  to  the  reporters  by  an  official  au 
thority,  and  copied  at  the  desks  of  the  War  Department.  It  thus  hap 
pened  that  while  there  was  a  general  despondency  of  the  public  mind, 
there  were  few  outside  the  severe  official  circles  of  Richmond  who  knew 
the  real  extremities  to  which  the  arms  and  affairs  of  the  Confederacy  had 
fallen.  There  was  a  dull  expectation  of  what  was  next  to  happen  ;  there 
was  a  vague  condition  of  the  public  mind,  in  which,  although  not  able  to 
discover  any  substantial  and  well-defined  ground  of  hope,  it  yet  plodded 
on  under  the  shadow  of  old  convictions,  and  with  a  dim  anticipation  of 
something  favourable  in  the  future.  While  every  one  affirmed  that  the 
affairs  of  the  Confederacy  were  in  a  bad  way,  and  while  every  one  ap 
peared  to  have  a  certain  sense  of  approaching  misfortune,  there  were  very 
few  who  knew  the  real  condition  and  numbers  of  the  armies  of  the  Con 
federacy,  and  realized  how  far  had  been  undermined  its  system  of  defence. 
It  was  difficult  indeed  to  believe  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia — 
that  army,  whose  name  had  been  for  four  years  as  the  blast  of  victory — 
had  declined  to  a  condition  in  which  it  was  no  longer  capable  of  offensive 
operations.  It  was  difficult  indeed  to  abandon  altogether  the  idea  that  the 
happy  accident  of  a  victory  somewhere  in  the  Confederacy  might  not,  after 
all,  put  a  new  aspect  on  affairs.  Even  if  the  conclusion  of  subjugation  had 
become  probable,  its  day  was  at  least  uncertain,  distant ;  and  the  opinion 
of  Gen.  Lee  was  quoted  in  the  streets  of  Richmond  that  in  any  event  the 
Southern  Confederacy  was  likely  to  last  another  year's  campaign.  Many 
lived  in  the  circle  of  each  day  ;  the  idea  of  Independence  was  yet  in  the 


THE  FORTRESS  MONROE  CONFERENCE.  681 

loose  conversations  of  the  people  ;  and  the  favourite  cantatrice  of  the  Rich 
mond  Theatre  sung  to  nightly  plaudits,  "  Farewell  forever  to  the  star- 
spangled  banner  !  "  Then  there  were  those  rumours  of  extravagant  for 
tune,  always  indicative  of  a  weak  and  despairing  condition  of  the  public 
mind ;  among  them  endless  stories  of  peace  negotiations  and  European 
"  recognition."  A  few  weeks  before  Richmond  fell,  the  report  was  credit 
ed  for  the  space  of  three  or  four  days  by  the  most  intelligent  persons  in  the 
city,  including  some  of  the  editors  of  the  newspapers  and  President  Davis' 
pastor,  that  a  messenger  from  France  had  arrived  on  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina,  and  was  making  his  way  overland  to  Richmond,  with  the  news 
of  the  recognition  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  by  the  Emperour  Na 
poleon  ! 

But  in  this  dull  condition  of  the  public  mind' there  came  a  well-defined 
rumour  of  "  peace  ;  "  an  event  in  which  another  and  last  appeal  was  to  be 
made  to  the  resolution  of  the  South. 


THE   FORTRESS   MONROE    CONFERENCE. 

At  different  periods  of  the  war  the  ambition  of  individuals  on  both 
sides  had  attempted  certain  propositions  of  peace,  and  sought  to  bring  the 
parties  at  Richmond  and  "Washington  into  such  a  position  that  they  could 
not  avoid  negotiations,  without  subjecting  themselves  to  the  injurious  im 
putation  of  preferring  war.  In  pursuance  of  this  diplomatic  errantry, 
Mr.  Francis  P.  Blair,  a  skilful  politician,  in  January,  1865,  obtained  a 
passport  from  President  Lincoln  to  go  through  the  Federal  lines,  visited 
Richmond,  and  while  disclaiming  any  official  instructions  or  countenance 
from  Washington,  sought  to  prevail  upon  President  Davis  to  send,  or  re 
ceive,  commissioners  to  treat  of  peace  between  the  contending  parties.  On 
the  19th  January,  Mr.  Blair  returned  to  Washington,  taking  with  him 
a  written  assurance,  addressed  to  himself,  from  President  Davis,  of  his  will 
ingness  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  peace,  to  receive  a  commissioner 
whenever  one  should  be  sent,  and  of  his  readiness,  whenever  Mr.  Blair 
could  promise  that  he  would  be  received,  to  appoint  such  a  commissioner, 
minister,  or  other  agent,  and  thus  u  renew  the  effort  to  enter  into  a  con 
ference  with  a  view  to  secure  peace  between  the  two  countries"  The 
reply  of  Mr.  Lincoln  was  no  less  diplomatic.  He  wrote  that  he  was 
u  ready  to  receive  any  agent  whom  Mr.  Davis  or  any  other  influential  per 
son  now  resisting  the  national  authority,  may  informally  send  me,  with  a 
view  of  securing  peace  to  the  people  of  our  common  country" 

While  the  intermediation  of  Mr.  Blair  was  taking  place  in  Richmond, 
a  number  of  Congressmen  and  leading  politicians  of  the  Confederacy  had 
been  exerting  themselves  to  use  the  peculiar  influence  of  the  Yice-Presi- 


682  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

dent,  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  in  a  negotiation  with  Washington,  and  for 
this  purpose  to  bring  him  and  President  Davis  to  a  friendly  understand 
ing.  There  had  long  been  a  coolness  between  these  two  high  officers. 
Mr.  Stephens  had  blown  hot  and  cold  in  the  war.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
contest  he  opposed  secession  ;  after  the  great  battles  of  1862  around  Rich 
mond,  he  was  intensely  Southern,  and  thought  the  death  of  every  indi 
vidual  in  the  Confederacy  preferable  to  subjugation  ;  at  later  periods  of 
the  war  he  squinted  at  "  reconstruction,"  and  dallied  with  the  "  Union  " 
faction  in  the  South.  The  reputation  of  this  man  is  a  striking  example  of 
how  difficult  it  is  in  all  parts  of  America  for  the  people  to  distinguish  be 
tween  a  real  statesman  and  an  elaborate  demagogue.  Mr.  Stephens  had 
a  great  idea  of  his  personal  consequence  ;  he  was  touchy  and  exacting  in 
his  intercourse  with  other  public  men  ;  and  he  refused  to  pass  a  word  with 
President  Davis  until  he  had  obtained  from  him  the  concession  of  a  cir 
cuitous  message  that  "  the  President  would  be  glad  to  see  Mr.  Stephens." 
In  the  interview  which  took  place,  President  Davis  remarked  graciously, 
but  with  a  tinge  of  sarcasm  in  his  tone,  that  he  knew  of  "  no  one  better 
calculated  to  conduct  a  peace  negotiation  with  the  North  than  Mr.  Alex 
ander  H.  Stephens."  In  the  statement  of  his  views  the  President  was 
remarkably  liberal.  He  allowed  Mr.  Stephens  to  name  for  himself  the 
associate  commissioners,  who  were  R.  M.  T.  Hunter  of  Virginia,  and  J.  A. 
Campbell  of  Alabama  ;  he  burdened  him  with  no  detail  of  instructions ; 
he  said :  "  I  give  you  a  carte-Handie,  only  writing  on  it  the  one  word, 
'  Independence.'  r 

The  anxiously  expected  conference  did  not  take  place  until  the  3d  of 
February.  It  was  attended  on  the  Federal  side  by  President  Lincoln  him 
self,  accompanied  by  his  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward ;  the  presence  of 
the  Northern  President  having  been  induced  by  an  earnest  telegram  from 
Gen.  Grant,  expressing  his  personal  belief  that  the  Confederate  commis 
sioners,  who  had  passed  through  his  lines,  were  sincere  in  their  desire  for 
peace,  and  his  strong  conviction  that  a  personal  interview  with  them  on 
the  part  of  Mr.  Lincoln  was  highly  desirable.  The  Confederate  commis 
sioners  were  entertained  on  board  of  a  steamer  lying  in  Hampton  Roads. 
The  conference  was  studiously  informal ;  there  were  no  notes  of  it ;  there 
was  no  attendance  of  secretaries  or  clerks  ;  there  was  an  irregular  conver 
sation  of  four  hours,  enlivened  by  two  anecdotes  of  Mr.  Lincoln  ;  but  there 
being  absolutely  no  basis  of  negotiation  between  the  two  parties,  not  even 
a  single  point  of  coincidence  between  them,  they  separated  without  effect. 
The  Confederate  commissioners  obtained  only  from  the  interview  the  dis 
tinct,  enlarged,  and  insolent  demand  of  Mr  Lincoln,  that  the  South  should 
submit  unconditionally  to  the  rule  of  the  Union,  and  conform  to  the  ad 
vanced  position  of  the  Federal  Executive  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  which 
included  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  abolishing  this  domestic  insti- 


THE  FORTRESS  MONROE  CONFERENCE.  683 

tution  of  the  South,  a  bill  establishing  a  Freedmen's  Bureau,  and  other 
measures  looking  to  a  new  construction  of  relations  between  the  black  and 
white  populations  of  the  country. 

The  report  of  the  conference  and  its  results  was  made  in  the  following 
message  from  President  Davis,  sent  in  to  the  Confederate  Congress  on  the 
5th  February  : 

"  To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America : 

"  Having  recently  received  a  written  notification  which  satisfied  me  that  the  President 
of  the  United  States  was  disposed  to  confer  informally  with  unofficial  agents  that  might 
be  sent  by  me  with  a  view  to  the  restoration  of  peace,  I  requested  Hon.  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  Hon.  K.  M.  T.  Hunter,  and  Hon.  John  A.  Campbell,  to  proceed  through  our 
lines  to  hold  a  conference  with  Mr.  Lincoln,  or  such  persons  as  he  might  depute  to  repre 
sent  him. 

"  I  herewith  submit,  for  the  information  of  Congress,  the  report  of  the  eminent  citi 
zens  above  named,  showing  that  the  enemy  refuse  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the 
Confederate  States,  or  any  one  of  them  separately,  or  to  give  our  people  any  other  terms 
or  guarantees  than  those  which  a  conqueror  may  grant,  or  permit  us  to  have  peace  on 
any  other  basis  than  our  unconditional  submission  to  their  rule,  coupled  with  the  accept 
ance  of  their  'recent  legislation,  including  an  amendment  to  the  Constitution  for  the 
emancipation  of  negro  slaves,  and  with  the  right  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  Congress  to 
legislate  on  the  subject  of  the  relations  between  the  white  and  black  population  of  each 
State. 

"  Such  is,  as  I  understand,  the  effect  of  the  amendment  to  the  Constitution  which  has 
been  adopted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

„  .«_..,,  "JEFFERSON"  DAVIS. 

"  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE,  RICHMOND,  February  5,  186o." 


"  RICHMOND,  VIRGINIA,  February  5,  1865. 

"  To  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States  : 

"  SIR  :  Under  your  letter  of  appointment  of  28th  ult.,  we  proceeded  to  seek  an  informal 
conference  with  Abraham  Lincoln,  President  of  the  United  States,  upon  the  subject  men 
tioned  in  your  letter. 

"  The  conference  was  granted,  and  took  place  on  the  3d  inst.,  on  board  a  steamer  an 
chored  in  Hampton  Roads,  where  we  met  President  Lincoln  and  Hon.  Mr.  Seward,  Secre 
tary  of  State  of  the  United  States.  It  continued  for  several  hours,  and  was  both  full  and 
explicit. 

"  We  learned  from  them  that  the  message  of  President  Lincoln  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States,  in  December  last,  explains  clearly  and  distinctly  his  sentiments  as  to  terms, 
conditions,  and  method  of  proceeding  by  which  peace  can  be  secured  to  the  people,  and 
we  were  not  informed  that  they  would  be  modified  or  altered  to  obtain  that  end.  We 
understood  from  him  that  no  terms  or  proposals  of  any  treaty  or  agreement  looking  to  an 
ultimate  settlement  would  be  entertained  or  made  by  him  with  the  authorities  of  the 
Confederate  States,  because  that  would  be  a  recognition  of  their  existence  as  a  separate 
power,  which  under  no  circumstances  would  be  done  ;  and  for  like  reasons,  that  no  such 
terms  would  be  entertained  by  him  from  States  separately ;  that  no  extended  truce  or 
armistice,  as  at  present  advised,  would  be  granted  or  allowed  without  satisfactory  assur 
ances  in  advance  of  complete  restoration  of  the  authority  of  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States  over  all  places  within  the  States  of  the  Confederacy ;  that  whatever 


684  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

consequences  may  follow  from  the  re-establishment  of  that  authority  must  be  accepted, 
but  the  individuals  subject  to  pains  and  penalties  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
might  rely  upon  a  very  liberal  use  of  the  power  confided  to  him  to  remit  those  pains  and 
penalties,  if  peace  be  restored. 

"  During  the  conference  the  proposed  amendments  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  adopted  by  Congress  on  the  31st  ult.,  were  brought  to  our  notice.  These  amend 
ments  provide  that  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude,  except  for  crime,  should 
exist  within  the  United  States,  or  any  place  within  their  jurisdiction,  and  that  Congress 
should  have  the  power  to  enforce  this  amendment  by  appropriate  legislation. 

"  Of  all  the  correspondence  that  preceded  the  conference  herein  mentioned  and  lead 
ing  to  the  same,  you  have  heretofore  been  informed. 

"Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servants, 

"  ALEX.  H.  STEPHENS, 
"  R.  M.  T.  HUNTER, 
"  J.  A.  CAMPBELL." 

It  was  doubtless  calculated  by  President  Davis  that  the  issue  of  the 
Fortress  Monroe  Conference  would  give  a  flat  answer  to  the  party  in  the 
Confederacy  that  had  been  clamouring  for  peace  negotiations,  and  make 
an  opportunity  to  excite  anew  the  spirit  and  indignation  of  the  Southern 
people.  It  was  indeed  a  powerful  appeal  to  the  heart  of  the  South  ;  it  had 
displayed  the  real  consequences  of  subjugation ;  it  had  declared  what 
would  be  its  pains  and  penalties  and  humiliation ;  it  was  the  ultimatum 
of  an  enemy  calculated  to  nerve  the  resolution  of  a  people  fighting  for 
liberty,  and  to  make  them  devote  anew  labour  and  life  for  the  great  cause 
of  their  redemption.  It  was  thought  in  Richmond  that  the  last  attempt  at 
negotiation  would  date  a  new  era  of  resolution  and  devotion  in  the  war. 
On  the  return  of  the  commissioners  a  day  was  appointed  for  an  imposing 
expression  of  public  opinion  on  the  event  of  the  conference ;  all  business 
was  suspended  in  Richmond  ;  at  high  noon  processions  were  formed  to  the 
different  places  of  meeting  ;  and  no  less  than  twenty  different  orators,  com 
posed  of  the  most  effective  speakers  in  Congress  and  the  Cabinet,  and  the 
most  eloquent  divines  of  Richmond,  took  their  stands  in  the  halls  of  legis 
lation,  in  the  churches  and  the  theatres,  and  swelled  the  eloquence  of  this 
last  and  grand  appeal  to  the  people  and  armies  of  the  South.  Two  of  the 
returned  commissioners,  Messrs.  Hunter  and  Campbell,  were  among  the 
orators  of  the  day.  Mr.  Stephens  had  been  urged  to  speak  ;  but  lie  had 
a  demagogue's  instinct  of  danger  in  the  matter ;  it  was  an  awkward 
occasion  in  which  he  might  say  too  much  or  too  little  ;  and  so  he  plead  ill- 
health,  and  escaped  to  Georgia.  It  was  an  extraordinary  day  in  Rich 
mond  ;  vast  crowds  huddled  around  the  stands  of  the  speakers  or  lined  the 
streets ;  and  the  air  was  vocal  with  the  efforts  of  the  orator  and  the  re 
sponses  of  his  audience.  It  appeared  indeed  that  the  blood  of  the  people 
had  again  been  kindled.  But  it  was  only  the  sickly  glare  of  an  expiring 
flame  ;  there  was  no  steadiness  in  the  excitement ;  there  was  no  virtue  in 


BATTLE   OF    HAKE' 8    HILL.  685 

huzzas  ;  tlie  inspiration  ended  with  the  voices  and  ceremonies  that  invoked 
it ;  and  it  was  found  that  the  spirit  of  the  people  of  the  Confederacy  was 
too  weak,  too  much  broken  to  react  with  effect,  or  assume  the  position  of 
erect  and  desperate  defiance. 

A  few  days  before  this  popular  convocation  in  Richmond,  and  just  on 
the  return  of  the  commissioners,  President  Davis  himself  had  addressed  a 
popular  audience  in  the  African  Church.  He  was  attended  to  the  stand 
by  the  Governor  of  Virginia.  He  made  a  powerful  and  eloquent  address  ; 
but  in  parts  of  it  he  fell  into  weak  and  bombastic  speech,  and  betrayed  that 
boastfulness  characteristic  of  almost  all  his  oral  utterances  in  the  war.  As 
a  writer,  Mr.  Davis  was  careful,  meditative,  and  full  of  dignity ;  but  as  a 
speaker,  he  was  imprudent,  and  in  moments  of  passion,  he  frequently 
blurted  out  what  first  came  into  his  mind.  On  this  occasion  he  was  boast 
ful,  almost  to  the  point  of  grotesqueness.  He  declared  that  the  march  which 
Sherman  was  then  making  would  be  "  his  last,"  and  would  conduct  him 
to  ruin  ;  he  predicted  that  before  the  summer  solstice  fell  upon  the  country 
it  would  be  the  North  that  would  be  soliciting  peace  ;  he  affirmed  that  the 
military  situation  of  the  Confederacy  was  all  that  he  could  desire ;  and 
drawing  up  his  figure,  and  in  tones  of  scornful  defiance,  heard  to  the  re 
motest  parts  of  the  building,  he  remarked  that  the  Federal  authorities  who 
had  so  complacently  conferred  with  the  commissioners  of  the  Confederacy, 
u  little  knew  that  they  were  talking  to  their  masters  !  "  Such  swollen 
speeches  of  the  President  offended  the  sober  sense  of  the  Confederacy  ;  and 
it  was  frequently  said  that  he  attempted  to  blind  the  people  as  to  the  ac 
tual  condition  of  affairs,  and  never  dealt  with  them  in  a  proper  spirit  of 
candour.  But  this  estimate  of  President  Davis  is  probably  a  mistaken 
one.  He  was  not  insincere  ;  in  all  his  strange  and  extravagant  utterances 
of  confidence  he  probably  believed  what  he  spoke  ;  and  to  the  last  he  ap 
pears  never  to  have  apprehended  the  real  situation.  He  was  blinded  by 
his  own  natural  temper  ;  in  the  last  moment  he  was  issuing  edicts,  playing 
with  the  baubles  of  authority,  never  realizing  that  he  was  not  still  the 
great  tribune  ;  he  was  sustained  by  a  powerful  self-conceit,  and  a  sanguine 
temperament ;  and  he  went  down  to  ruin  with  the  fillet  of  vanity  upon 
his  eyes. 


BATTLE   OF   HABE's   HILL. 


In  the  last  days  of  March,  1865,  Gen.  Lee  made  his  last  offensive  dem 
onstration,  which  ended  in  failure,  and  plainly  and  painfully  revealed  the 
condition  of  his  troops.  He  determined  to  try  Grant's  lines  south  of  the 
Appomattox ;  the  attack  being  immediately  directed  by  Gen.  Gordon  on 
the  enemy's  works  at  Hare's  Hill.  The  project  of  assault  was  bold ;  its 


686  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

promises  were  large  ;  one  success  might  lead  to  another  ;  and  if  the  troops 
once  got  possession  of  a  part  of  the  enemy's  line,  in  the  flush  of  success 
they  might  be  carried  to  the  capture  of  the  neighbouring  works,  and  Gen. 
Lee  might  even  venture  on  the  great  enterprise  of  getting  possession  of 
Grant's  military  road  and  cutting  his  entire  right  from  its  base  at  City 
Point  and  from  the  army  north  of  the  James. 

The  disposition  of  Gen.  Lee's  force  was  generally  as  follows  :  Long- 
street  commanded  the  Confederate  left,  across  the  James,  and  his  right 
division  extended  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Petersburg.  Gordon  came 
next,  with  his  three  divisions,  reduced  by  arduous  and  fatiguing  marches 
and  bloody  battles  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  to  the  dimensions  of  only 
respectable  brigades.  He  commanded  just  in  front  of  Petersburg,  from 
the  Appomattox  to  a  small  stream  to  the  right  of  the  city.  It  was  along 
this  line,  almost  its  entire  length,  that  a  continuous  struggle  for  months 
had  been  kept  up,  and  in  some  places  the  opposing  forces  were  but  a  few 
yards  apart.  A.  P.  Hill,  with  his  three  divisions,  held  the  right,  extend 
ing  to  Hatcher's  Run,  while  the  cavalry  guarded  either  flank. 

The  assault  of  the  25th  March  was  made  two  miles  south  of  the  Appo 
mattox  and  just  to  the  left  of  the  Crater.  Massing  two  divisions,  Gordon, 
in  the  early  light  of  the  morning  dashed  on  the  Federal  works.  The  ene 
my  was  surprised  ;  the  sharpshooters  of  Grimes'  division,  composing  the 
advance,  succeeded  in  driving  the  Federal  troops  from  their  works,  and  the 
Confederates  occupied  their  breastworks  for  a  distance  of  a  quarter  of  a 
mile,  with  comparatively  a  slight  loss  and  with  the  loss  to  the  enemy  of 
one  principal  fort  (Steadman),  and  some  five  hundred  prisoners.  Had  this 
opportunity  been  taken  advantage  of,  there  is  no  telling  the  result ;  but 
the  troops  could  not  be  induced  to  leave  the  breastworks  they  had  taken 
from  the  enemy,  and  to  advance  beyond  them  and  seize  the  crest  in  rear 
of  the  line  they  had  occupied.  They  hugged  the  works  in  disorder  until 
the  enemy  recovered  from  his  surprise ;  and  soon  the  artillery  in  the  forts 
to  the  right  and  left  began  their  murderous  fire  on  them.  When  fresh  troops 
were  brought  up  by  the  enemy,  their  advance  was  almost  unresisted,  and 
an  easy  recapture  of  the  fort  was  obtained,  the  Confederates  retiring  under 
a  severe  fire  into  their  old  works.  Nearly  two  thousand  men  took  shelter 
under  the  breastworks  they  had  captured,  and  surrendered  when  the  enemy 
advanced,  anoMhe  result  was  a  Confederate  loss  much  greater  than  that  of 
the  foe.  This  affair  demonstrated  to  all  that  the  day  of  offensive  move 
ments  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  was  gone.  The  experiment  had 
entailed  a  loss  that  could  be  ill  afforded  by  Gen.  Lee  ;  and  one  more  such 
disaster  might  have  been  irreparable. 


LAST  BATTLES  AROUND  PETERSBURG.  687 


THE  LAST  BATTLES  ABOUND  PETERSBURG. 

Gen.  Grant  had  at  first  designed  to  await  the  junction  of  Sherman's 
forces  for  his  final  operations  upon  Richmond,  so  as  to  complete  his  assur 
ance  of  victory.  But  he  feared  that  if  Sherman  crossed  the  Roanoke  river, 
Johnston  would  take  the  alarm,  and  move  to  Lee's  lines  ;  and  as  the  cir 
cumspect  Federal  commander  was  careful  to  risk  nothing,  even  approach 
ing  to  an  equal  match  of  force,  he  determined  to  dispatch  his  final  move 
ment  upon  Richmond,  and  to  make  his  experiment  upon  Lee's  little  army 
with  no  further  occasions  of  delay.  The  area  of  critical  operations  in  the 
Confederacy  was  now  within  close  and  narrow  boundaries.  Its  fate  was 
to  be  practically  decided  in  operations  taking  place  between  the  Roanoke 
and  James  Rivers  in  one  direction,  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  Alle- 
ghany  Mountains  in  the  other.  In  this  circumscribed  space  Richmond  was 
die  prominent  figure,  the  critical  point,  and  Lee's  army  the  chief  contestant. 

The  usual  preliminary  to  a  great  action  of  the  Federals — a  movement 
of  cavalry — was  directed  by  Gen.  Grant  before  the  time  assigned  for  a 
general  movement  of  the  armies  operating  against  Richmond.  The  imme 
diate  object  was  to  cut  off  all  communications  with  the  city  north  of 
J  ames  River  ;  and  on  the  27th  February,  Sheridan  moved  from  the  Shen- 
andoah  Yalley  with  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  numbering  about  ten  thou 
sand  sabres.  On  the  1st  March  he  secured  the  bridge  across  the  middle 
fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  entered  Staunton  the  next  day,  and  thence  pushed 
on  towards  Waynesboro',  where  Early,  with  less  than  twelve  hundred  men, 
disputed  the  debouche  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  This  force — a  remnant  of  the 
Army  of  the  Yalley — was  posted  on  the  banks  of  a  stream,  with  no  way 
open  for  retreat ;  and  Sheridan's  magnificent  cavalry  easily  ran  over  it, 
and  took  more  than  nine  hundred  prisoners.  Gen.  Early,  with  two  of  his 
staff  officers,  escaped  by  taking  to  the  woods.  The  next  day  Charlottes- 
ville  was  surrendered  ;  and  here  Sheridan  paused  to  await  the  arrival  of 
his  trains,  busy  meanwhile  in  destroying  the  railroads  towards  Richmond 
and  Lynchburg.  His  instructions  prescribed  that  he  should  gain  Lynch- 
burg  on  the  south  bank  of  the  James.  From  that  point  he  was  to  effectu 
ally  break  up  those  main  branches  of  Lee's  communications,  the  Lynch 
burg  railroads  and  James  River  Canal,  after  which  he  was  to  strike  south 
ward  through  Virginia  to  the  westward  of  Danville  and  join  Sherman. 
But  moving  towards  the  James  River,  between  Richmond  and  Lynchburg, 
Sheridan  found  himself  confronted  by  a  swollen  and  impassable  stream.  He 
fell  back,  rounded  the  left  wing  of  Lee's  army,  crossed  the  Pamunkey 
River  at  the  "White  House,  and  on  the  25th  March  joined  Gen.  Grant  in 
the  lines  before  Petersburg.  He  had  not  completed  the  circuit  designed 


688  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

for  him  ;  but  he  had  traversed  thirteen  counties,  and  done  enormous 
damage.  The  damage  to  the  canal  was  almost  irreparable ;  every  lock 
had  been  destroyed  as  far  as  Dugaldsville,  twenty  miles  from  Lynchburg  ; 
and  as  for  the  railroads  radiating  from  Charlottesville  to  Waynesboro, 
Amherst  Court-house  and  Louisa  Court-house  and  extending  from  the 
South  Anna  to  Chesterfield  Station  and  the  Chickahominy  river,  every 
bridge,  nearly  every  culvert,  and  scores  of  miles  of  the  rail  itself  had  been 
completely  destroyed. 

Sheridan's  cavalry,  diverted  back  from  its  intended  tour  to  North  Caro 
lina,  proved  a  timely  and  important  accession  to  Grant's  strength  in  his 
final  encounter.  There  were  indications  that  that  encounter  was  near  at 
hand.  There  had  been  days  of  painful  expectation  along  the  Confederate 
line.  In  the  vicinity  of  Petersburg  the  heavy  booming  of  guns  was  occa 
sionally  heard  away  on  the  right  sounding  like  distant  thunder.  Again 
sounds  of  conflict  would  open  on  the  extreme  left  and  the  rattle  of  musket 
ry  and  the  beat  of  artillery  would  scarcely  leave  doubt  of  a  battle  in 
earnest ;  but  after  a  few  impulsive  volleys  strife  would  cease  and  a  pro 
found  quiet  prevail.  The  increasing  signs  of  activity  inside  the  enemy's 
lines  indicated  plainly  enough  preparations  for  attack  or  movement  of 
some  sort ;  but  it  was  impossible  to  say  where  the  blow  would  fall  and 
how  it  would  be  delivered.  In  the  words  of  one  of  their  officers  "  each 
night  the  Confederates  unfolded  their  blankets  and  unloosed  their  shoe 
strings  in  uncertainty." 

The  movement  designed  by  Gen.  Grant  may  be  briefly  described  as 
an  attempt  upon  Lee's  right  and  vulnerable  flank  by  a  turning  column 
which  contingently  embraced  his  whole  army  and  included  a  heavy  opera 
tion  of  cavalry.  On  the  day  that  Sheridan  reached  his  lines,  three  divi 
sions  of  what  was  called  the  Army  of  the  James  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  were  withdrawn  from  Longstreet's  front  without  attracting  his  atten 
tion,  and  were  transferred  to  a  position  near  Hatcher's  Bun.  The  Second 
and  Fifth  corps,  which  had  held  this  part  of  the  enemy's  entrenched  lines, 
were  now  foot-loose  to  manoeuvre  by  the  left ;  and  co-operating  with 
Sheridan's  cavalry  (about  twenty-five  thousand  men  in  all),  they  were 
directed  to  move  to  the  right  of  Lee's  entrenched  line,  and  threaten  his 
communication  by  the  Southside  Railroad.  The  movement  commenced 
on  the  29th  March. 

To  secure  the  defence  of  his  right  against  this  powerful  column  which 
Grant  had  thrust  out  by  the  left,  was  the  immediate  necessity  that  stared 
Gen.  Lee  in  the  face,  for  it  was  vitally  important  to  secure  the  lines  where 
on  his  troops  depended  for  their  daily  food  ;  but  it  was  at  the  same  time 
indispensable  that  he  should  maintain  the  long  entrenched  line  that  covered 
Petersburg  and  Richmond.  There  was  no  resource  but  the  desperate  one 
of  stripping  his  entrenchments  to  secure  his  menaced  right  and  contest  the 


BATTLE   OF   FIVE   FORKS.  689 

prize  of  the  Southside  Kailroad.  In  the  night  of  the  29th,  Gen.  Lee,  hav 
ing  perceived  Grant's  manoeuvre,  despatched  Pickett's  and'Bushrod  John 
son's  divisions,  "Wise's  and  Ransom's  brigade,  Iluger's  battalion  of  infantry, 
and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  division,  in  all  about  seventeen  thousand  men,  to  en 
counter  the  turning  column  of  the  enemy. 

The  right  of  the  Confederate  entrenched  line  crossed  Hatcher's  Eun  at 
the  Boydton  plank  road,  and  extended  some  distance  along  the  White  Oak 
road.  Four  miles  beyond  the  termination  of  this  line  there  was  a  point 
where  several  roads  from  the  north  and  south  converged  on  the  White 
Oak  road,  forming  what  is  known  as  the  Five  Forks.  It  was  an  isolated 
position,  but  one  of  great  value,  as  it  held  the  strategic  key  that  opened 
up  the  whole  region  which  Lee  was  now  seeking  to  cover.  In  the  evening 
of  the  29th,  Sheridan  occupied  Dinwiddie  Court-house,  six  miles  southwest 
of  where  the  two  co-operating  corps  of  infantry  lay  on  their  arms  and 
about  eight  miles  south  of  Five  Forks. 

A  heavy  rain  the  next  day  prevented  further  operations  ;  but  on  the 
31st  Sheridan  pushed  forward  to  Five  Forks,  where  he  encountered  two 
divisions  of  infantry  under  Pickett  and  Johnson.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
day  this  Confederate  force,  which  had  been  moved  down  by  the  White 
Oak  road,  made  a  determined  charge  upon  the  whole  cavalry  line  of  the 
enemy,  forced  it  back,  and  drove  it  to  a  point  within  two  miles  of  Din 
widdie  Court-house. 

On  the  morning  of  the  1st  April,  Sheridan,  now  reinforced  by  the  Fifth 
corps,  commanded  by  Warren,  advanced  boldly  again  in  the  direction  of 
Five  Forks,  having  ascertained  that  the  Confederates  during  the  night 
had  withdrawn  all  but  a  mask  of  force  from  his  front.  In  the  afternoon, 
Pickett  and  Johnson  found  themselves  confined  within  their  works  at  the 
Five  Forks,  and  flanked  by  a  part  of  the  Fifth  corps,  which  had  moved 
down  the  White  Oak  road.  The  Confederate  troops  having  got  the  idea  that 
they  were  entrapped,  and  finding  themselves  pressed  front,  flank  and  rear, 
mostly  threw  down  their  arms.  Five  thousand  men  surrendered  themselves 
as  prisoners.  The  remnants  of  the  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Johnson  fled 
westward  from  Five  Forks  routed,  demoralized,  and  past  control ;  and 
Gen.  Lee  found  that  his  right,  wrenched  violently  from  his  centre,  was 
turned  almost  without  a  battle,  and  that  what  he  had  counted  as  the  bulk 
of  his  army  was  no  longer  of  any  use.  It  was  the  only  occasion  on  which 
the  Confederate  commander  ever  exhibited  anything  like  reproof  in  the 
field.  He  remarked  that  the  next  time  the  troops  were  to  be  taken  into 
action,  he  would  put  himself  at  the  head  of  them  ;  and  turning  to  one  of 
his  brigadiers,  he  ordered  him,  with  singular  emphasis  and  severity,  to 
gather  and  put  under  guard  "  all  the  stragglers  on  the  field,"  making  a 
plain  reference  to  the  conduct  of  his  officers. 

But  even  if  the  shameful  misfortune  of  Five  Forks  had  not  befallen 
44 


690  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Gen.  Lee,  the  result  would  not  have  been  materially  different ;  for  the  fate 
of  Petersburg  and  Kichmond  was  decided  without  this  event.  In  massing 
upon  his  right,  Gen.  Lee  had  reduced  the  force  defending  Petersburg  to 
two  incomplete  corps,  Gordon's  and  Hill's ;  and  these  strung  over  nine 
miles  of  breastworks,  made  little  more  than  sentinels.  Before  Longstreet, 
who  commanded  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  was  made  aware  of  the  sit 
uation,  and  could  obey  Lee's  orders  for  troops,  Grant  had  descried  the 
weakness  of  the  Confederate  lines  before  Petersburg,  and  determined  the 
easy  task  of  breaking  them. 

On  the  night  of  the  1st  April,  Grant  celebrated  the  victory  of  Five 
Forks,  and  performed  the  prelude  of  what  was  yet  to  come  by  a  fierce  and 
continuous  bombardment  along  his  lines  in  front  of  Petersburg.  Every 
piece  of  artillery  in  the  thickly  studded  forts,  batteries,  and  mortar-beds 
joined  in  the  prodigious  clamour  ;  reports,  savagely,  terrifically  crashing 
through  the  narrow  streets  and  lanes  of  Petersburg,  echoed  upwards  ;  it 
appeared  as  if  fiends  of  the  air  were  engaged  in  the  sulphurous  conflict. 
As  dawn  broke,  Grant  prepared  for  the  attack,  which  was  made  in  double 
column  at  different  points  on  the  Confederate  line. 

The  assault  was  opened  from  the  Appornattox  to  Hatcher's  Run.  The 
most  determined  effort  was  made  on  Gordon's  lines,  and  here  the  enemy 
succeeded  in  taking  a  portion  of  the  breastworks  near  the  Appomattox. 
But  they  could  not  use  the  advantage  which  they  had  struggled  so  hard  to 
obtain,  the  Confederates  holding  an  inner  cordon  of  works,  and  the  posi 
tion  which  the  enemy  had  taken  being  exposed  to  a  raking  fire  of  artillery 
on  the  right  and  left.  But  while  this  contest  was  going  on  to  the  left  of 
the  "  Crater,"  the  enemy  massed  heavily  against  Hill's  left  opposite  a  posi 
tion  the  weakest  in  the  line,  from  which  McGowan's  brigade  had  been 
transferred  the  day  previous,  leaving  only  artillerists  in  the  trenches  and 
the  picket  in  front.  The  Confederate  skirmishers  were  driven  with  impu 
nity,  the  batteries  were  carried  in  a  moment,  and  a  loud  huzza  that 
drowned  the  sound  of  battle  on  other  parts  of  the  line,  proclaimed  that 
the  enemy  had  obtained  an  important  success. 

Just  in  rear,  some  two  or  three  hundred  yards,  on  many  parts  of  the 
Confederate  line,  heavy  forts  had  been  erected  to  guard  against  just  such 
results  as  had  ensued.  In  rear  of  the  line  of  works  captured  by  the  enemy 
were  batteries  Alexander  and  Gregg  ;  and  these  two  works  were  all  that 
now  prevented  the  enemy  from  completely  cutting  the  Confederate  lines  in 
two  to  the  Appomattox.  After  getting  in  order,  the  enemy  moved  on  these 
works — on  Fort  Alexander  first,  taking  it  with  a  rush,  although  the  gun 
ners  stood  to  their  guns  to  the  last,  and  fired  their  last  shot  while  the  Fed 
eral  troops  were  on  the  ramparts. 

In  Fort  Gregg  there  was  a  small  and  mixed  garrison.  Capt.  Chew,  of 
the  4th  Maryland  battery  of  artillery,  was  in  command  of  the  work.  There 


DEFENCE  OF  FOKT  GREGG.  691 

was  added  to  his  battery  of  two  3-inch  rifles  and  thirty  men,  a  body  of 
men  known,  in  the  vulgar  parlance  of  soldiers,  as  "  Walker's  Mules,"  dis 
mounted  drivers  to  whom  were  given  muskets.  These  men  were  Virgin 
ians  and  Louisianians  who  belonged  to  Walker's  artillery  brigade,  and 
amounted  in  round  numbers,  to  about  one  hundred.  The  remainder  of 
the  garrison,  about  one  hundred  and  twenty,  were  some  men  from  Harris' 
Mississippi  brigade,  and  some  North  Carolinians.  Both  of  these  com 
mands,  the  Mississippians  and  North  Carolinians,  had  been  driven  back 
from  the  picket  lines,  and  had  fled  into  Fort  Gregg  for  shelter. 

Having  run  over  Fort  Alexander,  the  enemy  moved  on  Fort  Gregg 
with  cheers.    Confidently,  in  beautiful  lines  and  in  all  the  majesty  of  over 
powering  numbers,  did  the  Federal  troops  advance  upon  the  devoted  work. 
They  had  got  within  fifty  yards  of  it,  and  not  the  flash  of  a  single  rifle  had 
yet  defied  them.     The  painful  thought  passed  through  the  ranks  of  their 
comrades  who  watched  in  the  distance  that  the  garrison  was  about  to  sur 
render.     But  instead  of  a  white  flag,  there  was  a  white  puff  of  smoke ;  and 
artillery  and  infantry  simultaneously  opened  on  the  confident  assailants, 
who,  staggering  and  reeling  under  the  death-dealing  volley,  at  last  gave 
way,  and  retreated  in  masses  under  cover.     A  loud  and  wild  cheer  rang 
out  from  the  Confederate  lines,  and  was  answered  in  exultant  tones  by 
the  heroic  little  garrison  in  Fort  Gregg.     But  reinforcements  were  hasten 
ing  from  the  lines  of  the  enemy.     There  were  none  to  send  to  the  succour 
of  the  garrison  ;  every  Confederate  soldier  was  needed  at  his  post,  and  no 
reserves  were  at  hand.     As  the  enemy  again  came  up  in  battle  array,  the 
troops  moved  forward  in  serried  ranks,  and  soon  the  fort  was  canopied  in 
smoke.     It  seemed  by  mutual  consent  that  the  conflict  ceased  on  other 
parts  of  the  line,  while  both  sides  stood  silent  and  anxious  spectators  of  the 
struggle  at  the  fort.     As  the  smoke  lifts  it  is  seen  that  the  Federals  have 
reached  the  ditch.     Those  in  the  distance  could  descry  lines  of  blue  uni 
forms  swarming  up  the  sides  of  the  works  ;   and  as  the  foremost  reached 
the  top,  they  reeled  and  fell  upon  their  comrades  below.     Once,  twice,  and 
thrice  they  reached  the  top,  only  to  be  repulsed  ;  and  yet  they  persevered 
while  the  guns  in  the  embrasures  continued  to  fire  in  rapid  succession. 
Presently  the  sound  of  artillery  ceased,  and  the  Federals  mounted  the 
work,  and  poured  a  rapid  fire  on  the  defenders  within.     Many  of  the  gar 
rison,  unwilling  to  surrender,  used  their  bayonets,  and  clubbed  their  guns 
in  an  unequal  struggle.     But  such  resistance  could  be  of  short  duration  ; 
and  soon  loud  huzzas  of  the  enemy  told  that  the  fort  had  been  taken,  and 
with  it  the  Confederate  army  cut  in  two.    But  the  event  had  been  marked 
by  a  heroic  self-immolation  ;  of  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  who  defend 
ed  the  fort  there  were  not  more  than  thirty  survivors  ;  and  to  the  illumined 
story  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  Fort  Gregg  gave  a  fitting  con 
clusion,  an  ornament  of  glory  that  well  clasped  the  record  of  its  deeds. 


692  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

As  soon  as  the  fort  was  captured,  cannonading  and  sharp  shooting  were 
renewed  on  other  parts  of  the  line.  In  a  moment  heavy  bodies  of  cavalry, 
emerging  from  the  enemy's  former  lines,  poured  rapidly  over  the  captured 
works,  and  galloped  in  squadrons  towards  the  Appomattox,  which  was 
some  four  or  five  miles  distant.  Their  track  could  be  traced  by  the  heavy 
columns  of  black  smoke  that  rose  from  the  various  farm-houses  on  their 
route,  which .  had  been  set  on  fire.  The  infantry,  which  had  succeeded 
in  capturing  the  fort,  formed  line  fronting  the  Confederate  right 
flank,  and  appeared  as  if  they  intended  marching  by  the  rear  into 
Petersburg. 

New  dispositions  were  now  made  along  the  Confederate  line.  The  pro 
tracted  resistance  offered  by  Fort  Gregg  enabled  Gen.  Lee  to  establish 
what  of  force  remained  to  him  in  the  manner  best  availing  for  the  defence 
of  Petersburg.  Longstreet,  accompanied  by  a  small  brigade  (Benning's)  of 
Fields'  division,  had  arrived  from  the  north  side  of  the  James  in  time  to 
check  the  advance  of  the  enemy  long  enough  to  enable  fresh  troops  to 
hurry  up  in  his  rear,  and  to  form  a  fresh  line  in  front  of  Petersburg. 
Meanwhile  Heth's  division  of  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  regained  some  ground, 
and  re-established  their  lines.  But  in  the  execution  of  the  movement  was 
lost  the  valuable  life  of  Gen.  Hill,  who  had  seen  his  first  service  at  the 
famous  field  of  Manassas  as  Colonel  of  the  Thirteenth  Virginia  regiment  in 
Gen.  Johnston's  army,  had  passed  rapidly  through  all  the  gradations  of 
rank  to  Lieuten ant-General,  and  had  borne  a  constant  and  distinguished 
part  in  the  four  years'  defence  of  the  Confederate  capital.  Desiring  to 
obtain  a  near  view  of  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  line,  he  had  ridden  forward, 
accompanied  by  a  single  orderly,  when  he  unexpectedly  came  upon  a  party 
of  six  Federal  soldiers  concealed  in  a  ravine.  Gen.  Hill  wore  only  the 
stars  of  a  colonel  on  a  rough  citizen's  coat.  He  advanced  upon  the  party, 
and  commanded  their  surrender ;  they  consented ;  but  he  neglected  to  dis 
arm  them,  and  reassured  by  finding  there  was  no  body  of  troops  in  the 
vicinity,  they  fired  a  treacherous  volley,  and  shot  him  through  the 
heart. 

The  line  on  which  Gen.  Lee  had  now  closed  around  Petersburg  was 
not  intended  for  a  renewal  of  battle,  which  was  now  hopeless,  but  merely 
to  gain  time  for  the  execution  of  another  purpose.  A  little  while  after  the 
fall  of  Fort  Gregg,  ominous  columns  of  smoke  arose  from  numberless  depots 
and  warehouses  of  Petersburg.  It  was  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning  when 
Gen.  Lee  wrote  a  hasty  telegram  to  the  War  Department,  advising  that 
the  authorities  of  Richmond  should  have  everything  in  readiness  to  evacu 
ate  the  capital  at  eight  o'clock  the  coming  night,  unless  before  that  time 
despatches  should  be  received  from  him  to  a  contrary  effect ! 


EVACUATION   OF    RICHMOND.  693 


EVACUATION   OF   RICHMOND. 

A  small  slip  of  paper,  sent  up  from  the  War  Department  to  President 
Davis,  as  lie  was  seated  in  his  pew  in  St.  Paul's  Church,  contained  the 
news  of  the  most  momentous  event  of  the  war. 

It  is  a  most  remarkable  circumstance  that  the  people  of  Richmond  had 
remained  in  profound  ignorance  of  the  fighting  which  had  been  taking 
place  for  three  days  on  Gen.  Lee's  lines.  There  was  not  a  rumour  of  it  in 
the  air.  Not  a  newspaper  office  in  the  city  had  any  inkling  of  what  was 
going  on.  Indeed  for  the  past  few  days  there  had  been  visible  reassurance 
in  the  Confederate  capital ;  there  were  rumours  that  Johnston  was  moving 
to  Lee's  lines  and  a  general  idea  that  the  combined  force  would  take  the 
offensive  against  the  enemy.  But  a  day  before  Grant  had  commenced  his 
heavy  movement  a  curious  excitement  had  taken  place  in  Richmond.  The 
morning  train  had  brought  from  Petersburg  the  wonderful  rumour  that 
Gen.  Lee  had  made  a  night  attack,  in  which  he  had  crushed  the  enemy 
along  his  whole  line.  John  M.  Daniel,  the  editor-  of  the  Richmond 
Examiner,  died  the  same  day  under  the  delusion  that  such  a  victory  had 
been  won ;  and  John  Mitchel,  who  wrote  his  obituary  in  the  morning 
papers,  expressed  the  regret  that  the  great  Virginian  had  passed  away  just 
as  a  decisive  victory  was  likely  to  give  the  turning  point  to  the  success  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy  !  The  circumstance  shows  how  little  prepared 
the  people  of  Richmond  were  on  the  bright  Sabbath  morning  of  the  2d  of 
April  for  the  news  that  fell  upon  them  like  a  thunder-clap  from  clear  skies, 
and  smote  the  ear  of  the  community  as  a  knell  of  death. 

The  report  of  a  great  misfortune  soon  traverses  a  city  without  the  aid 
of  printed  bulletins.  But  that  of  the  evacuation  of  Richmond  fell  upon 
many  incredulous  ears.  One  could  see  the  quiet  streets  stretching  away, 
unmolested  by  one  single  sign  of  war  ;  across  the  James  the  landscape 
glistened  in  the  sun  ;  everything  which  met  the  eye  spoke  of  peace,  and 
made  it  impossible  to  picture  in  imagination  the  scene  which  was  to  ensue. 
There  were  but  few  people  in  the  streets  ;  no  vehicles  disturbed  the  quiet 
of  the  Sabbath ;  the  sound  of  the  church-going  bells  rose  into  the  cloudless 
sky,  and  floated  on  the  blue  tide  of  the  beautiful  day.  How  was  it  possible 
to  imagine  that  in  the  next  twenty-four  hours,  war,  with  its  train  of  hor- 
rours,  was  to  enter  the  scene ;  that  this  peaceful  city,  a  secure  possession 
for  four  years,  was  at  last  to  succumb  ;  that  it  was  to  be  a  prey  to  a  great 
conflagration,  and  that  all  the  hopes  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  were  to 
be  consumed  in  one  day,  as  a  scroll  in  the  fire ! 

As  the  day  wore  on,  clatter  and  bustle  in  the  streets  denoted  the  pro 
gress  of  the  evacuation,  and  convinced  those  who  had  been  incredulous  of 


694:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

its  reality.  The  disorder  increased  each  hour.  The  streets  were  thronged 
with  fugitives  making  their  way  to  the  railroad  depots  ;  pale  women  and 
little  shoeless  children  struggled  in  the  crowd ;  oaths  and  blasphemous 
shouts  smote  the  ear.  "Wagons  were  being  hastily  loaded  at  the  Depart 
ments  with  boxes,  trunks,  etc.,  and  driven  to  the  Danville  depot.  In  the 
afternoon  a  special  train  carried  from  Richmond  President  Davis  and  some 
of  his  Cabinet.  At  the  Departments  all  was  confusion  ;  there  was  no  sys 
tem  ;  there  was  no  answer  to  inquiries ;  important  officers  were  invisible, 
and  every  one  felt  like  taking  care  of  himself.  Outside  the  mass  of  hur 
rying  fugitives,  there  were  collected  here  and  there  mean-visaged  crowds, 
generally  around  the  commissary  depots  ;  they  had  already  scented  prey  ; 
they  were  of  that  brutal  and  riotous  element  that  revenges  itself  on  all 
communities  in  a  time  of  great  public  misfortune. 

The  only  convocation,  the  only  scene  of  council  that  marked  the  fall  of 
Richmond,  took  place  in  a  dingy  room  in  a  corner  of  the  upper  story  of 
the  Capitol  Building.  In  this  obscure  chamber  assembled  the  City  Coun 
cil  of  Richmond,  to  consult  on  the  emergency,  and  to  take  measures  to 
secure  what  of  order  was  possible  in  the  scenes  about  to  ensue.  It  ap 
peared  to  represent  all  that  was  left  of  deliberation  in  the  Confederate  cap 
ital.  It  was  a  painful  contrast  to  look  in  upon  this  scene  ;  to  traverse  the 
now  almost  silent  Capitol  House,  so  often  vocal  with  oratory,  and  crowded 
with  the  busy  scene  of  legislation ;  to  hear  the  echo  of  the  footstep  ;  and  at 
last  to  climb  to  the  dismal  show  of  councilmen  in  the  remote  room  where 
half  a  dozen  men  sat  at  a  rude  table,  and  not  so  many  vacant  idlers  listened 
to  their  proceedings.  At  the  head  of  the  board  sat  an  illiterate  grocer  of 
the  name  of  Saunders,  who  was  making  his  last  exhibition  of  Southern 
spirit,  and  twenty-four  hours  thereafter  was  subscribing  himself  to  some 
very  petty  Federal  officer,  "  most  respectfully,  your  most  obedient  servant." 
Here  and  there,  hurrying  up  with  the  latest  news  from  the  War  Depart 
ment,  was  Mayor  Mayo,  excited,  incoherent,  chewing  tobacco  defiantly, 
but  yet  full  of  pluck,  having  the  mettle  of  the  true  Virginian  gentleman, 
stern  and  watchful  to  the  last  in  fidelity  to  the  city  that  his  ancestors  had 
assisted  in  founding,  and  exhibiting,  no  matter  in  what  comical  aspects,  a 
courage  that  no  man  ever  doubted.  When  it  was  finally  announced  by 
the  Mayor  that  those  who  had  hoped  for  a  despatch  from  Gen.  Lee  con 
trary  to  what  he  had  telegraphed  in  the  morning,  had  ceased  to  indulge 
such  an  expectation,  and  that  the  evacuation  of  Richmond  was  a  foregone 
conclusion,  it  was  proposed  to  maintain  order  in  the  city  by  two  regiments 
of  militia  ;  to  destroy  every  drop  of  liquor  in  the  warehouses  and  stores  ; 
and  to  establish  a  patrol  through  the  night.  But  the  militia  ran  through 
the  fingers  of  their  officers  ;  the  patrols  could  not  be  found  after  a  certain , 
hour  ;  and  in  a  short  while  the  whole  city  was  plunged  into  mad  confusion 
and  indescribable  horrours. 


DISORDER   IN   THE    CONFEDERATE    CAPITAL.  695 

But  the  horrours  of  that  night  in  the  Confederate  capital  were  to  be 
studiously  veiled  from  the  eyes  of  the  enemy.  The  Federal  force  on  the 
north  side  of  James  River  consisted  of  three  divisions  under  the  command 
of  Gen.  Weitzel ;  while  Gen.  Ewell  covered  this  approach  to  the  capital 
with  a  force  about  four  thousand  strong.  The  Confederates  were  silently 
withdrawn  from  Weitzel's  front,  their  rear-guard  traversing  the  city  be 
fore  daybreak.  "Weitzel  had  been  instructed  to  push  on,  whenever  satis 
fied  of  his  ability  to  enter  Richmond.  During  the  whole  day  that  Grant 
had  been  engaged  in  front  of  Petersburg,  the  entire  lines  north  of  the 
James  were  perfectly  quiet.  Weitzel's  command  had  orders  to  make  as 
great  a  show  as  possible.  He  fired  no  gun  during  the  day,  but  as  darkness 
came  on,  he  set  all  his  bands  of  music  to  work  upon  national  airs.  The 
Confederates  vied  with  the  musical  entertainment ;  for  many  hours  the 
night  was  filled  with  melodious  strains.  But  about  midnight  a  complete 
and  absolute  silence  fell  upon  the  lines.  It  was  a  dead  quiet ;  a  close  mask 
to  what  was  taking  place  in  the  doomed  city  ;  and  not  until  the  morning 
hours  did  the  direful  blazon  in  the  sky  proclaim  to  "VYeitzel  that  his  hour 
had  come  and  that  Richmond  was  at  his  mercy. 

There  had  been  but  little  sleep  for  the  people  of  Richmond  in  the  night 
which  preceded  their  great  misfortune.  It  was  an  extraordinary  night ; 
disorder,  pillage,  shouts,  mad  revelry  of  confusion.  In  the  now  dimly- 
lighted  city  could  be  seen  black  masses  of  people,  crowded  around  some 
object  of  excitement,  besieging  the  commissary  stores,  destroying  liquor, 
intent  perhaps  upon  pillage,  and  swaying  to  and  fro  in  whatever  momen 
tary  passion  possessed  them.  The  gutters  ran  with  a  liquor  freshet,  and 
the  fumes  filled  the  air.  Some  of  the  straggling  soldiers  passing  through 
the  city,  easily  managed  to  get  hold  of  quantities  of  the  liquor.  Confusion 
became  worse  confounded  ;  the  sidewalks  were  encumbered  with  broken 
glass  ;  stores  were  entered  at  pleasure  and  stripped  from  top  to  bottom ; 
yells  of  drunken  men,  shouts  of  roving  pillagers,  wild  cries  of  distress  filled 
the  air,  and  made  night  hideous. 

But  a  new  horrour  was  to  appear  upon  the  scene  and  take  possession 
of  the  community.  To  the  rear-guard  of  the  Confederate  force  on  the  north 
side  of  James  River,  under  Gen.  Ewell,  had  been  left  the  duty  of  blowing 
up  the  iron-clad  vessels  in  the  James  and  destroying  the  bridges  across  that 
river.  The  Richmond,  Virginia,  and  an  iron  ram,  were  blown  to  the 
winds ;  the  little  shipping  at  the  wharves  was  fired  ;  and  the  three  bridges 
that  spanned  the  river  were  wrapped  in  flames,  as  soon  as  the  last  troops 
had  traversed  them.  The  work  of  destruction  might  well  have  ended 
here.  But  Gen.  Ewell,  obeying  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  had  issued 
orders  to  fire  the  four  principal  tobacco  warehouses  of  the  city  ;  one  of 
them — the  Shockoe  warehouse — situated  near  the  centre  of  the  city,  side 
by  side  with  the  Gallego  flour  mills,  just  in  a  position  and  circumstances 


696  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

from  winch  a  conflagration  might  extend  to  the  whole  business  portion  of 
Richmond.  In  vain  Mayor  Mayo  and  a  committee  of  citizens  had  remon 
strated  against  this  reckless  military  order.  The  warehouses  were  fired ; 
the  flames  seized  on  the  neighbouring  buildings  and  soon  involved  a  wide 
and  widening  area ;  the  conflagration  passed  rapidly  beyond  control ; 
and  in  this  mad  fire,  this  wild,  unnecessary  destruction  of  their  property 
the  citizens  of  Richmond  had  a  fitting  souvenir  of  the  imprudence  and 
recklessness  of  the  departing  Administration. 

Morning  broke  on  a  scene  never  to  be  forgotten.  It  was  a  strange  pic 
ture — impossible  to  describe — the  smoke  and  glare  of  fire  mingled  with 
the  golden  beams  of  the  rising  sun.  The  great  warehouse  on  the  Basin  was 
wrapped  in  flames ;  the  fire  was  reaching  to  whole  blocks  of  buildings ; 
and  as  the  sun  rose  majestically  above  the  horizon,  ifc  burnished  the  fringe 
of  smoke  with  lurid  and  golden  glory.  Curious  crowds  watched  the  fire. 
Its  roar  sounded  in  the  ears ;  it  leaped  from  street  to  street ;  pillagers 
were  busy  at  their  vocation,  and  in  the  hot  breath  of  the  fire  were  figures 
as  of  demons  contending  for  prey. 

The  sun  was  an  hour  or  more  above  the  horizon,  when  suddenly  there 
ran  up  the  whole  length  of  Main  street  the  cry  of  "  Yankees ! "  "  Yan 
kees  !  "  The  upper  part  of  this  street  was  choked  with  crowds  of  pillagers 
— men  provided  with  drays,  others  rolling  barrels  up  the  street,  or  bend 
ing  under  heavy  burdens,  and  intermixed  with  them  women  and  children 
with  smaller  lots  of  plunder  in  bags,  baskets,  tubs,  buckets,  and  tin-pans. 
As  the  cry  of  "  Yankees  "  was  raised,  this  motley  crowd  tore  up  the 
street,  cursing,  screaming,  trampling  upon  each  other,  alarmed  by  an 
enemy  riot  yet  in  sight,  and  madly  seeking  to  extricate  themselves  from 
imaginary  dangers.  Presently,  beyond  this  crowd,  following  up  the  tangled 
mass  of  plunderers,  but  not  pressing  or  interfering  with  them,  was  seen  a 
small  body  of  Federal  cavalry,  riding  steadily  along.  Forty  Massachusetts 
troopers,  despatched  by  Gen.  Weitzel  to  investigate  the  condition  of 
affairs,  had  ridden  without  let  or  hindrance  into  Richmond.  At  the  corner 
of  Eleventh  street  they  broke  into  a  trot  for  the  public  square,  and  in  a  few 
moments  their  guidons  were  planted  on  the  Capitol,  and  fluttered  there  a 
strange  spectacle  in  the  early  morning  light. 

A  few  hours  thereafter,  and  Weitzel's  troops  were  pouring  through  the 
streets  of  the  city.  A  lady,  who  witnessed  the  grand  Federal  entree,  and 
has  given  a  very  graphic  account  of  it,  thus  describes  a  portion  of  the 
scene  :  "  Stretching  from  the  Exchange  Hotel  to  the  slopes  of  Church  Hill, 
clown  the  hill,  through  the  valley,  up  the  ascent  to  the  hotel,  was  the 
array,  with  its  unbroken  line  of  blue,  fringed  with  bright  bayonets. 
Strains  of  martial  music,  flushed  countenances,  waving  swords,  be 
tokened  the  victorious  army.  As  the  lino  turned  at  the  Exchange  Hotel 
into  the  upper  street,  the  movement  was  the  signal  for  a  wild  burst  of  cheers 


CONFLAGRATION   IN   RICHMOND.  697 

from  each  regiment.  Shouts  from  a  few  negroes  were  the  only  responses. 
Through  throngs  of  sullen  spectators  ;  along  the  line  of  fire  ;  in  the  midst 
of  the  horrours  of  a  conflagration,  increased  by  the  explosion  of  shells  left 
by  the  retreating  army ;  through  curtains  of  smoke ;  through  the  vast 
serial  auditorium  convulsed  with  the  commotion  of  frightful  sounds,  moved 
the  garish  procession  of  the  grand  army,  with  brave  music,  and  bright 
banners  and  wild  cheers.  A  regiment  of  negro  cavalry  swept  by  the  hotel. 
As  they  turned  the  street  corner  they  drew  their  sabres  with  savage  shouts^ 
and  the  blood  mounted  even  in  my  woman's  heart  with  quick  throbs  of 
defiance."  * 

Meanwhile  the  fire  raged  with  unchecked  fury.  The  entire  business 
part  of  the  city  was  on  fire ;  stores,  warehouses,  manufactories,  mills,  de 
pots,  and  bridges — all,  covering  acres  ;  the  continuous  thunder  of  explod 
ing  shells  sounded  in  the  sea  of  fire  ;  and  in  the  midst  of  it  was  the  long, 
threatening,  hostile  army  entering  to  seize  its  prey.  All  during  the  fore 
noon,  flame  and  smoke  and  burning  brands  and  showers  of  blazing  sparks 
filled  the  air,  spreading  still  further  the  destruction,  until  it  had  swept  be 
fore  it  every  bank,  every  auction  store,  every  insurance  office,  nearly  every 
commission  house,  and  most  of  the  fashionable  stores.  The  atmosphere 
was  almost  choking ;  men,  women,  and  children  crowded  into  the  square 
of  the  Capitol  for  a  breath  of  pure  air  ;  but  it  was  not  to  be  obtained  even 
there,  and  one  traversed  the  green  slopes  blinded  by  cinders  and  strug 
gling  for  breath.  Already  piles  of  furniture  had  been  collected  here,  drag 
ged  from  the  ruins  of  burning  houses ;  and  in  uncouth  arrangements,  made 
with  broken  tables  and  bureaus,  were  huddled  women  and  children,  with 
no  other  home,  with  no  other  resting  place  in  Heaven's  great  hollowness. 

Some  tardy  attempts  were  made  to  arrest  the  conflagration ;  in  the 
afternoon  the  military  authorities  organized  the  crowds  of  negroes  as  a  fire 
corps ;  but  the  few  steam-engines  that  played  upon  the  flames  were  not 
sufficient  to  check  their  progress.  It  was  late  in  the  evening  when  the  fire 
had  burned  itself  out.  It  had  consumed  the  most  important  part  of  Rich 
mond.  Commencing  at  the  Shockoe  warehouse,  the  fire  radiated  front 
and  rear,  and  on  two  wings,  burning  down  Main  street,  half  way  between 
Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  streets,  and  back  to  the  river,  through  Cary  and 
all  the  intermediate  streets.  "Westward,  on  Main,  the  fire  was  stayed  at 
Ninth  street,  sweeping  back  to  the  river.  On  the  north  side  of  Main  the 
flames  were  stayed  between  Thirteenth  and  Fourteenth  streets.  From  this 
point  the  flames  raged  on  the  north  side  of  Main  up  to  Eighth  street,  and 
back  to  Bank  street.  The  pencil  of  the  surveyor  could  not  have  more  dis 
tinctly  marked  out  the  business  portion  of  the  city. 

The  evening  breezes  had  turned  the  course  of  the  fire ;  and  as  these 

*  "  Nathalie,"  in  Norfolk  Virginian. 


698  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

still  continued,  heavy  mist-clouds  hung  upon  the  horizon,  or  streamed  up 
wards  on  the  varying  current  of  the  winds.  As  night  came  on,  there  was 
a  painful  reaction  after  the  day's  terrible  excitement ;  a  strange  quiet  fell 
upon  the  blackened  city  and  its  scenes  of  destruction.  It  was  the  quiet 
of  a  great  desolation.  Groups  of  women  and  children  crawled  under  shel 
ters  of  broken  furniture  in  the  Capitol  square  ;  hundreds  of  homeless  per 
sons  laid  down  to  sleep  in  the  shadows  of  the  ruins  of  Richmond ;  and 
worn  out  by  excitement,  exhausted  as  by  the  spasm  of  a  great  battle,  men 
watched  for  the  morrow  with  the  dull  sense  that  the  work  of  years  had 
been  ruined,  and  that  all  they  possessed  on  earth  had  been  swept  away. 

While  Richmond  was  filled  with  horrour  and  destruction,  and  the 
smoke  of  its  torment  ascended  to  the  skies,  very  different  scenes  were 
taking  place  far  away  in  the  cities  of  the  North.  It  was  a  strange  reverse 
to  the  picture  we  have  been  contemplating.  "With  those  fervours  and 
shows  characteristic  of  the  Northern  mind,  Washington  and  New  York 
were  celebrating  the  downfall  of  the  Confederate  capital.  Bells  were  rung  ; 
wild  and  enthusiastic  congratulations  ran  along  the  street ;  and  vast  crowds 
collected,  whose  fantastic  exhibitions  of  joy,  not  content  with  huzzas, 
cheers,  and  dancing  in  the  streets,  broke  out  into  a  blasphemous  singing 
of  hymns  of  the  church.  In  New  York  twenty  thousand  persons  in  the 
open  air  sung  the  doxology.  There  was,  of  course,  an  unlimited  display 
of  flags  ;  and  as  evidence  of  this  characteristic  exhibition  it  is  said  that 
half  an  hour  after  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Richmond  was  known,  not  a 
single  large  flag  in  the  whole  city  of  New  York  was  left  unpurchased. 
These  symbols  of  loyalty  not  only  floated  over  houses,  but  were  fastened 
to  carts,  stages  and  wagons.  The  newspapers  were  mostly  occupied  with 
spread-eagles  and  maps  of  Richmond.  The  World  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  event  of  the  day  "  more  fully  justified  exuberant  rejoicing  than 
any  previous  achievement  in  the  history  of  the  war."  The  New  York 
Herald — the  organ  par  excellence  of  Yankee  wind — went  further,  and  de 
clared  that  the  taking  of  Richmond  was  "  one  of  the  grandest  triumphs 
that  had  crowned  human  efforts  for  centuries" 

Such  stuff  was  characteristic  of  Northern  newspapers.  But  looking  to 
facts  we  shall  find  a  more  precise  language  in  which  to  describe  the 
achievement  of  Gen.  Ulysses  S.  Grant  in  the  fall  of  Richmond. 

It  was  simply  the  consummation  of  the  disgrace  of  this  commander — 
that  he  should  have  taken  eleven  months  to  capture  a  position  at  no  time 
held  .by  more  than  one  third  of  his  forces,  having  lost  in  the  enterprise  in 
killed  and  wounded  more  than  double  the  numbers  actually  in  arms 
against  him !  This  sentence  may  grate  011  Northern  pride ;  but  it  is 
founded  upon  plain,  unyielding  figures  ;  it  is  the  inexorable  statement  of 
the  law  of  proportions  ;  it  can  be  no  more  contested  than  a  mathematical 
demonstration.  As  long  as  the  intelligent  of  this  world  are  persuaded  of 


DEFICIENCIES   OF   NORTHERN   GENERALSHIP.  699 

the  opinion  that  a  great  General  is  he  who  accomplishes  his  purposes  with 
small,  but  admirably  drilled  armies  ;  who  defeats  large  armies  with  small 
ones  ;  who  accomplishes  great  military  results  by  strategy,  more  than  by 
fighting,  who  makes  of  war  an  intellectual  exercise  rather  than  a  match  of 
brute  force,  that  title  will  be  given  to  Robert  E.  Lee  above  all  men  in 
America,  and  the  Confederate  commander  will  be  declared  to  have  been 
much  greater  in  defeat  than  Grant  in  his  boasted  victory. 

The  adulation  of  partisans  has  no  permanent  place  in  the  records  of 
glory.  The  office  of  the  historian  is  to  reduce  the  exaggerations  of  the 
present,  and  that  without  reference  to  the  passionate  criticisms  of  the  times 
in  which  he  lives.  If  the  fact  be  that  the  North  has  produced  no  great 
General  in  this  war  ;  that  the  exhibitions  of  generalship,  chivalry,  human 
ity,  and  all  that  noble  sentimentalism  that  properly  belongs  to  the  state 
of  war  have  been  more  largely  on  the  Confederate  side ;  that  the  Northern 
people  have  exhibited  gross  materialism  in  the  war,  have  excluded  that 
noble  spirituality  common  to  the  great  conflicts  of  civilized  nations,  and 
worshipped  the  grossest  types  of  physical  power,  the  fault  is  in  themselves, 
and  not  in  the  pen  that  writes  these  things. 


CHAPTEE    XLII. 

PUBLIC  FEELING  IN  BIGHMOND  AFTER  EVACUATION  DAY. — PEESIDENT  DAVIS1  PBOCLAMATION 
AT  DANVILLE. — NEW  AND  SANGUINE  THEOBY  OF  CONFEDEEATE  DEFENCE. — MOEAL  EFFECT 
OF  TIIE  FALL  OF  EICHMOND. — EETREAT  AND  FINAL  SUEEENDEE  OF  LEE'S  AEMY. — CEOSS- 
ING  OF  THE  APPOMATTOX. — EXPLOSION  OF  MAGAZINES. — THE  WAGON-TEAIN  FEOM  EICH 
MOND. — OEDEE  OF  GEANT'S  PUESUIT. — GEN.  LEE'S  NEW  HOPES. — THEY  ABE  DASHED  AT 

AMELIA  COUET-HOUSE.— THE  CONFEDEEATES  IN  A  STAEVING  CONDITION. — LEE  ABANDONS 
THE  EOUTE  TO  DANVILLE  AND  MAKES  FOE  LYNCHBUEG,  BY  WAY  OF  FAEMVILLE. — SUFFEE- 
INGS  ON  THE  MAECH. — DEMORALIZATION  OF  THE  TEOOPS. — SOME  SPIEITED  EPISODES. — 
THE  ACTION  OF  SAILOES'  CEEEK. — THE  CONFEDEEATES  IN  THE  VICINITY  OF  FAEMVILLE. — 
AFFAIES  WITH  THE  ENEMY. — THE  CONFEDEEATES  EETEEAT  TO  APPOMATTOX  COUET-HOUSE 

WITHOUT  MOLESTATION. — SENSE  OF  BELIEF  AMONG  THE  TEOOPS. OMINOUS  SOUNDS  OF 

CANNON. — THE  EXIT  TO  LYNCHBUEG  CLOSED  BY  SHEEIDAN. — DESPEEATE  ADVENTUEE  OF 
GOEDON'S  COEPS. — THE  EECOIL. — A  FLAG  OF  TEUCE  ON  THE  SCENE. — COEEESPONDENCE 
BETWEEN  GENS.  GEANT  AND  LEE,  LEADING  TO  THE  SUEEENDEB  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  NOETH- 
EEN  VIBGINIA.— THE  CONFEEENCE  AT  M'LEAN7S  HOUSE. — GEN.  LEE  ANNOUNCING  THE 

TEEMS  OF  SUEEENDEE. — A  TOUCHING  SCENE  AT  HIS  HEADQUAETEES. GEN.  LEE's  FABE- 

WELL  ADDEESS  TO  HIS  ABMY. — MAGNANIMOUS  AND  DELICATE  BEHAVIOUE  OF  GEANT. — 
GEN.  LEE'S^EETUEN  TO  HIS  HOME.— GEE  AT  EXULTATION  AT  WASHINGTON. — SECEETAEY 
STANTON'S  CONGEATULATIONS. — SCENE  AT  THE  PEESIDENT'S  HOUSE. — CHAEACTEEISTIO 
SPEECH  AND  LAST  JOKE  OF  ABEAHAM  LINCOLN. 

THE  Federal  occupants  of  Richmond  no  doubt  thought  the  people  very 
submissive  to  the  new  authority.  They  saw  no  sign  of  violence,  and  they 
heard  no  expression  of  defiance.  The  population  of  Richmond  moved 
mechanically  before  their  new  masters.  But  there  was,  for  some  days,  an 
undercurrent  of  eager,  excited  thought  which  the  Federals  did  not  per 
ceive  ;  citizens  whispered  among  themselves,  and  went  around  the  street- 
corners  to  relate  in  low  tones  to  each  other  some  rumour  eagerly  grasped 
for  the  new  hope  it  contained.  Thus  it  was  told  in  whispers  that  Gen. 
Lee  had  won  a  great  victory  on  his  retreat,  that  Johnston  had  struck  Sher 
man  a  mortal  blow,  or  that  some  other  extravagant  event  had  happened, 
some  sudden  relief  of  the  falling  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy.  It  is  not 
easy  for  men  to  descend  at  once  to  the  condition  of  despair. 


LAST   PROCLAMATION.  701 

But  even  outside  the  circle  of  absurd  rumours,  there  were  intelligent 
minds  in  Kichmond  that  still  entertained  lingering  hopes  of  the  cause  of 
the  Confederacy.  The  foundation  of  these  hopes  was  small,  but  not  alto 
gether  visionary.  There  was  a  chance  that  Lee  might  get  off  his  army 
safely,  and  effect  a  successful  retreat ;  he  might  unite  with  Johnston  ;  and, 
although  driven  from  Virginia,  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  might  re 
open  Georgia  and  the  Carolinas,  arid  place  the  Government  nearer  its 
resources  of  subsistence,  with  the  control  of  a  territory  practically  much 
larger  than  that  in  tjie  Richmond  jurisdiction. 

These  things  were  possibilities,  very  small  and  very  remote.  It  was 
learned  through  Northern  newspapers,  circulated  in  Kichmond,  that  Presi 
dent  Davis,  who  had  reached  Danville,  had  issued  there  the  following 
proclamation : 

DANVILLE,  Vx.,  April  5, 1865. 

The  General-in-Chief  found  it  necessary  to  make  such  movements  of  his  troops  as  to 
uncover  the  capital.  It  would  be  unwise  to  conceal  the  moral  and  material  injury  to 
our  cause  resulting  from  the  occupation  of  our  capital  by  the  enemy.  It  is  equally  un 
wise  and  unworthy  of  us  to  allow  our  own  energies  to  falter,  and  our  efforts  to  become 
relaxed  under  reverses,  however  calamitous  they  may  be.  For  many  months  the  largest 
and  finest  army  of  the  Confederacy,  under  a  leader  whose  presence  inspires  equal  confi 
dence  in  the  troops  and  the  people,  has  been  greatly  trammelled  by  the  necessity  of  keep 
ing  constant  watch  over  the  approaches  to  the  capital,  and  has  thus  been  forced  to  forego 
more  than  one  opportunity  for  promising  enterprise.  It  is  for  us,  my  countrymen,  to 
show  by  our  bearing  under  reverses  how  wretched  has  been  the  self-deception  of  those 
who  have  believed  us  less  able  to  endure  misfortune  with  fortitude  than  to  encounter 
dangers  with  courage. 

We  have  now  entered  upon  a  new  phase  of  the  struggle.  Relieved  from  the  necessity 
of  guarding  particular  points,  our  army  will  be  free  to  move  from  point  to  point,  to 
strike  the  enemy  in  detail  far  from  his  base.  Let  us  but  will  it,  and  we  are  free. 

Animated  by  that  confidence  in  your  spirit  and  fortitude  which  never  yet  failed  me, 
I  announce  to  you,  fellow-countrymen,  that  it  is  my  purpose  to  maintain  your  cause 
with  my  whole  heart  and  soul ;  that  I  will  never  consent  to  abandon  to  the  enemy  one 
foot  of  the  soil  of  any  of  the  States  of  the  Confederacy.  That  Virginia — noble  State— 
whose  ancient  renown  has  been  eclipsed  by  her  still  more  glorious  recent  history ;  whose 
bosom  has  been  bared  to  receive  the  main  shock  of  this  war ;  whose  sons  and  daughters 
have  exhibited  heroism  so  sublime  as  to  render  her  illustrious  in  all  time  to  come — that 
Virginia,  with  the  help  of  the  people,  and  by  the  blessing  of  Providence,  shall  le  field 
and  defended,  and  no  peace  ever  be  made  with  the  infamous  invaders  of  her  territory. 

If  by  the  stress  of  numbers  we  should  ever  be  compelled  to  a  temporary  withdrawal 
from  her  limits,  or  those  of  any  other  border  State,  we  will  return  until  the  baffled  and 
exhausted  enemy  shall  abandon  in  despair  his  endless  and  impossible  task  of  making 
slaves  of  a  people  resolved  to  be  free. 

Let  us,  then,  not  despond,  my  countrymen,  but,  relying  on  God,  meet  the  foe  with 
fresh  defiance,  and  with  unconquered  and  unconquerable  hearts. 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

Tins  proclamation  was  the  last  effusion  of  the  sanguine  temperament 


702  THE    LOST   CAUSE. 

of  the  Confederate  President.  It  gave  a  new  colour  to  the  evacuation  of 
Richmond.  But  the  hopeful  and  ingenious  minds  which  constructed  the 
new  theory  of  Confederate  defence  had  failed  to  take  in  a  most  important 
element  in  the  consideration — the  moral  effect  of  the  fall  of  Richmond. 
They  did  not  reflect  that  this  city  had  been  for  four  years  the  central  object 
of  all  the  plans  and  exertions  of  the  war  ;  they  did  not  understand  that  it 
had  become  to  the  popular  mind  the  symbol  of  the  Confederacy  ;  and  they 
could  not  realize  that  when  Richmond  fell  the  cause  lost  in  the  estimation 
of  the  army  and  people  the  emblem  and  semblance  of  nationality  and  all 
appliances  for  supporting  the  popular  faith  and  enthusiasm.  But  the  sequel 
was  to  develop  and  demonstrate  all  these  consequences,  and  the  last  hopes 
of  the  Confederacy  were  to  be  speedily  extinguished. 


EETEEAT   AND  FINAL   SUEBENDEE   OF   LEE?S   AEMY. 

In  his  last  despatch  from  Petersburg,  Gen.  Lee  had  stated  that  some 
time  during  the  night  of  the  2d  April,  he  would  fall  back  behind  the  Ap- 
pomattox.  He  was  then  holding  a  semicircular  line,  the  left  resting  on 
the  Appomattox,  narrowly  including  Petersburg  ;  while  his  extreme  right, 
which  Sheridan  was  still  pressing,  was  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Southside 
Railroad,  some  fifteen  miles  west  of  the  town.  It  appears  that  the  enemy 
already  imagined  that  he  had  cut  off  the  troops  on  the  right,  supposing 
that  they  could  not  cross  the  river  except  through  Petersburg  ;  but  in  this 
he  was  mistaken.  "When  night  closed,  the  air  was  luminous  with  the 
steady  glare  of  the  burning  warehouses  in  Petersburg.  For  several  hours 
cannonading  was  kept  up ;  but  about  midnight  the  Confederates  began 
their  retreat.  By  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Gordon's  whole  corps, 
except  a  few  pickets  and  stragglers,  was  safely  across  the  river,  and  the 
bridge  on  fire. 

As  the  troops  from  Petersburg  got  across  the  river,  the  heavily-charged 
magazine  of  Cummin's  battery  of  siege  guns  blew  up,  lighting  the  deep 
darkness  of  the  night  with  its  fierce  and  vivid  glare,  and  then  shaking  the 
earth  like  the  shock  of  an  earthquake.  Fort  Clifton's  magazine  in  a 
moment  followed,  and  then  the  explosion  was  taken  up  all  along  the  line 
to  Richmond.  The  scene  was  fierce  and  imposing.  The  retreating  army 
left  the  light  and  pierced  the  midnight  darkness.  At  each  step  some  new 
explosion  would  sound  in  their  ears.  The  whole  heavens  in  their  rear 
were  lit  up  in  lurid  glare,  and  added  intensity  to  the  blackness  before 
their  eyes. 

On  leaving  Petersburg,  Gordon's  corps  took  the  river  road ;  Mahone, 
with  his  division,  and  all  other  troops  or  the  south  side  of  the  James,  the 
middle  road,  and  Ewell  and  Elzey,  with  the  Richmond  garrison,  and  other 


RETREAT   OF   GEN.    LEE.  703 

troops,  the  road  nearest  the  James  Eiver.  During  the  day  following  the 
evacuation  of  Petersburg,  the  Confederates  made  good  progress,  their  route 
unimpeded  by  wagons  and  artillery.  But  after  the  junction  of  Gordon's 
corps  with  Mahone  and  Ewell,  with  thirty  miles  of  wagons,  containing  the 
special  plunder  of  the  Richmond  departments,  they  went  at  a  rate  so  dis 
tressingly  slow,  that  it  was  apparent  that  an  enterprising  enemy  would 
have  little  trouble  in  overtaking  them. 

But  the  day  passed  without  any  attack  of  the  enemy,  and  without  the 
appearance  of  any  considerable  body  of  his  forces.  So  far  the  retreat  had 
been  an  occasion  of  reassurance  ;  it  had  been  effected  safely  ;  and  with  the 
additions  made  to  the  Petersburg  section  of  troops  from  the  Richmond 
lines  and  from  Lee's  extreme  right,  which  had  crossed  the  Appomattox 
above  Petersburg,  that  resourceful  commander  had  now  well  in  hand 
more  than  twenty  thousand  troops.  Gen.  Lee  had  clearly  seen  that  his 
retreat  would  put  the  enemy  to  the  necessity  of  breaking  up  into  bodies 
of  one  or  two  army  corps,  with  a  view  to  a  vigorous  pursuit.  On  the 
morning  of  the  3d,  Grant  commenced  pursuit.  Its  order,  calculated  on 
the  clear  assumption  that  Lee  would  move  for  the  Danville  road,  was  as 
follows  :  Sheridan  to  push  for  the  Danville  road,  keeping  near  the  Appo 
mattox  ;  Meade  to  follow  with  the  Second  and  Sixth  corps ;  and  Ord  to 
move  for  Burkes ville  along  the  Southside  road,  the  Ninth  corps  stretching 
along  the  road  behind  him.  It  was  certainly  a  well-planned  pursuit ;  but 
it  involved  the  possibility  that  Lee  might  fall  on  the  enemy  in  detail ;  it 
was  a  question  of  the  rapidity  of  movements  and  combinations,  in  which, 
although  Grant  held  the  interiour  line,  his  adversary  was  not  in  a  hopeless 
situation ;  for  Lee,  even  if  forced  from  the  Danville  road,  might  take  up 
an  eccentric  line,  make  a  race  to  Farmville,  there  cross  the  Appomattox 
once  more,  and,  by  destroying  the  bridges  after  him,  escape  into  the  moun 
tains  beyond  Lynchburg. 

With  spirits  visibly  reassured,  the  retreating  army  reached  Amelia 
Court-house  in  the  morning  of  the  4th.  But  a  terrible  disappointment 
awaited  it  there.  Several  days  before,  Gen.  Lee  had  despatched  most  dis 
tinct  and  urgent  orders  that  large  supplies  of  commissary  and  quarter 
master's  stores  should  be  sent  forward  from  Danville  to  Amelia  Court 
house.  But  the  authorities  in  Richmond  bungled  the  command  ;  and  the 
train  of  cars  loaded  with  these  supplies  ran  through  to  relieve  the  evacuation 
of  the  capital,  without  unloading  the  stores  at  Amelia  Court-house.  Gen. 
Lee  found  there  not  a  single  ration  for  his  army.  It  was  a  terrible  revela 
tion.  To  keep  life  in  his  army,  he  would  have  to  break  up  half  of  it  into 
foraging  parties  to  get  food  ;  the  country  was  scant  of  subsistence,  a  tract 
of  straggling  woods  and  pine  barrens  ;  and  soon  the  pangs  of  hunger  would 
tell  upon  the  flagging  spirits  of  his  men,  and  consume  the  last  hope. 
Meanwhile  the  forced  delay  of  his  army  at  Amelia  Court-house  gave 


704:  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

Sheridan,  who  was  pursuing  with  his  cavalry,  and  the  Fifth  corps,  time  to 
strike  in  upon  the  Confederate  line  of  retreat.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  4th 
he  was  reported  at  Jetersville,  on  the  Danville  Railroad,  seven  miles  south 
west  of  Amelia  Court-house.  But  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of  battle 
with  Gen.  Lee ;  the  concern  was  now  simply  to  escape.  His  men  were 
suffering  from  hunger ;  half  of  them  had  been  sent  or  had  straggled  in 
quest  of  food  ;  soldiers  who  had  to  assuage  their  craving  by  plucking  the 
buds  and  twigs  of  trees,  were  scarcely  to  be  blamed  for  courting  capture ; 
and  thus  with  his  army  in  loose  order,  in  woful  plight,  diminishing  at 
every  step,  Gen.  Lee  determined  to  try  the  last  desperate  chance  of  escape, 
and  to  penetrate  the  region  of  hills  in  the  direction  of  Farniville,  hoping  to 
avail  himself  of  these  positions  of  defence. 

On  the  5th  he  took  up  this  line  of  retreat ;  but  the  locomotion  of  his 
army  was  no  longer  what  it  had  been.  The  troops  went  wearily  along, 
averaging  hardly  half  a  mile  an  hour.  It  was  with  some  satisfaction  that 
they  saw  the  wagons  which  had  so  effectually  clogged  their  march  begin 
to  cast  up  their  plunder.  Jaded  horses  and  mules  refused  to  pull ;  de 
moralized  and  badly-scared  drivers,  with  straining  eyes  and  perspiring 
bodies,  plied  their  whips  vigorously  to  no  effect ;  difficult  places  in  the 
road  were  choked  with  blazing  wagons,  fired  to  save  their  contents  from 
the  enemy  ;  there  were  deafening  reports  from  ammunition  exploding  and 
shells  bursting,  when  touched  by  the  flames  ;  and  on  this  line  of  terrible 
retreat,  behind  and  on  either  flank,  there  was  a  running  fight  through  every 
hour  of  the  day.  At  every  hill  divisions  would  alternately  halt,  and  form 
linse  of  battle  and  check  the  pursuers.  As  soon  as  proper  disposition  had 
been  made  on  the  next  line  of  hills  the  rear  division  would  move  off  and 

-  the  others,  only  to  form  again  at  the  next  suitable  defensive  position. 
Thus  toiled  on  the  retreating  army.  Hundreds  of  men  dropped  from  ex 
haustion  ;  thousands  threw  away  their  arms  ;  the  demoralization  appeared 
at  last  to  involve  the  officers  ;  they  did  nothing  to  prevent  straggling  ;  and 
many  of  them  seemed  to  shut  their  eyes  on  the  hourly  reduction  of  their 
commands,  and  rode  in  advance  of  their  brigades  in  dogged  indifference. 

But  in  the  jaded,  famishing  crowd  there  was  yet  left  something  of  the 
old  spirit  which  had  made  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  famous  through 
out  the  world,  and  inscribed  its  banners  with  the  most  glorious  names  of 
the  war.  Its  final  retreat  was  not  to  be  without  its  episodes  of  desperate 
and  devoted  courage. 

On  the  6th,  the  enemy  having  changed  the  order  of  pursuit  to  conform 
to  Lee's  new  movement,  Sheridan,  with  his  cavalry,  struck  in  upon  the 
Confederate  line  of  retreat  just  south  of  Sailors'  Creek,  a  small  tributary 
of  the  Appomattox.  Swell's  corps,  consisting  of  about  four  thousand 
two  hundred  men,  was  called  upon  to  support  Pickett,  who,  with  his  divi 
sion  reduced  to  about  eight  hundred  men,  was  being  sorely  pressed  by 


ENGAGEMENT   AT   SAILORS'    CKEEK.  705 

Sheridan.  On  reaching  the  ground,  and  whilst  deploying  his  troops  into 
line  of  battle,  it  was  discovered  that  Gordon's  division,  which  formed  the 
rear-guard  of  the  army,  had  taken  another  road,  following  after  the  wagon 
train,  and  that  the  Federal  forces  had  already  occupied  the  high  ground  in 
£  well's  rear,  opening  upon  his  troops  a  rapid  and  deadly  fire  of  artillery. 
A  very  brief  time  elapsed,  when  the  appearance  of  a  very  heavy  force  of 
infantry,  also  in  the  rear,  rendered  it  necessary  to  face  about  the  Confed 
erate  line,  and  prepare  for  another  conflict  on  the  very  ground  over  which 
it  had  just  passed.  The  enemy  advanced  with  spirit,  and  with  the  evident 
determination  of  bringing  matters  to  a  crisis,  and  thus,  without  being  able 
to  assist  Pickett,  Ewell,  with  his  small  force,  was  compelled  to  hold  his 
ground  against  these  overwhelming  numbers  in  his  (Pickett's)  rear.  At 
this  critical  juncture  fresh  troops  were  brought  up  against  Pickett,  and, 
charging  impetuously  on  his  line,  it  was  easily  broken,  never  again  to  be 
reformed,  or  restored  to  such  order  as  to  render  it  longer  available.  The 
enemy's  forces,  confident  and  exulting  over  the  prospect  of  success,  v,vre 
now  hurled  upon  the  brave  men  of  Swell's  corps.  It,  however,  with  an 
exhibition  of  valour  never  surpassed,  continued  to  stand  at  bay.  It  kept 
up  a  most  destructive  fire,  strewing  the  field  with  dead  and  wounded.  But 
at  last  the  unequal  contest  was  terminated ;  Gen.  Ewell  was  captured,  and 
one  of  his  division  commanders,  G.  W.  C.  Lee ;  and  the  greater  portion 
of  the  command  sun-en dered,  but  not  until  they  had  given  evidences  of  a 
spirit  which  the  enemy  had  scarcely  looked  for  in  so  small  a  portion  of  a 
fugitive  army. 

The  retreat  of  what  remained  of  the  Confederate  army  was  continued, 
until  at  last  it  had  crossed  the  Appomattox  and  reached  Farmville.  Ex 
cept  Longstreet's  command,  it  crossed  the  river  during  the  night ;  Gor 
don's  troops  at  the  High  Bridge  going  into  bivouac  on  the  opposite  side, 
while  Longstreet  occupied  the  hills  on  the  river  near  the  town  of  Farmville. 
Here,  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  the  haversacks  of  many  of  the  men  were 
replenished  for  the  first  time  since  leaving  Petersburg.  It  is  said  of  these 
devoted  men  who  yet  clung  to  the  great  Confederate  commander,  that 
their  suffering  from  the  pangs  of  hunger  "  has  not  been  approached  in  the 
military  annals  of  the  last  fifty  years." 

At  early  dawn  the  enemy  made  an  attack  on  Gordon  at  the  bridge,  and 
on  Longstreet  on  the  hills  near  Farmville.  Firing  the  bridge,  and  leaving 
one  brigade  to  check  the  enemy,  the  remainder  of  Gordon's  corps  took  the 
railroad  track  to  Farmville,  leaving  the  briga  :;arply.  On 

the  high  hills  on  the  upper  side  of  the  Appomattox,  just  beyond  Farm 
ville,  it  appeared  as  if  the  Confederates  intended  to  give  battle.  The  artil 
lery  was  placed  in  position,  and  active  skirmishing  had  commenced  i 
the  Federal  advance,  which  had  crossed  the  river  on  the  heels  of  the  re 
treating  rear-guard  of  the  Confederates.  The  lines  of  infantry  were  formed 
45 


706  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

in  order  of  battle ;  but  it  was  only  done  to  cover  the  movement  of  the 
wagons,  as  the  army  took  up  its  line  of  retreat.  That  portion  of  the  Fed 
eral  army  which  had  crossed  the  river  dashed  on  recklessly,  and  seemed  to 
think  they  had  only  a  demoralized  mob  to  contend  with.  They  drove  the 
Confederate  wagon  guard  in  and  cut  the  train  in  two,  on  the  road  the 
wagons  were  traversing  ;  but  Grimes'  division  advanced  at  a  double-quick, 
attacked  and  charged  the  assailants,  routed  them,  and  captured  two  hun 
dred  prisoners. 

During  all  day  of  the  7th,  the  Confederate  army  marched  without 
molestation  in  the  rear.  Occasionally  the  enemy's  cavalry  would  dash  in  on 
a  portion  of  their  wagon  train,  kill  a  few  horses,  frighten  drivers  and  quar 
termasters,  and  then  scamper  away  ;  but  no  serious  impediment  was  offered 
to  the  march.  The  whole  army  had  left  the  main  road  and  were  travers 
ing  dense  thickets  of  oak  and  pine,  through  which  ran  rarely  used  and 
broken  roads.  On  the  8th  they  continued  to  march  steadily,  and  in  the 
middle  of  the  day  struck  a  better  road,  and  made  rapid  progress  until 
dark,  when  the  rear  was  within  four  miles  of  Appomattox  Court-house. 
The  head  of  the  column  had  reached  the  Court-house.  Lynchburg  was 
but  twenty-four  miles  off.  Not  a  gun  had  been  fired  during  the  day. 
The  troops  went  into  camp  without  restraint.  No  enemy  seemed  near. 
The  bands  of  the  divisions  enlivened  the  departing  hours  of  day  with  mar 
tial  music.  The  weary  private  soldiers  prepared  to  sleep  with  a  strange 
sense  of  relief  and  contentment. 

But  in  this  night  of  apparent  security  the  general  officers  were  consult 
ing  together  ;  and  their  looks  plainly  indicated  intense  anxiety.  Soon  the 
rumble  of  distant  cannon  sounded  in  front.  Presently  came  the  ominous 
order  for  all  the  extra  artillery  to  be  cut  down  and  the  commands  dis 
banded.  The  true  situation  was  soon  apparent  to  Gen.  Lee.  In  pressing 
for  Lynchburg  he  had  to  put  himself  in  a  dangerous  predicament ;  he  was 
011  a  strip  of  land  not  more  than  seven  or  eight  miles  broad  between  the 
James  and  Appomattox  rivers  ;  and  the  firing  in  front  indicated  that  the 
outlet  towards  Lynchburg  was  closed  by  Sheridan,  while  Meade  in  the 
rear,  and  Ord  south  of  the  Court-house  completed  the  environment  and 
put  Lee  in  a  position  from  which  it  was  impossible  to  extricate  his  army 
without  a  battle,  which  it  was  no  longer  capable  of  fighting. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  19th,  Gordon's  corps  was  ordered  to  move 
to  the  front  through  Apomattox  Court-house,  passing  the  entire  wagon 
and  artillery  train  of  the  army.  Lee's  army  had  at  this  time  dwindled 
down  to  eight  thousand  men  with  muskets  in  their  hands.  Gordon  was 
thrown  out  with  about  two  thousand  men  in  front ;  the  wreck  of  Long- 
street's  command  covered  the  rear ;  and  between  these  thin  lines  was  the 
remnant  of  the  wagon  train,  and  clinging  to  these  thousands  of  unarmed 
stragglers,  many  of  them  famishing  and  too  weak  to  carry  their  muskets. 


COERESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  GENS.  GRANT  AND  LEE.         707 

Such  was  the  condition  and  disposition  of  Gen.  Lee's  forces  when  Gordon 
attempted  the  last  desperate  task  of  cutting  his  way  through  Sheridan's 
lines.  The  Confederate  cavalry  was  drawn  up  in  mass  in  the  village.  The 
fields,  gardens,  and  streets  were  strewn  with  troops  bivouacking  in  line  of 
battle.  In  the  early  light  of  morning  Gordon's  corps  marched  through 
and  to  the  west  of  the  village. 

After  reconnoitring,  it  was  discovered  that  the  enemy  in  front  was  dis 
mounted  cavalry  in  heavy  force.  Dispositions  were  made  for  attack,  and 
about  ten  o'clock  Gordon's  line  was  ordered  forward.  The  enemy's  cavalry 
was  easily  driven  back  ;  it  seemed  that  an  exit  would  be  secured,  until  it 
was  discovered  that  the  cavalry  was  falling  back  upon  large  masses  of  in 
fantry,  which  were  hastening  forward  and  just  forming  to  advance.  It 
was  the  turn  of  the  Confederates  to  fall  back.  Gordon  now  sent  word  to 
Gen.  Lee  that  the  enemy  was  driving  him  back.  Just  as  his  divisions  had 
formed  anew  to  resist  a  flank  movement  of  Sheridan,  while  the  skirmish 
ers  were  engaged,  while  the  Richmond  Howitzers  (who  had  fired  the  first 
gun  at  Bethel),  having  already  discharged  one  volley,  were  loading  for  an 
other,  a  flag  of  truce  appeared  upon  the  scene,  and  the  action  suddenly  and 
strangely  ceased. 

The  explanation  of  the  cessation  of  hostilities  was  soon  made  known. 
"While  the  pursuit  of  Lee's  army  by  Grant's  overwhelming  forces  was  still 
in  progress,  the  following  correspondence,  commenced  at  Farmville,  had 
taken  place  between  the  two  commanders,  terminated  by  Lee's  seeking  the 
final  interview,  when  he  received  the  message  referred  to  from  Gordon  : 


April  7,  1865. 

GEN.  R.  E.  LEE,  Commanding  C.  S.  A.  : 

General :  The  result  of  last  week  must  convince  you  of  the  hopelessness  of  further 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  this  struggle.  I  feel  that  it 
is  so,  and  regard  it  as  my  duty  to  shift  from  myself  the  responsibility  of  any  further  effu 
sion  of  blood,  by  asking  of  you  the  surrender  of  that  portion  of  the  Confederate  South 
ern  army,  known  as  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S,  GRANT, 

Lieutenant-General,  commanding  Armies  of  the  United  States. 


April  7,  1865. 

General :  I  have  received  your  note  of  this  day.  Though  not  entirely  of  the  opinion 
you  express  of  the  hopelessness  of  further  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  I  reciprocate  your  desire  to  avoid  useless  effusion  of  blood,  and  therefore,  be 
fore  considering  your  proposition,  ask  the  terms  you  will  offer  on  condition  of  its  sur 
render. 

R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

To  LIEVT.-GEN.  TJ.  S.  GHA.NT,  Commanding  Armies  of  the  United  States. 


708  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 


April  8,  1865. 

To  GEN.  B.  E.  LEE,  Commanding  C.  8.  A.  : 

General :  Your  note  of  last  evening,  in  reply  to  mine  of  the  same  date,  asking  the 
conditions  on  which  I  will  accept  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  is 
just  received. 

In  reply,  I  would  say,  that  peace  being  my  first  desire,  there  is  but  one  condition 
that  I  insist  upon,  viz. : 

That  the  men  surrendered  shall  be  disqualified  for  taking  up  arms  again  against  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  until  properly  exchanged. 

I  will  meet  you,  or  designate  officers  to  meet  any  officers  you  may  name  for  the  pur 
pose,  at  any  point  agreeable  to  you,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  definitely  the  terms 
upon  which  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  will  be  received. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General, 

Commanding  Armies  of  the  United  States. 


April  8, 1865. 

General :  I  received,  at  a  late  hour,  your  note  of  to-day  in  answer  to  mine  of  yester 
day. 

I  did  not  intend  to  propose  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  to 
ask  the  terms  of  your  proposition.  To  be  frank,  I  do  not  think  the  emergency  has 
arisen  to  call  for  the  surrender. 

But  as  the  restoration  of  peace  should  be  the  sole  object  of  all,  I  desire  to  know 
whether  your  proposals  would  tend  to  that  end. 

I  cannot,  therefore,  meet  you  with  a  view  to  surrender  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  ;  but  so  far  as  your  proposition  may  affect  the  Confederate  States  forces  under  my 
command  and  tend  to  the  restoration  of  peace,  I  should  be  pleased  to  meet  you  at  10 
A.  M.  to-morrow,  on  the  old  stage-road  to  Richmond,  between  the  picket-lines  of  the 
two  armies. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE,  General  C.  8.  A. 

To  LIEUT.-GEN.  GRANT,  Commanding  Armies  of  the  United  States. 


April  9,  1865. 

To  GEN.  R.  E.  LEE,  Commanding  C.  8.  A.  : 

General :  Your  note  of  yesterday  is  received.  As  I  have  no  authority  to  treat  on  the 
subject  of  peace,  the  meeting  proposed  for  10  A.  M.  to-day  could  lead  to  no  good.  I  will 
state,  however,  General,  that  I  am  equally  anxious  for  peace  with  yourself;  and  the 
whole  North  entertain  the  same  feeling.  The  terms  upon  which  peace  can  be  had  are 
well  understood.  By  the  South  laying  down  their  arms  they  will  hasten  that  most  de 
sirable  event,  save  thousands  of  human  Hyes,  and  hundreds  of  millions  of  property  not 
yet  destroyed. 


CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  GENS.  GRANT  AND  LEE.         709 

Sincerely  hoping  that  all  our  difficulties  may  be  settled  without  the  loss  of  another 
life,  I  subscribe  myself, 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  .servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General  United  States  Army. 


April  9, 18G5. 

General :  I  received  your  note  of  this  morning  on  the  picket-line,  whither  I  had 
come  to  meet  you  and  ascertain  definitely  what  terms  were  embraced  in  your  proposition 
of  yesterday  with  reference  to  the  surrender  of  this  army. 

I  now  request  an  interview  in  accordance  with  the  offer  contained  in  your  letter  of 
yesterday  SOT  that  purpose. 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE,  General. 

To  LIEUT.-GEN.  GRANT,  Commanding  Annies  of  the  United  States. 


April  9,  1865. 

GEN.  R.  E.  LEE,  Commanding  C.  8.  A. : 

Your  note  of  this  date  is  but  this  moment,  11.59  A.  M.,  received. 
In  consequence  of  my  having  passed  from  the  Richmond  and  Lynchburg  road  to 
the  Farmville  and  Lynchburg  road,  I  am,  at  this  writing,  about  four  miles  west  of 
Walter's  Church,  and  will  push  forward  to  the  front  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  you. 

Notice  sent  to  me  on  this  road  where  you  wish  the  interview  to  take  place,  will  meet 
me. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 


APPOMATTOX  COURT-HOUSE,  April  9,  1865. 

GEN.  R.  E.  LEE,  Commanding  C.  S.  A. : 

In  accordance  with  the  substance  of  my  letter  to  you  of  the  8th  inst.,  I  propose  to 
receive  the  surrender  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  the  following  terms,  to  wit : 

Rolls  of  all  the  officers  and  men  to  be  made  in  duplicate,  one  copy  to  be  given  to  an 
officer  designated  by  me,  the  other  to  be  retained  by  such  officers  as  you  may  designate. 

The  officers  to  give  their  individual  parole  not  to  take  arms  against  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  until  properly  exchanged ;  and  each  company  or  regimental  com 
mander  to  sign  a  like  parole  for  the  men  of  their  commands. 

The  arms,  artillery,  and  public  property  to  be  parked  and  stacked,  and  turned  over 
to  the  officers  appointed  by  me  to  receive  them. 

This  will  not  embrace  the  side-arms  of  the  officers,  nor  their  private   horses  or 


This  done,  each  officer  and  man  will  ~be  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  not  to  le  dis 
turbed  ~by  United  States  authority,  so  long  as  they  observe  their  parole  and  the  laws  in 
force  where  they  may  reside. 

Very  respectfully, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 


710  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

HEADaUARTERS  ARMY   OF  NORTHERN   VIRGINIA,  April  9,  186& 

LIEUT.-GEN.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Commanding  U.  S.  A.  : 

General :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  this  date,  containing  the  terms  of  surrender 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  as  proposed  by  you.  As  they  are  susbtantially  the 
same  as  those  expressed  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  inst.,  they  are  accepted.  I  will  proceed 
to  designate  the  proper  officers  to  carry  the  stipulations  into  effect. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

K.  E.  LEE,  General 

The  interview  of  the  two  commanders  took  place  at  the  house  of  Mr. 
Wilmer  McLean.  It  was  a  great  occasion  ;  thrilling  and  wonderful  mem 
ories  must  have  crowded  upon  these  two  men  as  they  stood  face  to  face. 
But  the  interview  was  very  simple  ;  there  was  no  theatrical  circumstance ; 
there  was  not  a  sentimental  expression  in  what  was  said.  No  man  ab 
horred  anything  melo-dramatic  more  than  Gen.  Lee.  His  manner  with 
Grant  bordered  on  taciturnity,  but  not  so  as  to  exhibit  temper  or  mortifica 
tion.  "  His  demeanour,"  writes  a  Federal  observer  of  the  memorable 
scene,  "  was  that  of  a  thoroughly  possessed  gentleman  who  had  a  very  dis 
agreeable  duty  to  perform,  but  was  determined  to  get  through  it  as  well 
and  as  soon  as  he  could." 

He  had  come  to  the  interview  attended  only  by  Col.  Marshall,  one  of 
his  aides.  "With  courteous  greeting  the  two  commanders  proceeded  at 
once  and  simply  to  business;  some  explanations  were  required  by  Gen. 
Lee  as  to  the  meaning  of  certain  phrases  in  the  terms  of  surrender ;  and 
without  other  question  or  remark  the  act  that  was  to  put  out  of  existence 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  reduced  to  form  at  a  deal  table. 

When  Gen.  Lee  had  been  seen  riding  to  the  rear,  the  rumour  of  sur 
render  flew  like  wild-fire  through  the  Confederates.  It  might  have  been 
supposed  that  the  worn  and  battered  troops  who  watched  on  their  arms 
for  the  result  of  the  conference  at  McLean's  house,  would  have  been  glad 
to  welcome  a  termination  of  their  sufferings,  come  in  what  form  it  might ; 
that  they  would  feel  a  certan  joy  when  a  long  agony  was  over.  But  such 
was  not  the  display,  when  about  half  past  three  o'clock  in  the  evening 
Gen.  Lee  was  seen  thoughtfully  riding  back  to  his  headquarters,  and  it 
was  known  that  the  surrender  had  been  completed.  His  leading  officers 
were  assembled,  anticipating  the  result  and  awaiting  his  return.  "When 
the  terms  of  surrender  were  announced,  they  approached  their  great  com 
mander  in  turn,  and  shook  hands,  expressing  satisfaction  at  his  course,  and 
regret  at  parting.  The  lines  of  battle  that  had  awaited  a  possible  renewal 
of  the  combat,  were  broken  ;  but  there  were  no  huzzas,  no  scattering,  not 
an  indecent  shout ;  but  the  men  broke  ranks  to  rush  up  to  their  beloved 


SCENE  OF  GEN.  LEE5S  SUEEENDEE.  711 

commander,  struggling  with  each  other  to  wring  him  once  more  by  the 
hand.  It  was  a  most  affecting  scene.  Kough  and  rugged  men,  familiar 
with  hardship,  danger,  and  death  in  a  thousand  shapes,  had  tears  in  their 
eyes,  and  choked  with  emotion  as  they  thronged  around  their  old  chieftain, 
littering  words  to  lighten  his  burden  and  mitigate  his  pain.  He  had  so 
often  himself  uttered  such  words  to  them,  when  they  bled  on  the  battle 
field  or  toiled  on  the  weary  march.  !Nbw  simple  as  ever,  very  serious  but 
collected,  with  the  marks  of  a  Roman  manhood  yet  about  him,  he  turned 
to  his  soldiers,  not  to  insult  the  occasion  with  a  harangue  or  explanations 
or  regrets,  but  merely  to  say,  as  the  signs  of  tearless  suffering  gathered  in 
his  face  :  "  Men,  we  have  fought  through  the  war  together  ;  and  I  have 
done  the  best  I  could  for  you." 

The  day  after  the  surrender  Gen.  Lee  took  formal  leave  of  his  army  in 
the  following  plain  and  manly  address  : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  NORTHERN  VIROINIA,  April  10,  1865. 

After  four  years  of  arduous  service,  marked  by  unsurpassed  courage  and  fortitude, 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  has  been  compelled  to  yield  to  overwhelming  numbers 
and  resources. 

I  need  not  tell  the  survivors  of  so  many  hard-fought  battles,  who  have  remained 
steadfast  to  the  last,  that  I  have  consented  to  this  result  from  no  distrust  of  them ;  but 
feeling  that  valour  and  devotion  could  accomplish  nothing  that  could  compensate  for 
the  loss  that  would  have  attended  the  continuation  of  the  contest,  I  have  determined  to 
avoid  the  useless  sacrifice  of  those  whose  past  services  have  endeared  them  to  their 
countrymen. 

By  the  terms  of  agreement,  officers  and  men  can  return  to  their  homes,  and  remain 
there  until  exchanged. 

You  will  take  with  you  the  satisfaction  that  proceeds  from  the  consciousness  of  duty 
faithfully  performed ;  and  I  earnestly  pray  that  a  merciful  God  will  extend  to  you  His 
blessing  and  protection. 

With  an  unceasing  admiration  of  your  constancy  and  devotion  to  your  country,  and 
a  grateful  remembrance  of  your  kind  and  generous  consideration  of  myself,  I  bid  you  an 
affectionate  farewell. 

B.  E.  LEE,  General. 

On  the  12th  April,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  its  last  parade. 
On  that  day,  in  pursuance  of  an  arrangement  of  the  commissioners  of  sur 
render,  the  troops  marched  by  divisions  to  a  spot  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Appomattox  Court-house,  where  they  stacked  arms  and  deposited  accou 
trements.  About  seventy-five  hundred  men  laid  down  their  arms ;  but 
the  capitulation  included  in  addition  some  eighteen  thousand  stragglers 
who  were  unarmed,  and  who  came  up  to  claim  the  benefit  of  surrender  and 
accept  paroles.  With  remarkable  delicacy,  Gen.  Grant  was  not  present  at 
the  ceremony,  and  had  not  been  visiole  since  his  interview  of  the  9th  with 
Gen.  Lee. 


712  THE   LOST   CAUSE.  :» 

Indeed,  this  Federal  commander  had,  in  the  closing  scenes  of  the  con 
test,  behaved  with  a  magnanimity  and  decorum  that  must  ever  be  remem 
bered  to  his  credit  even  by  those  who  disputed  his  reputation  in  other 
respects,  and  denied  his  claims  to  great  generalship.  He  had  with  re 
markable  facility  accorded  honourable  and  liberal  terms  to  the  vanquished 
army.  He  did  nothing  to  dramatize  the  surrender ;  he  made  no  triumphal 
entry  into  Richmond  ;  he  avoided  all  those  displays  of  triumph  so  dear  to 
the  Northern  heart ;  he  spared  everything  that  might  wound  the  feel 
ings  or  imply  the  humiliation  of  a  vanquished  foe.  There  were  no 
indecent  exultations ;  no  "  sensations  ^'  no  shows ;  he  received  the  sur 
render  of  his  adversary  with  every  courteous  recognition  due  an  honour 
able  enemy,  and  conducted  the  closing  scenes  with  as  much  simplicity  as 
possible. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  April,  Gen.  Lee,  attended  by  five  mem 
bers  of  his  staff,  rode  into  Richmond,  and  drew  rein  at  his  house  on 
Franklin  street.  He  passed  on  rapidly,  as  if  to  escape  notice.;  black 
ened  ruins  threw  their  shadows  across  the  way ;  strange  faces  were 
on  the  streets  ;  but  it  was  impossible  for  his  commanding  figure  to 
pass  without  the  challenge  of  curiosity,  and  there  presently  ran 
along  the  side-walks  the  shout,  "  It's  Gen.  Lee."  Instantly  there 
was  a  wild  chase  after  the  party  of  horsemen.  The  General  simply 
raised  his  hat  as  he  rode  rapidly  on ;  dismounting,  he  shook  hands 
with  some  that  pressed  upon  him ;  he  showed  an  anxiety  to  enter  his 
house,  and  in  a  few  moments  he  had  passed  into  the  fondly-desired  retire 
ment  of  his  simple  home. 

In  Washington  the  surrender  of  Gen.  Lee's  army  was  taken  as  the 
close  of  the  war.  No  sooner  was  it  known  than  Secretary  Stanton  imme 
diately  telegraphed  an  order  to  the  headquarters  of  every  army  and  depart 
ment,  and  to  every  fort  and  arsenal  in  the  United  States,  to  fire  a  salute 
of  two  hundred  guns  in  celebration  of  the  event.  To  Grant  he  despatched  : 
"  Thanks  be  to  Almighty  God  for  the  great  victory  with  which  He  has  this 
day  crowned  you  and  the  gallant  armies  under  your  command.  The 
thanks  of  this  department,  and  of  the  Government,  and  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States — their  reverence  and  honour  have  been  deserved — will 
be  rendered  to  you  and  the  brave  and  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  of  your 
army  for  all  time." 

A  vast  concourse  of  people  assembled  at  the  President's  house  to  make 
the  popular  congratulations  to  Mr.  Lincoln.  There  was  music,  illumina 
tions  ;  the  ground  was  ablaze  with  triumphal  lights  ;  and  the  vast  crowd 
called  impatiently  for  a  response  from  the  President.  It  was  a  grand  his 
torical  occasion ;  one  of  great  thoughts  and  imposing  circumstances ;  one 
for  noble  and  memorable  utterances.  The  President  of  the  United  States 
came  forward,  and  called  for  the  "  rebel "  song  of  "  Dixie."  He  said  : 


LAST  JOKE   OF   PRESIDENT  LINCOLN.  713 

"  I  have  always  thought  that  c  Dixie '  was  one  of  the  best  songs  I  ever 
heard.  Our  adversaries  over  the  way,  I  know,  have  attempted  to  appro 
priate  it ;  but  I  insist  that  on  yesterday  we  fairly  captured  it.  I  referred 
the  question  to  the  attorney-general,  and  he  gave  it  as  his  legal  opinion 
that  it  is  now  our  property.  (Laughter  and  loud  applause.)  I  now  ask 
the  band  to  give  us  a  good  turn  upon  it."  It  was  the  characteristic  speech 
and  last  joke  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 


CHAPTER    XLIII. 

GEN.  LEE'S  SURRENDER  THE  DECISIVE  EVENT  OF  THE  WAR. — STRENGTH  AND  SITUATION  OF  THE 
CONFEDERATE  FORCES    SOUTH    OF    VIRGINIA. — SURRENDER    OF    JOHNSTON'S    ARMY. — GEN. 

JOHNSTON'S  LINE  OF  RETREAT  FROM  RALEIGH. — SHERMAN'S  PURSUIT. — THE  CONFERENCE 

AT  DURHAM  STATION. — SHERMAN'S  u  MEMORANDUM  OR  BASIS  OF  AGREEMENT." HE  AT 
TEMPTS  AN  EXTRAORDINARY  GAME  OF  HYPOCRISY. — HIS  ASTOUNDING  CONFESSIONS  AT 

WASHINGTON. CURIOUS    SPEECH    AT    A    SOLDIERS'    FESTIVAL. — SHERMAN'S    CONVENTION 

WITH  JOHNSTON  REPUDIATED  AT  WASHINGTON. — JOHNSTON  COMPELLED  TO  SURRENDER 
ON  THE  TERMS  GIVEN  LEE. — REVIEW  OF  THE  SECTIONS  OF  CONFEDERATE  DEFENCE. — OPER 
ATIONS  IN  THE  SOUTHWEST. — CAPTURE  OF  MOBILE. — WILSON'S  EXPEDITION. THE  EXPE 
DITION  OF  GEN.  CANBY  AGAINST  MOBILE  AND  CENTRAL  ALABAMA. — STATEMENTS  OF  HIS 

FORCE. — THE  WORKS  AND   GARRISON  OF  MOBILE. — SIEGE  OF  SPANISH  FORT. GEN.  MAURY 

ORDERS  ITS  EVACUATION. CAPTURE  OF  FORT  BLAKELY. — EVACUATION  OF  MOBILE. — HOW 

WILSON'S  CAVALRY  WAS  TO  CO-OPERATE  WITH  CANBY. — DISPOSITION    OF    THE    FORCES    OF 

GENS.  FORREST  AND  RODDY. CAPTURE    OF    SELMA,  MONTGOMERY    AND    COLUMBUS. — THE 

HEROIC  EPISODE  OF  WEST  POINT. — WILSON  ADVANCES  UPON  MACON. — NEW8  OF  SHERMAN'S 
TRUCE. — SURRENDER  OF  ALL  THE  CONFEDERATE  FORCES  IN  ALABAMA,  MISSISSIPPI  AND 
EAST  LOUISIANA. — THE  TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. — SURRENDER  OF  GEN.  SMITH. — HOPE  OF  PRO 
LONGING  THE  WAR  WEST  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  RIVER. — THE  LAST  CALCULATION  OF  "  EURO 
PEAN  RECOGNITION." — SURRENDER  OF  THE  TRANS-MISSISSIPPI  ARMY  TO  GEN.  CANBY. — 
THE  DOWNFALL  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY  COMPLETE.-SOME  REFLECTIONS  ON  THE  TERMINA 
TION  OF  THE  WAR. — ITS  FLAT  CONCLUSION. — NO  GRAND  CATASTROPHE. — EXPLANATION 
OF  THIS. — THEORIES,  TO  ACCOUNT  FOR  THE  FAILURE  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY. — THE  VUL 
GAR  ARGUMENT  OF  THE  NUMERICAL  SUPERIOURITY  OF  THE  NORTH. — HOW  THIS  ARGUMENT 
IS  DEFECTIVE. — THE  TRUE  BASIS  OF  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE  MILITARY  FORCES  OF 
NORTH  AND  SOUTH. — THE  NUMERICAL  INEQUALITY  NOT  SUFFICIENT  TO  DETERMINE  THE 
WAR  AGAINST  THE  SOUTH. — INCONSISTENCY  OF  THIS  ARGUMENT  ON  THE  PART  OF  SOUTHERN 
LEADERS. — THE  RELATION  OF  NUMBERS  TO  OTHER  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  CONTEST. — WHAT 
ADVANTAGES  THE  SOUTH  HAD  IN  THE  EXTENT  AND  FEATURES  OF  HER  TERRITORY. — GEN 
ERAL  CONCLUSION,  AND  AN  IMPORTANT  REFLECTION  CONSEQUENT  UPON  IT. 

THE  surrender  of  Gen.  Lee  was  plainly  the  decisive  event  of  the  war, 
and  drew  after  it  rapid  and  important  consequences.  The  situation  in  the 
Atlantic  States  south  of  Virginia,  was  weak ;  and  that  part  of  the  Con 
federacy  had  been  for  some  time  thoroughly  demoralized.  The  limits  of 
Johnston's  command  included  North  and  South  Carolina,  Georgia  and 


GEN.L 


SURRENDER   OF   JOHNSTON'S   ARMY.  715 

Florida  ;  and  the  fate  of  this  extensive  military  territory  depended  upon 
an  army  whose  effective  force  was  less  than  twenty  thousand  men.  Gen. 
Johnston's  statement  of  the  force  at  his  command  in  the  vicinity  of 
Raleigh,  was  18,578  total,  infantry  and  artillery  present  for  duty,  of  which 
not  more  than  14,179  were  effective,  with  a  cavalry  force  little  over  five 
thousand.  Florida  was  destitute  of  troops,  and  South  Carolina  was  pretty 
much  in  the  condition  of  a  conquered  province,  there  being  no  known 
Confederate  force  in  it  beyond  a  division  of  cavalry  less  than  one  thou 
sand.  Gen.  Johnston  found  himself  by  the  disaster  in  Virginia,  opposed 
to  a  combined  force  of  alarming  magnitude  ;  there  was  great  difficulty  in 
supplying  his  troops ;  the  enemy  had  already  captured  all  workshops  with 
in  the  Confederacy  for  the  preparation  of  ammunition  and  repairing  of 
arms ;  and  thus  embarrassed,  crippled  and  disheartened,  what  was  ac 
counted  in  point  of  importance  the  second  army  of  the  Confederacy,  num 
bering  on  its  rolls  more  than  seventy  thousand  men,  and  yet  reduced  to 
less  than  one-third  of  this  number  by  desertions  and  "  absenteeism,"  aban 
doned  the  hope  of  successful  war,  and  prepared  to  surrender. 


On  the  night  of  the  13th  April,  Sherman's  army  had  halted  some  four 
teen  miles  from  Raleigh,  when  it  received  the  news  of  the  surrender  of 
Lee.  The  next  day  it  occupied  Raleigh  ;  Gen.  Johnston  having  taken  up 
a  line  of  retreat  by  the  railroad  running  by  Hillsboro,  Greensboro,  Salis 
bury  and  Charlotte.  Sherman  commenced  pursuit  by  crossing  the  curve 
of  that  road  in  the  direction  of  Ashboro,  and  Charlotte ;  and  after  the  head 
of  his  column  had  crossed  the  Cape  Fear  River  at  Avens  Ferry,  he  re 
ceived  a  communication  from  Gen.  Johnston  on  the  15th  April,  asking  if 
some  arrangement  could  not  be  effected,  which  should  prevent  the  further 
useless  effusion  of  blood.  It  was  eventually  arranged  that  a  personal  in 
terview  should  take  place  between  the  two  commanders  at  a  designated 
point ;  and  on  the  18th  April,  they  met  at  a  farm-house,  five  miles  from 
Durham  Station,  under  a  flag  of  truce.  In  proposing  a  surrender,  Gen. 
Johnston  wanted  some  more  general  concessions  than  had  been  made  in 
the  case  of  Gen  Lee  ;  and  the  result  was  a  military  convention,  which  Gen. 
Johnston  declared  that  he  signed  "  to  spare  the  blood  of  his  gallant  little 
army,  to  prevent  further  suffering  of  the  people  by  the  devastation  and 
ruin  inevitable  from  the  marches  of  invading  armies,  and  to  avoid  the  crime 
of  waging  a  hopeless  war."  This  document,  which  we  place  here,  was  cer 
tainly  an  extraordinary  ona  on  Sherman's  part. 


716  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

MEMORANDUM,  on  BASIS  OF  AGREEMENT,  made  this  eighteenth  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1865, 
near  Durham  Station,  in  the  State  of  North  Carolina,  "by  and  'between  Gen.  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  commanding  Confederate  Army,  and  Maj.-Gen.  W.  T.  Sherman,  commanding 
Army  of  the  United  States,  in  North  Carolina,  loth  leing  present : 

1.  The  contending  armies  now  in  the  field  to  maintain  the  status  quo,  until  notice  is 
given  by  the  commanding  general  of  any  one  to  its  opponent,  and  reasonable  time,  say 
forty-eight  hours,  allowed. 

2.  The  Confederate  armies  now  in  existence  to  be  disbanded,  and  conducted  to 
their  several  State  capitals,  therein  to  deposit  their  arms  and  public  property  in  the 
State  arsenal,  and  each  officer  and  man  to  execute  and  file  an  agreement  to  cease  from 
acts  of  war,  and  to  abide  the  action  of  both  State  and  Federal  authorities.    The  num 
ber  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  to  be  reported  to*the  chief  of  ordnance  at  Washing 
ton  City,  subject  to  the  future  action  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the 
meantime  to  be  used  solely  to  maintain  peace  and  order  within  the  borders  of  the  States 
respectively. 

3.  The  recognition  by  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  of  the  several  State 
governments,  on  their  officers  and  legislatures  taking  the  oath  prescribed  by  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  where  conflicting  State  governments  have  resulted 
from  the  war,  the  legitimacy  of  all  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States. 

4.  The  re-establishment  of  all  Federal  courts  in  the  several  States,  with  powers  as 
defined  by  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  Congress. 

5.  The  people  and  inhabitants  of  all  these  States  to  be  guarantied,  so  far  as  the 
Executive  can,  their  political  rights  and  franchises,  as  well  as  their  rights  of  person 
and  property,  as  defined  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  States 
respectively. 

6.  The  Executive  authority  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  not  to  disturb 
any  of  the  people  by  reason  of  the  late  war,  so  long  as  they  live  in  peace  and  quiet  and 
abstain  from  acts  of  armed  hostility,  and  obey  the  laws  in  existence  at  the  place  of  their 
residence. 

7.  In  general  terms,  the  war  to  cease — a  general  amnesty,  so  far  as  the  Executive  of 
the  United  States  can  command,  on  the  condition  of  the  disbandment  of  the  Confed 
erate  armies,  distribution  of  the  arms,  and  the  resumption  of  peaceable  pursuits  by  the 
officers  and  men  hitherto  composing  said  armies. 

Not  being  duly  empowered  by  our  respective  principals  to  fulfil  these  terms,  we 
individually  and  officially  pledge  ourselves  to  promptly  obtain  an  answer  thereto,  and 
to  carry  out  the  above  programme. 

"W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General, 

Commanding  Army  T7.  S.  in  N.  C. 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General, 

Commanding  C.  S.  A.  in  N.  C. 

There  was  much  surprise  on  the  part  of  the'  Southern  people,  that  a 
man  of  Sherman's  furious  antecedents  and  incendiary  record  in  the  war, 
should  exhibit  such  a  spirit  of  liberality  as  contained  in  the  above  paper. 
But  farther  developments  explained  the  apparent  contradiction,  and 
showed  that  Sherman  intended  the  paper  only  as  a  snare ;  that  he  was 
prepared  to  violate  its  spirit  as  soon  as  it  was  signed ;  that  he  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  disregard  the  paroles  he  took,  and  to  refuse  to  protect 


HYPOCRISY   OF   GEN.    SHERMAN.  717 

them ;  and  that  he  was  performing  a  part  of  hypocrisy,  the  meanest  it  is 
possible  to  conceive.  A  few  weeks  after  the  conference  at  Durham 
Station,  this  man  had  the  astounding  hardihood  to  testify  as  follows 
before  a  committee  of  the  Congress  at  Washington :  "  It  then  occurred 
to  me  that  I  might  write  off  some  general  propositions,  meaning  little,  or 
'meaning  much,  according  to  the  construction  of  parties — what  I  would 
term  <  glittering  generalities ' — and  send  them  to  "Washington,  which 
I  could  do  in  four  days.  I  therefore  drew  up  the  Memorandum  (which 
has  been  published  to  the  world)  for  the  purpose  of  referring  it  to  the 
proper  Executive  authority  of  the  United  States,  and  enabling  him  to 
define  to  me  what  I  might  promise,  simply  to  cover  the  pride  of  the 
Southern  men,  who  thereby  became  subordinate  to  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  civil  and  military.  If  any  concessions  were  made  in  those  general 
terms,  they  were  made  because  I  then  believed,  and  now  believe,  they 
would  have  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  United  States  the  absolute 
control  of  every  Confederate  officer  and  soldier,  all  their  muster-rolls, 
and  all  their  arms.  1  never  designed  to  shelter  a  human  being  from  any 
liability  incurred  in  consequence  of  past  acts  to  the  civil  tribunals  of  our 
country,  and  I  do  not  believe  a  fair  and  manly  interpretation  of  my  terms 
can  so  construe  them,  for  the  words,  "  United  States  courts,"  "  United 
States  authorities,"  "  limitations  of  executive  power,"  occur  in  every  para 
graph.  And  if  they  seemingly  yield  terms  better  than  the  public  would 
desire  to  be  given  to  the  Southern  people,  if  studied  closely  and  well,  it 
will  le  found  that  there  is  an  absolute  submission  on  their  part  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  either  through  its  executive,  legislative, 
or  judicial  authorities." 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  find  terms,  within  the  decent  vocabulary  of 
history,  to  characterize  the  effrontery  and  self-complacency  of  this  con 
fession  of  a  game  of  hypocrisy  with  a  conquered  honorable  adversary, 
surrendering  his  arms  with  full  faith  in  the  promises  of  the  conqueror ! 
But  even  this  record  of  double-dealing  was  to  be  surpassed.  The  man 
who  affected  so  much  generosity  at  Durham  Station,  and  signed  the  name 
of  "  W.  T.  Sherman,  Major-General,  &c. "  to  the  Memorandum  quoted 
above,  took  occcasion,  after  the  surrender  of  Lee  and  Johnston,  to  make 
the  following  speech  at  a  soldiers'  festival  in  the  State  of  Ohio  : — 

"  When  the  rebels  ventured  their  all  in  their  efforts  to  destroy  our  Government,  they 
pledged  their  lives,  their  fortunes,  and  their  sacred  honours  to  their  cause.  The 
Government  accepted  their  wager  of  battle.  Hence,  when  we  conquered,  we,  ~by  conquest, 
gained  all  they  had — their  property  became  ours  by  conquest.  Thus  they  lost  their  slaves, 
their  mules,  their  horses,  their  cotton,  their  all ;  and  even  their  lives  and  personal  liberty, 
thrown  by  them  into  the  issue,  were  theirs  only  by  our  forbearance  and  clemency.  So, 
soldiers,  when  we  marched  through  and  conquered  the  country  of  the  rebels,  we  lecame 
owners  of  all  they  had,  and  I  don't  want  you  to  be  troubled  in  your  consciences  for 


718  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

taking,  while  on  our  great  march,  the  property  of  conquered  rebels.  They  forfeited 
their  rights  to  it,  and  I,  being  agent  for  the  Government  to  which  I  belonged,  gave  you 
authority  to  keep  all  the  quartermasters  couldn't  take  possession  of  or  didn't  want. 

Such  an  example  of  astounding  inconsistency,  such  a  record  of  un 
blushing  hypocrisy  no  public  man  could  stand  against  for  a  day,  except 
in  that  peculiar  community  of  the  North,  where  demagogueism  and  time- 
service  are  fair  games,  and  "  the  smart  man  "  gets  the  plaudits  of  the 
multitude,  no  matter  in  what  line  of  conduct  he  asserts  his  ingenuity. 

It  may  well  be  imagined  that  the  truce  of  Durham  Station  was  dis 
regarded  at  Washington,  and  that  no  time  was  lost  there  in  repudiating 
the  propositions  contained  in  Sherman's  basis  of  agreement,  which,  in  the 
extravagant  language  of  that  amateur  diplomatist,  was  to  restore  "  peace 
to  the  banks  of  the  Kio  Grande."  Of  course,  no  plan  could  be  entertained 
at  "Washington  that  substituted  the  simple  idea  of  a  restored  Union  for 
that  of  subjugation.  The  Federal  Government,  as  is  already  apparent  in 
these  pages,  was  not  likely  to  be  satisfied  with  anything  short  of  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery  in  the  South,  the  extinction  of  the  State  governments, 
or  their  reduction  to  provisional  establishments,  and  the  programme  ol 
a  general  confiscation  of  property.  Sherman  was  censured  and  denounced 
in  a  way  that  shook  his  factitious  military  reputation  ;  and  it  was  said  to 
be  the  madness  of  generosity  to  abolish  the  confiscation  laws,  and  relieve 
"  rebels  "  from  all  pains  and  penalties  for  their  crimes.  It  was  at  once 
telegraphed  from  Washington  throughout  the  country,  that  Sherman's 
truce  was  disregarded,  and  that  Grant  would  go  to  North  Carolina  to 
compel  Johnston's  surrender  on  the  same  terms  as  Gen.  Lee  had  accepted. 
On  this  basis,  the  surrender  was  eventually  made ;  but  Gen.  Grant  was 
generous  enough  to  forbear  taking  control  of  Sherman's  army,  contenting 
himself  with  prompting  that  commander  to  what  the  Washington  Gov 
ernment  had  declared  should  be  the  text  of  the  negotiations. 

In  following  the  logical  chain  of  consequences  of  Gen.  Lee's  surrender, 
we  are  led  to  notice  how  each  section  of  the  Confederate  defences  ga?e 
way  with  this  event.  We  have  already  seen  how  the  cordon  of  the 
Atlantic  States  fell  with  Johnston's  surrender  ;  and  we  shall  now  see  how 
the  system  of  Confederate  defence  fell  in  the  Southwest ;  and  how,  in  a 
little  time  thereafter,  the  department  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  was  pros 
trated,  completing  the  downfall  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 


OPERATIONS  IN   THE    SOUTHWEST— CAPTURE  OF   MOBILE — WILSON'S   EXPEDITION. 

As  part  of  the  general  design  of  the  Federal  arms  in  1865,  a  move 
ment  was  prepared  early  in  that  year  against  the  city  of  Mobile  and  the 


OPERATIONS   IN   THE   SOUTH-WEST.  719 

interiour  of  Alabama.  When  Hood's  ill-fated  army  was  beaten  and  driven 
across  the  Tennessee  River,  the  troops  which  Gen.  Canby  had  sent  to  aid 
Thomas  were  returned,  and,  being  heavily  reinforced,  prepared  to  under 
take,  with  assured  success,  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Mobile — an  enterprise 
which  had  not  yet  been  ventured  upon,  unless  very  remotely,  by  any 
Federal  army. 

The  works  of  Mobile  were  very  strong,  and  the  supplies  of  food  were 
abundant  for  a  siege.  The  heavy  ordnance  was  excellent  and  well  dis 
posed.  But  the  garrison  was  few  in  number,  and  the  supply  of  ammu 
nition  was  small.  Other  important  interests  of  the  Confederacy  would 
admit  of  no  more  troops,  nor  of  more  ammunition  being  placed  in  Mobile. 

A  large  Federal  army  was  soon  collected  on  the  waters  near  Mobile, 
with  a  very  great  naval  force  and  a  fleet  of  transports  adequate  to  all  the 
requirements  of  so  great  an  expedition.  Early  in  March,  the  preparations 
for  attack  seemed  complete.  But  the  weather  was  bad  and  unfavourable 
to  operations.  On  the  25th  March,  Gen.  Canby  commenced  to  move  his 
forces  to  the  attack.  Two  corps  of  infantry,  respectively  commanded  by 
Gens.  Granger  and  A.  J.  Smith,  (the  whole  commanded  by  Canby  in  per 
son)  marched  from  their  camp  on  and  near  Fish  River,  against  the  posi 
tions  occupied  by  Gen  Maury  at  Spanish  Fort  and  Blakely. 

The  same  day,  a  corps  of  infantry,  with  a  strong  force  of  cavalry,  moved, 
under  command  of  Gen.  Steele,  from  Pensacola  towards  Salem,  via  Pol 
lard.  The  whole  of  Canby 's  forces  now  in  motion  may  be  estimated  at 
near  sixty  thousand  effectives,  being  three  corps  of  infantry,  and  about  six 
thousand  cavalry. 

The  whole  artillery  and  infantry  effective  force  holding  Mobile,  under 
Gen.  Maury's  command,  numbered  less  than  eight  thousand.  His  cavalry 
numbered  less  than  fifteen  hundred,  and  were  not  available  in  the  siege 
operations. 

On  the  26th  March,  Canby  appeared  in  heavy  force  before  Spanish 
Fort,  and  commmenced  its  siege.  The  same  day,  he  threw  a  division  as  if 
against  Fort  Blakely,  but  did  not  yet  take  position  for  its  siege.  The 
position  of  Spanish  Fort  was  about  twelve  miles  from  Mobile,  on  the  east 
ern  shore  of  Appalachie  River,  about  two  and  a  half  miles  above  its  mouth. 
The  position  was  important  as  commanding  the  batteries,  Huger  and 
Tracey,  which  held  the  Appalachie  River.  The  fortifications  when  the 
siege  commenced,  consisted  of  a  battery  on  the  water  of  six  heavy  guns  and 
of  three  detached  redoubts  (open  in  the  gorge)  connected  by  a  line  of  rifle- 
pits,  with  a  line  of  abattis  in  front ;  the  whole  sweeping  in  a  sort  of  semi 
circle,  and  resting  both  flanks  on  the  river.  The  whole  length  of  coast  was 
about  a  mile  and  a  half.  Gen.  Randall  Gibson,  of  Louisiana,  commanded 
the  forces  and  conducted  the  defence  of  Spanish  Fort.  The  garrison  of 
Spanish  Fort  was  made  up  of  the  veteran  Louisiana  brigade  of  Gibson, 


720  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

(five  hundred  muskets),  the  veteran  Alabama  brigade,  of  Holtzclaw, 
(seven  hundred  muskets),  and  a  brigade  of  Alabama  loys  under  Brig.-Gen. 
Thomas,  numbering  about  nine  hundred  effectives.  There  were  besides, 
several  companies  of  the  Twenty-second  Louisiana  heavy  artillery,  and 
three  companies  of  light  artillery.  Soon  after  the  siege  commenced,  the 
brigade  of  boy-reserves  was  exchanged  for  Eaton's  Texans  and  North  Car 
olinians,  which  numbered  only  about  five  hundred  muskets,  and  which 
made  the  whole  infantry  force  about  seventeen  hundred  muskets. 

The  enemy  pressed  his  siege  energetically,  but  cautiously.  The  defence 
was  vigourous,  bold  and  defiant.  The  little  garrison,  when  manning  their 
works,  as  they  did  incessantly  for  sixteen  days  and  nights,  stood  in  single 
rank,  and  several  feet  apart.  The  experience  of  defence  soon  showed  that 
many  things  were  lacking  ;  but  the  troops  vigourously  applied  themselves 
to  remedy  the  defects,  and  in  a  few  nights  had  constructed  traverses  and 
bomb-proofs,  and  chevaux-de-frise  and  rifle-pits,  which  proved  amply  suf 
ficient  for  all  their  subsequent  requirements.  By  energetic  digging,  the 
enemy  managed  to  advance  to  within  one  hundred  yards  of  portions  of  the 
main  line  of  defence.  He  continually  increased  his  batteries.  He  finally 
opened  at  close  range,  with  a  great  number  of  wooden  mortars  ;  and  al 
though,  in  the  early  part  of  the  operations,  the  skill  and  energy  of  Slocum'a 
and  Massenberg's,  and  Potter's  artillerists  could  always  silence  the 
enemy's  guns,  they  were  quite  ineffective  now,  and  towards  the  close,  every 
gun  of  the  Confederates  was  easily  silenced. 

On  the  8th  April,  Gen.  Maury,  after  conference  with  Gen.  Gibson,  de 
cided  that  the  defence  had  been  protracted  long  enough,  and  gave  orders 
to  commence  that  night  to  remove  the  surplus  material,  and  stores,  and 
men,  so  that  by  the  night  of  the  llth,  the  whole  force  should  be  with 
drawn.  Early  in  the  night  of  the  8th,  the  enemy  made  a  forward  move 
ment  on  Gibson's  left  flank  and  established  himself  in  such  a  position  as 
would  cut  off  further  communications  by  the  river  with  Mobile,  and  im 
peril  the  garrison.  In  pursuance  of  his  general  instructions,  Gibson  with 
drew  his  garrison  at  once,  and  evacuated  the  position  of  Spanish  Fort, 
necessarily  leaving  his  guns  and  stores  to  the  enemy.  The  garrison  was 
immediately  transferred  to  the  city  of  Mobile,  which,  it  was  judged,  would 
be  soon  attacked.  Col.  Patton  tansferred  his  headquarters  to  Battery 
Huger,  upon  which,  and  Tracey,  would  depend  the  defence  of  the  Appa- 
lachie  River. 

On  the  31st  March,  Steele,  who  had  marched  with  his  corps  from  Pen- 
sacola,  had  dispersed  the  cavalry  force,  which,  under  Clauton,  opposed  his 
advance  at  Pine  Barren  Creek,  and  occupied  Pollard  ;  and  now  sudden  y 
appeared  before  Blakely  and  commenced  to  besiege  it. 

Gen.  St.  John  Liddell,  of  Louisiana,  commanded  the  forces  at  Blakely, 
which  consisted  of  about  2,300  muskets,  and  three  or  four  companies  of 


CAPTURE   OF   MOBILE.  721 

artillery — in  all  about  2,600  effectives.  The  ground  was  better  for  defence 
than  at  Spanish  Fort.  The  works  were  better  placed  ;  and  it  was  believed 
that  the  enemy  would  make  but  slow  progress  in  its  siege.  The  garrison 
consisted  of  the  Missouri  brigade,  about  four  hundred  and  fifty  muskets, 
under  Gates  ;  a  Mississippi  brigade,  eight  hundred  muskets  ;  the  brigade 
of  Alabama  boy-reserves,  under  Thomas,  nine  hundred  muskets ;  a  regi 
ment  of  Mississippi  dismounted  light  artillerists  armed  with  muskets,  and 
several  companies  of  artillery. 

Very  little  progress  had  been  made  in  the  siege  of  Blakely,  when 
Spanish  Fort  was  evacuated  on  the  8th  April.  During  the  following  day, 
however,  Canby  was  sending  up  his  army  from  about  Spanish  Fort  to 
wards  Blakely ;  and  in  the  evening,  at  five  o'clock,  he  made  a  grand  as 
sault  with  a  column  of  twenty-five  thousand  infantry.  After  being  re 
pulsed  on  many  parts  of  the  line,  he  succeeded  in  overwhelming  the  little 
garrison,  and  capturing  it  with  the  position. 

Gen.  Maury  found  his  force  now  reduced  to  less  than  five  thousand  ef 
fective  infantry  and  artillery  ;  his  ammunition  almost  exhausted  ;  and  the 
city  of  Mobile,  with  its  population  of  more  than  thirty  thousand  non-com 
batants,  exposed  to  the  danger  of  assault  and  sack,  by  an  army  of  more 
than  fifty  thousand  men,  ten  thousand  of  whom  were  negroes.  His  in 
structions  from  his  superiour  officer  were  to  save  his  garrison,  and  evacuate 
the  city  whenever  he  should  find  that  judicious  defence  could  no  longer 
be  made,  and  that  an  opportunity  of  withdrawing  the  garrison  was  still 
open  to  him. 

On  the  night  of  the  fall  of  Blakely,  he  resolved  to  evacuate  Mobile, 
and  save  his  army.  On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  the  operations  of  the 
evacuation  commenced.  Many  steamers  were  in  the  port  prepared  for 
this  contingency  ;  upon  them  were  hastily  thrown  such  ordnance  stores  as 
remained  fit  for  troops  in  the  field,  all  of  the  light  guns,  and  the  best  of  the 
quartermaster's  and  commissary  stores.  The  garrisons  of  the  redoubts  and 
batteries  about  the  city  were  also  embarked  on  these  steamers,  and  sent 
up  the  Tombigbee  river  to  Demopolis.  The  infantry  forces  accompanied 
the  wagon  train  by  the  dirt  road  to  Mendina  or  were  sent  up  on  the  cars. 
The  large  depots  of  commissary  stores  were  turned  over  to  the  mayor  of 
Mobile,  for  the  use  of  the  people  of  the  city. 

In  the  morning  of  the  12th  April,  the  evacuation  was  completed.  Gen. 
Maury,  with  his  staff,  and  the  rear-guard  of  three  hundred  Louisianians, 
under  Col.  Lindsay,  moved  out  of  the  city  at  daylight.  Gen.  Gibson  re 
mained  to  see  to  the  execution  of  the  orders,  relative  to  the  drawing  in  of 
the  cavalry  force  of  Col.  Spence,  which  was  to  burn  the  cotton  in  the  city, 
and  then  cover  the  rear  of  the  army.  After  having  seen  to  the  execution 
of  every  order,  Gen.  Gibson  directed  the  Mayor  of  the  city  to  go  out  to 
the  fleet  with  a  white  flag,  and  apprise  the  Federal  authorities  that  Mobile 
46 


722  THE  LOST  CAUSE. 

had  been  entirely  evacuated  by  the  Confederate  forces,  and  that  no  resist 
ance  would  be  offered  to  the  enemy's  entrance  into  the  city.  About  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Gen.  Canby  with  his  forces,  inarched  into  Mobile, 
and  peaceably  occupied  it. 

The  Federal  navy  took  but  little  part  in  the  operations.  Two  monitors 
were  sunk  by  torpedoes  in  an  attempt  to  cross  Appalachie  Bar,  when  the 
fleet  desisted  from  further  action.  During  the  progress  of  the  evacuation, 
the  little  isolated  garrisons  of  Tracey  and  Huger,  under  Col.  Patton's 
command,  restrained  and  returned  with  great  effect  the  heavy  fire  of  the 
enemy's  batteries  on  the  eastern  shore.  Here  was  fired  the  last  cannon 
for  the  Confederacy  in  the  war. 

Whilst  the  operations  against  Mobile  were  in  progress,  a  heavy  move 
ment  of  Federal  cavalry  was  completing  the  plan  of  subjugation  in  the 
Southwest.  An  expedition,  consisting  of  twelve  thousand  five  hundred 
men,  was  placed  under  command  of  Gen.  "Wilson,  who  had  been  detailed 
from  Thomas'  army,  and  directed  to  make  a  demonstration,  from  East- 
port,  at  the  head  of  steamboat  navigation  on  the  Tennessee  River  upon 
Tuscaloosa  and  Selma,  in  favour  of  Canby's  operations  against  Mobile  and 
Central  Alabama. 

On  the  22d  March,  all  the  arrangements  having  been  perfected,  and 
the  order  of  march  designated,  the  movement  began.  At  this  time  Gen. 
Forrest's  forces  were  near  "West  Point,  Mississippi,  one  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  southwest  of  Eastport,  while  Gen.  Roddy  occupied  Montevallo,  on 
the  Alabama  and  Tennessee  River  Railroad,  nearly  the  same  distance  to 
the  southeast.  By  starting  on  diverging  roads,  Wilson  expected  to  leave 
the  Confederates  in  doubt  as  to  his  real  object,  and  compel  their  small 
bodies  of  cavalry  to  watch  equally  Columbus,  Tuscaloosa  and  Selma. 

The  enemy  in  full  strength  approached  Selma  on  the  2d  April.  Gen. 
Forrest,  after  an  affair  with  his  advance  near  Ebenezer  Church,  had  fallen 
back  to  Selma.  He  had  developed  "Wilson's  force,  and  knew  that  he  would 
not  be  able  to  save  the  city  with  the  limited  force  under  his  command  ; 
but  he  determined  to  discharge  what  he  considered  to  be  his  duty,  and  to 
make  the  best  fight  he  could  under  the  circumstances.  The  line  of  works 
was  about  four  miles  long.  It  was  held  by  not  more  than  three  thousand 
men  in  all ;  fully  one-half  of  whom  were  undrilled,  untrained  militia,  with 
old-fashioned  muskets  in  their  hands,  and  so  strung  out  over  the  ground 
they  had  to  defend,  that  they  were  from  five  to  ten  feet  apart.  Skirmish 
ing  commenced  in  front  of  the  works  about  noon.  About  four  or  five 
o'clock,  a  charge  was  made  against  that  part  of  the  line  near  the  point 
where  the  Selma  and  Meridian  Railroad  crossed  the  works,  and  which  was 
held  by  a  Kentucky  brigade,  under  the  command  of  Gen.  Buford.  After 
an  obstinate  fight,  the  position  was  carried  ;  the  enemy  came  into  posses 
sion  of  one  of  the  most  important  depots  in  the  southwest ;  and  having  oc- 


DEFENCE   OF   WEST  POINT.  723 

cupied  Selma,  destroyed  the  arsenals,  foundries,  arms,  stores  and  military 
munitions  of  every  kind.  Gen.  Forrest  escaped  with  a  portion  of  his  com 
mand.  Having  captured  Selma,  and  communicated  with  Gen.  Canby, 
"Wilson  determined  to  move  by  the  way  of  Montgomery  into  Georgia,  and 
after  breaking  up  railroads,  and  destroying  stores  and  army  supplies,  in 
that  State,  to  march  thence  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  theatre  of  opera 
tions  in  North  Carolina  and  Virginia.  On  the  12th  April,  his  advance 
guard  reached  Montgomery  and  received  the  surrender  of  the  city.  Thence 
a  force  marched  direct  on  Columbus,  and  another  on  West  Point.  Both 
of  these  places  were  assaulted  and  captured  on  the  16th ;  but  at  West 
Point,  there  was  an  episode  of  desperate  Confederate  valour  in  the  dreary 
story  of  a  country  overrun  almost  without  resistance. 

Gen.  R.  C.  Tyler,  with  an  obstinate  heroism,  unsurpassed  during  the 
war,  determined  to  hold  West  Pont,  with  less  than  three  hundred  men. 
He  believed  the  maintenance  of  his  post,  and  the  delay  of  the  opposing 
forces  from  crossing  the  Chattahoochie  at  that  point,  an  essential  aid  to  the 
defence  of  Columbus  ;  and  although  his  garrison  was  a  feeble  one,  impro 
vised,  for  the  most  part,  from  the  citizens,  he  did  not  hesitate  a  moment  in 
what  he  regarded  the  duty  of  a  soldier,  to  hold  his  post  at  whatever  sacri 
fice,  to  the  last  extremity.  It  was  a  hopeless  defence,  except  for  the  pur 
poses  of  delaying  the  enemy ;  and  it  was  protracted  until  the  brave  and 
devoted  commander  had  fallen  dead  with  his  sword  in  his  hand. 

This  memorable  defence  of  West  Point  was  made  in  a  small  work — 
Fort  Tyler — about  half  a  mile  from  the  centre  of  the  town.  Firing  contin 
uously  with  large  cannon  and  rifles,  the  enemy  slowly  and  cautiously  ap 
proached  the  gallant  little  band  of  heroes  until  within  about  twenty  steps 
of  them.  Then,  with  loud  yells,  they  attempted  to  scale  the  works,  but 
were  repulsed  and  held  at  bay  until  all  the  ammunition  in  the  fort  had 
been  exhausted ;  and  then,  when  the  Federals  were  in  the  ditch  around 
the  fort,  the  brave  and  gallant  men  inside  of  it,  hurled  stones,  and  even 
their  unbayonetted  guns,  upon  them.  The  Confederate  flag  was  never 
hauled  down,  until  by  the  Federals,  nor  any  white  flag  hoisted  until  the 
enemy  had  leaped  the  parapet. 

In  referring  to  the  affair  of  West  Point,  a  Southern  newspaper  that  yet 
dared  to  speak  its  mind,  said  :  "  A  more  gallant  instance  of  devotion  has 
never  been  known  since  the  time  of  Charles,  King  of  Sweden,  when  he, 
with  his  body-guard  and  a  few  house  servants,  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's 
country,  defended  himself  against  an  entire  army  of  Turks,  until  his  place 
of  retreat  was  burned  to  the  ground  by  lighted  arrows  from  the  assaulting 
party." 

On  the  21st,  Wilson,  having  united  his  forces,  approached  Macon, 
which  was  defended  by  Gen.  Howell  Cobb,  with  a  small  force,  mostly 


THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

militia.     Witliin  thirteen  miles  of  the  town,  he  was  met  by  a  flag  of  truce, 
bearing  the  following  communication  : 

HEADOUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  TENNESSEE  AND  GEORGIA,  ) 
MACON,  April  20,  1865.         \ 

To  the  Commanding  General  of  the  United  States  Forces  : 

GENERAL  :  I  have  just  received  from  Gen.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  my  immediate  com 
mander,  a  telegraphic  dispatch  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy : 

"  GREENSBORO',  April  19,  1865.  \ 
"  Yia  COLUMBIA  19th,  via  AUGUSTA  20th.  ) 

"  MAJ.-GEN.  H.  COBB  :  Inform  General  commanding  enemy's  forces  in  your  front, 
that  a  truce  for  the  purpose  of  a  final  settlement  was  agreed  upon  yesterday  between 
Gens.  Johnston  and  Sherman  applicable  to  all  forces  under  their  commands.  A  message 
to  that  effect  from  Gen.  Sherman  will  be  sent  him  as  soon  as  practicable.  The  contend 
ing  forces  are  to  occupy  their  present  position,  forty-eight  hours'  notice  being  given  of  a 
resumption  of  hostilities.  "  G.  T.  BEAUBEGAED, 

"  General  Second  in  Command." 

My  force  being  a  portion  of  Gen.  Johnston's  command,  I  proceed  at  once  to  execute 
the  terms  of  the  armistice,  and  have  accordingly  issued  orders  for  the  carrying  out  the 
same.  I  will  meet  you  at  any  intermediate  point  between  our  respective  lines,  for  the 
purpose  of  making  the  necessary  arrangements  for  a  more  perfect  enforcement  of  the 
armistice.  This  communication  will  be  handed  to  you  by  Brig.-Gen.  F.  H.  Robinson. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully  yours, 

HOWELL  COBB, 

Major-General  Commanding,  etc. 

This  notice  led  to  a  correspondence,  not  necessary  to  be  included  here, 
and  was  ultimately  followed  by  the  final  capitulation  of  the  Confederate 
forces  east  of  the  Chattahoochie.  The  destruction  of  iron-works,  foun 
dries,  arsenals,  supplies,  ammunition,  and  provisions  in  Alabama  and 
Georgia  was  irreparable ;  the  Confederacy  east  of  the  Mississippi  was  evi 
dently  in  a  state  of  collapse  ;  and — the  news  of  Johnston's  surrender  hav 
ing  traversed  the  country — Gen.  Dick  Taylor,  on  the  4th  May,  surrendered 
to  Gen.  Canby  u  the  forces,  munitions  of  war,  etc.,  in  the  Department  of 
Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  East  Louisiana."  The  terms  of  surrender  were 
essentially  the  same  as  those  accorded  to  Lee  and  Johnston  :  officers  and 
men  to  be  paroled  until  duly  exchanged  or  otherwise  released  by  the 
United  States ;  officers  to  give  their  individual  paroles ;  commanders  of 
regiments  and  companies  to  sign  paroles  for  their  men ;  arms  and  muni 
tions  to  be  given  up  to  the  United  States  ;  officers  and  men  to  be  allowed 
to  return  to  their  homes,  and  not  to  be  molested  so  long  as  they  kept  their 
paroles  and  obeyed  the  laws  where  they  resided,  but  persons  resident  in 
Northern  States  not  to  return  without  permission ;  officers  to  be  allowed 
to  retain  their  side-arms,  private  horses,  and  baggage  ;  horses,  the  private 
property  of  enlisted  men,  not  to  be  taken  from  them,  but  they  be  allowed 


SURRENDER   OF   KIRBY    SMITIl's   ARMY.  725 

to  retain  them  for  private  purposes  only.  Thus,  in  the  first  days  of  May, 
all  of  the  Confederate  forces  east  of  the  Mississippi  Eiver  had  been 
surrendered. 


THE   TRANS-MISSISSIPPI — SURRENDER   OF   GEN.  SMITH. 

Although  since  the  loss  of  Vicksburg,  and  with  it  the  Confederate  con 
trol  of  the  Mississippi  River,  what  was  known  as  the  Trans-Mississippi, 
had  been  to  a  great  extent  isolated,  and  but  little  able  to  contribute  effec 
tively  to  the  Confederate  cause,  yet  men  remembered  that  it  was  a  country 
of  vast  resources  ;  and  a  general  notion  had  long  prevailed  at  Richmond 
that  in  the  last  extremity  of  fortune  the  Confederacy  might  here  find  a 
refuge.  Even  after  the  sum  of  disasters  just  narrated,  it  was  hoped  that 
the  Trans-Mississippi  would  hold  out,  and  the  struggle  be  protracted  until 
European  interference  might  possibly  occur  to  the  relief  of  the  Southern 
people  ;  for  throughout  the  war  they  had  persisted  in  the  belief  that  Eng 
land  and  France  had  withheld  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  only  on  the 
assumption  that  it  would  certainly  accomplish  its  independence  without 
involving  them,  and  the  conclusion  was  fair  that  on  the  failure  of  this 
assumption  they  would  not  hesitate  to  act. 

In  a  general  order  of  Gen.  Kirby  Smith,  issued  at  Shreveport,  on  the 
news  of  the  surrender  of  Lee,  he  declared  to  the  Confederate  troops  of  the 
Trans-Mississippi  that  if  they  held  out,  they  would  speedily  and  surely 
receive  the  aid  of  nations  who  already  deeply  sympathized  with  them. 
He  added :  "  The  great  resources  of  the  department,  its  vast  extent,  the 
numbers,  discipline,  and  the  efficiency  of  the  army,  will  secure  to  our 
country  terms  that  a  proud  people  can  with  honour  accept,  and  may,  un 
der  the  providence  of  God,  be  the  means  of  checking  the  triumph  of  our 
enemy,  and  securing  the  final  success  of  our  cause." 

But  the  last  hope  of  the  Confederacy  was  quickly  to  expire.  To  the 
lively  and  sanguine  address  of  Gen.  Smith  there  was  but  little  response  in 
the  public  mind.  When  the  full  extent  of  the  disasters  east  of  the  Missis 
sippi  River  was  known ;  when  the  news  came  that  a  force  of  the  enemy 
under  Sheridan,  had  been  put  in  motion  for  Texas  ;  and  when  in  the  face 
of  these  announcements  it  was  perceived  that  nothing  but  straggling  rein 
forcements  could  be  expected  from  the  other  side  of  the  Mississippi,  the 
consequence  was  that  such  demoralization  ensued  in  Gen.  Smith's  army, 
and  extended  to  the  people  of  Texas,  that  that  commander  concluded  to 
negotiate  terms  of  surrender.  On  the  26th  May,  and  before  the  arrival 
of  Sheridan's  forces,  he  surrendered  what  remained  of  his  command  to 
Gen.  Canby.  The  last  action  of  the  war  had  been  a  skirmish  near  Brazos, 


726  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

in  Texas.  With  the  surrender  of  Gen.  Smith  the  war  ended,  and  from  the 
Potomac  to  the  Rio  Grande  there  was  no  longer  an  armed  soldier  to  resist 
the  authority  of  the  United  States. 


Most  of  the  wars  memorable  in  history  have  terminated  with  some 
momentous  and  splendid  crisis  of  arms.  Generally  some  large  decisive 
battle  closes  the  contest ;  a  grand  catastrophe  mounts  the  stage  ;  a  great 
scene  illuminates  the  last  act  of  the  tragedy.  It  was  not  so  with  the  war 
of  the  Confederates.  And  yet  there  had  been  every  reason  to  anticipate 
a  dramatic  termination  of  the  contest.  A  war  had  been  fought  for  four 
years ;  its  scale  of  magnitude  was  unprecedented  in  modern  times ;  its 
operations  had  extended  from  the  silver  thread  of  the  Potomac  to  the 
black  boundaries  of  the  western  deserts  ;  its  track  of  blood  reached  four 
thousands  of  miles  ;  the  ground  of  Virginia  had  been  kneaded  with  human 
flesh  ;  its  monuments  of  carnage,  its  spectacles  of  desolation,  its  altars  of 
sacrifice  stood  from  the  wheat-fields  of  Pennsylvania  to  the  vales  of  New 
Mexico.  It  is  true  that  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  had  been  dreadfully 
depleted  by  desertions ;  but  in  the  winter  of  1864-'5,  the  belligerent  re 
public  had  yet  more  than  a  hundred  thousand  men  in  arms  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River.  It  was  generally  supposed  in  Richmond  that  if  the 
Confederate  cause  was  ever  lost  it  would  be  only  when  this  force  had  been 
massed,  and  a  decisive  field  fixed  for  a  grand,  multitudinous  battle.  This  idea 
had  run  through  the  whole  period  of  the  war  ;  it  was  impossible  in  Rich 
mond  to  imagine  the  close  of  the  contest  without  an  imposing  and  splendid 
catastrophe.  In  the  very  commencement  of  the  war,  when  troops  were 
gaily  marching  to  the  first  line  of  battle  in  Virginia,  President  Davis  had 
made  an  address  in  the  camps  at  Rockett's,  declaring  that  whatever  misfor 
tunes  might  befall  the  Confederate  arms,  they  would  .rally  for  a  final  and 
desperate  contest,  to  pluck  victory  at  last.  He  said  to  the  famous  Hamp 
ton  Legion :  "  When  the  last  line  of  bayonets  is  levelled,  I  will  be 
with  you." 

How  far  fell  the  facts  below  these  dramatic  anticipations  !  The  contest 
decisive  of  the  tenure  of  Richmond  and  the  fate  of  the  Confederacy  was 
scarcely  more  than  what  may  be  termed  an  "  affair,"  with  reference  to  the 
extent  of  its  casualties,  and  at  other  periods  of  the  war  its  list  of  killed 
and  wounded  would  not  have  come  up  to  the  dignity  of  a  battle  in  the 
estimation  of  the  newspapers.  Gen.  Lee's  entire  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded,  in  the  series  of  engagements  that  uncovered  Richmond  and  put 
him  on  his  final  retreat,  did  not  exceed  two  thousand  men.  The  loss  of 
two  thousand  men  decided  the  fate  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  !  The 
sequence  was  surrender  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Rio  Grande.  The  whole 
fabric  of  Confederate  defence  tumbled  down  at  a  stroke  of  arms  that  did 


FLAT   CONCLUSION   OF   THE   WAR.  727 

not  amount  to  a  battle.  There  was  no  last  great  convulsion,  such  as  usu 
ally  marks  the  final  struggles  of  a  people's  devotion  or  the  expiring  hours 
of  their  desperation.  The  word  "  surrender  "  travelled  from  Virginia  to 
Texas.  A  four  years'  contest  terminated  with  the  smallest  incident  of 
blood-shed ;  it  lapsed  ;  it  passed  by  a  rapid  and  easy  transition  into  a  pro 
found  and  abject  submission. 

There  must  be  some  explanation  of  this  flat  conclusion  of  the  war.  It 
is  easily  found.  Such  a  condition  could  only  take  place  in  a  thorough 
demoralization  of  the  armies  and  people  of  the  Confederacy  ;  there  must 
have  been  a  general  decay  of  public  spirit,  a  general  rottenness  of  public 
affairs  when  a  great  war  was  thus  terminated,  and  a  contest  was  aban 
doned  so  short  of  positive  defeat,  and  so  far  from  the  historical  necessity 
of  subjugation. 

There  has  been  a  very  superficial,  and,  to  some  people,  a  very  pleasant 
way  of  accounting  for  the  downfall  of  the  Southern  Confederacy,  by  simply 
ascribing  it  to  the  great  superiourity  of  the  North  in  numbers  and  re 
sources.  This  argument  has  had  a  great  career  in  the  newspapers  and  in 
small  publications ;  and  the  vulgar  mind  is  easily  imposed  upon  by  the 
statistical  parallel  and  the  arithmetical  statement,  inclined  as  it  is  to  limit 
its  comprehension  of  great  historical  problems  to  mere  material  views  of 
the  question.  We  shall  give  this  argument  the  benefit  of  all  it  contains, 
and  state  it  in  its  full  force.  Thus,  it  is  correctly  said  that  official  reports 
in  Washington  show  that  there  were  called  into  the  Federal  service  from 
the  Northern  States  2,656,553  men  during  the  war,  and  that  this  number 
is  quite  one-third  as  many  as  all  the  white  men,  women,  and  children  of 
the  Southern  States.  Again,  the  figures  in  the  War  Department  at  Wash 
ington  show  that  on  the  1st  of  May,  1865,  the  military  force  of  the  North 
was  1,000,516  men  of  all  arms  ;  while  the  paroles  taken  in  the  Confederacy 
officially  and  conclusively  show  that  the  whole  number  of  men  within  its 
limits  under  arms  was  exactly  174,223.  Thus,  it  is  said,  putting  the  num 
ber  1,000,516  against  174,223,  and  taking  into  account  the  superiourity  of 
the  North  in  war  materiel,  there  is  sufficient  reason  for  the  failure  of  the 
Confederate  cause  without  looking  for  another. 

This  explanation  of  failure  is  of  course  agreeable  to  the  Southern 
people.  But  the  historical  judgment  rejects  it,  discovers  the  fallacy,  and 
will  not  refuse  to  point  it  out.  It  is  simply  to  be  observed  that  the  dis 
parity  of  military  force,  as  between  North  and  South  stated  above,  is  not 
the  natural  one  ;  and  that  the  fact  of  only  174,223  Confederates  being  un 
der  arms  in  the  last  period  of  the  war  was  the  result  of  mal-administration, 
the  defective  execution  of  the  conscription  law,  the  decay  of  the  volunteer 
spirit,  the  unpopularity  of  the  war,  and  that  these  are  the  causes  which  lie 
beyond  this  arithmetical  inequality,  which,  in  fact,  produced  the  greater 
part  of  it,  and  which  must  be  held  responsible  in  the  explanation.  The 


728  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

fallacy  consists  in  taking  the  very  results  of  Confederate  mal-administra- 
tion,  and  putting  them  in  comparison  against  a  full  exhibition  of  Northern 
power  in  the  war. 

The  only  just  basis  of  comparison  between  the  military  forces  of  North 
and  South  is  to  be  found  in  a  careful  parallel  statement  of  the  populations. 
This  excludes  all  question  of  administration  and  political  skill.  For 
tunately  we  have  precise  data  for  the  estimate  we  propose.  If  we  add  to 
the  Free  States  the  four  Slave  States  that  followed  their  lead,  under  more 
or  less  compulsion,  Delaware,  Maryland,  Missouri,  and  Kentucky,  and  to 
these  the  districts  at  Federal  command  from  an  early  period  of  the  war, 
say  half  of  Tennessee  and  Louisiana  and  a  third  of  Virginia,  we  have  a 
population,  by  the  census  of  1860,  of  23,485,722  on  the  Federal  side. 
This  leaves  under  the  rule  of  the  Confederacy  7,662,325.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  this  superiourity  of  the  North  in  numbers  had  great  weight ; 
that  it  contributed  much  to  the  discomfiture  of  the  Confederacy ;  that  it 
must  be  taken  largely  into  any  explanation  of  the  results  of  the  war — but 
the  great  question,  at  last,  remains,  was  this  numerical  inequality,  of  itself, 
sufficient  to  determine  the  war  in  favour  of  the  North,  considering  the 
great  compensation  which  the  South  had  in  superiour  animation,  in  the 
circumstance  of  fighting  on  the  defensive,  and,  above  all,  in  the  great  ex 
tent  of  her  territory.  We  fear  that  the  lessons  and  examples  of  history 
are  to  the  contrary,  and  we  search  in  vain  for  one  instance  where  a  coun 
try  of  such  extent  as  the  Confederacy  has  been  so  thoroughly  subdued  by 
any  amount  of  military  force,  unless  where  popular  demoralization  has 
supervened.  If  war  was  a  contest  on  an  open  plain,  where  military  forces 
fight  a  duel,  of  course  that  inferiour  in  numbers  must  go  under.  But  war 
is  an  intricate  game,  and  there  are  elements  in  it  far  more  decisive  than 
that  of  numbers.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  America  all  intelligent 
men  in  the  world  and  the  Southern  leaders  themselves  knew  the  disparity 
of  population  and  consequently  of  military  force  as  between  the  North  and 
South ;  but  they  did  not  on  that  account  determine  that  the  defeat  of 
the  South  was  a  foregone  conclusion,  and  the  argument  comes  with  a  bad 
grace  from  leaders  of  the  Confederacy  to  ascribe  now  its  failure  to  what 
stared  them  in  the  face  at  the  commencement  of  the  contest,  and  was  then 
so  lightly  and  even  insolently  dismissed  from  their  calculation.  The  judg 
ment  of  men  who  reflected,  was  that  the  South  would  be  ultimately  the 
victor,  mainly  because  it  was  impossible  to  conquer  space  ;  that  her  sub 
jection  was  a  "  geographical  impossibility  ; "  that  three  millions  of  men 
could  not  garrison  her  territory  ;  that  a  country  so  vast  and  of  such  pecu 
liar  features — not  open  as  the  European  countries,  and  traversed  every 
where  by  practicable  roads,  but  wild  and  difficult  with  river,  mountain, 
and  swamp,  equivalent  to  successive  lines  of  military  fortifications,  welted, 
as  it  were,  with  natural  mounds  and  barriers — could  never  be  brought  un- 


REFLECTIONS   ON   THE   CLOSE   OF   THE   WAE.  729 

der  subjection  to  the  military  power  of  the  North.  And  these  views  were 
severely  just ;  they  are  true  forever,  now  as  formerly  ;  but  they  proceeded 
on  the  supposition  that  the  morale  of  the  Confederacy  would  be  preserved, 
and  when  the  hypothesis  fell  (mainly  through  maladministration  in  Rich 
mond)  the  argument  fell  with  it. 

There  is  but  one  conclusion  that  remains  for  the  dispassionate  student 
of  history.  Whatever  may  be  the  partial  explanations  of  the  downfall  of 
the  Southern  Confederacy,  and  whatever  may  be  the  various  excuses  that 
passion  and  false  pride,  and  flattery  of  demagogues,  may  offer,  the  great 
and  melancholy  fact  remains  that  the  Confederates,  with  an  abler  Govern 
ment  and  more  resolute  spirit,  might  have  accomplished  their  inde 
pendence. 

This  reflection  irresistibly  couples  another.  Civil  wars,  like  private 
quarrels,  are  likely  to  repeat  themselves,  where  the  unsuccessful  party  has 
lost  the  contest  only  through  accident  or  inadvertence.  The  Confederates 
have  gone  out  of  this  war,  with  the  proud,  secret,  deathless,  dangerous  con 
sciousness  that  they  are  THE  BETTER  MEN,  and  that  there  was  nothing  want 
ing  but  a  change  in  a  set  of  circumstances  and  a  firmer  resolve  to  make 
them  the  victors.  To  deal  with  such  a  sentiment,  to  keep  it  whipped,  to 
restrain  it  from  a  new  experiment  requires  the  highest  efforts  of  intellect, 
the  most  delicate  offices  of  magnanimity  and  kindness,  and  is  the  great  task 
which  the  war  has  left  to  American  statesmanship.  Would  it  be  strange, 
in  a  broad  view  of  history,  that  the  North,  pursuing  a  policy  contrary  to 
what  we  have  indicated,  and  venturing  upon  new  exasperation  and  de 
fiance,  should  realize  that  the  South  has  abandoned  the  contest  of  the  last 
four  years,  merely  to  resume  it  in  a  wider  arena,  and  on  a  larger  issue,  and 
in  a  change  of  circumstances  wherein  may  be  asserted  the  profit  of  ex 
perience,  and  raised  a  new  standard  of  Hope ! 


CHAPTEE    XLIV. 

PBOPEE  LIMIT  OF  THE  NARRATIVE  OF  THE  WAR. — A  GLANCE  AT  ITS  POLITICAL  CONSEQUENCES. 
— GENEBAL  CONDITION  OF  THE   SOUTH   AFTEE   THE   WAE. — ALTEE  NATIVE   OF   POLICIES  AT 

WASHINGTON. HIDEOUS  PEOGEAMME   OF   THE   EADICALS. — THE    POLICY   OF    BECONCILIA- 

TION. — ENLIGHTENED    LESSON   OF    HISTOEY. THE    PEOBLEM    OF    "  BECONSTEUCTION." 

COINCIDENCE  OF  MODEEATE  EEPUBLICAN8  WITH  THE  CONSEEVATIVE  PLAN. — POSITION  OF 
PEESIDENT  JOHNSON. — ESTIMATE  OF  THE  VIEWS  AND  OHAEACTEE  OF  THE  NEW  PEESIDENT. 
— HIS  SCHOOL  OF  POLITICS,  MIDWAY  BETWEEN  THOSE  OF  OALHOUN  AND  HAMILTON. — A 
HAPPY  POSITION. — THE  GEEAT  HISTOEICAL  ISSUE. — 9EEIES  OF  EADICAL  MEASUEES  IN 
CONGEESS.  — THE  BLINDNESS  OF  DESPOTISM. — PLAIN  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  EADICAL 

POLICY. — THE  residuum  OF  STATE  EIGHTS  CLAIMED  BY  THE  SOUTH. — PEESIDENT  JOHN 
SON'S  DECLAEATION  OF  ANOTHEE  WAE. — HAVE  THE  AMEEIOANS  A  GOVERNMENT  ? — DIF- 
FEEENCE9  OF  OPINION  IN  THE  SOUTH,  OOEEESPONDENT  TO  THE  DIVISION  OF  PAETIES  IN 
THE  NOETH. — A  SMALL  AND  DETESTABLE  FACTION  OF  TIME-SERVEES. — NOBLE  DECLAEA 
TION  OF  EX-PEESIDENT  DAVIS. — ELOQUENT  APPEAL  OF  HENRY  A.  WISE. — BASIS  FOE  A 
NEW  SOUTHEEN  PARTY. — THE  SOUTH  TO  8UEEENDEE  ONLY  WHAT  THE  WAE  CONQUERED. 
— WHAT  THE  WAE  DETEEMINED,  AND  WHAT  IT  DID  NOT  DETERMINE. — THE  NEW  ARENA 

OF   CONTEST   AND  "  THE   WAE    OF    IDEAS." COAESE    AND   SUPEEFICIAL    ADVICE    TO    THE 

SOUTH  ABOUT  MATEEIAL  PEOSPEEITY. AN  ASPIEATION  OF  GOV.  OEE  OF  SOUTH  OAEOLINA. 

— THE  SOUTH  SHOULD  NOT  LOSE  ITS  MOEAL  AND  INTELLECTUAL  DISTINCTIVENESS  AS  A 
PEOPLE. — QUESTIONS  OUTSIDE  THE  PALE  OF  THE  WAE. — EIGHTS,  DUTIES  AND  HOPES  OF 
THE  SOUTH. — WHAT  WOULD  BE  THE  EXTEEMITY  OF  HER  HUMILIATION. 

THE  record  of  the  war  closes  exactly  with  the  laying  down  of  the  Con 
federate  arms.  We  do  not  design  to  transgress  this  limit  of  our  narrative. 
But  it  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  regard  generally  the  political  conse 
quences  of  the  war,  so  far  as  they  have  been  developed  in  a  formation  of 
parties,  involving  the  further  destinies  of  the  country,  and  in  the  light  of 
whose  actions  will  probably  be  read  many  future  pages  of  American 
History. 

The  surrender  of  Gen.  Lee's  army  was  not  the  simple  act  of  a  defeated 
and  overpowered  General ;  it  was  not  the  misfortune  of  an  individual. 
The  public  mind  of  the  South  was  fully  represented  in  that  surrender. 


TWO   POLICIES   OF   "  KECONSTKUCTION."  743 

The  people  had  become  convinced  that  the  Confederate  cause  was  lost ; 
they  saw  that  the  exertions  of  four  years,  misdirected  and  abused,  had  not 
availed,  and  they  submitted  to  what  they  conceived  now  to  be  the  deter 
mined  fortune  of  the  war. 

That  war  closed  on  a  spectacle  of  ruin,  the  greatest  pf  modern  times. 
There  were  eleven  great  States  lying  prostrate ;  their  capital  all  absorbed  ; 
their  fields  desolate ;  their  towns  and  cities  ruined ;  their  public  works 
torn  to  pieces  by  armies  ;  their  system  of  labour  overturned  ;  the  fruits  of 
the  toil  of  generations  all  swept  into  a  chaos  of  destruction ;  their  slave 
property  taken  away  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen  ;  a  pecuniary  loss  of  two  thou 
sand  millions  of  dollars  involved  in  one  single  measure  of  spoliation — a 
penalty  embraced  in  one  edict,  in  magnitude  such  as  had  seldom  been  ex 
acted  unless  in  wars  synonymous  with  robberies. 

As  an  evidence  of  the  poverty  of  the  South,  produced  by  the  war,  we 
may  cite  the  case  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina.  By  the  census  of  1860, 
the  property  of  the  State  was  value  at  $400,000,000.  Of  this,  it  has  been 
estimated  that  the  injury  to  the  banks,  private  securities,  railroads,  cities, 
houses,  plantations,  stock,  etc.,  amounted  to  $100,000,000.  There  were, 
by  the  same  census,  400,000  slaves,  valued  at  $200,000,000.  This  left 
only  $100,000,000  for  the  value  of  all  the  property  left  in  the  State  ;  and 
the  principal  portion  of  this  consisted  of  lands,  which  had  fallen  in  value 
immensely. 

The  close  of  the  war  presented  the  Government  at  Washington  with 
the  alternative  of  two  distinct  and  opposite  policies,  with  reference  to  the 
subdued  Southern  States.  One  was  the  policy  of  the  restoration  of  the 
Union  with  reconciliation  :  the  other  the  policy  of  restriction.  The  party 
that  favoured  the  latter  was  not  long  in  developing  the  full  extent  of  its 
doctrine,  which  involved  universal  confiscation  at  the  South,  a  general 
execution  of  prominent  men,  the  disfranchisement  of  men  who  acted  or 
sympathized  with  the  Confederates,  and  the  granting  of  the  right  of  voting 
to  the  freed  blacks.  This  hideous  programme  was  announced  not  only  as 
a  jtist  punishment  of  "  rebels,"  but  as  a  security  for  the  future,  and  the  in 
dispensable  condition  of  the  public  peace. 

But  to  men  who  had  read  the  lessons  of  history  it  was  clearly  appar 
ent  that  this  policy  would  be  destructive  of  the  very  ends  it  proposed  ; 
that  it  would  increase  the  acerbity  of  feeling  at  the  South  ;  that  it  would 
deliver  the  two  races  over  to  the  most  violent  discord  ;  and  that  it  would 
be  the  occasion  of  immeasurable  chaos  and  interminable  anarchy.  It  was 
the  immortal  BTJKKE  who  uttered  the  great  philosophical  truth  of  history  : 
that  "  liberty,  and  not  despotism,  was  the  cure  of  anarchy  ;"  and  who  pro 
posed  as  the  speedy  and  sovereign  remedy  for  the  disorders  of  the  Col 
onies,  that  they  should  be  "  admitted  to  a  share  in  the  British  Con 
stitution." 


744  THE  LOST   CAUSE. 

It  was  precisely  this  enlightened  lesson  which  those  who  agreed  in  the 
sentiment  of  clemency,  proposed  to  apply  to  the  condition  of  the  Southern 
States.  It  was  this  party  which  took  its  instruction  from  exalted  schools 
of  statesmanship  ;  which  looked  at  the  situation  from  the  eminence  of  His 
tory  ;  and  which  desired  to  bind  up  with  the  Federal  authority  the  rights, 
peace,  and  prosperity  of  all  parts  of  the  country. 

Obviously  the  policy  of  this  party,  with  reference  to  what  was  called 
"  Reconstruction,"  was  to  consider  the  Southern  States  as  in  the  Union, 
without  any  ceremonies  or  conditions  other  than  what  might  be  found  in 
the  common  Constitution  of  the  country.  What  may  be  designated  gen 
erally  as  the  Conservative  party  in  the  North,  had  long  held  the  doctrine 
that,  as  the  Union  was  inviolable  and  permanent,  secession  was  illegal,  rev 
olutionary,  null,  and  void  ;  that  it  had  no  legal  validity  or  effect ;  that  it 
was  the  act  of  seditious  individuals,  and  did  not  affect  the  status  of  the 
States  purporting  to  secede.  This  branch  of  their  doctrine  was  accepted 
by  a  large  number  of  the  Republican  party ;  among  them  Mr.  Seward, 
the  Secretary  of  State.  President  Lincoln  had  acted  upon  this  theory 
when  it  became  necessary  to  reorganize  States  overrun  by  Federal  armies. 
It  was  held  by  the  Conservative  party,  against  all  rational  dispute,  that 
the  business  of  the  Federal  Government,  with  respect  to  the  insurgent 
States,  was  simply  to  quell  resistance,  and  to  execute  everywhere  the 
Constitution  and  laws.  Its  contest  was  not  with  the  States,  but  with  the 
illegal  powers  within  the  States  engaged  in  resisting  its  authority.  When 
the  resistance  of  these  persons  ceased,  the  work  was  done  ;  and  the  States 
were  eo  instante,  ipso  facto,  as  much  within  the  Union  as  ever  ;  no  act  of 
re-admission  being  necessary.  It  only  remained  for  the  judiciary  to  pro 
ceed  by  indictment  and  legal  trial,  under  the  forms  of  law,  against  the  in 
dividuals  who  had  resisted  the  authority  of  the  Union  to  test  the  fact  of 
treason,  and  to  vindicate  the  reputation  of  the  Government.  And  this 
was  the  whole  extent  to  which  the  policy  of  penalities  could  be  insisted 
upon. 

On  this  opinion  there  was  soon  to  be  a  sharp  and  desperate  array  of 
parties  at  Washington.  When,  by  the  tragical  death  of  President  Lin 
coln,  in  a  public  theatre,  at  the  hands  of  one  of  the  most  indefensible  but 
courageous  assassins  that  history  has  ever  produced,  the  Executive  office 
passed  to  the  Yice-President,  Andrew  Johnson,  the  Southern  people 
ignorantly  deplored  the  change  as  one  to  their  disadvantage,  and  the 
world  indulged  but  small  expectations  from  the  coming  man.  The  new 
President  was  sprung  from  a  low  order  of  life,  and  was  what  Southern 
gentlemen  called  a  "  scrub."  In  qualities  of  mind  it  was  generally  con 
sidered  that  he  had  the  shallowness  and  fluency  of  the  demagogue  ;  but  in 
this  there  was  a  mistake.  At  any  rate,  it  must  be  confessed,  Mr.  Johnson 
had  no  literature  and  but  little  education  of  any  sort ;  in  his  agrarian 


POLITICS   AND   CHARACTER   OF   PRESIDENT  JOHNSON.  745 

speeches  in  the  Senate,  he  quoted  "  the  Lays  of  Ancient  Rome  "  as  "  trails- 
lated  by  Macaulay ; "  and  he  was  constantly  making  those  mistakes  in 
historical  and  literary  allusions  which  never  fail  to  characterize  and  betray 
self-educated  men.  Before  his  elevation  to  the  Presidency,  Mr.  Johnson 
was  considered  a  demagogue,  who  seldom  ventured  out  of  common-places, 
or  attempted  anything  above  the  coarse  sense  of  the  multitude,  successful, 
industrious,  a  clod-head,  a  "  man  of  the  people,"  that  peculiar  product  of 
American  politics.  But  there  are  familiar  instances  in  history  where  char 
acters  apparently  the  most  common-place  and  trifling,  have  been  suddenly 
awakened  and  elevated  as  great  responsibilities  have  been  thrust  upon 
them,  and  have  risen  to  the  demands  of  the  new  occasion.  An  example  of 
such  change  was  afforded  by  plain  Andrew  Johnson,  when  he  stepped  to 
the  dignity  of  President  of  a  restored  Union,  with  all  its  great  historical 
trusts  for  him  to  administer  in  sight  of  the  world.  From  that  hour  the 
man  changed.  The  eminence  did  not  confound  him  ;  he  saw  before  him 
a  part  in  American  history  second  only  to  that  of  George  Washington  ; 
he  left  behind  him  the  ambitions  and  resentments  of  mere  party  ;  he  rose 
as  the  man  who  has  been  secretly,  almost  unconsciously,  great — a  common 
place  among  his  neighbour,  the  familiar  fellow  of  the  company — suddenly, 
completely  to  the  full  height  and  dignity  of  the  new  destiny  that  called 
him.  The  man  who  had  been  twitted  as  a  tailor  and  condemned  as  a 
demagogue,  proved  a  statesman,  measuring  his  actions  for  the  future,  in 
sensible  to  clamour  and  patient  for  results. 

President  Johnson  belonged  to  an  intermediate  school  of  politics,  stand 
ing  between  the  doctrines  of  Mr.  Calhoun  and  those  of  Alexander  Hamil 
ton.  He  was  never  an  extreme  State-Eights  man ;  he  had  never  recog 
nized  the  right  of  nullification,  or  that  of  secession ;  but  he  was  always 
disposed  to  recognize,  in  a  liberal  degree,  the  rights  of  the  States,  and  to 
combat  the  theory  that  the  Federal  Government  absorbed  powers  and 
privileges,  which,  from  the  foundation  of  the  republic,  had  been  conceded 
to  the  States. 

It  was  fortunate  that  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  country,  who  was  to 
administer  its  affairs  and  determine  its  course  on  the  close  of  the  war,  occu 
pied  this  medium  ground  in  politics — the  one  that  suggested  the  practica 
bility  of  compromise,  and  assured  a  conservative  disposition  in  a  time  of 
violent  and  critical  dispute.  It  was  natural  that  on  the  close  of  hostilities 
the  tide  of  public  opinion  should  have  set  strongly  in  favour  of  Consolida 
tion  ;  and  that  men  should  apply  the  precedent  of  powers  used  in  the  war, 
to  the  condition  of  peace.  The  great  question  which  the  war  had  left,  was 
as  to  the  form  and  spirit  of  the  Government  that  ensued  upon  it — in  short, 
the  determination  of  the  question  whether  the  experience  of  the  past  four 
years  had  been  a  Constitutional  Revolution,  or  the  mere  decision  of  certain 
special  and  limited  questions.  This  was  the  great  historical  issue.  The 


746  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

political  controversies  which  figured  in  the  newspapers  were  only  its  inci 
dents  ;  and  the  questions  which  agitated  Congress  all  sounded  in  the  great 
dispute,  whether  the  war  had  merely  accomplished  its  express  and  particu 
lar  objects,  or  given  the  American  people  a  change  of  polity,  and  dated 
a  new  era  in  their  Constitutional  history. 

At  the  time  these  pages  are  committed  to  the  press,  a  series  of  meas 
ures  has  already  been  accomplished  or  introduced  by  the  Radical  party  in 
the  Congress  at  Washington  that  would  accomplish  a  revolution  in  the 
American  system  of  government,  the  most  thorough  and  violent  of  modern 
times.  Propositions  have  been  made  so  to  amend  the  Constitution  as  to 
deprive  the  States  of  the  power  to  define  the  qualifications  of  electors ; 
propositions  to  regulate  representation  by  the  number  of  voters,  and  not  of 
population ;  propositions  to  declare  what  obligations  assumed  by  the 
States  shall  be  binding  on  them,  and  what  shall  be  the  purposes  of  their 
taxation.  What  is  known  as  the  Civil  Eights  Bill  (passed  over  the  Presi 
dent's  veto)  has  not  only  established  negro  equality,  but  has  practically 
abolished,  on  one  subject  of  jurisdiction  at  least,  State  laws  and  State 
courts.  In  short,  the  extreme  Black  Republican  party  at  "Washington  has 
sought  to  disfranchise  the  whole  Southern  people,  to  force  negro  suffrage 
upon  the  South,  to  prevent  the  South  from  being  represented  in  Congress 
so  as  to  perpetuate  the  power  of  the  Radicals,  and  afford  them  the  means 
of  governing  the  Southern  States  as  conquered  and  subjugated  territories. 

The  practical  fault  of  all  Despotism  is  that  it  takes  too  little  into  ac 
count  the  sentimentalism  which  opposes  it,  and  attempts  to  deal  with  men 
as  inanimate  objects,  to  which  the  application  of  a  certain  amount  of  force 
for  a  desired  end  is  decisive.  It  never  considers  feelings  and  prejudices. 
It  does  not  understand  that  in  the  science  of  government  there  are  ele 
ments  to  conciliate  as  well  as  forces  to  compel.  The  Northern  radicals 
look  to  the  dragoon  with  his  sword,  the  marshal  with  his  process  of  confis 
cation,  and  the  negro  thrust  into  a  false  position  as  the  pacificators  of  the 
country  and  the  appropriate  sentinels  of  the  South.  They  never  reflect  on 
the  results  of  such  measures  upon  the  feelings  of  the  Southern  people ; 
they  do  not  estimate  the  loss  in  that  estrangement  which  makes  unprofit 
able  companions  ;  they  do  not  imagine  the  resentments  they  will  kindle  ; 
they  do  not  calculate  the  effect  of  a  constant  irritation  that  at  last  wears 
into  the  hearts  of  a  people,  and  makes  them  ready  for  all  desperate  enter 
prises. 

If  on  this  subject  the  Northern  people  are  best  addressed  in  the  lan 
guage  of  their  interests,  they  may  be  reminded  that  the  policy  of  the  Radi 
cals  is  to  detain  and  embarrass  the  South,  not  only  in  the  restoration  of 
her  political  rights,  but  in  her  return  to  that  material  prosperity,  in  which 
the  North  has  a  partnership  interest,  and  the  Government  itself  its  most 
important  financial  stake.  The  Southern  people  must  be  relieved  from  the 


THE  "RESIDUUM"  OF  STATE  EIGHTS.  747 

apprehension  of  confiscation,  and  other  kindred  measures  of  oppression,  be 
fore  they  can  be  expected  to  go  to  work  and  improve  their  condition. 
They  must  be  disabused  of  the  idea  that  the  new  system  of  labour  is  to  be 
demoralized  by  political  theories,  before  giving  it  their  confidence,  and  en 
larging  the  experiment  of  it.  The  troubled  sea  of  politics  must  be  com 
posed  before  the  industry  of  the  South  can  return  to  its  wonted  channels, 
and  reach  at  last  some  point  of  approximation  to  former  prosperity. 

The  financiers  at  Washington  consider  it  of  the  utmost  importance  that 
the  South  should  be  able  to  bear  its  part  of  the  burden  of  the  national 
debt,  and  by  its  products  for  exchange  contribute  to  the  reduction  of  this 
debt  to  a  specie  basis.  The  whole  edifice  of  Northern  prosperity  rests 
on  the  unstable  foundation  of  paper  credit.  Every  man  in  the  North 
is  intelligibly  interested  in  the  earliest  development  of  the  material  pros 
perity  of  the  South.  It  is  not  by  political  agitation  that  this  interest  is  to 
be  promoted  ;  not  under  the  hand  of  the  Fanaticism  that  sows  the  wind 
that  there  are  to  grow  up  the  fruits  of  industry.  When  the  Southern' 
people  obtain  political  reassurance,  and  'are  able  to  lift  the  shield  of  the 
Constitution  over  their  heads,  they  will  be  prepared  for  the  fruitful  works 
of  peace  ;  they  will  be  ready  then  for  the  large  and  steady  enterprises  of 
industry.  All  history  shows  and  all  reason  argues  that  where  a  people  are 
threatened  with  political  changes,  and  live  in  uncertainty  of  the  future, 
capital  will  be  timid,  enterprise  will  be  content  with  make-shifts,  and 
labour  itself,  give  but  an  unsteady  hand  to  the  common  implements  of 
industry. 

He  must  be  blind  who  does  not  perceive  in  the  indications  of  Northern 
opinion  and  in  the  series  of  legislative  measures  consequent  upon  the  war 
the  sweeping  and  alarming  tendency  to  Consolidation.  It  is  not  only  the 
territorial  unity  of  the  States  that  is  endangered  by  the  fashionable  dogma 
of  the  day,  but  the  very  cause  of  republican  government  itself.  A  war 
of  opinions  has  ensued  upon  that  of  arms,  far  more  dangerous  to  the 
American  system  of  liberties  than  all  the  ordinances  of  Secession  and  all 
the  armed  hosts  of  the  Confederates. 

The  State  Rights  put  in  question  by  the  propositions  we  have  referred 
to  in  Congress,  are  not  those  involved  in  the  issue  of  Secession,  and,  there 
fore,  decided  against  the  South  by  the  arbitration  of  the  war.  The  Radi 
cal  programme,  which  we  have  noted  above,  points  the  illustration  that 
the  war  did  not  sacrifice  the  whole  body  of  State  Rights,  and  that  there 
was  an  important  residuum  of  them  outside  of  the  issue  of  Secession,  which 
the  people  of  the  South  were  still  entitled  to  assert,  and  to  erect  as  new 
standards  of  party.  It  is  precisely  those  rights  of  the  States  which  a  revo- 
Itionary  party  in  Congress  would  deny,  namely  :  to  have  their  Constitu 
tional  representation,  to  decide  then*  own  obligations  of  debt,  to  have  their 
own  codes  of  crimes  and  penalties,  and  to  deal  with  their  own  domestic 


748  THE   LOST   CAUSE. 

concerns,  that  the  Southern  States  claim  have  survived  the  war  and  are 
not  subjects  of  surrender. 

And  it  is  just  here  that  the  people  of  the  South  challenge  that  medium 
doctrine  of  State  Eights  professed  by  President  Johnson  to  make  the  neces 
sary  explanation,  and  to  distribute  the  results  of  the  war  between  North 
and  South.  They  do  not  look  at  the  propositions  in  Congress  as  involving 
a  mere  partisan  dispute  ;  they  are  not  disposed  to  encounter  them  in  a  nar 
row  circle  of  disputation,  and  make  a  particular  question  of  what  is  one 
grand  issue.  They  regard  them  in  the  broad  and  serious  sense  of  a  revolu 
tion  against  the  Constitution  ;  a  rebellion  against  all  the  written  and  tra 
ditionary  authority  of  American  statesmanship  ;  a  war  quite  as  distinct  as 
that  of  bayonets  and  more  comprehensive  in  its  results  than  the  armed 
contest  that  has  just  closed. 

The  following  remarks  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  do  not 
magnify  the  occasion.  They  are  historical : 

"  The  present  is  regarded  as  a  most  critical  juncture  in  the  affairs  of  the  nation, 
scarcely  less  so  than  when  an  armed  and  organized  force  sought  to  overthrow  the  Gov 
ernment.  To  attack  and  attempt  the  disruption  of  the  Government  by  armed  combina 
tion  and  military  force,  is  no  more  dangerous  to  the  life  of  the  nation  than  an  attempt 
to  revolutionize  and  undermine  it  by  a  disregard  and  destruction  of  the  safeguards 
thrown  around  the  liberties  of  the  people  in  the  Constitution.  My  stand  has  been  taken, 
my  course  is  marked ;  I  shall  stand  by  and  defend  the  Constitution  against  all  who  may 
attack  it,  from  whatever  quarter  the  attack  may  come.  I  shall  take  no  step  backward 
in  this  matter." 

An  intelligent  foreigner,  making  his  observations  at  Washington  at 
this  time,  would  be  puzzled  to  determine  whether  the  Americans  had  a 
Government,  or  not.  There  are  the  names  :  The  Executive,  the  Congress, 
the  Judiciary  ;  but  what  is  the  executive  question,  what  the  congressional 
question,  what  the  judicial  queston,  it  appears  impossible  to  decide.  It  is 
a  remarkable  fact  that  at  Washington  to-day,  there  is  not  a  single  well-de 
fined  department  of  political  power !  There  are  the  paraphernalia  and 
decorations  of  a  government ;  an  elaborate  anarchy  ;  but  the  well-defined 
distribution  of  power  and  the  order  necessary  to  administer  public  affairs 
appear  to  have  been  wholly  lost,  the  charter  of  the  government  almost 
obliterated,  and  the  Constitution  overlaid  with  amendments,  which,  car 
ried  into  effect,  would  hardly  leave  a  vestige  of  the  old  instrument  or  a 
feature  in  which  could  be  recognized  the  work  of  our  forefathers,  and  the 
ancient  creation  of  1789.  The  controversy  thus  engendered  is  something 
more  than  a  mere  question  of  parties  where  there  are  points  of  coincidence 
between  the  contestants  sufficient  to  confine  opposition,  and  where  both 
argue  from  the  common  premises  of  a  written  constitution.  It  is  some 
thing  more  than  the  temporary  rack  and  excitement  of  those  partisan 


PARTIES    IN   THE   SOUTH.  749 

difficulties  in  which  the  American  people  have  had  so  much  experience 
of  exaggerated  dangers  and  foolish  alarms  that  they  are  likely  to  give  them 
attention  no  longer,  but  as  ephemeral  sensations.  It  is  something  vastly 
more  than  the  usual  vapours  of  the  political  cauldron.  When  a  Congress, 
representing  not  much  more  than  a  moiety  of  the  American  States,  and, 
therefore,  in  the  condition  of  an  unconstitutional  authority  and  factious 
party,  undertakes  to  absorb  the  power  of  the  government ;  to  determine 
Executive  questions  by  its  close  "  Committee  of  Reconstruction  ;  "  to  put 
down  the  judiciary  of  the  Southern  States  and  by  a  Freedmen's  Bureau, 
and  other  devices,  erect  an  imperium  in  imperio  in  one  part  of  the  Union, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  controversy  is  no  narrow  one  of  party,  that  it  involves 
the  traditions  and  spirit  of  the  government,  and  goes  to  the  ultimate  con 
test  of  constitutional  liberty  in  America.  Regarding  these  issues,  the  ques 
tion  comes  fearfully  to  the  mind  :  Has  the  past  war  merely  laid  the  foun 
dation  of  another  ?  The  pregnant  lesson  of  human  experience  is  that  few 
nations  have  had  their  first  civil  war  without  having  their  second ;  and 
that  the  only  guaranty  against  the  repetition  is  to  be  found  in  the  policy 
of  wise  and  liberal  concessions  gracefully  made  by  the  successful  party. 
And  such  reconciliations  have  been  rarest  in  the  republican  form  of  gov 
ernment  ;  for,  while  generosity  often  resides  in  the  breast  of  individual 
rulers,  the  history  of  mankind  unhappily  shows  that  it  is  a  rare  quality  of 
political  parties,-  where  men  act  in  feverish  masses  and  under  the  domin 
ion  of  peculiar  passions. 

To  the  division  of  parties  in  the  North — Radicals  and  Conservatives — 
there  has  grown  up  to  some  extent  a  correspondent  difference  of  opinions 
among  the  Southern  people  as  to  the  consequences  of  the  war.  But  only 
to  a  certain  extent ;  for  the  party  in  the  South  that,  corresponding  to  the 
theory  of  the  Northern  Radicals,  account  themselves  entirely  at  the  mercy 
of  a  conquering  power  and  taking  everything  ex  gratia,  is  only  the  detest 
able  faction  of  tin^e-servers  and  the  servile  coterie  that  attends  all  great 
changes  in  history,  and  courts  the  new  authority  whatever  it  may  be. 

There  is  a  better  judgment  already  read  by  the  Southern  people  of 
what  the  war  has  decided  as  against  themselves.  The  last  memorable 
remark  of  Ex-President  Davis,  when  a  fugitive,  and  before  the  doors  of  a 
prison  closed  upon  him,  was :  "  The  principle  for  which  we  contended  is 
bound  to  reassert  itself,  though  it  may  be  at  another  time  and  in  another 
form."  It  was  a  wise  and  noble  utterance,  to  be  placed  to  the  credit  of 
an  unfortunate  ruler.  And  so,  too,  the  man,  marked  above  all  others  as 
the  orator  of  the  South — Henry  A.  Wise,  of  Virginia,  standing  before  his 
countrymen,  with  his  gray  hairs  and  luminous  eyes,  has  recently  proclaimed 
with  trumpet-voice  that  all  is  riot  lost,  that  a  great  struggle  of  constitu 
tional  liberty  yet  remains,  and  that  there  are  still  missions  of  duty  and 
glory  for  the  South. 
47 


750  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

The  people  of  the  South  have  surrendered  in  the  war  what  the  war  has 
conquered  ;  but  they  cannot  be  expected  to  give  up  what  was  not  involved 
in  the  war,  and  voluntarily  abandon  their  political  schools  for  the  dogma 
of  Consolidation.  That  dogma,  the  result  has  not  properly  imposed  upon 
them  ;  it  has  not  "  conquered  ideas."  The  issues  of  the  war  were  practi 
cal  :  the  restoration  of  the  Union  and  the  abolition  of  slavery  ;  and  only  so 
far  as  political  formulas  were  necessarily  involved  in  these  have  they  been 
affected  by  the  conclusion.  The  doctrine  of  secession  was  extinguished  ; 
and  yet  there  is  something  left  more  than  the  shadow  of  State  Rights,  if  we 
may  believe  President  Johnson,  who  has  recently  and  officially  used  these 
terms,  and  affirmed  in  them  at  least  some  substantial  significance.  Even  if 
the  States  are  to  be  firmly  held  in  the  Union  ;  even  if  the  authority  of  the 
Union  is  to  be  held  supreme  in  that  respect,  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  to 
be  supreme  in  all  other  respects  ;  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  to  legislate 
for  the  States  ;  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  "  a  national  Government  over 
the  States  and  people  alike."  It  is  for  the  South  to  preserve  every  rem 
nant  of  her  rights,  and  even,  though  parting  with  the  doctrine  of  secession, 
to  beware  of  the  extremity  of  surrendering  State  Rights  in  gross,  and  con 
senting  to  a  "  National  Government,"  with  an  unlimited  power  of  legisla 
tion  that  will  consider  the  States  as  divided  only  by  imaginary  lines  of 
geography,  and  see  in  its  subjects  only  "  the  one  people  of  all  the  States." 

But  it  is  urged  that  the  South  should  come  to  this  understanding,  so  as 
to  consolidate  the  peace  of  the  country,  and  provide  against  a  "  war  of 
ideas."  Now  a  "  war  of  ideas  "  is  what  the  South  wants  and  insists  upon 
perpetrating.  It  may  be  a  formidable  phrase — "  the  war  of  ideas  " — but 
after  all,  it  is  a  harmless  figure  of  rhetoric,  and  means  only  that  we  shall 
have  parties  in  the  country.  We  would  not  live  in  a  country  unless  there 
were  parties  in  it ;  for  where  there  is  no  such  combat,  there  is  no  liberty, 
no  animation,  no  topics,  no  interest  of  the  twenty-four  hours,  no  theatres 
of  intellectual  activity,  no  objects  of  ambition.  We  do  not  desire  the  va 
cant  unanimity  of  despotism.  All  that  is  left  the  South  is  "  the  war  of 
ideas."  She  has  thrown  down  the  sword  to  take  up  the  weapons  of  argu 
ment,  not  indeed  under  any  banner  of  fanaticism,  or  to  enforce  a  dogma, 
but  simply  to  make  the  honourable  conquest  of  reason  and  justice.  In 
such  a  war  there  are  noble  victories  to  be  won,  memorable  services  to  be 
performed,  and  grand  results  to  be  achieved.  The  Southern  people  stand 
by  their  principles.  There  is  no  occasion  for  dogmatic  assertion,  or  fanati 
cal  declamation,  or  inflammatory  discourse  as  long  as  they  have  a  text  on 
which  they  can  make  a  sober  exposition  of  their  rights,  and  claim  the  ver 
dict  of  the  intelligent. 

Outside  the  domain  of  party  politics,  the  war  has  left  another  consider 
ation  for  the  people  of  the  South.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  States  re 
duced  by  war  are  apt  to  experience  the  extinction  of  their  literature,  the 


DUTY  AND  HOPE  OF  THE  SOUTH.  75 J 

decay  of  mincj,  and  the  loss  of  their  distinctive  forms  of  thought.  Nor  is 
such  a  condition  inconsistent  with  a  gross  material  prosperity  that  often 
grows  upon  the  bloody  crust  of  war.  When  Greece  fell  under  the  Roman 
yoke,  she  experienced  a  prosperity  she  had  never  known  before.  It  was 
an  era  rank  with  wealth  and  material  improvement.  But  her  literature 
became  extinct  or  emasculated ;  the  distinctive  forms  of  her  art  disap 
peared  ;  and  her  mind,  once  the  peerless  light  of  the  world,  waned  into  an 
obscurity  from  which  it  never  emerged. 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  in  the  present  condition  of  the  Southern  States, 
losses  will  be  experienced  greater  than  the  immediate  inflictions  of  fire  and 
sword.  The  danger  is  that  they  will  lose  their  literature,  their  former 
habits  of  thought,  their  intellectual  self-asssertion,  while  they  are  too  intent 
upon  recovering  the  mere  material  prosperity,  ravaged  and  impaired  by 
the  war.  There  are  certain  coarse  advisers  who  tell  the  Southern  people 
that  the  great  ends  of  their  lives  now  are  to  repair  their  stock  of  national 
wealth ;  to  bring  in  Northern  capital  and  labour ;  to  build  mills  and  fac 
tories  and  hotels  and  gilded  caravansaries  ;  and  to  make  themselves  rivals 
in  the  clattering  and  garish  enterprise  of  the  North.  This  advice  has  its 
proper  place.  But  there  are  higher  objects  than  the  Yankee  magna  bona 
of  money  and  display,  and  loftier  aspirations  than  the  civilization  of  mate 
rial  things.  In  the  life  of  nations,  as  in  that  of  the  individual,  there  is  some 
thing  better  than  pelf,  and  the  coarse  prosperity  of  dollars  and  cents.  The 
lacerated,  but  proud  and  ambitious  heart  of  the  South  will  scarcely  respond 
to  the  mean  aspiration  of  the  recusant  Governor  of  South  Carolina — Mr. 
Orr  :  "  I  am  tired  of  South  Carolina  as  she  was.  I  court  for  her  the  ma 
terial  prosperity  of  New  England.  I  would  have  her  acres  teem  with  life 
and  vigour  and  intelligence,  as  do  those  of  Massachusetts." 

There  are  time-servers  in  every  cause ;  there  are  men  who  fill  their 
bellies  with  husks,  and  turn  on  their  faces  and  die  ;  but  there  are  others 
who,  in  the  midst  of  public  calamities,  and  in  their  own  scanty  personal 
fortune,  leave  behind  them  the  memory  of  noble  deeds,  and  a  deathless 
heritage  of  glory. 

Defeat  has  not  made  "  all  our  sacred  things  profane."  The  war  has 
left  the  South  its  own  memories,  its  own  heroes,  its  own  tears,  its  own 
dead.  Under  these  traditions,  sons  will  grow  to  manhood,  and  lessons 
sink  deep  that  are  learned  from  the  lips  of  widowed  mothers. 

It  would  be  immeasurably  the  worst  consequence  of  defeat  in  this  war 
that  the  South  should  lose  its  moral  and  intellectual  distinctiveness  as  a 
people,  and  cease  to  assert  its  well-known  superiourity  in  civilization,  in 
political  scholarship,  and  in  all  the  standards  of  individual  character  over 
the  people  of  the  North.  That  superiourity  has  been  recognized  by  every 
foreign  observer,  and  by  the  intelligent  everywhere ;  for  it  is  the  South 
that  in  the  past  produced  four-fifths  of  the  political  literature  of  America, 


752  THE   LOST  CAUSE. 

and  presented  in  its  public  men  that  list  of  American  names  best  known 
in  the  Christian  world.  That  superiourity  the  war  has  not  conquered  or 
lowered  ;  and  the  South  will  do  right  to  claim  and  to  cherish  it. 

The  war  has  not  swallowed  up  everything.  There  are  great  interests 
which  stand  out  of  the  pale  of  the  contest,  which  it  is  for  the  South  still  to 
cultivate  and  maintain.  She  must  submit  fairly  and  truthfully  to  what 
the  war  has  properly  decided.  But  the  war  properly  decided  only  what 
was  put  in  issue  :  the  restoration  of  the  Union  and  the  excision  of  slavery ; 
and  to  these  two  conditions  the  South  submits.  But  the  war  did  not  de 
cide  negro  equality  ;  it  did  not  decide  negro  suffrage ;  it  did  not  decide 
State  Rights,  although  it  might  have  exploded  their  abuse  ;  it  did  not  de 
cide  the  orthodoxy  of  the  Democratic  party ;  it  did  not  decide  the  right  of 
a  people  to  show  dignity  in  misfortune,  and  to  maintain  self-respect  in  the 
face  of  adversity.  And  these  things  which  the  war  did  not  decide,  the 
Southern  people  will  still  cling  to,  still  claim,  and  still  assert  in  them  their 
rights  and  views. 

This  is  not  the  language  of  insolence  and  faction.  It  is  the  stark  let 
ter  of  right,  and  the  plain  syllogism  of  common  sense.  It  is  not  untimely 
or  unreasonable  to  tell  the  South  to  cultivate  her  superiourity  as  a  people ; 
to  maintain  her  old  schools  of  literature  and  scholarship  ;  to  assert,  in  the 
forms  of  her  thought,  and  in  the  style  of  her  manners,  her  peculiar  civiliza 
tion,  and  to  convince  the  North  that,  instead  of  subjugating  an  inferiour 
country,  she  has  obtained  the  alliance  of  a  noble  and  cultivated  people, 
and  secured  a  bond  of  association  with  those  she  may  be  proud  to  call 
brethren ! 

In'such  a  condition  there  may  possibly  be  a  solid  and  honourable  peace ; 
and  one  in  which  the  South  may  still  preserve  many  things  dear  to  her  in 
the  past.  There  may  not  be  a  political  South.  Yet  there  may  be  a  social 
and  intellectual  South.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  South,  mistaking 
the  consequences  of  the  war,  accepts  the  position  of  the  inferiour,  and 
gives  up  what  was  never  claimed  or  conquered  in  the  war ;  surrenders  her 
schools  of  intellect  and  thought,  and  is  left  only  with  the  brutal  desire  of 
the  conquered  for  "  bread  and  games  ; "  then  indeed  to  her  people  may  be 
applied  what  Tacitus  wrote  of  those  who  existed  under  the  Roman  Empire : 
"  We  cannot  be  said  to  have  lived,  but  rather  to  have  crawled  in  silence, 
the  young  towards  the  decrepitude  of  age  and  the  old  to  dishonourable 
graves." 


THE  END. 


0nlg  Official 


0f 


BY    E.    A.    POLLARD. 


THE  LOST  CAUSE, 

BY 

EDWARD  A.  POLLARD, 


OF    VIRGINIA, 

EDITOR  OF  THE  "RICHMOND  EXAMINER,"  DURING  THE  WAR. 


Comprising  a  full   and   authentic   account   of   the   rise   and   progress   of   the 

late   Southern   Confederacy—The   Campaigns,   Battles,  Incidents 

and   Adventures  of   the   most   gigantic   struggle 

of  the   world's  history. 

COMPLETE  IN  ONE  LARGE  KOYAL  OCTAVO  VOLUME  OP  NEAELY  800  PAGES. 

WITH 


STEBt 


OF 


DISTINGUISHED     CONFEDERATE    LEADERS, 


Jefferson  Davis, 
A.  H.  Stephens, 
J.  P.  Benjamin, 
Henry  A.  Wise, 
J.  C.  Breckenridg-e, 
Wm.  Ii.  Yancey, 
J.  M.  Mason, 
John  Slidell, 


A3  FOLLOWS  : 

Robert  E.  Lee, 
"Stonewall"  Jackson, 
P.  GI-.  T.  Beauregurd, 
B.  S.  Ewell, 
A.  P.  Hill, 
J.   Long-street, 
A.  S.  Johnston, 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 


Jo.  E.  Johnston, 
Braxton  Bragg, 
Kirby  Smith, 
N.  B.  Forrest, 
Leonidas  Polk, 
J.  B.  Hood, 
W.  J.  Hardee, 
John  Morgan. 


The  Publishers  take  pleasure  in  announcing  that  they  have  secured  the  talents  of  this  distinguished  Author 
and  Historian,  in  preparing  a  work  worthy  of  the  theme  and  the  occasion. 

The  history  of  the  vanquished  has  too  often  fallen  to  the  pen  of  the  victor,  and  to  insure  justice  to  the 
Southern  cause,  the  pen  must  be  taken  by  some  Southern  man  who  is  willing  to  devote  his  time  and  talents  to  the 
vindication  of  his  countrymen,  in  a  history  which  shall  challenge  the  criticism  of  the  intelligent,  and  invite  the 
attention  of  all  honest  inquirers. 

Such  a  work  will  be  of  peculiar  interest  to  the  candid  and  intelligent  public  of  the  North,  and  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  the  People  of  the  Southern  States. 

Mr.  POLLAED,  of  all  writers  in  the  South,  is  doubtless  the  best  qualified  to  prepare  a  complete  and  Standard 
History  of  the  War,  and  to  commit  to  the  present  and  future  generations  a  faithful  and  worthy  record  of  their 
great  struggle,  and  of  a  cause  lost,  save  in  honor — having  been  employed  during  the  entire  period  of  the  war  as 
editor  of  a  Richmond  newspaper,  and  thus  trained  to  the  best  sources  of  information,  and  by  especial  research 
has  collected  a  quantity  of  historical  material  pertaining  to  the  secret  history  of  the  war  which  no  one  else  in  the 
country  has  or  can  now  obtain. 

He  comes  to  the  work  with  the  encouragement  and  authority  of  Generals  R.  E.  LEE.  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 
BEAUREGARD,  "DiCK  "  TAYLOK,  FITZHUGU  LEE,  Ex-Gov.  WISK,  and  other  distinguished  Confederate  Leaders. 

This   Work  is  sold  only  by  subscription,  and  cannot  be  obtainetl  except  through  our 
autJiorized  Traveling  Agents. 


In  every  Township  and  County  in  the  United  States  and  Canada  to  introduce  this 

GREAT    AND    IMPORTANT    WORK. 
To  Energetic  Men  and  Women  a  Rare  Chance  is  offered  to  make  Money. 

Address,        E.  B.  TREAT  &  CO.,  Publishers, 

65±  BROADWAY,   NEW   YOKE, 

oi-    IBz-^ixola   Offioos. 


TESTIMONIALS. 


GEN.  ROBERT  E.  L.EE  writes  the  author,  that  he  is  "glad  to  hear" 
that  he  has  undertaken  to  write  the  History  of  the  War,  and  that  such  a  work 
will  be  "received  with  pleasure  by  this  and  future  generations." 

GEN.  JO.  E.  JOHNSTON  writes,  "  I  shall  be  ready  at  all  times  to  give  you 
any  information  I  possess  on  the  subject  of  your  great  work." 

GEN.  "DICK"  TAYLOR  promises  the  aid  of  valuable  documents,  and 
adds,  "Permit  me  to  say  that  I  feel  a  deep  interest  in  your  success." 

GEN.  FITZHUGH  L.EE  writes:  "Eminently  fitted  for  the  task  in  every 
way,  you  will  deserve  and  receive  the  thanks  of  us  all  by  transmitting  to  our  children's 
children  an  authentic  and  full  narrative  of  past  events." 

Atlanta  (Go,.)  Erasnys,  "Mr.  POLLARD  is  one  of  the  most  brilliant  writers  in  the  South,  as  is  proven  from 
the  many  works  that  have  emanated  from  his  pen,  and  his  able  editorials  in  the  Richmond  Examiner." 

Norfolk  Virginian  says,  "At  times  his  style  rises  to  the  level  of  Napier." 

New  York  Daily  News  says,  ""We  believe  many  of  Mr.  Pollard's  countrymen  have  designated  him  as  the 
future  historian  of  the  war  on  the  Southern  side." 

Memphis  Commercial  says,  "  We  have  the  highest  assurance  that  the  work  proposed  will  challenge  critical 
investigation,  and  will  supply  in  the  historical  literature  of  the  war  a  noble  desideratum,  in  allowing  to  the 
vanquished  party  an  audience  before  the  civilized  world.  Of  Mr.  Pollard's  qualifications  for  this  great  work,  it  is 
just  to  say  they  are  unquestionably  high.  His  genius  as  a  writer  is  beyond  dispute ;  his  enthusiasm  in  his  task 
is  warm  and  generous,  and  his  ambition  high  and  far-reaching." 

The  Florence  (Ala.)  Journal  says,  "The  name  of  Mr.  Pollard  is  a  matter  of  history— has  been  'mentioned 
in  story' — and  we  but  utter  a  sentiment  honestly  entertained,  when  we  write  as  our  opinion  that  Edward  A. 
Pollard,  Esq.,  is  the  finest  writer  of  his  age  in  the  whole,  land.  His  is  the  style  of  the  old  English  classics,  pure 
and  undefiled." 

New  York  Watchman ;  "  Mr.  Pollafe's  literary  reputation  will  bring  his  work  before  the  public  favorably, 
and  those  who  desire  to  hear  'the  other  side '  will  peruse  this  book  with  great  interest" 

New  York  Day  Book  :  "  We  have  seen  some  specimen  pages,  and  can  vouch  for  the  excellent  style  of  its  exe 
cution.  We  doubt  not  that  Mr.  Pollard's  well-known  ability  as  a  writer  will  give  this  work  a  wide  circulation." 

Petersburg  (  Vet.)  Express  :  "  Mr.  Pollard,  as  a  writer,  has  been  familiar  to  every  reader  for  several  years,  and 
we  believe  no  Southern  man  now  living  enjoys  so  high  a  reputation.  His  style  is  far  more  forcible,  in  our  esti 
mation,  than  that  of  Bancroft,  and  not  surpassed  by  the  classic  elegance  of  Prescott." 

Weekly  Gleaner  (Columbia.  S.  <7.) :  "The  distinguished  abilities  of  the  author,  and  his  excellent  opportunities 
for  statistical  and  other  information  in  reference  to  his  subject,  is  a  guarantee  that  the  work  will  be  invaluable  as 
history,  and  desirable  as  an  addition  to  the  literature  of  the  South." 

Staunton  (  Va.)  Spectator  :  "This  book  will  be  read  with  great  interest  by  the  whole  people." 

Nashville  Gazette :  "  From  the  specimen  pages  wo  are  induced  to  believe  that  this  book  will  take  its  place  as 
a  standard  work  on  the  war." 

New  Era  (Atlanta,  Ga.)  :  "The  South  relies,  to  a  very  great  extent,  upon  this  book,  for  a  fair  record  of  the 
deeds  of  her  men  during  the  revolution.  Mr.  Pollard  has  had  abundant  opportunity  to  collect  material  for  his 
book,  and  we  doubt  not  it  will  be  every  way  acceptable  to  the  Southern  people." 

New  ffaven  (Conn.)  Register :  "  Mr.  Pollard  is  a  bold,  vigorous  writer,  and  he  portrays  the  events  through  which 
he  passed,  in  vivid  colors.  Every  candid  student  must  desire  to  learn  the  sentiments  which  actuated  the  Southern 
people  during  the  conflict,  and,  thus  far,  Pollard's  work  is  the  best  that  has  been  issued. 

New  York  Evening  Post :  "  A  work  based  upon  documents  and  information  of  leading  Southern  generals  and 
politicians  cannot  fail  to  be  an  interesting  and  important  contribution  to  the  history  of  the  great  struggle." 

Montgomery  (N.Y.)  Republican  :  "Every  intelligent  reading  man  cannot  fail  to  be  interested  in  this  work. 
A  Southern  history  of  the  war  by  a  distinguished  Virginian  is  just  what  is  wanted  to  give  us  the  whole  truth  of 
History." 

New  Haven  Palladium  :  "This  book  is  now  iu  press,  and  will  ultimately  find  its  way  into  every  library  of 
any  pretension.  It  is  the  or.ly  full  and  authentic  history  of  the  war  from  a  Southern  stand-point,  and  is  the 
counterpart  of  Greeley's  "  American  Conflict." 

Selma  (Ala.)  Messenger  :  "  Mr.  Pollard's  work  is  valuable,  and  should  be  in  the  hands  of  every  scholar  and 
gentleman.  *  *  *  His  statement  of  facts  may  be  relied  on." 

Yorkvitte  (S.  C.)  Inquirer  :  "  This  is  not  a  re-hash  of  his  former  history,  but  is  a  denova  (new)  work,  and  is 
the  one  in  which  the  author  desires  to  present  himself  to  the  public." 

Daily  Phoenix  (Columbia,  S.  C.) :  "  The  distinguished  abilities  of  the  author  is  a  guarantee  that  the  work  will 
be  invaluable  aa  history,  and  desirable  as  an  addition  to  the  literature  of  the  South." 

Nashville  Daily  Union  :  "  This  work  will  be  valuable  as  the  most  complete  and  authentic  history  of  the  war 
from  a  Southern  stand-point." 


WASHINGTON  &  HIS  GENERALS 

COMPRISING 

POPULAK   BIOGRAPHIES 

OF 

f  Ij*  (Sallant  Qdtnhn  rf  <mr  Rational 

BY   HON.    J.    T.    HEADLEY, 

AUTHOR   OF  "NAPOLEON   AND   HIS   MARSHALS,"   "SACBED   MOUNTAINS,"    "HISTORY 
GREAT  EEBELLION,"  &0M  &c. 


Embellished  with  Numerous  Steel  Plate  Engravings. 
COMPLETE  IN  ONE  LARGE  OCTAVO  VOLUME. 


This  is  truly  a  great  national  work,  giving  an  authentic  account  of  the  early  life, 
military  career,  public  services,  and  character  of 

Major-General  George  Washington,  Major-General  Nathaniel  Greene, 

Israel  Putnam,  William  Moultrie, 

Kichard  Montgomery,  Henry  Knox, 

Benedict  Arnold,  Benjamin  Lincoln, 

John  Stark,  Charles  Lee, 

Philip  Schuyler,  James  Clinton, 

Horatio  Gates,  John  Sullivan, 

Fredk.  Wm.  Steuhen,  Lafayette, 

William  Sterling,  Commodore  Paul  Jones. 

Including  Brigadier-Generals  Marion,  Pickens,  Mercer,  Wooster,  and  others. 

FROM  PREFACE. — The  object  in  the  following  work  is  three-fold.  First,  to  group 
around  the  "  Father  of  his  Country  "  the  generals  who  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  with 
him  through  the  stormy  period  of  the  Rerolution.  Second,  to  give  in  successive  pic 
tures  rather  than  in  military  detail,  the  great  battles  of  the  Revolution.  Third,  to  pre 
sent  the  early  history  of  each  general,  showing  how  they  were  trained  by  Providence 
for  the  very  work  to  which  their  lives  were  given.  There  could  be  no  better  time 
than  now  to  contemplate  those  pure  patriots,  who  knew  no  sectional  interests,  but 
were  bound  together  and  borne  aloft  by  a  common  love  for  the  whole  country — when 
Massachusetts  called  aloud  from  Bunker  Hill,  and  Marion,  from  the  swamps  of  South 
Carolina,  answered  her — when  New  York  and  Virginia  moved  side  by  side,  bound  by 
a  common  interest,  and  resolved  to  share  a  common  destiny.  May  that  common  in 
heritance  never  be  divided ! 

CONDITIONS. 

The  work  will  be  comprised  In  one  octavo  volume  of  nearly  eight  hundred  pages,  Including 
seventeen  steel  plate  engravings.  It  will  be  printed  from  clear  and  "beautiful  type,  on  good  paper, 
and  furnished  to  subscribers  in  neat  and  substantial  binding, 

Cloth,  Gilt  Side  and  Back,  at $3  50 

Leather,  .Library  Style,  50  cents  extra.    Payable  on  delivery. 

The  work  can  be  obtained  only  through  onr  Distributing  Agents.  Those  ordering  the  work 
trill  not  be  obliged  to  take  it  unless  it  corresponds  with  the  description  in  every  particular. 

E.  B.  TREAT  &  Co.,  Publishers,  New  York. 


NAPOLEON  AND  HIS  MARSHALS: 

COMPRISING   A 

FULL  AND  AUTHENTIC  ACCOUNT 

OF   THE 

fife,  Uilitarg  (Star,  Character,  (fotle,  &  ieatlj 

OP 

NAPOLEON   BONAPARTE, 


'THE  HERO  OF  A  HUNDRED  BATTLES." 


BY  HON.  J.   T.  HEADLEY, 

AUTHOR  OF  "  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  GENERALS,"  "  SACKED   MOUNTAINS,"  "  HISTOEY  OP 
GREAT  EEBBLLION,"  &c.,  &c. 


Including  Biographies  of  the  Most  Prominent  Marshals  that  clustered  around  Napoleon 
in  his  Victorious  Campaigns. 


Berthier,            Mars 
Aug-ereau, 
Davoust, 
Lannes, 
Macdonald, 
Moncey, 

hal  St.  Cyr,              Mars 
Soult, 
'       Mortier, 
4       Murat, 
'       Massena, 
'       Marmont, 

hal  Victor, 
1      Bessieres, 
*       Bernadotte, 
'       Suchet, 
'       Brune, 
*       Ney,  and  others. 

Embellished  with  Numerous  Steel  Plate  Engravings. 


It  has  been  my  design,  in  the  following  work,  not  only  to  give  the  true  character 
of  Napoleon,  and  the  wars  he  waged,  but  to  illustrate  the  men  who  led  his  armies  to 
victory ;  forming,  as  they  do,  a  group  the  like  of  which  the  world  has  never  seen. 
Their  battles  revolutionized  the  whole  art  of  war,  and  form  a  gallery  of  pictures  that 
has  no  equal  in  the  history  of  any  nation.  Many  of  these  renowned  battle-fields  I 
have  gone  over  in  person,  and  hence  been  able  to  give  more  accurate  descriptions  than 
I  otherwise  could.  These  never  will  lose  their  interest  while  great  deeds  are  admired 
and  true  heroes  honored.  Napoleon's  marshals  can  appropriately  be  placed  side  by 
side  with  our  own  great  generals  of  the  present  war. 

The  portraits  are  copies  of  those  in  the  national  gallery  of  France,  and  hence  must 
be  considered  accurate  likenesses. 


The  work  will  be  comprised  in  one  octavo  volume  of  over  seven  hundred  pages,  including 
twenty-one  steel  plate  and  other  engravings.  It  will  be  printed  from  new  and  beautiful  type,  on 
good  paper,  and  furnished  to  subscribers  in  neat  and  substantial  binding. 


Cloth,  Gilt  Side  and  Back,  at        -        - 
Leather,  Library  Style,  50  cents  extra. 


$3  50 
Payable  on  Delivery. 


The  work  can  be  obtained  only  through  our  Distributing  Agents.    Those  ordering  the  work  will 
not  be  obliged  to  take  it,  unless  it  corresponds  with  the  description  in  every  particular. 

E.  B.  TKEAT  &  Co.,  Publishers,  New  York. 
"Wa.3a.tocl. 


CIRCULATION  DEPARTMENT 

202  Main  Library 


ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

1 -month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling  642-3405 

6-month  loans  may  be  recharged  by  bringing  books  to  Circulation  Desk 

Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  made  4  days  prior  to  due  date 

DUE   AS  STAMPED  BELOW 

MAR  2  o  78 


REG,  cm    JUN  0  2 

DEC     11981 
7/ 


RETD 

JUL  241983 

rec'dcirc.  APR1?  1§83 


o  r;-S 


FORM  NO.  DD6,  40m   10 '77 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


